People vs.

Jabinal
55 SCRA 607 27 February 1974

Antonio J.

Facts:
The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas
finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The
validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s
ruling in People vs. Mapa. As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused
admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint was without the requisite license a permit. He
however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor, and was
likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the authority to
possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as peace officer. Relying on the
Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused
sought for his aquittal. Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the
trial court nonetheless decided otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People
vs. Lucero were reversed and subsequently abandoned in people vs. mapa

Issue:
Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and
Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang
and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?

Ruling:

The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.

The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal

maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" - the interpretation placed upon the written law
by a competent court has the force of law

The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence,
of the law, at the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967,
but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on
the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof

Pesca vs Pesca
G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001

Vitug, J.

FACTS:
The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four children. She
contends that respondent surprisingly showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to
perform his marital obligations starting 1988. His “true color” of being an emotionally
immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was
a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon until 1:00
o’clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking,
respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded
shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves
were not spared from physical violence.
Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in
Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she returned
home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as
expected. On the morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half
an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. He was
imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their marriage to
be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent
and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, which in turn
reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the marriage of respondent and petitioner still
subsists.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina
should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.

HELD:
The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet”
– that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law.

The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous

legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus
constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior
ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new
doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of
“lex prospicit, non respicit.”Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from
the Canon Law, was given legal life by the Court in the case of Santos; in the case of Molina,
additional procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for
annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity was added. Both judicial
decisions in Santos and Molina have the force and effect of law. Thus, the guidelines in the
case of Molina are mandatory in nature. The petition was denied.

Director of Lands Vs CA
GR No. 102858, July 28, 1997

Panganiban, J.

FACTS:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters
of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land registration court in its decision
dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”, in compliance with
the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper
of general circulation. The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set
aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of
Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the
failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the
application. The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this
recourse to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice of
initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory.
HELD:
YES. Petition was granted.

“Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.”

The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires publication of the
notice of initial hearing. It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in
rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as
against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so,
the process must strictly be complied with.

The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The
law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that
where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus,
the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without
prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly
complied with.

Pascual vs Pascual
GR No. 84240, March 25, 1992

Paras, J.

FACTS:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the
acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the
full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual. Don Andres Pascual died intestate
on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or
spurious children and was survived by Adela Soldevilla de Pascual assurviving
spouse, children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of
the deceased, children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased,
acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of
the deceased and the intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of
the deceased and represented by his heirs. Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving
spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed for administration of the intestate estate of her
late husband. all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT,
over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S.
Pascual.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted
to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

HELD:
No.

DUREX LEX SED LEX- the law may be harsh but that is the law

Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that
it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and
the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They
may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article
992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the
latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product
of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize
this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child
but petitioners are his illegitimate children. Clearly the term “illegitimate” refers to both
natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally
placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not
acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the negative.

People vs Patricio Amigo

GR No. 1167919, January 18, 1996

Melo, J.

Facts:
On December 29, 1989 at around 1:00 Pm, Benito Ng Suy was driving their gray Ford Fiera
back home, with his daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger one together with his two-
year-old son. An accidental head on collision occurred between the Fiera and the Tamaraw
being driven by one Virgillio Abogado, with Abogado was the accused, Patricio Amigo alias
"Bebot". The collision caused slight damage to the right bumper of the Tamaraw.

While Abogado and Benito were having a verbal confrontation, Patricio approached Benito
asking the latter to leave the incident as it was only a minor incident. However, Benito said
that Patricio should not interfere, which made Patricio irritated and caused the latter to
stab Benito, rendering the victim into a critical condition which later caused his death due
to a sepsis infection that has already circulated in his body.

Patricio Amigo was charged initially with Frustrated murder, but was modified to the crime
of murder to which he was convicted with a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused-
Appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harch as a penalty
and pleads for sympathy.

Issue:
Whether or Not the penalty imposed upon the accused "Reclusion Perpetua" be modified or
reduced by virtue of Section 19 (1) of Article III of the Constitution which prohibits the
imposition of death penalty.

