ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V.

PALANG and
HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 24199 entitled Erlinda Agapay v. Carlina (Cornelia) Palang and Herminia P. Dela
Cruz dated June 22, 1994 involving the ownership of two parcels of land acquired during
the cohabitation of petitioner and private respondents legitimate spouse.
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 when he took private
respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic
Church in Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding, in October 1949, he left to work
in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlinas only child, Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950.
Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the Philippines was in 1964 and
during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother,
not in Pangasinan with his wife and child. The trial court found evidence that as early as
1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in
[1]

1972, he refused to live with private respondents, but stayed alone in a house in
Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.
On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second
marriage with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. Two months earlier,
[2]

on May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale, jointly purchased
a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan with an area of
10,080 square meters. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101736 covering
said rice land was issued in their names.
A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September 23,
1975, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. TCT No. 143120 covering said property
was later issued in her name.
On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as
a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties
[3]

therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their
only child, Herminia Palang.[4]

Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on

December 6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon
Carlinas complaint. Two years later, on February 15, 1981, Miguel died.
[5]

On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz,
herein private respondents, instituted the case at bar, an action for recovery of ownership
and possession with damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan (Civil Case No. U-4265). Private respondents sought to get back
the riceland and the house and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly
purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.
 Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the riceland covered by TCT
No. 101736 is registered in their names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already given her
half of the property to their son Kristopher Palang. She added that the house and lot
covered by TCT No. 143120 is her sole property, having bought the same with her own
money.Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded from claiming aforesaid properties since
the latter had already donated their conjugal estate to Herminia.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision on June 30, 1989
dismissing the complaint after declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the
subject properties pertained to the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel Palang. The
lower court went on to provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of
Kristopher Palang, Miguels illegitimate son. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered-

1) Dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiffs;

2) Confirming the ownership of defendant Erlinda Agapay of the residential lot located at
Poblacion, Binalonan, Pangasinan, as evidenced by TCT No. 143120, Lot 290-B
including the old house standing therein;

3) Confirming the ownership of one-half (1/2) portion of that piece of agricultural land
situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, consisting of 10,080 square
meters and as evidenced by TCT No. 101736, Lot 1123-A to Erlinda Agapay;

4) Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance from his deceased father, Miguel
Palang, the one-half (1/2) of the agricultural land situated at Balisa, San Felipe,
Binalonan, Pangasinan, under TCT No. 101736 in the name of Miguel Palang, provided
that the former (Kristopher) executes, within 15 days after this decision becomes final
and executory, a quit-claim forever renouncing any claims to annul/reduce the donation
to Herminia Palang de la Cruz of all conjugal properties of her parents, Miguel Palang
and Carlina Vallesterol Palang, dated October 30, 1975, otherwise, the estate of
deceased Miguel Palang will have to be settled in another separate action;

5) No pronouncement as to damages and attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED. [6]

On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial courts decision. The Court of Appeals
rendered its decision on July 22, 1994 with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision is hereby

REVERSED and another one entered:

1. Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owners of the properties in question;

2. Ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and deliver the properties in question to
herein plaintiffs-appellants;

3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title

Nos. 143120 and 101736 and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of title in the
name of plaintiffs-appellants.

No pronouncement as to costs. [7]

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the validity of two
deeds of absolute sale covering the riceland and the house and lot, the first in favor of
Miguel Palang and Erlinda Agapay and the second, in favor of Erlinda Agapay alone.
Second, petitioner contends that respondent appellate court erred in not declaring
Kristopher A. Palang as Miguel Palangs illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit from
Miguels estate. Third, respondent court erred, according to petitioner, in not finding that
there is sufficient pleading and evidence that Kristoffer A. Palang or Christopher A. Palang
should be considered as party-defendant in Civil Case No. U-4625 before the trial court
and in CA-G.R. No. 24199. [8]

After studying the merits of the instant case, as well as the pertinent provisions of law
and jurisprudence, the Court denies the petition and affirms the questioned decision of
the Court of Appeals.
The first and principal issue is the ownership of the two pieces of property subject of
this action. Petitioner assails the validity of the deeds of conveyance over the same
parcels of land. There is no dispute that the transfers of ownership from the original
owners of the riceland and the house and lot, Corazon Ilomin and the spouses Cespedes,
respectively, were valid.
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and
Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing
for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry
each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July
15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina
was still susbsisting and unaffected by the latters de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual
contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts
in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions
to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or
industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership
and no presumption of equal shares. [9]
 In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in
the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that she
[10]

actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the
date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and
Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S.
Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she
contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, there[11]

being no proof of the same.

Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and
Erlinda actually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was
intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof
of the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been
adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased even before they
started living together. In any case, even assuming that the subject property was bought
before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual
contribution would still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of
the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with
Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court
of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private
respondent Carlina Palang.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their
conjugal property in favor of their daughter Herminia in 1975. The trial court erred in
holding that the decision adopting their compromise agreement in effect partakes the
nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of property between spouses and the
termination of the conjugal partnership. Separation of property between spouses during
[12]

the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment
when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment which
[13]

resulted from the parties compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of
property and should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00
on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary
public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of
this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for
the purchase price and directed that Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee. [14]

The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which
was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between
persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of
the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the
prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the
[15]

condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union. [16]
 The second issue concerning Kristopher Palangs status and claim as an illegitimate
son and heir to Miguels estate is here resolved in favor of respondent courts correct
assessment that the trial court erred in making pronouncements regarding Kristophers
heirship and filiation inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof
of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and
claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding
instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action
which is for recovery of ownership and possession. [17]

As regards the third issue, petitioner contends that Kristopher Palang should be
considered as party-defendant in the case at bar following the trial courts decision which
expressly found that Kristopher had not been impleaded as party defendant but theorized
that he had submitted to the courts jurisdiction through his mother/guardian ad litem. The
[18]

trial court erred gravely. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was, therefore, not a
party to the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he
was not involved in the case at bar. Petitioner adds that there is no need for Kristopher to
file another action to prove that he is the illegitimate son of Miguel, in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits. Petitioners grave error has been discussed in the preceeding
[19]

paragraph where the need for probate proceedings to resolve the settlement of Miguels
estate and Kristophers successional rights has been pointed out.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., petitioner, vs. MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO, respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.: batas

This is a petition for review of the amended decision of the Court of Appeals dated May
[1]

7, 1998 in CA G.R. CV No. 48443 granting respondents motion for reconsideration of its
decision dated November 7, 1996, and of the resolution dated December 21, 1998
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition
[2]

and/or Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages" against respondent

Ma. Elvira Castillo. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-656 at the Regional
Trial Court in Makati City, alleged that petitioner and respondent, both married and with
children, but separated from their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship
sometime in 1979 while their respective marriages still subsisted. During their union,
they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as
president and chairman of the board of directors, and respondent as vice-president and
treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner and respondent acquired real and
personal properties which were registered solely in respondents name. In 1992, due to
irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitioner demanded from respondent
his share in the subject properties, but respondent refused alleging that said properties
had been registered solely in her name.

