Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990 wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.
Salas & Villareal for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court
of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio)
affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 13207 for partition,
reconveyance of ownership and possession and damages, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and
against defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be
divided into two (2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff and one-
half for defendant. From both shares shall be equally deducted the
expenses for the burial, mausoleum and related expenditures.
Against the share of defendants shall be charged the expenses for
scholarship, awards, donations and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Memorial Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire
estate property, including but not limited to, specific items
already mentioned in this decision and to render an accounting of
the property of the estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt
of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce shall belong to
plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of
litigation; P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author
of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a
bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces.
His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia
Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the
private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased
father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his
marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban,
Jr. was born.
up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land
in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother,
Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal
property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child,
Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her
son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were
transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt
Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to
honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college
education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26,1977 without
having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with
Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place
his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties
came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia
agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted by her in
her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978" which she
filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the
immediately preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also the
relative of the deceased within the third degree, she being the
younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the
decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the petition they
(petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have
agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides
they have closely known each other due to their filiation to the
decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are
not far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis
supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings
leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the
advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her
appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.
(Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of
administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased;
and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting,
the estate be adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended
petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She
explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the properties of the
estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's
nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the
1
disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be
facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the
sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay
the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up
the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be
registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 17,1981 under Reg.
No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a
motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole
heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On October
27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record).
Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 (or one year
and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for
partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No.
13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment
pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of
the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred
that the properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and were in
the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation." The trial
court denied her motions for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA GR CV
No. 09010). On January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered
judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in toto.Hence, this petition
for review wherein she raised the following legal issues:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to
entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of
Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana,
Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) were
still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in
Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva
troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third
degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she
had agreed to place the same in the Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that
conformably with said agreement, the Foundation has been formed
and properties of the estate have already been transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction—
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's
contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to
entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share
of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc.
No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the
same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the
administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate
to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the
estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate
proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the
administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367,
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29,
1974, 56 SCRA 266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as
the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the
proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed the
administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The pertinent portions
of the order are quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss
Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it appears
from the record that despite the notices posted and the publication
of these proceedings as required by law, no other heirs came out
to interpose any opposition to the instant proceeding. It further
appears that herein Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to
the estate of the late Esteban Javellana who died on February 26,
1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March
17, 1978, it was established that the late Esteban Javellana died
single, without any known issue, and without any surviving
parents. His nearest relative is the herein Administratrix, an
elder [sic] sister of his late mother who reared him and with whom
he had always been living with [sic] during his lifetime.
x x x x x x x x x
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is
hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of the late Esteban S.
Javellana, who died intestate on February 26, 1977 at La Paz,
Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the
settlement of this estate so that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-
16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of
First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order
declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia)
declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was
properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court denied
2
her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on
certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one
year later, a separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We
hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court
that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate
proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111,
117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of partition
executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same. The finality of the approval of the project of The probate
court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution,
has power to determine the proportion or parts to which each
distributed is entitled. ... The power to determine the legality
or illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the
jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal distribution of
the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and independent action
is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the general
tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits;
and is further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino
v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of
the decedent is exclusively within the range of the administratrix
proceedings and can not properly be made an independent action.
(Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper.
(Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate
proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29,
1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the
order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied
with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a judicial
partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the
heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the
prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia,
83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has
not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper
motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for
reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had
already been closed, and not through an independent action, which
would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a
decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final
and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and
disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v.
Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil.
1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107
Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis supplied)
In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the
special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased
Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed
that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese
woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties
acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case
declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that
the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa
Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled
that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent)
is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of
the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue,
and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of
partition. (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed
and terminated for over three years, the action for annulment of the project of
partition was allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant case, the
estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless, Concordia had lost her
right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have opted
likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting
aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on the ground of
extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia
to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring
the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of the
estate, were improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters he within
the exclusive competence of the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud—
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings
by extrinsic fraud employed by Celedonia? It is noteworthy that extrinsic fraud
was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It was
only in her amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud was alleged
for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act
or conduct of the prevailing party which prevented a fair
submission of the controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714).
A fraud 'which prevents a party from having a trial or presenting
all of his case to the court, or one which operates upon matters
pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner by which
such judgment was procured so much so that there was no fair
submission of the controversy. For instance, if through fraudulent
machination by one [his adversary], a litigant was induced to
withdraw his defense or was prevented from presenting an available
defense or cause of action in the case wherein the judgment was
obtained, such that the aggrieved party was deprived of his day
3
 in court through no fault of his own, the equitable relief against
such judgment may be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July
31, 1971). (cited in Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno;
Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral
fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which connotes any
fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the
trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents,
attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented
from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. ... The
overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court
or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that
affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court. (Libudan v.
Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29; Sterling Investment
Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318, 323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended
to be filed by Celedonia. She admitted in her complaint that she
and Celedonia had agreed that the latter would "initiate the
necessary proceeding" and pay the taxes and obligations of the
estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her complaint alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate
of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the lowest possible cost and
the least effort, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the
defendant shall initiate the necessary proceeding, cause the
payment of taxes and other obligations, and to do everything else
required by law, and thereafter, secure the partition of the estate
between her and the plaintiff, [although Celedonia denied that
they agreed to partition the estate, for their agreement was to
place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis
supplied)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. She
stayed away by choice. Besides, she knew that the estate came exclusively from
Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with Celedonia to place
it in a foundation as the deceased had planned to do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the
time and place of hearing of the petition is required to be
published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules
of Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's original petition
was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and 9,
1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of
her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for the settlement of the
estate was, by order of the court, published in "Bagong Kasanag"
(New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305,
Record). The publication of the notice of the proceedings was
constructive notice to the whole world. Concordia was not deprived
of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she had actual,
as well as constructive notice of the same. As pointed out by the
probate court in its order of October 27, 1978:
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about
five months after Celedonia Solivio was declared as the sole heir.
... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly
published as required by law, despite which the present movant
only came to court now, then she is guilty of laches for sleeping
on her alleged right. (p. 22, Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a
petition for relief from judgment nor a motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of
probate court and proceeding was in rem no subsequent errors or
irregularities are available on collateral attack. (Bedwell v.
Dean 132 So. 20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban
within the third degree on his mother's side was not false. Moreover, it was made
in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of Esteban had
come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving relative
on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have been self-
defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she stated in her
petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not
constitute extrinsic fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters
which would defeat one's own claim or defense is not such extrinsic
fraud as will justify or require vacation of the judgment. (49
C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National
Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v.
Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate
may be filed by any "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of Court). The
filing of Celedonia's petition did not preclude Concordia from filing her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal—
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was
subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within
the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of the Civil
Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law
4
 for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and
who belong to the line from which said property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the
ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his
descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the
reservees (reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree
counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the
line from which the property came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title
and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by
operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956
Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable
property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother,
Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore,
he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt,
Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's
side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a
descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It
does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the
reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces,
what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009
of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with
the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor
children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives
of the decedent within the third degree in the collateral line,
each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate 'without
distinction of line or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2)
share and share alike of the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share—
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased
to the foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
(from whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her
"Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed
in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner
Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to
make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have
closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent
and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far
away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not
waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of
Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which
Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and to
finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial
admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the
agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank,
L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968,
24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478; and
Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly,
did not even testify in the case, although she could have done so by deposition
if she were supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only her husband, Narciso,
and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively participated in the trial. Her husband
confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia, but he endeavored to
dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend to give all, but only one-
half, of her share to the foundation (p. 323, Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" was
established and duly registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission under
Reg. No. 0100027 for the following principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of
scholarships for such deserving students as the Board of Trustees
of the Foundation may decide of at least one scholar each to study
at West Visayas State College, and the University of the
Philippines in the Visayas both located in Iloilo City.
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St.
Clements Redemptorist Community for a deserving student who has
the religious vocation to become a priest.
5
 3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote
the advancement and enrichment of the various fields of
educational endeavors, especially in literary arts. Scholarships
provided for by this foundation may be named after its benevolent
benefactors as a token of gratitude for their contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to
determine community needs and be able to alleviate partially or
totally said needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper
care of the Solivio-Javellana mausoleum at Christ the King
Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana Memorial at
the West Visayas State College, as a token of appreciation for the
contribution of the estate of the late Esteban S. Javellana which
has made this foundation possible. Also, in perpetuation of his
Roman Catholic beliefs and those of his mother, Gregorian masses
or their equivalents will be offered every February and October,
and Requiem masses every February 25th and October llth, their
death anniversaries, as part of this provision.
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions,
endowments and financial aids or loans from whatever source, to
invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income thereof and pay
or apply only the income or such part thereof as shall be
determined by the Trustees for such endeavors as may be necessary
to carry out the objectives of the Foundation.
7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease,
mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise, invest,
trade, or deal, in any manner permitted by law, in real and
personal property of every kind and description or any interest
herein.
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or
proper for the accomplishments of any of the purposes herein
enumerated or which shall at any time appear conducive to the
protection or benefit of the corporation, including the exercise
of the powers, authorities and attributes concerned upon the
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines in
general, and upon domestic corporation of like nature in
particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:
The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of
its eight Esteban Javellana scholars graduated in 1986, one (1)
from UPV graduated Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU graduated with
honors; one was a Cum Laude and the other was a recipient of Lagos
Lopez award for teaching for being the most outstanding student
teacher.
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso Barangay
High School, the site of which was donated by the Foundation. The
School has been selected as the Pilot Barangay High School for
Region VI.
The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who
would be ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis Xavier
Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation likewise is
a member of the Redemptorist Association that gives yearly
donations to help poor students who want to become Redemptorist
priests or brothers. It gives yearly awards for Creative writing
known as the Esteban Javellana Award.
Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana
Multi-purpose Center at the West Visayas State University for
teachers' and students' use, and has likewise contributed to
religious civic and cultural fund-raising drives, amongst other's.
(p. 10, Rollo)
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation,
Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared
an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate.
However, comformably with the agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia
Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia
Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the
private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an
equal number of trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation
which shall administer the same for the purposes set forth in its charter. The
petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the probate court
an inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory to
terminating the proceedings therein.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176422 March 20, 2013
MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-in-fact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA,
DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all surnamed MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA,
JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS,
ROSA BUENA VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO, LEONILA P. DELOS
SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOS-CABUHAT,
MERCEDITA P. DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P.
DELOS SANTOS, JR., and CECILIA M. MENDOZA,Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
6
REYES, J.:
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a
reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from
which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by
the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.1
The Facts
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in
Sta. Maria, Bulacan: (1) Lot 1681-B, with an area of 7,749 square meters;2 (2)
Lot 1684, with an area of 5,667 sq m;3 and (3) Lot No. 1646-B, with an area of
880 sq m.4 Lot Nos. 1681-B and 1684 are presently in the name of respondent Julia
Delos Santos5(respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other hand, is also in the name
of respondent but co-owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the
property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza
(Dominga). Placido and Dominga had four children: Antonio, Exequiel, married to
Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. Petitioners Maria, Deogracias, Dionisia,
Adoracion, Marcela and Ricardo are the children of Antonio. Petitioners Juliana,
Fely, Mercedes, Elvira and Fortunato, on the other hand, are Valentin’s children.
Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of Placido and Dominga’s
properties that were subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated
to Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, it passed on to his spouse Leonor and only
daughter, Gregoria. After Leonor’s death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992,
Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They claimed that after Gregoria’s
death, respondent, who is Leonor’s sister, adjudicated unto herself all these
properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners
claim that the properties should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf
and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on
reserva troncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as these did
not originate from petitioners’ familial line and were not originally owned by
Placido and Dominga. According to respondent, the properties were bought by
Exequiel and Antonio from a certain Alfonso Ramos in 1931. It appears, however,
that it was only Exequiel who was in possession of the properties.6
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 6, found merit in
petitioners’ claim and granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva
Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance. In its Decision dated November 4,
2002, the RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering respondents (heirs of Julia Policarpio) to reconvey the three
(3) parcels of land subject of this action in the name of the plaintiffs
enumerated in the complaint including intervenor Maria Cecilia M. Mendoza
except one-half of the property described in the old title, TCT No. T-
124852(M) which belongs to Victorina Pantaleon;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the titles in the
name of Julia Policarpio, TCT No. T-149033(M), T-183631(M) and T-149035(M)
and reconvey the same to the enumerated plaintiffs; and
3. No pronouncement as to claims for attorney’s fees and damages and
costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision dated November 16, 2006 provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 4, 2002 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Br. 6, Third Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 is hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same per
Resolution9 dated January 17, 2007.
In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that petitioners failed to establish
that Placido and Dominga owned the properties in dispute.10 The CA also ruled that
even assuming that Placido and Dominga previously owned the properties, it still
cannot be subject to reserva troncal as neither Exequiel predeceased Placido and
Dominga nor did Gregoria predecease Exequiel.11
Now before the Court, petitioners argue that:
A.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES
ARE NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF
THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.
B.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS
MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE
LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.12
Petitioners take exception to the ruling of the CA, contending that it is
sufficient that the properties came from the paternal line of Gregoria for it to
be subject to reserva troncal. They also claim the properties in representation
of their own predecessors, Antonio and Valentin, who were the brothers of
Exequiel.13
Ruling of the Court
7
This petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The general rule in this regard is that it should raise only questions of law.
There are, however, admitted exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the
CA’s findings are contrary to those of the trial court.14 This being the case in
the petition at hand, the Court must now look into the differing findings and
conclusion of the RTC and the CA on the two issues that arise – one, whether the
properties in dispute are reservable properties and two, whether petitioners are
entitled to a reservation of these properties.
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother
or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation
of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong
to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis ours)
There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first
transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or donation, from an
ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the prepositus. The second
transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant
or reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is from
the reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives within the
third degree from which the property came.15
The lineal character of the
reservable property is reckoned
from the ascendant from whom the
prepositus received the property by
gratuitous title
Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reserva troncal
is not applicable.
The fallacy in the CA’s resolution is that it proceeded from the erroneous premise
that Placido is the ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of the Civil Code. From
thence, it sought to trace the origin of the subject properties back to Placido
and Dominga, determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and whether Gregoria
predeceased Exequiel.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received
by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the
property from the prepositus by operation of law; and
(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the
prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the property
came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.16
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned
only from Exequiel’s as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission
occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does
not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal
character of the property.17It was also immaterial for the CA to determine whether
Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased
Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties and he is the
ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the
other hand, is the descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by
gratuitous title.
Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired
by the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative
title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient
does not give anything in return.18 At risk of being repetitious, what was clearly
established in this case is that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel
(ascendant). After his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the
properties as inheritance.
Ascendants, descendants and
collateral relatives under Article
964 of the Civil Code
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be
an ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista) of the
descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregoria’s ascendant; rather, she
is Gregoria’s collateral relative.
Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of degrees among ascendants
and descendants, and those who are not ascendants and descendants but come from
a common ancestor, viz:
8
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or
collateral.1âwphi1 A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees
among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who
are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor. (Emphasis
and italics ours)
Gregoria’s ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her grandparents,
great-grandparents and so on. On the other hand, Gregoria’s descendants, if she
had one, would be her children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Not being
Gregoria’s ascendants, both petitioners and Julia, therefore, are her collateral
relatives. In determining the collateral line of relationship, ascent is made to
the common ancestor and then descent to the relative from whom the computation
is made. In the case of Julia’s collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is
to be made from Gregoria to her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the
common ancestor, that is, Julia and Leonor’s parents (second line/degree), and
then descent to Julia, her aunt (third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregoria’s
collateral relative within the third degree and not her ascendant.
First cousins of the
descendant/prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and cannot be
considered reservees/reservatarios
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are
not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line from which the property came
and upon whom the property last revolved by descent.19 It is Gregoria in this
case. Petitioners are Gregoria’s fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins.
First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees
or reservatarios.20
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin
as Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up
to the third degree from whom the reservable properties came. The only recognized
exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the
right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the
brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within the third degree.21 In
Florentino v. Florentino,22 the Court stated:
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are
relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest
relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person
holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one
more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming
same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives
within the third degree belong to the line from which such property came, inasmuch
as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 now Article 891 is in the
highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of the designated persons
who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the
reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding
degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize
them as such.
x x x Nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios
who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of
the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. x x x.23 (Emphasis
and underscoring ours)
The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the properties are
reservable in character, petitioners cannot benefit from reserva troncal. First,
because Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant
within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code and second, because
petitioners are not Gregoria’s relatives within the third degree. Hence, the CA’s
disposition that the complaint filed with the RTC should be dismissed, only on
this point, is correct. If at all, what should apply in the distribution of
Gregoria’s estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers
or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to determine the proper
distribution of Gregoria’s estate at this point as the cause of action relied
upon by petitioners in their complaint filed with the RTC is based solely on
reserva troncal. Further, any determination would necessarily entail reception
of evidence on Gregoria’s entire estate and the heirs entitled thereto, which is
best accomplished in an action filed specifically for that purpose.
A reservista acquires ownership of
the reservable property until the
reservation takes place or is
extinguished
Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable error in the RTC’s
disposition of the case. In upholding the right of petitioners over the
properties, the RTC ordered the reconveyance of the properties to petitioners and
the transfer of the titles in their names. What the RTC should have done, assuming
for argument’s sake that reserva troncal is applicable, is have the reservable
nature of the property registered on respondent’s titles. In fact, respondent,
as reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the reservable character
of the property on the title.24 In reserva troncal, the reservista who inherits
from a prepositus, whether by the latter’s wish or by operation of law, acquires
the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership.
All the attributes of ownership belong to him exclusively.25
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but
subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the
reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the
reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee
gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee’s
rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death
9
of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the
reservor.26 (Citations omitted)
It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished,27 that a reservatario
becomes, by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property.28 In any
event, the foregoing discussion does not detract from the fact that petitioners
are not entitled to a reservation of the properties in dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 16, 2006 and
Resolution dated January 17, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77694
insofar as it dismissed the Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92
are AFFIRMED. This Decision is without prejudice to any civil action that the
heirs of Gregoria
Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the determination of
ownership of the properties in question.
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S.
Militar alias Sy Quio he sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and
Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua. When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua
contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a
child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving
any issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow
Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage and
sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his first marriage. In Intestate
Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated January 15,
1931 1 adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and
the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la Torre,
the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the
second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze Frias chua; and P1,550.00 in favor
of Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons of the first marriage. By virtue of said
adjudication, Transfer Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483) 2 dated April 28,
1932 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre
and Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.