Held:
No.

Dura Lex Sed Lex- the law may be harsh but that is the law

The Supreme Court hold that Article III, Section 19 (1) does not change the penalty periods
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only in so far as it prohibits the
imposition of death penalty. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remain the
same.

Thus, a person originally subject to death penalty and another who committed the murder
without the attendance of any modifying circumstances will now be both punishable with
the same medium period although the former is conceitedly more guilty than the latter. But
that is the will of the constitution and the duty of the court is to apply the law, disregarding
the sympathy or pity for an accused. Dura Lex Sed Lex.
 Silva vs Cabrera
GR No. L-50999, March 23, 1990

Midialdea, J.

FACTS:
Zuelig filed an application for clearance to terminate the services of Songco, and others, on
the ground of retrenchment due to financial losses. During the hearing, the parties agreed
that the sole issue to be resolved was the basis of the separation pay due. The salesmen
received monthly salaries of at least P400.00 and commission for every sale they made.

The Collective Bargaining Agreements between Zuelig and the union of which Songco, et al.
were members contained the following provision: "Any employee who is separated from
employment due to old age, sickness, death or permanent lay-off, not due to the fault of
said employee, shall receive from the company a retirement gratuity in an amount
equivalent to one (1) month's salary per year of service."

The Labor Arbiter ordered Zuelig to pay Songco et al., separation pay equivalent to their
one-month salary (exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of service with
the company.

The National Labor Relations Commission sustained the Arbiter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances should be included in the
monthly salary of Songco, et al. for the purpose of computing their separation pay.

HELD:
Yes.
where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation
or construction; there is only room for application

In the computation of backwages and separation pay, account must be taken not only of
the basic salary of the employee, but also of the transportation and emergency living
allowances.

Even if the commissions were in the form of incentives or encouragement, so that the
salesman would be inspired to put a little more industry on jobs particularly assigned to
them, still these commissions are direct remunerations for services rendered which
contributed to the increase of income of the employee. Commission is the recompense
compensation or reward of an agent, salesman, executor, trustee, receiver, factor, broker
or bailee, when the same is calculated as a percentage on the amount of his transactions
or on the profit to the principal. The nature of the work of a salesman and the reason for
such type of remuneration for services rendered demonstrate that commissions are part of
Songco, et al's wage or salary.

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that some salesmen do not receive any basic
salary, but depend on commissions and allowances or commissions alone, although an
employer-employee relationship exists.

If the opposite view is adopted, i.e., that commissions do not form part of the wage or salary,
then in effect, we will be saying that this kind of salesmen do not receive any salary and,
therefore, not entitled to separation pay in the event of discharge from employment. This
narrow interpretation is not in accord with the liberal spirit of the labor laws, and
considering the purpose of separation pay which is, to alleviate the difficulties which
confront a dismissed employee thrown to the streets to face the harsh necessities of life.
In Soriano vs. NLRC (155 SCRA 124), we held that the commissions also claimed by the
employee (override commission plus net deposit incentive) are not properly includible in
such base figure since such commissions must be earned by actual market transactions
attributable to the petitioner [salesman]. Since the commissions in the present case were
earned by actual transactions attributable to Song, et al., these should be included in their
separation pay. In the computation thereof, what should be taken into account is the
average commission earned during their last year of employment.

