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E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find
ISLANDS, defendant-appellant. nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the
of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court,
with the costs of the cause. however, limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which the
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was error,
damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated
in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely for a period of six months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only
disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage two months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was
accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time. We,
his complaint." therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court any fault on his part, is P18,075.
erred: (a) in finding that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent
ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the
(b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the
rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741. Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are appear in said suit.
as follows: Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a collision
riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on
Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it
southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, possible to determine the amount of damages, if any, to which the
upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after claimant is entitled; and
passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General
as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned recommended that an Act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr.
suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that
street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle said questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine
from the southwestern point or from the post place there. Legislature, that:
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of
according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the
was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between
the left parietal region, a would in the same place and in the back part of his his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to
head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious. determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is
The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the
the grey matter and brain was had suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial
the night in question, which was the time set for performing the operation, on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant said
his pulse was so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little Government at the same.
hope that he would live. His right leg was broken in such a way that the SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
fracture extended to the outer skin in such manner that it might be regarded Enacted, February 3, 1915.
as double and the would be exposed to infection, for which reason it was of Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity
the most serious nature. from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former,
At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action in favor of
noticed that the plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and the plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously
a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the recognized.
fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an
functions of the brain and nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, individual without its consent. It is also admitted that the instant case is one
had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. This latter against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the
weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the
mental labor, especially when he attempted to use his money for terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly.
mathematical calculations. The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in
According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the
mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the
after having received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision,
condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the . . . ." These were the two questions submitted to the court for determination.
agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be decided." We have
accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could "decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur,
not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we have also fixed
because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision.
no longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that
reach the highest parts of the building. amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.
As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the
work as a contractor, he had to dissolved the partnership he had formed Federal and State Governments in the United States," we may look to the
with the engineer. Wilson, because he was incapacitated from making decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose
mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his and scope of Act No. 2457.
mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed
of the Uy Chaco building." by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the legislative enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says Justice Story,
effect that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance "does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or
of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur. agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive
question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award awarded for permanent of the public interest." (Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing U.
injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during
S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers vs. States, 20 How., this statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass.,
527; 15 L. Ed., 991.) 28), said:
In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against the
damages from the state for personal injuries received on account of the state a new and heretofore unrecognized class of liabilities, but only an
negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state institution created by intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized existing
the legislature for the purpose of improving agricultural and kindred industries; liabilities can be adjudicated.
to disseminate information calculated to educate and benefit the industrial In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had,
classes; and to advance by such means the material interests of the state, by the terms of the statute of New York, jurisdiction of claims for damages for
being objects similar to those sought by the public school system. In passing injuries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained,
upon the question of the state's liability for the negligent acts of its officers or Chief Justice Ruger remarks: "It must be conceded that the state can be made
agents, the court said: liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents or servants, only by
No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by force of some positive statute assuming such liability."
reason of the misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized exercise of powers It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the
by its officers or agents. (Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall., 269; Clodfelter Government's liability to any cause not previously recognized, we will now
vs. State, 86 N. C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State, 104 examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent
Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Green vs. State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the
Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203; Story on Agency, sec. 319.) Civil Code reads:
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but
where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is stated not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom
in 36 Cyc., 915, thus: properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It of the preceding article shall be applicable.
does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same
submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or
any lawful defense. negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16, the damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions
1915, the Act of 1913, which authorized the bringing of this suit, read: of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the
of Summit, Waukesha County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court or functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised for the purpose negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of
of settling and determining all controversies which he may now have with branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the
the State of Wisconsin, or its duly authorized officers and agents, relative contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in
to the mill property of said George Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the order that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private
State of Wisconsin on the Bark River, and the mill property of Evan persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state,
Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use of therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise
the waters of said Bark River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of
Waukesha, Wisconsin. acquiring rights and contracting obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain,
In determining the scope of this act, the court said: January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations
liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit which arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas in the first article thereof.
now stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is difficult to No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down that where a person who
see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or
state's immunity from suit. It simply gives authority to commence suit for negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is
the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate. Nowhere made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause
in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the the damage, the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an
disposition of the suit shall depart from well established principles of law, identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and
or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act superiority over the authors of the damage, because the law presumes that
opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or
question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to proof,
of the state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature had intended to change however, because, as held in the last paragraph of article 1903,
the rule that obtained in this state so long and to declare liability on the responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned
part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to mere in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of
inference, but would have done so in express terms. (Murdock Grate Co. a family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to
vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A., 399.) answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the
In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and owners or directors of
upon and considered, are as follows: an establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it
All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for acts through the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and only in
negligence against the state not allowed by the state board of examiners, this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of
are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions herein contained, to objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.
bring suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general
competent jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final judgment. The principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is
rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to such suits, except as herein occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or
otherwise provided. negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the
And the court said: name and representation of the state itself and as an external expression of
This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers, yet said article is not
arising under different facts, and in both it was held that said statute did applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the
not create any liability or cause of action against the state where none petitioners by an executive official, acting in the exercise of his powers, in
existed before, but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by
liability as would have existed if the statute had not been enacted. the owner of the property which they hold in sublease.
(Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Melvin vs. That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case
State, 121 Cal., 16.) wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed
"jurisdiction of all claims against the commonwealth, whether at law or in order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he
equity," with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In construing is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound
to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This
concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to
acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the prove that the Storm Drain Section, Office of the City Engineer of Manila,
functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which received a report of the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at the corner of
are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May P. Burgos and Old Luneta Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the same
18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.) was covered on the same day (Exhibit 4); that again the iron cover of the same
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the catch basin was reported missing on January 30, 1958, but the said cover was
principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, replaced the next day (Exhibit 5); that the Office of the City Engineer never
in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it received any report to the effect that the catchbasin in question was not
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or covered between January 25 and 29, 1968; that it has always been a policy of
commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose the said office, which is charged with the duty of installation, repair and care
which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or of storm drains in the City of Manila, that whenever a report is received from
omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or whatever source of the loss of a catchbasin cover, the matter is immediately
technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner attended to, either by immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the
laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in catchbasin with steel matting that because of the lucrative scrap iron business
not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant; that the Office
damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said
erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 iron covers; that in order to prevent such thefts, the city government has
of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the City by constructing
146.) them under the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and openings on the
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine side of the gutter; and that these changes had been undertaken by the city
Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme from time to time whenever funds were available.
Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they
act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered
and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such the aforementioned decision sustaining the theory of the defendants and
an agent. dismissing the amended complaint, without costs.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed,
without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of
legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was
sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this
enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called appeal by the City of Manila.
upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with
the courts. The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
CITY OF MANILA, petitioner, vs. GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents. The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other
of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or
unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers
about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps,
he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his
eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death
blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to his of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road,
assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or
the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which supervision.
he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid,
Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter,
and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City
injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire
administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a Philippines.
private practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think,
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned,
First Instance of Manila, a complaint — which was, subsequently, amended Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation;
— for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4
officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the decision of the trial of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City
court, and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals, of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure
of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other
businessman and a professor at the University of the East. He held officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the
responsible positions in various business firms like the Philippine other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription
Merchandising Co., the A.U. Valencia and Co., the Silver Swan Manufacturing making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the
Company and the Sincere Packing Corporation. He was also associated with death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of the
several civic organizations such as the Wack Wack Golf Club, the Chamber of defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public
Commerce of the Philippines, Y's Men Club of Manila and the Knights of Rizal. works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers
As a result of the incident, plaintiff was prevented from engaging in his to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof,
customary occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular.
P50.00 during his incapacity to work. Because of the incident, he was Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a
subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his business associates and friends. road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
During the period of his treatment, plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety
for the welfare of his minor children since he was their only support. Due to It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages:
the filing of this case, plaintiff has obligated himself to pay his counsel the sum 1) because the accident involving him took place in a national highway; and 2)
of P2,000.00. because the City of Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact
not made in the answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed,
as well as in his amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective with costs against the City of Manila. It is so ordered.1äwphï1.ñët
condition of a street which is "under the supervision and control" of the City. In
its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the streets JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI, Petitioner, vs. SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAÑA and
aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and ROSALITA CARDAÑA, Respondents.
regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the Before us is a petition for review assailing the Decision1 dated October 18,
defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 54412, declaring petitioner
zealous in the performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed liable for negligence that resulted in the death of Jasmin Cardaña, a school
upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos child aged 12, enrolled in Grade 6, of San Roque Elementary School, where
Avenue was and is under its control and supervision. petitioner is the principal. Likewise assailed is the Resolution2 dated March 20,
2003 denying reconsideration.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway The facts are as follows:
was made, for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaña was walking along the perimeter fence
the Court of Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, of the San Roque Elementary School when a branch of a caimito tree located
which had not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the within the school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous death. Thus,
first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of the decision of the her parents - Dominador and Rosalita Cardaña - filed a case for damages
appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof. before the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte against petitioner.
The Cardañas alleged in their complaint that even as early as December 15,
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the 1992, a resident of the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on the possible
liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong danger the tree posed to passersby. Lerios even pointed to the petitioner the
to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What tree that stood near the principal’s office. The Cardañas averred that
said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control petitioner’s gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of their
or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, daughter.
therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract Petitioner denied the accusation and said that at that time Lerios had only
from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. offered to buy the tree. She also denied knowing that the tree was dead and
In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides: rotting. To prove her point, she presented witnesses who attested that she had
brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers during a meeting on
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the following December 15, 1992 and assigned Remedios Palaña to negotiate the sale.
legislative powers: In a Decision3 dated February 5, 1996, the trial court dismissed the complaint
for failure of the respondents to establish negligence on the part of the
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out, petitioner.
construction and improvement, and to regulate the use of streets, avenues, On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. The
alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places; appellate court found the appellee (herein petitioner) liable for Jasmin’s death,
to provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public places; . . as follows:
. to provide for the inspection of, fix the license fees for and regulate the Foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Appellee
openings in the same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the Joaquinita Capili is hereby declared liable for negligence resulting to the death
building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in and of Jasmin D. Cardaña. She is hereby ordered to indemnify appellants, parents
under the same and the erecting of poles and the stringing of wires therein; to of Jasmin, the following amounts:
provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters therein, . . . to regulate 1. For the life of Jasmin D. Cardaña P50,000.00;
traffic and sales upon the streets and other public places; to provide for the 2. For burial expenses 15,010.00;
abatement of nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners thereof; 3. For moral damages 50,000.00;
to provide for the construction and maintenance, and regulate the use, of 4. For attorney’s fees and litigation 10,000.00.
bridges, viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, expenses
hoop rolling, and other amusements which may annoy persons using the SO ORDERED.4
streets and public places, or frighten horses or other animals; to regulate the Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner now comes
speed of horses and other animals, motor and other vehicles, cars, and before us submitting the following issues for our resolution:
locomotives within the limits of the city; to regulate the lights used on all I WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIS-À-VIS THE SET
vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to provide for and change the location, OF FACTS STATED IN THE CHALLENGED DECISION, ERRED IN
grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any such railroad to raise or lower FINDING THE PETITIONER NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE LIABLE
its tracks to conform to such provisions or changes; and to require railroad FOR DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 2206 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND IN
companies to fence their property, or any part thereof, to provide suitable ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO PAY DAMAGES TO THE
protection against injury to persons or property, and to construct and repair RESPONDENTS; AND
ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts along and under their tracks, so that the II WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
natural drainage of the streets and adjacent property shall not be obstructed. PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.5
On the other hand, respondents posit the following issue:
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. Whether or not the Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals, Twelfth
917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City Division, in CA G.R. CV. No. 54412 promulgated on October 18, 2002 …
relies. Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation of the highway funds should be affirmed and respected, thus remain undisturbed.6
and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalities in the Primarily, the issue is whether petitioner is negligent and liable for the death
construction of roads and streets within their respective boundaries, and of Jasmin Cardaña.
Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic Petitioner asserts that she was not negligent about the disposal of the tree
Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway since she had assigned her next-in-rank, Palaña, to see to its disposal; that
funds. Moreover, it provides that "the construction, maintenance and despite her physical inspection of the school grounds, she did not observe any
improvement of national primary, national secondary and national aid indication that the tree was already rotten nor did any of her 15 teachers inform
provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District her that the tree was already rotten;7 and that moral damages should not be
Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the granted against her since there was no fraud nor bad faith on her part.
Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such On the other hand, respondents insist that petitioner knew that the tree was
appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in dead and rotting, yet, she did not exercise reasonable care and caution which
annual or special appropriation Acts." an ordinary prudent person would have done in the same situation.
To begin, we have to point out that whether petitioner was negligent or not is
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under a question of fact which is generally not proper in a petition for review, and
the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty when this determination is supported by substantial evidence, it becomes
of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said road, which were conclusive and binding on this Court.8 However, there is an exception, that is,
decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the when the findings of the Court of Appeals are incongruent with the findings of
findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review.
the lower court.9 In our view, the exception finds application in the present Was petitioner’s explanation as to why she failed to have the tree removed
case. immediately sufficient to exculpate her?
The trial court gave credence to the claim of petitioner that she had no As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the
knowledge that the tree was already dead and rotting and that Lerios merely school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its premises.
informed her that he was going to buy the tree for firewood. It ruled that That she was unaware of the rotten state of the tree calls for an explanation
petitioner exercised the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances on her part as to why she failed to be vigilant.
require and that there was an absence of evidence that would require her to Petitioner contends she was unaware of the state of the dead and rotting tree
use a higher standard of care more than that required by the attendant because Lerios merely offered to buy the tree and did not inform her of its
circumstances.10 The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, ruled that petitioner condition. Neither did any of her teachers inform her that the tree was an
should have known of the condition of the tree by its mere sighting and that no imminent danger to anyone. She argues that she could not see the immediate
matter how hectic her schedule was, she should have had the tree removed danger posed by the tree by its mere sighting even as she and the other
and not merely delegated the task to Palaña. The appellate court ruled that teachers conducted ground inspections. She further argues that, even if she
the dead caimito tree was a nuisance that should have been removed soon should have been aware of the danger, she exercised her duty by assigning
after petitioner had chanced upon it.11 the disposition of the tree to another teacher.
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a We find petitioner’s explanation wanting. As school principal, petitioner is
lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation involving expected to oversee the safety of the school’s premises.1âwphi1 The fact that
an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other, she failed to see the immediate danger posed by the dead and rotting tree
a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from shows she failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by her position.
which an ordinary prudent person in the actor’s position, in the same or similar Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to another
circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to teacher, she exercises supervision over her assignee.17 The record shows that
cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner.12 more than a month had lapsed from the time petitioner gave instruction to her
The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm assistant Palaña on December 15, 1992, to the time the incident occurred on
someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As the school principal, February 1, 1993. Clearly, she failed to check seasonably if the danger posed
petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and by the rotting tree had been removed. Thus, we cannot accept her defense of
safety of the children within the school and its premises. That she was lack of negligence.
unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling branch had caused the Lastly, petitioner questions the award of moral damages. Moral damages are
death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the responsibility of her position. awarded if the following elements exist in the case: (1) an injury clearly
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or omission factually established;
prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the (3) a wrongful act or omission by the defendant as the proximate cause of the
plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages predicated on
whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.18 However, the person
between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.13 claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and
The fact, however, that respondents’ daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of the convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough
dead and rotting tree within the school’s premises shows that the tree was that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, and serious anxiety
indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of as the result of the actuations of the other party. Invariably, such action must
the principle of res ipsa loquitur. be shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive.19 Under the
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such circumstances, we have to concede that petitioner was not motivated by bad
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except faith or ill motive vis-à-vis respondents’ daughter’s death. The award of moral
for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an damages is therefore not proper.
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the In line with applicable jurisprudence, we sustain the award by the Court of
person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must Appeals of ₱50,000 as indemnity for the death of Jasmin,20 and ₱15,010 as
not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the reimbursement of her burial expenses.21
person injured.14 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 18, 2002
The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or and the Resolution dated March 20, 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
inference that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and rotting tree which CV. No. 54412 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION such that the award of
caused the death of respondents’ daughter was a result of petitioner’s moral damages is hereby deleted.
negligence, being in charge of the school.
In the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,15 this Court held: JOSE V. LAGON, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
…As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law MENANDRO V. LAPUZ, respondents.
of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be On June 23, 1982, petitioner Jose Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of Tonina Sepi, through an intestate court,[1] two parcels of land located at
negligence. Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. A few months after the sale, private respondent
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise: Menandro Lapuz filed a complaint for torts and damages against petitioner
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sultan Kudarat.
happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference In the complaint, private respondent, as then plaintiff, claimed that he entered
or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant’s part, under the into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi Mengelen Guiabar over
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction three parcels of land (the property) in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao beginning
speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks 1964. One of the provisions agreed upon was for private respondent to put up
for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as commercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The
to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the rentals to be paid by those tenants would answer for the rent private
part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence. respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. In
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury 1974, the lease contract ended but since the construction of the commercial
complained of was under the control or management of the defendant, and buildings had yet to be completed, the lease contract was allegedly renewed.
that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent to
of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used the court-appointed administrator of her estate. But when the administrator
proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable advised him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose constructed, he discovered that petitioner, representing himself as the new
from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. owner of the property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus
The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that petitioner’s filed a complaint against the latter, accusing petitioner of inducing the heirs of
negligence is presumed once respondents established the requisites for the Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold
doctrine to apply. Once respondents made out a prima facie case of all rights over it.
requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to explain. The presumption or In his answer to the complaint, petitioner denied that he induced the heirs of
inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under Bai Tonina to sell the property to him, contending that the heirs were in dire
appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that of due care need of money to pay off the obligations of the deceased. He also denied
or innocence, may outweigh the inference.16 interfering with private respondents leasehold rights as there was no lease
contract covering the property when he purchased it; that his personal
investigation and inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject 5. Dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the defendant for lack of merit;
lots. 6. With costs against the defendant.[2]
Petitioner claimed that before he bought the property, he went to Atty. Petitioner appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals.[3] In a decision
Benjamin Fajardo, the lawyer who allegedly notarized the lease contract dated January 31, 1995,[4] the appellate court modified the assailed judgment
between private respondent and Bai Tonina Sepi, to verify if the parties indeed of the trial court as follows:
renewed the lease contract after it expired in 1974. Petitioner averred that Atty. a) The award for moral damages, compensatory damages, exemplary
Fajardo showed him four copies of the lease renewal but these were all damages, temperate or moderate damages, and nominal damages as well
unsigned. To refute the existence of a lease contract, petitioner presented in as expenses of litigation in the amount of P62,500.00 and interests under
court a certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court confirming that no paragraph 3-a(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i) are deleted;
record of any lease contract notarized by Atty. Fajardo had been entered into b) The award for attorneys fees is reduced to P30,000.00;
their files. Petitioner added that he only learned of the alleged lease contract c) Paragraphs 1,2,5 and 6 are AFFIRMED;
when he was informed that private respondent was collecting rent from the d) Additionally, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay to the plaintiff by
tenants of the building. way of actual damages the sum of P178,425.00 representing the amount of
Finding the complaint for tortuous interference to be unwarranted, petitioner rentals he collected from the period of October 1978 to August 1983, and
filed his counterclaim and prayed for the payment of actual and moral minus the amount of P42,700.00 representing rentals due the defendant
damages. computed at P700.00 per month for the period from August 1978 to August
On July 29, 1986, the court a quo found for private respondent (plaintiff below): 1983, with interest thereon at the rate until the same is fully paid;
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff: e) Paragraph 4 is deleted.[5]
1. Declaring the Contract of Lease executed by Bai Tonina Sepi Before the appellate court, petitioner disclaimed knowledge of any lease
Mangelen Guiabar in favor of the plaintiff on November 6, 1974 (Exh. A contract between the late Bai Tonina Sepi and private respondent. On the
and A-1) over Lot No. 6395, Pls-73. Lot No 6396. Pls.-73. Lot No. 6399. other hand, private respondent insisted that it was impossible for petitioner not
3ls-73, and Lot no.9777-A. CSD-11-000076-D (Lot No. 3-A. 40124), all to know about the contract since the latter was aware that he was collecting
situated along Ledesma St., Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, which document rentals from the tenants of the building. While the appellate court disbelieved
was notarized by Atty. Benjamin S. Fajardo, Sr. and entered into his the contentions of both parties, it nevertheless held that, for petitioner to
notarial register as Doc. No. 619. Page No. 24. Book No. II. Series of become liable for damages, he must have known of the lease contract and
1974, to be authentic and genuine and as such valid and binding for a must have also acted with malice or bad faith when he bought the subject
period of ten (10) years specified thereon from November 1, 1974 up to parcels of land.
October 31, 1984; Via this petition for review, petitioner cites the following reasons why the Court
2. Declaring the plaintiff as the lawful owner of the commercial buildings should rule in his favor:
found on the aforesaid lots and he is entitled to their possession and the 1. The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in holding that petitioner is
collection (of rentals) of the said commercial buildings within the period liable for interference of contractual relation under Article 1314 of the New Civil
covered by this Contract of Lease in his favor; Code;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the following: 2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that private respondent
a) Rentals of the commercial buildings on the lots covered by the is precluded from recovering, if at all, because of laches;
Contract of Lease in favor of the plaintiff for the period from October 3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner liable for actual
1, 1978 up to October 31, 1984, including accrued interests in the damages and attorneys fees, and;
total amount of Five Hundred Six Thousand Eight Hundred Five 4. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners
Pesos and Fifty Six Centavos (P506, 850.56), the same to continue counterclaims.[6]
to bear interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum until the whole Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third person who induces
amount is fully paid by the defendant to the plaintiff; another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
b) Moral damages in the amount of One Million Sixty Two Thousand contracting party. The tort recognized in that provision is known as
Five Hundred Pesos (P1,062,500.00); interference with contractual relations.[7] The interference is penalized
c) Actual or compensatory damages in the amount of Three Hundred because it violates the property rights of a party in a contract to reap the
Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P312, 500.00); benefits that should result therefrom.[8]
d) Exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of One Hundred The core issue here is whether the purchase by petitioner of the subject
Eighty Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P187,500.00) property, during the supposed existence of private respondents lease contract
e) Temperate or moderate damages in the amount of Sixty Two with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P62,500.00); petitioner should be held liable for damages.
f) Nominal damages in the amount of Sixty Two Thousand Five The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals,[9] laid down the
Hundred Pesos (P62,500.00); elements of tortuous interference with contractual relations: (a) existence of a
g) Attorneys fees in the amount of One Hundred Twenty Five valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence
Thousand Pesos (P125,000.00); of the contract and (c) interference of the third person without legal justification
h) Expenses of litigation in the amount of Sixty Two Thousand Five or excuse. In that case, petitioner So Ping Bun occupied the premises which
Hundred Pesos (P62,500.00); the corporation of his grandfather was leasing from private respondent, without
i) Interest on the moral damages, actual or compensatory damages the knowledge and permission of the corporation. The corporation, prevented
temperate or moderate damages, nominal damages, attorneys fees from using the premises for its business, sued So Ping Bun for tortuous
and expenses of litigation in the amounts as specified hereinabove interference.
