Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
CA
201 SCRA 157
PARAS, J.
FACTS:
Private respondents Manuel Cuady and Lilia Cuady obtained from Supercars Inc. a
credit of P39,574.80, which covered the cost of (1) Ford Escort 1300 and was evidenced by a
promissory note. To secure the prompt compliance of the obligation under the said
promissory note, the Cuady spouses constituted a chattel mortgage. Supercars Inc. assigned
the promissory note and chattel mortgage to the petitioner. They paid a total of P36,730.15 to
the petitioner, thus leaving an unpaid balance of P2,344.65. The spouses also owe the
petitioner P460.00 representing the penalties for late payment.
Petitioner obtained the renewal of the insurance coverage of the vehicle with Zenith
Insurance Corporation because the spouses failed to do so. Under its terms and conditions,
any loss under the policy shall be payable to the petitioner. Unfortunately, the said vehicle
figured in an accident and was badly damaged. It was reported to the petitioner and to the
insurer, Zenith Insurance Corporation. The Cuadys asked the petitioner to consider it as a
total loss but the latter insisted on just having the motor vehicle repaired. When B.A. Finance
Corporation did not respond favorably to the request, the Cuadys stopped paying their
monthly installments on the promissory note.
In view of the failure of the Cuadys to pay the remaining installments on the note,
petitioner sued them for the recovery of the said remaining instalments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has waived its right to collect the unpaid balance of the
Cuady spouses on the promissory note for failure of the former to enforce the total loss
provision in the insurance coverage of the motor vehicle subject of the chattel mortgage?
HELD:
Yes, B.A. Finance Corporation was deemed subrogated to the rights and obligations
of Supercars, Inc. when the latter assigned the promissory note and chattel mortgage
constituted on the motor vehicle. Consequently, B.A. Finance Corporation is
bound by the terms and conditions of the chattel mortgage.
Under the deed of chattel mortgage, B.A. Finance Corporation was constituted
attorney-in-fact with full power and authority to file, follow-up, prosecute, compromise or
settle insurance claims; to sign execute and deliver the corresponding papers, receipts and
documents to the Insurance Company as may be necessary to prove the claim, and to collect
from the latter the proceeds of insurance to the extent of its interests, in the event that the
mortgaged car suffers any loss or damage.
In granting B.A. Finance Corporation the said powers and prerogatives, the Cuady
spouses created in the former's favour, an agency. Thus, under Article 1884 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, B.A. Finance Corporation is bound by its acceptance to carry out the
agency, and is liable for damages which, through its non-performance, the Cuadys, the
principal in the case at bar, may suffer.
Unquestionably, the Cuadys suffered pecuniary loss in the form of salvage value of
the motor vehicle in question, not to mention the amount equivalent to the unpaid balance on
the promissory note, when B.A. Finance Corporation steadfastly refused and refrained from
proceeding against the insurer for the payment of a clearly valid insurance claim, and
continued to ignore the yearning of the Cuadys to enforce the total loss provision in the
insurance policy, despite the undeniable fact that Rea Auto Center, the auto repair shop
chosen by the insurer itself to repair the aforementioned motor vehicle, misrepaired and
rendered it completely useless and unserviceable.
SARSABA VS. FE VDA. DE TE
594 SCRA 410
PERALTA, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda,
filed with the RTC, a Complaint for recovery of motor vehicle, damages with prayer for the
delivery of the truck pendente lite against petitioner (Atty. Sarsaba), Sereno, Lavarez and the
NLRC of Davao City. Respondent alleged, among others, that: (1) she is the wife of the late
Pedro Te, the registered owner of the truck, as evidenced by the Official Receipt and
Certificate of Registration. Petitioner Sarsaba alleges that that there was no showing that the
heirs have filed an intestate estate proceedings of the estate of Pedro Te, or that respondent
was duly authorized by her co-heirs to file the case; and that the truck was already sold to
Gasing on March 11, 1986 by one Jesus Matias, who bought the same from the Spouses Te.
Corollarily, Gasing was already the lawful owner of the truck when it was levied on
execution and, later on, sold at public auction. During the pendency of the case, Vda. de Te
died.
Sarsaba filed an Omnibus Motion to dismiss the case and one of the arguments was
that Vda. De Te’s death extinguished the agency agreement.
Respondent, through her lawyer, argues that respondent's death did not render functus
officio her right to sue since her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda, had long testified on
the complaint on March 13, 1998 for and on her behalf and, accordingly, submitted
documentary exhibits in support of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of Vda. De Te extinguishes the agency.
HELD:
Yes. Agency is extinguished by the death of the principal. The only exception where
the agency shall remain in full force and effect even after the death of the principal is when if
it has been constituted in the common interest of the latter and of the agent, or in the interest
of a third person who has accepted the stipulation in his favor.
In the case at bar, the special power of attorney was constituted for the benefit solely
of the principal or for respondent Fe Vda. de Te. Nowhere can we infer from the stipulations
therein that it was created for the common interest of respondent and her attorney-infact.
Neither was there any mention that it was to benefit a third person who has accepted the
stipulation in his favor.