A.
(GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS)
1. AAA v. Carbonell
FACTS:
Feb. 28, 2001 to Aug.16, 2001: AAA worked as a secretary at the
Arzadon Automotive and Car Service Center. He Boss Arzadon is the
accused.May 27, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m.: Arzadon asked her to deliver
a book to an office located at another building but when she returned
to their office, the lights had been turned off and the gate was closed.
But she still went in to get her handbag.
On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van
holding a pipe. He told her to go near him and upon reaching his side,
he threatened her with the pipe and forced her to lie on the pavement.
He removed her pants and underwear, and inserted his penis into her
vagina. She wept and cried out for help but those were useless since
nobody was there. She didn’t report the incident at first because of
Arzadon’s threats but then she found out she’s preggy so she
eventually filed the complaint for rape.
AAA failed to appear for the 4 consecutive orders to take the witness
stand in order to satisfy the judge for the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Because of this, dismissed the
Case for lack of probable cause. He claims that under Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause “to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.
Petitioner contends that the judge is not required to personally examine
the complainant and her witnesses in satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as
the documentary evidence and transcript of stenographic notes may
sufficiently establish this.
Respondent Judge Carbonell argues in his Comment that the finding of
probable cause by the investigating prosecutor is not binding or
obligatory, and that he was justified in requiring petitioner and her
witnesses to take the witness stand in order to determine probable
cause.
ISSUE: WON Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause
HELD: YES.Soliven v. Makasiar: The constitutional provision does
not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the
complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to: 1)personally
evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor or 2) he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require
the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses. ->
What the law requires as personal determination on the part of the
judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating
prosecutor.
In this case, Judge Carbonell dismissed the case without taking into
nd
consideration the June 11, 2003 Resolution of 2 Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo, the October 13, 2003 Resolution of the
panel of prosecutors, and the July 1, 2005 Resolution of the
Department of Justice, all of which sustain a finding of probable cause
against Arzadon. Moreover, he failed to evaluate the evidence in
support thereof. Respondent judge’s finding of lack of probable cause
was premised only on the complainant’s and her witnesses’ absence
during the hearing scheduled by the respondent judge for the judicial
determination of probable cause.
Petitioner narrated in detail the alleged rape incident both in her
. .
Sinumpaang Salaysay and Complaint-Affidavit She attended several
clarificatory hearings that were conducted in the instant case. The
transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing held on October 11,
2002 shows that she positively identified Arzadon as her assailant, and
the specific time and place of the incident. She also claimed that she
bore a child as a result of the rape and, in support of her contentions,
presented the child and her birth certificate as evidence. In contrast,
Arzadon merely relied on the defense of alibi which is the weakest of
all defenses.

After a careful examination of the records, the SC found that there is

sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.

Thus, respondent Judge committed GAD in the dismissal. for lack of

probable cause on the ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to
take the witness stand. Considering there is ample evidence and
sufficient basis on record to support a finding of probable cause, it was
unnecessary for him to take the further step of examining the petitioner
and her witnesses. Moreover, he erred in holding that petitioner’s
absences in the scheduled hearings were indicative of a lack of interest
in prosecuting the case. In fact, the records show that she has
relentlessly pursued the same.

Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret out the

truth. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

2. UNILAB v. ISIP
FACTS:
UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported
to be manufacturing fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon
multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the clandestine
manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the
help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance
of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause,
the court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize “finished
or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON
multivitamins.” No fake Revicon was however found; instead, sealed
boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of
Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by
UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to
the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination.
The court granted the motion. The respondents then filed a motion to
quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the
seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and
therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, which the
petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox
were seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted
the motion of the respondents.
justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position
from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must
discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure It was
thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items
were seized on plain view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes were
in the plain view of the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to
present any of officers who were present when the warrant was
enforced to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered
inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were
incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only
the enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the sealed
boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were
immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents
knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum
then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view
doctrine applies to the seized items.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened,
contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view
doctrine.

HELD:

It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under
the plain view doctrine. However, seized things not described in the
warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce
evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply are
present, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior
 right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
3. Stonehill vs Diokno
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
FACTS:
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
to search “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, individual capacity.
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the
subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of
the offense,” or “used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense,” which is described in the applications
adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.”

The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as
their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for
being general warrants.The documents, papers, and things seized under
the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two
(2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of
the aforementioned corporations,

and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the corporation.

HELD: No.As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein

have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or
of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can
be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the

objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly objec
to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the
4. Laud vs. People
ISSUE: Having been divested as Vice Executive Judge pursuant to
Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, was the issuance of
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 by Judge Peralta an issuance by a de
facto officer?
**Petitioner’s contention:
RULING: YES. Imposition of administrative penalties did operate to
divest Judge Peralta’s authority to act as Vice-Executive Judge, it must
be qualified that the abstraction of such authority would not, by and of
itself, result in the invalidity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407
considering that Judge Peralta may be considered to have made the
issuance as a de facto officer whose acts would, nonetheless, remain
valid.
The treatment of a de facto officer’s acts is premised on the reality that
third persons cannot always investigate the right of one assuming to
hold an important office and, as such, have a right to assume that
officials apparently qualified and in office are legally such. Public
interest demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an
office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as
the public – as distinguished from the officer in question – is
concerned. Indeed, it is far more cogently acknowledged that the de
facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the protection of the de
facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the public and
individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging
the duties of an office without being lawful officers.
5. Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Asuncion
May 19, 1999Nature: Petition for certiorari and prohibition
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
Before us is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying for (1)
the nullification of Search Warrant No. 799 (95) and the Orders dated
March 23, 1993 and August 3, 1995, issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City; and (2) the issuance of
temporary restraining order (TRO) or an injunction against State
Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III, ordering him to desist proceeding with
IS No. 95-167
On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua
applied for a search warrant before the said RTC of Quezon City,
staring:
1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines, located at PICOP compound, is in possession or ha[s] in
[its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which
are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in
committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and
conceal[ed] in the premises described;
2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the
law to take possession and bring to the described properties
After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C.
Asuncion issued the contested search warrant.
On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the
PICOP compound and seized a number of firearms and explosives.
Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the
petitioners filed a "Motion to Quash" before the trial court.
Subsequently, they also filed a "Supplemental Pleading to the Motion
to Quash" and a "Motion to Suppress Evidence." On March 23, 1995,
the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners'
motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second
contested Order denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid
HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition is hereby GRANTED and Search Warrant No. 799 (95)
accordingly declared NULL and VOID. The temporary restraining
order issued by this Court on October 23, 1995 is hereby MADE
PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
The fundamental right against unreasonable and searches and seizures
and the basic conditions for the issuance of a search warrant are laid
down in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3)
the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are
personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or
affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.( Section 3 and 4,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court)
In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trail
court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other
deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing
for the issuance or the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that
petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3)
the place to be searched was not described with particularity.
No Personal Examination of the Witnesses
Chief Inspector Pascua's application for a search warrant was
supported by (1) the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and
SPO2 Cecilio T. Moriro, (2) a summary of information and (3)
supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except
for Pascua and Bacolod however, none of the aforementioned
witnesses and policemen appeared before the trial court. Moreover, the
applicant's participation in the hearing for the issuance of the search
warrant consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod.
The trial judge failed to propound questions, let alone probing
questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod.
Obviously, His Honor relied mainly on their affidavits. This Court has
frowned on this practice in this language:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of
the complainant and the witnesses he may procedure and attach them
to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the
Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-
existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
Bacolod's Testimony Pertained Not to Facts Personally Known to Him
When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed
that the PICOP security guards had no license to possess the subject
firearms. This, however, does not meet the requirement that a witness
must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief.
Particularity of the Place to Be Searched
In view of the manifest objective of the against unreasonable search,
the Constitution to be searched only to those described in the warrant.
Thus, this Court
has held that "this constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a
spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and
person and to afford it constitutional protection against the long reach
of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his
privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need,
and then only under stringent procedural
safeguards." Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the
probable cause requirement in that, at least under some circumstances,
the lack of a more specific description will make it apparent that there
has not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described
items are to be found in particular place.
In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to describe the
place with particularly. It simply authorizes a search of "the
aforementioned premises," but it did not specify such premises
Seized Firearms and Explosives Inadmissible in Evidence
Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the firearms, explosives and
other materials seized were "inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding." As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of
unlawfully seized evidence was "the only practical means of enforcing
the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures." Verily, they are the "fruits of the poisonous tree." Without
this exclusionary rule, the constitutional right "would be so ephemeral
and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from
all brutish means evidence means of coercing evidence . . .."
6. People v Go
The search and seizure of articles must be limited to those which
are particularly described in the search warrant.
On April 28, 1999, SPO1 Fernandez, SPO1 Serquea and a confidential
informant conducted a test buy operation at the residence of Benny Go
at 1480 General Luna Street, Ermita, Manila during which they
purchased from him P1,500.00 worth of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu). The police officers did not immediately arrest
him. Instead, they applied for a Search Warrant for Go’s residence
from RTC based on their firm belief that there was a large quantity of
illegal drugs in his house. On June 14, 1999, a raiding team, armed
with a warrant commanding them to make an immediate search
anytime of the day or night of Go’s residence and to seize and take
possession of METAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu),
weighing scale, other drug paraphernalias and proceeds of the above
crime, proceeded to Benny Go’s said residence. The team opened the
door of the house. Upon their entry, the raiding team met Jack Go,
Benny Go’s son. He is the only one present at the house at the time.
The policemen at once introduced themselves, informed Jack Go that
they had a warrant for the search of the premises, and promptly
handcuffed him to a chair to restrain him. As Jack Go was the only one
present at the house at the time they called on 2 baranggay kagawads,
Kagawads Gaspar Lazaro and Emmanuel Manalo to act as a witness
on the said search. In the course of the search of the premises which
took place from 6:00 to 11:00 in the evening, they recovered one knot
tied transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline substance from
the drawer of a cabinet. They seized properties and objects even those
which were not included in the warrant such as the passports, bank
books, checks, a typewriter, a check writer, several dry seals and stamp
pads, Chinese and Philippine currency and appellants Toyota Corolla
GLI car. When they were almost finished with their search, Benny Go
arrived at 9:30 in the evening and immediately, together with the two
witnesses, was made to sign the inventory receipt and affidavit of
orderly search. The Trial Court convicted Benny Go for violation of
the offense charged. Benny Go filed for an appeal. On appeal, Go
assails the decision of the RTC as well the validity of the search
performed by the raiding team and the admissibility of the evidence
taken therefrom. Go also asks for the return of the properties seized
that were not included in the search warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties not included in the search
warrant may be returned to Benny Go
HELD: The constitution protects individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures. It requires that the articles to be seized shall be
particularly described in the warrant to limit the things to be seized to
those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant (to
leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles
they should seize) At the same time, the evidences seized such as the
assorted documents, passports, bankbooks, checks, check writer,
typewriter, dry seals and stamp pads are not in the plain view of the
raiding team. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain
view of an officer, who have acquired the right to search and seize in
the particular place described in the warrant, is in the position to
subject those objects to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
In the case at hand, plain view doctrine is not applicable to justify the
seizure and retention of the questioned seized items. The things
belonging to Benny Go not specifically mentioned in the warrants
must be returned to him. Therefore, Benny Go is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged and is hereby ordered immediately RELEASED from
confinement, unless he is lawfully held in custody for another cause.
**A complaint for alleged possession of instruments intended for the
commission of falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 176 of the
Revised Penal Code on the basis of dry seals and rubber stamps was
filed against Benny Go. Only after the Chinese embassy and Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation verify the seals and stamps when the
nature of it was established and it was in fact counterfeited. Therefore,
again plain view doctrine is not applicable. It is impossible for a
policeman to determine at the very instance that the seals and stamps
are counterfeited. However, since these objects have been certified as a
counterfeit by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, they may
not be returned and are hereby declared confiscated in favor of the
State to be disposed of according to law.
7. Wilson v Layne
Fourth Amendment: The right of the people to be secure in their
houses against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated
Qualified immunity grants a liability shield to government officials
performing discretionary functions if their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a
reasonable person should know of.
On April 16, 1992, a team made up of U.S. Marshals and Montgomery
County (MD.) Police executed a warrant to arrest Dominic Wilson,
who had violated probation on a previous felony charge. His known
address was in Rockville, Maryland, home of his parents Charles and
Geraldine Wilson who are the plaintiffs in this case. The officers
invited Washington Post reporter and photographer to accompany them
although the arrest warrant did not make any mention of the presence
of media representatives during the execution of the warrant. The
officers and two media representatives entered the Wilson’s home at
6:45 AM, surprising Charles and Geraldine Wilson. Charles Wilson did
not immediately realize that those persons who entered their house
were police officers and so he yelled and curse at them. The police
officers, believing him to be the person sought by the warrant,
immediately subdued him on the floor. Geraldine Wilson walked in
and saw the officers restraining her husband and the Washington Post
photographer took pictures of the incident. The Marshals and local
officers searched the house but did not found Dominic Wilson hence
they left the residence. Pictures taken at the scene were never
published.
Charles and Geraldine Wilson sued the law enforcement officers for
damages, contending that the officers violated their rights. The officers
moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The
District Court rejected the motion for summary judgment so the
respondents appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision,
finding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court
found that it was not clearly established that allowing a ride-along
policy violated a person's Fourth Amendment rights. Wilson argued
that media's presence amounts to an invasion of privacy. A home is
entitled to special privacy protection under the Fourth Amendment.
The warrants issued by the courts to apprehend a target authorized
only the presence of law enforcement officials and did not mention the
presence of media representatives. On the other hand, the respondent
contended that they should be granted qualified immunity since it was
not clearly established that the ride-along practice was unlawful.
Media ride-alongs facilitate law enforcement by helping them to
discourage criminal activity, enhancing public confidence, and
accurately recording the execution of warrants.
Issues:
WON law enforcement officials violate the Fourth Amendment when
they allow the news media to ride-along during the execution of a
warrant.
WON law enforcement officials are entitled to qualified immunity
because such a violation was not clearly established by statute or
common law.
HELD:
Yes, Fourth Amendment right was violated but officers are entitled to
qualified immunity.
It violates the Fourth Amendment when the officers brought the
members of the media into the residence of the Wilson’s during the
execution of a search warrant. A person is entitled to a privacy in their
home as well as the presence of a reporter is not related to the police's
duties. However, the Fourth Amendment right was not clearly
established at the time of the violation. The court stated that it is not
unreasonable for a police officer to think that it is lawful to bring a
reporter along while they are in their duty. Also, the court ruled that the
officers were acting pursuant to an established Marshall policy and
hence had no reason to doubt its legality. **Dissenting Opinion: They
agree with the Court that allowing a member of the media to enter a
person's home violates the Fourth Amendment. However, they believes
that this violation was clearly established before the incident and the
officers should not receive qualified immunity.
8. Los Angeles Country v. Rettele
A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of
the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property
described therein and bring it before the court. A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Dennis Watters
investigated a fraud and identity-theft crime. There were four suspects
of the investigation and known to be African-Americans. Deputy
Watters obtained a search warrant for two houses in Lancaster,
California, where he believed he could find the suspects. The warrant
obtained by Watters authorized him to search the houses and the
suspects for documents and computer files. Watters informed the other
deputies that they would be searching for three African-American
suspects. However, Watters did not know that one of the houses which
is the first to be searched had been sold to a man named Max Rettele.
He had purchased the home and moved into it three months earlier
with his girlfriend Judy Sadler and Sadler’s 17-year-old son Chase
Hall. Max Rettele, Judy Sadler and Chase Hall are Caucasians. The
