G.R. Nos.

79937-38 February 13, 1989

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS:

On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with
a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong.
Consequently, private respondent filed a complaint in the RTC of Quezon City for the refund of
premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. The complaint of the respondent
sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated
damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the
complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the
body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).

Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted
petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. On a later date, private respondent filed a "Re-Amended
Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than Pl0,000,000. 00 as actual compensatory damages"
in the prayer. Private respondent now alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees
in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70. Judge Asuncion admitted the amended complaint. Based
on the claim of private respondent, the docket fee now amounts to P39,786.00 which the private
respondent paid. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning
the order of Judie Asuncion. On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed an additional claim of
P20,000,000.00 as damages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70, as a result, the
private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.00.

Petitioners contended with the Court of Appeals (CA) that on the ground of nonpayment of the
correct and proper docket fee by the respondent, the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case. CA denied the motion, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket
fee has not been paid.

RULING:

NO. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which
shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may
also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.

Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in
the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing
fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court
or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18936 May 23, 1967

INTESTATE ESTATE OF ENCARNACION ELCHICO Vda. de FERNANDO, deceased.

NATIVIDAD E. IGNACIO and LEONOR E. ALMAZAN, administratrices-appellants,
vs.
PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, INC., claimant appellee.

Paterno R Canlas for administratrices-appellants.

Manuel O. Chan and A G. Martinez for claimant-appellee.

SANCHEZ, J.:

The present case has its roots in the proceedings hereinafter to be recited:

August 29, 1951. Pampanga Bus Company, Inc. (referred to herein as Pambusco) lodged its
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against two (2) defendants Valentin Fernando and
Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando. The suit was to collect P105,000.00 upon a contractual
obligation.1

January 23, 1955. Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando died. By this time, Pambusco in the
foregoing civil case had already presented its evidence and submitted its case.

March 23, 1955. Intestate proceedings were filed.2 Notice to the estate's creditors was given for
them to file their claims within six (6) months from this date, the first publication of the notice.

April 16, 1955. On Pambusco's motion, the court in the civil case ordered Jose Nicolas, then
administrator, to substitute for the deceased Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando as one of the
defendants. No objection to this order was registered.
July 15, 1955. Pambusco amended its complaint in the civil case naming therein administrator Jose
Nicolas and original defendant Valentin Fernando, as defendants. The court, without objection,
admitted this amended complaint on August 27, 1955.

Jose Nicolas, as such administrator, filed an amended answer with counterclaim against Pambusco.
The date of filing said answer is not of record. In due course, Nicolas presented his evidence.

December 11, 1958. After trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered
judgment in the civil case (Civil Case 14578), as follows:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants,
ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of NINETY-THREE THOUSAND PESOS
(P93,000.00) together with the costs of these proceedings. Defendants' counterclaim is
hereby dismissed.

The two defendants appealed.

May 28, 1960. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, thus —

As plaintiff's complaint is well founded and meritorious and the evidence of record justify
the award of P93,000.00 in its favor, it stands to reason that defendants' counterclaims
were correctly dismissed.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed without pronouncement as to

costs.3

Both defendants appealed by certiorari to this Court. Valentin Fernando's appeal4 was dismissed for
having been filed out of time. The appeal of the estate of Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de
Fernando,5 raising issues of fact, likewise dismissed.

February 25, 1959. We go back to Special Proceeding 25256, Intestate Estate of Encarnacion Elchico
Vda. Fernando. On this day, while defendants in Civil Case 14576 were perfecting their appeal from
the judgment the Court of First Instance, Pambusco registered its contingent claim in these special
proceedings — for whatever money judgment may be rendered in his favor in the civil suit.

January 25, 1961. The judgment in the civil case having reached finality, Pambusco moved in the
intestate proceedings that the heirs and/or the present joint administratrices, Natividad E. Ignacio
and Leonor E. Almazan, be ordered to pay P46,500.00, the share of the deceased in the judgment
debt.

The administratrices opposed. Ground: Pambusco's claim is time-barred.

March 13, 1961. Resolving Pambusco's motion, the probate court (in Sp. Proc. 25256) issued an
order, the dispositive part of which is as follows:

Wherefore, the Court hereby allows said amount of P46,500.00 to be paid by the heirs
and/or the joint administratrices; but no payment thereof shall be made until after the
administratrices shall have informed the Court in writing as to the existence of other
 unsettled money claims against the estate and of the sufficiency of the assets available for
payment of all the debts.

In harmony with the foregoing, the Court hereby orders said administratrices to inform the
Court, within ten (10) days from the notice of this order, of the other unsettled money
together with the amount of each, and of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the assets
available for payment of all the debts.

By order of May 24, 1961, the probate court denied the motion to reconsider the foregoing order.

The administratrices came to this Court on appeal.

Given the facts just recited, was Pambusco's claim properly admitted by the probate court?

It will be remembered that at the time Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando died, the civil case
against her and the other defendant Valentin Fernando had not yet been decided by the Court of
First Instance of Manila. That case, however, was prosecuted — with the assent of the administrator
of her estate — to final conclusion.

1. This situation brings to the fore a consideration of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,6 which
reads:

SEC. 21. Where claim does not survive. — When the action is for recovery of money, debt or
interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance,
it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules.

The Philosophy behind the rule which provides for the dismissal of the civil case is that, upon the
death of defendant, all money claims should be filed in the testate or interstate proceedings "to
avoid useless duplicity of procedure."7 Obviously, the legal precept just quoted is procedural in
nature. It outlines the method by which an action for recovery of money, debt or interest may
continue, upon the terms therein prescribed. Whether the original suit for the recovery of money —
as here — proceeds to its conclusion, or is dismissed and the claim covered thereby filed with the
probate court, one thing is certain: no substantial rights of the parties are prejudiced.

But is there justification for the civil case to go on in spite of the death of Encarnacion Elchico Vda.
de Fernando "before final judgment in the Court of First Instance?"

2. At the time of the death of defendant Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando, plaintiff Pambusco
had already closed its evidence and submitted its case. Her administrator substituted. By this
substitution, the estate had notice of the claim. The estate was thus represented. The administrator
did not complain of the substitution. At no time did the estate of the deceased impugn the authority
of the regular courts to determine the civil case. Much less did it seek abatement of the civil suit. On
the contrary, its administrator took active steps to protect the interests of the estate. He joined
issue with plaintiff. He filed an amended answer. He counterclaimed. He went to trial. Defeated in
the Court of First Instance, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. He even elevated that civil case to
this Court. Now that the judgment has become final, the estate cannot be heard to say that said
judgment — reached after a full dress trial on the merits — will now go for naught. The estate has
thus waived its right to have Pambusco's claim re-litigated in the estate proceedings. For, though
presentment of probate claims is imperative, it is generally understood that it may be waived by the
estate's representative.8 And, waiver is to be determined from the administrator's "acts and
conduct."9 Certainly, the administrator's failure to plead the statute of nonclaims, his active
participation, and resistance to plaintiff's claim, in the civil suit, amount to such waiver. 10

3. Courts are loathe to overturn a final judgment. Judicial proceedings are entitled to respect. Non
quieta movere. 11Plaintiff's claim has passed the test in three courts of justice: the Court of First
Instance, the Court of Appeals and this Court. The judgment in plaintiff's favor should be enforced.
Appellants' technical objection — after judgment had become final in the civil case — that plaintiff's
claim should have been litigated in the probate court does not impair the validity of said judgment.
For, such objection does not go into the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter.

