INTERNATIONAL RISK CONTROL ASIA

[An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Company]

“HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY”

(HAZID)
SARASWATI OIL FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT – PHASE 2

FOR

CAIRN ENERGY INDIA LIMITED

GURGAON

IRCA Document Number IRCA-CEIL-HZD-20121347-01

A1 13-10-2012 Issued for Review Anees Ansari R. Kumar R. Kumar

Revision Issue Date Reason for Issue Prepared by Reviewed by Approved by IRCA

Office: 302-A, BSEL TECH Park, Sector 30A, Vashi, Mumbai-400703 (INDIA)
Tel: +91 (22) 27811045 Fax: +91(22) 27811409 Email: irca@ircamumbai.com Web: http://www.ircamumbai.com
 HAZID STUDY REPORT
SARASWATI OIL FIELD DEVELOPMENT – PHASE 2

Document No. IRCA-CEIL-HZD-20121347-01 Rev A1 October 2012

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................1.1

2. FACILITY DESCRIPTION ...............................................................................................................2.1

3. SCOPE OF WORK & REFERENCE DRAWINGS / DOCUMENTS ..............................................3.1

4. STUDY METHODOLOGY ...............................................................................................................4.1

5. PROJECT TEAM ...............................................................................................................................5.1

6. STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS......................................................................................................6.1
Annexure – I: HAZID Record Sheet
Annexure – II: Marked-Up Plot Plan

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 HAZID STUDY REPORT
SARASWATI OIL FIELD DEVELOPMENT – PHASE 2

Document No. IRCA-CEIL-HZD-20121347-01 Rev A1 October 2012

1. INTRODUCTION

Cairn Energy India Ltd. is the Operator of contract area RJ-ON-90/1 in the state of Rajasthan,
India. The current operations in Rajasthan are focused on production from the largest Oil field
Mangala, Raageshwari Deep Gas & Bhagyam fields. The other fields in operation are RAAG Oil
& Saraswati.
The oil from Mangala field is processed in an onshore oil and gas processing facility known as
Mangala Processing Terminal (MPT). This is located about 25 kms from Barmer in Barmer
district, in the state of Rajasthan.
Cairn Energy India Pty Limited (CEIL) is exploring the possibility of developing Saraswati oil
field which is a marginal field development. CEIL intents to produce the wells that are currently
available for development in phased development. As part of Phase-2, standalone production
facilities are planned in Oil well Pad 1.
Petro6 has carried out ‘Engineering of Saraswati Oil Field Development Project – Phase 2.
Being a responsible organization CEIL wish to ensure that they have identified the hazards
associated with proposed modifications. They have therefore commissioned IRCA to facilitate a
HAZID study of Engineering of Saraswati Oil Field Development Project – Phase 2.
This document presents IRCA's report on the HAZID study.

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 HAZID STUDY REPORT
SARASWATI OIL FIELD DEVELOPMENT – PHASE 2

Document No. IRCA-CEIL-HZD-20121347-01 Rev A1 October 2012

Abbreviation
HAZOP Hazard and Operability
HAZID Hazard Identification
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
FERA Fire & Explosion Risk Analysis
EERA Escape & Evacuation Risk Analysis
BFPD Barrel Fluid Per Day

BOPD Barrel Oil Per Day

BWPD Barrel Water Per Day

Fi-Fi Fire Fighting

F&G Fire & Gas

CEIL Cairn Energy India Ltd.

MPT Mangala Processing Terminal

HP High Pressure
LP Low Pressure
Max. Maximum
Min. Minimum
SCFD Standard cubic feet per day

STBD Standard barrels per day

VSD Variable Speed Drive

WAT Wax appearance temperature

WP Well pad

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 HAZID STUDY REPORT
SARASWATI OIL FIELD DEVELOPMENT – PHASE 2

Document No. IRCA-CEIL-HZD-20121347-01 Rev A1 October 2012

2. FACILITY DESCRIPTION

2.1 Well Flow-lines

Five No’s of 2”/ 150# CS flow lines deliver the well fluids from individual wells to Pad-3
Production Header. The nominal design flow rate is 150 BLPD. In view of the tendency for wax
formation at 38°C and below, the lines are heat traced and insulated to maintain the temperature
above wax appearance temperature.

2.2 Multiphase Flow Meter (Future)

A portable, Multi-Phase flow meter, hooked up as and when required to measures the individual
phase flow rates of oil, water and gas mixtures. Individual fluid flow rates of a producing well
are required for flow assurance and to facilitate Reservoir management. These facilities are
provided for future.