deputies’, upon their arrival to the first house, announce their presence
which awoke Rettele and Sadler. The deputies entered the bedroom
with guns drawn to Rettele and Sadler. Deputies ordered them to get
out of their bed and to show their hands however they protested that
they were not wearing clothes. Rettele and Sadler were held at
gunpoint for one to two minutes before Rettele and Sadler were
allowed to dress. By the time the deputies realized they had made a
mistake, they apologized to Rettele and Sadler. This case was filed by
Rettele and Sadler, respectively and as guardians ad litem. Rettele and
Sadler alleged that the petitioners violated their Fourth Amendment
rights by obtaining a warrant in reckless fashion and conducting an
unreasonable search and detention. The District Court held that the
warrant was obtained by proper procedures, search was reasonable and
that any Fourth Amendment rights the deputies violated were not
clearly established and as a result, the deputies were entitled to
qualified immunity. Respondents filed an appeal. They did not
challenge the validity of the warrant but they did argue that the
deputies had conducted the search in an unreasonable manner. The
Court of Appeals concluded that the search and detention were
“unnecessarily painful, degrading, or prolonged, and involved ‘an
undue invasion of privacy.” Also, the court held that a reasonable
deputy should have known the search and detention were unlawful.
ISSUE: WON the act of the deputies constitute an unreasonable
manner of conducting a search.
HELD: No. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
court held that the search was reasonable because when the deputies
ordered respondents from their bed, they had no way of knowing
whether the suspects who are African-American were elsewhere in the
house. The presence of some Caucasians in the residence did not
eliminate the possibility that the suspects lived there as well. The
deputies, as they search the house which they believed the suspects
stays and might be armed, possessed authority to secure the premises
before deciding whether to continue with the search. In executing a
search warrant officers may take reasonable action to secure the
premises and to ensure their own safety and the efficacy of the search.
Such unreasonable actions include the use of excessive force that
cause unnecessary pain or are imposed for a prolonged and
unnecessary period of time. Therefore, the orders by the deputies to
Rettele and Sadler were permissible and necessary to protect their
safety. In the case at hand, blankets and bedding can conceal a weapon
so the deputies needed a moment to secure the room and ensure that
other persons do not present a danger. The warrant obtained by the
deputies is a valid warrant which was issued upon probable cause and
particularly described the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. A warrant also serves as a protection to the deputies as long as
they execute the wearrant in a reasonable manner. In conclusion, the
Fourth Amendment is not violated.
9. People v. CA
FACTS:
On August 13, 1992, PNP-Special Investigation Service Command
(PNP-CISC) were conducting a surveillance of suspected drug-pushing
activities at the Regine Condominium, Makati Avenue, Makati City.
Among their targeted suspects was Valentino “Toto” Ortiz. Police
officers saw Ortiz from his Cherokee jeep and noticed that he had a
suspiciously bulging pants pocket thus the police officers immediately
moved in and accosted him. An unlicensed .25 caliber “Raven”
automatic pistol with one magazine and seven rounds of live .25
caliber ammunition was obtained from Ortiz. Also, the police officers
searched Ortiz’s vehicle which resulted in the retrieval of a sealed
cellophane packet of “shabu” from the compartment. The police then
took private respondent into custody. Soon after Ortiz’s arrest, a search
warrant was obtained from the MTC of Parañaque commanding the
PNP officers “to make an immediate search at any reasonable hour of
day or night of the house/s, closed receptacles and premises above-
described and forthwith seize and take possession” of the property
subject of the offense. The search warrant was supported by the
statements of two police officers who affirms that they had personal
knowledge that private respondent was keeping in his residence at
148-D Peru Street, Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro
Manila, unlicensed firearms specifically mentioned in the search
warrant. (Baby armalite M-16; Shotgun, 12 g; pistol cal. 9mm; pistol
cal. 45 and with corresponding ammunitions). Armed with the warrant,
the PNP CISC team, accompanied by a representative of the MTC
judge and a brgy. security officer, went to Ortiz’s residence at about
7:30 P.M to search said premises. Ortiz’s wife and their child’s nanny
were both present during the search, but neither consented to be a
witness to the search. The search resulted in the seizure unlicensed
firearms and ammunition. After Ortiz’s wife signed a receipt for the
seized firearms and ammunition, the search warrant was returned,
executed and filed by the police with the issuing court. At the
preliminary investigation, the prosecutor ruled the warrantless search
done with Ortiz’s person and jeep in Makati is invalid for violating his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
However, the prosecutor found the search conducted in Parañaque is
valid. Ortiz moved for reinvestigation. Ortiz alleged that the dismissal
of the charges against him in Makati also applies to the search
conducted in his house in Parañaque. However, the trial court denied
Ortiz’s contention so he filed for reconsideration and deferral of
arraignment, but said motions were likewise denied. Ortiz moved to
quash the search warrant on the grounds that he was not present when
his house was searched since he was then detained at Camp Crame;
that the search warrant was not shown to his wife; and that the search
was conducted in violation of the witness-to-search rule. Again, the
trial court ruled in negative, denied the motion to quash of Ortiz for
lack of merit. And charged Ortiz with illegal possession of firearms.
The CA reversed trial court’s decision, holding as inadmissible in
evidence the seized firearms and ammunition.
ISSUE: WON the CA make a mistake in holding that the firearms and
ammunition seized from Ortiz’s house are inadmissible as evidence for
being the fruits of an illegal search.
HELD: YES. In this case, there is no illegal search.
“Sec. 8 of Rules of Court. Time of making search. – The warrant
must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit
asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to
be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be
served at any time of the day or night. The general rule is that
search warrants must be served during the daytime. However, the
rule allows an exception, namely, a search at any reasonable hour
of the day or night, when the application asserts that the property
is on the person or place ordered to be searched. In the instant
case, the judge issuing the warrant relied on the positive assertion
of the applicant and his witnesses that the firearms and
ammunition were kept at private respondent’s residence.
Evidently, the court issuing the warrant was satisfied that the
affidavits of the applicants clearly satisfied the requirements of
Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The rule on issuance of a
search warrant allows for the exercise of judicial discretion in
fixing the time within which the warrant may be served, subject to
the statutory requirement fixing the maximum time for the
execution of a warrant. The inescapable conclusion is that the
judge who issued the questioned warrant did not abuse his
discretion in allowing a search “at any reasonable hour of the day
or night.” Absent such abuse of discretion, a search conducted at
night where so allowed, is not improper.
The general rule is that search warrants must be served in the daytime.
However, when the application asserts that the property is on the
person or place ordered to be searched, a search at any reasonable hour
of the day and night can be ordered. As to whether the time during
which the search was executed was unreasonable or not, the Supreme
Court stated that the exact time of the execution of the warrant should
be left at the discretion of the law enforcement officers. Judicial notice
may be taken not just from the realities of law enforcement but also the
prevailing conditions in the place to be searched. As such, the SC
deemed that 7:30 PM was a reasonable time, taking notice that said
time in a suburban subdivision in Metro Manila in an hour at which the
residents are still up and about.
“Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of
two witnesses. – No search of a house, room, or any other
premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of
the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in
the same locality.”
Ortiz’s wife and their child’s nanny were both present during the
search despite respondent’s absence. Hence, the search conducted by
the police officers are legal.
B. (WARRANTLESS SEARCHES)
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution - The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
Exclusionary Rule - Article III, Section 3(2), that "any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
Plain View Doctrine - Objects in the plain view of an officer who has
the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be presented as evidence.
10. PEOPLE vs LEANGSIRI
FACTS: Accused Leangsiri was arrested at the arrival area of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). He was in the act of
bringing into the country 8,225.31 grams of heroin hidden under the
false bottom of a black suitcase. He informed the authorities that he
was to deliver the contraband to three (3) people at the Las Palmas
Hotel in Manila. The team and agents of the Bureau of Customs
proceeded to the Las Palmas Hotel, where they allowed Leangsiri to
check into Room 504 with the confiscated black suitcase containing
the heroin.
At around eight oclock in the evening, two hours after checking
in, Leangsiri received a telephone call from his contact. Leangsiri was
told that the black suitcase would be picked up at about ten oclock that
night. Thereupon, the two NARCOM agents positioned themselves
inside the washroom, with its door opened a fraction to give them
visual access to the rest of the hotel room.
At about ten p.m., Amidus co-appellants, Omogbolahan and
Bhola, arrived at the hotel. As Amidu flashed a thumbs up sign to
them, they all headed for the elevator and went up to the fifth floor of
the hotel. They knocked on the door of Room 504. Leangsiri stood up
from the bed in which he sat, opened the door, and let the three
appellants in. Leangsiri took the black suitcase and brought it to the
dining area of the room where appellants stood in full view of
NARCOM agents Gapiangao and Balneg. Leangsiri opened the
suitcase and displayed its contents to his visitors.
Appellants briefly examined the black suitcase and two (2)
transparent plastic bags which contained the heroin. After the
examination, Leangsiri closed the suitcase and handed it over to
appellants. Appellants started to leave the hotel room with the
contraband when Gapiangao and Balneg barged out of the washroom,
identified themselves as NARCOM agents, and made the arrest.
Appellant Amidu, on the other hand, merely said she was
staying in Room 413 of the same hotel. Accompanied by the hotels
owner and security officer, Samala searched appellant Amidus room.
Tucked within the pages of her telephone and address book was a
piece of paper with the name SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI written on it.
The paper and Amidus other possessions were confiscated
ISSUE: WON the piece of paper found in Amidus hotel room, with
the name SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI written on it, should not have
been admitted as an evidence.
RULING: YES. The Revised Rules of Court provide that (a) person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without
a search warrant. To absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person
who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time of an incident
to his or her arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the commission of the offense. Such warrantless
search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of
arrest.
The Court held that the warrantless search made by the
authorities on the accused apartment which was located a few blocks
away from where she was arrested was illegal for being an untenable
violation, if not nullification, of the basic constitutional right and
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless
search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s person and the
premises under his immediate control admits of an exception. The
exception obtains when the Plain View Doctrine applies.
The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
The extension of the original justification is legitimate only
where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence
before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a
general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.
In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the
Las Palmas Hotel. The piece of paper bearing Leangsiris name was
obtained through a warrantless search of Room 413 of the same hotel,
and found tucked within the pages of appellant Amidus telephone and
address book. Clearly, the warrantless search is illegal and the piece of
paper bearing Leangsiris name cannot be admitted as evidence against
appellants. The inadmissibility of this evidence will not, however,
exculpate appellants. Its exclusion does not destroy the prosecution’s
case against appellants. The remaining evidence still established their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
11. VALEROSO vs CA
FACTS: The prosecution claims that Valeroso was arrested near the
INP Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about
to board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest, the arresting
officers bodily searched him, and they found One (1) cal. 38 "Charter
Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with five (5) live ammo
without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the
proper authorities.
The defense, on the other hand, insists that Valeroso was
arrested inside the boarding house of his children. After serving the
warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of the
police officers searched the boarding house and forcibly opened a
cabinet where they discovered the subject firearm.
ISSUE: WON Valeroso’s constitutional right against illegal search and
seizure was violated.
RULING: YES. Keeping in mind that substantial rights must
ultimately reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to
reconsider.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured
by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. From this constitutional
provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as a general rule, the
procurement of a warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly
search or seize the person, house, papers, or effects of any individual.
To underscore the significance the law attaches to the fundamental
right of an individual against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
Constitution succinctly declares in Article III, Section 3(2), that "any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding."
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The
following are the well-recognized instances where searches and
seizures are allowed even without a valid warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a) a prior
valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; b) the evidence
was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and d)
"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government,
the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of
fire, sanitary and building regulations.
In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to
effect a valid search or seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence
of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was
made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured.
For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an
incident to a lawful arrest. Searches and seizures incident to lawful
arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an
offense without a search warrant.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer
to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the
latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise,
the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself
frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer
to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the
right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not
only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area
within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the
seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the
one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase
"within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is
arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed
in the clothing of the person arrested.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude
that the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest without any
resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their
control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the
room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to
Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an "area within
his immediate control" because there was no way for him to take any
weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso’s
right against unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the
evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in evidence
against him.
12. LUZ vs. PEOPLE
FACTS: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-
Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer,
substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in
the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction
of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving
a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down
the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor
vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station
since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of
the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were
issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he
noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something
from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take
out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a
weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the
contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal
container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2)
cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon
seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the
accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and
something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled
out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be
four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the
other two (2) contained suspected shabu.
On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the
defense of planting of evidence and extortion.
ISSUE: WON the search and seizure of the alleged subject shabu is
illegal.
RULING: First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he
was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso
facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a
person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the
custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual
force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention
on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an
intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the
arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the
latter:
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his
citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest.
There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive
him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the
ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may
be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial
court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to
the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down
almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of
convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to
take petitioner into custody.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012,
which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet
while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules
of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or
charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be
stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for
such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a
traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the
police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into
custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In
this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic
citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same
violation.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall
be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for
the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any.
Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used
against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional
requirements were complied with by the police officers
only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when
he was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his
ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a
second time after the police officers allegedly discovered the drugs as
he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search
that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following are the
instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain view; (iii)
search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)
customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and
emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances,
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this
case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to
be inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually
concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly,
the evidence was not immediately apparent.
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing
evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently
given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the
prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3
Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and
intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely
told to take out the contents of his pocket.
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in
which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the
defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the
defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the
education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of
coercive police procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no
incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place;
and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting. It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and
positive testimony,that the necessary consent was obtained, and was
freely and voluntarily given. In this case, all that was alleged was that
petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the morning,
accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh
heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule.
While the rule normally applies when a police officer observes
suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a
criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons.
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While
he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest
opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not,
however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during the illegal warrantless arrest.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the
power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without
contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement
of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the
basic principles of government.
13. MARTINEZ vs PEOPLE
FACTS: At around 9:15 in the evening of December 29, 2007, the
police officers assigned to the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID)
Section of the Malate Police Station 9 (Police Station 9), conducted a
routine foot patrol along Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila. In the
process, they heard a man shouting "Putangina mo! Limangdaan na
ba ito?" For purportedly violating Section 844 of the Revised
Ordinance of the City of Manila (Manila City Ordinance) which
punishes breaches of the peace, the man, later identified as Ramon,
was apprehended and asked to empty his pockets. In the course
thereof, the police officers were able to recover from him a small
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
suspected to be shabu. Consequently, Ramon was charged with
possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11(3), Article II of RA
9165
In defense, Ramon denied the charge and gave his version of
the incident. He narrated that on December 29, 2007, at around 4:00 in
the afternoon, while walking along Balingkit Street to borrow a
welding machine from one Paez Garcia, a man in civilian clothing
approached and asked him if he is Ramon Goco. Upon affirming his
identity, he was immediately handcuffed by the man who eventually
introduced himself as a police officer. Together, they boarded a tricycle
(sidecar) where the said officer asked him if he was carrying illegal
drugs. Despite his denial, he was still brought to a precinct to be
detained. Thereafter, PO2 Soque propositioned Ramon and asked for
₱20,000.00 in exchange for his release. When Ramon’s wife, Amalia
Goco, was unable to produce the ₱20,000.00 which PO2 Soque had
asked for, he (Ramon) was brought to the Manila City Hall for inquest
proceedings.
ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest of Ramon justifies a subsequent
body search.
RULING: NO. The body search as well as the warrantless arrest is not
lawful. A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is
one that is carried out under the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113
of the Rules of Court which requires that the apprehending officer must
have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person caught in
flagrante delicto. To be sure the term probable cause has been
understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. In this light, the determination of the existence or
absence of probable cause necessitates a re-examination of the factual
incidents.
As found in jurisprudence, the traditional exceptions are customs
searches, searches of moving vehicles, seizure of evidence in plain
view, consented searches, "stop and frisk" measures and searches
incidental to a lawful arrest. This last-mentioned exception is of
particular significance to this case and thus, necessitates further
disquisition.
To determine if the body search is lawful we must first determine if the
arrest was lawful. To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of
shouting in a thickly-populated place, with many people conversing
with each other on the street, would constitute any of the acts
punishable under Section 844 of the Manila City Ordinance as above-
quoted. Ramon was not making or assisting in any riot, affray,
disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace; he was not assaulting,
beating or using personal violence upon another; and, the words he
allegedly shouted – "Putanginamo! Limangdaannabaito?" –are not
slanderous, threatening or abusive, and thus, could not have tended to
disturb the peace or excite a riot considering that at the time of the
incident, Balingkit Street was still teeming with people and alive with
activity.
Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was validly arrested the
warantless search that resulted from it was also illegal. Thus, the
subject shabu purportedly seized from Ramon is inadmissible in
evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree as
mandated by the above discussed constitutional provision. In this
regard, considering that the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicit
of the crime charged, Ramon's acquital should therefore come as a
matter of course.
14. RILEY vs. CALIFORNIA
FACTS: Riley was stopped for a traffic violation, which eventually
led to his arrest on weapons charges. An officer searching Riley
incident to the arrest seized a cell phone from Riley’s pants pocket.
The officer accessed information on the phone and noticed the
repeated use of a term associated with a street gang. At the police
station two hours later, a detective specializing in gangs further
examined the phone’s digital contents. Based in part on photographs
and videos that the detective found, the State charged Riley in
connection with a shooting that had occurred a few weeks earlier and
sought an enhanced sentence based on Riley’s gang membership. Riley
moved to suppress all evidence that the police had obtained from his
cell phone. The trial court denied the motion, and Riley was convicted.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed.
Wurie was arrested after police observed him participate in an
apparent drug sale. At the police station, the officers seized a cell
phone from Wurie’s person and noticed that the phone was receiving
multiple calls from a source identified as “my house” on its external
screen. The officers opened the phone, accessed its call log,
determined the number associated with the “my house” label, and
traced that number to what they suspected was Wurie’s apartment.
They secured a search warrant and found drugs, a firearm and
ammunition, and cash in the ensuing search. Wurie was then charged
with drug and firearm offenses. He moved to suppress the evidence
obtained from the search of the apartment. The District Court denied
the motion, and Wurie was convicted. The First Circuit reversed the
denial of the motion to suppress and vacated the relevant convictions.
ISSUE: WON the police can, with a warrant, search digital
information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been
arrested.
RULING: NO. A warrantless search is reasonable only if it falls
within a specific exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement. The well-established exception at issue here applies when
a warrantless search is conducted incident to a lawful arrest.
Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a
weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s
escape. Officers may examine the phone’s physical aspects to ensure
that it will not be used as a weapon, but the data on the phone can
endanger no one.
Although an individual’s privacy rights are diminished once
arrested, it should not be treated as a complete deprivation. The Court
then distinguishes the search of a cigarette pack from the privacy
invasion at issue regarding a search of a cell phone or residence and
determines such a search is not constitutional. The search of the data
on a cell phone is a major invasion of privacy due to the quality and
quantity of information stored on phones.
The Court also concludes the government’s assertion that
under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), a warrantless search of a
cell phone is justified when the cell phone is reasonably believed to
contain evidence of the crime of arrest, applies to the search of
vehicles and is inapplicable to a cell phone. Absent a warrant or
demonstration of exigent circumstances, the government may not
conduct a search of a cell phone incident to arrest.
But the Court’s holding is not that the information on a cell
phone is immune from search; it is that a warrant is generally required
before a search. The warrant requirement is an important component of
the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and warrants may be
obtained with increasing efficiency. In addition, although the search
incident to arrest exception does not apply to cell phones, the
continued availability of the exigent circumstances exception may
give law enforcement a justification for a warrantless search in
particular cases.
15. BIRCHFIELD vs. NORTH DAKOTA
BACKGROUND: To fight the serious harms inflicted by drunk
drivers, all States have laws that prohibit motorists from driving with a
blood alcohol concentration (BAC) exceeding a specified level. BAC
is typically determined through a direct analysis of a blood sample or
by using a machine to measure the amount of alcohol in a person’s
breath. To help secure drivers’ cooperation with such testing, the States
have also enacted “implied consent” laws that require drivers to submit
to BAC tests. Originally, the penalty for refusing a test was suspension
of the motorist’s license. Over time, however, States have toughened
their drunk-driving laws, imposing harsher penalties on recidivists and
drivers with particularly high BAC levels. Because motorists who fear
these increased punishments have strong incentives to reject testing,
some States, including North Dakota and Minnesota, now make it a
crime to refuse to undergo testing.
FACTS: In these cases, all three petitioners were arrested on drunk-
driving charges. The state trooper who arrested petitioner Danny
Birchfield advised him of his obligation under North Dakota law to
undergo BAC testing and told him, as state law requires, that refusing
to submit to a blood test could lead to criminal punishment. Birchfield
refused to let his blood be drawn and was charged with a misdemeanor
violation of the refusal statute. He entered a conditional guilty plea but
argued that the Fourth Amendment prohibited criminalizing his refusal
to submit to the test. The State District Court rejected his argument,
and the State Supreme Court affirmed.
breath tests when someone is arrested on suspicion of driving while
intoxicated.
However, the Court said, blood tests are different. They are
significantly more invasive than breathing into a tube. They require
piercing the skin and extracting a part of a person’s body. A blood
sample can be preserved and gives law enforcement a DNA sample.
This supplies much more information than a breath test, which shows
someone’s BAC (blood-alcohol content) level. The Court decided that
the government’s interest in stopping drunk driving does not outweigh
the privacy concerns of blood tests. Therefore, police must get a
warrant before drawing blood from someone who has been arrested on
suspicion of driving drunk.
Therefore, motorists may be criminally punished for refusing to
take a breath test based on implied-consent laws, but not for blood
tests. Birchfield was charged with refusing a blood test, and this
criminal charge is reversed.