from May 24, 1982 up to June 27, 1986, in the total amount of Nine As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract must be duly
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P900,000.00); all of which will continue established. To prove this, private respondent presented in court a notarized
to bear interests at a legal rate of 12% per annum until the whole copy of the purported lease renewal.[10] While the contract appeared as duly
amounts are fully paid by the defendants to the plaintiffs; notarized, the notarization thereof, however, only proved its due execution and
4. For failure of the defendant to deposit with this Court all the rentals delivery but not the veracity of its contents. Nonetheless, after undergoing the
he had collected from the thirteen (13) tenants or occupants of the rigid scrutiny of petitioners counsel and after the trial court declared it to be
commercial buildings in question, the plaintiff is hereby restored to valid and subsisting, the notarized copy of the lease contract presented in
the possession of his commercial buildings for a period of seventy- court appeared to be incontestable proof that private respondent and the late
three (73) months which is the equivalent of the total period for which Bai Tonina Sepi actually renewed their lease contract. Settled is the rule that
he was prevented from collecting the rentals from the tenants or until overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notarized
occupants of his commercial buildings from October 1, 1978 up to document continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to
October 31, 1984, and for this purpose a Writ of Preliminary its execution and delivery.[11]
Injunction is hereby issued, but the plaintiff is likewise ordered to pay The second element, on the other hand, requires that there be knowledge on
to the defendant the monthly rental of Seven Hundred Pesos the part of the interferer that the contract exists. Knowledge of the subsistence
(P700.00) every end of the month for the entire period of seventy of the contract is an essential element to state a cause of action for tortuous
three (73) months. This portion of the judgment should be interference.[12] A defendant in such a case cannot be made liable for
considered as a mere alternative should the defendant fail to pay interfering with a contract he is unaware of.[13] While it is not necessary to
the amount of Five Hundred Five Pesos and Fifty Six Centavos prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be aware of the facts which, if
(P506,805.56) hereinabove specified;
followed by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure of the attorneys fees must have clear, factual and legal bases[27] which, in this case,
contractual relations and rights of the parties in the contract.[14] do not exist.
In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the lease contract. Regarding the dismissal of petitioners counterclaim for actual and moral
His sellers (the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi) likewise allegedly did not inform him damages, the appellate court affirmed the assailed order of the trial court
of any existing lease contract. because it found no basis to grant the amount of damages prayed for by
After a careful perusal of the records, we find the contention of petitioner petitioner. We find no reason to reverse the trial court and the Court of
meritorious. He conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and Appeals. Actual damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in
unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have made a cautious man recompense for, loss or injury sustained. To be recoverable, they must not
probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the property. An only be capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree
examination of the entire propertys title bore no indication of the leasehold of certainty.[28] Petitioner was unable to prove that he suffered loss or injury,
interest of private respondent. Even the registry of property had no record of hence, his claim for actual damages must fail. Moreover, petitioners prayer for
the same.[15] moral damages was not warranted as moral damages should result from the
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such wrongful act of a person. The worries and anxieties suffered by a party hailed
knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him liable for tortuous to court litigation are not compensable.[29]
interference. Which brings us to the third element. According to our ruling in With the foregoing discussion, we no longer deem it necessary to delve into
So Ping Bun, petitioner may be held liable only when there was no legal the issue of laches.
justification or excuse for his action[16] or when his conduct was stirred by a WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
must have acted with malice[17] or must have been driven by purely impious ASIDE.
reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act of interference cannot be
justified.[18] C. S. GILCHRIST, plaintiff-appellee, vs. E. A. CUDDY, ET AL., defendants.
Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of private respondent JOSE FERNANDEZ ESPEJO and MARIANO ZALDARRIAGA, appellants.
that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. An appeal by the defendants, Jose Fernandez Espejo and Mariano
The word induce refers to situations where a person causes another to choose Zaldarriaga, from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, dismissing
one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation.[19] The records show their cross-complaint upon the merits for damages against the plaintiff for the
that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property alleged wrongful issuance of a mandatory and a preliminary injunction.
was completely of their own volition and that petitioner did absolutely nothing Upon the application of the appellee an ex parte mandatory injunction was
to influence their judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer any issued on the 22d of May, 1913, directing the defendant, E. A. Cuddy, to send
evidence to support his claim. In short, even assuming that private respondent to the appellee a certain cinematograph film called "Zigomar" in compliance
was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the with an alleged contract which had been entered into between these two
fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of parties, and at the time an ex parte preliminary injunction was issued
petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous restraining the appellants from receiving and exhibiting in their theater the
interference was never established. Zigomar until further orders of the court. On the 26th of that month the
In So Ping Bun, the Court discussed whether interference can be justified at appellants appeared and moved the court to dissolve the preliminary
all if the interferer acts for the sole purpose of furthering a personal financial injunction. When the case was called for trial on August 6, the appellee moved
interest, but without malice or bad faith. As the Court explained it: for the dismissal of the complaint "for the reason that there is no further
x x x, as a general rule, justification for interfering with the business relations necessity for the maintenance of the injunction." The motion was granted
of another exists where the actors motive is to benefit himself. Such without objection as to Cuddy and denied as to the appellants in order to give
justification does not exist where the actors motive is to cause harm to the them an opportunity to prove that the injunction were wrongfully issued and
other. Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the the amount of damages suffered by reason thereof.
interferers interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and The pertinent part of the trial court's findings of fact in this case is as follows:
that an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not It appears in this case that Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar and
merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, that on the 24th of April he rented it to C. S. Gilchrist for a week for P125,
for he acts in self-protection. Moreover, justification for protecting ones and it was to be delivered on the 26th of May, the week beginning that day.
financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his A few days prior to this Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist, which he
economic interest in the subject matter with that of the others. It is sufficient if had forwarded to him in Manila, saying that he had made other
the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in arrangements with his film. The other arrangements was the rental to these
wrongful motives.[20] defendants Espejo and his partner for P350 for the week and the injunction
The foregoing disquisition applies squarely to the case at bar. In our view, was asked by Gilchrist against these parties from showing it for the week
petitioners purchase of the subject property was merely an advancement of beginning the 26th of May.
his financial or economic interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by It appears from the testimony in this case, conclusively, that Cuddy willfully
improper motives. In the very early case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy,[21] the Court violated his contract, he being the owner of the picture, with Gilchrist
declared that a person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled because the defendants had offered him more for the same period. Mr.
by a proper business interest. In other words, a financial or profit motivation Espejo at the trial on the permanent injunction on the 26th of May admitted
will not necessarily make a person an officious interferer liable for damages that he knew that Cuddy was the owner of the film. He was trying to get it
as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved. through his agents Pathe Brothers in Manila. He is the agent of the same
In sum, we rule that, inasmuch as not all three elements to hold petitioner liable concern in Iloilo. There is in evidence in this case on the trial today as well
for tortuous interference are present, petitioner cannot be made to answer for as on the 26th of May, letters showing that the Pathe Brothers in Manila
private respondents losses. advised this man on two different occasions not to contend for this film
This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without injury. Injury is Zigomar because the rental price was prohibitive and assured him also that
the legal invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which he could not get the film for about six weeks. The last of these letters was
results from the injury.[22] In BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of written on the 26th of April, which showed conclusively that he knew they
Appeals,,[23] the Court turned down the claim for damages of a cardholder had to get this film from Cuddy and from this letter that the agent in Manila
whose credit card had been cancelled by petitioner corporation after several could not get it, but he made Cuddy an offer himself and Cuddy accepted it
defaults in payment. We held there that there can be damage without injury because he was paying about three times as much as he had contracted
where the loss or harm is not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In that with Gilchrist for. Therefore, in the opinion of this court, the defendants failed
instance, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone since signally to show the injunction against the defendant was wrongfully
the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not procured.