Amores v. HRET,
GR No. 189600, June 29, 2010

Carpio Morales, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner, Milagros E. Amores, challenges the decision of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (public respondent), which both dismissed her petition for Quo
Warranto. Her petition seeks to ouster Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, whom she alleged to
have assumed office as a representative of the party list organization Citizen’s Battle Against
Corruption(CIBAC)without formal proclamation by the Commission on Elections; to be a
disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector since at the time of his filing of his
certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old, which was beyond
the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Party-List System Act; to have changed his
affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers sector was not effected
at least 6 months before the May 14,2007 elections. The public respondent held that age
qualification pursuant to Section 9 of RA 7941 only applied to those nominated until
1998, unless the sectoral party exclusively represents the youth which is not
CIBAC’s case. Moreover, it held that Section 14 of RA 7941 did not apply as there was no
resultant change in the party-list affiliation. After having her motion for reconsideration
denied by Resolution No. 09-130, petitioner filed Petitioner for Certoriari contending that
the public respondent has created distinctions in the application of Sections 9 and 15 of
RA No. 7941 fostering interpretations that go against equal protection of laws. In addition,
partial proclamation NBC Resolution 07-60 was not enough basis for Villanueva to assume
office on July 10, 2007.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sections 9 and 15 of Republic Act No. 7941 apply to Villanueva?

HELD:
Yes.
when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for
construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.

The court has held that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 or Party List System Act, apply
to the private respondent. According to Section 9 of RA 7941, a nominee of the youth sector
must be at least 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of election. When a youth
sectoral representative attains the age of 30 during his term, he will be allowed to continue
until the expiration of his term. Meanwhile, Section 15 reads “Change of Affiliation; Effect.
Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during
his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, that if he changes his political party or sectoral
affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as
party-list representative under his new party or organization. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)” The court has found no textual support for the public respondent’s
interpretation that Section 9 is applicable only to those nominated until 1998 and found
that Villanueva has changed his affiliation only on March 17, 2007, which was within 6
months before the May 2007 elections.

RCBC vs IAC
 GR No. 74851, December 9, 1999

Melo, J.

Facts:
On September 28, 1984, BF Homes filed a “Petition for Rehabilitation and for Declaration
of Suspension of Payments” with the SEC.

RCBC, one of the creditors listed in BF Homes’ inventory of creditors and liabilities, on
October 26, 1984, requested the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to extra-judicially foreclose its
real estate mortgage on some properties of BF Homes. BF Homes opposed the auction sale
and the SEC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioners filing
of a bond. Presumably unaware of the filing of the bond on the very day of the auction sale,
the sheriff proceeded with the public auction sale in which RCBC was the highest bidder
for the properties auctioned. But because of the proceedings in the SEC, the sheriff withheld
the delivery to RCBC of the certificate of sale covering the auctioned properties.

On March 13, 1985, despite the SEC case, RCBC filed with RTC an action for mandamus
against the provincial sheriff of Rizal to compel him to execute in its favor a certificate of
sale of the auctioned properties.
On March 18, 1985, the SEC appointed a Management Committee for BF Homes.

Consequently, the trial court granted RCBC’s “motion for judgment on the pleading”
ordering respondents to execute and deliver to petitioner the Certificate of Auction Sale.

On appeal, the SC affirmed CA’s decision (setting aside RTC’s decision dismissing the
mandamus case and suspending issuance to RCBC of new land titles until the resolution
of the SEC case) ruling that “whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for
rehabilitation and suspension of payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such
preference but stand on equal footing with other creditors.” Hence, this Motion for
Reconsideration.

Issue:
When should the suspension of actions for claims against BF Homes take effect?

Held:
The issue of whether or not preferred creditors of distressed corporations stand on equal
footing with all other creditors gains relevance and materiality only upon the appointment
of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body.

Upon cursory reading of Section 6, par (c) of PD 902-A, it is adequately clear that
suspension of claims against a corporation under rehabilitation is counted or figured up
only upon the appointment of a management committee or a rehabilitation takes effect as
soon as the application or a petition for rehabilitation is filed with the SEC may to some, be
more logical and wise but unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language of the
law. To insist on such ruling, no matter how practical and noble would be to encroach upon
legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law --- plainly judicial legislation.

Once a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body is appointed

pursuant to PD 902-A, all actions for claims against a distressed corporation pending before
any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly; Suspension shall not
prejudice or render ineffective the status of a secured creditor as compared to a totally
unsecured creditor. What it merely provides is that all actions for claims against the
corporation, partnership or association shall be suspended. This should give the receiver a
chance to rehabilitate the corporation if there should still be a possibility for doing so. In
the event that rehabilitation is no longer feasible and claims against the distressed
corporation would eventually have to be settled, the secured creditors shall enjoy preference
over the unsecured creditors subject only to the provisions of the Civil Code on Concurrence
and Preferences of Credit.
 People vs Mapa
GR No. L-22301

Fernando, J.

