DEFINITION OF CRIMINAL LAW informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional

Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that

LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 12809620 JAN 1999 the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY cases where one or ore of the “principal accused” are
government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP
Facts: officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they
did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng
resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending
gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies,
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
“principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of
andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in
R.A. 7975.
the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a
8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall
member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what
apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not
actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out
begun as of the approval hereof.
between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG,
Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to
Issues:
investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a
legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the
the panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for multiple
petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection clause
murder against twenty-six respondents including herein
of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been
petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-
introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire
intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the
jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
Ombudsman filed amended informations before the
Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post
accessory.
facto statute.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction

of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended

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(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members
of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office
of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the
determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s
or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.
RULING:
Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A.
8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too
shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing
argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every
classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the
party who challenges the law must present proof of
arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary
when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must
apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which
are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases
involving” certain public officials and under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any
court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law
is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases.
The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in
the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner
and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A.
8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be
committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for
the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. [63] This
jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5,
Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that
the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases
committed by public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to
their office as may be determined by law. This constitutional
mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it
declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or
hereafter may be provided by law.
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law,
generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is
not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not
penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations or those that define crimes and provide for their
punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters,
has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a
procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by
which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A.
8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
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In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have
been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately
connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while
he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate
relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in
determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However,
upon examination of the amended information, there was no
specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the
said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of
their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and
investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their
custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with
such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense
which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his
office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations
that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and,
therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
DUE PROCESS AS APPLIED TO PENAL LAWS
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL
POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and the REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV,
ILOILO CITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 74457. March 20, 1987
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner in this case transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo for the violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the
slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. Petitioner
sued for recovery, and the trial Court of Iloilo issued a writ of
replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of twelve
thousand pesos (P 12, 000.00). After considering the merits of
the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the said carabaos
and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the E.O, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of
authority and also for its presumed validity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Executive Order is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes, though police power was invoked by the government in this
case for the reason that the present condition demand that the
carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the
small farmers who rely on them for energy needs, it does not
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however, comply with the second requisite for a valid exercise of
the said power which is, "that there be a lawful method." The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is
missing.
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of Police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive. To justify the State in the imposition of its
authority in behalf of the public, it must be:
1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require such interference;
2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
APLLICATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW
GR no. 127107 October 12, 1998
Peter Paul Dimatulac and Veronica Dimatulac, petitioners vs.
Hon. Sensinando Villon, et. al., respondents.
Facts:
SP03 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in
Pampanga. A complaint for murder was filed in the MTC
and after preliminary investigation, Judge Designate
David issued warrants of arrest against the accused.
Only David, Mandap, Magat, and Yambao were arrested and it
was only Yambao who submitted his counter-affidavit.
Judge David then issued a resolution finding reasonable
ground that the crime of murder has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Though it was not clear whether Pampanga Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Alfonso-Flores acted motu
proprio, or upon motion of the private respondents, she
conducted a reinvestigation and resolved that the Yabuts
and Danny were in conspiracy, along with the other
accused, and committed homicide.
Before the information for homicide was filed, the Petitioner
appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary
of Justice. However, Provincial Proseutor Maranag
ordered for the release of David, Mandap, Magat, and
Naguit. An information for homicide was also filed before
the Regional Trial Court.
Judge Raura approved the cash bonds of the Yabuts and
recalled the warrants of arrest against them.
Private Prosecutor Amado Valdez then filed a Motion to issue
hold departure order and Urgent Motion to defer
proceedings. Judge Roura deferred the resolution of the
first Motion and denied the second. He also set the
arraignment of the accused.
The petitioners filed a Motion to inhibit Judge Roura for
hastily setting the date for arraignment pending the
appeal in the DOJ and for prejudging the matter. They
also filed a Petition for prohibition with the Court of
Appeals.
Public Prosecutor Datu filed a Manifestation and Comment