amount to legal injury or wrong.[24] Indeed, lack of malice in the conduct The appellants duly excepted to the order of the court denying their motion for
complained of precludes recovery of damages.[25] new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the decision
With respect to the attorneys fees awarded by the appellate court to private rendered. There is lacking from the record before us the deposition of the
respondent, we rule that it cannot be recovered under the circumstances. defendant Cuddy, which apparently throws light upon a contract entered into
According to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees may be awarded between him and the plaintiff Gilchrist. The contents of this deposition are
only when it has been stipulated upon or under the instances provided discussed at length in the brief of the appellants and an endeavor is made to
therein.[26] Likewise, being in the concept of actual damages, the award for show that no such contract was entered into. The trial court, which had this
deposition before it, found that there was a contract between Cuddy and
Gilchrist. Not having the deposition in question before us, it is impossible to no contract between Cuddy and Gilchrist this defense would be tenable, but
say how strongly it militates against this findings of fact. By a series of the mere right to compete could not justify the appellants in intentionally
decisions we have construed section 143 and 497 (2) of the Code of Civil inducing Cuddy to take away the appellee's contractual rights.
Procedure to require the production of all the evidence in this court. This is the Chief Justice Wells in Walker vs. Cronin (107 Mass., 555), said: "Everyone
duty of the appellant and, upon his failure to perform it, we decline to proceed has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry,
with a review of the evidence. In such cases we rely entirely upon the skill and credit. He has no right to be free from malicious and wanton
pleadings and the findings of fact of the trial court and examine only such interference, disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or loss come as a result
assigned errors as raise questions of law. (Ferrer vs. Neri Abejuela, 9 Phil. of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum absque
Rep., 324; Valle vs. Galera, 10 Phil. Rep., 619; Salvacion vs. Salvacion, 13 injuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with."
Phil. Rep., 366; Breta vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 15 Phil. Rep., 446; Arroyo vs. Yulo, In Read vs. Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons ([1902] 2 K. B., 88),
18 Phil. Rep., 236; Olsen & Co. vs. Matson, Lord & Belser Co., 19 Phil. Rep., Darling, J., said: "I think the plaintiff has a cause of action against the
102; Blum vs. Barretto, 19 Phil. Rep., 161; Cuyugan vs. Aguas, 19 Phil. Rep., defendants, unless the court is satisfied that, when they interfered with the
379; Mapa vs. Chaves, 20 Phil. Rep., 147; Mans vs. Garry, 20 Phil. Rep., 134.) contractual rights of plaintiff, the defendants had a sufficient justification for
It is true that some of the more recent of these cases make exceptions to the their interference; . . . for it is not a justification that `they acted bona fide in the
general rule. Thus, in Olsen & Co. vs. Matson, Lord & Belser Co., (19 Phil. best interests of the society of masons,' i. e., in their own interests. Nor is it
Rep., 102), that portion of the evidence before us tended to show that grave enough that `they were not actuated by improper motives.' I think their
injustice might result from a strict reliance upon the findings of fact contained sufficient justification for interference with plaintiff's right must be an equal or
in the judgment appealed from. We, therefore, gave the appellant an superior right in themselves, and that no one can legally excuse himself to a
opportunity to explain the omission. But we required that such explanation man, of whose contract he has procured the breach, on the ground that he
must show a satisfactory reason for the omission, and that the missing portion acted on a wrong understanding of his own rights, or without malice, or bona
of the evidence must be submitted within sixty days or cause shown for failing fide, or in the best interests of himself, or even that he acted as an altruist,
to do so. The other cases making exceptions to the rule are based upon seeking only good of another and careless of his own advantage." (Quoted
peculiar circumstances which will seldom arise in practice and need not here with approval in Beekman vs. Marsters, 195 Mass., 205.)
be set forth, for the reason that they are wholly inapplicable to the present It is said that the ground on which the liability of a third party for interfering with
case. The appellants would be entitled to indulgence only under the doctrine a contract between others rests, is that the interference was malicious. The
of the Olsen case. But from that portion of the record before us, we are not contrary view, however, is taken by the Supreme Court of the United States in
inclined to believe that the missing deposition would be sufficient to justify us the case of Angle vs. Railway Co. (151 U. S., 1). The only motive for
in reversing the findings of fact of the trial court that the contract in question interference by the third party in that case was the desire to make a profit to
had been made. There is in the record not only the positive and detailed the injury of one of the parties of the contract. There was no malice in the case
testimony of Gilchrist to this effect, but there is also a letter of apology from beyond the desire to make an unlawful gain to the detriment of one of the
Cuddy to Gilchrist in which the former enters into a lengthy explanation of his contracting parties.
reasons for leasing the film to another party. The latter could only have been In the case at bar the only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist —
called forth by a broken contract with Gilchrist to lease the film to him. We, Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by
therefore, fail to find any reason for overlooking the omission of the defendants exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desire; but
to bring up the missing portion of the evidence and, adhering to the general this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that
rule above referred to, proceed to examine the questions of law raised by the contract and causing its breach. It is, therefore, clear, under the above
appellants. authorities, that they were liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their
From the above-quoted findings of fact it is clear that Cuddy, a resident of acts, unless they are relieved from such liability by reason of the fact that they
Manila, was the owner of the "Zigomar;" that Gilchrist was the owner of a did not know at the time the identity of the original lessee (Gilchrist) of the film.
cinematograph theater in Iloilo; that in accordance with the terms of the The liability of the appellants arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual
contract entered into between Cuddy and Gilchrist the former leased to the obligations, as they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate
latter the "Zigomar" for exhibition in his (Gilchrist's) theater for the week his contract with Gilchrist. So that if the action of Gilchrist had been one for
beginning May 26, 1913; and that Cuddy willfully violate his contract in order damages, it would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code.
