Republic of the Philippines immediately thereafter, is the subject of Investigating Fiscal Alfredo Cantos, filed an the Kombi continued
do Cantos, filed an the Kombi continued to speed towards the C.M.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 74041 July 29, 1987
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO LIGON y TRIAS and FERNANDO
GABAT y ALMERA, accused,
FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused-
appellant.
YAP, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XX,
rendered on February 17, 1986, convicting the
accused-appellant, Fernando Gabat, of the crime
of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua. The victim was Jose
Rosales y Ortiz, a ,Seventeen-year old working
student who was earning his keep as a cigarette
vendor. He was allegedly robbed of Es cigarette
box containing cigarettes worth P300.00 more or
less.1
Only Fernando Gabat was arrested and brought
to trial and convicted. The other accused, Rogelio
Ligon, was never apprehended and is still at
large.
The fatal incident happened on a Sunday,
October 23, 1983 at about 6:10 p.m. The accused,
Fernando Gabat, was riding in a 1978
Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father, Antonio
Gabat, and driven by the other accused, Rogelio
Ligon. The Kombi was coming from Espana
Street going towards the direction of Quiapo.
Fernando Gabat was seated beside the driver, in
the front seat by the window on the right side of
the Kombi. At the intersection of Quezon
Boulevard and Lerma Street before turning left
towards the underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, the
Kombi had to stop as the traffic light was red.
While waiting for the traffic light to change,
Fernando Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor,
Jose Rosales y Ortiz (Rosales for short) to buy
some cigarettes from him. Rosales approached
the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of
cigarettes. While this transaction was occurring,
the traffic light changed to green, and the Kombi
driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved
forward. As to what precisely happened between
Gabat and Rosales at the crucial moment, and
conflicting versions by the prosecution and the
defense. It is not controverted, however, that as
the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo,
Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but
apparently lost his grip and fell down on the
pavement. Rosales was rushed by some
bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital,
where he was treated for multiple physical
injuries and was confined thereat until his death
on October 30, 1983.
Following close behind the Kombi at the time of
the incident was a taxicab driven by Prudencio
Castillo. He was behind the Kombi, at a distance
of about three meters, travelling on the same
lane in a slightly oblique position ("a little bit to
the right").2 As the Kombi did not stop after the
victim fell down on the pavement near the foot of
the underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped
towards Roxas Boulevard, beeping his horn to
make the driver stop. When they reached the
Luneta near the Rizal monument, Castillo saw an
owner-type jeep with two persons in it. He
sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi,
telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao."3 The two
men in the jeep joined the chase and at the
intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard,
Castillo was able to overtake the Kombi when
the traffic light turned red. He immediately
blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right
behind it. The two men on board the jeep turned
out to be police officers, Patrolmen Leonardo
Pugao and Peter Ignacio. They drew their guns
and told the driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his
companion, Fernando Gabat, to alight from the
Kombi. It was found out that there was a third
person inside the Kombi, a certain Rodolfo
Primicias who was sleeping at the rear seat.4 The
three were all brought by the police officers to
the Western Police District and turned over to
Pfc. Fernan Payuan. The taxicab driver,
Prudencio Castillo, also went along with them.
The written statements of Castillo and Rodolfo
Primicias were taken by the traffic investigator,
Pfc. Fernan Payuan.5 Payuan also prepared a
Traffic Accident Report, dated October 23,
1983.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias
were released early morning the following day,
but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over
to the City Fiscal's Office for further
investigation.
information in court against Rogelio Ligon dated
December 6, 1983 charging him with Homicide
thru Reckless Imprudence.7 Six months later,
however, or on June 28, 1984, Assistant Fiscal
Cantos filed another information against Rogelio
Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with
Homicide.8 He filed the latter information on the
basis of a Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio
Castillo9 and a joint affidavit of Armando Espino
and Romeo Castil, cigarette vendors, who
allegedly witnessed the incident on October 23,
1983.10 These affidavits were already prepared
and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on
January 17, 1984.
On October 31, 1983, an autopsy was conducted
by the medico-legal officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation, Dr. Orlando V. Salvador,
who stated in his autopsy report that the cause
of death of Rosales was "pneumonia hypostatic,
bilateral, secondary to traumatic injuries of the
head."11
The prosecution tried to establish, through the
sole testimony of the taxicab driver, Prudencio
Castillo, that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes
from Rosales and pried loose the latter's hand
from the window of the Kombi, resulting in the
latter falling down and hitting the pavement. In
its decision, the trial court summarized the
testimony of Castillo as follows: At about 6:00
o'clock in the evening of October 23, 1983,
Castillo was then driving his taxicab along Lerma
Street near Far Eastern University, and at the
intersection of Lerma and Quezon Boulevard, the
traffic light changed from green to red. The
vehicular traffic stopped and Prudencio Castillo's
taxi was right behind a Volkswagen Kombi.
While waiting for the traffic light to change to
green, Castillo Idly watched the Volkswagen
Kombi and saw Gabat, the passenger sitting
beside the driver, signal to a cigarette vendor.
The cigarette vendor, Rosales, approached the
right side of the Kombi. While Rosales was
handing the cigarettes to Gabat, the traffic light
suddenly changed to green. When the Kombi
moved forward, Gabat suddenly grabbed the
cigarette box held by Rosales. Taken aback, Jose
Rosales ran beside the Kombi and was able to
hold on to the windowsill of the right front door
with his right hand. While Rosales was clinging
to the windowsill, with both feet off the ground,
Recto underpass. Castillo, who was closely
following the Kombi, then saw Gabat forcibly
remove the hand of Rosales from the windowsill
and the latter fell face down on Quezon
Boulevard near the Recto underpass.12
The version of the defense, on the other hand,
was summarized by the court as follows: On the
date and time in question, Fernando Gabat, 31
years old, an underwriter, was on board the
Volkswagen Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon. The
Kombi had to stop at the intersection of Lerma
Street and Quezon Boulevard when the traffic
light turned red. Fernando Gabat, who wanted to
buy cigarettes, called a cigarette vendor who
approached the right side of the Kombi. Gabat
bought two sticks of cigarettes and handed to the
cigarette vendor, Rosales, a P5.00 bill. In order to
change the P5.00 big, Rosales placed his cigarette
box containing assorted cigarettes on the
windowsill of the front door of the Kombi
between the arm of Gabat and the window
frame. Suddenly, the traffic light changed from
red to green and Rogelio Ligon moved the
vehicle forward, heedless of the transaction
between Gabat and the cigarette vendor. As the
vehicle sped onward, the cigarette box which
was squeezed between the right arm of Gabat
and the window frame fell inside the Kombi.
Rosales then ran beside the vehicle and clung to
the windowsill of the moving vehicle. Gabat
testified that when he saw the cigarette vendor
clinging on the side of the front door, he told
Ligon to veer to the right in order that Rosales
could get off at the sidewalk. However, Gabat
declared, that Ligon said that it could not be
done because of the moving vehicular traffic.
Then, while the vehicle slowed down and Ligon
was maneuvering to the right in an attempt to go
toward the sidewalk, Rosales lost his grip on the
window frame and fell to the pavement of
Quezon Boulevard. Gabat allegedly shouted at
Ligon to stop but Ligon replied that they should
go on to Las Pinas and report the incident to the
parents of Gabat, and later they would come
back to the scene of the incident. However, while
the Kombi was speeding along Dewey Boulevard,
it was blocked by the taxi of Prudencio Castillo
and a jeep driven by policemen. Gabat and Ligon
were brought to police headquarters, but neither
of them executed any written statement.13
The trial court gave full credence to the
prosecution's version, stating that there can be
no doubt that Gabat forcibly took or grabbed the
cigarette box from Rosales because, otherwise,
there could be no reason for the latter to run
after the Kombi and hang on to its window. The
court also believed Castillo's testimony that
Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the right
hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the
Kombi, otherwise, the latter could not have fallen
down, having already been able to balance
himself on the stepboard.
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as
incredible the testimony of Gabat that the
cigarette vendor placed the cigarette box on the
windowsill of the Kombi, holding it with his left
hand, while he was trying to get from his pocket
the change for the 5-peso bill of Gabat. The court
said that it is of common knowledge that
cigarette vendors plying their trade in the streets
do not let go of their cigarette box; no vendor lets
go of his precious box of cigarettes in order to
change a peso bin given by a customer.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court are
accorded great respect and are not disturbed on
appeal, unless it is shows that the findings are
not supported by the evidence, or the court
failed to consider certain material facts and
circumstances in its evaluation of the evidence.
In the case at bar, a careful review of the record
shows that certain material facts and
circumstances had been overlooked by the trial
court which, if taken into account, would alter
the result of the case in that they would
introduce an element of reasonable doubt which
would entitle the accused to acquittal.
While the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a
disinterested witness with no motive, according
to the court a quo, "other than to see that justice
be done," his testimony, even if not tainted with
bias, is not entirely free from doubt because his
observation of the event could have been faulty
or mistaken. The taxicab which Castillo was
driving was lower in height compared to the
Kombi in which Gabat was riding-a fact admitted
by Castillo at the trial.14 Judicial notice may also
be taken of the fact that the rear windshield of
the 1978 Volkswagen Kombi is on the upper
portion, occupying approximately one-third
(1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle, thus making
it visually difficult for Castillo to observe clearly
what transpired inside the Kombi at the front
end where Gabat was seated. These are
circumstances which must be taken into
consideration in evaluating Castillo's testimony
as to what exactly happened between Gabat and
the cigarette vendor during that crucial moment
before the latter fell down. As the taxicab was
right behind the Kombi, following it at a distance
of about three meters, Castillo's line of vision
was partially obstructed by the back part of the
Kombi. His testimony that he saw Gabat grab the
cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pry loose
the latter's hand from the windowsill of the
Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable doubt,
specially considering that this occurrence
happened in just a matter of seconds, and both
vehicles during that time were moving fast in the
traffic.
We find it significant that in his statement given
to the police that very evening,15 Castillo did not
mention that he saw Gabat forcibly prying off the
hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the
Kombi, although the police report prepared by
the investigating officer, Pfc. Fermin M. Payuan,
on the same date, stated that when the traffic
signal changed to green and the driver stepped
on the gas, the cigarette box of the cigarette
vendor (Rosales) was grabbed by the passenger
Gabat and "instantly the former clung to the door
and was dragged at a distance while at the same
time the latter punched the vendor's arm until
the same (sic) fell to the pavement," thus
showing that during the police investigation
Castillo must have given a statement to the
police which indicated that Gabat did something
to cause Rosales to fall from the Kombi.16 It was
by way of a supplementary affidavit prepared by
the lawyer of the complainant and sworn to by
Castillo before the Assistant City Fiscal on
January 17, 1984 that this vital detail was added.
This supplementary affidavit was made the basis
for filing another information charging both
Gabat and the driver with the crime of Robbery
with Homicide.
Considering the above circumstances, the Court
is not convinced with moral certainty that the
guilt of the accused Fernando Gabat has been
established beyond reasonable doubt. In our
view, the quantum of proof necessary to sustain
Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as
robbery with homicide has not been met in this
case. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on
reasonable doubt.
However, it does not follow that a person who is
not criminally liable is also free from civil
liability.1avvphi1 While the guilt of the accused
in a criminal prosecution must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance
of evidence is required in a civil action for
damages.17 The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil liability might arise did not
exist.18
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the
Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of
the accused on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the
same act or omission, has been explained by the
Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the
accused in a criminal case also releases
him from civil liability is one of the
most serious flaws in the Philippine
legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of
justice, where the acquittal was due to
a reasonable doubt in the mind of the
court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as
the civil responsibility is derived from
the criminal offense, when the latter is
not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded.
This is one of those cases where
confused thinking leads to unfortunate
and deplorable consequences. Such
reasoning fails to draw a clear line of
demarcation between criminal liability
and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the
distinction. The two liabilities are
separate and distinct from each other.