2.3 Indirect Water Bath Heater

The Indirect Water Bath Heater preheats the well fluid to enhance separation in the separator.
The heater is provided with a bypass on the process side, in case the well fluids are hot enough,
pre-heating is not required in the unit.

2.4 Separator
Three phase horizontal vessel that separates the pre-heated well fluids in to gas, oil and water.
Residence of 10 min for water and 10 min for oil is provided for separation. The vessel contains
all necessary internals and control devices for efficient separation and continuous uninterrupted
operation. The degassed oil will flow to the Export Oil Storage Vessel under liquid level control
and produced water will flow to the PW Degasser under liquid level control for further
stabilization. Also the evolved gas from the separator will be routed to the Fuel Gas system
under pressure control.

2.5 Produced Water Degasser

The separated water is routed to PW Degasser which is a two phase separator, where associated
gas if any present shall be safely vented to atmosphere before dispatching the water to
Evaporation Pit.

2.6 Export Oil Storage Vessel

The Export oil storage vessel provides storage & stabilization of oil before export. It also ensures
free water drainage before export. The Export Oil Storage Vessel is sized to provide storage of
50 m3 working capacity which provides a working volume equivalent to ~11 hours holdup.

2.7 Export Oil Pumps

The Export Oil Pumps deliver the stabilized oil from Export Oil Storage Vessel into road tankers
for transportation to adjacent Mangala Process Terminal. The pump is also provided with a
minimum recirculation line.
Occasionally the Export Oil Pump is also used for the following:
• Transferring liquids from tankers back to Export Oil Storage Vessel in case of any tanker
leakage
• For circulating fluids from Export Oil Storage Vessel to tankers via Indirect Water Bath
Heater. This is to maintain the required export oil temperature while loading.

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 HAZID STUDY REPORT
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Document No. IRCA-CEIL-HZD-20121347-01 Rev A1 October 2012

Block Diagram

2.8 Utilities

2.8.1 Fuel Gas System

Under normal operating conditions, gas from separator is introduced under pressure control to
the Fuel Gas Scrubber. An impingement plate or inlet diverter will be used where the gas enters
the pressure vessel to allow a directional change and help to knock out any liquids. The gas will
flow through a mist extractor before exiting the vessel. Liquids collected at the base of the vessel
are flowed, under on- off level control to the Export Oil Storage Vessels. The outlet gas flows
through a Fuel Gas Heater (Electric Heater) where it gets heated to 105 °C providing 15 °C
margin above hydrocarbon dew point before it gets distributed as fuel for Indirect Water Bath
Heater.

2.8.2 Instrument and Utility Air system

An instrument air package consisting of air compressor (1 operating and 1 standby spare), air
dryer system (1 operating and 1 standby spare) and air receiver is provided. The Air Compressor
Package comprises of two screw type air compressors, an air receiver, instrument air pre-filters,
heatless type air dryer, instrument air after filters and other ancillaries.)

2.8.3 Potable Water System

Potable water is required for safety showers, control room and office buildings if any. Potable
water supplied by trucks shall be stored in a tank located on the roof of control room and
thereafter distributed.

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 HAZID STUDY REPORT
SARASWATI OIL FIELD DEVELOPMENT – PHASE 2

Document No. IRCA-CEIL-HZD-20121347-01 Rev A1 October 2012

2.8.4 Chemical injection

Chemical injection skid comprises of storage and pumping system. The chemical injection
system provides the facility to inject selected chemicals into the process fluids to improve
performance of the process facilities to meet the required product specifications and protect the
equipment and lines from corrosive elements. The following chemicals are included as part of
the package:
• Corrosion Inhibitor
• Demulsifier

2.8.5 Closed Drain System

Closed Drain System shall include Closed Drain Vessel & Pump to safely collect the residual
liquids from process vessels & piping segments. The liquid drained to the vessel is pumped back
to the Indirect Water Bath Heater.

2.8.6 Flare System

The Flare System shall include Flare Knock-Out Drum, Flare KOD Pumps, Flame from
generator, Flare tip and stack. Flare KOD shall knock out the condensates before being flared.
The Condensate from Flare KOD on level control shall be pumped to closed drain vessel via
Flare KOD Pumps.