SO ORDERED. On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate
without any issue. After his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded
to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time or on March 6, 1952,
Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her
favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her
name. Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no
direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except her brother and
sisters.

In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No.

7839-A, the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage and
dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased
Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complaint a
G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977 quo 3 (subseqently segregated as a distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case No.
7839-A) on May 11, 1966 before the respondent Court of First Instance of Negros
IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners, Occidental, Branch V, praying that the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399
vs. which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed to Consolacion de la
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and SUSANA DE LA TORRE, Torre upon the latter's death, be declaredas a reservable property for the reason
in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la that the lot in questionn was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981
Torre, respondents. of the New Civil Code, Private respondent as administratrix of the estate of
individually the complaint of petitioners 4
Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for private respondent.
On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the
Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners. complaint of petitioner. Hence this instant.

The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:

MARTIN, J.: ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
from another ascendat, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed the reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law
complaint of petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A, entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua,
for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and
et al. vs. Susana de la Torre, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of
belong to the line from which said property came.
Consolacion de la Torre"
Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed
with a reservable character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that
10
the property was acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or from a brother
or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue;
(3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and
(4) that there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which said property came. 5 In the case before Us, all of the foregoing requisites
are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias Chua of the second
marriage died intestate in 1952; he died withour leaving any issue; his pro-
indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de
la Torre died, Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the
third degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and
Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias
Chua, who are the petitioners herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisit
of reserva troncal — whether the property in question was acquired by Juanito
Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving
this point, the respondent Court said:
It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the
property in question was not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre
and Juanito Frias Chua gratuitously but for a consideration,
namely, that the legatees were to pay the interest and cost and
other fees resulting from Civil Case No. 5300 of this Court. As
such it is undeniable that the lot in question is not subject tot
a reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code, and as
such the plaintiff's complaint must fail.
We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in
question is not subject to a reserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil
Code. It is, As explained by Manresa which this Court quoted with approval
in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The transmission is gratuitous or by
gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return." It matters
not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges;
what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of
mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the
part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or does
nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, 6 "the
essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from
pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is
evident from the record that the transmission of the property in question to
Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias
Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true
that there is the order (Exh. "D") of the probate Court in Intestate Proceeding
No. 4816 which estates in express terms;
2. — Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de Consolacion de la
Torre, viuda, mayor de edad, y de su hiju, Juanito Frias Chua,
menor de edad, todos residente de San Enrique, Negros Occidental,
I.F.,como herederos del finado Jose Frias Chua Choo, estas
propiadades:
14483
La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399 del Catsatro de
la Carlota, Negros Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadddrados y
cubierto por el Certificado de Titulo No. 11759, en partes equales
pro-indiviso; por con la obligscion de pagar a las Standard Oil
Co. of New York la deuda de P3971.20, sus intereses, costas y
demas gastos resultantes del asunto civil No. 5300de este jusgado
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of
P3,971.20 is imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not
personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by
an order of the court in the Testate Proceeding No.4816 dated January 15, 1931.
As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition
imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity,
itg is gratuitous. it does not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs,
in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standare oil co. of New York the
amount of P3,971.20. This does not change the gratuitous nature of the
transmission of the property to him. This being the case the lot in question is
subject to reserva troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.
It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias
Chua to the respondent heirs or legatees was agreed upon by the heirs in their
project of partition based on the last will and testament of Jose Frias Chua. But
petitioners claim that the supposed Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua
was never probated. The fact that the will was not probated was admitted in
paragraph 6 of the respondents' answer. 7 There is nothing mentioned in the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 7839 A which is the subject of the
present appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931 of the trial court in the
Testate Estate Proceeding No. 4816 nor in the private respondent's brief, that
the Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua has ever been probated. With the
foregoing, it is easy to deduce that if the Last Will and Testament has in fact
been probated there would have been no need for the testamentary heirs to prepare
a project of partition among themselves. The very will itself could be made the
basis for the adjudication of the estate as in fact they did in their project of
partition with Juanito Frias Chua getting one-half of Lot 399 by inheritance as
a sone of the deceased Jose Frias Chua by the latter's second marriage.
According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952 without any
issue. After his death his mother Consolation de la Torre succeeded to his one-
half pro-indiviso share of Lot 399. This was, however, subject to the condition
that the property was reservable in character under Art. 891 of the Civil Code
in favor of relatives within the third degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the
property came. These relatives are the petitioner herein.
It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion
of Lot 399 which originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has already prescribed
when it was filed on May 11, 1966. We do not believe so. It must be remembered
that the petitioners herein are claiming as reservees did not arise until the
time the reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, died in March 1966. When the
petitioners therefore filed their complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion
of Lot 399, they were very much in time to do so.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The
petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are declared
owners of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental is hereby ordered to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796
covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name of Consolacion de la Torre and to issue
a new Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided
11
portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and
Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said lot. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Candelaria Baldovino were declared to be the rightful reservees, and as such,
entitled to the reservable properties (the original reserveess Candelaria Padura
and Manuel Padura, having predeceased the reservista). The instant petition,
dated October 22, 1956, filed by appellants Baldovino seeks to have these
properties partitioned, such that one-half of the same be adjudicated to them,
and the other half to the appellees, allegedly on the basis that they inherit by
right of representation from their respective parents, the original reservees. To
this petition, appellees filed their opposition, maintaining that they should all
(the eleven reservees) be deemed as inheriting in their own right, under which,
they claim, each should have an equal share.

Based on the foregoing finding of facts, the lower court rendered judgment
declaring all the reservees (without distinction) "co-owners, pro-indiviso, equal
shares of the parcels of land" subject matter of the suit.
G. R. No. L-11960
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva
Agustin Padura troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and
belonging to the line of origin, are nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but
REYES, J.B.L., J.: some are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood,
should the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the
nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of
Appeal on a pure question of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of
the half blood?
Laguna in its Special Proceedings No. 4551.
The appellants contend that notwithstanding the reservable character of the
The facts are simple and undisputed. Agustin Padura contracted two marriages
property under Art, 891 of the new Civil Code (Art. 811 of the Code of 1889)
during his lifetime. With his first wife, Gervacia Landig, he had one child whom
the reservatarios nephews of the whole blood are entitled to a share twice as
they named Manuel Padura, and with his second, Benita Garing; he had two children
large as that of the others, in conformity with Arts, 1006, 1008 of the Civil
named Fortunato Padura and Candelaria Padura.
Code of the Philippines (Arts. 949 and 951 of the Code of 1889) on intestate
succession.
Agustin Padura died on April 26, 1908, leaving a last will and testament, duly
probated in Special Proceedings No, 664 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
wherein he bequeathed his properties among his children, Manuel, Candelaria and
Fortunato, and his surviving spouse, Benita Garing. Under the probate proceedings, "Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with
Fortunate was adjudicated four parcels of land covered under Decree No. 25960 brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share
issued In Land Registration Case No. 86 G. L. R. O. No. 10818, object of this double that of the latter.(949)n
appeal.
"Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per
Fortunato Padura died unmarried on May 28, 1908, without having executed a will; capita or per stripes, in accordance with the rules laid down for brothers and
and not having any issue, the said parcels of land were inherited exclusively by sisters of the full blood, (951)"
her mother, Benita Garing. She applied for and later was issued a Torrens
Certificate of Title in her name, but subject to the condition that the properties The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on
were reservable in favor of relatives within the third degree belonging to the the subject. After mature reflection, we have concluded that the position of the
line from which said property came, in accordance with the applicable provision appellants is correct. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily
of law, under a decree of the court dated August 25, 1916, in Land Registration to assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives
Case No. G. L. R. O. No. 10818. belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its
being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant
On August 26, 1934, Candelaria Padura died leaving as her only heirs, her four (reservista). To this end, the Code provides:
legitimate children, the appellants herein, Cristeta, Melania, Anicia and Pablo,
all surnamed Baldovino, Six years later, on October 6, 1940, Manuel Padura also
died. Surviving him are his legitimate children, Dionisia, Felisa, Flora,
"Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
Gornelio, Francisco, Juana, and Severino, all surnamed Padura, the appellees
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother
herein.
or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation
of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong
Upon the death of Benita Garing (the reservista), on October 15, 1952, appellants
to the line from which said property came. (811)"
and appellees took possession of the reservable properties. In a resolution,
dated August 1, 1953, of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Special
Proceedings No. 4551, the legitimate children of the deceased Manuel Padura and