with the trial court and opposed the inhibition of Roura.
He also stated that he will no longer allow the private
prosecutor to participate. Judge Roura voluntarily
inhibited himself and was replaced by Judge Villon.
The Petitioners filed with the RTC a Manifestation submitting
documentary evidence to support their contention that
the offense committed was murder.
Judge Villon ordered for the resetting of the arraignment. The
Yabuts entered a plea of not guilty. The petitioners then
filed a Urgent Motion to set aside arraignment.
Secretary Guingona of the DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of
the petitioners. He also ruled that treachery was present.
The Yabuts opposed the Manifestation because they have
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 already been arraigned and they would be put under
double jeopardy.
The Secretary of Justice then set aside his order and the
appeal was held not and academic due to the previous
arraignment of the accused for homicide.
Judge Villon denied the Motion to set aside arraignment. The
motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this
petition for certiorari/prohibition and mandamus.
Issues:
Whether the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor committed
grave abuse of discretion in reinvestigating the case
without having the respondents within the custody of the
law and for filing the information pending the appeal of
the resolution with the DOJ.
Whether Hon. Villon acted with grave abuse of discretion in
proceeding with the arraignment and for denying the
Motions to set aside the arraignment.
Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion in reconsidering his order.
Decision:
Petition is GRANTED.
Alfonso-Reyes was guilty of having acted with grave
abuse of discretion for conducting a reinvestigation despite the
fact that the Yabuts were still at large. Though Sec. 5, Rule 112
states that the prosecutor is not bound by the findings of the
judge who conducted the investigation, the resolution should be
based on the review of the record and evidence transmitted.
Hence, she should have sustained the recommendation since all
the accused, except Yambao, failed to file their counter-affidavits.
It is impossible for Alfonso-Reyes to not have known the appeal
filed with the DOJ. The filing of an appeal is provided in Sec. 4,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. There is nothing in the law which
prohibits the filing of an appeal once an information is filed.
Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion for
deferring the resolution to the motion for a hold departure order.
Since the accused were out on bail, the Motion should have been
granted since they could have easily fled. Though he is not bound
to the resolution of the DOJ, he should have perused the
documents submitted.
The DOJ was also in grave abuse of its discretion for
setting aside its order. In doing so, it has relinquished its power
of control and supervision of the Public Prosecutor. The state has
been deprived of due process. Hence, the dismissal of the case is
null and void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the
accused.
--
LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR no. 125865
January 28, 2000
Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang
Respondent: People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development
Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory
words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged
before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral
defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued
by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him
to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB.
The next day, the MeTC judge received an “office of protocol”
from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from
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 legal process under section 45 of the Agreement between the
ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters
of the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC
judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal
cases.
The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed
by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City
which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to
enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion
for reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case
to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by
immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary
investigation was held before the criminal case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity
from legal process with regard to Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was
imperative.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts
cannot blindly adhere to the communication from the DFA that
the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no binding
effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due
process not only of the accused but also of the prosecution.
Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not
absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done
in “official capacity”. Hence, slandering a person could not
possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our
laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation,
in the name of official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases
cognizable by the MeTC such as this case. Being purely a
statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only
when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure
is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases
falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Hence, SC denied the petition.
EFFECT OF VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW
[ GR NOS. 138792-804, Mar 31, 2005 ]
DANTE GUEVARRA v. FOURTH DIVISION OF SANDIGANBAYAN
The petitioners are correct in claiming that an order or
resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordering the dismissal of
criminal cases becomes final and executory upon the lapse of 15
days from notice thereof to the parties, and, as such, is beyond
the jurisdiction of the graft court to review, modify or set aside, if
no appeal therefrom is filed by the aggrieved party. However, if
the Sandiganbayan acts in excess or lack of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case, the dismissal is null
and void. A tribunal acts without jurisdiction if it does not have
the legal power to determine the case; there is excess of
jurisdiction where a tribunal, being clothed with the power to
determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law.
[26]
A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force
or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-
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existent.[27] Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action
or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to
take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order;
it may simply be ignored.[28]
By its Order, the graft court deprived the respondent People of
the Philippines of its right to due process. In fine, the
Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction and committed
grave abuse of its discretion in dismissing the 13 criminal cases
against the petitioners.[30] Hence, its Order dated January 26,
1998 dismissing the 13 criminal cases, as against the petitioners,
was null and void;[31] it may thus be rectified, as did the graft
court, per its Resolution dated April 6, 1999 despite the lapse of
fifteen days from notice of the Special Prosecutor of its January
26, 1998 Order. By rectifying its void Order, it cannot be said that
the graft court acted with grave abuse of its discretion,
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
The Special Prosecutor must share the blame with the
Sandiganbayan because in his Manifestation and Motion, the
Special Prosecutor averred therein that Justice Marigomen
recommended the dismissal of the 13 criminal cases against all
the accused, without specifically stating therein that the
recommendation for dismissal pertained only to petitioner
Olonan, and not to the other accused who are the petitioners
herein. The Special Prosecutor should have been more precise
and forthright so as not to mislead the graft court.
CRUEL & UNUSUAL PENALTY
Harden vs. Director of Prisons (81 Phil. 741)
Facts:
On July 12, 1941 Fred M. Harden was involved in a civil case with
Mrs. Harden concerning conjugal partnership, payment of
alimony and accounting. A preliminary injunction was issued
restraining Mr. Harden from transferring or alienating, except
with consideration and consent of the court, all assets (money,
shares of stock, property, real, personal, whether in his name, her
name or both) in the partnership with Mrs. Harden.
During 1946 however, Mr. Harden transferred drafts and cash in
overseas accounts. In the course of two years, he received orders
from the SC to return the amounts but Mr. Harden kept filing for
extensions. On March 24, 1948, he was committed to jail because
of contempt (failure to comply with the court’s orders of
producing the amounts) and held there until he can produce said
amounts.
Issue:
Relevant: WoN the imprisonment sentence for Mr. Harden is
excessive punishment.
Irrelevant: WoN the property moved into foreign jurisdiction is
still covered by Philippine jurisdiction
Held and Ratio:
Relevant: No. Mr. Harden has “the keys to his prison” and his
detainment is something that he himself can end at any time.
(Sec. 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court: When the contempt
consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of
the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a
superior court until he performs it)
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In these circumstances, the judgment can not be said to be
excessive or unjust. (Davis vs. Murphy, [1947] 188 P., 2nd. 229-
231.). As stated in a more recent case (De Wees, [1948], 210 S.
W., 2d. 145-147), "to order that one be imprisoned for an
indefinite period in a civil contempt is purely a remedial
measure. Its purpose is to coerce the contemner to do an act
within his or her power to perform. He must have the means by
which he may purge himself of the contempt." The latter decision
cites Staley vs. South Jersey Realty Co., 83 N. J. Eq., 300, 90 A.,
1042, 1043, in which the theory is expressed in this language:
"In a 'civil contempt' the proceeding is remedial, it is a step in the
case the object of which is to coerce one party for the benefit of
the other party to do or to refrain from doing some act specified
in the order of the court. Hence, if imprisonment be ordered, it is
remedial in purpose and coercive in character, and to that end
must relate to something to be done by the defendant by the
doing of which he may discharge himself." As quaintly expressed,
the imprisoned man "carries the keys to his prison in his own
pocket."
Irrelevant: Yes. “While a court cannot give its receiver authority
to act in another state without the assistance of the courts
thereof (53 C. J., 390-391) yet it may act directly upon the parties
before it with respect to the property beyond the limits of its
territorial jurisdiction, and hold them in contempt if they resist
the court’s orders with reference to its custody or disposition.”
Decision: Petition is denied.
Separate Opinion: Perfecto, J.
He believes that it is indeed an excessive penalty because of Mr.
Harden’s claims that it is beyond his power to comply with the
court order and would thus result in life imprisonment for Mr.
Harden.
People V. Dionisio
22 SCRA 1299
FACTS: On or about the 19th day of August, 1962, in Manila City,
Rosauro Dionisio, a person who is not duly authorized in any
capacity by the Games and Amusement Board to conduct a horse
race, did then and there willfully and unlawfully offer, arrange
and collect bets for the Special Daily Double Race being then
conducted at the Sta. Ana Racing Club at Makati and for that
purpose has in possession the cash amount of P8.50, one Nueva
Era Racing Program, dated August 19, 1962, one list of bets, one
ballpen and one booklet of Daily Double receipt. He was thereby
charged in violation of Republic Act No. 3063.
ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty applied to his offense infringes
the Constitutional provision that “Excessive fines shall not be
imposed nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” (Art III Sec. 1
clause 19, of the Constitution of the Phils)
RULING: Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves
cruel and unusual punishment, for the Constitutional structure has
been interpreted as referring to penalties that are inhumane and
barbarous, or shocking to the conscience and fines or
imprisonment are definitely not in this category.
Nor does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
“The Social Scourge of Gambling must be stamped out. The laws
against gambling must be enforced to the limit.” (Peo v. Gorostiza,
77 Phil 88)
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Nor does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. In People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 655, this Court ruled:
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. "The fact that the punishment authorized
by the statute, is severe does not make it cruel and
unusual." (24 C.J.S. 1187-1188.) Expressed in other
terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the
punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive,"
"wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as
to shock the moral sense of the community."
EX POST FACTO LAW
Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20,
1999
FACTS: Petitioner Lacson was involved in a criminal
case that started when eleven persons, believed to be members
of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) were killed by the Anti-
Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG)where
the petitioner was one of the heads. Then, in a media expose, it
was said that what happened was a rub-out and not a shoot-out.
Among other issues, petitioner argues that Republic Act (R.A.)
8249, that was enacted during his case was pending,has a
retroactive effect and is plan from the facts and was made to suit
the petitioner’s case, thus, making it an ex-post facto law that
would affect the right of the accused to procedural due process.
Hence, the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statute R.A. 8249 may be considered
as an ex post facto law that may affect the petitioner’s right to
due process?
HELD: No.
REASONING: There is nothing ex-post facto in R.A. 8249 – an ex
post facto law generally provides for a retroactive effect on penal
laws. However, the Court explains, R.A. 8249 is not a penal law.
As the Court defines, ‘Penal laws are those acts of the legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties thereof; or
those that defines crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for
their punishment’.
Republic Act 8249 is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is
not penal in character, thus, may not be considered an ex post
facto law. Therefore, the argument of the petitioner that the law
in question has retroactive effect and may affect his right to due
process is wrong.
LACSON vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
RA 7975 which amended PD 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other
procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a
penal law, but a clear procedural statute.
Elementary Rule:
Jurisdiction of a Court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and information and not by the evidence presented by
the parties at trial. The mode or right to appeal in not included in
the prohibition of ex post facto considering that the right to
appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be
regulated by law.
MULTIPLE MURDER CHARGED
Section 4 of RA 8249, requires that the offense charged must be
committed by the offender IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE in order
for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.
People vs Montejo (INTIMINATELU CONNECTED)
9|Page
Intimately connected with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
function.
*Actual recital of FACTS
US vs KARELSEN (the object of this written accusation)
1. Furnish the accused with discretion of charge
2. Avail himself of his conviction of acquittal
3. Inform the Court of the facts alleged so that it may decide
What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the
information that would indicate the close intimacy that would
indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense
charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed
in relation to public office.
Advertisements
EXCEPTION TO EX POST FACTO CLAUSE
WRIGHT vs CA G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994 Extradition, Ex
post facto law
OCTOBER 25, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian
authorities for indictable crimes in his country. Extradition
proceedings were filed against him which ordered the
deportation of petitioner. Said decision was sustained by the
Court of Appeals; hence, petitioner came herein by way of review
on certiorari, to set aside the order of deportation, contending
that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the
extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates
Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Can extradition treaty be applied retroactively?
RULING:
NO. Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include
all laws of retrospective application, whether civil or criminal.
However, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone, The
Federalist and other early U.S. state constitutions in Calder vs.
Bull concluded that the concept was limited only to penal and
criminal statutes.
As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are
1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act
was not an offense when committed;
2) laws which, while not creating new offenses, aggravate the
seriousness of a crime;
3) statutes which prescribes greater punishment for a crime
already committed; or,
4) laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it
substantially easier to convict a defendant.
“Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that
the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects
the substantial rights of the accused.” This being so, there is no
absolutely no merit in petitioner’s contention that the ruling of
the lower court sustaining the Treaty’s retroactive application
with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty’s coming
10 | P a g e
into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed
against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly amending RA 3019.
concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation
nor a criminal procedural statute. “It merely provides for the
extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a
crime which offense or crime was already committed or Issue: Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional
consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.” guarantee against an ex post facto law.