that he might accept the appellant's offer of P350 for the film for the same Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission,
period. Did the appellants know that they were inducing Cuddy to violate his causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged
contract with a third party when they induced him to accept the P350? Espejo to repair the damage do done. There is nothing in this article which requires
admitted that he knew that Cuddy was the owner of the film. He received a as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the
letter from his agents in Manila dated April 26, assuring him that he could not identity of a person to whom he causes damages. In fact, the chapter wherein
get the film for about six weeks. The arrangement between Cuddy and the this article is found clearly shows that no such knowledge is required in order
appellants for the exhibition of the film by the latter on the 26th of May were that the injured party may recover for the damage suffered.
perfected after April 26, so that the six weeks would include and extend But the fact that the appellants' interference with the Gilchrist contract was
beyond May 26. The appellants must necessarily have known at the time they actionable did not of itself entitle Gilchrist to sue out an injunction against them.
made their offer to Cuddy that the latter had booked or contracted the film for The allowance of this remedy must be justified under section 164 of the Code
six weeks from April 26. Therefore, the inevitable conclusion is that the of Civil Procedure, which specifies the circumstance under which an injunction
appellants knowingly induced Cuddy to violate his contract with another may issue. Upon the general doctrine of injunction we said in Devesa vs. Arbes
person. But there is no specific finding that the appellants knew the identity of (13 Phil. Rep., 273):
the other party. So we must assume that they did not know that Gilchrist was An injunction is a "special remedy" adopted in that code (Act No. 190) from
the person who had contracted for the film. American practice, and originally borrowed from English legal procedure,
The appellants take the position that if the preliminary injunction had not been which was there issued by the authority and under the seal of a court of
issued against them they could have exhibited the film in their theater for a equity, and limited, as in order cases where equitable relief is sought, to
number of days beginning May 26, and could have also subleased it to other cases where there is no "plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law,"
theater owners in the nearby towns and, by so doing, could have cleared, which "will not be granted while the rights between the parties are
during the life of their contract with Cuddy, the amount claimed as damages. undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable
Taking this view of the case, it will be unnecessary for us to inquire whether injury will be done," which cannot be compensated in damages, and where
the mandatory injunction against Cuddy was properly issued or not. No there will be no adequate remedy, and which will not, as a rule, be granted,
question is raised with reference to the issuance of that injunction. to take property out of the possession of one party and put it into that of
The right on the part of Gilchrist to enter into a contract with Cuddy for the another whose title has not been established by law.
lease of the film must be fully recognized and admitted by all. That Cuddy was We subsequently affirmed the doctrine of the Devesa case in Palafox vs.
liable in an action for damages for the breach of that contract, there can be no Madamba (19 Phil., Rep., 444), and we take this occasion of again affirming
doubt. Were the appellants likewise liable for interfering with the contract it, believing, as we do, that the indiscriminate use of injunctions should be
between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the time the identity of one discouraged.
of the contracting parties? The appellants claim that they had a right to do Does the fact that the appellants did not know at the time the identity of the
what they did. The ground upon which the appellants base this contention is, original lessee of the film militate against Gilchrist's right to a preliminary
that there was no valid and binding contract between Cuddy and Gilchrist and injunction, although the appellant's incurred civil liability for damages for such
that, therefore, they had a right to compete with Gilchrist for the lease of the interference? In the examination of the adjudicated cases, where in injunctions
film, the right to compete being a justification for their acts. If there had been have been issued to restrain wrongful interference with contracts by strangers
to such contracts, we have been unable to find any case where this precise We are not lacking in authority to support our conclusion that the court was
question was involved, as in all of those cases which we have examined, the justified in issuing the preliminary injunction against the appellants. Upon the
identity of both of the contracting parties was known to the tort-feasors. We precise question as to whether injunction will issue to restrain wrongful
might say, however, that this fact does not seem to have a controlling feature interference with contracts by strangers to such contracts, it may be said that
in those cases. There is nothing in section 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure courts in the United States have usually granted such relief where the profits
which indicates, even remotely, that before an injunction may issue restraining of the injured person are derived from his contractual relations with a large and
the wrongful interference with contrast by strangers, the strangers must know indefinite number of individuals, thus reducing him to the necessity of proving
the identity of both parties. It would seem that this is not essential, as in an action against the tort-feasor that the latter was responsible in each case
injunctions frequently issue against municipal corporations, public service for the broken contract, or else obliging him to institute individual suits against
corporations, public officers, and others to restrain the commission of acts each contracting party and so exposing him to a multiplicity of suits. Sperry &
which would tend to injuriously affect the rights of person whose identity the Hutchinson Co. vs. Mechanics' Clothing Co. (128 Fed., 800); Sperry &
respondents could not possibly have known beforehand. This court has held Hutchinson Co. vs. Louis Weber & Co. (161 Fed., 219); Sperry & Hutchinson
that in a proper case injunction will issue at the instance of a private citizen to Co. vs. Pommer (199 Fed., 309); were all cases wherein the respondents were
restrain ultra vires acts of public officials. (Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 inducing retail merchants to break their contracts with the company for the sale
Phil. Rep., 366.) So we proceed to the determination of the main question of of the latters' trading stamps. Injunction issued in each case restraining the
whether or not the preliminary injunction ought to have been issued in this respondents from interfering with such contracts.
case. In the case of the Nashville R. R. Co. vs. McConnell (82 Fed., 65), the court,
As a rule, injunctions are denied to those who have an adequate remedy at among other things, said: "One who wrongfully interferes in a contract between
law. Where the choice is between the ordinary and the extraordinary others, and, for the purpose of gain to himself induces one of the parties to
processes of law, and the former are sufficient, the rule will not permit the use break it, is liable to the party injured thereby; and his continued interference
of the latter. (In re Debs, 158 U. S., 564.) If the injury is irreparable, the ordinary may be ground for an injunction where the injuries resulting will be irreparable."