In her Amended Answer, respondent admitted that she engaged in the customs
[3]

brokerage business with petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight Customs Brokerage
Corporation was organized with other individuals and duly registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission in 1987. She denied that she and petitioner lived as
husband and wife because the fact was that they were still legally married to their
respective spouses. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real and personal
properties involved in petitioners action for partition on the ground that they were
acquired entirely out of her own money and registered solely in her name.

On November 25, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, in [4]

accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Court. She contended that summary judgment
[5]

was proper, because the issues raised in the pleadings were sham and not genuine, to
wit: CODES

A.

The main issue is -- Can plaintiff validly claim the partition and/or
payment of co-ownership share, accounting and damages,
considering that plaintiff and defendant are admittedly both married
 to their respective spouses under still valid and subsisting
marriages, even assuming as claimed by plaintiff, that they lived together
as husband and wife without benefit of marriage? In other words, can the
parties be considered as co-owners of the properties, under the law,
considering the present status of the parties as both married and
incapable of marrying each other, even assuming that they lived together
as husband and wife (?)

B.

As a collateral issue, can the plaintiff be considered as an

unregistered co-owner of the real properties under the Transfer
Certificates of Title duly registered solely in the name of defendant
Ma. Elvira Castillo? This issue is also true as far as the motor vehicles in
question are concerned which are also registered in the name of
defendant. [6]

On the first point, respondent contended that even if she and petitioner actually
cohabited, petitioner could not validly claim a part of the subject real and personal
properties because Art. 144 of the Civil Code, which provides that the rules on co-
ownership shall govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together
as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which is void ab initio, applies
only if the parties are not in any way incapacitated to contract marriage. In the parties
[7]

case, their union suffered the legal impediment of a prior subsisting marriage. Thus, the
question of fact being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether they lived together as husband
and wife, was irrelevant as no co-ownership could exist between them.

As to the second issue, respondent maintained that petitioner can not be considered an
unregistered co-owner of the subject properties on the ground that, since titles to the
land are solely in her name, to grant petitioners prayer would be to allow a collateral
attack on the validity of such titles.

Petitioner opposed respondents Motion for Summary Judgment. He contended that the
[8]

case presented genuine factual issues and that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been
repealed by the Family Code which now allows, under Art. 148, a limited co-ownership
even though a man and a woman living together are not capacitated to marry each
other. Petitioner also asserted that an implied trust was constituted when he and
respondent agreed to register the properties solely in the latters name although the
same were acquired out of the profits made from their brokerage business. Petitioner
invoked the following provisions of the Civil Code: yacats

Art. 1452. If two or more persons agree to purchase property and by

common consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the
benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in
proportion to the interest of each.
 Art. 1453. When the property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his
declared intention to hold it for, or transfer it to another grantor, there is an
implied trust in favor of the person whose benefit is contemplated.

On January 30, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision granting respondents motion
[9]

for summary judgment. It ruled that an examination of the pleadings shows that the
issues involved were purely legal. The trial court also sustained respondents contention
that petitioners action for partition amounted to a collateral attack on the validity of the
certificates of title covering the subject properties. It held that even if the parties really
had cohabited, the action for partition could not be allowed because an action for
partition among co-owners ceases to be so and becomes one for title if the defendant,
as in the present case, alleges exclusive ownership of the properties in question. For
these reasons, the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 93-656.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals on November 7, 1996, ordered the case remanded to
the court of origin for trial on the merits. It cited the decision in Roque v. Intermediate
Appellate Court to the effect that an action for partition is at once an action for
[10]

declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate

portion of the properties involved. If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the
property, the action for partition should not be dismissed. Rather, the court should
resolve the case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-
owner, the court should dismiss the action, not because the wrong remedy was availed
of, but because no basis exists for requiring the defendant to submit to partition.
Resolving the issue whether petitioners action for partition was a collateral attack on the
validity of the certificates of title, the Court of Appeals held that since petitioner sought
to compel respondent to execute documents necessary to effect transfer of what he
claimed was his share, petitioner was not actually attacking the validity of the titles but
in fact, recognized their validity. Finally, the appellate court upheld petitioners position
that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been repealed by Art. 148 of the Family Code. haideem

Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. On May
7, 1998, nearly two years after its first decision, the Court of Appeals granted
respondents motion and reconsidered its prior decision. In its decision now challenged
in the present petition, it held

Prefatorily, and to better clarify the controversy on whether this suit is a

collateral attack on the titles in issue, it must be underscored that plaintiff-
appellant alleged in his complaint that all the nine (9) titles are registered
in the name of defendant-appellee, Ma. Elvira T. Castillo, except one
which appears in the name of Eloisa Castillo (see par. 9,
Complaint). However, a verification of the annexes of such initiatory
pleading shows some discrepancies, to wit:

1. TCT No. 149046 (Annex A) =.Elvira T. Castillo, single

2. TCT No. 168208 ( Annex B) =..........-do-

 3. TCT No. 37046 (Annex C) =..........-do-

4. TCT No. 37047 (Annex D) = ..... ...-do-

5. TCT No. 37048 (Annex E) =..........-do-

6. TCT No. 30368 (Annex F) =.Steelhaus Realty & Dev. Corp.

7. TCT No. 30369 (Annex G) =..........-do-

8. TCT No. 30371 (Annex F) =..........-do-

9.TCT No. (92323) 67881

(Annex I) = Eloisa Castillo

hustisya

In this action, plaintiff-appellant seeks to be declared as 1/2 co-owner of

the real properties covered by the above listed titles and eventually for
their partition [par. (a), Prayer; p. 4 Records]. Notably, in order to achieve
such prayer for a joint co-ownership declaration, it is unavoidable that the
individual titles involved be altered, changed, canceled or modified to
include therein the name of the appellee as a registered 1/2 co-owner.
Yet, no cause of action or even a prayer is contained in the complaint
filed. Manifestly, absent any cause or prayer for the alteration,
cancellation, modification or changing of the titles involved, the desired
declaration of co-ownership and eventual partition will utterly be an
indirect or collateral attack on the subject titles in this suit.