-- Held:

EXCEPTION TO EX POST FACTO CLAUSE The court finds no merit in the petitioner’s contention that RA
3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which includes
BAYOT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN the crime of estafa through falsification of Public Documents as
among crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith
[128 SCRA 383; NO.L-61776 TO NO.L-61861; 23 MAR 1984]
with suspension from public office pending action in court, is a
penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition
Facts: Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in against the enactment of ex post facto law.
more than 100 counts of estafa thru falsification of Public
Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment and public office
documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges started
during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not a
from his alleged involvement as a government auditor of the
penalty because it is not a result of a judicial proceeding. In fact,
commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of education and
if acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to
culture, with some other employees from the said ministry. The
reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to
bureau of treasury and the teacher’s camp in Baguio City for the
receive during suspension and does not violate the
preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for the
constitutional provision against ex post facto law.
nom-existent obligations of the teacher’s camp resulting in
damage to the government of several millions. The 1st 32 cases
The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because
were filed on July 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal mayor
he is currently occupying a position different from that under
of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on January 1980. but on May
which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision
1980 Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the
clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom
accused together with his other co-accused in all but one of the
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under RA
thirty two cases filed against them.
3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the government or
public funds or property or whatever stage of executionand

11 | P a g e
mode of participation shall be suspended from office. The use of
the word “office” applies to any office which the
officer charged may be holding and not only the particular office
under which he was charged.
--
PEOPLE VS FERRER, 28 SCRA 382
BILL OF ATTAINDER
FACTS:
Co-respondents herein were charged in violation of RA 1700 or
Anti Subversion Law by instigating, recruiting, inciting others to
rise up and take arms against the Government with the purpose
of overthrowing the Government of the Philippines.
Respondents, who were charged in violations of RA 1700 (Anti
Subversion Law) moved to quash the charged and alleged that
the said law is Bill of Attainder.
The Law punishes any person who "knowingly, wilfully and by
overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member
of the Party or of any other similar "subversive organization.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law in question or the RA 1700/ Anti
Subversion Law is a bill of attainder.
HELD:
No. Article 3 Section 22 of the Constitution provides:
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
A Bill of Attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment
without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a
judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bill
of attainders serves to implement the principle of separation of
powers by confining the legislatures to rule-making and thereby
forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.
The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of burden on it,
and a legislative intent to stigmatise statute as a bill of attainder.
1. The Supreme Court held that when the act is viewed in its
actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Philippines or the member thereof for
the purpose of punishment. What it does is simple to declare the
party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition.
The term "Communist Part of the Philippines" issues solely for
definitional purposes. In fact the act applies not only to the
Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any organisation
having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on
individuals but on conduct.
PROSPECTIVITY RULE
PEOPLE VS BRACAMONTE, G.R. No. 95939; June 17, 1996
12 | P a g e
Although Republic Act No. 7659 reimposed the death penalty for
certain heinous crimes, including robbery with homicide, [27] the
capital punishment could not be imposed in the case at
bench. The crime here was committed way back in September
23, 1987, while R.A. No. 7659 took effect only on December 31,
1993.[28] To impose upon appellant the death penalty would
violate the basic rule in criminal law that, if the new law imposes
a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time of the commission
of the offense shall be applied, [29] which in this case is Article 294
(1) of the Revised Penal Code sans the death penalty clause by
virtue of Section 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
provides, viz:
FACTS:
On October 6, 1987, appellant Florentino Bracamonte, together
with Manuel Sapon and Ernie Cabral, stood charged with the
crime of Robbery with Double Homicide after they were
positively identified by Violeta Parnala, the owner of the house
and the mother of one of the victims.
Parnala and her husband arrived home from the Kingdom of
Jehovah’s Witnesses and were confounded when their
housemaid refused to heed their call from the outside. Parnala
was surprised to see three men emerge from inside the house.
The three men then dashed off.
Found inside the house were the bodies of 6-year old Jay Vee and
the Paranala’s housemaid, Rosalina. Some items, amounting to
P1,100, were also found to have been missing. Thus, the charges.
Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime in 1989 while Sapon
and Bracamonte were at large until the latter’s arrest in October
of the same year. Appellant Bracamonte denied the charges and
interposed the defense of alibi. Appellant also contended that
there was no circumstantial evidence that will link him in the
crime and that Parnala couldn’t possible know him to merit
identification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bracamonte’s defense of alibi and Parnala’s lack
of personal affiliation with Bracamonte are worth discharging
the appellant of the crime.
RULING:
It has been said that the defense of alibi is inherently weak since
it is very easy to concoct. In order that this defense may prosper,
it must be established clearly and convincingly not only that the
accused is elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime,
but that likewise it would have been physically impossible for
him to be at the vicinity thereof. In the instant case, appellant
Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear and convincing
proof, that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
victims’ house at the time the crime was committed.
Positive identification by an independent witness who has not
been shown to have any reason or motive to testify falsely must
13 | P a g e
prevail over simple denials and the unacceptable alibi of the
accused. Appellant himself admitted that he was not aware of any
reason or motive why Parnala should testify against him. There is
also nothing in law and jurisprudence which requires that in
order for there to be a positive identification by a prosecution
witness of a felon, he must know the latter personally. If this
were the case, the prosecution would rarely get any conviction
since, in most instances, the perpetrator of the crime is unrelated
to the victim. The witness’ degree of closeness or familiarity with
the accused, although may be helpful, is by no means an
indispensable requirement for purposes of positive
identification.
The Court noted that appellant, together with his two (2) other
co-accused, were charged and convicted of robbery with double
homicide. The charge and the corresponding conviction should
have been for robbery with homicide only although two persons
were killed. In this complex crime, the penalty prescribed in
Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the
number of killings accompanying the robbery. The multiplicity of
the victims slain, though, is appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance.
COVERAGE OF PROSPECTIVITY RULE COVER
Co. V CA, G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993
Chief Justice Narvasa
FACTS: Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on
September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated
Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of
P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It
was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by
the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT." A criminal complaint for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage
company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged.
He argued on appeal that at the time of the issuance of the check