One affects the social order and the
other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the
offender while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so different from
each other that article 1813 of the
present (Spanish) Civil Code reads
thus: "There may be a compromise
upon the civil action arising from a
crime; but the public action for the
imposition of the legal penalty shall not
thereby be extinguished." It is just and
proper that, for the purposes of the
imprisonment of or fine upon the
accused, the offense should be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. But for the
purpose of indemnifying the
complaining party, why should the
offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion
or violation of every private right to be
proved only by a preponderance of
evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved
person any less private because the
wrongful act is also punishable by the
criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission
recommends the adoption of the
reform under discussion. It will correct
a serious defect in our law. It will close
up an inexhaustible source of injustice
a cause for disillusionment on the part
of the innumerable persons injured or
wronged. 19
In the instant case, we find that a preponderance
of evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts
from which the civil liability of Gabat arises. On
the basis of the trial court's evaluation of the
testimonies of both prosecution and defense
witnesses at the trial and applying the quantum
of proof required in civil cases, we find that a
preponderance of evidence establishes that
Gabat by his act and omission with fault and
negligence caused damage to Rosales and should
answer civilly for the damage done. Gabat's
wilfull act of calling Rosales, the cigarette
vendor, to the middle of a busy street to buy two
sticks of cigarettes set the chain of events which
led to the death of Rosales. Through fault and
negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver
from moving forward while the purchase was
completed; (2) failed to help Rosales while the
latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle,
and (3) did not enforce his order to the driver to
stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the driver's act
of speeding away, instead of stopping and
picking up the injured victim. These proven facts
taken together are firm bases for finding Gabat
civilly liable under the Civil Code20 for the
damage done to Rosales.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered acquitting
the appellant Gabat for the crime of Robbery
with Homicide. However, he is hereby held
civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there
being fault or negligence, and sentenced to
indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz in the
amount of P15.000.00 for the latter's death,
P1,733.35 for hospital and medical expenses, and
P4,100.00 for funeral expenses. The alleged loss
of income amounting to P20,000.00, not being
supported by sufficient evidence, is DENIED.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-
Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 75357 November 27, 1987
RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTION and/or
RUFO MAURICIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PARAS, J :
Illustre Cabiliza was charged before the Regional
Trial Court of the 5th Judicial Region, Branch II,
Legaspi City with homicide and damage to
property through reckless imprudence, in an
information which reads-
That on or about the 20th day
of September, 1979, in the city
of Legaspi, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then
the driver of an Izusu dump
truck, bearing Plate No. WD-
224 T Philippines "79,
belonging to and owned by
RUFO MAURICIO
CONSTRUCTIONS, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously drive, operate
and manage the said vehicle
in a reckless and imprudent
manner without taking the
necessary precaution to
prevent and/or avoid accident
to persons and/or damage to
property, and without regard
to traffic rules and
regulations, causing as a
result of his carelessness and
imprudence the said vehicle
that he was driving to
sideswipe and hit a Colt
Gallant with Plate No. AC -206
S Pilipinas "79, driven and
owned by the late JUDGE
ARSENIO SOLIDUM, thereby
inflicting injuries upon the
said Judge Arsenio Solidum
which directly caused his
untimely death, and further
causing damage to the said
Colt Gallant in the amount of
Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency to
the damage and prejudice of
the late Judge Arsenio
Solidum and/or his family,
and likewise causing damage
to the house owned by PABLO
NAVARRA, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Pablo
Navarro.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo,
pp. 74-75)
After arraignment and trial on the merits,
Cabiliza was convicted of the crime charged in a
Decision dated October 12, 1983, the dispositive
portion of which reads —
WHEREFORE, this Court finds
accused Illustre Cabiliza guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide and
damage to property thru
reckless imprudence and
hereby sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years and
four (4) months, as minimum
to six (6) years, as maximum
of prision correccional to
indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Judge Arsenio G.
Solidum, the sum of
P115,723.05 as actual and
compensatory damages,
Pl,447,200.00 for the loss of
earning capacity of the
deceased; P200,000.00 as
moral damages; and
P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and to pay the costs.
(Rollo, p. 75)
The aforesaid judgment was promulgated on
November 9, 1983. On November 11, 1983,
Cabiliza filed a Notice of Appeal. But he did not
live to pursue his appeal as he died on January 5,
1984. A notice of death dated February 4, 1984
was filed by his counsel Atty. Eustaquio S.
Beltran. In the same notice of death, Atty. Beltran
manifested the intention of Rufo Mauricio, as THE LOWER COURT ERRED
employer of Cabiliza to proceed with the case on IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT
appeal pursuant to his right as employer who is THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
subsidiarily liable. THE COLLISION RESULTING
On March 5, 1984, the lower court issued an IN DEATH OF JUDGE ARSENIO
Order requiring the heirs of Cabiliza to appear SOLIDUM AND DAMAGE TO
and to substitute him as appellant with respect HIS CAR, WAS DUE TO THE
to the civil aspect of the case. LATTER'S GROSS
On motion of the heirs of the victim, the lower NEGLIGENCE AND
court in its order dated August 23, 1984 ordered IMPRUDENCE IN INVADING
the issuance of a writ of execution and THE PROPER LANE OF THE
accordingly on the same date, the Branch Clerk ISUZU DUMP TRUCK OWNED
of Court issued a writ. BY RUFO MAURICIO
The writ of execution was however returned CONSTRUCTION;
unsatisfied per Sheriff's return of service dated III
September 3, 1984, because Cabiliza was found THE LOWER COURT ERRED
insolvent. A certificate of insolvency was issued IN AWARDING THE TOTAL OF
by the Register of Deeds of the Province of P 1,782,923.05 DAMAGES IN
Cagayan and by the Municipal Assessor of FAVOR OF THE COMPLAIN
Claveria Cagayan where Cabiliza appears to be a ANTS;
permanent resident. IV
On September 3, 1984, the victim's widow, Mrs. THE LOWER COURT ERRED
Aurora Solidum, filed a motion for the issuance IN NOT DISMISSING THE
of a subsidiary writ of execution to be enforced INFORMATION AGAINST THE
against the employer of Cabiliza, Rufo Mauricio ACCUSED UPON PROOF OF
and/or Rufo Mauricio Construction Co., which HIS DEATH AND IN NOT
was granted by the court in its order dated RELEASING THE EMPLOYER
September 6, 1984. A subsidiary writ of RUFO MAURICIO
execution was issued by the Clerk of Court also CONSTRUCTIONS AND/OR
on September 6, 1984. RUFO MAURICIO FROM
On September 12, 1984, Rufo Mauricio thru his LIABILITY;
counsel Atty. Beltran filed a motion to quash the V
subsidiary writ of execution. Resolution of this THE LOWER COURT ERRED
motion was held in abeyance. IN NOT GIVING APPELLANT
Meanwhile, Rufo Mauricio, as the employer of RUFO MAURICIO AND/OR
Cabiliza pursued the latter's appeal before the RUFO MAURICIO
Intermediate Appellate Court (AC-G.R. No. CONSTRUCTION A DAY IN
01829). He interposed the following assignment COURT TO RESIST THE
of errors — DAMAGES BEING CLAIMED
I BY THE HEIRS OF THE
THE LOWER COURT ERRED VICTIM.
IN CONCLUDING THAT THE On April 8, 1986, the Intermediate Appellate
ACCUSED WAS GROSSLY Court promulgated its now assailed
NEGLIGENT AND Decision, 1 the pertinent portion of which reads
IMPRUDENT IN TRYING TO —
OVERTAKE ANOTHER TRUCK We find that the proper
WHEN THERE WAS AN ON amount of damages for loss of
COMING CAR FROM THE earnings based on Life
OPPOSITE DIRECTION; expectancy of the deceased is
II Pl,082,223.84. In this respect,
the trial court's findings is
 modified. The Judgment delict, since the liability or obligation arise (not from a crime,
appealed from is affirmed in the accused for here, no crime was committed, the accused
all other aspects. was not having been convicted by final judgment, and
WHEREFORE, with the afore- exempted therefore still regarded as innocent) but from
mentioned modifications, the from a quasi-delict (See Arts. 2176 and 2177, Civil
appealed Judgment is criminal Code), as in this case. The liability of the
AFFIRMED. (Rollo, p. 86) liability. employer here would not be subsidiary
Rufo Mauricio filed a motion for reconsideration 2. Exemplary damages cannot but solidary with his driver (unless said
which was denied for lack of merit in the be imposed upon an employer employer can prove there was no negligence on
Resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court who at the time of the alleged his part at all, that is, if he can prove due
dated July 18, 1986. incident was not present nor diligence in the selection and supervision of his
The said Decision and Resolution are the subject inside the vehicle involved in driver). (See 8th par. of Art. 2180, Art. 2194, Civil
of the present petition. Petitioner contends that the accident. Code; also People vs. Navoa, 132 SCRA 412;
— 3. The petitioner employer People vs. Tirol, 102 SCRA 558; People vs.
1. The dismissal of the cannot be condemned (to Sandaydiego 82 SCRA 120).
criminal case against the pay) an exhorbitant amount Inasmuch as the employer (petitioner herein)
accused employee wipes out of damages to the tune of was not a party in the criminal case, and to grant
not only the employee's P1,417,946.89, without giving him his day in court for the purpose of cross-
primary civil liability, but also him opportunity to cross examining the prosecution witnesses on their
his employer's subsidiary examine the witness testimonies on the driver's alleged negligence
liability for such criminal supporting such claim and and the amount of damages to which the heirs of
negligence, because: affording him opportunity to the victim are entitled, as well as to introduce
a. The adduce evidence to resist the any evidence or witnesses he may care to
criminal claim, because that would be present in his defense, the hearing on the motion
case is deprivation of property to quash the subsidiary writ of execution must
based on without due process of law, be reopened precisely for the purpose adverted
Article 100 repugnant to the Freedom to hereinabove.
of the Constitution. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of
Revised 4. The Honorable the appellate court is hereby SET ASIDE, and this
Penal Code Intermediate Appellate Court case is REMANDED to the trial court for the
wherein misapplied the facts contrary hearing adverted to in the next preceding
criminal to the physical evidence and paragraph.
liability relied on conjectures and SO ORDERED.
and the surmises that depicted a Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and
exemption different picture of the Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
of criminal accident when the evidence Footnotes
liability shows that it was the victim 1 Penned by Justice Esteban
implies who was negligent at the time M. Lising concurred in by
exemption of the accident. (Rollo, pp. 18- Justices Rodolfo A. Nocon and
from civil 19) Federico B. Alfonso, Jr.
liability The first contention of petitioner that the death
arising of the accused-employee wipes out not only the
from crime. employee's primary civil liability but also his
b. The civil employer's subsidiary liability is without merit.
liability of The death of the accused during the pendency of
the his appeal or before the judgment of conviction
employer (rendered against him by the lower court)
petitioner became final and executory extinguished his
is based, if criminal liability meaning his obligation to serve
any, on the imprisonment imposed and his pecuniary
quasi- liability for fines, but not his civil liability should
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf
and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN
ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON
II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth
Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon
City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND
SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD
SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal
of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 29, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 which
affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court
dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-1751, and its
resolution dated November 17, 1991 denying
herein, petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between
Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay
occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno
Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said
carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow
of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own
behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed
on February 8, 1989 an action for damages
against Benigno Torzuela and herein private
respondents Safeguard Investigation and
Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or
Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"),
alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. The
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-1751
among others alleges the following:
1. . . .
Defendants SAFEGUARD
INVESTIGATION AND
SECURITY CO., INC.,
(Defendant Safeguard) and
SUPERGUARD SECURITY
CORPORATION (Defendant
Superguard) are corporations
duly organized and existing in
accordance with Philippine
laws, with offices at 10th
Floor, Manufacturers
Building, Inc., Plaza Santa
Cruz, Manila. They are
impleaded as alternative
defendants for, while the
former appears to be the
employer of defendant
BENIGNO TORZUELA
(defendant TORZUELA), the
latter impliedly acknowledged
responsibility for the acts of
defendant TORZUELA by
extending its sympathies to
plaintiffs.
Defendant BENIGNO
TORZUELA is of legal age, an
employee of defendant
SAFEGUARD and/or
defendant SUPERGUARD and,
at the time of the incident
complained of, was under
their control and supervision.