It is here that We fell into error, such that, if not rectified will surely lead to
a procedural lapse and a possible injustice. Well settled is the rule that a
certificate of title cannot be altered, modified or canceled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law. Jksm

In this jurisdiction, the remedy of the landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another name is, after one year
from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but respecting it
as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an action for
reconveyance or, if the property had passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, for damages. Verily, plaintiff-appellant should have
first pursued such remedy or any other relief directly attacking the subject
titles before instituting the present partition suit. Apropos, the case at
bench appears to have been prematurely filed.

Lastly, to grant the partition prayed for by the appellant will in effect rule
and decide against the properties registered in the names of Steelhouse
Realty and Development Corporation and Eloisa Castillo, who are not
 parties in the case. To allow this to happen will surely result to injustice
and denial of due process of law. . . . [11]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the Court of Appeals
in its resolution dated December 21, 1998. Hence this petition.

Petitioner contends that: (1) the Court of Appeals, in its first decision of November 7,
1996, was correct in applying the Roque ruling and in rejecting respondents claim that
she was the sole owner of the subject properties and that the partition suit was a
collateral attack on the titles; (2) the Court of Appeals correctly ruled in its first decision
that Art. 148 of the Family Code governs the co-ownership between the parties, hence,
the complaint for partition is proper; (3) with respect to the properties registered in the
name of Steelhouse Realty, respondent admitted ownership thereof and, at the very
least, these properties could simply be excluded and the partition limited to the
remaining real and personal properties; and (4) the Court of Appeals erred in not
holding that under the Civil Code, there is an implied trust in his favor. [12]

The issue in this case is really whether summary judgment, in accordance with Rule 35
of the Rules of Court, is proper. We rule in the negative.

First. Rule 35, 3 of the Rules of Court provides that summary judgment is proper only
when, based on the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, and after summary
hearing, it is shown that except as to the amount of damages, there is no veritable issue
regarding any material fact in the action and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, i.e., an issue
[13]

of fact the resolution of which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished
from an issue which is sham, fictitious, contrived, set-up in bad faith, or patently
unsubstantial, summary judgment is not proper. Chiefx
[14]

In the present case, we are convinced that genuine issues exist. Petitioner anchors his
claim of co-ownership on two factual grounds: first, that said properties were acquired
by him and respondent during their union from 1979 to 1992 from profits derived from
their brokerage business; and second, that said properties were registered solely in
respondents name only because they agreed to that arrangement, thereby giving rise to
an implied trust in accordance with Art. 1452 and Art. 1453 of the Civil Code. These
allegations are denied by respondent. She denies that she and petitioner lived together
as husband and wife. She also claims that the properties in question were acquired
solely by her with her own money and resources. With such conflicting positions, the
only way to ascertain the truth is obviously through the presentation of evidence by the
parties.

The trial court ruled that it is immaterial whether the parties actually lived together as
husband and wife because Art. 144 of the Civil Code can not be made to apply to them
as they were both incapacitated to marry each other. Hence, it was impossible for a co-
ownership to exist between them.
We disagree.

Art. 144 of the Civil Code provides:

When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

This provision of the Civil Code, applies only to cases in which a man and a woman live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage provided they are not
incapacitated or are without impediment to marry each other, or in which the marriage
[15]

is void ab initio, provided it is not bigamous. Art. 144, therefore, does not cover parties
living in an adulterous relationship. However, Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides
for a limited co-ownership in cases where the parties in union are incapacitated to marry
each other. It states:

In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding article, only the
[16]

properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint

contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of credits. HTML

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties
are in bad faith.

It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case were not
capacitated to marry each other at the time that they were alleged to have been living
together, they could not have owned properties in common. The Family Code, in
addition to providing that a co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides that, if
the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through
their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership eventhough the couple
are not capacitated to marry each other.
In this case, there may be a co-ownership between the parties herein. Consequently,
whether petitioner and respondent cohabited and whether the properties involved in the
case are part of the alleged co-ownership are genuine and material. All but one of the
properties involved were alleged to have been acquired after the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988. With respect to the property acquired before the Family Code
took effect if it is shown that it was really acquired under the regime of the Civil Code,
then it should be excluded.

Petitioner also alleged in paragraph 7 of his complaint that:

Due to the effective management, hardwork and enterprise of plaintiff

assisted by defendant, their customs brokerage business grew and out of
the profits therefrom, the parties acquired real and personal properties
which were, upon agreement of the parties, listed and registered in
defendants name with plaintiff as the unregistered co-owner of all said
properties. Esmsc
[17]

On the basis of this, he contends that an implied trust existed pursuant to Art. 1452 of
the Civil Code which provides that "(I)f two or more persons agree to purchase property
and by common consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the
benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in proportion to the
interest of each." We do not think this is correct. The legal relation of the parties is
already specifically covered by Art. 148 of the Family Code under which all the
properties acquired by the parties out of their actual joint contributions of money,
property or industry shall constitute a co-ownership. Co-ownership is a form of trust and
every co-owner is a trustee for the other. The provisions of Art. 1452 and Art. 1453 of
[18]

the Civil Code, then are no longer material since a trust relation already inheres in a co-
ownership which is governed under Title III, Book II of the Civil Code.

Second. The trial court likewise dismissed petitioners action on the ground that the
same amounted to a collateral attack on the certificates of title involved. As already
noted, at first, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners action does not challenge the
validity of respondents titles. However, on reconsideration, it reversed itself and affirmed
the trial court. It noted that petitioners complaint failed to include a prayer for the
alteration, cancellation, modification, or changing of the titles involved. Absent such
prayer, the appellate court ruled that a declaration of co-ownership and eventual
partition would involve an indirect or collateral attack on the titles. We disagree.