12
It is well known that the reserva troncal had no direct precedent in the law of
Castile. The President of the Spanish Code Commission, D. Manuel Alonso Martinez,
explained the motives for the formulation of the reserva troncal in the Civil
Code of 1889 in his book "El Codigo Civil en sus relaciones con las Legislaciones
Forales" (Madrid, 1884, Vol. 1, pp. 226-228, 233-235) in the following words:
"La base cuarta, á más de estar en pugna con la legislacion española, es una
desviacion del antiguo derecho romano y del moderno derecho europeo, perfectamente
conformes ambos con el tradicional sistema de Castilla. En qué se fundó, pues,
la Comision para semejante novedad? Que razones pudieron moverla á establecer
la sucesion lineal, separándose del cáuce secular?
"Lo diré en breves frases. Hay un case, no del todo raro, que subleva el
sentimiento de cuantos lo imaginan ó lo ven: el hijo mayor de un magnate sucede
á su padre en la mitad Integra de pingues mayorazgos, tocando á sus hermanos un
lote modestisimo en la division de la herencia paterna; aquel hijo se casa y
fallece al poco tiempo dejando un tierno vástago; la viuda, todavia jóven, contrae
segundas bodas y tiene la desdicha de perder al hijo del primer matrimonio
heredando toda su fortuna con exclusion de la madre y los hermanos de su primer
marido. No hay para qué decir que, si hay descendientes del segundo matrimonio,
á ellos se trasmite en su dia la hereticia. Por donde resulta el irritante
espectáculo de que los vástagos directos del magnate viven en la estrechez y tal
vez en la miseria, mientras gozan de su rico patrimonio personas extrañas á su
familia y que, por un órden natural, la son profundamente antipáticas. Esta
hipótesis se puede realizar y se realize, aunque por lo general en menor escala,
entre propietarios, banqueros é industriales. labradores y comerciantes, sin
necesidad de vinculaciones ni titulos nobiliarios.
"Pues bien, la mayoria de la Comision se preocupó vivamente de esto, considerando
el principio de familia como superior al del afecto presumible del difunto. A
esta impresion obedecia la propuesta del Sr. Garcia Goyena, para que á los
ascendientes se les diera su legitima tan sólo en usufructo: en idéntica razon
se apoyaba el Sr. Franco para pedir con insistencia se declarase que, si un
ascendiente tenia hecha una donacion á su descendiente, bien fuese al contraer
matrinionio ó bien con cualquiera otro motivo, y muriese el donatario sin
sucesion, volvieran los bienes donados al donante, sin perjuicio de la legitima
que pudiera corresponderle en su calidad de ascendiente. La Comision no se
atrevió a ir tan allá como estos dos Sres. Vocales; pero, para eludir las
consecuencias que á las veces produce el principio de la proximidad del parentesco
y que he puesto de relieve poco há, proclamó, no sin vacilar, la doctrina de la
sucesion lineal." (pp.226-227)
"Y este fué el temperamento que, por indicacion mia, adoptó la Comision
Codificadora, norabrando una Sub-comision que redactara las bases é que habia de
sujetarse esta especie de reversion de los bienes inmuebles al tronco de donde
procedan, lo mismo en la sucesion testamentaria que en la intestada, sin perjuicio
del derecho sacratisimo de los padres al disfrute de la herencia de sus hijos
malogrados prematuramente.
"Dicha Subcomision, compuesta de los Sres. Durán y Bás y Franco como defensores
del régimen f oral, y de los Sres. Manresa y Garcia Goyena en representacion de
la legislacion castellana, sometieron á la deliberacion de la Comision
Codificadora la proposicion siguiente:
'El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido
por titulo lucrativo de_ otro ascendiente ó de un hermano, se halla obligado á
reservar los que hubiese adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los
parientes del difunto que se hallaran comprendidos dentro del tercer grado y que
lo sean por la parte de donde proceden los bienes.'
"No voy á discutir ahora si esta fórmula es más ó ménos feliz, y si debe aprobarse
tal cual está redactada ó si há menester de enmienda ó adicion. Aplazo este
examen para cuando trate de la sucesion intestada, á la cual tiene mayor
aplicacion. Por el momento me limito á reconocer. primero: que con esta base
desaparece el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen
bruscamente y á titulo gratuito á manos extrañas por el azar de los enlaces y de
muertes prematuras; segundo: que sin negar que sea una novedad esta base del
derecho de Castllla, tiene en rigor en su abono la autoridad de los Códigos más
niveladores y el ejemplo de las naciones más democráticas de Europe, si no en la
extension en que lo presenta la Comision Codificadora, á lo ménos en el principio
generador de la reforma." (pp.233-235)
The stated purpose o£ the reserva is accomplished once property has devolved to
the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is
no further occasion for its application. In the relations between
one reservatario and another of the same degree, there is no call for applying
Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the reversionary
property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In
this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that
upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass,
not to all the reservatorios as a class, but only to those nearest in degree to
the descendant (prepositus) , excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree
(Florentine vs. Florentine, 40 Phil. 489-490; T. S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los
Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the third degree of relationship
from the descendant (prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor
of nephews (Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).
"Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are
re1atives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest
relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person
holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one
more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming
same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came,
inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest
degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within
the third degree of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore,
relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered
as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the
part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree
of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of
reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case
of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. x x x."
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) (see also
Nieva and Alacala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
13
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary
intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are
entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half-blood. If in
determining the rights of thereservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the
right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share
for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives
(reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned; but within that group,
the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules
of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This
conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an
exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed
to accomplish the purpose of the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries
(Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):
"creándose un verdadero estado excepcipnal del derecho, no debe ampliarse, sino
más bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto, manteniendo la excepción mientras
fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando
las reglas generales y fundamentals del Código en materia de sucesión, en aquellos
extremos no resueltos de un raodo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera
de accián de la reserva que se crea."
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil
Code's hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the
suppression of the reserve viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889
(Arts. 812 and 968-980).
There is a third point that deserves consideration. Even during
the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of
the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing
anything that might frustrate their reversionary right: and for this purpose they
can compel the annotation of their right in the Registry of Property even while
the reservista is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295). This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that
corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista. It is likewise clear that the
reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista, who may not
dispose of them by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs.
Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservist,
but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the
heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the
reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Torao 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol.
6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) Had the nephews of whole and half-blood succeeded
the prepositus directly, those of full-blood would undoubtedly receive a double
share compared to those of the half-blood (Arts. 1008 and 1006, jam cit.) Why
then should the latter receive equal shares simply because the transmission of
the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva? The decedent
(causante) the heirs and their relationship being the same, there is no cogent
reason why the hereditary portions should vary.
It should be stated, in justice to the trial court, that its opinion is supported
by distinguished commentators of the Civil Code of 1889, among them Sanchez Román
(Estudios, Vol. 65 Tomo 2, p. 1008) and Mucius Scaevola (Código Civil, Vol 14,
p. 342). The reason given by these authors is that the reservatarios are called
by law to take the reservable property because they belong to the line of origin;
and not because of their relationship. But the argument, if logically pursued,
would lead to the conclusion that the property should pass to any and all
the reservatarios, as a class, and in equal shares, regardless of lines and
degrees. In truth, such is the thesis of Scaevola, that later became known as
the theory of reserva integral (14 Scaevola, Cod. Civ. p. 332 et seq.). But, as
we have seen, the Supreme Courts of Spain and of the Philippines have rejected
that view, and consider that the reservable property should be succeeded by
the reservatario who is nearest in degree, according to the basic rules of
intestacy. The refutation of the trial court's position is found in the
following, passage of Manresa's Commentaries (Vol. 6, 7th Ed., p. 346):
"A esto se objeta que el derecho consignado en el articulo 811 es un derecho
propio que nace de la mera calidad de pariente; no un derecho que se adquiere por
sucesión. Ciertamente, el derecho se concede a los parientes lineales dentro del
tercer grado; pero se les concede con motivo de la muerte de un descendiente y
en la sucesión de este. Ellos suceden por la procedencia especial de los bienes
después de ser éstos disfrutados por el ascendiente; pero suceden a titulo
lucrativo y por causa de muerte y ministerio de la ley, lo cual es dificil poderlo
negar. Hasta podrlan estimarse esos parientes legitimarios o herederos forzosos,
como el mismo autor reconoce en otro lugar de su obra. De modo que este argumento
no es convincente."
All told, our considered opinion is that reason and policy favor keeping to a
minimum the alterations introduced by the reserva in the basic rules of
succession mortis causa.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of November 5, 1956 is reversed and set aside, and
the reservatarios who are nephews of the whole blood are declared entitled to a
share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half-blood. Let the records
be remanded to the court below for further proceedings in accordance with this
decision.
So Ordered.
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO
PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO, defendants-
appellants.
NARVASA, J.:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code
on reserva troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the
parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":
14
1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and
the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas
Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's
grandaunt and granduncles.
2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-
Camacho have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had
a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and
great grandfather of defendant. The family relationship of the
parties is as shown in the chart attached hereto as Annex 'A' and
made an integral part of this stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime
gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia
Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels of land are
presently covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165,
64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of
which are attached to this stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and
'B-2'.
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5,
survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate
children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant
Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned four
(4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children
in equal pro-indiviso shares.
5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate,
survived by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix
(among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino
Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three
(3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies
of which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were
adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as
she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3)
parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino
Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso shares.
6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate,
single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso
share in the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his
father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received
the said property subject to a reserva troncal which was
subsequently annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title
Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.
7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died
intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of land
abovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate child,
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary
right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died
intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now
owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-
Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal
advice, the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon
upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate
succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her
said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half
pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was
inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights
(3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also
third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.
11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination
in this case the legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D.
Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels
of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third degree
relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with said
defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was
inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and
entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso
share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land,
and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and
to be collected by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the
tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real
estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives
and have acted upon legal advice in pursuing their respective
claims, and in order to restore and preserve harmony in their
family relations, they hereby waive all their claims against each
other for damages (other than legal interest on plaintiffs' sore
in the rentals which this Honorable Court may deem proper to
award), attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which shall be
borne by the respective parties. 1
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco,
Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho,
entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute,
in equal proportions, rendering judgment as follows:
... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the
parties, the court holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel
Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of
one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or three-eights (3/8) of the
seven (7) parcels of land involved in this action. Consequently,
they are, likewise, entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals
collected and to be collected by the defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-
15
 Camacho from the tenants of the said parcels of land, minus the
expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs'
share in the rentals.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly
waived all their claims against each other for damages including
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation other than the legal
interests on plaintiffs' share in the rentals, the court renders
judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8)
of the seven (7) parcels of land described in Transfer Certificate
of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T-64167, T-16546 and T-16554 of
the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-
Camacho is hereby ordered to make an accounting of all rents
received by her on the properties involved in this action for the
purpose of determining the legal interests which should be paid
to the plaintiffs on their shares in the rentals of the property
in question.
SO ORDERED. 2
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.
The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled
by the lower Court, all relatives of thepraepositus within the third degree in
the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon
the death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil
Code, which reads:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law
for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and
who belong to the line from which said property came. (811),
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are
subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, 3 where
the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in
the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim
was also made that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal
shares. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the
principles of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces
of whole blood were each entitled to a share double that of each of the nephews
and nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said
the Court:
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case
of reserva troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees)
surviving the reservista, and belonging to the fine of origin, are
nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of
the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood,
should the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally,
or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as
large as that of the nephews of the half blood?
xxx xxx xxx
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish
commentators on the subject. After mature reflection, we have
concluded that the position of the appellants is correct.
The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure
the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives
belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and
avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the
inheriting ascendant (reservista).
xxx xxx xxx
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property
has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But
from this time on, there is no further occasion for its
application. In the relations between one reservatario and another
of the same degree there is no call for applying Art. 891 any
longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the
reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of
intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this
Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the
ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to
all the reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in
degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding
those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los
Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the third degree of
relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of
representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs.
Florentino, supra).
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession
when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree,
the right of the nearest relative, called reservatarios over the
property which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more
remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one
claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not
among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by
the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal
and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within
the third degree of the person from whom the reservable property
came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding
degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law
does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of
representation on the part of one alleging his right
as reservatario who is not within the third degree of
relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the
16
 part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned
by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom
the reservable property came. ... . (Florentino vs. Florentino,
40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) See also Nieva and
Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic
principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that
whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double
that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in determining the
rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the
right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of
double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should
be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group
of relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be
returned; but within that group, the individual right to the
property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary
intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise.
This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that
the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be
limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of
the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th
Ed., p. 250):
... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe
ampliarse, sino mas bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto,
manteniendo la excepcion mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese
realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las reglas
generales y fundamentales del Codigo en materia de sucesi6n, en
aquehos extremes no resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan
fuera de la propia esfera de accion de la reserva que se crea.
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of
the new Civil Code's hostility to successional reservas and
reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the reserva
viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and
968-980).
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate
succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto
because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus),
they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant,
although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter. To this
effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris4 where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the
Civil Code were cited and applied:
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in
case of intestacy nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all
other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the
succession. This is readily apparent from Articles 1001, 1004,
1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provide
as follows:
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitle to one-half
of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children
to the other half.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of
the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with
nephews and nieces who are the children of the decedent's brothers
and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita,
and the latter per stirpes.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor
children of brothers and sisters, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other
collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the
succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil
Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the
Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or
nieces, children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not,
the surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor
children of brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and
sisters and nephews and nieces inheritedab intestato ahead of the
surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the
widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely
placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers
and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred
position of the latter vis a vis the other collaterals.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of
succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab
intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive
and are willing and qualified to succeed. ...
17
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that
as to the reservable property, thereservatarios do not inherit from
the reservista, but from the descendant praepositus:
... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part
of the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of it by
will, as long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs.
Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit from
the reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom
the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the
condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman,
Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed.,
pp. 274, 310) ... .
To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands 5, where it was ruled that
intestacy proceedings to determine the right of a reservatario are not necessary
where the final decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name
of the reservista over property subject to reserva troncal Identifies
the reservatario and there are no other claimants to the latter's rights as such:
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary
rests upon the assumption that thereservatario win succeed in, or
inherit, the reservable property from the reservista. This is not
true. The reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis
causa nor is the reservable property part of
thereservista's estate; the reservatario receives the property as
a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus), said property
merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally strayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that
there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the matter
must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the
reservable property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of
the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the
appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of
law, the owner of the reservable property. As already stated, that
property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does not
even answer for the debts of the latter. ... .
Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no
doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-
appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a
different result should obtain simply because "the transmission of the property
was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a
"detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its
transmission to the reservatario.
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the
defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the
reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and
the complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 6878 September 13, 1913
MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
Francisco Dominguez for appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property
classified as required by law to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for
registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land situated in the
municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63
centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were
filed, one for each parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September
22, 1882. In this marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1,
1881, and who at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also
died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two
parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence
the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her
ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan — that is, two uncles german of
Pedro Sablan — appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of
two things: Either that the registration be denied, "or that if granted to her
the right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the registration of
each parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application
appealed through a bill of exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in
question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and
that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of
the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of
error), and denies that the land which are the subject matter of the application
are required by law to be reserved — a contention we regard as indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by
inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano
Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them
by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they
18
having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property had between
him and his brothers. These are admitted facts.
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a
valuable consideration [gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in article
968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return
for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the
uncles german are within the third degree of blood relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter
acquired without a valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from
a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired
by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and
belong to the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels
of land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration — that is, by
inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them
by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and
belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands
proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature property
required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in
question have been acquired by operation of law, and that only property acquired
without a valuable consideration, which is by operation of law, is required by
law to reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in
first instance, but only herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance was
merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property in question in 1882, before the
enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right required by
law to be reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the
right of action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting
that it existed and that they had it" (p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary,
that the applicant inherited the two parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died
"unmarried and without issue." The trial court so held as a conclusion of fact,
without any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro
Sablan died without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to
her son's legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased,
his ascendants shall from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any
of these lands had passed into her possession by free disposal in her son's will;
but the case presents no testamentary provision that demonstrate any transfer of
property from the son to the mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's
wish. The legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was
abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the predecessor
in interest. (Act No. 190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provision of article 811
of the Civil Code have therefore been fully complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of
his property, all he left at death would not be required by law to be reserved,
but only what he would have perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate
ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half
of the hereditary estate of the children and descendants. The latter may
unrestrictedly dispose of the other half, with the exception of what is
established in article 836. (Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by
law to be reserved, because it is what by operation of law could full to the
mother from her son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have
to be reserved. This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the
subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved, because the
interested party has not proved that either of them became her inheritance through
the free disposal of her son.
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It
must be admitted that a half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his
mother by operation of law. The law provides that the other half is also presumed
to be acquired by operation of law — that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise,
proof to offset this presumption must be presented by the interested party, that
is, that the other half was acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of
law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible — that the trial court failed
to sustain the renunciation of the right required by law to be reserved, which
the applicant attributes to the opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in
the case. The appellant deduces it from the fact that the appellees did not
contradict the following statement of hers at the trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother
came to my house and said that those rice lands were mine, because we had already
talked about making delivery of them. (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the
fact that Basilio Sablan said that the lands belong to the appellant and must be
delivered to her it cannot be deduced that he renounced the right required by law
to be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the
Civil Code, for they really belong to her and must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right
of action. The appellant alleges prescription of the opponent's right of action
for requiring fulfillment of the obligation they attribute to her recording in
the property registry the right required by law to be reserved, in accordance
with the provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created by
law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She
adds: "Prescription of the right alleged to the reserved by force of law has not
been invoked." (Eight allegation.)
19
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage
Law are. Nor did she do so in first instance, where she says only the following,
which is quoted from the record: "I do not refer to the prescription of the right
required by law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the prescription of
the right of action of those who are entitled to the guaranty of that right for
seeking that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage Law
grants a period of time for recording it in the property registry, if I remember
correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the registry; but as they have not
exercised that right of action, such right of action for seeking here that it be
recorded has prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be
reserved has not prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the
property registry that this property is required by law to be reserved" (p. 69
of the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for
requiring the applicant to constitute the mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law
for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the required by law to be reserved; but
because that right of action has prescribed, that property has not been divested
of its character of property required by law to be reserved; that it has such
character by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went into effect in
the Philippine in December, 1889, and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which
only went into effect in the country by law of July 14, 1893; that from December,
1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code acquired
the character of property reserved by operation of law was such independently of
the Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the
country; that although the Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since
July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the force of article 811 of the Civil
Code, but has operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the right of
action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by operation of law
to require of the person holding the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage
to answer for the enforcement, in due time, of the right; that to lose the right
of action to the guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that the right reserved
is the principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and loss
of the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth
allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of
land in question being indisputable, even though it be admitted that the right
of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a guaranty of final enforcement of
such right has prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this appeal is the
question raised in the first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels
of land can and ought to be registered, not in the property registry newly
established by the Mortgage Law, but in the registry newly organized by Act No.
496. But as the have slipped into the allegations quoted some rather inexact
ideas that further obscure such an intricate subject as this of the rights
required to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief disgression on the
most essential points may not be out of place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended
one of the colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and consequently in
the Philippines. The preamble of said amended Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect,
with the modifications necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on
May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing
in those regions the renovation of the law on real property, and
consequently of agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but
on the eight day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the
Civil Code, as set forth in article 968 thereof, where it says:
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting
a seconds marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants
of the first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she may have
required from the deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or
other transfer without a valuable consideration."
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the
Philippines on December 1, 189, do not contain any provision that can be applied
to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code, for such right is a
creation of the Civil Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions intended
to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first
marriage when their father or mother contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless,
the holding of the supreme court of Spain, for the first time set forth in the
decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that
tend to secure the right required to be reserved in the property refer
especially to the spouses who contract second or later marriages, they do
not thereby cease to be applicable to the right establishes in article
811, because, aside from the legal reason, which is the same in both
cases, such must be the construction from the important and conclusive
circumstance that said provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals
with inheritances in common, either testate or intestate, and because
article 968, which heads the section that deals in general with property
required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions in
article 811; and it would consequently be contradictory to the principle
of the law and of the common nature of said provisions not to hold them
applicable to that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As
the supreme court has already declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in
article 977 and 978 for the rights required by law to the reserved to which said
articles refer, are applicable to the special right dealt with in article 811,
because the same principle exists and because of the general nature of the
provisions of the chapter in which they are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889,
to July, 1893, a case had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article
811, the persons entitled to such right would have been able to institute, against
the ascendant who must make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and
guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first marriage
against their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for
assurance, under article 977; are: Inventory of the property subject to the right
reserved, annotation in the property registry of such right reserved in the real
property and appraisal of the personal property; and the guaranty, under article
20
978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what
is validly alienated.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in
the Philippines this is not only a principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked
for the applicability to the right reserved in article 811 of the remedies of
assurance and guaranty provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there
is a positive provision of said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain,
to wit, article 199, which read thus:
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811
of the Civil Code can only be required by the relatives in whose favor
the property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be
require by the person who should legally represent them. In either case
the right of the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved
will be secured by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding
article (relative to the right reserved by article 968 of the Civil Code),
applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with
respect to the father.
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with
article 199 quoted, so that said article 168 reads as thus:
Legal mortgage is established:
1. . . .
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers,
for the property required to be reserved, upon the property of the person
obliged to reserve it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree
that the period of ninety days fixed for the right of action to the guaranty,
that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the effectiveness of the right
required by law to be reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a
principle in this matter. Now it should by noted that such action has not
prescribed, because the period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not
for the exercise of the right of action of the persons entitled to the right
reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who must make
the reservation.
Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's
instituting in court the proceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the
relatives themselves may demand fulfillment, etc., . . . applying, according to
said article 199, to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions
with respect to the father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In
the case of article 199 of the law the proceedings to which article 190 thereof
refers will be instituted within the ninety days succeeding the date of the date
of the acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to reserve the
property; after this period has elapsed, the interested parties may require the
institution of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other case, their
legal representatives."
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration
by prescription of the period for the right must be reserved, but really the
commencement thereof, enables them to exercise it at any time, since no limits
is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by law to be
reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made in the property
registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute
proceedings to that end, and an allegation of prescription against the exercise
of such right of action cannot be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right
of action for requiring that the property be reserved, for she explicitly so
stated at the trial, and as the case presents no necessity for the proceedings
that should be instituted in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law,
this prescription of the right of action cannot take place, because such right
of action does not exist with reference to instituting proceedings for annotation
in the registry of Act No. 496 of the right to the property required by law to
be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present case, to intervene in
the registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for
recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration
because of this finding set forth in its decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the
applicant and the two uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the
application cannot be made except in the name of all of them in common.
(B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy,
dispose of, and recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the
absolute or complete ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who has the
right to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the person who has the rights
of disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or contract
is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an enjoying,
and then he is said not to have the fee simple — that is, the rights of disposal
and recovery, which pertain to another who, after the usufruct expires, will come
into full ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is
this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to
the reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate
title belonging to the person in whose favor the reservation is made. If that
were so, the person holding the property could not apply for registration of
title, but the person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's
consent. This opinion does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be
supported by decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June
18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to
the enforcement thereof.
21
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points — the usufruct
and the fee simple; the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived,
but become obscure in the presence of that deceptive emphasis which only brings
out two things: that the person holding the property will enjoy it and that he
must keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be
maintained — that is, that the surviving spouse (the person obliged by article
968 to make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere usufructuary and the
descendants immediately as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in
the Code." (Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or
by operation of law, requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly
transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership
belong to him exclusively — use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute
ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least,
if there be no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property
proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute
owner of the property. If there should be relatives within the third degree who
belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that
absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be
determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to
be effective. The opinion which makes this limitation consist in reducing the
ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the
right of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as
it does not have, according to the opinion that he has been expressed in speaking
of the rights of the father or mother who has married again. There is a marked
difference between the case where a man's wish institutes two persons as his
heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his property, and the case
of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In the
first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary
property resides in the hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it,
while the usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of the hereditary
property (except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in accordance with
the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof
except the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself,
because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendants who holds the property
required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father of mother required by
article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they might itself,
the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in first
marriage, and recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons
in whose favor the right is required to be reserved in either case cannot perform
any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687