...
3. On December 7, 1988 at
around 8:00 a.m., defendant
TORZUELA, while he was on
duty as security guard at the
"Big Bang sa Alabang,"
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila shot and killed
NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a
.38 caliber revolver belonging
to defendant SAFEGUARD,
and/or SUPERGUARD (per
Police Report dated January 7,
1989, copy attached as Annex
A);
4. The incident resulting in
the death of NAPOLEON V.
DULAY was due to the
concurring negligence of the
defendants. Defendant
TORZUELA'S wanton and
reckless discharge of the
firearm issued to him by
defendant SAFEGUARD
and/or SUPERGUARD was the
immediate and proximate
cause of the injury, while the
negligence of defendant
SAFEGUARD and/or
SUPERGUARD consists in its
having failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision and
control of its employee to
avoid the injury.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, pp. 117-118)
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory,
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees. The said Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 was
raffled to Branch 84 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, presided by respondent Judge
Teodoro Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent
SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the complaint does not state a valid
cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that
Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the
scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act
of shooting was committed with deliberate
intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is
governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a
person guilty of a felony. —
Every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly
liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a
complaint for damages based on negligence
under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as
the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the
civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to
quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code. In addition, the private respondent
argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is
premature considering that the conviction of
Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua
non for the employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo,
p. 55-59).
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion
praying that it be excluded as defendant on the
ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its
employees (Rollo, p. 96).
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that
their cause of action against the private
respondents is based on their liability under
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation
imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their
employees and household
helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not
engaged in any business or an
industry.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners contended that a suit against
alternative defendants is allowed under Rule 3,
Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, the
inclusion of private respondents as alternative
defendants in the complaint is justified by the
following: the Initial Investigation Report
prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that
Torzuela is an employee of SAFEGUARD; and
through overt acts, SUPERGUARD extended its
sympathies to petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).
Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21,
1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide
was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati and was docketed as Criminal Case No.
89-1896.
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino
issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion
to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for
exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge
held that the complaint did not state facts
necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-
delict since it does not mention any negligence
on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon
Dulay or that the same was done in the
performance of his duties. Respondent judge
ruled that mere allegations of the concurring
negligence of the defendants (private
respondents herein) without stating the facts
showing such negligence are mere conclusions of
law (Rollo, p. 106). Respondent judge also
declared that the complaint was one for damages
founded on crimes punishable under Articles
100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as
distinguished from those arising from, quasi-
delict. The dispositive portion of the order dated
April 13, 1989 states:
WHEREFORE, this Court holds
that in view of the material
and ultimate facts alleged in
the verified complaint and in
accordance with the
applicable law on the matter
as well as precedents laid
down by the Supreme Court,
the complaint against the
alternative defendants
Superguard Security
Corporation and Safeguard
Investigation and Security Co.,
Inc., must be and (sic) it is
hereby dismissed. (Rollo, p.
110)
The above order was affirmed by the respondent
court and petitioners' motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied.
Petitioners take exception to the assailed
decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not
limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts
that are intentional and voluntary, citing
Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195 [1990]). Thus,
petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of shooting
Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict
actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code.
Petitioners further contend that under Article
2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents
are primarily liable for their negligence either in
the selection or supervision of their employees.
This liability is independent of the employee's
own liability for fault or negligence and is
distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil
action against the employer may therefore
proceed independently of the criminal action
pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioners submit that the question of
whether Torzuela is an employee of respondent
SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better
resolved after trial.
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act
of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article
33 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 33. In cases of
defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action
for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Rule 111. . . . .
Sec. 3. When civil action may
proceed independently — In
the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent
civil action which has been
reserved may be brought by
the offended party, shall
proceed independently of the
criminal action, and shall
require only a preponderance
of evidence. (Emphasis
supplied)
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has
been held to include consummated, frustrated
and attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners
maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is
unnecessary since the civil action can proceed
independently of the criminal action. On the
other hand, it is the private respondents'
argument that since the act was not committed
with negligence, the petitioners have no cause of
action under Articles 2116 and 2177 of the New
Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in
Article 2177 is not applicable to acts committed
with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-
offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to
death, aside from being purely personal, was
done with deliberate intent and could not have
been part of his duties as security guard. And
since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers
only: acts done within the scope of the
employee's assigned tasks, the private
respondents cannot be held liable for damages.
We find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being
prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of
Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal
and civil actions. When a
criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil
action , reserves his right to
institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes
recovery of indemnity under
the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32,
33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission
of the accused. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent
civil action before the prosecution in the criminal
action presents evidence is even far better than a
compliance with the requirement of express
reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely
what the petitioners opted to do in this case.
However, the private respondents opposed the
civil action on the ground that the same is
founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as
the shooting was not attended by negligence.
What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the
petitioner's cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by
the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting
the cause of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158
SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or
suit and the law to govern it is to be determined
not by the claim of the party filing the action,
made in his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for
relief. (De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis
Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982]). An examination
of the complaint in the present case would show
that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are
invoking their right to recover damages against
the private respondents for their vicarious
responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno
Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon
Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
complaint.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties
is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents,
there is no justification for limiting the scope of
Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or
omissions resulting from negligence. Well-
entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176
covers not only acts committed with negligence,
but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional. As far back as the definitive case of
Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court
already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers
to "fault or negligence," covers
not only acts "not punishable
by law" but also acts criminal
in character; whether
intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action against
the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed,
if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages
on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. In
 other words, the extinction of
civil liability referred to in
Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act
considered as quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or
has not been committed by
the accused. Briefly stated, We
here hold, in reiteration of
Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be
punishable by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case
of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191
SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court held:
Article 2176, whenever it
refers to "fault or negligence,"
covers not only acts criminal in
character, whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a civil action
lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not
he is prosecuted or found
guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not
allowed, (if the tortfeasor is
actually also charged
criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two
cases vary. [citing Virata v.
Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472]
(Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents submit that the word
"intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate
obiter, and should be read as "voluntary" since
intent cannot be coupled with negligence as
defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the absence of more substantial reasons, this
Court will not disturb the above doctrine on the
coverage of Article 2176.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33
of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries
intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in
Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that
the actions for damages allowed thereunder
are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical
injuries" in Article 33 has already been
construed to include bodily injuries causing
death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the
Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v.
Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime
of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal
Code. It includes not only physical injuries but
also consummated, frustrated, and attempted
homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293
[1983]). Although in the Marcia case (supra), it
was held that no independent civil action may be
filed under Article 33 where the crime is the
result of criminal negligence, it must be noted
however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case
at bar, is charged with homicide, not with
reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant
in Marcia was charged with reckless
imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action
based on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their
liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal
Code; and that they are not liable for Torzuela's
act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a
security guard. It having been established that
the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners
may proceed directly against Torzuela and the
private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is
caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after
selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The
liability of the employer under Article 2180 is
direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee
and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176
SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent
upon the private respondents to prove that they
exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their
employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of
negligence but also acts which are intentional
and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the
part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's
complaint simply because it failed to make
allegations of attendant negligence attributable
to private respondents.
With respect to the issue of whether the
complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of
action, the general rule is that the allegations in a
complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against the defendants if, admitting the
facts alleged, the court can render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer therein. A cause of action exist if the
following elements are present, namely: (1) a
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages
(Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA 33
[1992]); Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993])
This Court finds, under the foregoing premises,
that the complaint sufficiently alleged an
actionable breach on the part of the defendant
Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint
alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon
Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the
shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty;
and that either SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and
responsible for his acts. This does not operate
however, to establish that the defendants below
are liable. Whether or not the shooting was
actually reckless and wanton or attended by
negligence and whether it was actually done
within the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether
the private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family; and whether the
defendants are actually liable, are questions
which can be better resolved after trial on the
merits where each party can present evidence to
prove their respective allegations and defenses.
In determining whether the allegations of a
complaint are sufficient to support a cause of
action, it must be borne in mind that the
complaint does not have to establish or allege
the facts proving the existence of a cause of
action at the outset; this will have to be done at
the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel
Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a
complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which
the complaint can be maintained, the same
should not be dismissed regardless of the
defenses that may be assessed by the defendants
(Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992]
citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To
sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of
action, the complaint must show that the claim
for relief does not exist rather than that a claim
has been defectively stated, is ambiguous,
indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board,
27 SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly
sustained an injury to their rights under the law,
it would be more just to allow them to present
evidence of such injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals as well as the Order of the
Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No.
Q-89-1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial
Court for trial on the merits. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 150793. November 19, 2004]
FRANCIS CHUA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and LYDIA C.
HAO, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner assails the Decision,[1] dated
June 14, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 57070, affirming the Order, dated
October 5, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 19. The RTC reversed
the Order, dated April 26, 1999, of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila,
Branch 22. Also challenged by herein petitioner
is the CA Resolution,[2] dated November 20,
2001, denying his Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as
follows:
On February 28, 1996, private respondent
Lydia Hao, treasurer of Siena Realty Corporation,
filed a complaint-affidavit with the City
Prosecutor of Manila charging Francis Chua and
his wife, Elsa Chua, of four counts of falsification
of public documents pursuant to Article 172[3] in
relation to Article 171[4] of the Revised Penal
Code. The charge reads:
That on or about May 13, 1994, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then
a private individual, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of
falsification upon a public document, to wit: the
said accused prepared, certified, and falsified the
Minutes of the Annual Stockholders meeting of
the Board of Directors of the Siena Realty
Corporation, duly notarized before a Notary
Public, Atty. Juanito G. Garcia and entered in his
Notarial Registry as Doc No. 109, Page 22, Book
No. IV and Series of 1994, and therefore, a public
document, by making or causing it to appear in
said Minutes of the Annual Stockholders Meeting
that one LYDIA HAO CHUA was present and has
participated in said proceedings, when in truth
and in fact, as the said accused fully well knew
that said Lydia C. Hao was never present during
the Annual Stockholders Meeting held on April
30, 1994 and neither has participated in the
proceedings thereof to the prejudice of public
interest and in violation of public faith and
destruction of truth as therein proclaimed.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Thereafter, the City Prosecutor filed the
Information docketed as Criminal Case No.
285721[6] for falsification of public document,
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila, Branch 22, against Francis Chua but
dismissed the accusation against Elsa Chua.
Herein petitioner, Francis Chua, was
arraigned and trial ensued thereafter.
During the trial in the MeTC, private
prosecutors Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho and Atty. Ariel
Bruno Rivera appeared as private prosecutors
and presented Hao as their first witness.
After Haos testimony, Chua moved to
exclude complainants counsels as private
prosecutors in the case on the ground that Hao
failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the
case.
In an Order, dated April 26, 1999, the
MeTC granted Chuas motion and ordered the
complainants counsels to be excluded from
actively prosecuting Criminal Case No. 285721.
Hao moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.
Hence, Hao filed a petition for certiorari
docketed as SCA No. 99-94846,[7] entitled Lydia
C. Hao, in her own behalf and for the benefit of
Siena Realty Corporation v. Francis Chua, and the
Honorable Hipolito dela Vega, Presiding Judge,
Branch 22, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 19.
The RTC gave due course to the petition
and on October 5, 1999, the RTC in an order
reversed the MeTC Order. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
respondent Court is ordered to allow the
intervention of the private prosecutors in behalf
of petitioner Lydia C. Hao in the prosecution of
the civil aspect of Crim. Case No. 285721, before
Br. 22 [MeTC], Manila, allowing Attys. Evelyn
Sua-Kho and Ariel Bruno Rivera to actively
participate in the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Chua moved for reconsideration which was
denied.
Dissatisfied, Chua filed before the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari. The petition
alleged that the lower court acted with grave
abuse of discretion in: (1) refusing to consider
material facts; (2) allowing Siena Realty
Corporation to be impleaded as co-petitioner in
SCA No. 99-94846 although it was not a party to
the criminal complaint in Criminal Case No.
285721; and (3) effectively amending the
information against the accused in violation of
his constitutional rights.
On June 14, 2001, the appellate court
promulgated its assailed Decision denying the
petition, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.