A torrens title, as a rule, is conclusive and indefeasible. Proceeding from this, P.D. No.
1529, 48 provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and
[19]

can not be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding. When is an

action an attack on a title? It is when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify
the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The
attack is direct when the object of an action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such
judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or
collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof. [20]

In his complaint for partition, consistent with our ruling in Roque regarding the nature of
an action for partition, petitioner seeks first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the
subject properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. He does not attack
respondents titles. Petitioner alleges no fraud, mistake, or any other irregularity that
would justify a review of the registration decree in respondents favor. His theory is that
although the subject properties were registered solely in respondents name, but since
by agreement between them as well as under the Family Code, he is co-owner of these
properties and as such is entitled to the conveyance of his shares. On the premise that
he is a co-owner, he can validly seek the partition of the properties in co-ownership and
the conveyance to him of his share. Esmmis

Thus, in Guevara v. Guevara, in which a parcel of land bequeathed in a last will and
[21]

testament was registered in the name of only one of the heirs, with the understanding
that he would deliver to the others their shares after the debts of the original owner had
been paid, this Court ruled that notwithstanding the registration of the land in the name
of only one of the heirs, the other heirs can claim their shares in "such action, judicial or
extrajudicial, as may be necessary to partition the estate of the testator."[22]

Third. The Court of Appeals also reversed its first decision on the ground that to order
partition will, in effect, rule and decide against Steelhouse Realty Development
Corporation and Eloisa Castillo, both strangers to the present case, as to the properties
registered in their names. This reasoning, however, ignores the fact that the majority of
the properties involved in the present case are registered in respondents name, over
which petitioner claims rights as a co-owner. Besides, other than the real properties,
petitioner also seeks partition of a substantial amount of personal properties consisting
of motor vehicles and several pieces of jewelry. By dismissing petitioners complaint for
partition on grounds of due process and equity, the appellate court unwittingly denied
petitioner his right to prove ownership over the claimed real and personal properties.
The dismissal of petitioners complaint is unjustified since both ends may be amply
served by simply excluding from the action for partition the properties registered in the
name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo.

WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 7, 1998, is
REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59,
Makati City for further proceedings on the merits.

SO ORDERED.
JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE and GINA S.
REY, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who
are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to
their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. [1]

Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her
[2]

husband, when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in July
1987. After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit as husband and wife in a house
[3]

built on a lot owned by Jacintos father. Their cohabitation was not blessed with any
[4]

children.Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel Saguid Brothers. Gina,
[5]

on the other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan
from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship with Jacintos relatives turned sour. Her periodic
absence, however, did not ebb away the conflict with petitioners relatives. In 1996, the
couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation. [6]

On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery
of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court
of Boac, Marinduque. She alleged that from her salary of $1,500.00 a month as
entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their
unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was
able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects,
with a total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of
these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her
contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.
Private respondent testified that she deposited part of her earnings in her savings
account with First Allied Development Bank. Her Pass Book shows that as of May 23,
[7]

1995, she had a balance of P21,046.08. She further stated that she had a total of
[8]

P35,465.00 share in the joint account deposit which she and the petitioner maintained
[9]

with the same bank. Gina declared that said deposits were spent for the purchase of
[10]

construction materials, appliances and other personal properties. [11]

In his answer to the complaint, petitioner claimed that the expenses for the
[12]

construction of their house were defrayed solely from his income as a captain of their
fishing vessel. He averred that private respondents meager income as fish dealer
rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of said house. Besides, selling fish
was a mere pastime to her; as such, she was contented with the small quantity of fish
allotted to her from his fishing trips. Petitioner further contended that Gina did not work
continuously in Japan from 1992 to 1994, but only for a 6-month duration each year. When
their house was repaired and improved sometime in 1995-1996, private respondent did
not share in the expenses because her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily
needs and business of her parents. From his income in the fishing business, he claimed
to have saved a total of P130,000.00, P75,000.00 of which was placed in a joint account
deposit with private respondent. This savings, according to petitioner was spent in
purchasing the disputed personal properties.
On May 21, 1997, the trial court declared the petitioner as in default for failure to file
a pre-trial brief as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89. [13]

On May 26, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 21, 1997
[14]

order, which was denied on June 2, 1997, and private respondent was allowed to present
evidence ex parte. Petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration but the same was
[15]

also denied on October 8, 1997.

On July 15, 1998, a decision [16]
was rendered in favor of private respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff Gina S. Rey against defendant Jacinto Saguid:

a) Ordering the partition of the house identified as plaintiffs Exhibit C and D and
directing the defendant to return and/or reimburse to the plaintiff the amount of seventy
thousand pesos (P70,000,00) which the latter actually contributed to its construction
and completion;

b) Declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive owner of the personal properties listed on
Exhibit M;

c) Ordering the defendant, and/or anyone in possession of the aforesaid personal

properties, to return and/or deliver the same to the plaintiff; and

d) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages in the sum of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. [17]

On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; however, the award
of P50,000.00 as moral damages was deleted for lack of basis. The appellate court
[18]

ruled that the propriety of the order which declared the petitioner as in default became
moot and academic in view of the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It
explained that the new rules now require the filing of a pre-trial brief and the defendants
non-compliance therewith entitles the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.
Both parties filed motions for reconsideration which were denied; hence, petitioner
filed the instant petition based on the following assigned errors:
A.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
APPLYING RETROACTIVELY THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE
PRESENT CASE AND HOLDING THE FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR THEREIN MOOT
AND ACADEMIC THUS, FAILED TO RULE ON THE PROPRIETY OF THE TRIAL
COURTS REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF DEFAULT DUE TO MISTAKE
AND/OR EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY PETITIONER.

B.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

RELYING ON THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH RECEIVED
THE EVIDENCE OF HEREIN RESPONDENT ONLY EX PARTE. [19]

The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not the trial court erred in allowing private
respondent to present evidence ex parte; and (2) whether or not the trial courts decision
is supported by evidence.
Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the
defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-
trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render
judgment on the basis thereof. The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion for
[20]

reconsideration showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief was due to fraud, accident,
[21]

mistake or excusable neglect. The motion need not really stress the fact that the
[22]

defendant has a valid and meritorious defense because his answer which contains his
defenses is already on record. [23]

In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is justified
because he was not represented by counsel. This justification is not, however, sufficient
to set aside the order directing private respondent to present evidence ex parte, inasmuch
as the petitioner chose at his own risk not to be represented by counsel. Even without the
assistance of a lawyer, petitioner was able to file a motion for extension to file
answer, the required answer stating therein the special and affirmative defenses, and
[24] [25]

several other motions. If it were true that petitioner did not understand the import of the
[26]

April 23, 1997 order directing him to file a pre-trial brief, he could have inquired from the
court or filed a motion for extension of time to file the brief. Instead, he waited until May
26, 1997, or 14 days from his alleged receipt of the April 23, 1997 order before he filed a
motion asking the court to excuse his failure to file a brief. Pre-trial rules are not to be
belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a partys
substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed. [27]