In Laserna vs. Altavas, 68 Phil. 703, suit was started by Jose Altavas against Jose Laserna Paro to
recover P4,500.00 as attorney's fees. The Court of First Instance decided in plaintiff's favor. During
the pendency of Laserna's appeal in this Court, he died. Aristona Laserna, the administratrix of
Laserna's estate, substituted. This Court affirmed the judgment. Altavas subsequently filed in
the estate proceedings a motion to direct the administratrix to pay the judgment for P4,500.00 in his
favor. The court granted this motion. On appeal, the administratrix urged that Altavas' claim "was
definitely barred by the statute of nonclaim," because of his failure "to present it before the
committee on claims and appraisal."12 This Court there stated.13 —

x x x we are of the opinion and so hold that, upon the facts and circumstances of the present
case, the claim of Jose Altavas, although it did not survive the deceased, need not have to be
presented before the committee on claims and appraisal principally because that claim is
already an adjudicated claim by final pronouncement by this Court in G.R. No. 40038. To
countenance appellant's theory would be to convert a claim duly passed upon, and
determined not only by the Court of First Instance but by this Court into a contested claim,
once again, . . . and "obliging a creditor whose claim had already been passed upon by the
Court to submit himself to the committee on claims and to pass over again through the
endless process of presenting his evidence which he had already done." ... It also appears
that the substitution of the defendant in civil case No. 2961, for the recovery of attorney's
fees, was effected at the instance of the defendant and appellant therein, Aristona Laserna.
She had an opportunity to contest that claim, and when her contention was overruled she
did not impugn the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Neither does it appear that during the
pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court she moved for the abatement or suspension of
the proceedings because of the provisions of sections 119, 700 and 703 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Under the circumstances it is unjust to defeat the claim of the appellee and to hold
that it had been barred by the statute of nonclaim.14

4. Of course, it is correct to say that upon the demise a defendant in a civil action planted on a claim
which does not survive, such claim should be presented to the probate court for allowance, if death
occurs before final judgment in the Court of First Instance. But, procedural niceties aside, the
revival of the civil action against the administrator, the decedent's representative, "is generally
considered equivalent to presentation" of such claim in probate court, 15"dispenses with the actual
presentation of the claim." 16 The soundness of this proposition commands assent. Because, the
administrator represent the deceased's estate itself, is an alter ego of the heirs. More than this, he is
an officer of the probate court.17 In the circumstances, presentment of Pambusco's 1950 claim ad
abundantiorem cautelam was at best reduced to a mere formality.
5. It matters not that Pambusco's said claim was filed with the probate court without the six-month
period from March 25, 1955, set forth in the notice to creditors. For, Section 2, Rule 86, permits
acceptance of such belated claims. Says Section 2: 18

SEC. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the notice provided in the preceding
section, the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall
not be more than twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months after the date of the first
publication of the notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on
application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited,
the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be
filed within a tune not exceeding one (1) month.

Here, the claim was filed in the probate court on February 25, 1959, while the defendants in the
civil case were still perfecting their appeal therein. The record does not show that the administrator
objected thereto upon the ground that it was filed out of time. The pendency of that case, we are
persuaded to say, is a good excuse for tardiness in the filing of the claim. 19 And, the order of final
distribution is still to be given.

Besides, the order of the lower court of March 18, 1961 allowing payment of appellee's claim
"impliedly granted said appellee an extension of time within which to file said claim." 20 The
probate court's discretion has not been abused. It should not be disturbed. 21

For the reasons given, we vote to affirm the order of the lower court of March 13, 1961 and May 24,
1961, under review. Costs against appellants. So ordered.

SECOND DIVISION

TITAN CONSTRUCTION G.R. No. 169548

CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
 PEREZ, JJ.
MANUEL A. DAVID, SR. and
MARTHA S. DAVID, Promulgated:
Respondents. March 15, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The review of factual matters is not the province of this Court.[1] The Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts, and is not the proper forum for the ventilation and substantiation of factual issues.[2]

This Petition for Review assails the July 20, 2004 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 67090 which affirmed with modification the March 7, 2000 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 80. Also assailed is the August 31, 2005 Resolution[5] of the CA
denying the motion for reconsideration.

Factual Antecedents
Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were married on March 25, 1957. In
1970, the spouses acquired a 602 square meter lot located at White Plains, Quezon City, which was
registered in the name of MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal age, Filipino, married to Manuel A. David and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 156043 issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City.[6] In 1976, the spouses separated de facto, and no longer communicated with each other.[7]

Sometime in March 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the property to Titan
Construction Corporation (Titan) for P1,500,000.00 through a Deed of Sale[8] dated April 24, 1995,
and that TCT No. 156043 had been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 130129 in the name of Titan.

Thus, on March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a Complaint[9] for Annulment of Contract
and Recovenyance against Titan before the RTC of Quezon City. Manuel alleged that the sale
executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his knowledge and consent, and therefore void.
He prayed that the Deed of Sale and TCT No. 130129 be invalidated, that the property
be reconveyed to the spouses, and that a new title be issued in their names.

In its Answer with Counterclaim,[10] Titan claimed that it was a buyer in

good faith and for value because it relied on a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) [11] dated January 4,
1995 signed by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf of the
spouses. Titan thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

In his unverified Reply,[12] Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature
purporting to be his was a forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell the property.

Subsequently, Manuel filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint[13] which was granted by
the trial court. Thus, on October 15, 1996, Manuel filed an Amended
Complaint[14] impleading Martha as a co-defendant in the proceedings. However, despite personal
service of summons[15] upon Martha, she failed to file an Answer. Thus, she was declared in
default.[16] Trial then ensued.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On March 7, 2000, the RTC issued a Decision which (i) invalidated both the Deed of Sale and TCT
No. 130129; (ii) ordered Titan to reconvey the property to Martha and Manuel; (iii) directed the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to issue a new title in the names of Manuel and Martha; and (iv)
ordered Titan to pay P200,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per appearance as attorneys fees, and P50,000.00
as costs of suit.

The RTC found that:

1) The property was conjugal in character since it was purchased by Manuel

and Martha with conjugal funds during their marriage. The fact that TCT No. 156043 was registered
in the name of MARTHA S. DAVID x x x married to Manuel A. David did not negate the propertys
conjugal nature.

2) The SPA professing to authorize Martha to sell the property on behalf of the spouses was
spurious, and did not bear Manuels genuine signature. This was the subject of expert testimony,
which Titan failed to rebut. In addition, despite the fact that the SPA was notarized, the genuineness
and due execution of the SPA was placed in doubt since it did not contain Manuels residence
certificate, and was not presented for registration with the Quezon City Register of Deeds, in
violation of Section 64 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.[17]

3) The circumstances surrounding the transaction with Martha should have put Titan on notice of
the SPAs dubious veracity. The RTC noted that aside from Marthas failure to register the SPA with
the Register of Deeds, it was doubtful that an SPA would have even been necessary, since the SPA
itself indicated that Martha and Manuel lived on the same street in Navotas.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:

1.) Declaring the Deed of Sale dated April 24, 1995 as void ab initio and without
force and effect.

2.) Declaring null and void TCT No. 130129 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City in the name of defendant Titan Construction Corporation.

3.) Ordering defendant Titan Construction Corporation to reconvey the subject

property to plaintiff and his spouse.

4.) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to make and issue a new title in
the name of plaintiff Manuel David and his Spouse, Martha David.

5.) Ordering defendant to pay P200,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per appearance as

attorneys fees and P50,000.00 as costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[18]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated July 20, 2004, the CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court but deleted the
award of attorneys fees and the amount of P50,000.00 as costs.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATION by deleting the award of attorneys fees in favor of plaintiff-
appellee Manuel A. David, Sr. and the amount of P50,000.00 as costs, the Decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED in all other respects, with costs against defendant-appellant Titan Construction
Corporation.[19]

Titan moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied on August 31, 2005.

Hence, this petition.

Issues

Titan raises the following assignment of errors:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SUBJECT DEED

OF SALE NULL AND VOID AND FAILED TO APPLY TO THIS CASE THE PERTINENT LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION.

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT TITAN WAS NOT A
BUYER IN GOOD FAITH CONTRARY TO THE STANDARDS APPLIED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT
IN CASES INVOLVING SIMILAR FACTS.

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED BY DISCARDING THE NATURE OF A

NOTARIZED SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY CONTRARY TO JURISPRUDENCE AND BY GIVING
UNDUE WEIGHT TO THE ALLEGED EXPERT TESTIMONY VIS--VIS THE CONTESTED SIGNATURES
AS THEY APPEAR TO THE NAKED EYE CONTRARY TO JURISPRUDENCE.

D. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED BY FAILING TO DETECT BADGES OF

CONNIVANCE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS.
E. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED BY NOT RULING THAT ASSUMING
THE SPA WAS NULL AND VOID, THE SAME IS IMMATERIAL SINCE THE RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS SOLELY THAT OF
RESPONDENT MARTHA S. DAVID.

F. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED BY NOT RULING THAT ASSUMING

THE SALE WAS VOID, ON GROUNDS OF EQUITY MARTHA S. DAVID SHOULD REIMBURSE
PETITIONER OF HIS PAYMENT WITH LEGAL INTEREST.[20]

Petitioners Arguments

Titan is claiming that it was a buyer in good faith and for value, that the property was Marthas
paraphernal property, that it properly relied on the SPA presented by Martha, and that the RTC
erred in giving weight to the alleged expert testimony to the effect that Manuels signature on the
SPA was spurious. Titan also argues, for the first time, that the CA should have ordered Martha to
reimburse the purchase price paid by Titan.

Our Ruling

The petition is without merit.

The property is part of the spouses conjugal partnership.

The Civil Code of the Philippines,[21] the law in force at the time of the celebration of the marriage
between Martha and Manuel in 1957, provides:

Article 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

Article 153 of the Civil Code also provides:

Article 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:

(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

xxxx
These provisions were carried over to the Family Code. In particular, Article 117 thereof provides:

Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:

(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

xxxx

Article 116 of the Family Code is even more unequivocal in that [a]ll property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the
name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.

We are not persuaded by Titans arguments that the property was Marthas exclusive property
because Manuel failed to present before the RTC any proof of his income in 1970, hence he could
not have had the financial capacity to contribute to the purchase of the property in 1970; and that
Manuel admitted that it was Martha who concluded the original purchase of the property. In
consonance with our ruling in Spouses Castro v. Miat,[22] Manuel was not required to prove that the
property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Rather, the presumption applies even when
the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.[23] Here, we find that Titan failed
to overturn the presumption that the property, purchased during the spouses marriage, was part of
the conjugal partnership.

In the absence of Manuels consent, the Deed of Sale is void.

Since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan required the
consent of both spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership. Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code ordains that
(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent, except in cases
provided by law.

Similarly, Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal
property must have the written consent of the other spouse, otherwise, such disposition is
void. Thus:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to
the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as
a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

The Special Power of Attorney purportedly signed by Manuel is spurious and void.

The RTC found that the signature of Manuel appearing on the SPA was not his genuine signature.

As to the issue of the validity or invalidity of the subject Special Power of Attorney x x x the Court
rules that the same is invalid. As aptly demonstrated by plaintiffs evidence particularly the
testimony of expert witness Atty. Desiderio Pagui, which the defense failed to rebut and impeach,
the subject Special Power of Attorney does not bear the genuine signature of plaintiff Manuel David
thus rendering the same as without legal effect.

Moreover, the genuineness and the due execution of the Special Power of Attorney was placed in
more serious doubt as the same does not contain the Residence Certificate of the plaintiff and most
importantly, was not presented for registration with the Quezon City Register of Deeds which is a
clear violation of Sec. 64 of P.D. No. 1529.
As regards defendant Titan Construction Corporations assertion that plaintiffs failure to verify his
Reply (wherein the validity of the Special Power of Attorney is put into question) is an implied
admission of its genuineness and due execution, [this] appears at first blush a logical conclusion.
However, the Court could not yield to such an argument considering that a rigid application of the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court will not be given premium when it would obstruct rather
than serve the broader interest of justice.[24]

Titan claims that the RTC gave undue weight to the testimony of Manuels witness, and that expert
testimony on handwriting is not conclusive.

The contention lacks merit. The RTCs ruling was based not only on the testimony of Manuels expert
witness finding that there were significant differences between the standard handwriting of Manuel
and the signature found on the SPA, but also on Manuels categorical denial that he ever signed any
document authorizing or ratifying the Deed of Sale to Titan.[25]

We also note that on October 12, 2004, Titan filed before the CA a Manifestation with Motion for Re-
Examination of Another Document/ Handwriting Expert[26] alleging that there is an extreme
necessity[27] for a conduct of another examination of the SPA by a handwriting expert as it will
materially affect and alter the final outcome[28] of the case. Interestingly, however, Titan filed
on January 6, 2005 a Manifestation/Motion to Withdraw Earlier Motion for Re-Examination of PNP
Laboratory Expert[29] this time praying that its motion for re-examination be withdrawn. Titan
claimed that after a circumspect evaluation, deemed it wise not to pursue anymore said request (re-
examination) as there is a great possibility that the x x x [PNP and the NBI] might come out with
two conflicting opinions and conclusions x x x that might cause some confusion to the minds of the
Honorable Justices in resolving the issues x x x as well as the waste of material time and resources
said motion may result.[30]

In any event, we reiterate the well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of trial courts, when
adopted and confirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive and will generally not be reviewed on
appeal.[31] We are mandated to accord great weight to the findings of the RTC, particularly as
regards its assessment of the credibility of witnesses[32] since it is the trial court judge who is in a
position to observe and examine the witnesses first hand.[33] Even after a careful and independent
scrutiny of the records, we find no cogent reason to depart from the rulings of the courts below.[34]

Furthermore, settled is the rule that only errors of law and not of fact are reviewable by this Court
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This applies with even
greater force here, since the factual findings by the CA are in full agreement with those of the trial
court.[35]
Indeed, we cannot help but wonder why Martha was never subpoenaed by Titan as a witness to
testify on the character of the property, or the circumstances surrounding the transaction with
Titan. Petitioners claim that she could not be found is belied by the RTC records, which show that
she personally received and signed for the summons at her address in Greenhills, San Juan. Titan
neither filed a cross claim nor made any adverse allegation against Martha.

On the Failure to Deny the Genuineness and Due Execution of the SPA

Titan claimed that because Manuel failed to specifically deny the genuineness and due execution of
the SPA in his Reply, he is deemed to have admitted the veracity of said document, in accordance
with Rule 8, Sections 7 and 8,[36] of the Rules of Court.

On this point, we fully concur with the findings of the CA that:

It is true that the reply filed by Manuel alleging that the special power of attorney is a forgery was
not made under oath. However, the complaint, which was verified by Manuel under oath, alleged
that the sale of the subject property executed by his wife, Martha, in favor of Titan was without his
knowledge, consent, and approval, express or implied; and that there is nothing on the face of the
deed of sale that would show that he gave his consent thereto. In Toribio v. Bidin, it was held that
where the verified complaint alleged that the plaintiff never sold, transferred or disposed their
share in the inheritance left by their mother to others, the defendants were placed on adequate
notice that they would be called upon during trial to prove the genuineness or due execution of the
disputed deed of sale. While Section 8, Rule 8 is mandatory, it is a discovery procedure and must be
reasonably construed to attain its purpose, and in a way as not to effect a denial of substantial
justice. The interpretation should be one which assists the parties in obtaining a speedy,
inexpensive, and most important, a just determination of the disputed issues.

Moreover, during the pre-trial, Titan requested for stipulation that the special power of attorney
was signed by Manuel authorizing his wife to sell the subject property, but Manuel refused to admit
the genuineness of said special power of attorney and stated that he is presenting an expert witness
to prove that his signature in the special power of attorney is a forgery. However, Titan did not
register any objection x x x. Furthermore, Titan did not object to the presentation of
Atty. Desiderio Pagui, who testified as an expert witness, on his Report finding that the signature on
the special power of attorney was not affixed by Manuel based on his analysis of the questioned and
standard signatures of the latter, and even cross-examined said witness. Neither did Titan object to
the admission of said Report when it was offered in evidence by Manuel on the ground that he is
barred from denying his signature on the special power of attorney. In fact, Titan admitted the
existence of said Report and objected only to the purpose for which it was offered. In Central Surety
& Insurance Company v. C.N. Hodges, it was held that where a party acted in complete disregard of
or wholly overlooked Section 8, Rule 8 and did not object to the introduction and admission of
evidence questioning the genuineness and due execution of a document, he must be deemed to
have waived the benefits of said Rule. Consequently, Titan is deemed to have waived the mantle of
protection given [it] by Section 8, Rule 8.[37]
It is true that a notarial document is considered evidence of the facts expressed therein.[38] A
notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution[39] and only
clear and convincing evidence will overcome such legal presumption.[40] However, such clear and
convincing evidence is present here. While it is true that the SPA was notarized, it is no less true
that there were defects in the notarization which mitigate against a finding that the SPA was either
genuine or duly executed. Curiously, the details of Manuels Community Tax Certificate are
conspicuously absent, yet Marthas are complete. The absence of Manuels data supports his claim
that he did not execute the same and that his signature thereon is a forgery. Moreover, we have
Manuels positive testimony that he never signed the SPA, in addition to the expert testimony that
the signature appearing on the SPA was not Manuels true signature.
Moreover, there were circumstances which mitigate against a finding that Titan was a buyer in
good faith.