The Order, dated October 5, 1999 as well as the
Order, dated December 3, 1999, are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioner had argued before the Court of
Appeals that respondent had no authority
whatsoever to bring a suit in behalf of the
Corporation since there was no Board Resolution
authorizing her to file the suit.
For her part, respondent Hao claimed that
the suit was brought under the concept of a
derivative suit. Respondent maintained that
when the directors or trustees refused to file a
suit even when there was a demand from
stockholders, a derivative suit was allowed.
The Court of Appeals held that the action
was indeed a derivative suit, for it alleged that
petitioner falsified documents pertaining to
projects of the corporation and made it appear
that the petitioner was a stockholder and a
director of the corporation. According to the
appellate court, the corporation was a necessary
party to the petition filed with the RTC and even
if private respondent filed the criminal case, her
act should not divest the Corporation of its right
to be a party and present its own claim for
damages.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it
was denied in a Resolution dated November 20,
2001.
Hence, this petition alleging that the Court
of Appeals committed reversible errors:
I. IN RULING THAT LYDIA HAOS
FILING OF CRIMINAL CASE NO.
285721 WAS IN THE NATURE OF
A DERIVATIVE SUIT
II. IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF
JUDGE DAGUNA THAT SIENA
REALTY WAS A PROPER
PETITIONER IN SCA NO. [99-
94846]
III. IN UPHOLDING JUDGE DAGUNAS
DECISION ALLOWING LYDIA
HAOS COUNSEL TO CONTINUE AS
PRIVATE PROSECUTORS IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 285721
IV. IN [OMITTING] TO CONSIDER
AND RULE UPON THE ISSUE
THAT JUDGE DAGUNA ACTED IN
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION
IN SCA NO. [99-94846] FOR
BEING A SHAM PLEADING.[10]
The pertinent issues in this petition are the
following: (1) Is the criminal complaint in the
nature of a derivative suit? (2) Is Siena Realty
Corporation a proper petitioner in SCA No. 99-
94846? and (3) Should private prosecutors be
allowed to actively participate in the trial of
Criminal Case No. 285721.
On the first issue, petitioner claims that the
Court of Appeals erred when (1) it sustained the
lower court in giving due course to respondents
petition in SCA No. 99-94846 despite the fact
that the Corporation was not the private
complainant in Criminal Case No. 285721, and
(2) when it ruled that Criminal Case No. 285721
was in the nature of a derivative suit.
Petitioner avers that a derivative suit is by
nature peculiar only to intra-corporate
proceedings and cannot be made part of a
criminal action. He cites the case of Western
Institute of Technology, Inc. v. Salas,[11]where the
court said that an appeal on the civil aspect of a
criminal case cannot be treated as a derivative
suit. Petitioner asserts that in this case, the civil
aspect of a criminal case cannot be treated as a
derivative suit, considering that Siena Realty
Corporation was not the private complainant.
Petitioner misapprehends our ruling
in Western Institute. In that case, we said:
Here, however, the case is not a derivative suit
but is merely an appeal on the civil aspect of
Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098 filed with
the RTC of Iloilo for estafa and falsification of
public document. Among the basic requirements
for a derivative suit to prosper is that the
minority shareholder who is suing for and on
behalf of the corporation must allege in his
complaint before the proper forum that he is
suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of
the corporation and all other shareholders
similarly situated who wish to join. . . .This was
not complied with by the petitioners either in
their complaint before the court a quo nor in the
instant petition which, in part, merely states that
this is a petition for review on certiorari on pure
questions of law to set aside a portion of the RTC
decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098
since the trial courts judgment of acquittal failed
to impose civil liability against the private
respondents. By no amount of equity
considerations, if at all deserved, can a mere
appeal on the civil aspect of a criminal case be
treated as a derivative suit.[12]
Moreover, in Western Institute, we said that
a mere appeal in the civil aspect cannot be
treated as a derivative suit because the appeal
lacked the basic requirement that it must be
alleged in the complaint that the shareholder is
suing on a derivative cause of action for and in
behalf of the corporation and other shareholders
who wish to join.
Under Section 36[13] of the Corporation
Code, read in relation to Section 23,[14] where a
corporation is an injured party, its power to sue
is lodged with its board of directors or
trustees.[15] An individual stockholder is
permitted to institute a derivative suit on behalf
of the corporation wherein he holds stocks in
order to protect or vindicate corporate rights,
whenever the officials of the corporation refuse
to sue, or are the ones to be sued, or hold the
control of the corporation. In such actions, the
suing stockholder is regarded as a nominal party,
with the corporation as the real party in
interest.[16]
A derivative action is a suit by a
shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of
action. The corporation is a necessary party to
the suit. And the relief which is granted is a
judgment against a third person in favor of the
corporation. Similarly, if a corporation has a
defense to an action against it and is not
asserting it, a stockholder may intervene and
defend on behalf of the corporation.[17]
Under the Revised Penal Code, every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.[18] When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.[19]
In Criminal Case No. 285721, the complaint
was instituted by respondent against petitioner
for falsifying corporate documents whose
subject concerns corporate projects of Siena
Realty Corporation. Clearly, Siena Realty
Corporation is an offended party. Hence, Siena
Realty Corporation has a cause of action. And the
civil case for the corporate cause of action is
deemed instituted in the criminal action.
However, the board of directors of the
corporation in this case did not institute the
action against petitioner. Private respondent was
the one who instituted the action. Private
respondent asserts that she filed a derivative suit
in behalf of the corporation. This assertion is
inaccurate. Not every suit filed in behalf of the
corporation is a derivative suit. For a derivative
suit to prosper, it is required that the minority
stockholder suing for and on behalf of the
corporation must allege in his complaint that he
is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf
of the corporation and all other stockholders
similarly situated who may wish to join him in
the suit.[20] It is a condition sine qua non that the
corporation be impleaded as a party because not
only is the corporation an indispensable party,
but it is also the present rule that it must be
served with process. The judgment must be
made binding upon the corporation in order that
the corporation may get the benefit of the suit
and may not bring subsequent suit against the
same defendants for the same cause of action. In
other words, the corporation must be joined as
party because it is its cause of action that is being
litigated and because judgment must be a res
adjudicata against it.[21]
In the criminal complaint filed by herein
respondent, nowhere is it stated that she is filing
the same in behalf and for the benefit of the
corporation. Thus, the criminal complaint
including the civil aspect thereof could not be
deemed in the nature of a derivative suit.
We turn now to the second issue, is the
corporation a proper party in the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC? Note
that the case was titled Lydia C. Hao, in her own
behalf and for the benefit of Siena Realty
Corporation v. Francis Chua, and the Honorable
Hipolito dela Vega, Presiding Judge, Branch 22,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner
before us now claims that the corporation is not
a private complainant in Criminal Case No.
285721, and thus cannot be included as
appellant in SCA No. 99-94846.
Petitioner invokes the case of Ciudad Real
& Devt. Corporation v. Court of
Appeals.[22] In Ciudad Real, it was ruled that the
Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion when it upheld the standing of
Magdiwang Realty Corporation as a party to the
petition for certiorari, even though it was not a
party-in-interest in the civil case before the
lower court.
In the present case, respondent claims that
the complaint was filed by her not only in her
personal capacity, but likewise for the benefit of
the corporation. Additionally, she avers that she
has exhausted all remedies available to her
before she instituted the case, not only to claim
damages for herself but also to recover the
damages caused to the company.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure,[23] when a trial court commits a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, the person aggrieved can file a
special civil action for certiorari. The aggrieved
parties in such a case are the State and the
private offended party or complainant.[24]
In a string of cases, we consistently ruled
that only a party-in-interest or those aggrieved
may file certiorari cases. It is settled that the
offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient
interest and personality as person(s) aggrieved
to file special civil action of prohibition and
certiorari.[25]
In Ciudad Real, cited by petitioner, we held
that the appellate court committed grave abuse
of discretion when it sanctioned the standing of a
corporation to join said petition for certiorari,
despite the finality of the trial courts denial of its
Motion for Intervention and the subsequent
Motion to Substitute and/or Join as
Party/Plaintiff.
Note, however, that in Pastor, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals[26] we held that if aggrieved, even a non-
party may institute a petition for certiorari. In
that case, petitioner was the holder in her own
right of three mining claims and could file a
petition for certiorari, the fastest and most
feasible remedy since she could not intervene in
the probate of her father-in-laws estate.[27]
In the instant case, we find that the
recourse of the complainant to the respondent
Court of Appeals was proper. The petition was
brought in her own name and in behalf of the
Corporation. Although, the corporation was not a
complainant in the criminal action, the subject of
the falsification was the corporations project and
the falsified documents were corporate
documents. Therefore, the corporation is a
proper party in the petition for certiorari
because the proceedings in the criminal case
directly and adversely affected the corporation.
We turn now to the third issue. Did the
Court of Appeals and the lower court err in
allowing private prosecutors to actively
participate in the trial of Criminal Case No.
285721?
Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v.
Gallardo,[28] holding that where from the nature
of the offense or where the law defining and
punishing the offense charged does not provide
for an indemnity, the offended party may not
intervene in the prosecution of the offense.
Petitioners contention lacks merit.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from
crime is the fundamental postulate that every
man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a
person commits a crime he offends two entities
namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the
political entity called the State whose law he has
violated; and (2) the individual member of the
society whose person, right, honor, chastity or
property has been actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or
omission. An act or omission is felonious because
it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but
because it caused damage to another.
Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability
is really the obligation and the moral duty of
everyone to repair or make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his own act or
omission, whether done intentionally or
negligently. The indemnity which a person is
sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the
penalty imposed by law for the commission of
the crime.[29] The civil action involves the civil
liability arising from the offense charged which
includes restitution, reparation of the damage the private offended party has the right to
caused, and indemnification for consequential intervene through the private prosecutors.
damages.[30] WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
Under the Rules, where the civil action for DENIED. The Decision, dated June 14, 2001, and
recovery of civil liability is instituted in the the Resolution, dated November 20, 2001, of the
criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57070,
offended party may intervene by counsel in the affirming the Order, dated October 5, 1999, of
prosecution of the offense.[31] Rule 111(a) of the the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, 19, are AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the private
[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil prosecutors are hereby allowed to intervene in
action arising from the offense charged shall be behalf of private respondent Lydia Hao in the
deemed instituted with the criminal action prosecution of the civil aspect of Criminal Case
unless the offended party waives the civil action, No. 285721 before Branch 22, of Metropolitan
reserves the right to institute it separately, or Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Costs against
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal petitioner.
action. SO ORDERED.
Private respondent did not waive the civil
action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it
separately, nor institute the civil action for
damages arising from the offense charged. Thus,
we find that the private prosecutors can
intervene in the trial of the criminal action.
Petitioner avers, however, that
respondents testimony in the inferior court did
not establish nor prove any damages personally
sustained by her as a result of petitioners alleged
acts of falsification. Petitioner adds that since no
personal damages were proven therein, then the
participation of her counsel as private
prosecutors, who were supposed to pursue the
civil aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary
and is without basis.
When the civil action is instituted with the
criminal action, evidence should be taken of the
damages claimed and the court should
determine who are the persons entitled to such
indemnity. The civil liability arising from the
crime may be determined in the criminal
proceedings if the offended party does not waive
to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right
to institute a separate civil action against the
defendant. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or
reservation of civil liability, evidence should be
allowed to establish the extent of injuries
suffered.[32]
In the case before us, there was neither a
waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the
offended party institute a separate civil action. It
follows that evidence should be allowed in the
criminal proceedings to establish the civil
liability arising from the offense committed, and
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 163753 January 15, 2014
DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS,
M.D., Petitioner,
vs.
HANZ CALAPIZ, REPRESENTED BY HIS
PARENTS, HILARIO CALAPIZ, JR. and HERLITA
CALAPIZ,Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The acquittal of the accused does not necessarily
mean his absolution from civil liability.