to reserve the right may dispose of the property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be
made by the surviving spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be
valid only if at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants
of the first marriage survive, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective,
but under a condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate
children or descendants of the first marriage survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved,
his alienation thereof would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a
right to do so and without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The
law says that the alienation subsists (to subject is to continue to exist)
"without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this
Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still
pending may mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the
right of the parties interested in said conditions by expressly reserving
that right in the registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose
favor the right is reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long
as the condition subsequent is pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse
who must reserve the right is alive, because it might easily happen that the
person who must reserve the right should outlive all the person in whose favor
the right is reserved and then there would be no reason for the condition
subsequent that they survive him, and, the object of the law having disappeared,
the right required to be reserved would disappear, and the alienation would not
only be valid but also in very way absolutely effective. Consequently, the
alienation is valid when the right required by law to be reserved to the children
is respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because
it will or will not become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist,
according to circumstances. This is what the law establishes with reference to
the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly directs that the
surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children
or descendants of the first marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more
than that the ascendants must make the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading,
"Rights and obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be
reserved," in these words:
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right
required by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within
the third degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to them has
been assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not even have the
capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the
things according to their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in
commenting upon the article of the Code referring to use and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally,
the owner in fee simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner
provided in article 974 and 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on this point,
but the Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892,
declared that articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they
refer to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of
22
the legislator on this subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought not
to be more privileged in the right reserved in article 811 than the children in
the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that the right required
to be reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject
to those conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of
the Mortgage Law, such alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the
condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit,
whether or not there exists at the time of his death relatives within the
third degree of the descendants from whom they inherit in the line whence
the property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of
the property at the death of the ascendants. If they do not exist, the
ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the
possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent can alienate and
encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the property required by law to
be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more because no
one can give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore
receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third
degree will in their turn have an expectation to the property while the
ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be transmitted to their heirs,
unless these are also within the third degree. After the person who is
required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind
the alienation of the realty required by law to be reserved and they will
complete ownership, in fee simple, because the condition and the usufruct
have been terminated by the death of the usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios
sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right
has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover,
for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a
condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the
right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate,
although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one
who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and
revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a
condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be
reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the
right is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way,
either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover,
because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can
transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve
the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple,
and only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendants of
whom they are relatives within the third degree, that it to say, a second
contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a
possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved
should, after their rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of
even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be reserved his act
would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on appeal
of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain
therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of
the nature and scope of the right required by law to be reserved the extent of
his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear by his dying before the person
required to reserve it, just as may even become absolute should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of
disposal inter vivos of the person required by law to reserve the right can be
impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all,
absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is
burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the
registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition
subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis
causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third degree of the
descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to
him, because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons
outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that
would otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the
right to the condition of a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must
be reserved cannot attack the alienation that may be absolutely made of the
property the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that which the
appellant has made of the two parcels of land in question to a third party,
because the conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an
alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code,
and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property required by law to be reserved
are all that the person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in
alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in
an incontrovertible manner. The question as to whether or not she transmits the
fee simple is purely academic, sine re, for it is not real, actual positive, as
is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and the other the
owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights
inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in
addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate
it, although under a condition, the whole question is reduced to the following
terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a
condition subsequent is annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone register
the ownership of the property he has inherited, when the persons in whose favor
the reservation must be made degree thereto, provided that the right reserved to
them in the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?
It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights
of the vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil
Code, art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same
title after he has once acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of
being disposable, has a condition subsequent annexed — that the alienation the
23
purchaser may make will be terminated, if the vendor should exercise the right
granted him by article 1507, which says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the
right to recover the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with article 1518,
and whatever more may have been agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing
sold by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and other expenses.
Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now
that the vendee may register his title in the same way as the owner of a thing
mortgaged — that is to say, the latter with the consent of his creditor and the
former with the consent of the vendor. He may alienate the thing bought when the
acquirer knows by well from the title entered in the registry that he acquires a
title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much more certain and to be expected
than the purely contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved
a right to inherit some day what another has inherited. The purpose of the law
would be defeated in not applying to the person who must make the reservation the
provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto, since the
argument in his favor is the more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem
legis dispositivo.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and
declare that the applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels
of land which are the subject matter of the applicants, recording in the
registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to either or both
of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her;
without special findings as to costs.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-10701 January 16, 1959
MARIA CANO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, EUSTAQUIA GUERRERO, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
JOSE FERNANDEZ, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Ramon C. Fernandez for appellants.
Jose B. Dealca for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
In an amended decision dated October 9, 1951, issued in Land Registration Case
No. 12, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2835, the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon decreed
the registration of Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Juban (Sorsogon) Cadastre,
under the following terms and conditions:
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the notices have been
duly published and posted as required by law, and that the title of the
applicant to the above-mentioned two parcels of land is registrable in
law, it is hereby adjudged and decreed, and with reaffirmation of the
order of general default, that the two parcels of land described in plan
SWO-24152, known as Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Cadastral Survey of
Juban, with their improvements, be registered in the name of Maria Cano,
Filipina, 71 years of age, widow and resident of Juban, province of
Sorsogon, with the understanding that Lot No. 1799 shall be subject to
the right of reservation in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to
Article 891 of the Civil code. After this decision shall have become final
for lack of appeal therefrom within the 30-day period from its
promulgation, let the corresponding decree issue.
So ordered. (Rec. App. pp. 18-19)
The decision having become final, the decree and the Certificate of Title (No.
0-20) were issued in the name of Maria Cano, subject to reserva troncal in favor
of Eustaquia Guerrero. In October 1955, counsel for the reserve (reservatorio)
Guerrero filed a motion with the Cadastral Court, alleging the death of the
original registered owner and reservista, Maria Cano, on September 8, 1955, and
praying that the original Certificate of Title be ordered cancelled and a new one
issued in favor of movant Eustaquia Guerrero; and that the Sheriff be ordered to
place her in possession of the property. The motion was opposed by Jose and
Teotimo Fernandez, sons of the reservistaMaria Cano, who contended that the
application and operation of the reserva troncal should be ventilated in an
ordinary contentious proceeding, and that the Registration Court did not have
jurisdiction to grant the motion.
In view of the recorded reserva in favor of the appellee, as expressly noted in
the final decree of registration, the lower court granted the petition for the
issuance of a new certificate, for the reason that the death of
the reservistavested the ownership of the property in the petitioner as the
sole reservatorio troncal.
The oppositors, heirs of the reservista Maria Cano, duly appealed from the order,
insisting that the ownership of the reservatorio can not be decreed in a mere
proceeding under sec. 112 of Act 496, but requires a judicial administration
proceedings, wherein the rights of appellee, as the reservatorio entitled to the
reservable property, are to be declared. In this connection, appellants argue
that the reversion in favor of the reservatorio requires the declaration of the
existence of the following facts:
(1) The property was received by a descendant by gratuitous title from an
ascendant or from a brother or sister;
(2) Said descendant dies without issue;
(3) The property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law;
and
(4) The existence of relatives within the third degree belonging the line
from which said property came. (Appellants' Brief, p. 8)
We find the appeal untenable. The requisites enumerated by appellants have already
been declared to exist by the decree of registration wherein the rights of the
appellee as reservatario troncal were expressly recognized:
From the above-quoted agreed stipulation of facts, it is evident that Lot
No. 1799 was acquired by the Appellant Maria Cano by inheritance from her
deceased daughter, Lourdes Guerrero who, in turn, inherited the same from
her father Evaristo Guerrero and, hence, falls squarely under the
24
 provisions of Article 891 of the Civil Code; and that each and everyone
of the private oppositors are within the third degree of consaguinity of
the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, and who belonging to the same line from
which the property came.
It appears however, from the agreed stipulation of facts that with the
exception of Eustaquia Guerrero, who is the only living daughter of the
decedent Evaristo Guerrero, by his former marriage, all the other
oppositors are grandchildren of the said Evaristo Guerrero by his former
marriages. Eustaquia Guerrero, being the nearest of kin, excludes all the
other private oppositors, whose decree of relationship to the decedent is
remoter (Article 962, Civil Code; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 62 Phil.,
279). (Rec. App. pp. 16-17)
This decree having become final, all persons (appellees included) are bared
thereby from contesting the existence of the constituent elements of the reserva.
The only requisites for the passing of the title from the reservista to the
appellee are: (1) the death of the reservista; and (2) the fact that
the reservatario has survived the reservista. Both facts are admitted, and their
existence is nowhere questioned.
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the
assumption that the reservatario will succeed in, or inherit, the reservable
property from the reservista. This is not true. The reservatario is not
the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of
the reservista's estate; the reservatarioreceives the property as a conditional
heir of the descendant ( prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line
of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there
being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to
have enjoined no more than a life interest in the reservable property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista,
the reservatario nearest to theprepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes,
automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property. As
already stated, that property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and
does not even answer for the debts of the latter. Hence, its acquisition by
the reservatario may be entered in the property records without necessity of
estate proceedings, since the basic requisites therefor appear of record. It is
equally well settled that the reservable property can not be transmitted by
a reservista to her or his own successors mortis causa,(like appellants herein)
so long as a reservatario within the third degree from the prepositus and
belonging to the line whence the property came, is in existence when
the reservista dies.
Of course, where the registration decree merely specifies the reservable
character of the property, without determining the identity of
the reservatario (as in the case of Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil., 279)
or where several reservatarios dispute the property among themselves, further
proceedings would be unavoidable. But this is not the case. The rights of
the reservataria Eustaquia Guerrero have been expressly recognized, and it is
nowhere claimed that there are other reservatarios of equal or nearer degree. It
is thus apparent that the heirs of the reservista are merely endeavoring to
prolong their enjoyment of the reservable property to the detriment of the party
lawfully entitled thereto.
We find no error in the order appealed from and therefore, the same is affirmed
with costs against appellants in both instances. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L.
VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y
FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA
Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA
Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF
DONA FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and
damages and holding, as not subject to reserve troncal, the properties which her
mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No.
73335). The facts are as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on
June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven
children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three
sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were
partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the
heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by
Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her
sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially
to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena
Legarda. The said properties consist of the following: 1äwphï1.ñët
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a
credit balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a
1/7 interest in certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason
& Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life
Assurance Company and the Manila Times.
25
 (c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to
80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry
of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201,
48202, 48205, 48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry
of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry
of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property
described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT
No. 41862 of the Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and
improvements at 181 San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and
48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila
registry of deeds (Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of
the Manila registry of deeds (Streets and Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry
of deeds of T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit
of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda
as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein
she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor
of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren
in all). The document reads: 1äwphï1.ñët
A mis hijos :
Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y
Pepito, los bienes que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y
tambien los acciones de la Destileria La Rosario' recientemente
comprada a los hermanos Values Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno
que yo he 0donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit
La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa;
proque ella esta construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda
Races. 1äwphï1.ñët
(Sgd.) FILOMENA
ROCES LEGARDA
6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six
surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share
in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in
representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a
holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda.
de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda
vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix,
filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's
estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena,
on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which should be
inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the
children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was
opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20,
1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces
and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said
properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her
holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and
her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this
appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error
that the lower court erred in not regarding the properties in question as
reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error
contend that the lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the
estate of her daughter Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and
hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in
not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable properties and
that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of
Mrs. Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its
resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave
due course to the petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under
undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court
resolved only the issue of whether the properties in question are subject
to reserva troncal that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving
factual matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not
pass upon those issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.
26
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under
article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races
Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren
to the exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from
her daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the
reservees in the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the
reservees in the second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first
impression. lt was resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before
discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in the Florentino case
and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on the
nature of reserve troncal, also called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-
troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in
descanting on the nature of reserve troncal which together with the reserva
viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the
decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership
caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the
reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a
certain family for generations which situation allegedly leads to economic
oligarchy, and is incompatible with the socialization of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented
agrarian unrest. Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate
relationship, is considered unjust and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission,
restored the reserve troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and
Castan Tobenas has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now
article 891, which reads: 1äwphï1.ñët
ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes
que este hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro
ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado a reservas los que
hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los
parientes que eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la
linea de donde los bienes proceden
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law
for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and
who belong to the line from which said property came.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title