First, TCT No. 156043 was registered in the name of MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal age, Filipino,
married to Manuel A. David but the Deed of Sale failed to include Marthas civil status, and only
described the vendor as MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal age, Filipino citizen, with postal address at 247
Governor Pascual, Navotas, Rizal. And it is quite peculiar that an SPA would have even been
necessary, considering that the SPA itself indicated that Martha and Manuel lived on the same street
(379 and 247 Governor Pascual Street, respectively).

Second, Titans witness Valeriano Hernandez, the real estate agent who brokered the sale between
Martha and Titan, testified that Jerry Yao (Yao), Titans Vice President for Operations (and Titans
signatory to the Deed of Sale), specifically inquired why the name of Manuel did not appear on the
Deed of Sale.[41] This indicates that Titan was aware that Manuels consent may be necessary. In
addition, Titan purportedly sent their representative to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
verify TCT No. 156043, so Titan would have been aware that the SPA was never registered before
the Register of Deeds.

Third, Valeriano Hernandez also testified that during the first meeting between Martha and Yao,
Martha informed Yao that the property was mortgaged to a casino for P500,000.00. Without even
seeing the property, the original title, or the SPA, and without securing an acknowledgment receipt
from Martha, Titan (through Yao) gave Martha P500,000.00 so she could redeem the property from
the casino.[42] These are certainly not actions typical of a prudent buyer.
Titan cannot belatedly claim that the RTC should have ordered Martha to reimburse the
purchase price.
Titan argues that the CA erred in not ruling that, even assuming the sale was void, on grounds of
equity, Martha should reimburse petitioner its payment with legal interest. We note that this equity
argument was raised for the first time before the CA, which disposed of it in this manner:

Anent defendant-appellants claim that the court a quo and this Court never considered the
substantial amount of money paid by it to Martha David as consideration for the sale of the subject
property, suffice it to say that said matter is being raised for the first time in the instant motion for
reconsideration. If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the first
time on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue be disallowed or disregarded
when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate
court.

Nonetheless, record shows that only defendant-appellant was initially sued by plaintiff-appellee in
his complaint for annulment of contract and reconveyance upon the allegation that the sale
executed by his wife, Martha David, of their conjugal property in favor of defendant-appellant was
without his knowledge and consent and, therefore, null and void. In its answer, defendant-appellant
claimed that it bought the property in good faith and for value from Martha David and prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint and the payment of his counterclaim for attorneys fees, moral and
exemplary damages. Subsequently, plaintiff-appellee filed a motion for leave to file amended
complaint by impleading Martha David as a defendant, attaching the amended complaint thereto,
copies of which were furnished defendant-appellant, through counsel. The amended complaint was
admitted by the court a quo in an Order dated October 23, 1996. Martha David was declared in
default for failure to file an answer. The record does not show [that] a cross-claim was filed by
defendant-appellant against Martha David for the return of the amount of
PhP1,500,000.00 it paid to the latter as consideration for the sale of the subject property.
x x x Thus, to hold Martha David liable to defendant-appellant for the return of the
consideration for the sale of the subject property, without any claim therefore being filed
against her by the latter, would violate her right to due process. The essence of due process is
to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of his defense. It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he
should be first informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is
premised.[43] (Emphasis supplied)

While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities,[44] it is equally true that elementary
considerations of due process require that a party be duly apprised of a claim against him before
judgment may be rendered. Thus, we cannot, in these proceedings, order the return of the amounts
paid by Titan to Martha. However, Titan is not precluded by this Decision from instituting the
appropriate action against Martha before the proper court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The July 20, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 67090 which affirmed with modifications the March 7, 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, and its August 31, 2005 Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, are AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the recovery by petitioner Titan Construction
Corporation of the amounts it paid to Martha S. David in the appropriate action before the proper
court.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 171219 September 3, 2012

ATTY. FE Q. PALMIANO-SALVADOR, Petitioner,

vs.
CONSTANTINO ANGELES, substituted by LUZ G. ANGELES*, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on September 16, 2005 dismissing the
petition before it, and its Resolution2dated January 13, 2006, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, be reversed and set aside.

The records reveal the CA's narration of facts to be accurate, to wit:

xxxx

Respondent-appellee ANGELES is one of the registered owners of a parcel of land located at 1287
Castanos Street, Sampaloc, Manila, evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 150872. The
subject parcel of land was occupied by one Jelly Galiga (GALIGA) from 1979 up to 1993, as a lessee
with a lease contract. Subsequently, Fe Salvador (SALVADOR) alleged that she bought on September
7, 1993 the subject parcel of land from GALIGA who represented that he was the owner, being one
in possession. Petitioner-appellant SALVADOR remained in possession of said subject property
from November 1993 up to the present.

On November 18, 1993, the registered owner, the respondentappellee ANGELES, sent a letter to
petitioner-appellant SALVADOR demanding that the latter vacate the subject property, which was
not heeded by petitioner-appellant SALVADOR. Respondent-appellee ANGELES, thru one Rosauro
Diaz, Jr. (DIAZ), filed a complaint for ejectment on October 12, 1994 with the Metropolitan Trial
Court [MeTC] of Manila, Branch 16, docketed as Civil Case No. 146190-CV.

The Assailed Decision of the Trial Courts

The [MeTC] rendered its decision on November 29, 1999 in favor of herein respondent-appellee
ANGELES, the dispositive portion of which reads, to wit:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the
latter and all persons claiming under her to:

1) vacate the parcel of land located at 1287 Castanos Street, Sampaloc, Manila, and
surrender the same to the plaintiff;

2) pay the plaintiff the sum of Php1,000.00 monthly as reasonable compensation for her use
and occupancy of the above parcel of land beginning November 1993 up to the time she has
actually vacated the premises;

3) pay the plaintiff the sum of Php5,000.00 as attorney's fees and the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.

In the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant SALVADOR, she alleged, among others, that DIAZ, who
filed the complaint for ejectment, had no authority whatsoever from respondent-appellee ANGELES
at the time of filing of the suit. Petitioner-appellant SALVADOR's appeal was denied by the
[Regional Trial Court] RTC in a Decision dated March 12, 2003. The Motion for Reconsideration
filed by SALVADOR was denied in an Order dated March 16, 2004.3

Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review, but in a Decision dated September
16, 2005, said petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the factual findings of the
lower courts that Galiga, the person who supposedly sold the subject premises to petitioner, was a
mere lessee of respondent, the registered owner of the land in question. Such being the case, the
lower court ruled that Galiga could not have validly transferred ownership of subject property to
herein petitioner. It was ruled by the CA that there were no significant facts or circumstances that
the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted, thus, it found no reason to overturn the factual
findings of the MeTC and the RTC. A motion for reconsideration of said Decision was denied in a
Resolution dated January 13, 2006.

Hence, the present petition, where one of the important issues for resolution is the effect of Rosauro
Diaz's (respondent's representative) failure to present proof of his authority to represent
respondent (plaintiff before the MeTC) in filing the complaint. This basic issue has been ignored by
the MeTC and the RTC, while the CA absolutely failed to address it, despite petitioner's insistence on
it from the very beginning, i.e., in her Answer filed with the MeTC. This is quite unfortunate, because
this threshold issue should have been resolved at the outset as it is determinative of the court's
jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff.