The Case
In this appeal, an accused desires the reversal of
the decision promulgated on February 20,
2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the judgment rendered on August 6,
1999 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
13, in Oroquieta City ordering him to pay moral
damages despite his acquittal of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries charged against him.2
Antecedents
On January 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, Jr.
and Herlita Calapiz brought their 8-year-old son,
Hanz Calapiz (Hanz), to the Misamis Occidental
Provincial Hospital, Oroquieta City, for an
emergency appendectomy. Hanz was attended to
by the petitioner, who suggested to the parents
that Hanz also undergo circumcision at no added
cost to spare him the pain. With the parents’
consent, the petitioner performed the coronal
type of circumcision on Hanz after his
appendectomy. On the following day, Hanz
complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited
blisters. His testicles were swollen. The parents
noticed that the child urinated abnormally after
the petitioner forcibly removed the catheter, but
the petitioner dismissed the abnormality as
normal. On January 30, 1995, Hanz was
discharged from the hospital over his parents’
protestations, and was directed to continue
taking antibiotics.
On February 8, 1995, Hanz was confined in a
hospital because of the abscess formation
between the base and the shaft of his penis.
Presuming that the ulceration was brought about
by Hanz’s appendicitis, the petitioner referred
him to Dr. Henry Go, an urologist, who diagnosed
the boy to have a damaged urethra. Thus, Hanz
underwent cystostomy, and thereafter was
operated on three times to repair his damaged
urethra.
When his damaged urethra could not be fully
repaired and reconstructed, Hanz’s parents
brought a criminal charge against the petitioner
for reckless imprudence resulting to serious
physical injuries. On April 17, 1997, the
information3 was filed in the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Oroquieta City (MTCC), to
which the latter pleaded not guilty on May 22,
1998.4 Under the order of April 30, 1999, the
case was transferred to the RTC pursuant to
Supreme Court Circular No. 11-99.5
At the trial, the Prosecution presented several
witnesses, including Dr. Rufino Agudera as an
expert witness and as the physician who had
operated on Hanz twice to repair the damaged
urethra. Dr. Agudera testified that Hanz had been
diagnosed to have urethral stricture and
cavernosal injury left secondary to trauma that
had necessitated the conduct of two operations
to strengthen and to lengthen the urethra.
Although satisfactorily explaining that the injury
to the urethra had been caused by trauma, Dr.
Agudera could not determine the kind of trauma
that had caused the injury.
In his defense, the petitioner denied the charge.
He contended that at the time of his examination
of Hanz on January 16, 1995, he had found an
accumulation of pus at the vicinity of the
appendix two to three inches from the penis that
had required immediate surgical operation; that
after performing the appendectomy, he had
circumcised Hanz with his parents’ consent by
using a congo instrument, thereby debunking the
parents’ claim that their child had been
cauterized; that he had then cleared Hanz on
January 27, 1995 once his fever had subsided;
that he had found no complications when Hanz
returned for his follow up check-up on February
2, 1995; and that the abscess formation between
the base and the shaft of the penis had been
brought about by Hanz’s burst appendicitis.
Ruling of the RTC
In its decision rendered on August 6, 1999,6 the
RTC acquitted the petitioner of the crime
charged for insufficiency of the evidence. It held
that the Prosecution’s evidence did not show the
required standard of care to be observed by
other members of the medical profession under
similar circumstances. Nonetheless, the RTC
ruled that the petitioner was liable for moral
damages because there was a preponderance of
evidence showing that Hanz had received the
injurious trauma from his circumcision by the
petitioner. The decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, this
court renders judgment acquitting the accused,
Dr. Encarnacion Lumantas, of reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries, but ordering him to pay Hanz Calapiz
₱50,000.00 as moral damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC,7 sustaining
the award of moral damages. It opined that even
if the petitioner had been acquitted of the crime
charged, the acquittal did not necessarily mean
that he had not incurred civil liability
considering that the Prosecution had
preponderantly established the sufferings of
Hanz as the result of the circumcision.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but
the CA denied the motion on April 28, 2004.8
Hence, this appeal.
Issue
Whether the CA erred in affirming the
petitioner’s civil liability despite his acquittal of
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries.
Ruling
The petition for review lacks merit.
It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable.9 Nevertheless,
the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged
does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability.
In Manantan v. Court of Appeals,10the Court
elucidates on the two kinds of acquittal
recognized by our law as well as on the different
effects of acquittal on the civil liability of the
accused, viz:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with
different effects on the civil liability of the
accused.1âwphi1 First is an acquittal on the
ground that the accused is not the author of the
act or omission complained of. This instance
closes the door to civil liability, for a person who
has been found to be not the perpetrator of any
act or omission cannot and can never be held
liable for such act or omission. There being no
delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may
be instituted must be based on grounds other
than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court. The second instance is an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the
accused has not been satisfactorily established,
he is not exempt from civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only.
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an
acquittal, the judgment shall state "whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to
prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
either case, the judgment shall determine if the
act or omission from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist."11
Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the
acquittal of an accused does not prevent a
judgment from still being rendered against him
on the civil aspect of the criminal case unless the
court finds and declares that the fact from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Although it found the Prosecution’s evidence
insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction
against the petitioner for the crime charged, the
RTC did not err in determining and adjudging his
civil liability for the same act complained of
based on mere preponderance of evidence.12 In
this connection, the Court reminds that the
acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence did not
require that the complainant’s recovery of civil
liability should be through the institution of a
separate civil action for that purpose.13
The petitioner’s contention that he could not be
held civilly liable because there was no proof of
his negligence deserves scant consideration. The
failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal
negligence with moral certainty did not forbid a
finding against him that there was preponderant
evidence of his negligence to hold him civilly
liable.14With the RTC and the CA both finding
that Hanz had sustained the injurious trauma
from the hands of the petitioner on the occasion
of or incidental to the circumcision, and that the
trauma could have been avoided, the Court must
concur with their uniform findings. In that
regard, the Court need not analyze and weigh
again the evidence considered in the proceedings
a quo. The Court, by virtue of its not being a trier
of facts, should now accord the highest respect to
the factual findings of the trial court as affirmed
by the CA in the absence of a clear showing by
the petitioner that such findings were tainted
with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable
error.
Every person is entitled to the physical integrity
of his body.1âwphi1 Although we have long
advocated the view that any physical injury, like
the loss or diminution of the use of any part of
one’s body, is not equatable to a pecuniary loss,
and is not susceptible of exact monetary
estimation, civil damages should be assessed
once that integrity has been violated. The
assessment is but an imperfect estimation of the
true value of one’s body. The usual practice is to
award moral damages for the physical injuries
sustained.15 In Hanz’s case, the undesirable
outcome of the circumcision performed by the
petitioner forced the young child to endure
several other procedures on his penis in order to
repair his damaged urethra. Surely, his physical
and moral sufferings properly warranted the
amount of ₱50,000.00 awarded as moral
damages.
Many years have gone by since Hanz suffered the
injury. Interest of 6% per annum should then be
imposed on the award as a sincere means of
adjusting the value of the award to a level that is
not only reasonable but just and commensurate.
Unless we make the adjustment in the
permissible manner by prescribing legal interest
on the award, his sufferings would be unduly
compounded. For that purpose, the reckoning of
interest should be from the filing of the criminal
information on April 17, 1997, the making of the
judicial demand for the liability of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on February 20, 2003, with the
modification that legal interest of 6% per annum
to start from April 17, 1997 is imposed on the
award of:₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005]
SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C.
SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA
LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA
SANTOS and LEONARDO
FERRER, petitioners, vs. HON.
NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as
Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 101, DIONISIO M SIBAYAN,
and VIRON TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY, INC., represented by
VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS,
President/Chairman, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition for Review on
Certiorari[1] dated March 1, 2002, petitioners
assail the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002,
respectively dismissing their petition for
certiorari and denying their motion for
reconsideration, arising from the dismissal of
their complaint to recover civil indemnity for the
death and physical injuries of their kin.
The following facts are matters of record.
In an Information dated April 25, 1994,
Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple
Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in
connection with a vehicle collision between a
southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan
and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed
the lives of the vans driver and three (3) of its
passengers, including a two-month old baby, and
caused physical injuries to five (5) of the vans
passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months. However, as there was a reservation to
file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of
civil liability was made by the municipal circuit
trial court in its decision promulgated on
December 17, 1998.[2]
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a
complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron
Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q.
Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, pursuant to their reservation to file
a separate civil action.[3] They cited therein the
judgment convicting Sibayan.
Viron Transit moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds of improper service of
summons, prescription and laches, and defective
certification of non-forum shopping. It also
sought the dropping of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as
defendant in view of the separate personality of
Viron Transit from its officers.[4]
Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss
contending, among others, that the right to file a
separate action in this case prescribes in ten (10)
years reckoned from the finality of the judgment
in the criminal action. As there was no appeal of
the decision convicting Sibayan, the complaint
which was filed barely two (2) years thence was
clearly filed within the prescriptive period.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on
the principal ground that the cause of action had
already prescribed. According to the trial court,
actions based on quasi delict, as it construed
petitioners cause of action to be, prescribe four
(4) years from the accrual of the cause of action.
Hence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners
reserved the right to file a separate civil action,
the complaint ought to be dismissed on the
ground of prescription.[5]
Improper service of summons was likewise
cited as a ground for dismissal of the complaint
as summons was served through a certain Jessica
Ubalde of the legal department without
mentioning her designation or position.
Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration pointing out yet again that the
complaint is not based on quasi delict but on the
final judgment of conviction in the criminal case
which prescribes ten (10) years from the finality
of the judgment.[6] The trial court denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration
reiterating that petitioners cause of action was
based on quasi delict and had prescribed under
Article 1146 of the Civil Code because the
complaint was filed more than four (4) years
after the vehicular accident.[7] As regards the
improper service of summons, the trial court
reconsidered its ruling that the complaint ought
to be dismissed on this ground.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals which dismissed the
same for error in the choice or mode of
appeal.[8] The appellate court also denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration reasoning
that even if the respondent trial court judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the order of dismissal, certiorari is still not the
permissible remedy as appeal was available to
petitioners and they failed to allege that the
petition was brought within the recognized
exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in lieu
of appeal.[9]
In this petition, petitioners argue that a
rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot
be a substitute for appeal will result in a judicial
rejection of an existing obligation arising from
the criminal liability of private respondents.
Petitioners insist that the liability sought to be
enforced in the complaint arose ex delicto and is
not based on quasi delict. The trial court
allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion
when it insisted that the cause of action invoked
by petitioners is based on quasi delict and
concluded that the action had prescribed. Since
the action is based on the criminal liability of
private respondents, the cause of action accrued
from the finality of the judgment of conviction.
Assuming that their petition with the
appellate court was procedurally flawed,
petitioners implore the Court to exempt this case
from the rigid operation of the rules as they
allegedly have a legitimate grievance to
vindicate, i.e., damages for the deaths and
physical injuries caused by private respondents
for which no civil liability had been adjudged by
reason of their reservation of the right to file a
separate civil action.
In their Comment[10] dated June 13, 2002,
private respondents insist that the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of prescription was
in order. They point out that the averments in
the complaint make out a cause of action
for quasi delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of
the Civil Code. As such, the prescriptive period of
four (4) years should be reckoned from the time
the accident took place.
Viron Transit also alleges that its
subsidiary liability cannot be enforced since
Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the
criminal case. It is Viron Transits contention that
the subsidiary liability of the employer
contemplated in Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code presupposes a situation where the civil
aspect of the case was instituted in the criminal
case and no reservation to file a separate civil
case was made.
Private respondents likewise allege that
the recourse to the Court of
Appeals via certiorari was improper as
petitioners should have appealed the adverse
order of the trial court. Moreover, they point out
several other procedural lapses allegedly
committed by petitioners, such as lack of
certification against forum-shopping; lack of
duplicate original or certified true copy of the
assailed order of the trial court; and non-
indication of the full names and addresses of
petitioners in the petition.
Petitioners filed a Reply[11] dated
September 14, 2002, while private respondents
filed a Rejoinder[12] dated October 14, 2002, both
in reiteration of their arguments.
We grant the petition.