property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is
inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the
said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for
the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased
descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property
came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title
(inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased
descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate
succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in
favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions
precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in
consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios)
or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging
to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant
(6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia
Lacerna died and her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the
death of Juan, those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the
exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not reservable
property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l
Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister
from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous
title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property,
(3) the reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from
the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario) who is
within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco)
from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the
reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101
Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August
31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs.
Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos
secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extrañas
por el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de
la vide personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel
hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980,
p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295.
ln that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father
Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina
Edroso, inherited from him the two parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The
reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro
Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system
in her name but the fact that the land was reservable property in favor of her
two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
27
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-
half share of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana
Mañalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited
by her father, Anacleto Mañalac who owned the other one-half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six
children. lt was held that the said one-half portion was reservable property in
the hands of Anacleto Mañalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by Leona
Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts of Juliana
Mañalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot
vs. Mañalac 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40
Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang
and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon
vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52
Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas,
63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one
at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property
last revolved by descent. He is called the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44
Phil. 186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother,
Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo
Abordo. ln his hands, the property was reservable property. Upon the death of
Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt
of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees.
They cannot even represent their parents because representation is confined to
relatives within the third degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject
to the rule of representation. But the representative should be within the third
degree from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship
and relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the
recipient gives nothing in return such as donacion and succession (Cabardo vs.
Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195
l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the
ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property
came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but
subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the
reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the
reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee
gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's
rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death
of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the
reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil.
295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480:
Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta
de retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory
condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservor's death, there are
reservees, the transferee of the property should deliver it to the reservees. lf
there are no reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the transferee's
title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson,
118 Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent
right. His expectant right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt
would become absolute should the reservor predecease the reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require
that the reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser
(Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs.
Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable
property is illegal for being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo
Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may
alienate and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall
transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reserves survives the
reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353). 1äwphï1.ñët
The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of
the descendant (prepositus) said property merely reverting to the
line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally
stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all
agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservists,
the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a than
interest in the reservable property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane
vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are
the ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the
right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might
frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they
can compel the annotation of their right in the registry of
property even while the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de
Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
28
 This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that
corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista lt is likewise
clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the
reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as
there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226,
237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from
the descendant (prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the
heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must
survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286;
Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J.
J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958,
104 Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to
the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable
properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The
reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or
relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living
or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could
convey the reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within
the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees
in the second degree, her three daughters and three sons. As indicated at the
outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen
grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter
Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate
(Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a
disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees
survived the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the
reservable properties from the prepositus, not from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited
by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in
this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees
to whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees
of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the
reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and,
consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring
violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino
vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was ruled: 1äwphï1.ñët
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the
death of ascendant (reservista) together with his own property in
favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no part
of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the
reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir
receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant has the
strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the
third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without
prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the
property, if he has at the same time the right of
a reservatario (reserves).
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second
wife Severina Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These
two inherited properties from their father. Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his
properties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will,
she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including
those coming from her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz
de Leon and the descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued
Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their share in the reservable properties,
which Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had
inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her daughter
Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could
not be disposed of in Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was
sustained by this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form
part of Severina's estate and could not be inherited from her by her daughter
Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-
seventh of the properties. The other six sevenths portions were adjudicated to
the other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in
this case the doctrine of the Florentino case. That doctrine means that as long
as during the reservor's lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within
the third degree of the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are
common descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came,
the property retains its reservable character. The property should go to the
nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves
to whom the reservable property should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the
only relatives within the third degree are the common descendants of the
predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is
irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of the ruling in
the Florentino case.
29
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not
reservable properties because only relatives within the third degree from the
paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties
to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda
and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been
satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special
accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein".
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed
the reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of
the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the relatives of the half-
blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property
bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's
estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees
or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property
to only one reserves it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless,
it is likewise true that the heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees
and there is no reason founded upon law and justice why the other reservees should
be deprived of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not
dispose of in her will the properties in question even if the disposition is in
favor of the relatives within the third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said
properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children
as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but
from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the
heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor
(Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character
due to the non-existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the
time of the death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family,
"except third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by
the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time
of her death, there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and
third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable character.
The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with article
891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's
holographic will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate.
(Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby
adjudged that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her
daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are
reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro
and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L.
Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should
pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14856 November 15, 1919
ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Ramon Querubin, Simeon Ramos and Orense and Vera for appellants.
Vicente Foz, Jose Singsong Tongson and Angel Encarnacion for appellees.
TORRES, J.:
On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion (together with her husband Simeon
Serrano), Gabriel, Magdalena, Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, and Antonino of the
surname Florentino; for Miguel Florentino, guardian ad litem of the minor Rosario
Florentino; for Eugenio Singson, the father and guardian ad litem of Emilia,
Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores of the surname Singson y Florentino; and for
Eugenio Singson, guardian of the minors Jose and Asuncion Florentino, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, against Mercedes
Florentino and her husband, alleging as follows:
That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de Leon;
that during the marriage he begot nine children called, Jose, Juan, Maria,
Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro, and Magdalena of the surname
Florentino y de Leon; that on becoming a widower he married the second time
Severina Faz de Leon with whom he had two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III of
the surname Florentino y de Leon; that Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died on
February 13, 1890; that he was survived by his second wife Severina Faz de Leon
and the ten children first above mentioned; that his eleventh son, Apolonio III,
was born on the following 4th of March 1890.
That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's aforementioned eleven children, Juan,
Maria and Isabel died single, without leaving any ascendants or descendants; that
Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, Antonio, and Rosario are the legitimate children of the
deceased Jose Florentino who was one of the children of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate
children of Espirita Florentino, now deceased, and her husband Eugenio Singson;
that Jose and Asuncion are the children of Pedro Florentino, another son of the
deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino.
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino executed a
will before the notary public of Ilocos Sur, instituting as his universal heirs
his aforementioned ten children, the posthumos Apolonio III and his widow Severina
Faz de Leon; that he declared, in one of the paragraphs of said will, all his
property should be divided among all of his children of both marriages.
30
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to Apolonio
Florentino III, his posthumos son, the property marked with the letters A, B, C,
D, E, and F in the complaint, a gold rosary, pieces of gold, of silver and of
table service, livestock, palay, some personal property and other objects
mentioned in the complaint.
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second marriage, died in
1891; that his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his property
described in the complaint; that the widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on November
18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress her only living
daughter, Mercedes Florentino; that, as such heir, said daughter took possession
of all the property left at the death of her mother, Severina Faz de Leon; that
among same is included the property, described in the complaint, which the said
Severina Faz de Leon inherited from her deceased son, the posthumos Apolonio, as
reservable property; that, as a reservist, the heir of the said Mercedes
Florentino deceased had been gathering for herself alone the fruits of lands
described in the complaint; that each and every one of the parties mentioned in
said complaint is entitled to one-seventh of the fruits of the reservable property
described therein, either by direct participation or by representation, in the
manner mentioned in paragraph 9 of the complaint.
That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, asked the
defendants to deliver their corresponding part of the reservable property; that
without any justifiable motive the defendants have refused and do refuse to
deliver said property or to pay for its value; that for nine years Mercedes
Florentino has been receiving, as rent for the lands mentioned, 360 bundles of
palay at fifty pesos per bundle and 90 bundles of corn at four pesos per bundle;
that thereby the plaintiffs have suffered damages in the sum of fifteen thousand
four hundred and twenty-eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos, in addition to
three hundred and eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos for the value of the fruits
not gathered, of one thousand pesos (P1,000) for the unjustifiable retention of
the aforementioned reservable property and for the expenses of this suit.
Wherefore they pray it be declared that all the foregoing property is reservable
property; that the plaintiffs had and do have a right to the same, in the quantity
and proportion mentioned in the aforementioned paragraph 9 of the complaint; that
the defendants Mercedes Florentino and her husband be ordered to deliver to the
plaintiffs their share of the property in question, of the palay and of the corn
above mentioned, or their value; and that they be condemned to pay the plaintiffs
the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) together with the costs of this instance.
To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred, alleging that the
cause of action is based on the obligation of the widow Severina Faz de Leon to
reserve the property she inherited from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y
de Leon who, in turn, inherited same from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino;
that, there being no allegation to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the
widow Severina Faz de Leon did not remarry after the death of this husband nor
have any natural child; that the right claimed by the plaintiffs is not that
mentioned in article 968 and the following articles, but that established in
article 811 of the Civil Code; that the object of the provisions of the
aforementioned articles is to avoid the transfer of said reservable property to
those extraneous to the family of the owner thereof; that if the property
inherited by the widow Severina Faz de Leon from her deceased son Apolonio
Florentino y Faz de Leon (property which originated from his father and her
husband) has all passed into the hands of the defendant, Mercedes Florentino y
Encarnacion, a daughter of the common ancestor's second marriage (said Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino with the deceased Severina Faz de Leon) it is evident that the
property left at the death of the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon
did not pass after the death of his mother Severina, his legitimate heirs as an
ascendant, into the hands of strangers; that said property having been inherited
by Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion from her mother (Severina), article 811 of
the Civil Code is absolutely inapplicable to the present case because, when the
defendant Mercedes, by operation law, entered into and succeeded to, the
possession, of the property lawfully inherited from her mother Severina Faz de
Leon, said property had, while in the possession of her mother, lost the character
of reservable property — there being a legitimate daughter of Severina Faz de
Leon with the right to succeed her in all her rights, property and actions; that
the restraints of the law whereby said property may not passed into the possession
of strangers are void, inasmuch as the said widow had no obligation to reserve
same, as Mercedes Florentino is a forced heiress of her mother Severina Faz de
Leon; that, in the present case, there is no property reserved for the plaintiffs
since there is a forced heiress, entitled to the property left by the death of
the widow Severina Faz de Leon who never remarried; that the obligation to reserve
is secondary to the duty of respecting the legitime; that in the instant case,
the widow Severina Faz de Leon was in duty bound to respect the legitime of her
daughter Mercedes the defendant; that her obligation to reserve the property
could not be fulfilled to the prejudice of the legitime which belongs to her
forced heiress, citing in support of these statements the decision of the supreme
court of Spain of January 4, 1911; that, finally, the application of article 811
of the Civil Code in favor of the plaintiffs would presuppose the exclusion of
the defendant from here right to succeed exclusively to all the property, rights
and actions left by her legitimate mother, although the said defendant has a
better right than the plaintiffs; and that there would be injustice if the
property claimed be adjudicated to the plaintiffs, as well as violation of section
5 of the Jones Law which invalidates any law depriving any person of an equal
protection. Wherefore they prayed that the demurrer be sustained, with costs
against the plaintiffs.
After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge absolved the
defendants from the complaint and condemned the plaintiffs to pay the costs.
Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it and to
grant them a new trial; said motion was overruled; the plaintiffs expected thereto
and filed the corresponding bill of exceptions which was allowed, certified and
forwarded to the clerk of this court.
On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants to the
complaint of the plaintiffs, but, instead of ordering the latter to amend their
complaint within the period prescribed by the rules — undoubtedly believing that
the plaintiffs could not alter nor change the facts constituting the cause of
action, and that, as both parties were agreed as to the facts alleged in the
complaint as well as in the demurrer, every question reduced itself to one of the
law, already submitted to the decision of the court — the said judge, disregarding
the ordinary procedure established by law, decided the case by absolving the
defendants from the complaint and by condemning the plaintiffs to pay the costs
of the instance.
There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the defendants, instead of
answering the complaint of the plaintiffs, confined themselves to filing a
demurrer based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not
constitute a cause of action. However, the judge preferred to absolve the
defendants, thereby making an end to the cause, instead of dismissing the same,
31
because undoubtedly he believed, in view of the controversy between the parties,
that the arguments adduced to support the demurrer would be the same which the
defendants would allege in their answer — those dealing with a mere question of
law which the courts would have to decide — and that, the demurrer having been
sustained, if the plaintiffs should insist — they could do no less — upon alleging
the same facts as those set out in their complaint and if another demurrer were
afterwards set up, he would be obliged to dismiss said complaint with costs
against the plaintiffs — in spite of being undoubtedly convinced in the instant
case that the plaintiffs absolutely lack the right to bring the action stated in
their complaint.
Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is not necessary
— as in this case what has been done does not prejudice the parties — the appellate
court will now proceed to decide the suit according to its merits, as found in
the record and to the legal provisions applicable to the question of law in
controversy so that unnecessary delay and greater expense may be avoided, inasmuch