Facts:
On or about August 13, 1962, Mario Mapa was apprehended due to possession of an
unlicensed firearm. The defendant admitted before the trial court that he was carrying the
unlicensed firearm and that he does not have a permit to carry such a weapon. In his
defense, he said that he is a secret agent of the Governor of Batangas and that he is exempt
from the requirement of securing a license of firearm. The defendant also showed a
certification that he was appointed as such.

Issue:
whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the
Philippine Constabulary

Held:
No.

when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for
construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.

In the present case, there is no room for interpretation or construction because the law is
clear. The law provides for the class of people who are not covered in the prohibitive law.
No exemption was provided for secret agents. Construction and interpretation come only
after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."

Bolos vs Bolos
GR No. 186400, October 20, 2010.

Mendoza, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code. After
trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy of said decision was
received by respondent Danilo and he thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued
the order declaring its decision declaring the marriage null and void as final and executory
and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo
filed with the CA a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the
RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render
the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning
him, the family home and their children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC
declaring the nullity of marriage as final and executory. The appellate court stated that the
requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was
solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized
before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the phrase “under the
Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word
“marriages.” Such that petitions filed after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed
by the A.M. No. even if the marriage was solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his
Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with
Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity.

Issue:
Whether or not the phrase “Under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC pertains to
the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.

Held:
No.

Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March
15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads: Section 1. Scope –
This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. The categorical
language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to
those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe
to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any
doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room
for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the
plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or
"speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est
recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure."

Enrile vs Salazar
186 SCRA 217

Narvasa, J.

Facts:
In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the crime of rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder. The warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Jaime
Salazar. Said crime arose from the failed coup attempts against then president Corazon
Aquino. There was no bail set for Enrile due to the seriousness of the crime charged against
him. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed a petition for habeas
corpus questioning his detention and alleging that the crime being charged against him is
nonexistent. He insists that there is no such crime as rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder. Enrile invoked the ruling in the landmark case of People vs
Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes
such as murder; as such, the proper crime that should have been charged against him
is simple rebellion – which is bailable.

Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him.
He claimed that it only took Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes (from the raffling
of the case to him) to issue the warrant. Enrile claimed that such period is so short that it
was impossible for the judge to have been able to examine the voluminous record of the
case from the prosecution’s office – that being, the constitutional provision that a judge may
only issue a warrant of arrest after personally determining the existence of probable cause
has not been complied with.
For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that the Hernandez ruling should be
abandoned and that it should be ruled that rebellion cannot absorb more serious
crimes like murder.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned.
2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined probable cause in the case at bar.

HELD:
1. No, the said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also noted that there was
actually a previous law (P.D. 942) which sought to abandon the Hernandez doctrine.
The said law provided that graver crimes may not be complexed with rebellion.
However, President Corazon Aquino repealed said law (by virtue of the power granted
to her by the 1986 Freedom Constitution). That being, the Hernandez doctrine, which
reflects the rebellion law under the Revised Penal Code, still stands. The courts
cannot change this because courts can only interpret laws. Only Congress can
change the rebellion law (which the SC suggested in order to strengthen the rebellion
law). But as it stands, Enrile is correct, there is no such crime as rebellion with
murder. Common crimes such as murder are absorbed. He can only be charged with
rebellion – which is bailable.

2. Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge Salazar only took an hour and
twenty minutes to issue the warrant from the time the case was raffled to him despite
the fact that the prosecution transmitted quite a voluminous record from the
preliminary investigation it conducted. It is sufficient that the judge follows
established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor. Just because Judge Salazar had what some
might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty,
gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does
that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed.

Macabenta vs Davao Stevemore

GR No. L-27489, April 30, 1970

Fernando, J.

