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Ermita On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was
Power of Appointment [6/9] appointed Administrator of the MARINA and she assumed her duties and
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of Constitution .
preliminary injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the designation of On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial
respondent Undersecretary Maria Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) inquiry are not present in this case. In fact, there no longer exists an actual
of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA). controversy that needs to be resolved in view of the appointment of
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and
respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the the relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport,
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). which rendered the present petition moot and academic. Petitioner’s prayer
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is likewise
Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), moot and academic since, with this supervening event, there is nothing left to
Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC enjoin.
Undersecretary.
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, Issue: W/N the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA,
concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to
constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription
the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and
and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment. assistants.
Held:
The petition is meritorious. any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in
or more positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as a concerned the conduct of their office.
citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal
act by public officials. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil
degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. But even in cases where subsidiaries.
supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to
resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:
principles to guide the bench, bar, and public. In the present case, the Sec. 7. x x x
mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no
Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct application of Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their Noting that the prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, all-embracing, the disqualification was held to be absolute, as the holding of
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during "any other office" is not qualified by the phrase "in the Government" unlike in
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in Section 13, Article VI prohibiting Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives from holding "any other office or employment in the their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or
Government"; and when compared with other officials and employees such employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this
as members of the armed forces and civil service employees, we concluded prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of
thus: Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the
officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive
service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those
itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President
being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2)
other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of
is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she
authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and
meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7,
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties
Union.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma.
a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime
Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the
for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and person named.
Note:
Power of Appointment [7/9]
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with
the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office.
Facts: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M.
When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in
Macapagal Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice
security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure
following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order to vie
because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on March 5, 2010, President
merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as
Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent
where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman
capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a
of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under
concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to challenge the
the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the
constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations, claiming
Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that
Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while
during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty.
designation is legislative in nature.
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as the
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it
Solicitor General and commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010. Agra
likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office.
renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on January
That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is
12, 2010, he was then the Government Corporate Counsel when President
merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the
Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor
office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the
General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice; subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict
Secretary of Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile of interest in the conduct of their office.
Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then relinquished his A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article
position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Held: Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, viz: differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or
employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, capacity. The text of Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the
in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or
employments in the Government or in government-owned or government
controlled-corporations was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office prohibition under Section 7, supra. Hence, his concurrent designations were
means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and still subject to the conditions under the latter constitutional provision. In this
administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual regard, the Court aptly pointed out in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma:
discharge of the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of
Section 13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an
the appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple appointive official to hold more than one office only if “allowed by law or by
offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all the primary functions of his position.” In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, this
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is Court ruled that, “[t]here is no legal objection to a government official
without question that the avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to prevent occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as
the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically long as there is no incompatibility.” The crucial test in determining whether
the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out in People v. Green –
deputies and assistants. To construe differently is to “open the veritable whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has
floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of the right to interfere with the other.
due to such position being merely vested with a cabinet rank under Section 3,
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth
Republic Act No. 9417, he nonetheless remained covered by the general
year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman
of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal Arroyo
Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly namely:
appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount
COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar, public interest;
in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling
that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of 7 years principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public;
which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the
when he was appointed to that position. following requisites for the exercise of judicial review of an executive act
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court
22, 2011 addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
step down from office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
word, Villar vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and
named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This must be the very litis mota of the case
development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein
moot and academic. ISSUES:
W/N Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan after having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA
and the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed under, and the
requirements for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at least circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution
HELD: The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that: appointed by the President for a term of seven years, and if he has served the
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the full term, then he can no longer be reappointed or extended another
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a
seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman term of seven years who likewise served the full term is barred from being
shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served
commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any the full term of seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is
In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or to prevent the president from “dominating” the Commission by allowing him
acting capacity. to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.
Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional
Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind within the commission, the appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has
point being that a second appointment, be it for the same position not served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence
(commissioner to another position of commissioner) or upgraded position of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that “the appointment to any vacancy shall be only
(commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.” In addition, such
ab initio. promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the
The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the
the word “reappointment” as, in context, embracing any and all species of term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not
appointment. The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
a promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar who
made under the aforestated circumstances or conditions. serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that his promotional the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full
appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve
term––from February 2008 to February 2015––given his four (4)-year tenure as more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.