on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the
promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21,
1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as
guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable
offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the
Ministry of Justice.
ISSUE: whether the decision issued by the Court be applied
retroactively to the prejudice of the accused.
HELD: No. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while
our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also
subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws
shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided."
This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non
respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale
against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive
application of a law usually divests rights that have already
become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence,
is unconstitutional
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CLASSICAL (JURISTIC) FROM
THE POSITIVIST (REALISTIC)
14 | P a g e

People v. Genosa, GR No. 135981
Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 11(1) and
Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code
Story: The Battered Woman Syndrome
The wife had suffered maltreatment from her husband for over
eight years. She was 8 months pregnant when, one evening, her
husband came home drunk and started to batter her. Shouting
that his wife "might as well be killed so there will be nobody to
nag" him, he dragged her towards a drawer where he kept a gun,
but was not able to open the drawer because it was locked. So he
got out a cutter from his wallet, but dropped it. She was able to hit
his arm with a pipe and escape into another room. The wife,
thinking of all the suffering that her husband had been inflicting
on her, and thinking that he might really kill her and her unborn
child, distorted the drawer and got the gun. She shot her husband,
who was by then asleep on the bed. She was tried and convicted for
parricide, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua (20 years and
1 day to 40 years) to death. On appeal, she alleged "battered
woman syndrome" as a form of self-defense.
FACTS:
That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15November1995,
attacked and wounded his husband, which ultimately led to his
death. According to the appellant she did not provoke her
husband when she got home that night it was her husband who
began the provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened
that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure
she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, The Appelant had to be
admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering
from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born
prematurely on December 1, 1995.
The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to
leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would
always follow her and they would reconcile. The Apellant said
that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her
that night was because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend,
Lulu Rubillos.
The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been
shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of
her husband, she was then found guilty of Parricide, with the
aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was
attacked while asleep.
ISSUES:
Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of
Self-defense, and can she be held liable for the aggravating
circumstance of treachery?
No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman
syndrome, which the appellant has been shown to be suffering in
the relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the
15 | P a g e
woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be
considered in the context of self-defense.
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the
appellant there was a sufficient time interval between the
unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack upon
him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent
behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that
time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality
or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended
altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual
threat on her life or safety.
Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense.
And absence of aggression does not warrant complete or
incomplete self-defense.
No, There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes
against persons by employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the
defense that the offended party might make.
The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing
itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or
conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence.
Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is
preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased
may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated
aggression from the assailant.
In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that
the appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully
attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any
retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears
that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about
the same moment when she decided to kill her spouse. In the
absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and
deliberately employed the method by which she committed the
crime in order to ensure its execution, the doubt should be
resolved in her favor.
HELD:
The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is
hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her
commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years,
8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
ADDENDUM:
When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome) as self defense
be appreciated?
Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS,
further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing
is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a
predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an
obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would
amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.' Still,
impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in
16 | P a g e
previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of
deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or
communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger.
Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-
defense may be appreciated.
UTILITARIAN THEORY AS FUNCTION OF PUNISHMENT
Magno V CA, G.R. 112170, April 10, 1996
Utilitarianism is a theory in normative ethics, or the ethics that
define the morality of actions, as proposed by Jeremy Bentham and
John Stuart Mill. ... The greatest happiness principle states that a
moral action is one that maximizes utility, or happiness, for the
greatest number of people.
For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard
the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public
checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor
encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through
manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and
objective of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of
jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with some color of
"get-rich" scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning businessmen
who are the pillars of society.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal
law, "affirms that the primary function of punishment is the
protective (sic) of society against actual and potential
wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be
considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be
punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be
safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to
that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be
clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will
not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The
Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)
Facts:
Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment
to make his car repair shop operational, approached Corazon
Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.
VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management
Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor
was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS
Finance could accommodate Magno and and provide him credit
facilities.
The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the
total amount of the equipment as warranty deposit but Magno
couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third
party who could lend him that amount.
Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided
that amount.As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six
checks, two of them were cleared and the rest had no sufficient
fund.
Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS
Finance which then pulled out the equipment.
Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing
Checks Law) and found guilty.
17 | P a g e