2.8.7 Fire Water System

The Fire water system shall be designed as per OISD STD 189. The facilities for Saraswati
Phase-2 are compared to a Quick Production Set –up. Following minimum fire protection
facilities shall be provided as required:
• Fire water system that includes storage and pumping system capable of fire fighting for
45 minutes. A diesel driven pump of capacity 72 m3/hr capable of developing minimum
700 kPa pressure shall be installed.
• Portable water cum foam monitor of 1200 lpm shall be positioned at the site.
• The following fire fighting accessories shall also be readily available at site:
• Additional fire hose - 2 Nos.
• Multi-purpose nozzle – 2 nos.
• Weather proof facility for storing above items
• For Foam System
a) Inline foam educator – 1 Nos
b) Foam branch pipe- 1 Nos
c) Foam compound – minimum 200lts
• Weather proof facility for storing above items.

2.8.8 Diesel storage system

Diesel storage and distribution shall include diesel storage tank and Pumps for distribution.
Diesel Pumps shall distribute the diesel to Diesel generators, Indirect water bath heater and Fire
water Pumps

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 HAZID STUDY REPORT
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Document No. IRCA-CEIL-HZD-20121347-01 Rev A1 October 2012

3. SCOPE OF WORK & REFERENCE DRAWINGS / DOCUMENTS

3.1 Scope of Work

The scope of work for this HAZID study is to cover following facilities:
• Saraswati Oil Field Development – Phase 2

3.2 Reference Drawings and Documents

The safety studies conducted are based/or referenced on the following drawings & documents. In
the event of significant change of the following drawings, the safety studies may be revised
subject to additional cost and schedule impact.

3.2.1 Design Basis (Doc. No. and Revision)

[SARAS-PR-L-1000] Rev B1

3.2.2 Plot Plan (Doc. No. and Revision)

[SARAS-PD-1000] Rev-B

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 HAZID STUDY REPORT
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Document No. IRCA-CEIL-HZD-20121347-01 Rev A1 October 2012

4. STUDY METHODOLOGY
The Hazard Identification (HAZID) process involves the following steps:

Selection of an Area/Activity /System/Equipment in which a hazardous situation may occur;

Identification (“brainstorming”) of hazards [what can go wrong!]
Analysis of causes by which undesired events could occur and its potential consequences;
Establish Safeguards in place
A qualitative risk assessment using a risk matrix
Developing recommendations to prevent the accident occurring or mitigate the consequences;
Recording of the minutes of discussion on HAZID Log sheets

Select the area/activity/system/Equipment to be considered

Identify Hazards

Analyze Probable Causes, Consequences & safeguards

Assess the Risk using a risk matrix

Develop recommendations

Record the minutes of discussion on HAZID Log Sheets

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 HAZID STUDY REPORT
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Document No. IRCA-CEIL-HZD-20121347-01 Rev A1 October 2012

Hazards Extract from ISO 17776 Checklist for HAZID/ENVID in oil & gas industry, indicted as
under, is proposed to be used in this HAZID/ENVID study.

The hazards which are applicable in CEIL Rajasthan Field are taken from ISO 17776 checklist.

HAZID / ENVID – Hazard Check List

H-01: Hydrocarbons
H-01.01 Crude oil under pressure / Hydrocarbons in formation
H-01.02 Hydrocarbon under pressure - Topside Facilities
H-01.03 Hydrocarbon under pressure - Fluid export Pipeline
H-01.04 Condensate, NGL
H-01.05 Hydrocarbon gas
H-01.06 Crude oil at low pressure
H-02: Refined Hydrocarbons
H-02.01 Lube and seal oil
H-02.02 Diesel fuel
H-03: Other Flammable Materials
H-03.01 Cellulosic materials
H-04: Pressure Hazards
H-04.01 Air / gases under pressure
H-04.02 Liquid under pressure
H-04.03 Non hydrocarbon gas under pressure in pipe works
H-04.04 Air under high pressure
H-05: Hazards Associated with Differences in Height
H-05.01 Personnel at height > 1.8m
H-05.02 Dropped Object
H-05.03 Personnel below grade (PIT)
H-06: Dynamic Situation Hazards
H-06.01 Equipment with moving or rotating parts
H-06.02 Use of hazardous hand tools
H-07: Environmental Hazards
H-07.01 Sand storm
H-07.02 Flood
H-07.03 High ambient temperature
H-08: Hot Surfaces
H-08.01 Process piping equipment (60-150°C)
Engine exhaust systems
H-08.02

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 HAZID STUDY REPORT
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Document No. IRCA-CEIL-HZD-20121347-01 Rev A1 October 2012