ISSUE: WON the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests

and warrantless blood tests incident to arrests for drunk driving.
In the absence of a warrant, can a state with an implied consent
law make it a crime for a driver to refuse to take a breath or blood test
to detect alcohol or drugs in the driver’s blood?

RULING: The Court held that the Fourth Amendment permits

warrantless breath tests upon arrests for drunk drinking, but does not
permit warrantless blood tests. The decision noted the different
impacts of both tests on an individual’s privacy. The majority said that
breath tests do not raise privacy concerns because there is barely a
physical intrusion. People must breathe to stay alive. So, requiring an
arrestee to exhale into a machine is not inconvenient or embarrassing,
nor does it leave any DNA samples with the government. Given the
small impact on privacy, and the government’s strong interest in
keeping highways safe, the Fourth Amendment allows warrantless

16. PEOPLE VS. SALANGUIT  Plain View Doctrine
 The search warrant authorized the seizure of shabu, not
marijuana
 Seizure of the latter (marijuana) is being justified by the “plain
view doctrine” of the searching party which is being contested
by accused-appellant, Salanguit
Prior justification and Discovery by Inadvertance
 Once a valid portion of the search warrant has been executed,
the plain view doctrine can no longer provide any basis for
admitting the other items subsequently found
 The location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant, thus
known to the police operatives = reasonable to assume that
police found the shabu first before the marijuana (and the
marijuana bricks are packed/wrapped in newspaper)
Apparent Illegality of the evidence
 Marijuana bricks were wrapped in newspaper = could not have
been readily discernible as marijuana = hence an inadmissible
evidence
 Nonetheless, confiscation of the drug must be upheld
17. TERRY VS. OHIO  Stop and Frisk Exception
 A policeman of 30 years in service patrol (McFadden) observed
2 strangers (Terry and Chilton) along with a another man
walking back and forth on a street corner, passing by a store for
about 24 times  McFadden approached the 2 for their
suspicious behavior (day light robbery which may involve use
of weapon)  McFadden asked their names and the two
answered mumbling  officer (McFadden) patted down their
outside clothes, found but unable to remove a pistol and
ordered the two to get inside a store and again ordered them to
face the wall, the officer seized a revolver from Chilton’s outer
garments
 ISSUES: Is the right to personal security violated by an
unreasonable search and seizure? Whether there was
justification for McFadden’s invasion of Terry’s personal
security by searching him for weapons in the course of that
investigation?
 “it is urged that distinctions should be made between a "stop"
and an "arrest" (or a "seizure" of a person), and between a
"frisk" and a "search." Thus, it is argued, the police should be
allowed to "stop" a person and detain him briefly for
questioning upon suspicion that he may be connected with
criminal activity. Upon suspicion that the person may be
armed, the police should have the power to "frisk" him for
weapons. If the "stop" and the "frisk" give rise to probable
cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime, then
the police should be empowered to make a formal "arrest," and
a full incident "search" of the person. This scheme is justified
in part upon the notion that a "stop" and a "frisk" amount to a
mere "minor inconvenience and petty indignity," which can
properly be imposed upon the citizen in the interest of effective
law enforcement on the basis of a police officer's suspicion.
(explanation nung doctrine used in the case)
 The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer
McFadden's taking steps to investigate petitioner's suspicious
behavior, but, rather, whether there was justification for
McFadden's invasion of Terry's personal security by searching
him for weapons in the course of that investigation. We are
now concerned with more than the governmental interest in
investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate
interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
him. Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that
police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of
their duties. American criminals have a long tradition of
armed violence, and every year in this country many law
enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and
thousands more are wounded. Virtually all of these deaths and
a substantial portion of the injuries are inflicted with guns and
knives.
 In view of these facts, we cannot blind ourselves to the need for
law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other
prospective victims of violence in situations where they may
lack probable cause for an arrest. When an officer is justified
in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior
he is investigating at close range is armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be
clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take
necessary measures to determine whether the person is, in
fact, carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of
physical harm
 The actions of Terry and Chilton were consistent with
McFadden's hypothesis that these men were contemplating a
daylight robbery -- which, it is reasonable to assume, would be
likely to involve the use of weapons -- and nothing in their
conduct from the time he first noticed them until the time he
confronted them and identified himself as a police officer gave
him sufficient reason to negate that hypothesis.
 The scope of the search in this case presents no serious
problem in light of these standards. Officer McFadden patted
down the outer clothing of petitioner and his two companions.
He did not place his hands in their pockets or under the outer
surface of their garments until he had felt weapons, and then he
merely reached for and removed the guns. He never did invade
Katz' person beyond the outer surfaces of his clothes, since he
discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a
weapon. Officer McFadden confined his search strictly to what
was minimally necessary to learn whether the men were armed
and to disarm them once he discovered the weapons. He did
not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever
evidence of criminal activity he might find. *IMPORTANT
19. VILLANUEVA V. PEOPLE 
Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by
clear and convincing evidence. -- Consent must also be
voluntary inorder to validate an illegal search; that is, the
consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.
 Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
 4 policemen + a complainant went to the house of Danilo. They
informed Danilo that there was a complaint filed by Brian
Resco against him for allegedly shooting the complainant in
Navotas.
 They invited him to the police station. There, he was subjected
to a body search and, in the process, a plastic sachet of shabu
(0.63g) was recovered from the left pocket of his pants.
 The RTC of Caloocan convicted him of the offenses charged –
CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
 Issue: W/N THERE IS ILLEGALITY IN THE ARREST
OF THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE HANDLING OF
THE CONFISCATED DRUG.
 Held: YES, Accused-appellant is estopped from questioning
the legality of his arrest. He was arrested without a warrant.
The warrantless search conducted is not among those allowed
by law.
 Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a
warrantless search can be conducted. These searches include:
(1) search of a moving vehicle; (2) seizure in plain view; (3)
customs search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5) stop-and-
frisk situation; (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstance.
 The search made was not among the enumerated instances.
While this type may seemingly fall under the consented search
exception, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but
shown by clear and convincing evidence.
 Consent must also be voluntary inorder to validate an illegal
search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given, and uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion.
 In this case, petitioner was merely "ordered" to take out the
contents of his pocket. Hence, the confiscated item is
inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section
3(2) of the 1987 Constitution: "Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding."
 The decisions of RTC and CA were set aside and Petitioner
was acquitted.
20. CABALLES VS. CA  Search of Moving Vehicle
 About 9:15 p.m. 2 policemen, while on a routine patrol in
Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a
passenger jeep. unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the
two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was
driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on the jeep,
he did not answer; he appeared pale and nervous.
With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo
and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by
National Power Corporation (NPC). The conductor wires
weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55, 244.45. Noceja asked
appellant where the wires came from and appellant answered
that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8
kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, appellant and
the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the
Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the
appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned
over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Appellant was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
 Routine inspection- does not violate of an individual’s right
against unreasonable search
 Extensive Search- warrantless search is only valid if there is
probable cause
 Vehicle looking suspicious because of it being covered with
kakawati leaves = does NOT constitute probable cause which
could justify the conduct of a search without warrant
 + there was no tip or confidential report about an incident
carrying of stolen cable wires
 Caballes acquitted of the crime of charged (theft).
21. DELA CRUZ VS. PEOPLE
- Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities,
although done without search warrants, are not
unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions
protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so
as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the
traveling public.
 Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel.
He frequently traveled, "coming back and forth taking a
vessel." At around 12:00 noon, Dela Cruz was at a pier of the
Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. While buying a
ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter. It
took him around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket. After, Dela
Cruz proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed his
bag on the x-ray scanning machine for inspection. The
operator of the x-ray machine saw firearms inside Dela
Cruz’s bag. Cutie Pie Flores (Flores) was the x-ray machine
operator-on-duty, saw the impression of what appeared to be
three firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag. Upon seeing the
suspected firearms, she called the attention of port personnel,
Igot who was the baggage inspector then. Dela Cruz was asked
whether he was the owner of the bag which he answered in the
affirmative and consented to Igot’s manual inspection of the
bag.
 Port Police Officer Abregana was on duty at the terminal of the
Cebu Domestic Port in Pier when his attention was called by
 Igot. Igot told Officer Abregana that there were firearms in a
bag owned by a certain person.
 Dela Cruz admitted that he was owner of the bag. The bag
was then inspected and the following items were found inside:
three (3) revolvers; NBI clearance; seaman’s book; other
personal items; and four (4) live ammunitions placed inside the
cylinder. When asked whether he had the proper documents
for the firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the negative.
 RTC and CA: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
possessing unlicensed firearms under Commission on
Elections Resolution No. 7764 in relation to Section 261 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 during the 2007 election period.
 ISSUES: First, whether petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz
was in possession of the illegal firearms within the meaning of
the Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation
to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; Second, whether
petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures; and Lastly, assuming that there was no waiver,
whether there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
 First issue more on Rules of Court, kaya 2 nd and 3rd issue tayo
hehe
 The Cebu Port Authority has adopted security measures
imposed by the Office for Transportation Security, including
the National Security Programme for Sea Transport and
Maritime Infrastructure. It is clothed with authority by the state
to oversee the security of persons and vehicles within its ports.
While there is a distinction between port personnel and port
police officers in this case, considering that port personnel are
not necessarily law enforcers, both should be considered
agents of government under Article III of the Constitution. The
actions of port personnel during routine security checks at ports
have the color of a state-related function.
 It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined
by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case. Given the circumstances obtaining here, we
find the search conducted by the airport authorities reasonable
and, therefore, not violative of his constitutional rights.  The
reason behind it is that there is a reasonable reduced
expectation of privacy when coming into airports or ports of
travel. Persons may lose the protection of the search and
seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the
public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. (Same sa People vs. Johnson) Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern
over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board
an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-
on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected
to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to
determine what the objects are. There is little question that such
searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are
often notified through airport public address systems, signs and
notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search
and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such
would be subject to seizure. These announcements place
passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections
against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to
routine airport procedures
 Was the search rendered unreasonable at the second point of
intrusion—when the baggage inspector opened petitioner’s
bag and called the attention of the port police officer?
 We rule in the negative. = The port personnel’s actions
proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the safety of
travelers and vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner
already submitted himself and his belongings to inspection by
placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine. The
presentation of petitioner’s bag for x-ray scanning was
 voluntary. Petitioner had the choice of whether to present the
bag or not. He had the option not to travel if he did not want his
bag scanned or inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual
inspection upon showing of probable cause that a crime is
being or has been committed are part of reasonable security
regulations to safeguard the passengers passing through ports
or terminals. Probable cause is: reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the
existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law are in the place to be searched.
****ALERT ALERT.**** (Mahilig mag pa expound si sir
ng mga pa quote sa cases, in case lang na matanong niya,
mukhang significant tong part na to)
 As one philosopher said, the balance between authority and an
individual’s liberty may be confined within the harm that the
individual may cause others. John Stuart Mill’s "harm
principle" provides:
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of
their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or
forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it
will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do
so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for
remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading
him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting
him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the
conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be
calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the
conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that
which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns
himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself,
over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
 A third point of intrusion to petitioner’s right to privacy
occurred during petitioner’s submission to port security
measures.  This court should determine whether the
requirements for a valid waiver against unreasonable searches
and seizures were met. After detection of the firearms through
the x-ray scanning machine and inspection by the baggage
inspector, Officer Abregana was called to inspect petitioner’s
bag.
 The Constitution safeguards a person’s right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. A warrantless search is
presumed to be unreasonable. However, this court lays down
the exceptions where warrantless searches are deemed
legitimate: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
(2) seizure in "plain view"; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4)
consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and
frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
 The consented search conducted on petitioner’s bag is different
from a customs search. Customs searches, as exception to the
requirement of a valid search warrant, are allowed when
"persons exercising police authority under the customs law . . .
effect search and seizure . . . in the enforcement of customs
laws." The Code authorizes persons having police authority
under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter,
pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or
building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect,
search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and
search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of
 holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without
mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases
 SC: Petition DENIED, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION (in
relation with the penalty imposed) the ruling of RTC and CA
22. PEOPLE VS. JOHNSON  Airport Searches ->
authorized by law
 Johnson was about to fly back to US after a visit in Calamba,
Ramirez (lady frisker @ the airport NAIA gate 16) frisked her
after feeling something hard on Johnson’s abdominal area
 Johnson: need to wear 2 panty girdles because underwent
operation for an ectopic pregnancy  Ramirez not satisfied,
told her superiors  directed Johnson to the ladies’ room,
found 3 plastic packs of shabu
 Johnson: Gross violation of her constitutional rights, hence the
plastic packs of shabu found are inadmissible evidence = NO
MERIT
 Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure
clause by exposure of their persons or properties to the public
in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.
 Travelers are often notified through airport public address
systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they
are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures. *GIST*
23. New Jersey vs TLO
FACTS: In a New Jersey high school, a teacher found two girls
smoking in the bathroom and took them to the principal's office. One
girl admitted to smoking but the other, known as T.L.O., denied it. The
principal demanded to see the girl's purse and found evidence that she
was also selling marijuana at school. T.L.O. was taken to the police
station where she admitted to selling marijuana. Based on her
confession and the evidence in her purse, the state of New Jersey
brought charges against her. In a juvenile court, T.L.O. argued that her
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures
had been violated. The court sided with the school, and T.L.O. took her
case to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which later found that the
search was unreasonable, and the evidence could not be used. The state
of New Jersey appealed the decision to the United States Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Does the exclusionary rule apply to searches conducted by
school officials in public schools?
HELD: After the original oral argument in March of 1984, the
Supreme Court restored the case to the calendar for reargument. In
addition to the previously argued question, the Court requested that the