Our Revised Penal Code provides that
every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.[13] Such civil liability may consist of
restitution, reparation of the damage caused and
indemnification of consequential
damages.[14] When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil liability arising from the offense is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
subject to three notable exceptions: first, when
the injured party expressly waives the right to
recover damages from the accused; second, when
the offended party reserves his right to have the
civil damages determined in a separate action in
order to take full control and direction of the
prosecution of his cause; and third, when the
injured party actually exercises the right to
maintain a private suit against the offender by
instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the
criminal case.
Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended in 1988, which governed
the institution of the criminal action, as well as
the reservation of the right to file a separate civil
action. Section 1, Rule 111 thereof states:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions.When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes
the others. The institution of, or the reservation
of the right to file, any of said civil actions
separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the
separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and
under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of
the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil
liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
filing fees for such action as provided in these
Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other
than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall
be paid by the offended party upon filing thereof
in court for trial.
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of
their right to file a separate civil action as a
result of the crime committed by Sibayan. On
account of this reservation, the municipal circuit
trial court, in its decision convicting Sibayan, did
not make any pronouncement as to the latters
civil liability.
Predicating their claim on the judgment of
conviction and their reservation to file a separate
civil action made in the criminal case, petitioners
filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan,
Viron Transit and its President/Chairman.
Petitioners assert that by the institution of the
complaint, they seek to recover private
respondents civil liability arising from crime.
Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the
allegations in the complaint, the trial court
dismissed the same, declaring that petitioners
cause of action was based on quasi delict and
should have been brought within four (4) years
from the time the cause of action
accrued, i.e., from the time of the accident.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the
allegations therein are consistent with
petitioners claim that the action was brought to
recover civil liability arising from crime.
Although there are allegations of negligence on
the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does
not necessarily mean that petitioners were
pursuing a cause of action based on quasi
delict, considering that at the time of the filing of
the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi
delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases
of negligence, the offended party has the choice
between an action to enforce civil liability arising
from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an
action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.
An act or omission causing damage to
another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil
liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an
act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g.,
culpa contractual or obligations arising from law
under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional
torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or
(b) where the injured party is granted a right to
file an action independent and distinct from the
criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code.[15] Either of these liabilities may be
enforced against the offender subject to the
caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant and
the similar proscription against double recovery
under the Rules above-quoted.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for
damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi
delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless,
petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue
opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the
surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so
because the prescription of the action ex quasi
delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime
especially as the latter action had been expressly
reserved.
The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus
Company[16] was decided upon a similar set of
facts. Therein, the driver of La Mallorca Bus
Company was charged with reckless imprudence
resulting to damage to property. The plaintiff interpretation is also consistent with the bar
made an express reservation for the filing of a against double recovery for obvious reasons.
separate civil action. The driver was convicted Now the procedural issue. Admittedly,
which conviction was affirmed by this Court. petitioners should have appealed the order of
Later, plaintiff filed a separate civil action for dismissal of the trial court instead of filing a
damages based on quasi delict which was petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
ordered dismissed by the trial court upon finding Such procedural misstep, however, should be
that the action was instituted more than six (6) exempted from the strict application of the rules
years from the date of the accident and thus, had in order to promote their fundamental objective
already prescribed. Subsequently, plaintiff of securing substantial justice.[20] We are loathe
instituted another action, this time based on the to deprive petitioners of the indemnity to which
subsidiary liability of the bus company. The trial they are entitled by law and by a final judgment
court dismissed the action holding that the of conviction based solely on a technicality. It is
dismissal of the earlier civil case operated as a our duty to prevent such an injustice.[21]
bar to the filing of the action to enforce the bus WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
companys subsidiary liability. rendered SETTING ASIDE the resolutions of the
We held that the dismissal of the action Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and
based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing the
enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the present action and denying petitioners motion
employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, for reconsideration, as well as the orders of the
final in character, the employer becomes lower court dated February 26, 2001 and July 16,
subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime 2001. Let the case be REMANDED to the trial
was in the discharge of the duties of the court for further proceedings.
employees. This is so because Article 103 of the SO ORDERED.
Revised Penal Code operates with controlling
force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved
party being deprived of indemnity even after the
rendition of a final judgment convicting the
employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not
have dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription, but instead allowed the complaint
for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the
merits, considering petitioners allegations in
their complaint, opposition to the motion to
dismiss[17] and motion for reconsideration[18] of
the order of dismissal, insisting that the action
was to recover civil liability arising from crime.
This does not offend the policy that the
reservation or institution of a separate civil
action waives the other civil actions. The
rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of
multiple suits between the same litigants arising
out of the same act or omission of the
offender.[19] However, since the stale action for
damages based on quasi delict should be
considered waived, there is no more occasion for
petitioners to file multiple suits against private
respondents as the only recourse available to
them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This
G.R. No. 158995 September 26, 2006
L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO
GABOR, Vice-President and General
Manager, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-
AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 43,
Bacolod City, and SPS. FLORENTINO and
THERESA VALLEJERA, respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this
petition for review on certiorari is the
Decision1 dated April 25, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), as reiterated in its Resolution of
July 10, 2003,2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, affirming
an earlier Order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 43, which denied
the petitioners' motion to dismiss in Civil Case
No. 99-10845, an action for damages arising
from a vehicular accident thereat instituted by
the herein private respondents - the spouses
Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera -
against the petitioners.
The antecedent facts may be briefly stated as
follows:
On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year
old son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and
Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van
owned by the petitioners and driven at the time
by their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y
Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the accident.
In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 67787, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Vincent Norman Yeneza.
Unfortunately, before the trial could be
concluded, the accused driver committed suicide,
evidently bothered by conscience and remorse.
On account thereof, the MTCC, in its order of
September 30, 1998, dismissed the criminal case.
On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the
spouses Vallejera filed a complaint3 for damages
against the petitioners as employers of the
deceased driver, basically alleging that as such
employers, they failed to exercise due diligence
in the selection and supervision of their
employees. Thereat docketed as Civil Case No.
99-10845, the complaint was raffled to Branch
43 of the court.
In their Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim,4 the petitioners as defendants
denied liability for the death of the Vallejeras' 7-
year old son, claiming that they had exercised
the required due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees, including the
deceased driver. They thus prayed in their
Answer for the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of cause of action on the part of the Vallejera
couple.
During pre-trial, the defendant petitioners
insisted that their dismissal prayer be resolved.
Hence, the trial court required them to file
within ten days a memorandum of authorities
supportive of their position.
Instead, however, of the required memorandum
of authorities, the defendant petitioners filed
a Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing that the
complaint is basically a "claim for subsidiary
liability against an employer" under the
provision of Article 1035 of the Revised Penal
Code. Prescinding therefrom, they contend that
there must first be a judgment of conviction
against their driver as a condition sine qua non to
hold them liable. Ergo, since the driver died
during the pendency of the criminal action,
the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary
liability was not fulfilled, hence the of lack of
cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs. They
further argue that since the plaintiffs did not
make a reservation to institute a separate action
for damages when the criminal case was filed,
the damage suit in question is thereby deemed
instituted with the criminal action. which was
already dismissed.
In an Order dated September 4, 2001,6 the trial
court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit and set the case for pre-trial. With their
motion for reconsideration having been denied
by the same court in its subsequent order7 of
September 26, 2001, the petitioners then went
on certiorari to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600,
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial judge in refusing to dismiss the basic
complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-
10845.
In the herein assailed decision8 dated April 25,
2003, the CA denied the petition and upheld the
trial court. Partly says the CA in its challenged
issuance:
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that the complaint neither
represents nor implies that the
responsibility charged was the
petitioner's subsidiary liability under
Art. 103, Revised Penal Code. As pointed
out [by the trial court] in the Order of
September 4, 2001, the complaint does
not even allege the basic elements for
such a liability, like the conviction of
the accused employee and his
insolvency. Truly enough, a civil action
to enforce subsidiary liability separate
and distinct from the criminal action is
even unnecessary.
xxx xxx xxx
Specifically, Civil Case No. 99-10845
exacts responsibility for fault or
negligence under Art. 2176, Civil Code,
which is
entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence
under the Revised Penal Code. Verily,
therefore, the liability under Art. 2180,
Civil Code, is direct and immediate, and
not conditioned upon prior recourse
against the negligent employee or prior
showing of the latter's insolvency.
(Underscoring in the original.)
In time, the petitioners moved for a
reconsideration but their motion was denied by
the CA in its resolution9 of July 10, 2003. Hence,
the petitioners' present recourse on their
submission that the appellate court committed
reversible error in upholding the trial court's
denial of their motion to dismiss.
We DENY.
As the Court sees it, the sole issue for resolution
is whether the spouses Vallejeras' cause of action
in Civil Case No. 99-10845 is founded on Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, as maintained by
the petitioners, or derived from Article 218010 of
the Civil Code, as ruled by the two courts below.
It thus behooves us to examine the allegations of
the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-
10845. That complaint alleged, inter alia, as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
3. That defendant [LG Food
Corporation] is the registered owner of
a Ford Fiera Van with Plate No. NMS
881 and employer sometime February
of 1996 of one Vincent Norman Yeneza
y Ferrer, a salesman of said
corporation;
4. That sometime February 26, 1996 at
around 2:00 P.M. at Rosario St., Bacolod
City, the minor son of said plaintiffs
[now respondents], Charles Vallejera, 7
years old, was hit and bumped by
above-described vehicle then driven by
said employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza
y Ferrer;
5. That the mishap was due to the gross
fault and negligence of defendant's
employee, who drove said vehicle,
recklessly, negligently and at a high
speed without regard to traffic
condition and safety of other road users
and likewise to the fault and negligence
of the owner employer, herein
defendants LG Food Corporation who
failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of his
employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y
Ferrer;
6. That as a result of said incident,
plaintiffs' son suffered multiple body
injuries which led to his untimely
demise on that very day;
7. That a criminal case was filed against
the defendant's employee, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 67787, (earlier filed
as Crim. Case No. 96-17570 before
RTC) before MTC-Branch III, entitled
"People v. Yeneza" for "Reckless
Imprudence resulting to Homicide," but
the same was dismissed because
pending litigation, then remorse-
stricken [accused] committed suicide;
xxx xxx xxx
8. That the injuries and complications
as well as the resultant death suffered
by the late minor Charles Vallejera
were due to the negligence and
imprudence of defendant's employee;
9. That defendant LG Foods
Corporation is civilly liable for the
negligence/imprudence of its
 employee since it failed to exercise
the necessary diligence required of a
good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of his
employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y
Ferrer which diligence if exercised,
would have prevented said
incident. (Bracketed words and
emphasis ours.)
Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests,
even remotely, that the herein petitioners are
being made to account for their subsidiary
liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code. As correctly pointed out by the trial court
in its order of September 4, 2001 denying the
petitioners' Motion to Dismiss, the complaint did
not even aver the basic elements for the
subsidiary liability of an employer under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior
conviction of the driver in the criminal case filed
against him nor his insolvency.
Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state
that plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the defendant
petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict.
Clear it is, however, from the allegations of the
complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of
remedy against the petitioners. To stress, the
plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross
fault and negligence on the part of the driver and
the failure of the petitioners, as employers, to
exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees. The spouses
further alleged that the petitioners are civilly
liable for the negligence/imprudence of their
driver since they failed to exercise the necessary
diligence required of a good father of the family
in the selection and supervision of their
employees, which diligence, if exercised, could
have prevented the vehicular accident that
resulted to the death of their 7-year old son.
Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure defines cause of action as the "act or
omission by which a party violates the right of
another." Such act or omission gives rise to an
obligation which may come from law,
contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-
delicts.11
Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to
another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil
liability ex delicto;12 and 2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an
act or omission complained of as felony (e.g.,
culpa contractual or obligations arising from
law;13 the intentional torts;14 and culpa
aquiliana15); or (b) where the injured party is
granted a right to file an action independent and
distinct from the criminal action.16 Either of
these two possible liabilities may be enforced
against the offender.17
Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their
heirs have a choice between an action to enforce
the civil liability arising from culpa
criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa
aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the
Civil Code. If, as here, the action chosen is
for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the
employer liable for the negligent act of its
employee, subject to the employer's defense of
exercise of the diligence of a good father of the
family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is
for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the
employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of
prior conviction of its employee.18
Article 116119 of the Civil Code provides that
civil obligation arising from criminal offenses
shall be governed by penal laws subject to the
provision of Article 217720 and of the pertinent
provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on
Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book,
regulating damages. Plainly, Article 2177
provides for the alternative remedies the
plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation
has the possibility of arising indirectly from the
delict/crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort.