In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a
persuasive reason to relax the application of the rules. There is nothing in the Constitution
which mandates that a party in a non-criminal proceeding be represented by counsel and
that the absence of such representation amounts to a denial of due process. The
assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession is not
engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members the
safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. [28]

However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, specifically, Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, rendered moot and academic the
issue of whether or not the plaintiff may be allowed to present evidence ex parte for failure
of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief. While the rules may indeed be applied
retroactively, the same is not called for in the case at bar. Even before the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure took effect on July 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was required under
Circular No. 1-89 which became effective on February 1, 1989. Pursuant to the said
circular, [f]ailure to file pre-trial briefs may be given the same effect as the failure to appear
at the pre-trial, that is, the party may be declared non-suited or considered as in default. [29]

Coming now to the substantive issue, it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were
not capacitated to marry each other because the former was validly married to another
man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages,
[30]

adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both

man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married
man.Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions ... Proof of actual contribution is
[31]

required.[32]

In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in
1987, which is before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998,
Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was
[33]

enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state
of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. [34]

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the
[35] [36]

issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and

an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners
therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is without basis because
they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of
the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that
[37]

the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution
in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined
by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must
be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys
own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. This applies with [38]

more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex
parte. The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the
defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in
the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the
facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the
[39]

burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. [40]

In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of
the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00
for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the
extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the
[41]

purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995 and December 23, 1995, in
the total amount of P11,413.00.
On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed
personal properties came partly from their joint account with First Allied Development
Bank. While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit,
there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares
therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of
the parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the
disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of
which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent to
one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the decision of the trial court which
granted the reliefs prayed for by private respondent. On the basis of the evidence
established, the extent of private respondents co-ownership over the disputed house is
only up to the amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution in the construction
thereof. Anent the personal properties, her participation therein should be limited only to
the amount of P55,687.50.
As regards the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as moral damages, the Court of
Appeals correctly deleted the same for lack of basis.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64166 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Private respondent Gina S.
Rey is declared co-owner of petitioner Jacinto Saguid in the controverted house to the
extent of P11,413.00 and personal properties to the extent of P55,687.50. Petitioner is
ordered to reimburse the amount of P67,100.50 to private respondent, failing which the
house shall be sold at public auction to satisfy private respondents claim.
SO ORDERED.
 Atienza vs De Castro

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari is the
Decision[1] dated April 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69797, as
reiterated in its Resolution[2] of September 16, 2005, reversing an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 61, in an action for Judicial Partition of
Real Property thereat commenced by the herein petitioner Lupo Atienza against
respondent Yolanda de Castro.
The facts:

Sometime in 1983, petitioner Lupo Atienza, then the President and General Manager of
Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired the services of
respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as accountant for the two corporations.

In the course of time, the relationship between Lupo and Yolanda became
intimate. Despite Lupo being a married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived together in
consortium beginning the later part of 1983. Out of their union, two children were born.
However, after the birth of their second child, their relationship turned sour until they
parted ways.

On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint against Yolanda for
the judicial partition between them of a parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-
Air Subdivision, Makati City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 147828 of the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City. In his complaint, docketed in said court as Civil Case
No. 92-1423, Lupo alleged that the subject property was acquired during his union with
Yolanda as common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by them.

Elaborating, Lupo averred in his complaint that the property in question was acquired by
Yolanda sometime in 1987 using his exclusive funds and that the title thereto was
transferred by the seller in Yolandas name without his knowledge and consent. He did
not interpose any objection thereto because at the time, their affair was still thriving. It
was only after their separation and his receipt of information that Yolanda allowed her
new live-in partner to live in the disputed property, when he demanded his share thereat
as a co-owner.
In her answer, Yolanda denied Lupos allegations. According to her, she acquired the
same property for Two Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,600,000.00) using her
exclusive funds. She insisted having bought it thru her own savings and earnings as a
businesswoman.

In a decision[3] dated December 11, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment for Lupo by
declaring the contested property as owned in common by him and Yolanda and ordering
its partition between the two in equal shares, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 147828 of the Registry of Deeds
of Makati City to be owned in common by plaintiff LUPO ATIENZA and the
defendant YOLANDA U. DE CASTRO share-and-share alike and ordering
the partition of said property between them. Upon the finality of this
Decision, the parties are hereby directed to submit for the confirmation of
the Court a mutually agreed project of partition of said property or, in case
the physical partition of said property is not feasible because of its nature,
that either the same be assigned to one of the parties who shall pay the
value corresponding to the share of the other or that the property to be sold
and the proceeds thereof be divided equally between the parties after
deducting the expenses incident to said sale.

The parties shall bear their own attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.

Costs against the defendant.

SO ORDERED.

From the decision of the trial court, Yolanda went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No.
69797, therein arguing that the evidence on record preponderate that she purchased the
disputed property in her own name with her own money. She maintained that the
documents appertaining to her acquisition thereof are the best evidence to prove who
actually bought it, and refuted the findings of the trial court, as well as Lupos assertions
casting doubt as to her financial capacity to acquire the disputed property.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate court, in its decision[4] of April 29,
2005, reversed and set aside that of the trial court and adjudged the litigated property as
exclusively owned by Yolanda, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed decision is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The subject property is hereby
 declared to be exclusively owned by defendant-appellant Yolanda U. De
Castro. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

In decreeing the disputed property as exclusively owned by Yolanda, the CA ruled that
under the provisions of Article 148 of the Family Code vis--vis the evidence on record and
attending circumstances, Yolandas claim of sole ownership is meritorious, as it has been
substantiated by competent evidence. To the CA, Lupo failed to overcome the burden of
proving his allegation that the subject property was purchased by Yolanda thru his
exclusive funds.

With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its Resolution
of September 16, 2005,[5] Lupo is now with this Court via the present recourse arguing
that pursuant to Article 144[6] of the Civil Code, he was in no way burdened to prove that
he contributed to the acquisition of the subject property because with or without the
contribution by either partner, he is deemed a co-owner thereof, adding that under Article
484[7] of Civil Code, as long as the property wasacquired by either or both of them during
their extramarital union, such property would be legally owned by them in common and
governed by the rules on co-ownership, which apply in default of contracts, or special
provisions.

We DENY.