parties brief and argue the additional question of whether the assistant
principal violated the Fourth Amendment in opening T.L.O.'s purse.
The Court heard reargument on October 02, 1984. The Court held that
while the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches
and seizures applies to public school officials, they may conduct
reasonable warrantless searches of students under their authority
notwithstanding the probable cause standard that would normally
apply to searches under the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that
the search of T.L.O.'s purse was reasonable under the circumstances.
24. VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT VS ACTON
FACTS: An official investigation led to the discovery that high school
athletes in the Vernonia School District participated in illicit drug use.
School officials were concerned that drug use increases the risk of
sports-related injury. Consequently, the Vernonia School District of
Oregon adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes
random urinalysis drug testing of its student athletes. James Acton, a
student, was denied participation in his school's football program when
he and his parents refused to consent to the testing.
ISSUE: Does random drug testing of high school athletes violate the
reasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment?
HELD: No. The reasonableness of a search is judged by "balancing the
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests." In the case of high
school athletes who are under State supervision during school hours,
they are subject to greater control than over free adults. The privacy
interests compromised by urine samples are negligible since the
conditions of collection are similar to public restrooms, and the results
are viewed only by limited authorities. Furthermore, the governmental
concern over the safety of minors under their supervision overrides the
minimal, if any, intrusion in student-athlete’s privacy.
25. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS DANGEROUS DRUGS
BOARD
FACTS: In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s
office with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a
senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks
(1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they
impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those
already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the
COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of
five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a
member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a
senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory
drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no
provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC
to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36(g) of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are
constitutional.
HELD: No. Pimentel’s contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance
is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to
which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with
the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to
the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.
The provision “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug
test” is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC
cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly
impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be
sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the
democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
HOWEVER, SEC 36 (c ) and (d) are constitutional.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized
drug testing shall be done by any government
forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing
laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH
to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The
drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2)
testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of
drug used and the confirmatory test which will
confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following
shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary
schools. Students of secondary and tertiary schools
shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations
as contained in the school’s student handbook and
with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug
testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and
private offices. Officers and employees of public and
private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall
be subjected to undergo a random drug test as
contained in the company’s work rules and
regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk
in the workplace. Any officer or employee found
positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt
with administratively which shall be a ground for
suspension or termination, subject to the provisions
of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Service Law;
“the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA
9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is
justifiable. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other
than saying that subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without
probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the
individual right to privacy,] has failed to show how the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or
unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right
to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of
one’s person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a
way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities. And
while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the
guarantee against unwarranted search, translation of the abstract
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures into workable
broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task,
to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed
though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of
the public and defers to the states exercise of police power.
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is
couched and as has been held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the
validity of a government search or intrusion. And whether a search at
issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing
of the government-mandated intrusion on the individual’s privacy
interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest. In the
criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause
to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing
policy for employees and students for that matter under RA 9165 is in
the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to in
Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-
cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may,
the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged
administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the
nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which
effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as
the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the
employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
employee’s privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the company’s work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered by management and the
bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation
in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of
impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under
conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the employee’s
privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies
that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening
test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible
the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important
consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained
professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the
Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering
and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.] In addition, the IRR
issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on
the need to know basis; that the drug test result and the records shall
be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to
protect the confidentiality of the test results. Notably, RA 9165 does
not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting
agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the
operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the
employee’s privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper
safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results,
and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal
drug in the country and thus protect the well-being of the citizens,
especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs.
The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of
promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the
workplace via a mandatory random drug test. To the Court, the need
for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial
enough to override the individual’s privacy interest under the
premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts
across gender, age group, and social- economic lines. And it may not
be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal
drugs, with their ready market, would be an investors dream were it
not for the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities.
The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public
execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer
assume a laid-back stance with respect to this modern-day scourge.
Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to
be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among
employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing
being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen
method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation
of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern
likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in
the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random
testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the
limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and
employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions
imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all
enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And
if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees,
the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by
constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to
the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency
26. DELA CRUZ VS PEOPLE (2014)
FACTS: Petitioner Jaime D. Dela Cruz was charged with violation of
Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman
- Visayas, in an Information dated 14 February 2006, which reads:
That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer,
having been duly appointed and qualified to such public position as
Police Officer 2 of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned in
the Security Service Group of the Cebu City Police Office, after
having been arrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) in an entrapment operation, was found positive for use of
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE commonly known as
"Shabu", the dangerous drug after a confirmatory test conducted on
said accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is
legal
RTC RULING (CA AFFIRMED): The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its Decision dated 6 June 2007, found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15,
Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
compulsory rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months
at the Cebu Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents
located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City.
Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC’s validation of the
result of the urine test despite its dubiousness having been admitted
inspite of the lack of legal basis for its admission. First, he alleges that
the forensic laboratory examination was conducted despite the fact that
he was not assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his constitutional
right. Secondly, he was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable doubt
notwithstanding the lack of sufficient basis to convict him.
HELD: No. The drug test can be made upon who were apprehended or
arrested under the situations listed in Art 2 of RA 9165. It must be
noted that the accused was arrested in the alleged act of extortion.
Extortion is not listed in Art 2 of RA 9165.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------
We find that petitioner never raised the alleged irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment and raises the issue only now before this
tribunal; hence, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the
validity of his arrest curing whatever defect may have attended his
arrest. However, "a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not
mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest”
“The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and
right against self-incrimination.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted
and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test.
He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved
futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug
testing under those circumstances.
The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.”
27. LUCAS VS LUCAS
FACTS: Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation
with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of his
mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in
Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioner’s
certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c)
petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint
Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his
Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of
Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music;
and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about
petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment
manifesting that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore
summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very
Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be
sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a
Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on
the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the
case and held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four
procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of
Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the
putative father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the
RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that
ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition
is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place.
Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA ruled in favor of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show
that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had
been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the
petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.
ISSUE: Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can
issue a DNA testing order
HELD: Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack of a prima facie
case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as
yet, been presented by petitioner.
RATIO:
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four
significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which
parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in
this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects
during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence.
They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial
stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation
has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish
a prima facie case is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by
a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory
pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for
conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the
DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may, at any time,
either motu proprio or on application of any person, who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order
shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing
of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the
case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the
type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to
DNA
testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c)
The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA
testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is
relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of
other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall
not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the
behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit
or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean, however, that a
DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the
hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there
must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable
possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test. In
these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a
“search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid.
Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility,
was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable
cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind
of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a
court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity
cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court
may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party
must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As
explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party
to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause
hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants
issuance of a court order for blood testing The same condition
precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative
father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the
motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.”
28. MARYLAND VS KING
FACTS:
The Maryland DNA Collection Act (MDCA) allows state and local
law enforcement officers to collect DNA samples from individuals
who are arrested for a crime of violence, an attempted crime of
violence, burglary, or attempted burglary. Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was
arrested on first and second-degree assault charges. While under arrest,
but prior to conviction, King's DNA was collected and logged in
Maryland's DNA database. That database matched King's DNA to a
DNA sample from an unsolved rape case. This sample was the only
evidence linking King to the rape. The trial judge denied King's
motion to suppress the DNA evidence and he was convicted of first-
degree rape and sentenced to life in prison.
King appealed the conviction, arguing that the MDCA was an
unconstitutional infringement of his Fourth Amendment privilege
against warrantless searches. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
reversed, holding that the MDCA was unconstitutional. The court held
that King's expectation of privacy was greater than Maryland's interest
in using the DNA for identification purposes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Fourth Amendment allows states to collect and
analyze DNA from people arrested, but not convicted, of serious
crimes.
HELD:
Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4
majority. The Court held that conducting a DNA swab test as a part of
the arrest procedure does not violate the Fourth Amendment because
the test serves a legitimate state interest and is not so invasive so as to
require a warrant. The routine administrative procedures that occur
during a booking for an arrest do not require the same justification and
the search of a location. The Court held that ascertaining an arrestee's
identity and criminal history is a crucial part of the arrest procedure
and that a DNA test is just as valid and informative as fingerprinting.
Determining an arrestee's criminal history also serves the legitimate
state interest of determining what level of risk the individual poses to
the public and what conditions should be set on his/her release from
custody.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the
Fourth Amendment categorically prevents searching a person for
evidence of a crime without cause. Because the majority's opinion
allows for DNA tests to be conducted in the absence of evidence
linking the arrestee to a specific DNA-related crime, these tests fall
within the boundaries of the British "general warrants" the Fourth
Amendment was intended to prohibit. He also argued that the
procedural safeguards on the DNA evidence make it an ineffective and
redundant identification tool. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice
Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.