HAZID / ENVID – Hazard Check List

H-09: Electricity
H-09.01 Voltage > 50V
H-09.02 Electrostatic energy
H-10: Physical
H-10.01 Noise
H-10.02 Vibration
H-10.03 Humidity
H-11: Asphyxiating Atmosphere
H-11.01 Oxygen concentration in air (imbalance)
H-11.02 Particulates in Air
H-12: Unspecified Product / compound groups
H-12.01 Dusts
H-12.02 Waste
H-13: Chemicals
H-13.01 Various Chemicals

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 HAZID STUDY REPORT
SARASWATI OIL FIELD DEVELOPMENT – PHASE 2

Document No. IRCA-CEIL-HZD-20121347-01 Rev A1 October 2012

Risk Ranking Matrix

Each issue identified in HAZID is to be subjected to risk ranking using CEIL Risk ranking
matrix indicated as under:

CEIL Risk ranking matrix

Risk Probability

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 HAZID STUDY REPORT
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Document No. IRCA-CEIL-HZD-20121347-01 Rev A1 October 2012

Risk Treatment Matrix

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 HAZID STUDY REPORT
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Document No. IRCA-CEIL-HZD-20121347-01 Rev A1 October 2012

HAZID Recording:
Two methods of recording of a HAZID study can be employed:
Complete - in which details of all discussion points are noted.
&
By Exception - in which only those deviations that require action are recorded.

Recording of this study is ‘complete recording’ wherein all discussions of significance are to be
recorded using software PHA-PRO from DYADEM of USA for which IRCA is a licensed user.

The discussion from the study is recorded on log sheets. Information is recorded in columns on
the log sheets as follows:

• Hazard Reference
• Top Event
• Threat / Causes
• Consequences
• Risk Matrix
• Safeguards
• Recommendations
• Revised Risk Matrix
• Remarks

HAZID Record sheet are attached as Annexure I. A copy of the Plot plan with Nodes marked up
is attached as Annexure II.

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 HAZID STUDY REPORT
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Document No. IRCA-CEIL-HZD-20121347-01 Rev A1 October 2012

5. PROJECT TEAM
The HAZID sessions were conducted at Petro6 Office in Chennai and involved following team
members:
Scan copy of attendance sheet is as under:

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Document No. IRCA-CEIL-HZD-20121347-01 Rev A1 October 2012

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 HAZID STUDY REPORT
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Document No. IRCA-CEIL-HZD-20121347-01 Rev A1 October 2012

6. STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS
The Preventive & Mitigation Measures expected to be in place, as emerged from this HAZID
study are listed as under. For details on causes and consequences reference is invited to HAZID
Record Sheets placed at Annexure-I.

1. In case PT/TT tapping is required to monitor the parameters during flowing condition, it
shall be located downstream of wing SSV.
2. Ensure shutdown is actuated from hardwired push button from a control room.
3. Ensure gas detectors location is with reference to density of gas (heavier than air).
4. Verify through dispersion analysis, the adequacy of separation distance from process area to
Control room.
5. Ensure proper slop for the flooring in loading bay leading to a sump.
6. Oil spill kits to be provided.
7. SOP for tanker loading.
8. Ensure provision of fall arrestor designed to applicable codes / standard.
9. Optimize the location of loading bay with reference to turning radius required by heavy
vehicles
10. Ensure LPG cylinder for black start is removed from plant area after start-up operation.

11. Existing Saraswati IRP is to be updated with reference to Saraswati Phase 2.

12. Ensure proper staircase with single fleet.
13. Establish a written procedure for action in case of sand storm.
14. Ensure All piping (including flare lines) where temperature is >55°C is to be covered by
insulation / physical barrier.
15. Ensure Exhaust height is 9 meters (as per applicable code).
16. For loading area, static / grounding indicator is to be provided.
17. Explore the possibility of providing fuel gas blanketing on export oil storage tank to
minimize the chance of air ingress.
18. Suitable containment to be ensured with the skid.

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 Annexure – I
HAZID Record Sheets