It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because
petitioner Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his
cohabitation with the respondent. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Article
148[8] of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships,
relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are
married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this
regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions ...[9] Proof of actual contribution is required.[10]
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who
are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to
their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.[11]

Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way
before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies
because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code.[12] Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision
governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or
concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.[13]

The applicable law being settled, we now remind the petitioner that here, as in other civil
cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or
the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. The petitioner as plaintiff below is
not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some
measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts
proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.[14] Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the
burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.[15]

It is the petitioners posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to acquire
the property in question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2)
corporations to raise the amount needed therefor. Unfortunately for petitioner, his
submissions are burdened by the fact that his claim to the property contradicts duly written
instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell dated March 24, 1987, the Deed of Assignment of
Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all
entered into by and between the respondent and the vendor of said property, to the
exclusion of the petitioner. As aptly pointed out by the CA:

Contrary to the disquisition of the trial court, [Lupo] failed to overcome this
burden. Perusing the records of the case, it is evident that the trial court
committed errors of judgment in its findings of fact and appreciation of
evidence with regard to the source of the funds used for the purchase of the
disputed property and ultimately the rightful owner thereof. Factual findings
of the trial court are indeed entitled to respect and shall not be disturbed,
 unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked or misinterpreted that would otherwise materially affect the
disposition of the case.

In making proof of his case, it is paramount that the best and most complete
evidence be formally entered. Rather than presenting proof of his actual
contribution to the purchase money used as consideration for the disputed
property, [Lupo] diverted the burden imposed upon him to [Yolanda] by
painting her as a shrewd and scheming woman without the capacity to
purchase any property. Instead of proving his ownership, or the extent
thereof, over the subject property, [Lupo] relegated his complaint to a mere
attack on the financial capacity of [Yolanda]. He presented documents
pertaining to the ins and outs of the dollar accounts of ENRICO and
EURASIAN, which unfortunately failed to prove his actual contribution in the
purchase of the said property. The fact that [Yolanda] had a limited access
to the funds of the said corporations and had repeatedly withdrawn money
from their bank accounts for their behalf do not prove that the money she
used in buying the disputed property, or any property for that matter, came
from said withdrawals.
As it is, the disquisition of the court a quo heavily rested on the apparent
financial capacity of the parties. On one side, there is [Lupo], a retired sea
captain and the President and General Manager of two corporations and on
the other is [Yolanda], a Certified Public Accountant. Surmising that [Lupo]
is financially well heeled than [Yolanda], the court a quo concluded, sans
evidence, that [Yolanda] had taken advantage of [Lupo]. Clearly, the court
a quo is in error. (Words in brackets supplied.)

As we see it, petitioners claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis
because not only did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof
but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof
redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say so and
voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance in this case, the
petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient
evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere
allegation is not evidence.

True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property covered thereby may be under co-
ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a
trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title. However, as already stated, petitioners evidence in support of his claim
is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial courts finding that the disputed
property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to petitioners
dismal failure to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to present preponderant
evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the
respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the
property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman
engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She presented her
clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also
presented her bank account statements and bank transactions, which reflect that she had
the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject property.

All told, the Court finds and so holds that the CA committed no reversible error in
rendering the herein challenged decision and resolution.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed issuances of the CA
are AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, Respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

What are the rights of an alien (and his successor-in-interest) who acquired real properties in the country
as against his former Filipina girlfriend in whose sole name the properties were registered under the
Torrens system?

The facts are as follows:

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983 after he was assigned by his employer,
Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company, to work at a project in Mindoro. In 1984, he
transferred to Cebu and worked at the Naga II Project of the National Power Corporation. There, he met
respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress
at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need of
additional income to support her children, respondent agreed. The tutorials were held in Antonietta’s
residence at a squatters’ area in Gorordo Avenue.

Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in a rented house in Hernan Cortes,
Mandaue City. Later, they transferred to their own house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision,
Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 19851 and March 10,
19862 covering the properties, Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 16, 19873 was likewise issued in their favor. However, when the Deed of
Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, registration was refused on
the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
Consequently, Jambrich’s name was erased from the document. But it could be noted that his signature
remained on the left hand margin of page 1, beside respondent’s signature as buyer on page 3, and at
the bottom of page 4 which is the last page. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 24790, 24791 and
24792 over the properties were issued in respondent’s name alone.

Jambrich also formally adopted respondent’s two sons in Sp. Proc. No. 39-MAN,4 and per Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City dated May 5, 1988.5

However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich
began to live with another woman in Danao City. Jambrich supported respondent’s sons for only two
months after the break up.

Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the real estate
business. He also built and repaired speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and
some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for about
₱150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to
petitioner for ₱250,000, as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment."6 On July 26, 1991, when
petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have been
transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged.

On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property before the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated November 18,
1985 and March 10, 1986 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 over the properties
which identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the parties
since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it
was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and
absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of
Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which Jambrich executed in his favor.

In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a single centavo of the purchase
price. On the contrary, she claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to
defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in question," and that Jambrich, being an alien,
was prohibited to acquire or own real property in the Philippines.

At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing her alleged financial capacity to buy the disputed
property with money from a supposed copra business. Petitioner, in turn, presented Jambrich as his
witness and documentary evidence showing the substantial salaries which Jambrich received while still
employed by the Austrian company, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.

In its decision, the court a quo found—

Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of the purchase and acquisition of [the] properties under
litigation that Wilhelm Jambrich was still working and earning much. This fact of Jambrich earning much is
not only supported by documentary evidence but also by the admission made by the defendant
Antoniet[t]a Opalla. So that, Jambrich’s financial capacity to acquire and purchase the properties . . . is
not disputed.7

xxx

On the other hand, evidence . . . clearly show that before defendant met Jambrich sometime in the latter
part of 1984, she was only working as a waitress at the St. Moritz Hotel with an income of ₱1,000.00 a
month and was . . . renting and living only in . . . [a] room at . . . [a] squatter area at Gorordo Ave., Cebu
City; that Jambrich took pity of her and the situation of her children that he offered her a better life which
she readily accepted. In fact, this miserable financial situation of hers and her two children . . . are all
stated and reflected in the Child Study Report dated April 20, 1983 (Exhs. "G" and "G-1") which facts she
supplied to the Social Worker who prepared the same when she was personally interviewed by her in
connection with the adoption of her two children by Wilhelm Jambrich. So that, if such facts were not true
because these are now denied by her . . . and if it was also true that during this time she was already
earning as much as ₱8,000.00 to ₱9,000.00 as profit per month from her copra business, it would be
highly unbelievable and impossible for her to be living only in such a miserable condition since it is the
observation of this Court that she is not only an extravagant but also an expensive person and not thrifty
as she wanted to impress this Court in order to have a big saving as clearly shown by her actuation when
she was already cohabiting and living with Jambrich that according to her . . . the allowance given . . . by
him in the amount of $500.00 a month is not enough to maintain the education and maintenance of her
children.8