Facts:
Conrado Macabenta was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company
ate Manay, Panabo, Davao, about 48 kilometers from his residence in Davao City. Although
quarters were provided by the respondent to its employees at the sawmill many of them
preferred to commute and the deceased went home about thrice a week, to which the
respondent furnished the transportation. On the day following the accident, Conrado and
Leonora were lawfully wedded in a marriage ceremony solemnized at San Pedro Hospital,
Davao City, where the deceased was hospitalized up to his death. Leonora gave birth to
the posthumous daughter at the deceased named Raquel.

Issues:
whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after the
accident as well as the posthumous child could be... considered dependents within the
meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act
Held:
We affirm the appealed decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission.

when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for
construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.
From the express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow living with the
deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under
18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether or not
actually dependent upon the deceased, are considered dependents.
Claimant here is clearly the widow of the deceased Conrado Macabenta. It is true that the
marriage took... place after the fatal accident but there was no question that at the time of
his death she was married to him. She, therefore, comes entirely within the letter of the
law. Nor can there be any doubt that the child, Raquel
Macabenta, also falls within the words the Act employs. As set forth in the decision, while
the marriage took place on Sept. 14, 1961, the widow and the deceased had already been
living together as husband and wife the preceding three... months. The child born, of such
relationship, later legalized, is, as made clear in the decision, the posthumous daughter of
the deceased. What the employer Davao Stevedore Terminal Company seems bent on
ignoring is that our Civil Code, in no uncertain terms, considers a conceived child born for
all purposes that are favorable to her provided the birth is attended with the conditions
specified, namely, that she is alive at the time she is completely delivered from the
mother's... womb. [4] Here, fortunately, the child has survived the ordeal of the loss of the
one called upon to support her, her father, who, unfortunately however, met his death
before her birth.

United States vs Hart

GR No. L-8848, November 21, 1913

Trent, J.

Facts:
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were found guilty on a charge of vagrancy under
the provisions of Act No. 519. All three appealed and presented evidence showing that each
of the defendants was earning a living at a lawful trade or business sufficient enough to
support themselves. However, the Attorney-General defended his clients by arguing that in
Section 1 of Act No. 519, the phrase “no visible means of support” only applies to the clause
“tramping or straying through the country” and not the first clause which states that “every
person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses,” thus making the
3 appellants guilty of vagrancy. He further argued that it been intended for “without visible
means of support” to qualify the first part of the clause, either the comma after gambling
houses would have been omitted, or else a comma after country would have been inserted.

Issue:
Whether or not Hart, Miller and Natividad are guilty of vagrancy under the Attorney-General’s
argument based on a mere grammatical criticism.

Held:
An argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive and the effect intended by the
Legislature should be the relevant determinant of the interpretation of the law. When the
meaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the courts to ascertain, if
possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that construction of the statute which will
give it effect. Moreover, ascertaining the consequences flowing from such a construction of
the law is also helpful in determining the soundness of the reasoning. Considering that the
argument of the Attorney-General would suggest a lack of logical classification on the part of
the legislature of the various classes of vagrants and since it was proven that all three of the
defendants were earning a living by legitimate means at a level of comfort higher than usual,
Hart, Miller and Natividad were acquitted, with the costs de oficio.

Morales vs Subido
GR No. L-26958, November 29, 1968
 Castro, J.

Facts:
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three
years but does not possess a bachelor’s degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau
of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his
career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the
resignation of the former Chief, Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila
and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor
of Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service, approved the designation of
Morales as acting chief but rejected his appointment for “failure to meet the minimum
educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position.” Instead,
Subido certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the
Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be
appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized
institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or
has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein
for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed
Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher. Nowhere in the above
provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police department of a city …”
can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being
deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following: No person may be
appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has served
either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or
police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for
at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a
city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of
captain and/or higher. Morales argued that the above version was the one which was
actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee
the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase “or has served as
chief of police with exemplary record.” Morales went on to support his case by producing
copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed
by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of
the then bill being deliberated upon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the
journals, to look searchingly into the matter.