Issue:
Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of
the checks in question.
Held:
No
To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he
did not withdraw as it was not his own account, it having
remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust
debt since he did not receive the amount in question. All the
while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing
company which is managed by the officials and employees of LS
Finance.
INTERPRETATION OF CRIMINAL LAWS
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
G.R. No. 112170. April 10,1996.
Facts:
On May 9,1989, provincial governor of Cotabato requested the
Office of the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation regarding
bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of
unwarranted benefits and it was found out that the petitioner
Cesario Ursua, a Community Environment and Natural Resources
officer was involved in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and
illegally-cut logs in the area. So, a complaint was filed against him
which was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
On August 1 1989, Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner,
wrote to the Office of the Ombudsman to furnished him a copy of
the complaint and asked petitioner to bring that letter to the
Office of the Ombudsman since his messenger had to attend to
some personal matters which the latter complied. Before
proceeding to the office of the Ombudsman, he talked to Oscar
Perez and the latter advised him that he could sign his name if
ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the
complaint. When he arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in
Davao City, he was asked to sign his name on a log book and
instead of writing his own name, he wrote “Oscar Perez”,
afterwhich he proceeded to the Administrative Division and hand
in the letter to Loida Kahulugan, Chief of the Administrative
Division in order to get a furnished copy of the complaint. Before
petitioner left, he was greeted by an acquaintance and from there
Loida learned that the one who introduced his name as Oscar
Perez is actually the petitioner himself so the latter reported the
matter immediately to the Deputy Ombudsman who ordered that
petitioner be accordingly charged.
On December 18,1990 petitioner without leave of court filed a
demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution
to prove that his supposed alias was different from
his registered name was fatal to its cause. Petitioner contends
that no document from the civil registry was presented to show
the registered name of the accused which according to him was a
condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction.The RTC
rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec.1 of
Commonwealth Act No.142 as amended by R.A. No.6085. On May
31,1993, The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the said
petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the C.A. contending that he has
not violated C.A. No.142 as amended by R.A. No.6085 as he never
used any alias name, he only used such name on one occasion
with an express consent of Oscar Perez himself.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has violated Sec.1 of Commonwealth
Act No.142 as amended by R.A.6085 or otherwise known as An
Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases.
18 | P a g e
Ruling:
No, the petitioner did not violateSec.1 of C.A No.142 as amended
by R.A. 6085. The court ruled that there is no evidence showing
that he had used or was intending to used that name in addition
to his real name. That name was used in an isolated transaction
where he was not even legally required to expose his real
identity. While the act may be covered by other provisions of law,
it does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A.
No.142
Section 1 of Commonwealth ActNo.142 provides that except as a
pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of a
pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall
use any namedifferent from the one which he was registered at
birth in the office of the civil registry or with which he was
baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he
was registered in the Bureau of Immigration upon entry, or such
substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent
court provided, that persons whose births have not
been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been
baptized, have one one year from the approval of this act within
which to register their names in the civil registry of their
residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and
one or two surnames.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner CESARIO URSUA is acquitted of the
crime charged.
THE EQUIPOSE RULE
Abarquez V People, G.R. No. 150762, Jan 20, 2006
The prosecution argues that Abarquez was remiss in his
duties as a barangay kagawad in not extending assistance to the
then wounded Quejong. This, however, does not necessarily show
concurrence in Almojuelas criminal act. When Paz ran away,
Abarquez shouted at him that he left his wounded companion.
Apparently, Abarquez was not aware of the extent of Quejongs
injury and he expected Paz to look after his own companion.
When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused, the doubt
should be resolved in his favor. Thus:
Every person accused has the right to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of
innocence stands as a fundamental principle of
both constitutional and criminal law. Thus, the
prosecution has the burden of proving every
single fact establishing guilt. Every vestige of
doubt having a rational basis must be removed.
The defense of the accused, even if weak, is no
reason to convict. Within this framework, the
prosecution must prove its case beyond any hint
of uncertainty. The defense need not even speak
at all. The presumption of innocence is more than
sufficient.[27]
We apply in this case the equipoise rule. Where the
evidence on an issue of fact is in issue or there is doubt on which
side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of
proof loses.[28] Hence:
19 | P a g e
 xxx The equipoise rule finds application if, as in
this case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt,
for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a
conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of
proof to convict the accused of the crime charged
is found lacking.
The equipoise rule (balancing test) which is the presumption of
innocence is applicable only where the evidence of the parties
is evenly balance, in which case the scale of justice should be tilt in
favor of the accused. There is no such balance in the case at bar.
--
G.R. No. 74259 February 14, 1991
GENEROSO P. CORPUZ, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Law Firm of Roberto P. Halili for petitioner.
Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial
Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya, the petitioner was designated Acting
Supervising Cashier in the said Office.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with malversation after he failed to
produce the missing amount incurred during his designation as
Acting Supervising Cashier. He insisted his innocence, claiming
that the shortage imputed to him was malversed by other people.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioner’s presumed innocence was not
sufficiently proved contrary.
RULING:
The absence of a post-audit is not, as the petitioner contends, a
fatal omission.1âwphi1 That is not a preliminary requirement to
the filing of an information for malversation as long as the prima
facie guilt of the suspect has already been established. The failure