This being the case, it is highly improbable and impossible that she could acquire the properties under
litigation or could contribute any amount for their acquisition which according to her is worth more than
₱700,000.00 when while she was working as [a] waitress at St. Moritz Hotel earning ₱1,000.00 a month
as salary and tips of more or less ₱2,000.00 she could not even provide [for] the daily needs of her family
so much so that it is safe to conclude that she was really in financial distress when she met and accepted
the offer of Jambrich to come and live with him because that was a big financial opportunity for her and
her children who were already abandoned by her husband.9

xxx
The only probable and possible reason why her name appeared and was included in [the contracts to sell
dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and finally, the deed of absolute sale dated November 16,
1987] as buyer is because as observed by the Court, she being a scheming and exploitive woman, she
has taken advantage of the goodness of Jambrich who at that time was still bewitched by her beauty,
sweetness, and good attitude shown by her to him since he could still very well provide for everything she
needs, he being earning (sic) much yet at that time. In fact, as observed by this Court, the acquisition of
these properties under litigation was at the time when their relationship was still going smoothly and
harmoniously.10 [Emphasis supplied.]

The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, . . . Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
Antoniet[t]a Opalla by:

1) Declaring plaintiff as the owner in fee simple over the residential house of strong materials and
three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5 which are covered by TCT Nos. 24790,
24791 and 24792 issued by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;

2) Declaring as null and void TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued in the name of defendant
Antoniet[t]a Descallar by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;

3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792
in the name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar and to issue new ones in the name of plaintiff
Camilo F. Borromeo;

4) Declaring the contracts now marked as Exhibits "I," "K" and "L" as avoided insofar as they
appear to convey rights and interests over the properties in question to the defendant Antoniet[t]a
Descallar;

5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱25,000.00 and
litigation expenses in the amount of ₱10,000.00; and,

6) To pay the costs.11

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated April 10, 2002,12 the appellate court
reversed the decision of the trial court. In ruling for the respondent, the Court of Appeals held:

We disagree with the lower court’s conclusion. The circumstances involved in the case cited by the lower
court and similar cases decided on by the Supreme Court which upheld the validity of the title of the
subsequent Filipino purchasers are absent in the case at bar. It should be noted that in said cases, the
title to the subject property has been issued in the name of the alien transferee (Godinez et al., vs. Fong
Pak Luen et al., 120 SCRA 223 citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phils. 461; United
Church Board for World Ministries vs. Sebastian, 159 SCRA 446, citing the case of Sarsosa Vda. De
Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547; Tejido vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78). In the case at bar, the title of
the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant. Thus,
Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title thereto.13

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this petition for review.

Petitioner assigns the following errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING
RESPONDENT’S JUDICIAL ADMISSION AND OTHER OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING
JAMBRICH’S PARTICIPATION, INTEREST AND OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION
AS FOUND BY THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JAMBRICH HAS
NO TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AND MAY NOT THEREFORE TRANSFER AND
ASSIGN ANY RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE WELL-
REASONED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND IN IMPOSING DOUBLE COSTS AGAINST
HEREIN PETITIONER (THEN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE).14

First, who purchased the subject properties?

The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court, who between respondent and Jambrich
possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the
properties in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich was gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an
Austrian company. He was earning an estimated monthly salary of ₱50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was
assigned to Syria for almost one year where his monthly salary was approximately ₱90,000.00.

On the other hand, respondent was employed as a waitress from 1984 to 1985 with a monthly salary of
not more than ₱1,000.00. In 1986, when the parcels of land were acquired, she was unemployed, as
admitted by her during the pre-trial conference. Her allegations of income from a copra business were
unsubstantiated. The supposed copra business was actually the business of her mother and their family,
with ten siblings. She has no license to sell copra, and had not filed any income tax return. All the
motorized bancas of her mother were lost to fire, and the last one left standing was already scrap.
Further, the Child Study Report15 submitted by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) in the adoption proceedings of respondent’s two sons by Jambrich disclosed that:

Antonietta tried all types of job to support the children until she was accepted as a waitress at St. Moritz
Restaurant in 1984. At first she had no problem with money because most of the customers of St. Moritz
are (sic) foreigners and they gave good tips but towards the end of 1984 there were no more foreigners
coming because of the situation in the Philippines at that time. Her financial problem started then. She
was even renting a small room in a squatters area in Gorordo Ave., Cebu City. It was during her time of
great financial distress that she met Wilhelm Jambrich who later offered her a decent place for herself
and her children.16

The DSWD Home Study Report17 further disclosed that:

[Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz when he saw Antonietta Descallar, one of the
waitresses of the said Restaurants. He made friends with the girl and asked her to tutor him in [the]
English language. Antonietta accepted the offer because she was in need of additional income to support
[her] 2 young children who were abandoned by their father. Their session was agreed to be scheduled
every afternoon at the residence of Antonietta in the squatters area in Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The
Austrian was observing the situation of the family particularly the children who were malnourished. After a
few months sessions, Mr. Jambrich offered to transfer the family into a decent place. He told Antonietta
that the place is not good for the children. Antonietta who was miserable and financially distressed at that
time accepted the offer for the sake of the children.18

Further, the following additional pieces of evidence point to Jambrich as the source of fund used to
purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house thereon:
 (1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath, during her re-direct examination and
during the proceedings for the adoption of her minor children, that Jambrich was the owner of the
properties in question, but that his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of
legal constraints. Nonetheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale, where he signed as
buyer.

(2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in installments was in postdated checks
issued by Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any account with any bank. Receipts of the
installment payments were also in the name of Jambrich and respondent.

(3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with Jambrich and her two children for ten months,
where she was completely under the support of Jambrich.

(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where he, as owner, bequeathed the subject
properties to respondent.

Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and participation over the subject
properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.

Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The findings of fact of the trial court are
accorded great weight and respect, if not finality by this Court, subject to a number of exceptions. In the
instant case, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. Even the appellate court
did not controvert the factual findings of the trial court. They differed only in their conclusions of law.

Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couple’s cohabitation also does not
help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each
other, does not apply.19 In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and
Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It
is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property
in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution
do not apply.20

Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties in the name of respondent alone. Having
found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is
the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent?