process is inadequate. In Wahle vs. Reinbach (76 Ill., 322), the supreme court In Hamby & Toomer vs. Georgia Iron & Coal Co. (127 Ga., 792), it appears
of Illinois approved a definition of the term "irreparable injury" in the following that the respondents were interfering in a contract for prison labor, and the
language: "By `irreparable injury' is not meant such injury as is beyond the result would be, if they were successful, the shutting down of the petitioner's
possibility of repair, or beyond possible compensation in damages, nor plant for an indefinite time. The court held that although there was no
necessarily great injury or great damage, but that species of injury, whether contention that the respondents were insolvent, the trial court did not abuse its
great or small, that ought not to be submitted to on the one hand or inflicted discretion in granting a preliminary injunction against the respondents.
on the other; and, because it is so large on the one hand, or so small on the In Beekman vs. Marsters (195 Mass., 205), the plaintiff had obtained from the
other, is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable Jamestown Hotel Corporation, conducting a hotel within the grounds of the
redress can be had therefor in a court of law." (Quoted with approval in Jamestown Exposition, a contract whereby he was made their exclusive agent
Nashville R. R. Co. vs. McConnell, 82 Fed., 65.) for the New England States to solicit patronage for the hotel. The defendant
The case at bar is somewhat novel, as the only contract which was broken induced the hotel corporation to break their contract with the plaintiff in order
was that between Cuddy and Gilchrist, and the profits of the appellee to allow him to act also as their agent in the New England States. The court
depended upon the patronage of the public, for which it is conceded the held that an action for damages would not have afforded the plaintiff adequate
appellants were at liberty to complete by all fair does not deter the application relief, and that an injunction was proper compelling the defendant to desist
of remarked in the case of the "ticket scalpers" (82 Fed., 65), the novelty of from further interference with the plaintiff's exclusive contract with the hotel
the facts does not deter the application of equitable principles. This court takes company.
judicial notice of the general character of a cinematograph or motion-picture In Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. vs. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co.
theater. It is a quite modern form of the play house, wherein, by means of an (171 Fed., 553), the court, while admitting that there are some authorities to
apparatus known as a cinematograph or cinematograph, a series of views the contrary, held that the current authority in the United States and England
representing closely successive phases of a moving object, are exhibited in is that:
rapid sequence, giving a picture which, owing to the persistence of vision, The violation of a legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action, and
appears to the observer to be in continuous motion. (The Encyclopedia that it is a violation of a legal right to interfere with contractual relations
Britanica, vol. 6, p. 374.) The subjects which have lent themselves to the art recognized by law, if there be no sufficient justification for the interference.
of the photographer in this manner have increased enormously in recent (Quinn vs. Leatham, supra, 510; Angle vs. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 151 U.
years, as well as have the places where such exhibition are given. The S., 1; 14 Sup. Ct., 240; 38 L. Ed., 55; Martens vs. Reilly, 109 Wis., 464, 84
attendance, and, consequently, the receipts, at one of these cinematograph N. W., 840; Rice vs. Manley, 66 N. Y., 82; 23 Am. Rep., 30; Bitterman vs.
or motion-picture theaters depends in no small degree upon the excellence of L. & N. R. R. Co., 207 U. S., 205; 28 Sup. Ct., 91; 52 L. Ed., 171; Beekman
the photographs, and it is quite common for the proprietor of the theater to vs. Marsters, 195 Mass., 205; 80 N. E., 817; 11 L. R. A. [N. S.] 201; 122
secure an especially attractive exhibit as his "feature film" and advertise it as Am. St. Rep., 232; South Wales Miners' Fed. vs. Glamorgan Coal Co.,
such in order to attract the public. This feature film is depended upon to secure Appeal Cases, 1905, p. 239.)
a larger attendance that if its place on the program were filled by other films of See also Nims on Unfair Business Competition, pp. 351- 371.
mediocre quality. It is evident that the failure to exhibit the feature film will In 3 Elliot on Contracts, section 2511, it is said: "Injunction is the proper remedy
reduce the receipts of the theater. to prevent a wrongful interference with contract by strangers to such contracts
Hence, Gilchrist was facing the immediate prospect of diminished profits by where the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable.
reason of the fact that the appellants had induced Cuddy to rent to them the And where there is a malicious interference with lawful and valid contracts a
film Gilchrist had counted upon as his feature film. It is quite apparent that to permanent injunction will ordinarily issue without proof of express malice. So,
estimate with any decree of accuracy the damages which Gilchrist would likely an injunction may be issued where the complainant to break their contracts
suffer from such an event would be quite difficult if not impossible. If he allowed with him by agreeing to indemnify who breaks his contracts of employment
the appellants to exhibit the film in Iloilo, it would be useless for him to exhibit may be adjoined from including other employees to break their contracts and
it again, as the desire of the public to witness the production would have been enter into new contracts with a new employer of the servant who first broke
already satisfied. In this extremity, the appellee applied for and was granted, his contract. But the remedy by injunction cannot be used to restrain a
as we have indicated, a mandatory injunction against Cuddy requiring him to legitimate competition, though such competition would involve the violation of
deliver the Zigomar to Gilchrist, and a preliminary injunction against the a contract. Nor will equity ordinarily enjoin employees who have quit the
appellants restraining them from exhibiting that film in their theater during the service of their employer from attempting by proper argument to persuade
weeks he (Gilchrist) had a right to exhibit it. These injunction saved the plaintiff others from taking their places so long as they do not resort to force or
harmless from damages due to the unwarranted interference of the intimidations on obstruct the public thoroughfares."
defendants, as well as the difficult task which would have been set for the court Beekman vs. Marster, supra, is practically on all fours with the case at bar in
of estimating them in case the appellants had been allowed to carry out their that there was only one contract in question and the profits of the injured
illegal plans. As to whether or not the mandatory injunction should have been person depended upon the patronage of the public. Hamby & Toomer vs.
issued, we are not, as we have said, called upon to determine. So far as the Georgia Iron & Coal Co., supra, is also similar to the case at bar in that there
preliminary injunction issued against the appellants is concerned, which was only one contract, the interference of which was stopped by injunction.
prohibited them from exhibiting the Zigomar during the week which Gilchrist For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed, with costs, against the
desired to exhibit it, we are of the opinion that the circumstances justified the appellants.
issuance of that injunction in the discretion of the court. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.