The choice is with the plaintiff who makes
known his cause of action in his initiatory
pleading or complaint,21 and not with the
defendant who can not ask for the dismissal of
the plaintiff's cause of action or lack of it based
on the defendant's perception that the plaintiff
should have opted to file a claim under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability
of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of
insolvency of such employee.22
Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the
death of the couple's minor son was caused by
the negligent act of the petitioners' driver; and
that the petitioners themselves were civilly liable action for damages when the criminal case
for the negligence of their driver for failing "to against the driver was filed.
exercise the necessary diligence required of a The argument is specious.
good father of the family in the selection and To start with, the petitioners' reliance
supervision of [their] employee, the driver, on Maniago is obviously misplaced. There, the
which diligence, if exercised, would have civil case was filed while the criminal case
prevented said accident." against the employee was still pending. Here, the
Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the criminal case against the employee driver was
petitioners based on Article 103 of the Revised prematurely terminated due to his death.
Penal Code, they would have alleged that the Precisely, Civil Case No. 99-10845 was filed by
guilt of the driver had been proven beyond the respondent spouses because no remedy can
reasonable doubt; that such accused driver is be obtained by them against the petitioners with
insolvent; that it is the subsidiary liability of the the dismissal of the criminal case against their
defendant petitioners as employers to pay for driver during the pendency thereof.
the damage done by their employee (driver) The circumstance that no reservation to institute
based on the principle that every person a separate civil action for damages was made
criminally liable is also civilly liable.23 Since when the criminal case was filed is of no moment
there was no conviction in the criminal case for the simple reason that the criminal case was
against the driver, precisely because death dismissed without any pronouncement having
intervened prior to the termination of the been made therein. In reality, therefor, it is as if
criminal proceedings, the spouses' recourse was, there was no criminal case to speak of in the first
therefore, to sue the petitioners for their direct place. And for the petitioners to insist for the
and primary liability based on quasi-delict. conviction of their driver as a condition sine qua
Besides, it is worthy to note that the petitioners, non to hold them liable for damages is to ask for
in their Answer with Compulsory Counter- the impossible.
Claim,24 repeatedly made mention of Article IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition
2180 of the Civil Code and anchored their is DENIED for lack of merit.
defense on their allegation that "they had Costs against the petitioners.
exercised due diligence in the selection and SO ORDERED.
supervision of [their] employees." The Court
views this defense as an admission that indeed
the petitioners acknowledged the private
respondents' cause of action as one for quasi-
delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
All told, Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence
suit brought under Article 2176 - Civil Code to
recover damages primarily from the petitioners
as employers responsible for their negligent
driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible. Thus, the employer is
liable for damages caused by his employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former is
not engaged in any business or industry.
Citing Maniago v. CA,25 petitioner would argue
that Civil Case No. 99-10845 should have been
dismissed for failure of the respondent spouses
to make a reservation to institute a separate civil
G.R. No. 161075 July 15, 2013
RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An independent civil action based on fraud
initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a
prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a
pending criminal prosecution of the defendant
for estafa through falsification. This is because
the result of the independent civil action is
irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The Case
On appeal is the amended decision promulgated
on August 18, 2003,1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) granted the writ of certiorari upon
petition by the State in C.A.-G.R. No. 71252
entitled People v. Han. Winlove M Dumayas,
Presiding Judge, Branch 59, Regional Trial Court,
Makati City and Rafael Consing, Jr., and set aside
the assailed order issued on November 26, 2001
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, in
Makati City deferring the arraignment of
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-120 entitled
People v. Rafael Consing, Jr. upon his motion on
the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question in the civil cases pending between him
and the complainant in the trial courts in Pasig
City and Makati City.
Antecedents
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for
himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la
Cruz) various loans totaling ₱18,000,000.00
from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were
secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on
a parcel of land (property) covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-687599 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite
registered under the name of de la Cruz.2 In
accordance with its option to purchase the
mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to
purchase one-half of the property for a total
consideration of ₱21,221,500.00. Payment was
effected by off-setting the amounts due to
Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la
Cruz and Consing in the amount of
₱18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount
of ₱3,145,946.50. The other half of the property
was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus
Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital.3
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could
develop the property, they learned that the title
to the property was really TCT No. 114708 in the
names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the
parties from whom the property had been
allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599
held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious.4
On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of
the total amount of ₱41,377,851.48 as of April
19, 1999 that had been paid to and received by
de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the
demands.5
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No.
1759 in the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC)
(Pasig civil case) for injunctive relief, thereby
seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding
against him for the collection of the
₱41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had acted
as a mere agent of his mother.
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal
complaint for estafa through falsification of
public document against Consing and de la Cruz
in the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office.6
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in
the RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418)
for the recovery of a sum of money and damages,
with an application for a writ of preliminary
attachment (Makati civil case).7
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati City filed against Consing
and De la Cruz an information for estafa through
falsification of public document in the RTC in
Makati City (Criminal Case No. 00-120), which
was assigned to Branch 60 (Makati criminal
case).8
On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer
his arraignment in the Makati criminal case on
the ground of existence of a prejudicial question
due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil
cases. On September 25, 2001, Consing
reiterated his motion for deferment of his
arraignment, citing the additional ground of
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the CA. On
November 19, 2001, the Prosecution opposed
the motion.9
On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order
suspending the proceedings in the Makati
criminal case on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question, and on March 18, 2001, the
RTC denied the Prosecution’s motion for
reconsideration.10
The State thus assailed in the CA the last two
orders of the RTC in the Makati criminal case via
petition for certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252).
On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its
decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252,11 dismissing
the petition for certiorari and upholding the
RTC’s questioned orders, explaining:
Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial
to the Cavite and Makati criminal cases?
We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in
the Pasig case, i.e. whether or not private
respondent may be held liable in the questioned
transaction, will determine the guilt or
innocence of private respondent Consing in both
the Cavite and Makati criminal cases.
The analysis and comparison of the Pasig civil
case, Makati criminal case, Makati civil case and
Cavite criminal case show that: (1) the parties
are identical; (2) the transactions in controversy
are identical; (3) the Transfer Certificate of Titles
(TCT) involved are identical; (4) the questioned
Deeds of Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5) the
dates in question are identical; and (6) the issue
of private respondent’s culpability for the
questioned transactions is identical in all the
proceedings.
As discussed earlier, not only was the issue
raised in the Pasig civil case identical to or
intimately related to the criminal cases in Cavite
and Makati. The similarities also extend to the
parties in the cases and the TCT and Deed of
Sale/ Mortgage involved in the questioned
transactions.
The respondent Judge, in ordering the
suspension of the arraignment of private
respondent in the Makati case, in view of CA-G.R.
SP No. 63712, where Unicapital was not a party
thereto, did so pursuant to its mandatory power
to take judicial notice of an official act of another
judicial authority. It was also a better legal tack
to prevent multiplicity of action, to which our
legal system abhors.
Applying the Tuanda ruling, the pendency of CA-
G.R. SP No. 63712 may be validly invoked to
suspend private respondent’s arraignment in the
Makati City criminal case, notwithstanding the
fact that CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 was an offshoot,
merely, in the Cavite criminal case.12
In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus
Builders commenced its own suit for damages
against Consing (Civil Case No. 99-95381) in the
RTC in Manila (Manila civil case).13
On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa
through falsification of public document was
filed against Consing and De la Cruz in the RTC in
Imus, Cavite, docketed as Criminal Case No.
7668-00 and assigned to Branch 21 (Cavite
criminal case). Consing filed a motion to defer
the arraignment on the ground of the existence
of a prejudicial question, i.e., the pendency of the
Pasig and Manila civil cases. On January 27,
2000, however, the RTC handling the Cavite
criminal case denied Consing’s motion. Later on,
it also denied his motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, Consing commenced in the CA a
special civil action for certiorari with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction
(C.A.-G.R. SP No. 63712), seeking to enjoin his
arraignment and trial in the Cavite criminal case.
The CA granted the TRO on March 19, 2001, and
later promulgated its decision on May 31, 2001,
granting Consing’ petition for certiorari and
setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of the
RTC, and permanently enjoining the RTC from
proceeding with the arraignment and trial until
the Pasig and Manila civil cases had been finally
decided.
Not satisfied, the State assailed the decision of
the CA in this Court (G.R. No. 148193), praying
for the reversal of the May 31, 2001 decision of
the CA. On January 16, 2003, the Court granted
the petition for review in G.R. No. 148193, and
reversed and set aside the May 31, 2001 decision
of the CA,14 viz:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question
that would justify the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite
criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA
1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is
whether or not respondent (Consing) merely
acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la
Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the
Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment,
the question is whether respondent and his
mother are liable to pay damages and to return
the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the
disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared
merely an agent of his mother in the transaction
involving the sale of the questioned lot, he
cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability.
An agent or any person may be held liable for
conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence,
the determination of the issue involved in Civil
Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is
irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the
respondent in the criminal case for estafa
through falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBI’s right to be paid
damages and the purchase price of the lot in
question will not be determinative of the
culpability of the respondent in the criminal case
for even if PBI is held entitled to the return of the
purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso
facto follow that respondent should be held
guilty of estafa through falsification of public
document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court
in the civil case that PBI should not be paid the
purchase price plus damages will not necessarily
absolve respondent of liability in the criminal
case where his guilt may still be established
under penal laws as determined by other
evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question
if the civil and the criminal action can, according
to law, proceed independently of each other.
Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however,
may the offended party recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, the petitioner was
accused in a criminal case for violation of Article
319 of the Revised Penal Code, for executing a
new chattel mortgage on personal property in
favor of another party without consent of the
previous mortgagee. Thereafter, the offended
party filed a civil case for termination of
management contract, one of the causes of action
of which consisted of petitioner having executed
a chattel mortgage while the previous chattel
mortgage was still valid and subsisting.
Petitioner moved that the arraignment and trial
of the criminal case be held in abeyance on the
ground that the civil case was a prejudicial
question, the resolution of which was necessary
before the criminal proceedings could proceed.
The trial court denied the suspension of the
criminal case on the ground that no prejudicial
question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial
court and ruled that:
… the resolution of the liability of the defendant
in the civil case on the eleventh cause of action
based on the fraudulent misrepresentation that
the chattel mortgage the defendant executed in
favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20,
1957, that his D-6 "Caterpillar" Tractor with
Serial No. 9-U-6565 was "free from all liens and
encumbrances" will not determine the criminal
liability of the accused in the said Criminal Case
No. 56042 for violation of paragraph 2 of Article
319 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even
granting for the sake of argument, a prejudicial
question is involved in this case, the fact remains
that both the crime charged in the information in
the criminal case and the eleventh cause of
action in the civil case are based upon fraud,
hence both the civil and criminal cases could
proceed independently of the other pursuant to
Article 33 of the new Civil Code which provides:
"In cases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action
shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence." (j) That, therefore,
the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders
referred to in the instant petition was not made
with "grave abuse of discretion."
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for
Damages and Attachment on account of the
alleged fraud committed by respondent and his
mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of the criminal case at bar.15
Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the
State moved for the reconsideration of the
adverse decision of the CA, citing the ruling in
G.R. No. 148193, supra, to the effect that the
Pasig and Manila civil cases did not present a
prejudicial question that justified the suspension
of the proceedings in the Cavite criminal case,
and claiming that under the ruling in G.R. No.
148193, the Pasig and Makati civil cases did not
raise a prejudicial question that would cause the
suspension of the Makati criminal case.