C. (ELECTRONIC AND OTHER SEARCHES) 29. KYLLO VS. US

Facts:

 Marijuana was allegedly grown in petitioner’s home in triplex. The

agents decided to use a thermal imaging device to scan the triplex to
determine if the amount of heat emanating from it was consistent
with the high-intensity lamps typically used for door marijuana
growth.
 The scan took only a few minutes. The scan showed that Kyllo’s
garage roof and a side wall were relatively hot compared to the rest
of the house and the neighboring found.
 After Kyllo was indicated a federal drug charge of manufacturing
marijuana he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect relative
amounts of heat emanating from a private home constitute an
unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment?
30. RICCIO “RICKY” A. POLLO v. CHAIRPERSON KARINA
CONSTANTINO-DAVID
(ELECTRONIC AND OTHER SEARCHES)
Government employee’s constitutional protection to privacy as to the
Ruling:
 Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court
held that "[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device that is not
in general public use, to explore details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion.”
 The surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable
without a warrant."
 The Fourth Amendment States that “The right of the people to be
secure in their persons houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.
computers they used in the work place may vary on a case-to-case
basis. In cases that there is reduced privacy expectation, search
incidental to work-related investigations must comply with the
reasonableness and scope test.
Facts:
 Pollo is a government employee whose computer was searched
pursuant to the anonymous letter complaint to the Office of
Chairperson David. The government employer used Pollo’s personal
files stored in the computer as evidence of misconduct. Thereafter,
Pollo was charged administratively and dismissed from service.
Pollo now assails the validity of the search and resulting evidence
thereby being the fruit of the poisonous tree.
Issue:
 Whether the search conducted on his office computer and the
copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent was
reasonable.
Ruling:
 YES. In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we
must balance the invasion of the employee’s legitimate expectations
of privacy against the government’s need for supervision, control,
and the efficient operation of the workplace. To the Court’s view,
therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches of the type at
issue here would impose intolerable burdens on public employers.
The delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused by the need
for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated
into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency’s work, and
ultimately to the public interest
 Public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy
interests of government employees for no investigatory, work-related
purposes, as well as forinvestigations of work-related misconduct,
should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the
inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:
 Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a two-fold
inquiry: first, one must consider whether the action was justified at
its inception, x x x; second, one must determine whether the search
as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.
Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be
justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for
a non-investigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed
file x x x. The search will be permissible in its scope when the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the
search and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the
misconduct.
D. (WARRANTLESS ARREST)
31. POSADAS VS. OMBUDSMAN
Facts:
 Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of
the Philippines, was killed in a rumble between his fraternity
and another fraternity on December 8, 1994. Petitioner
Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P. Diliman, asked the Director
of the NBI for assistance in determining the persons
responsible for the crime. With that, respondent Dizon, Chief
of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his men went
to U.P. and, on the basis of the supposed positive identification
of two alleged eyewitnesses, they attempted to arrest Francis
Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, officers/members of the
Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina.
It appears that the two suspects had come that day to the U.P.
Police Station for a peace talk between their fraternity and the
Sigma Rho Fraternity.
 Petitioners Posadas, Lambino, and Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and
a certain Atty. Villamor, counsel for the suspects, objected on
the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with
them. As a result of their intervention, Taparan and Narag were
not arrested by the NBI agents on that day. However, criminal
charges were filed later against the two student suspects.
 Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, charging petitioners Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino,
 Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security Force of the U.P.
Police, and Atty. Villamor with violation of P.D. 1829, which
makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and
prosecution of criminal offenders.
 On motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's Office
recommended the dismissal of the case. But such was
disapproved. The Office of the Ombudsman directed the
Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of
petitioners in the Sandiganbayan.
 Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the
resolution of the Ombudsman's office ordering the prosecution
of petitioners.
Issue:
 Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI
could be validly made without a warrant.
Ruling: No,
 In view of Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution, the rule is that no
arrest may be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a
judge after examining the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce and after finding probable cause to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed the crime. The
exceptions when an arrest may be made even without a warrant
are provided in Rule 113, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure which reads:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
 There is no question that this case does not fall under
paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting officers in this case did
not witness the crime being committed. Neither are the students
fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from
confinement. The question is whether paragraph (b) applies
because it is the contention of the respondents that the NBI
agents had personal knowledge of facts gathered by them in the
course of their investigation indicating that the students sought
to be arrested were the perpetrators of the crime. But the Court
ruled in negative.
 "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant
under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable
cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds
of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when,
in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts.
 At the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were
nowhere near the scene of the crime. When respondent Dizon
and his men attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter
were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything that
would create the suspicion that they were doing anything
illegal.
E. EXCLUSIONARY RULE-barred the admission of such
tainted evidence and whatever other fruits they may bear or lead to,
without prejudice to still imposing just deserts upon the errant officers.
A fruit of an illegal or unconstitutional act could not and should not be
given any form of legitimacy by its admission in evidence; a means of
deterrence, the erring officers may also be subjected to criminal and
civil liabilities for violating the constitutional proscription against merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court, but it
unreasonable search and seizures.) shall not be used at all.
 If the knowledge from an independent source they may be proved
like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government’s own
32. SILVERTHRONE LUMBER CO. UNITED STATES
wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed. (pp. 618-619)
Facts:
 An indictment upon a single specific charge was brought against
Frederick W. Silverthrone and his father.
 Both were arrested at their homes early morning of February and
were detained in custody a number of hours.
 While being detained the representatives of the Department of
Justice and the U.S. marshal WITHOUT A SHADOW OF
AUTHORITY went to their company office, Silverthrone Lumber
Co., Inc. and made a clean sweep of all the books, papers and
documents found there.
 The district court ordered return of the originals but impounded the
photographs and copies. The subpoenas to produce the originals were
served. Although the district court found that all the papers were
seized in violation of the owners' constitutional rights, it ordered the
owners to comply with the subpoenas.
 Silverthrone refused to comply on the ground that the order
infringed the rights of the parties under the Fourth Amendment.
F. (PRIVACY INTERESTS)
Issue:
33. Ople v Torres
 Whether or not the Govertment can use the knowledge it gained from
reading illegally seized documents as evidence against the petitioners Facts:
at trial?
Ople seeks for the invalidation of Administrative Order No. 308
Ruling: entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
 No, the essence of the provision (The Fourth Amendment) in Reference System" on two constitutional grounds (1) it is a usurpation
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in certain way is that not
of the power of Congress to legislate, and (2) it impermissibly
intrudes protected zone of privacy (violates right to privacy).
Issue:
Whether or not the assailed administrative order violates right to
privacy.
Ruling:
Yes. AO 208 is unconstitutional for violating the right to privacy,
protected by the bill of rights enshrined in the constitution.
In view of the issue: whether or not the issuance of the assailed
issue by the president usurps the legislative powers of the
Congress
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which
relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the
sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative
policy. The court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. The contention of
the dissenters that the assailed order is not a law because it confers no
right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office is
not correct because the said order it forces the citizens to avail the
identification card in order for the citizens to transact business with the
government. Without the ID, a citizen will have a difficulty exercising
his rights and enjoying his privileges. Hence, the contention that the
order gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand. Petitioner
claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law
and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue.
". . . Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here
that administrative legislation must he restricted in its scope and
application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the
general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public
law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the
authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent
source of power to make laws." – Fisher
In view of the issue: whether or not the assailed order violates the
right to privacy
The essence of privacy is the “right to be let alone”. In Morfe vs.
Mutuc, the court ruled that there is a constitutional right to privacy that
deserves constitutional protection. This right is expressly recognized in
section 3(1) of the bill of rights.
It is the burden of the government to show that the assailed
administrative order is justified. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with
the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and
social security providers and other government instrumentalities and
(2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions
and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is
debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the
issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness,
the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented
will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a
Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number
to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of
"Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." A.O.
No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that
it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological
information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor
General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference
System will contribute to the "generation of population data for
development planning." Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308
can give the government the authority to store and retrieve information
for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his
PRN. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308
may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by
enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable
unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and
circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way
for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies
access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against
leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs
of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear
of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose,
or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. It is plain and
we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal
information which will be gathered about our people will only be
processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper
safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track
down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to
access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-
incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by
government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the
PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we
consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or
placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded.
They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy
does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not
intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that
the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify such
intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional
invasions.
"the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an
unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat
is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its
benign capacity to forget." – Kalvin Jr.
34. Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Director-General, NEDA
Facts:
This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420, which requires
all government agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations to streamline and harmonize their ID system, on the
ground that it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the
executive branch of the government and that it infringes on right to
privacy (by allowing access to personal confidential data without the
owner’s consent)
Issue:
Whether or not EO 420 usurps legislative power by the president and