of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal use. 8 And what
determines whether the crime of malversation has been
committed is the presence of the following requirements under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code:
(a) That the offender be a public officer.
(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office.
(c) That those funds or property were public funds or
property for which he was accountable.
(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or
consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them.
The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a "sinister design"
to hold him responsible for a crime he has not committed is less
than convincing. His attempt to throw the blame on others for his
20 | P a g e
failure to account for the missing money only shows it is he who
is looking for a scapegoat. The plaintive protest that he is "a small
fry" victimized by the "untouchables" during the Marcos regime
is a mere emotional appeal that does not impress at all. The
suggestion that the supposed injustice on the petitioner would
be abetted by this Court unless his conviction is reversed must be
rejected as an warrant presumptuousness.
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only
where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which
case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the
scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here.
The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not
been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of
persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the
accused must yield to the positive finding that he malversed the
sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose
confidence he has breached. His conviction must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
--
TOMAS H. COSEP, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
In an effort to escape liability, petitioner advances the theory that
private complainant was never a contractor, but was merely a
laborer entitled to a daily rate of P20.00. Moreover, the amount
of P4,500.00 he gave to the private complainant represents the
total salary of the other thirteen (13) workers who constructed
the artesian well. Hence, he could not have withheld the
said P500.00 since there was none in the first place. To bolster
his contention, petitioner presented as evidence the Time Book
and Payroll Sheet,[1] and a Memorandum dated May 10, 1987,
issued by the Mayor of Olutanga indicating that private
complainant was hired as the head laborer during the
construction of the artesian well.[2]
Sandiganbayan found Petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
While SC do not see any merit in petitioners first assigned error,
SC, however, agree with him that his guilt was not adequately
proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.
Going over the records and the TSN of the private
complainant, we entertain serious misgivings about his
testimony, especially after he had erred as regards important
facts and information, not to mention the questionable lapses of
memory. Indeed, for evidence to be believed, it must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation
of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. [15]
It is worthy to note that private complainant narrated that
he was the one who paid the workers their wages during the
construction of the well.[16] However, it baffles us that in paying
these workers, he never bothered to have them sign any payroll
or voucher receipt,[17] a practice which is routine for those
engaged in hiring workers for construction projects. At the very
least, the payroll or voucher receipts are necessary, not only for
accounting purposes, but for protection against spurious or
unsubstantiated claims that may arise. Simply put, private
complainants behavior was in total disregard of logic and usual
management practice expected from a prudent businessman.
What is incredible is the failure of private complainant to
remember even a single name of his workers. [18] Since six of the
thirteen (13) laborers bore his own surname Alegre, it strains
21 | P a g e
credulity that he could not remember any of them. Obviously,
private complainants claim that he is a contractor is a falsehood.
Aside from the foregoing considerations, private complainant
signed the payroll sheet indicating his status as a head
laborer. Therefore, this representation is conclusive upon him
and he cannot deny or disprove the same without violating the
principle of estoppel.
Estoppel. A legal principle that bars a party from denying or
alleging a certain fact owing to that party's previous conduct,
allegation, or denial. The rationale behind estoppel is to prevent
injustice owing to inconsistency or Fraud.
All these considerations taken together, it is clear that the
prosecution failed to establish private complainants assertion
that he is a contractor. Hence, we agree with the defense that
private complainant, as laborer, together with thirteen (13) other
workers was entitled only to a total of P4,475.00 and
not P5,000.00 representing their salaries. This being the case,
the P4,500.00 that he received from petitioner was even in excess
of the amount which he and the other workers, was originally
entitled to. Consequently, to affirm petitioners conviction would
result in a serious injustice. It is axiomatic that in every criminal
prosecution, if the state fails to discharge its burden of proving
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, it fails utterly.
[24]
Accordingly, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven
with moral certainty, it is our policy of long standing that the
presumption of innocence of the accused must be favored and his
exoneration be granted as a matter of right.[25]
--
EVANGELINE LADONGA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005
Facts:
In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became
Alfredo Oculam’s regular customers in his pawnshop business.
Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a
P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to July 7, 1990 issued
by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during
the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an
additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No.
284744, post dated to July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between
May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in
the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136,
post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks
bounced upon presentment for the reason “CLOSED ACCOUNT”;
when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite
repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced
because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was
closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued
only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam
should not encash the checks when they mature; and, that
petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no
participation in the issuance thereof. The RTC rendered a joint
decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner brought the case to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer
of the three checks that bounced but her co-accused husband
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under the latter’s account could be held liable for violations of PRESUMPTION OF LAW VS. PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE ON THE
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator. CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

