Republic v.

CA
132 SCRA 514 (1984)
In this case, the Tancincos were the registered owners of a parcel of land bordering on the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. In 1973, they filed an application for the registration of three
lots adjacent to their fishpond property.
The Assistant Provincial Fiscal opposed the application. Upon the advise of the Commissioner
appointed by the court, the applicants withdrew their application with respect to one of the lots.
Thereafter, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application. The Republic appealed
to the Court of Appeals which affi rmed the decision of the lower court in toto. The Republic
appealed to the Supreme Court. The Republic claimed that there was no accretion to speak of
under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because what actually happened was that the Tancincos
simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and thus, if
there was any accretion to speak of, it was man-made and artifi cial and not the result of the
gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river. In ruling for the Republic,
the Supreme
Court held —
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides: “To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.”
The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion covered
by this particular provision is said to have taken place. They are: (1) that the deposit be gradual
and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that
the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers. The requirement that the
deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from
Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the
exclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the
addition to the said property was made gradually through the effects of the current of the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that it is preposterous to believe that
almost four (4) hectares of land came into being because of the effects of the Meycauayan and
Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of the private respondents who happens to be their overseer and
whose husband was fi rst cousin of their father noticed the four hectare accretion to the twelve
hectare fishpond only in 1939. The respondents claim that at this point in time, accretion had
already taken place. If so, their witness was incompetent to testify to a gradual and imperceptible
increase to their land in the years before 1939. However, the witness testified that in that year,
she observed an increase in the area of the original fishpond which is now the land in question. If
she was telling the truth, the accretion was sudden. However, there is evidence that the alleged
alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current of the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the
sole effect of the current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river
and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly
and gradually by the river’s current on the fishpond adjoining it.
It is under two meters of water. The private respondents’ own evidence shows that the water in
the fishpond is two meters deep on the side of that pilapil facing the fishpond and only one meter
deep on the side of the pilapil facing the river.
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited
by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of
his land. If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the
destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject to
encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which may
prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of
Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused
by special works expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion. When the private
respondents transferred their dikes towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation
purposes and not to protect their property from the destructive force of the waters of the river.

We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that the testimony of the private
respondents’ lone witness to the effect that as early as 1939 there already existed such alleged
alluvial deposits, deserves no merit. It should be noted that the lots in question were not included
in the survey of their adjacent property conducted on May 10, 1940 and in the Cadastral Survey
of the entire Municipality of Meycauayan conducted between the years 1958 to 1960. The
alleged accretion was declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 or 33 years after it had
supposedly permanently formed. The only valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas could
not have been there in 1939. They existed only after the private respondents transferred their
dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. What private respondents claim as
accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation.

The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 and 2 in the names of the private
respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore
classified as property of the public domain under Article 420, paragraph 1 and Article 502,
paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the
Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names
of the private respondents is nulland void.