as, even if all the ordinary proceedings be followed, the suit would be
subsequently decided in the manner and terms that it is now decided in the opinion
thoughtfully and conscientiously formed for its determination.
In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to invoke, in
their favor, the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, and whether the
same article is applicable to the question of law presented in this suit, it is
necessary to determine whether the property enumerated in paragraph 5 of the
complaint is of the nature of reservable property; and if so, whether in
accordance with the provision of the Civil Code in article 811, Severina Faz de
Leon (the widow of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino) who inherited said
property from her son Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death of his father
Apolonio Isabelo) had the obligation to preserve and reserve same for the
relatives, within the third degree, of her aforementioned deceased son Apolonio
III.
The above mentioned article reads:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by
the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came.
During the marriage of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II and Severina Faz de Leon
two children were born, namely the defendant Mercedes Florentino and Apolonio
Florentino III (born after the death of his father). At the death of Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino under a will, his eleven children succeeded to the inheritance
he left, one of whom, the posthumos son Apolonio III, was given, as his share,
the aforementioned property enumerated in the complaint. In 1891 the said
posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III died and was succeeded by his legitimate
mother Severina Faz de Leon, who inherited the property he left and who on dying,
November 18, 1908, instituted by will as her sole heiress her surviving daughter,
Mercedes Florentino, the defendant herein, who took possession of all property
left by her father, same constituting the inheritance. Included in said
inheritance is the property, specified in by the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino
III from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino, and which, at the death of the
said posthumos son, had in turn been inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de
Leon. Even if Severina left in her will said property, together with her own, to
her only daughter and forced heiress, Mercedes Florentino, nevertheless this
property had not lost its reservable nature inasmuch as it originated from the
common ancestor of the litigants, Apolonio Isabelo; was inherited by his son
Apolonio III; was transmitted by same (by operation of law) to his legitimate
mother and ascendant, Severina Faz de Leon.
The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property, now claimed
by his brothers, by a lucrative title or by inheritance from his aforementioned
legitimate father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. Although said property was
inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, nevertheless, she was in duty
bound, according to article 811 of the Civil Code, to reserve the property thus
acquired for the benefit of the relatives, within the third degree, of the line
from which such property came.
According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the reservable
property, but its enjoyment, use or trust, merely for the reason that said law
imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve same for certain designated persons
who, on the death of the said ascendants reservists, (taking into consideration
the nature of the line from which such property came) acquire the ownership of
said property in fact and by operation of law in the same manner as forced heirs
(because they are also such) — said property reverts to said line as long as the
aforementioned persons who, from the death of the ascendant-reservists, acquire
in fact the right of reservatarios (person for whom property is reserved), and
are relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant from whom the reservable
property came.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are
living, within the third degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life
usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. He is, however,
the legitimate owner of his own property which is not reservable property and
which constitutes his legitime, according to article 809 of the Civil Code. But
if, afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant
(from whom came the reservable property) die or disappear, the said property
becomes free property, by operation of law, and is thereby converted into the
legitime of the ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to his legitimate
successors or testamentary heirs. This property has now lost its nature of
reservable property, pertaining thereto at the death of the relatives,
called reservatarios, who belonged within the third degree to the line from which
such property came.lawphil.net
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are
relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest
relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person
holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one
more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming
same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came,
inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in article 811 is in the highest
degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are the
relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the reservable
property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can
never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as
such.
32
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the
part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree
of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part
of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case
of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came.
These reservatarios have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and
mothers) who are the brothers of the said deceased person and relatives within
the third degree in accordance with article 811 of the Civil Code.
In this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the plaintiffs
Encarnacion, Gabriel and Magdalena are the legitimate children of the first
marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that Ramon, Miguel,
Ceferino, Antonio, and Rosario are both grandchildren of Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II, and children of his deceased son, Jose Florentino; that the same
have the right to represent their aforementioned father, Jose Florentino; that
Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate children of the
deceased Espirita Florentino, one of the daughters of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II, and represent the right of their aforementioned mother;
and that the other plaintiffs, Jose and Asuncion, have also the right to represent
their legitimate father Pedro Florentino one of the sons of the aforementioned
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. It is a fact, admitted by both parties, that the
other children of the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino
II died without issue so that this decision does not deal with them.
There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservable property
left at the death of Apolonio III; the posthumos son of the aforementioned
Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his three children of his first marriage —
Encarnacion, Gabriel, Magdalena; his three children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro who
are represented by their own twelve children respectively; and Mercedes
Florentino, his daughter by a second marriage. All of the plaintiffs are the
relatives of the deceased posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, within the
third degree (four of whom being his half-brothers and the remaining twelve being
his nephews as they are the children of his three half-brothers). As the first
four are his relatives within the third degree in their own right and the other
twelve are such by representation, all of them are indisputably entitled
as reservatarios to the property which came from the common ancestor, Apolonio
Isabelo, to Apolonio Florentino III by inheritance during his life-time, and in
turn by inheritance to his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, widow of the
aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.
In spite of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code already cited, the
trial judge refused to accept the theory of the plaintiffs and, accepting that
of the defendants, absolved the latter from the complaint on the ground that said
article is absolutely inapplicable to the instant case, inasmuch as the defendant
Mercedes Florentino survived her brother, Apolonio III, from whom the reservable
property came and her mother, Severina Faz de Leon, the widow of her father,
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that the defendant Mercedes, being the only
daughter of Severina Faz de Leon, is likewise her forced heiress; that when she
inherited the property left at the death of her mother, together with that which
came from her deceased brother Apolonio III, the fundamental object of article
811 of the Code was thereby complied with, inasmuch as the danger that the
property coming from the same line might fall into the hands of strangers had
been avoided; and that the hope or expectation on the part of the plaintiffs of
the right to acquire the property of the deceased Apolonio III never did come
into existence because there is a forced heiress who is entitled to such property.
The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that article 811 of the
Civil Code does not destroy the system of legitimate succession and that the
pretension of the plaintiffs to apply said article in the instant case would be
permitting the reservable right to reduce and impair the forced legitimate which
exclusively belongs to the defendant Mercedes Florentino, in violation of the
precept of article 813 of the same Code which provides that the testator cannot
deprive his heirs of their legitime, except in the cases expressly determined by
law. Neither can he impose upon it any burden, condition, or substitution of any
kind whatsoever, saving the provisions concerning the usufruct of the surviving
spouse, citing the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of January 4, 1911.
The principal question submitted to the court for decision consists mainly in
determining whether they property left at the death of Apolonio III, the posthumos
son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was not invested with the character of
reservable property when it was received by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon.
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their complaint came,
without any doubt whatsoever, from the common ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and
when, on the death of Apolonio III without issue the same passed by operation of
law into the hands of his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it became
reservable property, in accordance with the provision of article 811 of the Code,
with the object that the same should not fall into the possession of persons
other than those comprehended within the order of person other than those
comprehended within the order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio
Isabelo II, the source of said property. If this property was in fact clothed
with the character and condition of reservable property when Severina Faz de Leon
inherited same from her son Apolonio III, she did not thereby acquire the dominion
or right of ownership but only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary with the
necessary obligation to preserve and to deliver or return it as such reservable
property to her deceased son's relatives within the third degree, among whom is
her daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of the
ascendant who inherits and receives same from his descendant, therefore it does
not form part of his own property nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs.
It becomes his own property only in case that all the relatives of his descendant
shall have died (reservista) in which case said reservable property losses such
character.
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her
own property in favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino, as forced
heiress. But whatever provision there is in her will concerning the reservable
property received from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will
reduce the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews of
her daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as said property is
not her own and she has only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the
obligation to preserve and to deliver same to the reservatarios, one of whom is
her own daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express provision of law, that
by operation of law all of the reservable property, received during lifetime by
Severina Faz de Leon from her son, Apolonio III, constitutes or forms parts of
the legitime pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said property did not come to
be the legitimate and exclusive property of Severina Faz de Leon, her only
legitimate and forced heiress, the defendant Mercedes, could not inherit all by
33
operation of law and in accordance with the order of legitimate succession,
because the other relatives of the deceased Apolonio III, within the third degree,
as well as herself are entitled to such reservable property.
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of Mercedes
Florentino, coming from the inheritance of her mother Severina Faz de Leon, has
been reduced and impaired; and the application of article 811 of the Code to the
instant case in no way prejudices the rights of the defendant Mercedes Florentino,
inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only of the reservable property, there
being no lawful or just reason which serves as real foundation to disregard the
right to Apolonio III's other relatives, within the third degree, to participate
in the reservable property in question. As these relatives are at present living,
claiming for it with an indisputable right, we cannot find any reasonable and
lawful motive why their rights should not be upheld and why they should not be
granted equal participation with the defendant in the litigated property.
The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress, her daughter
Mercedes, the property received from the deceased son Apolonio III lost the
character, previously held, of reservable property; and that the mother, the said
Severina, therefore, had no further obligation to reserve same for the relatives
within the third degree of the deceased Apolonio III, is evidently erroneous for
the reason that, as has been already stated, the reservable property, left in a
will by the aforementioned Severina to her only daughter Mercedes, does not form
part of the inheritance left by her death nor of the legitimate of the heiress
Mercedes. Just because she has a forced heiress, with a right to her inheritance,
does not relieve Severina of her obligation to reserve the property which she
received from her deceased son, nor did same lose the character of reservable
property, held before the reservatariosreceived same.
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the reservista Severina,
took possession of the property in question, same did not pass into the hands of
strangers. But it is likewise true that the said Mercedes is not the
only reservataria. And there is no reason founded upon law and upon the principle
of justice why the other reservatarios, the other brothers and nephews, relatives
within the third degree in accordance with the precept of article 811 of the
Civil Code, should be deprived of portions of the property which, as reservable
property, pertain to them.
From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced by the Supreme
Court of Spain on January 4, 1911, for the violation of articles 811, 968 and
consequently of the Civil Code is not applicable in the instant case.
Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of Spain held that the
legitime of the forced heirs cannot be reduced or impaired and said article is
expressly respected in this decision.
However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their supposed rights,
it has not been shown, upon any legal foundation, that the reservable property
belonged to, and was under the absolute dominion of, the reservista, there being
relatives within the third degree of the person from whom same came; that said
property, upon passing into the hands of the forced heiress of the deceased
reservista, formed part of the legitime of the former; and that the said forced
heiress, in addition to being a reservataria, had an exclusive right to receive
all of said property and to deprive the other reservatarios, her relatives within
the third degree of certain portions thereof.
Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity for damages and
the delivery of the fruits collected, it is not proper to grant the first for
there is no evidence of any damage which can give rise to the obligation of
refunding same. As to the second, the delivery of the fruits produced by the land
forming the principal part of the reservable property, the defendants are
undoubtedly in duty bound to deliver to the plaintiffs six-sevenths of the fruits
or rents of the portions of land claimed in the complaint, in the quantity
expressed in paragraph 11 of the same, from January 17, 1918, the date the
complaint was filed; and the remaining seventh part should go to the defendant
Mercedes.
For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the order of
decision appealed from we should declare, as we hereby do, that the aforementioned
property, inherited by the deceased Severina Faz de Leon from her son Apolonio
Florentino III, is reservable property; that the plaintiffs, being relatives of
the deceased Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to six-sevenths
of said reservable property; that the defendant Mercedes is entitled to the
remaining seventh part thereof; that the latter, together with her husband Angel
Encarnacion, shall deliver to the plaintiffs, jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits
or rents, claimed from said portion of the land and of the quantity claimed, from
January 17, 1918, until fully delivered; and that the indemnity for one thousand
pesos (P1,000) prayed for in the complaint is denied, without special findings
as to the costs of both instances. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-12957 March 24, 1961
CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees.
DIZON, J.:
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and
void the sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the
spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to
reconvey to appellants Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan),
Oriental Negros; and (3) ordering all the appellees to pay, jointly and severally,
to appellants the sum of P500.00 as damages, plus the costs of suit. In their
answer appellees disclaimed any knowledge or information regarding the sale
allegedly made on April 20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants and
alleged that, if such sale was made, the same was void on the ground that Andrea
Gutang had no right to dispose of the property subject matter thereof. They
further alleged that said property had never been in possession of appellants,
the truth being that appellees, as owners, had been in continuous possession
thereof since the death of Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and
counterclaim, they further alleged that on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana
Yaeso, as the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso, executed a public
instrument of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes, the
said sale having been registered together with an affidavit of adjudication
34
executed by Paulina and Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the
aforesaid deceased; that since then the Esparcias had been in possession of the
property as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as
follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (1)
that the sale of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff
spouses Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay is void, and the reconveyance
prayed for by them is denied; (2) that the sale made by Paulina and
Cipriana Yaeso in favor of defendants Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes
involving the same lot is also void, and they have no valid title thereto;
and (3) that the reservable property in question is part of and must be
reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and
heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea Gutang as of December 13,
1951. No pronouncement as to the costs.
From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal, their
principal contentions being, firstly, that the lower court erred in holding that
Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan was a reservable property; secondly,
in annulling the sale of said lot executed by Andrea Gutang in their favor; and
lastly, in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled to inherit said
land.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa
Ruales, he had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while
with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According
to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon his
death — the date of which does not clearly appear of record — were left to his
children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to
Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion)
to Francisco. As a result of the cadastral proceedings, Original Certificate of
Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco. Because
Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the property for him,
declared it in her name for taxation purposes (Exhs A & A-1), and paid the taxes
due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the
age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir,
executed the public instrument Exhibit F entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND
SALE whereby, among other things, for and in consideration of the sum of P800.00
she sold the property in question to appellants. When thereafter said vendees
demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of
Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 — which was in their possession — the
latter refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the
cadastral record No. 507. The same, however, was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso,
the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared the property
in their name, on January 1, 1951 executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses
Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in turn, declared it in their
name for tax purposes and thereafter secured the issuance in their name of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141 (Exhs. 5 & 5-A).
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the
land in question was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by
operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried
and without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang.
The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property
came, if any survived her. The record discloses in this connection that Andrea
Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana
Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve
creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged
to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came (6 Manresa
268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court has held in connection with this matter
that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property
but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the
reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation,
said alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the
reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by
the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista (Edroso
vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil. 279).
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to
the condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of
the alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any person
entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died,
Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the
previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect
and the reservable property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership
to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina
and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was
subject to a similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor
of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from which the
reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate
and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation
shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the
person obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the
reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve,
died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon
Andrea's death. While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister
prior to this event, became effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory
condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the appealed decision, in so
far as it orders the reversion of the property in question to the Estate of
Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees — the Esparcia spouses did — not appeal
therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision — as above modified — is affirmed, with costs,
and without prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have
against the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in
question.
35