Held: Wa-acon V People,

The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides
that “a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an G.R. No. 164575, Dec. 6, 2006
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.”

To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the

accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts
of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance
to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement
the criminal plan.
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code whereas provides:
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner
performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.
Malversation of public funds or property. – Presumption of
Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed
malversation. – Any public officer who, by reason of the
to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was
duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
issued.
property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, or through
However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by
person to take such public funds or property, wholly or
conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even
property x x x
knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not
enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any
xxxx
active participation in the commission of the crime with a view
to the furtherance of the common design and purpose
The failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which
he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer shall be prima facie evidence that

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 he has put such missing funds or property to
personal uses (emphasis supplied).
The elements to constitute malversation under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code are as follows:
The elements common to all acts of malversation – under
Article 217 are: (a) that the offender be a public officer;
(b) that he had custody or control of funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office; (c) these funds were
public funds or property for which he was accountable;
and (d) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or
consented or through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them.13
Prima facie evidence is defined as:
Evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the
judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the
group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense,
and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain
sufficient. Evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted,
is sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue it
supports, but which may be contradicted by other
evidence (emphasis supplied).18
Errors by the petitioner
In his quest to exculpate himself from the legal assumption of
criminal liability for the missing funds, he insisted that:
1) the sacks of rice were less than that declared in the receipts
when they were delivered to him;
2) he sold the rice at the older and lower prices, as he was not
informed of changes in the prices of the rice; and
3) the empty sacks of rice were in the possession of the delivery
men.
Moreover, petitioner did not bring forward his co-workers to
attest to and confirm the practice of, and substantiate
petitioner's story of receiving sacks of rice without weighing
them and that the bags received weighed less than that reflected
in the receipt. The established rule is that "[d]enials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are deemed
negative and self-serving evidence unworthy of credence." 21 The
court a quo is correct in holding that as compared to credible
witnesses like the COA auditors who testified on affirmative
matters, the self-serving negative testimony of accused petitioner
Wa-acon has no substantial weight or credit.22
ACTUS NON FACIT REUM, NISI MENS SIT REA
an act does not make a defendant guilty without a guilty mind.
G.R. No. L-63408 & 64026 August 7, 1985
GAUDIOSO C. LLAMOSO, HILARIO A. GUIGUE PROTACIO U.
JUMAMOY, JR., NICANOR ANINIPO and ALFREDO
CAGAIS petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Enrico B. Aumentado for petitioner in 63408.
Prospers A. Crescini for petitioner in 64026.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Facts:
This case is about a false entry in the payroll for March 16 to 31,
1981 of 12 laborers who worked in the improvement of Sta. Rosa
Street, municipality of E. Villanueva, Siquijor. The anomaly
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involves the sum of P130 as the wages for two weeks of one laborer
at P13 a day. The entries for the 11 laborers were not falsified.

Issue:
The Sandiganbayan convicted Llamoso, Guigue, Jumamoy, Cagais
and Aninipo as conspirators in the crime of falsification of public
documents by allegedly having made it appear in the time book,
payroll and authority to hire employees (Exh. A to A-2) that
Aninipo worked in the Sta. Rosa Street project when in fact he
did not work therein.

Ruling:
We hold that the accused are not criminally liable because they
had no criminal intent. Making no concealment or evasion,
they admitted that there was a false entry. They acted in good
faith (12-13 tsn Nov. 16, 1982). They may be disciplined
administratively for the irregularity but their inclusion of ninipo
in the payroll is outside the pale of criminal law.

Apparently, the case was an isolated instance. It should not be

equated with the systematic and rampant practice in some
engineering districts of fabricating payrolls with fictitious
laborers working on fictitious projects resulting in the
defraudation of the government of considerable sums of money,

There is a ruling that the accused is not guilty of falsification in

the absence of proof that he maliciously perverted the truth with
the wrongful intent of injuring some third person (U.S. vs. Reyes,
1 Phil. 341, 343).

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