0
Node: 1. Sarasvati Oil Field Development - Phase 2
Plot Plan: [SARAS-PD-1000] Rev-B
Revised
Top Events Threats / Risk Matrix Safeguards
Ref. No. Hazard Description Consequences Recommendations Risk
(Activities) Causes
L S R Preventive Mitigating L S R
H-01 Hydrocarbons
H-01.01 Crude oil under pressure / Formation well Leakage from X- Blowout X-mas tree is 1. In case PT/TT tapping
Hydrocarbons in fluid leakage mas tree valve / for rated is required to monitor
formation flanges / pressure the parameters during
instrument flowing condition, it
tapings etc. Periodic shall be located
2 5 5 testing of X- downstream of wing 1 5 10
mas tree SSV.
Minimum
instrument
tapings
H-01.02 Hydrocarbon under Well fluid release Leakage from Oil spillage, potential QA QC Process 2. Ensure shutdown is
pressure - Topside valve / flanges / of fire procedure, shutdown actuated from
Facilities piping / SOPs, PM from control hardwired push button
instrument 3 4 7 room is from a control room. 2 2 19
tapings etc. possible, Fire
fighting
system,
H-01.03 Hydrocarbon under NA
pressure - Liquid pipeline
H-01.04 Condensate, NGL Condensate leak Leakage from Potential fire / QA QC Process
valve / flanges / explosion procedure, shutdown
piping / SOPs, PM from control
instrument 2 4 11 room is 1 2 21
tapings / pump All junction possible, Fire
seal etc. boxes are for fighting
classified area system
H-01.05 Hydrocarbon gas Gas release Leakage from Potential fire QA QC Process 3. Ensure gas detectors
valve / flanges / procedure, shutdown location is with
piping / SOPs, PM from control reference to density of
instrument room is gas (heavier than air).
tappings etc. possible, Fire
3 4 7 All junction fighting 4. Verify through 2 2 19
boxes are for system dispersion analysis,
classified area the adequacy of
separation distance
from process area to
Control room.

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Node: 1. Sarasvati Oil Field Development - Phase 2
Plot Plan: [SARAS-PD-1000] Rev-B
Revised
Top Events Threats / Risk Matrix Safeguards
Ref. No. Hazard Description Consequences Recommendations Risk
(Activities) Causes
L S R Preventive Mitigating L S R
H-01.06 Crude oil at low pressure Crude oil Leakage from Oil spillage, potential QA QC Common
leakage export tank / fire procedure, dyke,
valve / flanges / SOPs, PM Fire fighting
piping / 3 4 7 system 2 2 19
instrument
tapings / pump
seal etc.
Leakage of Tank Overfill, Oil spillage, potential QA QC Manned 5. Ensure proper slop for
Crude oil in tank damage, fire procedure operation, the flooring in loading
Loading Bay Leakage from start-stop bay leading to a
loading arm switch for sump.
pump
provided at 6. Oil spill kits to be
loading bay, provided.
fire ring main 7. SOP for tanker
coverage for loading.
3 4 7 loading area 2 2 19
8. Ensure provision of fall
arrestor designed to
applicable codes /
standard.
9. Optimize the location
of loading bay with
reference to turning
radius required by
heavy vehicles
H-02 Refined Hydrocarbons
H-02.01 Lube and seal oil No significant
issue
H-02.02 Leakage of Diesel Diesel leak Leakage from Diesel spillage, QA QC Containment
tank / piping etc. potential fire 3 4 7 procedure, is provided 2 2 19
SOPs, PM
H-03 Other Flammable Materials
H-03.01 Cellulosic materials Fire in control Electric fire Asset damage PM Fire
room extinguisher

2 3 14 2 2 19

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Node: 1. Sarasvati Oil Field Development - Phase 2
Plot Plan: [SARAS-PD-1000] Rev-B
Revised
Top Events Threats / Risk Matrix Safeguards
Ref. No. Hazard Description Consequences Recommendations Risk
(Activities) Causes
L S R Preventive Mitigating L S R
H-04 Pressure Hazards
H-04.01 Air / gases under Leakage of LPG Leakage from Potential fire QA QC Fire fighting 10. Ensure LPG cylinder
pressure valve / piping / procedure, system for black start is
tubing etc. 2 3 14 SOPs, PM removed from plant 1 2 21
area after start-up
operation.
H-04.02 Liquid under pressure NA
H-04.03 Non hydrocarbon gas NA
under pressure in pipe
works
H-04.04 Air under high pressure Instrument Air Tubing / piping Potential unwanted QA QC
release failure shutdown 2 3 14 procedure, 1 2 21
SOPs, PM
H-05 Hazards Associated with Differences in Height
H-05.01 Personnel at height > Fall from height Slip trip fall Personnel injury Working First Aid box 11. Existing Saraswati IRP
1.8m (Separator PSV platform & at the location is to be updated with
platform, Export handrails reference to Saraswati
Tank, Tanker provided, Phase 2.
Loading SOPs
operations) 2 3 14 1 2 21
Suitable fall
protection
system for
tanker loading
operation.
H-05.02 Dropped Object No significant
issue
H-05.03 Personnel below grade Maintenance Confined space - Personnel injury PTW for First Aid box 12. Ensure proper
(PIT) work on flare lack of adequate confined at the location staircase with single
KOD pump / breathing air space entry fleet.
export oil pump