whether or not it violates right to privacy
Ruling:
In view of the issue whether or not the issuance of the order
constitutes a usurpation of the legislative powers by the president
EO 420 does not constitute a usurpation of legislative power by the
President
The purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to
reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility,
and provide convenience to the people served by government entities.
Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under
the uniform ID system to only 14 specific items, which are the usual
data required for personal identification by the government entities. In
fact, EO 420 will reduce the data required to be collected and recorded
in the ID databases of the government entities. In fact, some
government entities collect and record more data than what EO 420
allows; the Supreme Court ID contains far more data than the
proposed uniform ID for government entities under EO 420.
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved
in either of two ways. First, the heads of these existing government
entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their
systems uniform. Second, the President may by executive or
administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive
department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format, as
provided under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. Under this
constitutional power of control, the President can direct all government
entities to adopt a uniform ID data collection. However, this power of
control is limited to the Executive branch of government only. This
shows that EO 320 does not establish a national ID system because a
legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory
for all branches of government.
Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the
President to promulgate. In issuing EO 420, the President did not
make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed
existing laws. What require legislation are three aspects of a
government maintained ID card system; (1) when the implementation
requires a special appropriation, (2) when it is compulsory on all
branches of government, and (3) when it requires the collection and
recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually
required. All of these requirements are not present in the assailed
order.
On the issue of whether or not the assailed order violates right to
privacy
All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government
entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their
governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens
that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to
privacy. The data collected and stored for the unified ID system under
EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific data, and the ID card itself
will show only eight specific data. The data collection, recording and
ID card system under EO 420 will even require less data collected,
stored and revealed than under the disparate systems prior to EO 420.
EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality
of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are
bereft of strict administrative safeguards. The right to privacy does not
bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities.
In Whalen v. Roe, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a
New York law that required doctors to furnish the government reports
identifying patients who received prescription drugs that have a
potential for abuse. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the privacy
claim, and declared that disclosures of private medical information to
doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance companies, and to public
health agencies are often an essential part of modern medical practice
even when the disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the character of
the patient.Compared to the personal medical data required for
disclosure to the New York State in Whalen, the 14 specific data
required for disclosure to the Philippine government under EO 420 are
far less sensitive and far less personal.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but
makes the existing sectoral card systems of government entities like
GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and
user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of
executive issuance under the Presidents constitutional power of control
over government entities in the Executive department, as well as under
the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed.
Petitions are DISMISSED. EO 420 is declared VALID.
G. (WRIT OF HABEAS DATA)
35.Gamboa vs. Chan
Facts:
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued A.O. 275, which
provides for the creation of an independent commission to address the
alleged existence of private armies in the country. Zeñarosa
Commission was formed to investigate the existence of private army
groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before
the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the
future. Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa
Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a
confidential report.
Gamboa alleges that PNP–Ilocos Norte classified her as someone who
keeps a PAG and without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos
Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s
enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. ABS-CBN broadcasted
on its evening news program the portion of the Report naming
Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.21
Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on
print media. Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who maintains
a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos
Norte gathered. Gamboa claims that her right to privacy was violated.
Issue:
Whether or not Gamboa’s right to privacy was violated.
Ruling:
No. Gamboa’s right to privacy was not violated.
"Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom
from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well,
if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed
the beginning of all freedom." – Justice Douglas. Right to privacy is
“the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men” – Justice Bradeis. However, in Standard Chartered
Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, the Supreme Court underscored
that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding
compelling state interest. Therefore, when the right to privacy finds
tension with a competing state objective, the courts are required to
weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental
right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or
overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
On the issue of habeas data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy
designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to
enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It must be
emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted,
there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand,
and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies
and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted
authority. It also provides for the establishment of one police force that
is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and
administered by a national police commission. Hence, it is clear that
the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to
investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of
dismantling them permanently.
The fact that the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa
Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without
affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted
as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an
inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and
investigation. However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of
protection established in existing law and jurisprudence, this Court
nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating entities
that information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality. In this
case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized
its confidential nature. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the
state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion
on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and
forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a
lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data
must be denied.
36. Vivares vs. St. Theresa’s College
Facts:
Julia Daluz and Julienne Suzara were graduating high school students
at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. In January 2012, while
changing into their swimsuits for a beach party, Julia and Julienne took
photos of themselves in their undergarments. These pictures were then
uploaded by Angela Tan on FB.
Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school
department, learned from her students about the pictures. Escudero
asked about the students and Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes
Taboada (Chloe), among others, were identified.
Escudero’s students showed her photos of the identified students,
which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking
cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of
Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of
their black brassieres.
Escudero showed the photos to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for
appropriate action. When the students reported to the office, they were
castigated and verbally abused by STC officials. There were also
barred from joining the graduation ceremony. A week before the
graduation, Angela’s and Julia’s mothers filed a petition before the
RTC. Despite the issuance of TRO, STC still barred the sanctioned
students from graduating.
Issue:
Whether or not there was an actual or threatened violation of the right
to privacy.
Ruling:
No; there was no actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy.
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an
individual’s right to informational privacy. It was defined as "a
procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age." The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely
of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.
Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or
security on the other. Hence, there must be an evidence showing an
actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy.
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
Justice Puno’s three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational
or situational privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional
privacy. Of the three, what is relevant in the present case is the right to
informational privacy – right of individuals to control information
about themselves.
The question now though is up to what extent is the right to privacy
protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational privacy involves
personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is
socializing––sharing a myriad of information, some of which would
have otherwise remained personal. To address concerns about privacy,
but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different
privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile
as well as information uploaded by the user. However, these privacy
settings are not foolproof. Utilization of these privacy tools is the
manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her
right to informational privacy. Hence, the determination of the extent
that the images in question were visible to other Facebook users is
necessary in resolving the issue whether the minors carved out a zone
of privacy when the photos were uploaded.
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn
account that her students showed her the photos using their own
Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be
able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by
Escudero’s students, and that it is reasonable to assume that the photos
were viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public
at large. Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is
“Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in question were
viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’
children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such
were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right
to informational privacy. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends
of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their
parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who
showed the images to Escudero. Had it been proved that the access to
the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the
"Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been
screened to limit access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting,
the result may have been different.
STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its
students to be responsible in their dealings and activities in
cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, when it enforced the disciplinary
actions specified in the Student Handbook, absent a showing that, in
the process, it violated the students’ rights.
37. Lee vs. Ilagan
Facts:
In 2011, Ilagan visited Lee at the latter’s condominium, rested for a
while and thereafter, proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan
noticed that his digital camera was missing. Lee confronted Ilagan at
the latter’s office regarding a purported sex video she discovered from
the camera involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the
video and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail. During
the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall
inside his office and walked away. Subsequently, Lee utilized the said
video as evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan. Ilagan
claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video and
threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the
NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his
right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other
woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is
warranted.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of
habeas data in favor of Ilagan.
Ruling:
No; the RTC erred in extending the privilege of the writ of habeas data
in favor of Ilagan.
Habeas data now stands as “a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.” The petition must adequately
show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the
one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. On
the same hand, the allegations in the petition must be supported by
substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.
The Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his
right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated
through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the
subject sex video.
The Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his
right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated
through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the
subject sex video. The petition would equally be dismissible due to the
inadequacy of the evidence presented.
Nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit
any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in
life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a
reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the subject
video in order to achieve unlawful ends. Lee even made it clear in her
testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video
was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and
administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan.
Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the
habeas data petition.