G.R. No. 7890 September 29, 1914
FILOMENA PECSON, as administratix of the last will and testament of Florencio
Pecson, et al., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO, defendant-appellee.
S. E. Imperial for appellants.
Tomas Lorayes for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that some time prior to the 17th day of September,
1910, the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the Court
of First Instance of the Province of Albay for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an
attorney at law, opposed the legislation of the will on the ground that it had
not been authorized nor signed by the deceased, in accordance with the provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure. After hearing the respective parties, the
Honorable Percy M. Moir, judge, found that the will had been signed and executed
in accordance with the provisions of law, and denied the opposition on the 17th
day of September, 1910.
On the 18th day of September, 1910, the said Tomas Lorayes, representing Basiliso
Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion in the words following:
1. That Rosario Mediavillo is and Joaquin Mediavillo was a legitimate
child of the deceased Teresa Pecson, who also was a daughter of the
testator, Florencio Pecson, and therefore the first mentioned is and the
second was a grandchild of the latter.
2. That the said granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, was
disinherited by her grandfather, the testator Florencio Pecson, according
to clause 3 of the will, because she failed to show him due respect and
on a certain occasion raised her hand against him.
3. That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps
she did, it was due to the derangement of her mental faculties which
occurred a long time ago and from which she now suffers in periodical
attacks.
By reason of all the foregoing and because the disinheriting clause 3 of
the will is unfounded, the undersigned prays the court to annul the said
clause and to make the testator's died without succession, but is
represented now by his father, Basiliso Mediavillo), participants in the
estate left by their grandfather; and, finally, that the court grant such
other relief as it may deem just and equitable.
After a consideration of the question presented by said motion, the lower court,
on the 22d day of September, 1911, rendered the following decision:
This case has come up to-day for a hearing on the declaration of heirs of
the decease Florencio Pecson, who died in Daraga, about the year 1910.
From the evidence it appears that the deceased had eight children by his
wife Nicolasa Manjares, likewise deceased, which children are those named
Emerenciano, Teresa, Filomena, Asunsion, Rufino, Zoila, Emiliano, and
Perfecto, all surnamed Pecson. It also appears that Rufino Pecson absented
himself from these Islands twenty-five years ago, going to Australia, and
that nothing has been heard of him for the past twenty years. The said
Rufino Pecson left no children in the Philippines and was unmarried when
he emigrated. As nothing has been heard of him for twenty years, it is
presumed that he died and it is held that the part of this estate to which
he was entitled must be divided among the other heirs.
It also appears from the evidence that Teresa Pecson married Basiliso
Mediavillo, by whom she had two children, Joaquin and Rosario Mediavillo.
Teresa also died, leaving these two children and her husband, Basiliso
Mediavillo. Her son Joaquin died, unmarried and childless, before the
death of the testator, Florencio Pecson. Rosario is the only living
daughter of Teresa and the latter's husband, Basiliso Mediavillo, is also
living. The evidence shows that this girl Rosario became insane in 1895,
when she went to Nueva Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved
that it was previous to this date that she disobeyed her grandfather and
raised her hand against him, and, as the testator states in the third
paragraph of his will, he disinherited her. This court understands that
this Rosario, who was then 14 years of age, and who shortly afterwards
became insane, was not responsible for her acts and should not have been
disinherited by her grandfather.
The court therefore decrees that this part of the will is contrary to law
and sets it aside as being of no force or value whatever. The court further
holds that Rosario Mediavillo, the daughter of Teresa Pecson, is the
heiress of the one-half of the share of this estate pertaining to the
said Teresa, and that her father, as the heir of his son Joaquin, also
Teresa's son, is the heris of the other one-half of the said share
pertaining to Teresa — that is, of the one-seventh of this estate that
pertains to the latter. Moreover, the court decrees that, besides the two
heirs just above mentioned, Emerciano, Filomena, Asuncion, Zoila,
Emiliano, and Perfecto, surnamed Pecson, and the children of Teresa, are
also heirs of the estate of Florencio Pecson.
From the decision the plaintiff appealed to this court and made the following
assignments of error:
FIRST ERROR
The lower court erred in finding that the part of the will which
disinherits Rosario Mediavillo is contrary to law, and in setting it aside
as being of no force or value whatever.
SECOND ERROR
36
 The lower court erred by decreeing that Basaliso Mediavillo, the father
of Joaquin Mediavillo, is the heir by representation of the one-half of
the one seventh of this estate pertaining to Joaquin Mediavillo.
With reference to the first assignment of error it may be said that from the
record it appears that during the lifetime of Florencio Pecson he had been married
to Nicolasa Manjares, with whom he had eight children, named Filomena, Asuncion,
Zoila, Emerenciano, Emiliano, Perfecto, Rufino and Teresa Pecson; that before the
death of Florencio Pecson he executed and delivered the will in question. The
will made no provision for the said Rufino Pecson, neither was there any provision
in the will for the said Teresa. All of the other children were named as heirs
in said will. It appears that Teresa had been married with one Basiliso
Mediavillo, and that some time before the making of the will in question she
died, leaving her husband and two children, Joaquin Mediavillo and Rosario
Mediavillo, as her heirs. It also appears from the record that Joaquin Mediavillo
died without heirs, leaving as the only heirs of the said Teresa Pecson, her
husband, Basilio Mediavillo and the said Rosario Mediavillo. The said Joaquin
Mediavillo died before his grandfather, Florencio Pecson, and probably before the
will in question was made.
Paragraph 3 of the will disinherited Rosario Mediavillo in the following language:
I declare that one of my daughters, named Teresa, now deceased, left a
legitimate daughter named Rosario Mediavillo. I also declare that I
disinherit my granddaughter, the said Rosario Mediavillo, because she was
grossly disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do
not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore, it is my will
that the said Rosario Mediavillo shall have no share in my property.
The defendant, Rosario Mediavillo, in the motion which she presented and which
is copied above, alleges that she was disinherited without case. Upon a
consideration of that question, the lower court found that she had been
disinherited without cause and annulled said paragraph 3 of the will. That order
of the lower court constitutes the error complained of by the appellant in her
first assignment of error.
By reference to said paragraph 3 above quoted, it will be seen that Florencio
Pecson disinherited the said Rosario Mediavillo "because she was grossly
disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not remember,
she raised her hand against me. Therefore it is my will that she, the said Rosario
Mediavillo, shall have no share in my property."
The lower court admitted proof the question of the responsibility of the said
Rosario Mediavillo at the time she offered the offense to her grandfather,
Florencio Pecson. After hearing the proof, the lower court reached the following
conclusion:
The evidence shows that this girl Rosario became insane in 1895, when she
went to Nueva Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it
was previous to this date that she disobeyed her grandfather and raised
her hand against him, and, as the testator states in the third paragraph
of his will, he disinherited her. This court understands that this
Rosario, who was then 14 years of age, and who shortly afterwards became
insane, was not responsible for her acts and should not have been
disinherited by her grandfather.
The first assignment of error presents the question whether or not the courts,
when a parent disinherits his children, may inquire into the cause of the
disinheritance and decide that there was or was not ground for such
disinheritance. The Civil Code (art. 848) provides that disinheritance
shall only take place for one of the causes expressly fixed by law. In accordance
with the provisions of that article (848) we find that articles 756 and 853
provide the cases or causes for disinheritance; or, in other words, the cases or
causes in which the ancestors may by will disinherit their heirs. Article 849 of
the Civil Code provides that the disinheritance can only be effected by the
testament, in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such
disinheritance. If it is true that heirs can be disinherited only by will, and
for causes mentioned in the Civil Code, it would seen to follow that the courts
might properly inquire whether the disinheritance has been made properly and for
the causes provided for by law. The right of the courts to inquire into the causes
and whether there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to
be supported by express provisions of the Civil Code. Article 850 provides that
"the proof of the truthfulness of the reason for disinheritance shall be
established by the heirs of the testator, should the disinherited person deny
it." It would appear then that if the person disinherited should deny the
truthfulness of the cause of disinheritance, he might be permitted to support his
allegation by proof. The right of the court to inquire whether or not the
disinheritance was made for just cause is also sustained by the provisions of
article 851, which in part provides that:
Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the
truth of which, if contradicted, should not be proven . . . shall annul
the designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person
disinherited.
It seems clear from the above-quoted provisions, that the courts may inquire into
the justice of a disinheritance such as was attempted in the present case, and
if they find that the disinheritance was without cause, that part of the testament
or will may be pronounced null and void. It remains, however, to be seen whether
the evidence adduced during the trial of the present cause was sufficient to show
that the disinheritance made in paragraph 3 of the will was made for just cause.
It appears from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years of
age, she had received some attentions from a young man — that she had received a
letter from him — and that her grandfather, Florencio Pecson, took occasion to
talk to her about the relations between her and the said young man; that it was
upon that occasion when, it is alleged, the disobedience and disrespect were
shown to her grandfather, and that was the cause for her disinheritance by her
grandfather. The record shows that very soon after said event she lost the use
of her mental powers and that she has never regained them, except for very brief
periods, up to the present time. The lower court, taking into consideration her
tender years, and the fact that she very soon thereafter lost the use of her
mental faculties, reached the conclusion that she was probably not responsible
for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather in the year 1894 or
1895.
After a careful consideration of the record, we are inclined to believe that the
same supports the conclusions of the lower court and that the same supports the
37
conclusions of the lower court that he did not commit the error complained of in
the first assignment of error.
With reference to the second assignment of error, it will be remembered that
Teresa Pecson, the mother of Rosario Mediavillo, at the time of her death left
two children, Rosario and Joaquin, and her husband Basiliso Mediavillo, and that
said Joaquin Mediavillo died without heirs. The lower court gave one-half of the
inheritance of the said Teresa Pecson to Rosario Mediavillo and the share that
would have gone to Joaquin Mediavillo, and the share that would have gone to
Joaquin Mediavillo, to his father Basiliso Mediavillo. In that conclusion of the
lower court we think error was committed. The appellant relies upon the provisions
of article 925 of the Civil Code, in his contention that the lower court committed
an error. Article 925 provides that:
The right of representation shall always take place in the direct
descending line, but never in the ascending. In collateral lines, it shall
take place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether
they be of the whole or half blood.
The appellee, in support of the conclusions of the lower court, cites articles
935 and 936 of the Civil Code. Article 935 provides that:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased,
his ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.
Article 936 provides that:
The father and mother, if living shall inherits share and share alike. If
one of them only survive, he or she shall succeed to the son's entire
estate.
It will be remembered that the whole argument of the appellants with reference
to the first assignment of error was that Rosario Mediavillo had been disinherited
and the court evidently believed that there were no "legitimate children,
descendants of the deceased, surviving," and that therefore the father or mother
of said legitimate children would inherit as ascendants. Inasmuch, however, as
there was a descendant in the direct line, surviving, the inheritance could not
ascend, and for the reason the lower court committed an error in declaring that
Basiliso Mediavillo was entitled to inherit that share of the estate that would
have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been living. Therefore, and for all
the foregoing, that part of the judgment of the lower court nullifying and setting
aside paragraph 3 of the will is hereby affirmed, and that art of said judgment
which decrees to Basiliso Mediavillo one-half of the estate of Florencio Pecson,
belonging to Teresa Pecson and which would have been given to Joaquin Mediavillo,
had he been surviving, is hereby revoked. And without any findings as to costs,
it is hereby ordered that the cause be remanded to the lower court, with direction
that judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and that such further proceedings
be had as the interested parties may deem necessary, for the purpose of disposing
of that part of the inheritance of Teresa Pecson would have belonged to Joaquin
Mediavillo, had he been surviving.
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO
D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO,
SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking the
nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for
probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP.
Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of
the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In
the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio,
Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement
of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
98–90870 of the RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa
D. Seangio–Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner
Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the
petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full
command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of
attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control
and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most
competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo
because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic
will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents,
Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners
averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate
proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for
the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 99–93396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They
likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over SP.
Proc. No. 98–90870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority
over intestate proceedings.2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s holographic will is quoted,
as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
38
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita,
Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at
hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na
si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya
ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis
kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw
gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para
makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China
Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito
ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China
Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga
custome[r] ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko
si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan
kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay
hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng
tatlong saksi. 3
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’ motion, SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 and SP. Proc.
No. 99–93396 were consolidated.4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings5 primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the
deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the
Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act
of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else;
that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee
or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such
being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court
is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not
barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the
dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear
that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1)
generally, the authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination
of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents question the
intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance
constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on
preterition does not apply because Segundo’s will does not constitute a universal
heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition
for probate proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng
Seangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs
mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted,
Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy
Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory
heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would
amount to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v.
Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear:
"for … respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case
to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void … would
have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate
outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved(underscoring
supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 99–93396 is hereby DISMISSED without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated
October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS,
DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF)
CONSIDERING THAT:
I
39
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 76 OF
THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR INITIAL
HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE
CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATOR’S WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF
THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS
IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E.,
THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATOR’S TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE
WITH THE REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON
THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE
FACE OF THE TESTATOR’S WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH
INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTESTATE CASE
CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE
OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place
for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance
thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published three weeks
successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation;
and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of
the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but
rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply
contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in
the decedent’s will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically
void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private
respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate.
None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the
holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that
it is both intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated
to proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work
injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was
dated, signed and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of
preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue as regards the
authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed
Segundo’s intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate
for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by
Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the
same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be
specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by
Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole,
can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that
the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or
descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of
children and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against
the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for
which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the
accusation has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or
concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already
made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or
ascendant who disinherit such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or
descendant;8
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil
interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by
Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need
not be witnessed.
40
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance No costs.
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law.
It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to SO ORDERED.
dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument,
and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property,
the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself.
In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of
the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of
Alfredo.10

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the

testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be
recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are
designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the
intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it
cannot be given effect.11

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned
in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally
than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator.12 In
this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned
as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last
testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a
holographic will. Unless the will is probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be
given effect.14

With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the compulsory
heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s
opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory
heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an
heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the
name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to
institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness
to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.1âwphi1

Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that
the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed
with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real
or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules
of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of
his property may be rendered nugatory.17

In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the
holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose.18

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside.
Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the
allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP.
Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid
testate proceedings.

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