HELD:
No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the
Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in
slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover
what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands
that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to
as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the
unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in
the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative
process. The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals
must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution
expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity
of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal,
is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the
case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to
matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the
event of any discrepancy.
 Astorga vs Villegas
GR No. L-23475 April 30, 1974

Makalintal, C.J.

FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate. Senator
Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The
House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the
presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill. The President also signed
it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the
enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not
embody the amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate
President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid.
Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is
conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.

HELD:
Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein,
the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a
law. The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of
having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bill’s due enactment,
the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such. “Where the journal
discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare
that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law.”

Sps. Romualdez vs Comelec

GR No. L-167011, April 30, 2008

Chico-Nazario, J.

Facts:
Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against Sps. Romualdez for violation of the OEC and
RA 8189 or Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 for making false information as to their
residence in their applications as new voters in Burauen, Leyte.

The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted

by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against
petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.

Sps. Romualdez contend that they intend to reside in Burauen, Leyte since 1989. On May
2000, they took actual residence in Burauen by leasing for 5 years the house of Renomeron.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted
by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against
petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.

Issue:
WON due process was violated.

Held:
No.
First, the Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched in
a language which embraces the allegations necessary to support the charge for violation of
Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189.
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the election
offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely different from those for
which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the first
place, there appears to be no incongruity between the charges as contained in the
Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the
denomination by private respondent of the alleged violations to be covered by Section
261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic
Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC against
petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on the same set of facts
as originally alleged in the private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.
In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined
by the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence presented by
the parties at the trial. Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of
law, but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information.

Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due process
because, as we have said, the charges contained in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit
and the charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based on the same set of facts.
In fact, the nature of the criminal charges in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and
that of the charges contained in the Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant to the
COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such that, petitioners cannot claim that they
were not able to refute or submit documentary evidence against the charges that the
COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due process because they were
granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in private respondent’s Complaint-
Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint
Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They
similarly filed a Memorandum before the said body. Finding that due process was not
dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with the stance of the
Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably apprised of the nature and
description of the charges against them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary
investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint and of
the evidence submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to adduce
controverting evidence for their defense. In all these stages, petitioners actively
participated.

Tanada vs Tuvera
136 SCRA 27 April 24, 1985

Escolin, J.

FACTS:
Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern
as recognized by the 1973 constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders
is necessary before its enforcement.

RULING:
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided ” The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day
following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into
effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability”
is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or
penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only
to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need
not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

Bagatsing v. Ramirez Case Digest

G.R. No. L-41631, December 17, 1976

Martin, J.

FACTS:
The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, “An Ordinance Regulating the
Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing Fees for the Rentals of Stalls and Providing
Penalties for Violation thereof and for other Purposes.” Respondent were seeking the
declaration of nullity of the Ordinance for the reason that a) the publication requirement
under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with, b) the Market
Committee was not given any participation in the enactment, c) Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated, and d) the ordinance would violate P.D. 7
prescribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products.

ISSUE:
What law shall govern the publication of tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board
of Manila, the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code.

HELD:
The fact that one is a special law and the other a general law creates the presumption that
the special law is to be considered an exception to the general. The Revised Charter of
Manila speaks of “ordinance” in general whereas the Local Tax Code relates to “ordinances
levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges” in particular. In regard therefore, the Local
Tax Code controls.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

267 SCRA 408, February 3, 1997

Belosillo, J.

Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation
No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding
held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the
execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered
by Renong Berhad.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by
respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on
prohibition and mandamus.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and
submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has
practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage
and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the
nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full
potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the
national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries
with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a
government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS
being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.

Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the
Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void.

Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to
be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played
and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century
Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First
Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call
of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will
continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that
GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share
and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as
may be necessary for purpose.

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from
selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to
accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.

According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph,
Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is
complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The
Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as
mandated by the provision in question.

The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said
hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and
controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the
nation’s cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be
interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not
prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the
absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing
the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and
that the foreigners are qualified, too