Note that the complaint before the MeTC was filed in the name of respondent, but it was one
Rosauro Diaz who executed the verification and certification dated October 12, 1994, alleging
therein that he was respondent's attorney-in-fact. There was, however, no copy of any document
attached to the complaint to prove Diaz's allegation regarding the authority supposedly granted to
him. This prompted petitioner to raise in her Answer and in her Position Paper, the issue of Diaz's
authority to file the case. On December 11, 1995, more than a year after the complaint was filed,
respondent attached to his Reply and/or Comment to Respondent's (herein petitioner) Position
Paper,4 a document entitled Special Power of Attorney (SPA)5 supposedly executed by respondent
in favor of Rosauro Diaz. However, said SPA was executed only on November 16, 1994, or more
than a month after the complaint was filed, appearing to have been notarized by one Robert F.
McGuire of Santa Clara County. Observe, further, that there was no certification from the Philippine
Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A, that said person is indeed a notary public in
Santa Clara County, California. Verily, the court cannot give full faith and credit to the official acts of
said Robert McGuire, and hence, no evidentiary weight or value can be attached to the document
designated as an SPA dated November 16, 1994. Thus, there is nothing on record to show that Diaz
had been authorized by respondent to initiate the action against petitioner.1âwphi1

What then, is the effect of a complaint filed by one who has not proven his authority to represent a
plaintiff in filing an action? In Tamondong v. Court of Appeals,6 the Court categorically stated that
"[i]f a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff [by one] who is not authorized to do so, the
complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence,
the court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint
and the plaintiff."7 This ruling was reiterated in Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance
Company,8 where the Court went on to say that "[i]n order for the court to have authority to dispose
of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Courts
acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and to be bound by a
decision, a party should first be subjected to the court's jurisdiction. Clearly, since no valid
complaint was ever filed with the [MeTC], the same did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
respondent [plaintiff before the lower court]."9

Pursuant to the foregoing rulings, therefore, the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over this case
and all proceedings before it were null and void. The courts could not have delved into the very
merits of the case, because legally, there was no complaint to speak of. The court's jurisdiction
cannot be deemed to have been invoked at all.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court in Civil Case No. 146190, dated November 29, 1999; the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
in Civil Case No. 00-96344, dated March 12, 2003; and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 83467, are SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The complaint filed by respondent before the
Metropolitan Trial Court is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

AUGUSTUS GONZALES andSPOUSES G.R. No. 167398

NESTOR VICTOR andMA. LOURDES
RODRIGUEZ,
Present:
Petitioners,

CARPIO,* J.,
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
BRION,**
-versus-
PERALTA, and
SERENO,*** JJ.

Promulgated:
QUIRICO PE,
Respondent.
August 9, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision[1] dated June
23, 2004 and Resolution[2] dated February 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Twentieth
Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 73171, entitled Quirico Pe v. Honorable Judge Rene Hortillo, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 31, Augustus Gonzales and Spouses
Engr. Nestor Victor and Dr. Ma. Lourdes Rodriguez, which granted the petition of respondent Quirico
Pe. The CA Decision reversed and set aside the Order[3] dated September 23, 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 31, which dismissed respondent's appeal for non-payment of
docket and other lawful fees, and directing the issuance of the writ of execution for the
implementation of its Decision[4] dated June 28, 2002 in favor of the petitioners and against the
respondent. The CA Decision also directed the RTC to assess the appellate docket fees to be paid by
the respondent, if it has not done so, and allow him to pay such fees and give due course to his
appeal.

The antecedents are as follows:

Respondent Quirico Pe was engaged in the business of construction materials, and had been
transacting business with petitioner Spouses Nestor Victor Rodriguez and Ma. Lourdes
Rodriguez. The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) awarded two contracts in favor
of petitioner Nestor Rodriguez for the following projects, namely, construction of Lanot-Banga Road
(Kalibo Highway) km. 39 + 200 to km. 40 + 275 Section IV (Aklan side) and concreting of Laua-an
Pandan Road (Tibial-Culasi Section), Province of Antique. In 1998, respondent agreed to supply
cement for the construction projects of petitioner Spouses Rodriguez. Petitioner Nestor Rodriguez
availed of the DPWHs pre-payment program for cement requirement regarding the Lanot-Banga
Road, Kalibo Highway project (Kalibo project), wherein the DPWH would give an advance payment
even before project completion upon his presentment, among others, of an official receipt for the
amount advanced. Petitioner Nestor Rodriguez gave Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Check No.
6563066 to respondent, which was signed by co-petitioners (his wife Ma. Lourdes Rodriguez and
his business partner Augustus Gonzales), but leaving the amount and date in blank. The blank LBP
check was delivered to respondent to guarantee the payment of 15,698 bags of Portland cement
valued at P1,507,008.00, covered by Official Receipt No. 1175,[5] issued by respondent (as owner of
Antique Commercial), in favor of petitioner Nestor Rodriguez (as owner of Greenland
Builders).However, a year later, respondent filled up blank LBP Check No. 6563066, by
placing P2,062,000.00 and June 30, 1999, corresponding to the amount and date.

On December 9, 1999, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint[6] for Declaration of Payment,

Cancellation of Documents and Damages against respondent with the RTC, Branch 31, Iloilo City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 25945. The amended complaint alleged that they entrusted blank LBP
Check No. 6563066 to respondent so as to facilitate the approval of the pre-payment application of
petitioner Nestor Rodriguez with the DPWH. They stated that the blank LBP check would serve as
collateral to guarantee the payment for 15,698 bags to be used for the Kalibo project, amounting
to P1,507,008.00, and that after payment of the said amount, respondent would return the LBP
check. According to them, after having paid respondent the amount of P2,306,500.00, which
is P139,160.00 more than the amount of P2,167,340.00 (representing the value for 23,360 bags of
cement taken for the Kalibo project), they were cleared of any liability.

On January 6, 2000, respondent filed an Answer to Amended Complaint,[7] averring that he had so
far delivered 40,360 bags of cement to petitioners who remitted P2,306,500.00, thereby leaving an
outstanding amount of P2,062,000.00. He countered that when petitioners stopped the bank-to-
bank online payments to him, he filled up the amount of P2,062,000.00 and made the LBP check
payable on June 30, 1999. The LBP check was dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds
(DAIF). By way of compulsory counterclaim, he sought recovery of the balance of P2,062,000.00,
with interest at 24% from January 29, 1999 until fully paid as actual damages.
In the Pre-trial Order[8] dated January 28, 2000, the trial court determined the following to be the
delimited issues, to wit:

(1) whether plaintiffs [herein petitioners] liability to defendant [herein respondent] for 15,698
bags priced at P1,507,008.00 subject of the earlier-mentioned pre-payment program and covered
by the blank LBP Check No. 6563066 has already been paid, hence, plaintiffs are no longer liable to
the defendant for this amount;

(2) whether this LBP Check No. 6563066 should not be returned by defendant to plaintiffs, or
failing in which, should now be declared as cancelled, null and void;

(3) whether plaintiffs have completely paid to the defendant the price of the cement used for the
Kalibo project which specifically is the amount of 23,360 bags of cement valued in the total amount
of P2,167,340.00;

(4) whether plaintiffs are entitled to damages and attorneys fees; and

(5) whether this case be dismissed and with the dismissal of the complaint to proceed with the
counterclaim.[9]

In a Decision dated June 28, 2002, the trial court, applying Section 14[10] of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, found that respondents subsequent filling up of LBP Check No. 6563066 in the
amount of P2,062,000.00 was not made strictly in accordance with the authority given to him by
petitioner Nestor Rodriguez, and that since one year had already lapsed, the same was not done
within a reasonable time. As to the 23,360 bags of cement for the Kalibo project, valued
at P2,167,340.00 which was subject of previous transactions, the trial court ruled that the same had
been fully paid and considered a settled issue. Consequently, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
the petitioners and against the respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, as
follows:

1. Declaring plaintiffs' obligation to the defendant for the cement supplied for the Kalibo (Lanot-
Banga) Road Construction Project in the amount of P2,167,340.00 as already and fully paid, hence,
plaintiffs are no longer liable to the defendant;
2. Declaring Land Bank Check No. 6563066 dated June 30, 1999 for P2,062,000.00 as null and void
and without any legal effect;

3. Ordering defendant to pay each plaintiff the sums of P100,000.00 as actual

damages; P500,000.00 as moral damages; P200,000.00 as attorney's fees and P2,000.00 per
hearing as appearance fee; P50,000.00 as miscellaneous actual and necessary litigation expenses;
and

4. To pay the costs.

Defendant's counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[11]

After receipt of a copy of the said RTC Decision on July 26, 2002, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal
on July 30, 2002.

In an Order[12] dated August 5, 2002, the trial court gave due course to respondent's appeal, and
directed the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the entire records of the case to the CA.

On August 26, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to Dismiss Appeal, and for
Issuance of Writ of Execution,[13] stating that respondents appeal should be dismissed as the same
was not perfected due to non-payment of docket and other lawful fees as required under Section 4,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Claiming that since the respondents appeal was not perfected and, as
a consequence, the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002 became final and executory, petitioners
sought the issuance of a writ of execution for the implementation of the said RTC Decision. To
buttress their motion, petitioners also appended a Certification[14] dated August 19, 2002, issued by
the Clerk of Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) of the RTC, Iloilo City, certifying that no
appeal fees in the case had been paid and received by the OCC.