2 3 14 1 2 21

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Node: 1. Sarasvati Oil Field Development - Phase 2
Plot Plan: [SARAS-PD-1000] Rev-B
Revised
Top Events Threats / Risk Matrix Safeguards
Ref. No. Hazard Description Consequences Recommendations Risk
(Activities) Causes
L S R Preventive Mitigating L S R
H-06 Dynamic Situation Hazards
H-06.01 Equipment with moving or Contact with Inadequate Personnel injury All rotating
rotating parts moving parts protection machine have
protective
Tanker safeguards
movement on 3 3 13 2 1 24
well pad Approve route
plan for tanker
operations.
SOP in place
H-06.02 Use of hazardous hand Electrocution, Inadequate tools Personnel injury / fire PTW and pre-
3 3 13 1 1 25
tools spark generation use inspection
H-07 Environmental Hazards
H-07.01 Sand storm Sand storm Unfavorable Difficulty in people 13. Establish a written
weather movement and 3 4 7 procedure for action in 3 1 23
operation case of sand storm.
H-07.02 Flood Flood Unfavorable Potential personnel ERP & DMP
weather injury, malfunction for flood is in
3 4 7 3 1 23
instrumentation / place
equipments
H-07.03 High ambient temperature Heat stroke Exposure to high Personnel injury Action plan for
temperature high ambient
3 3 13 2 2 19
temperature is
in place
H-08 Hot Surfaces
H-08.01 Process piping equipment Hot surface People working Potential personnel First Aid box 14. Ensure All piping
(55-150°C) around process burn injury at the location (including flare lines)
piping where temperature is
3 3 13 1 2 21
>55°C is to be covered
by insulation / physical
barrier.
H-08.02 Engine exhaust systems Hot fumes People working Potential personnel 15. Ensure Exhaust height
nearby injury 3 3 13 is 9 meters (as per 1 2 21
applicable code).
H-09 Electricity
H-09.01 Voltage > 50V Electrocution, Improper Personnel injury / fire ELCBs &
spark generation insulation, not 3 3 13 LOTO 1 3 16
following SOPs

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Node: 1. Sarasvati Oil Field Development - Phase 2
Plot Plan: [SARAS-PD-1000] Rev-B
Revised
Top Events Threats / Risk Matrix Safeguards
Ref. No. Hazard Description Consequences Recommendations Risk
(Activities) Causes
L S R Preventive Mitigating L S R
H-09.01 Electrostatic energy Oil transfer from Flammable Potential explosion Dual earthing 16. For loading area,
Storage Tanks mixture inside inside the tanks for storage static / grounding
the tanks and tanks and PM indicator is to be
electrostatic schedule for provided.
energy causing checking the
source of ignition 3 4 7 earthing 17. Explore the possibility 1 3 16
of providing fuel gas
blanketing on export
oil storage tank to
minimize the chance
of air ingress.
H-10 Physical
H-10.01 Noise No significant
issue
(Permissible
noise level are
covered in
equipment data
sheet)
H-10.02 Vibration No significant
issue
(Permissible
vibration level
are covered in
equipment data
sheet)
H-10.03 Humidity No significant
issue
H-11 Asphyxiating Atmosphere
H-11.01 Oxygen concentration in Vessel entry Unfavorable Potential personnel PTW for
air (imbalance) ambient injury confined
2 3 14 1 3 16
condition space entry

H-11.02 Particulates in Air NA

H-12 Unspecified Product / compound groups
H-12.01 Dusts Covered in Sand
storm

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Node: 1. Sarasvati Oil Field Development - Phase 2
Plot Plan: [SARAS-PD-1000] Rev-B
Revised
Top Events Threats / Risk Matrix Safeguards
Ref. No. Hazard Description Consequences Recommendations Risk
(Activities) Causes
L S R Preventive Mitigating L S R
H-12.02 Waste Disposal of Un-segregated Environmental issue Waste
waste waste management
3 3 13 1 2 21
system in
place
H-13 Chemicals
H-13.01 Various Chemicals Leakage from de-emulsifier & Chemical Spillage MSDS in place 18. Suitable containment
chemical skid Corrosion to be ensured with the
Inhibitors flange/ 3 3 13 skid. 1 2 21
piping/ valve
failure

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 Annexure – II
Marked-Up Plot Plan

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Node: 01