It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.21 It is only a means of confirming the
fact of its existence with notice to the world at large.22 Certificates of title are not a source of right. The
mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that
respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A
certificate of title implies that the title is quiet,23 and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible.24 However,
there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did
not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration.25 This is the situation in the instant case.
Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She had no income of
her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then fully supported by
Jambrich.

Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section 7,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,26 which is basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution,27 and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.28 The capacity to acquire private land
is dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Private land may be
transferred only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Only
Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the fundamental law explicitly
prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal
succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.29

Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to
Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich
conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries
v. Sebastian,30 the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases31 that if land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in
the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Applying
United Church Board for World Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, viz.:

[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation [were]
void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the
acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the
original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.

The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of petitioner and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs
in the name of respondent. It declared petitioner as owner in fee simple of the residential house of strong
materials and three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5, and ordered the Register of Deeds
of Mandaue City to issue new certificates of title in his name. The trial court likewise ordered respondent
to pay petitioner ₱25,000 as attorney’s fees and ₱10,000 as litigation expenses, as well as the costs of
suit.

We affirm the Regional Trial Court.

The rationale behind the Court’s ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in
subsequent cases,32 is this – since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation’s land for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who
became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the
property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more
public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino
hands has been achieved.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV
No. 42929 dated April 10, 2002 and its Resolution dated July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-1148 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-
LUNA,Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law.
Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted
as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be
enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.

The Case

The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the
1

decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati
City. The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a condominium
2

unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second marriage.

Antecedents

The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:

ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar,
Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife,
herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil
ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later
solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948.
In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal,
Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina
Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and
EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of
property, to which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION
AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and
to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the
Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo,
Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA
contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned
to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.

Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko
(LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development
Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St.,
Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for ₱1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for
36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas law office of LUPSICON.
After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983,
and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing the following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G.
Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA
CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA
and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E.
Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G.
Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"

Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners
but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the
interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter
established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office
condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office furniture
and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first
marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to his
father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz &
Associates.

The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books, office
furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of
ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case
No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of the
marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had no children,
SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾
pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate of
ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and testament; and thatthe heirs of
ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The
complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject properties;that the
same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of
SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer the subject
properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to
SOLEDAD. 3

Ruling of the RTC

On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned facts, disposing
4

thusly:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the
KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to
have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
 (b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence
the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with
respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";

(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit and
defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate arrangements have
been madefor transport and storage.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 5

Decision of the CA

Both parties appealed to the CA. 6

On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS
ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY
OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE
UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS
ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT AND LUNA;

V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF

THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT THE
NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE
FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE
APPLICABLE;

VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
 IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION
FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE. 7

In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE
LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID FOR
THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED
AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL. 8

On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision, holding and ruling:
9

EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997.
The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not terminate his
prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our
jurisdiction. x x x
10

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity,
Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:

(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW
LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761
consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby
adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna
while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still
subsisting and valid;

(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry
of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
Zaballero Luna";

(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first
marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
condominium unit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 11

On March 13, 2006, the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
12 13
 Issues

In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:

A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation and
Property Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their
conjugal partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;

B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic court’s
approval of the Agreement;

C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof
of actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the subjectcondominium unit; and

D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the subject
law books. 14

The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to the
25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).

The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should determine,
firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly
dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty.
Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the Court

We affirm the modified decision of the CA.

1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia

subsisted up to the time of his death

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on
September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which
adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that
Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule,
15

Philippine laws governed thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until
the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.

From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute
divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of
absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if either or both of
16

the spouses are residing abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws
17

have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages
have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the annulment of the marriage.

It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia. Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad,
18

did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his
death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an
inviolable social institution, and regards it as a special contract of permanent union between a man and
19

a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life. The non-recognition of absolute divorce in
20
the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among
Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the
death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on
marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be
given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.

2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement

was void for lack of court approval

The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement) that the
late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the divorce proceedings
before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible error in decreeing
otherwise.

The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.

Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time
of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not
entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil
Codeclearly so provides, to wit:

Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.

Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:

Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund
the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon
the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage.

The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of termination
enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled;

(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.

The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and liquidate
their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still required
under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of
property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.
(1432a)

Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed when
the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has
been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.

xxxx

The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the
conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to safeguard his interests.
Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.

After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The
provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable.
(1433a)

But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna and
Eugenia?

The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as an
incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for their
execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the action for divorce. With the
21

divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public
policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under
Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in
the lifetime of their marriage.

3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,

was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership

What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?

The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was
void for being bigamous, on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been
22

dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had
subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.

The Court concurs with the CA.

In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the
Civil Codeclearly states:

Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A bigamous marriage is considered void ab
23

initio.
24

Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its being
bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-
ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married,
ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact. To
1âwphi1

establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual
contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and
competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of
Appeals: 25

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership
ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively,
we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-
ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterousunion is without
basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of
the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted
property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of
coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or
the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence
and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed
to present evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law
1âwphi1

gives the defendantsome measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court isconvinced that the facts proven by the
plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mereallegation is not evidence. 26

The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase of the
condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least ₱306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions of
₱159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex Financing and Banco
Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30; and that such aggregate contributions of ₱306,572.00 corresponded to
27

almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit amounting to ₱362,264.00
of the unit’s purchase price of ₱1,449,056.00. The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid
28

for solely out of her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note; that 29

she had the financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not
acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.

Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?

In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s assertions on her actual contributions
through the following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds were
used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin this case – proof
that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply – as to
cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but
not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the
rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily applicable to many situations and thus it
created a void at first because it applied only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were
without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there still
exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This void
was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares
were prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution
was required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of
credit. If one of the parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to
the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith.
Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage
was an inviolable social institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held
by the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15
SCRA 355, thus:

xxxx

As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that
she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish that the four (4)
checks that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the
condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court, viz.:

"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on
January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7" was
signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of ₱97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was payable to
Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third check
which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of
Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for ₱4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the
foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the
subject condominium unit. The connection was simply not established. x x x"

SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of ₱100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is
no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the
trial court correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:

"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty. Luna,
together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as the
spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from
Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and his
partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"

The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES
LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium
unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration
does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase "married to" preceding
"Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no
participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she
had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law office amortization and for
the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who bought the law office space and
the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from
SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed. 30

The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were
substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo them.
Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof. Her
mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence, did not serve the purpose. In contrast, given
31

the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna
acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It should then be justly
concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of
his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.