In the Order dated September 23, 2002, the trial court dismissed respondent's appeal and directed
the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002.
On October 2, 2002, the Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Provincial Sheriff of Iloilo issued the Writ of
Execution[15] directing the execution of the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002.

On October 7, 2002, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order,[16] seeking to set aside
the RTC Order dated September 23, 2002 (which dismissed his appeal and directed the issuance of
a writ of execution to implement the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002), and to enjoin the
implementation of the Writ of Execution dated October 2, 2002.
In a Resolution[17] dated October 9, 2002, the CA granted the respondents prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and, in the Resolution[18] dated August 20, 2003, approved the respondents
injunction bond and directed the Division Clerk of Court to issue the writ of preliminary injunction.

On August 20, 2003, the Division Clerk of Court issued the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction,[19] thereby enjoining the implementation of the Writ of Execution dated October 2, 2002.

On June 23, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed order and writ of execution of the Regional Trial
Court must be, as it is hereby, SET ASIDE. The trial court is hereby ordered to assess the appellate
docket fees, if it has not done so, and allow the petitioner to pay such fees and give due course to
the petitioner's appeal. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[20]

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[21] on August 24, 2004, which, however,
was denied by the CA in a Resolution[22] dated February 23, 2005.

Hence, petitioner filed this present petition raising the sole issue that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT
AND ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO BELATEDLY PAY THE REQUIRED APPELLATE DOCKET AND
OTHER LEGAL FEES.
Petitioners allege that since respondent failed to pay the docket and other legal fees at the time he
filed the Notice of Appeal, his appeal was deemed not perfected in contemplation of the law. Thus,
petitioners pray that the CA decision be set aside and a new one be rendered dismissing the
respondents appeal and ordering the execution of the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002.

On the other hand, respondent, citing Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, maintains that his
appeal has been perfected by the mere filing of the notice of appeal. Respondent theorizes that with
the perfection of his appeal, the trial court is now divested of jurisdiction to dismiss his appeal and,
therefore, only the CA has jurisdiction to determine and rule on the propriety of his appeal. He
raises the defense that his failure to pay the required docket and other legal fees was because the
RTC Branch Clerk of Court did not make an assessment of the appeal fees to be paid when he filed
the notice of appeal.

The petition is meritorious.

In cases of ordinary appeal, Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the appeal to the
CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the RTC (the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from) and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.Section 3 thereof states that the appeal
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed
from. Concomitant with the filing of a notice of appeal is the payment of the required appeal fees
within the 15-day reglementary period set forth in Section 4 of the said Rule. Thus,

SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within the period for taking an appeal, the
appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said
fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on
appeal.

In reversing the ruling of the trial court, the CA cited Yambao v. Court of Appeals[23] as justification
for giving due course to respondents petition and ordering the belated payment of docket and other
legal fees. In Yambao, the CA dismissed therein petitioners appeal from the RTC decision for failure
to pay the full amount of the required docket fee. Upon elevation of the case, the Court, however,
ordered the CA to give due course to their appeal, and ruled that their subsequent payment of
the P20.00 deficiency, even before the CA had passed upon their motion for reconsideration, was
indicative of their good faith and willingness to comply with the Rules.
The ruling in Yambao is not applicable to the present case as herein respondent never made any
payment of the docket and other lawful fees, not even an attempt to do so, simultaneous with his
filing of the Notice of Appeal. Although respondent was able to file a timely Notice of Appeal,
however, he failed to pay the docket and other legal fees, claiming that the Branch Clerk of Court did
not issue any assessment. This procedural lapse on the part of the respondent rendered his appeal
with the CA to be dismissible and, therefore, the RTC Decision, dated June 28, 2002, to be final and
executory.

In Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo,[24] as with other subsequent cases[25] of the same ruling, the Court
explained that the procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as
the payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and
jurisdictional. It bears stressing that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. An
ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made within 15 days
from notice. And within this period, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from. The requirement of paying the full amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed
period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. The payment of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is
not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. Further, under Section 1
(c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on
the ground of the non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period
as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an
indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.

Respondents claim that his non-payment of docket and other lawful fees should be treated as
mistake and excusable negligence, attributable to the RTC Branch Clerk of Court, is too superficial
to warrant consideration. This is clearly negligence of respondent's counsel, which is not
excusable. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could
not have guarded against.[26] Respondent's counsel filed a notice of appeal within the reglementary
period for filing the same without, however, paying the appellate docket fees. He simply ignored the
basic procedure of taking an appeal by filing a notice of appeal, coupled with the payment of the full
amount of docket and other lawful fees. Respondents counsel should keep abreast of procedural
laws and his ignorance of the procedural requirements shall bind the respondent. In National Power
Corporation v. Laohoo,[27] we ruled that therein counsels failure to file the appeal in due time does
not amount to excusable negligence. The non-perfection of the appeal on time is not a mere
technicality. Besides, to grant therein petitioners plea for the relaxation of the rules on technicality
would disturb a well-entrenched ruling that could make uncertain when a judgment attains finality,
leaving the same to depend upon the resourcefulness of a party in concocting implausible excuses
to justify an unwarranted departure from the time-honored policy of the law that the period for the
perfection of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional.
The CA took cognizance over the case, based on the wrong premise that when the RTC issued the
Order dated August 5, 2002 giving due course to respondents Notice of Appeal and directing the
Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the entire records of the case to the CA, it ipso facto lost
jurisdiction over the case. Section 9,[28] Rule 41 of the Rules explains that the court of origin loses
jurisdiction over the case only upon the perfection of the appeal filed in due time by the appellant
and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. Withal, prior to the transmittal of the
original records of the case to the CA, the RTC may issue orders for the protection and preservation
of the rights of the prevailing party, as in this case, the issuance of the writ of execution because the
respondents appeal was not perfected.
Moreover, Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules states that the CA may dismiss an appeal taken from the
RTC on the ground of non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the 15-day
reglementary period:

SEC 13. Dismissal of appeal. Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to
the appellate court, the trial court may motu proprio or on motion dismiss the appeal for having
been taken out of time, or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period. (As amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, May 1, 2000.)

Since respondents appeal was not perfected within the 15-day reglementary period, it was as if no
appeal was actually taken. Therefore, the RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on pending incidents
lodged before it, such as the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, to Dismiss Appeal, and for
Issuance of Writ of Execution, filed on August 26, 2002, which sought to set aside its Order dated
August 5, 2002 that gave due course to respondents Notice of Appeal, and directed the issuance of a
writ of execution. Having no jurisdiction over the case, the prudent thing that the CA should have
done was to dismiss the respondents appeal for failure to pay the appeal fees, and declare that the
RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002 has now become final and executory.

As an incidental matter on the propriety of petitioners petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules, respondent raises the argument that since the subject of the present petition is the
writ of preliminary injunction granted by the CA (in favor of the respondent enjoining the execution
of the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002), in CA-G.R. SP No. 73171, which is interlocutory in nature,
petitioners petition should be denied for being the wrong remedy. In other words, respondent
advances the theory that since the assailed CA Decision dated June 23, 2004 partakes of an
interlocutory order, i.e., enjoining the finality of the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002, petitioners
should have availed of the remedy of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Respondents argument is unfounded. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the
CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is not identical to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. Rule 45 provides that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in
any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to Us
by filing a petition for review on certiorari, which would be but a continuation of the appellate
process over the original case.[29]Therefore, petitioners filing of the present petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper and adequate remedy to challenge the Decision dated June
24, 2004 and Resolution dated February 23, 2005 of the CA.

To recapitulate, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the
requirements of the rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal.[30] The rules
require that from the date of receipt of the assailed RTC order denying ones motion for
reconsideration, an appellant may take an appeal to the CA by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC
and paying the required docket and other lawful fees with the RTC Branch Clerk of Court, within the
15-day reglementary period for the perfection of an appeal. Otherwise, the appellant's appeal is not
perfected, and the CA may dismiss the appeal on the ground of non-payment of docket and other
lawful fees. As a consequence, the assailed RTC decision shall become final and executory and,
therefore, the prevailing parties can move for the issuance of a writ of execution.