COA commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court.
While there had been divergence of opinion as to the import of the word To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution,
“reappointment,” there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case viz:
both positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view 1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions,
would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation and after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of
would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an
rotational system of succession. appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing
authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system
any circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year prescribed by the Constitution.
the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term 2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death,
as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said rule resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion
would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than
breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so
the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid 5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a
down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). temporary or acting capacity.
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were Betoy v BoA
appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than
On June 8, 2001, RA 9136 (EPIRA) was enacted by Congress with the goal of
seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the
restructuring the electric power industry and privatization of the assets of the
unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is
National Power Corporation. On February 27, 2002, pursuant to Section 77 of
not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate
the EPIRA, the Secretary of the Department of Energy promulgated the IRR.
period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of
the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided
Section 63 of the EPIRA provides for separation benefits to officials and
further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death,
employees who would be affected by the restructuring of the electric power
resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that
industry and the privatization of the assets of the NPC. Rule 33 of the IRR
“reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and
provided for the coverage and the guidelines for the separation benefits to
the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman).
be given to the employees affected.
On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different
34 of EPIRA for being exorbitant display of State Power and was not premised oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially involves a question of
on the welfare of the people. fact and, thus, this Court is precluded from reviewing the same.
ISSUE: Is the universal charge under Section 34 of the EPIRA, a tax or an Barrioquinto v. Fernandez
exaction in the exercise of the State’s police power?
Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made
In Gerochi vs. Department of Energy, the Court ruled that the Universal
during the war. The case was proceeded against Jimenez because
Charge is not a tax but an exaction in the exercise of the State’s police power.
Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found. Jimenez was then sentenced to life
The Universal Charge is imposed to ensure the viability of the country’s electric
imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the
power industry.
defendant Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants
amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized
Petitioner argues that the imposition of a universal charge to address the under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
stranded debts and contract made by the government through the NCC-IPP persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Barrioquinto learned about the
contracts or Power Utility-IPP contracts or simply the bilateral agreements or proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke amnesty as well. However,
contracts is an added burden to the electricity-consuming public on their Commissioner Fernandez of the 14thAmnesty Commission refused to process
monthly power bills. It would mean that the electricity-consuming public will the amnesty request of the two accused because the two refused to admit to
suffer in carrying this burden for the errors committed by those in power who the crime as charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain
runs the affairs of the State. This is an exorbitant display of State Power at the Tolentino was the one who committed the crime being charged to them.
expense of its people.
ISSUE: Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.
HELD: Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes
must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say
take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the President with that “invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of
the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should confession and avoidance.” Although the accused does not confess the
take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty
is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he
offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged,
and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party,
offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the
convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the
does “nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,” enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to
and it “in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity be “regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to
imposed upon him by the sentence” (art 36, RPC). While amnesty looks the nation,” or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty
backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases
committed no offense. coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by
the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is
shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non,
admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, Vera v. People
and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either
Executive Clemency [2/6] Issue:
Should persons invoking the benefit of amnesty first admit having committed
Facts:
the crime of which they were accused?
Vera and 96 others were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with
murder before CFI of Quezon. They invoked the benefits of the Amnesty Held:
Proclamation No. 8 of the President; thus, the case was referred to the 8th
Guerilla Amnesty Commission which tried the case. During the hearing, none Yes. It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgiveness
of the petitioners admitted having committed the crime. Vera was the only for an act which, according to him, he has not committed. Amnesty
one who took the witness stand and denied having killed Lozanes. presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains
The Commission said it could not take cognizance of the case because the that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty.
benefits of amnesty could only be invoked by defendants in a criminal case Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it
who, admitting commission of the crime, plead that the said crime was is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The
committed in pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance,
against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but
occupation. The Commission ordered that the case be remanded to disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved,
the court of origin for trial. would being the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty
proclamation.
The CA affirmed the decision of the Commission. Vera appealed to the SC,
contending that to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation it is Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez and the other cases cited by petitioner were
not necessary for them to admit the commission of the crime charged, citing superseded and deemed overruled by the subsequent cases of People v.
the case of Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, etc.
Llanita, et al. (L-2082, April 26, 1950, 86 Phil. 219) and People v. Guillermo, et al.