Since the CA erroneously took cognizance over the case, its Decision dated June 23, 2004 and
Resolution dated February 23, 2005 should be overturned, and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
issued on August 20, 2003 should likewise be lifted. Thus, the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002 is
reinstated and, as the said decision having become final and executory, the case is remanded for its
prompt execution.

While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of
his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within the
reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It raises jurisdictional problem, as it deprives the
appellate court of its jurisdiction over the appeal.After a decision is declared final and executory,
vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within
the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
decision on the case.[31]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 23, 2004 and Resolution dated
February 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 73171, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction, issued by the Court of Appeals on August 20, 2003,
is LIFTED.

The Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Iloilo City
is REINSTATED and, in view of its finality, the case is REMANDED for its prompt execution.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156829. June 8, 2004]
RAMON D. MONTENEGRO, petitioner, vs. MA. TERESA L. MONTENEGRO, for herself and as the
mother and natural guardian of the minors, ANTONIO AMELO and ANA MARIA PIA ISABEL,
both surnamed MONTENEGRO, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioner Ramon D. Montenegro seeks the reversal of the 8 November 2002 Order[1] in Civil Case
No. 94-8467 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Bacolod City, holding him guilty of indirect
contempt for his repeated failure to appear at the scheduled hearings for his examination as
judgment obligor and imposing on him the penalty of three (3) months imprisonment and a fine of
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000), and of the subsequent 3 January 2003 Order[2] denying his
motion for the reconsideration of the 8 November 2002 Order.
On 14 June 1994, respondent Ma. Teresa V. Lizares-Montenegro (hereinafter, respondent Teresa),
for herself and as mother and guardian of her two minor children Antonio Amelo and Ana
Maria Pia Isabel, filed with the trial court below a complaint for support against her husband,
herein petitioner Ramon D. Montenegro. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 94-8467. Four
years after the filing of the complaint, petitioner and respondent Teresa executed a compromise
agreement which was submitted to the trial court for approval on 13 October 1998. On the same
date, the trial court rendered a Decision approving the compromise agreement and ordering the
parties to comply with it. The parties did not appeal from the Decision; hence, it became final and
executory.
Under the terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner obligated himself to:
(1) Pay the respondent the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000) representing her entire share
in their conjugal partnership of gains, Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000) of which is payable upon
signing of the compromise agreement while the remaining balance of Five Hundred Thousand
(P500,000) must be paid within one (1) year from the execution of the compromise agreement.
(2) Establish a trust fund in the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000) in favor of his children
Antonio Amelo and Ana Maria Pia Isabel within sixty (60) days from the approval of the
compromise agreement.
(3) Obtain an educational plan or an investment plan to cover tuition and other matriculation fees
for the college education of Ana Maria Pia Isabel within one (1) year from the approval of the
compromise agreement.
Since petitioner failed to comply with his obligations under the compromise agreement despite the
lapse of the periods provided therein, respondent Teresa filed a motion for the execution of the
judgment. The trial court granted the motion and issued a writ of execution on 15 February 1999.
A second writ of execution and a notice of garnishment, issued by the trial court on 21 May
2001 and on 28 May 2001, respectively, were returned unsatisfied.
In several conferences[3] called by the trial court, petitioner admitted his failure to comply with his
obligations under the compromise agreement but alleged that he was no longer in a position to do
so as he was already insolvent. In the conference held on 6 March 2002, respondent Teresa
manifested that she would file a motion for examination of petitioner as judgment obligor. The trial
court gave her 30 days within which to file the appropriate motion and informed petitioner that he
would have 30 days to file a comment or reply to the motion.
On 14 March 2002, respondent Teresa filed a motion to examine petitioner as judgment obligor
under Sections 36 and 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In her motion, she alleged that there is an
urgency for the examination to be conducted at the earliest time since petitioner was about to
migrate to Canada. Acting on the said motion, the trial court issued on 19 March 2002 an Order
granting the motion for examination of petitioner as judgment obligor and setting his examination
on 22 March 2002. On the same day the motion for examination was granted, petitioner filed with
the court a Manifestation alleging that the grant of the motion for examination was premature
because he still would have 30 days from receipt of the motion, or until April 14, 2002, within
which to file a comment or opposition thereto as agreed upon during the conference on 6 March
2002.
On 22 March 2002, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared for the scheduled hearing. On that
date, the trial court issued an order re-scheduling the hearing to 10 April 2002 and requiring the
petitioner to explain why he should not be held in contempt of court for disobeying the 19 March
2002 Order.
On 26 March 2002, petitioner filed a Compliance with Motion to Re-schedule Proceedings. He
explained that he did not attend the 22 March 2002 hearing because he was under the impression
that he still had 30 days from the filing of the motion to examine him as judgment obligor within
which to respond to the motion; besides, his counsel was not available on 22 March 2002 due to
previously scheduled hearings.
At the hearing on 4 April 2002 of the Compliance with Motion to Re-schedule Proceedings, counsel
for petitioner manifested that his client already left for Canada on 26 March 2002 and will be
unable to attend the 10 April 2002 hearing, and that petitioner would be available for examination
on the last week of July or first week of August 2002. Counsel prayed that the hearing be thus reset
accordingly. The trial court denied the motion and informed the parties that the hearing scheduled
on 10 April 2002 will proceed as scheduled.
On 5 April 2002, petitioner filed a manifestation reiterating that he would be unable to attend
the 10 April 2002 hearing because he was already in Canada. Counsel for petitioner likewise
manifested that he would also be unavailable on the said date because he would be in Manila to
attend to his other cases.
On 17 June 2002, the trial court issued an Order directing the petitioner to show cause why he
should not held in contempt of court for failure to appear on the 10 April 2002 hearing for his
examination as judgment obligor. In his Compliance and Explanation filed on 28 June 2002,
petitioner alleged that he was unable to attend the 10 April 2002 hearing because he was
in Canada and had no intention to abscond from his obligation.
On 13 June 2002, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for the examination of the
petitioner on 3 July 2002. A subpoena was issued against the petitioner and served at his address of
record. Respondent Teresa also caused the service of the subpoena at 8051 Estrella Avenue, San
Antonio Village, Makati City where petitioner is allegedly residing.
The 3 July 2002 hearing did not push through as the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena Ad
Testificandum[4] on 28 June 2002. In the motion, petitioner admitted that 8051 Estrella Avenue, San
Antonio Village, Makati City, is his present address but alleged that Makati City is more than 100
kilometers away from Bacolod City; thus, he may not be compelled by subpoena to attend the 3 July
2002 hearing in Bacolod City. In this motion, petitioner did not allege that he was still in Canada.
In its Order of 2 September 2002, the trial court denied the Motion to Quash Subpoena Ad
Testificandum, but re-scheduled the hearing to 23 October 2002. On 22 October 2002, the day
before the scheduled hearing, petitioner filed a manifestation informing the trial court that he was
still in Canada and would not be able to attend the 23 October 2002 hearing; however, he would be
in Manila on the first week of December 2002. He moved that the hearing be re-scheduled on 9
December 2002. The manifestation, however, did not contain a notice of hearing.
On 23 October 2002, petitioner did not appear at the scheduled hearing, prompting the trial court
to issue an order citing him in contempt of court.
In its Order of 8 November 2002, the trial court declared petitioner in contempt of court under
Section 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court[5] and imposed on him the penalty of imprisonment for
three months and ordered him to pay a fine of P20,000. His motion for reconsideration of the Order
having been denied by the trial court in its Order of 3 January 2003, petitioner filed the petition in
the case at bar.
The petition raises pure questions of law. After the issues were joined, we resolved to give due
course to the petition.
Having raised only questions of law, petitioner is bound by the trial courts findings of fact.
The core issue to be determined is whether, based on the facts found by the trial court, the latter
erred in holding the petitioner guilty of indirect contempt for willfully disobeying the orders of the
trial court requiring him to appear for examination as a judgment obligor at the hearings scheduled
on 22 March 2002, 10 April 2002, and 23 October 2002.
We rule in the negative.
The totality of petitioners acts clearly indicated a deliberate and unjustified refusal to be examined
as a judgment obligor at the time the examination was scheduled for hearing by the trial court. His
acts tended to degrade the authority and respect for court processes and impaired the judiciarys
duty to deliver and administer justice. Petitioner tried to impose his will on the trial court.
Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to
create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed.[6] It is defined as
disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity.[7] The power to
punish contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts; and,
consequently, to the due administration of justice.[8]
The Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely, direct contempt and indirect
contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same, and includes disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an
affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.[9]
On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates particular acts which
constitute indirect contempt, thus:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including
the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment
or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter
into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in
any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of
an order or process of a court held by him.
In relation to the foregoing, Section 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court also provides that a party or
other person may be compelled, by an order or subpoena, to attend before the court or
commissioner to testify as provided in the two preceding sections, and upon failure to obey such
order or subpoena or to be sworn, or to answer as a witness or to subscribe his deposition, may be
punished for contempt as in other cases. This provision relates specifically to Section 3(b) of Rule
71 of the Rules of Court.
Indirect contempt may either be initiated (1) motu proprio by the court by issuing an order or any
other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt or (2) by the filing of a verified petition, complying with the requirements for filing
initiatory pleadings.[10] In the present case, the trial court initiated the proceedings for indirect
contempt by issuing two orders[11] directing the petitioner to show cause why he should not be
punished for indirect contempt.
Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal depending on the nature and effect of
the contemptuous act. Criminal contempt is conduct directed against the authority and dignity of
the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which
tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.[12] On the other hand, civil contempt is the
failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing
party therein and is therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order was
made.[13] If the purpose is to punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it is
civil.[14]
In the present case, the contemptuous act was the petitioners refusal to attend a hearing for his
examination as judgment obligor, upon motion by the respondent Teresa. It must be pointed out
that the purpose of Section 36 of Rule 39 is to provide the judgment obligee a remedy in case where
the judgment obligor continues to fail to comply with its obligation under the judgment. Petitioners
refusal to be examined, without justifiable reason, constituted indirect contempt which is civil in
nature.
Petitioners deliberate willfulness and even malice in disobeying the orders of the trial court are
clearly shown in the pleadings he himself had filed before the trial court.
In his Manifestation of 19 March 2002 petitioner insisted on his right to file a reply or comment on
the Motion to Examine Defendant as Judgment Obligor until 14 April 2002 solely on the basis of the
purported agreement at the conference on 6 March 2002. Petitioner merely brushed aside the
Order of the trial court requiring him to appear on 22 March 2002 for the hearing by not appearing
in court. Petitioner cannot simply assume that his manifestation would suffice for the trial court to
re-schedule the 22 March 2002 hearing. That portion of the manifestation filed by petitioner on 19
March 2002, which reads:
3. In the meantime, we have no other option but to cancel the setting on March 22, 2002 until
Respondent shall have submitted his Reply/Comment and the issue is finally laid to rest by the
issuance of a final Order for that purpose.
demonstrates beyond doubt arrogance, haughtiness and disrespect. While petitioner apparently
disagrees with the 19 March 2002 Order of the trial court, he did not file a motion for its
reconsideration. Neither did he file a motion to reset the scheduled hearing on 22 March
2002. We have ruled that a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.[15] Petitioner sought to deprive the trial court of the
discretion; he took it upon himself to cancel or to order the court to cancel the 22 March
2002 scheduled hearing.
Petitioner makes a belated claim in the present petition that his failure to attend the 22 March
2002 hearing was due to the fact that he was already on his way to Manila on 22 March 2002 in
preparation for his 26 March 2002 trip to Canada. However, such explanation was not stated in
the 19 March 2002 Manifestation and 5 April 2002 Compliance and Motion to Re-schedule
Proceedings. The explanation is either a delayed afterthought or an unguarded confession of a
deliberate plan to delay or even avoid his examination as a judgment obligor.
Neither can petitioner rely on the alleged irregularity in the trial courts grant of the motion to
examine him as judgment obligor before he was able to file a reply or comment. Section 36 of Rule
39 of the Rules of Court allows, as a matter of right, the plaintiff who is a judgment obligee to
examine the defendant as judgment obligor, at any time after the return of the writ of execution is
made. Section 36 reads as follows:
Sec. 36. Examination of judgment obligor when judgment unsatisfied. When the return of a writ of
execution issued against property of a judgment obligor, or any one of several obligors in the same
judgment, shows that the judgment remains unsatisfied, in whole or in part, the judgment obligee,
at any time after such return is made, shall be entitled to an order from the court which
rendered the said judgment, requiring such judgment obligor to appear and be examined
concerning his property and income before such court or before a commissioner appointed by it, at
a specified time and place; and proceedings may thereupon be had for the application of the
property and income of the judgment obligor towards the satisfaction of the judgment. But no
judgment obligor shall be so required to appear before a court or commissioner outside the
province or city in which such obligor resides or is found. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in scheduling the examination of petitioner
on 22 March 2002. On the contrary, it acted with utmost judiciousness to avoid a miscarriage of
justice because petitioner was reported to be about to leave for Canada, a fact which petitioner did
not refute in his Manifestation of 19 March 2002.
It is noteworthy that while petitioner insisted that he still had until 14 April 2002 to file a reply or
comment on the motion for examination, he also manifested through counsel on 5 April 2002 that
he already left for Canada on 26 March 2002 and will not be back until the last week of July or the
first week of August 2002. It is obvious then that petitioner wanted to gain time to avoid being
examined.
With respect to the 10 April 2002 hearing, it is established that petitioner was already in Canada at
the time of the scheduled hearing. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the re-scheduling of the
hearing to 10 April 2002 was brought about by his unjustifiable failure to attend the 22 March
2002 hearing.
Subsequently, despite petitioners 19 March 2002 and 5 April 2002 manifestations that he would
return to the Philippines sometime during the last week of July or first week of August 2002,
petitioner did not attend the 23 October 2002 hearing. Again, instead of filing a motion to reset the
hearing, petitioner filed a manifestation the day before the scheduled hearing, informing the court
that he will be unable to attend the hearing and suggesting the hearing to be reset to 9 December
2002. Such manifestation to re-schedule the 23 October 2002 hearing was, for all intents and
purposes, a motion to postpone the hearing, but the pleading did not contain a notice of hearing.
It is of no moment that petitioner was eventually examined as judgment obligor on 17 December
2002, nine months after the original setting. His subsequent appearance at the hearing did not wipe
out his contemptuous conduct.
We shall now take up the penalties imposed by the trial court.
Under Section 7 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person found guilty of contempt of court against
a Regional Trial Court may be punished with a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. The penalties of imprisonment for three
months and a fine of twenty thousand pesos are within the allowable penalties the trial court may
impose. However, the penalties of imprisonment and fine may be imposed one at a time, or
together.
In the present case, the nature of the contemptuous acts committed are civil in nature. Section 7 of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides for indefinite incarceration in civil contempt proceedings to
compel a party to comply with the order of the court. This may be resorted to where the attendant
circumstances are such that the non-compliance with the court order is an utter disregard of the
authority of the court which has then no other recourse but to use its coercive power.[16] It has been
held that when a person or party is legally and validly required by a court to appear before it for a
certain purpose, when that requirement is disobeyed, the only remedy left for the court is to use
force to bring such person or party before it.[17]
The reason for indefinite incarceration in civil contempt proceedings, in proper cases, is that it is
remedial, preservative, or coercive in nature. The punishment is imposed for the benefit of a
complainant or a party to a suit who has been injured. Its object is to compel performance of the
orders or decrees of the court, which the contemnor refuses to obey although able to do so.[18] In
effect, it is within the power of the person adjudged guilty of contempt to set himself free.
In the present case, however, the act which the trial court ordered the petitioner to do has already
been performed, albeit belatedly and not without delay for an unreasonable length of time. As such,
the penalty of imprisonment may no longer be imposed despite the fact that its non-
implementation was due to petitioners absence in the Philippines.
We are not unmindful of the nature of the judgment from which the present controversy arose. Six
years have elapsed from the time the compromise agreement for the support of the children of
petitioner and respondent was executed. We take judicial notice of the amount of expenses which a
travel outside the country, particularly to Canada, entails, much more so when the person traveling
to Canada is trying to establish himself in the said country as an immigrant. Petitioners claim for
insolvency is negated by his frequent travels to Canada. We thus exhort the parties, specifically the
petitioner, to resort to all reasonable means to fully satisfy the judgment for support based on the
compromise agreement, for the paramount interests of their minor children.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 8 November 2002 Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 94-8467 is modified. As modified, the
penalty of imprisonment is deleted therefrom, while the penalty of fine of P20,000 is affirmed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.