In his opposition to the State’s motion for
reconsideration, Consing contended that the
ruling in G.R. No. 148193 was not binding
because G.R. No. 148193 involved Plus Builders,
which was different from Unicapital, the
complainant in the Makati criminal case. He
added that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 did
not yet become final and executory, and could
still be reversed at any time, and thus should not
control as a precedent to be relied upon; and that
he had acted as an innocent attorney-in-fact for
his mother, and should not be held personally
liable under a contract that had involved
property belonging to his mother as his
principal.
On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its
decision, reversing itself. It relied upon the ruling
in G.R. No. 148193, and held thusly:
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is similar with the case at
bench. The transactions in controversy, the
documents involved; the issue of the
respondent’s culpability for the questioned
transactions are all identical in all the
proceedings; and it deals with the same parties
with the exception of private complainant
Unicapital.
However, the Supreme Court, upon review of CA-
G.R. SP No. 63712, People of the Philippines vs.
Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. (G.R. No. 148193, January
16, 2003) held that "Civil Case No. 99-95381, for
Damages and attachment on account of alleged
fraud committed by respondent and his mother
in selling the disputed lot to Plus Builders, Inc. is
an independent civil action under Article 33 of
the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of the criminal case at bar." In view
of the aforementioned decision of the Supreme
Court, We are thus amending Our May 20, 2003
decision.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration is GRANTED. The Orders dated
November 26, 2001 and March 18, 2002 issued
by the respondent Judge are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing of Criminal
Case No. 00-120 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.16
Consing filed a motion for reconsideration,17 but
the CA denied the motion through the second
assailed resolution of December 11, 2003.18
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue
Petitioner reiterates his contention that the
decision in G.R. No. 148193 was not controlling
in relation to C.A.-G.R. No. 71252, which involved
Plus Builders, not Unicapital, the complainant in
Criminal Case No. 00-120. He posits that in
arriving at its amended decision, the CA did not
consider the pendency of the Makati civil case
(Civil Case No. 99-1418), which raised a
prejudicial question, considering that the
resolution of such civil action would include the
issue of whether he had falsified a certificate of
title or had willfully defrauded Unicapital, the
resolution of either of which would determine
his guilt or innocence in Criminal Case No. 00-
120.
In its comment,19 the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) counters that Unicapital brought
the Makati civil case as an independent civil
action intended to exact civil liability separately
from Criminal Case No. 00-120 in a manner fully
authorized under Section 1(a) and Section 2,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.20 It argues that
the CA correctly took cognizance of the ruling in
G.R. No. 148193, holding in its challenged
amended decision that the Makati civil case, just
like the Manila civil case, was an independent
civil action instituted by virtue of Article 33 of
the Civil Code; that the Makati civil case did not
raise a prejudicial question that justified the
suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120; and that
as finally settled in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig
civil case did not also raise any prejudicial
question, because the sole issue thereat was
whether Consing, as the mere agent of his
mother, had any obligation or liability toward
Unicapital.
In his reply,21 Consing submits that the Pasig
civil case that he filed and Unicapital’s Makati
civil case were not intended to delay the
resolution of Criminal Case No. 00-120, nor to
pre-empt such resolution; and that such civil
cases could be validly considered determinative
of whether a prejudicial question existed to
warrant the suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-
120.
Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of
the existence of a prejudicial question that
warranted the suspension of the proceedings in
the Makati criminal case?
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari is
absolutely meritless.
Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore
the firm holding in the ruling in G.R. No. 148193
to the effect that the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 00-120 could not be suspended because
the Makati civil case was an independent civil
action, while the Pasig civil case raised no
prejudicial question. That was wrong for him to
do considering that the ruling fully applied to
him due to the similarity between his case with
Plus Builders and his case with Unicapital.
A perusal of Unicapital’s complaint in the Makati
civil case reveals that the action was predicated
on fraud. This was apparent from the allegations
of Unicapital in its complaint to the effect that
Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a "wanton,
fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in
offering as security and later object of sale, a
property which they do not own, and foisting to
the public a spurious title."22 As such, the action
was one that could proceed independently of
Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33
of the Civil Code, which states as follows:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
It is well settled that a civil action based on
defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be
independently instituted pursuant to Article 33
of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of a criminal case.23 This was
precisely the Court’s thrust in G.R. No. 148193,
thus:
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question
if the civil and the criminal action can, according
to law, proceed independently of each other.
Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence,
the criminal action and shall require only a the determination of the issue involved in Civil
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is
may the offended party recover damages twice irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the
for the same act or omission charged in the respondent in the criminal case for estafa
criminal action. through falsification of public
xxxx document.25 (Words in parentheses supplied;
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Damages and Attachment on account of the WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the amended
alleged fraud committed by respondent and his decision promulgated on August 18, 2003; and
mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
independent civil action under Article 33 of the SO ORDERED.
Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of the criminal case at bar.24
Contrary to Consing’s stance, it was not
improper for the CA to apply the ruling in G.R.
No. 148193 to his case with Unicapital, for,
although the Manila and Makati civil cases
involved different complainants (i.e., Plus
Builders and Unicapital), the civil actions Plus
Builders and Unicapital had separately instituted
against him were undeniably of similar mold, i.e.,
they were both based on fraud, and were thus
covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code. Clearly,
the Makati criminal case could not be suspended
pending the resolution of the Makati civil case
that Unicapital had filed.
As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the
issue of Consing’s being a mere agent of his
mother who should not be criminally liable for
having so acted due to the property involved
having belonged to his mother as principal has
also been settled in G.R. No. 148193, to wit:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question
that would justify the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite
criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA
1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is
whether or not respondent (Consing) merely
acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la
Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the
Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment,
the question is whether respondent and his
mother are liable to pay damages and to return
the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the
disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared
merely an agent of his mother in the transaction
involving the sale of the questioned lot, he
cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability.
An agent or any person may be held liable for
[G.R. No. 122823. November 25, 1999]
SEA COMMERCIAL COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, JAMANDRE INDUSTRIES,
INC. and TIRSO
JAMANDRE, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
In this petition for review by certiorari, SEA
Commercial Company, Inc. (SEACOM) assails the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
NO. 31263 affirming in toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5, in Civil
Case No. 122391, in favor of Jamandre
Industries, Inc. (JII) et al., the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff,
ordering the plaintiff:
1) To pay defendant the sum of P66,156.15
(minus 18,843.85) with legal interest thereon,
from the date of the filing of the counterclaim
until fully paid;
2) To pay defendant P2,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages;
3) To pay attorneys fees in the sum
of P10,000.00; and
4) To pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
SEACOM is a corporation engaged in the
business of selling and distributing agricultural
machinery, products and equipment. On
September 20, 1966, SEACOM and JII entered
into a dealership agreement whereby SEACOM
appointed JII as its exclusive dealer in the City
and Province of Iloilo[1] Tirso Jamandre executed
a suretyship agreement binding himself jointly
and severally with JII to pay for all obligations of
JII to SEACOM[2]. The agreement was
subsequently amended to include Capiz in the
territorial coverage and to make the dealership
agreement on a non-exclusive basis[3]. In the
course of the business relationship arising from
the dealership agreement, JII allegedly incurred a
balance of P18,843.85 for unpaid deliveries, and
SEACOM brought action to recover said amount
plus interest and attorneys fees.
JII filed an Answer denying the obligation
and interposing a counterclaim for damages
representing unrealized profits when JII sold to
the Farm System Development Corporation
(FSDC) twenty one (21) units of Mitsubishi
power tillers. In the counterclaim, JII alleged that
as a dealer in Capiz, JII contracted to sell in 1977
twenty-four (24) units of Mitsubishi power
tillers to a group of farmers to be financed by
said corporation, which fact JII allegedly made
known to petitioner, but the latter taking
advantage of said information and in bad faith,
went directly to FSDC and dealt with it and sold
twenty one (21) units of said tractors, thereby
depriving JII of unrealized profit of eighty-five
thousand four hundred fifteen and 61/100 pesos
(P85,415.61).
The trial court rendered its decision on
January 24, 1990 ordering JII to pay SEACOM the
amount of Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred
Forty Three and 85/100 (P18,843.85)
representing its outstanding obligation. The trial
court likewise granted JIIs counterclaim for
unrealized profits, and for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney fees as above quoted.
SEACOM appealed the decision on the
counterclaim.
The Court of Appeals held that while there
exists no agency relationship between SEACOM
and JII, SEACOM is liable for damages and
unrealized profits to JII.
This Court, however, is convinced that with or
without the existence of an agency relationship
between appellant SEACOM and appellee JII and
notwithstanding the error committed by the
lower court in finding that an agency
relationship existed between appellant and
defendant corporation the former is liable for the
unrealized profits which the latter could have
gained had not appellant unjustly stepped in and
in bad faith unethically intervened.
It should be emphasized that the very purpose of
the dealership agreement is for SEACOM to have
JII as its dealer to sell its products in the
provinces of Capiz and Iloilo. In view of this
agreement, the second assigned error that the
lower court erred in holding that appellant
learned of the FSDC transaction from defendant
JII is clearly immaterial and devoid of merit. The
fact that the dealership is on a non-exclusive
basis does not entitle appellant SEACOM to join
the fray as against its dealer. To do so, is to
violate the norms of conduct enjoined by Art. 19
of the Civil Code. By virtue of such agreement,
the competition in the market as regards the sale
of farm equipment shall be between JII, as the
dealer of SEACOM and other companies, not as
against SEACOM itself. However, SEACOM, not
satisfied with the presence of its dealer JII in the
market, joined the competition even as the
against the latter and, therefore, changed the
scenario of the competition thereby rendering
inutile the dealership agreement which they
entered into the manifest prejudice of JII. Hence,
the trial court was correct when it applied Art.
19 of the Civil Code in the case at bar in that
appellant SEACOM acted in bad faith when it
competed with its own dealer as regards the sale
of farm machineries, thereby depriving appellee
JII of the opportunity to gain a clear profit of
P85,000.00.
and affirmed the judgment appealed from in toto.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari,
which submits the following reasons for the
allowance thereof:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
DECIDED QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY
NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE, CONSIDERING THAT:
A therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER
IS LIABLE TO PAY DAMAGES AND UNREALIZED
PROFITS TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO AGENCY
RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN THEM.
B informed SEACOM about the preference of the
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER
ACTED IN BAD FAITH AGAINST THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT CORPORATION DESPITE THE
FACT THAT SAID RULING IS CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
C cannot be bound by the listing made by
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE NON-
EXCLUSIVITY CLAUSE IN THE DEALERSHIP
AGREEMENT EXECUTED BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT
CORPORATION PRECLUDES THE PETITIONER
FROM COMPETING WITH THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT CORPORATION.
D farm equipment. With respect to the awards of
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO UNREALIZED
PROFITS, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
AND ATTORNEYS FEES.[4]
Petitioner SEACOM disputes the conclusion
of the Court of Appeals that despite the fact that
no agency relationship existed between the
parties, the SEACOM is still liable in damages and
unrealized profits for the reason that it acted in
bad faith. Petitioner SEACOM invokes the non-
exclusivity clause in the dealership agreement
and claims that the transaction with FSDC was
concluded pursuant to a public bidding and not
on the basis of alleged information it received
from private respondent Tirso
Jamandre. Moreover, petitioner SEACOM claims
that it did not underprice its products during the
public bidding wherein both SEACOM and JII
participated. Petitioner also disputes the award
of moral damages to JII which is a corporation, in
the absence of any evidence that the said
corporation had a good reputation which was
debased.
Private respondents in their comment,
contends that the four assigned errors raise
mixed questions of fact and law and are
Court which may take cognizance of only
questions of law. The assigned errors were also
refuted to secure affirmance of the appealed
decision. JII maintains that the bidding set by
FSDC on March 24, 1997 was scheduled after the
demonstration conducted by JII, and after JII
farmers to buy Mitsubishi tillers. JII further
rebuts the SEACOMs contention that the
transaction with FSDC was pursuant to a public
bidding with full disclosure to the public and
private respondent JII considering that JII had
nothing to do with the list of 37 bidders and
SEACOMs employee; moreover, JII did not
participate in the bidding not having been
informed about it.Furthermore, the price at
which SEACOM sold to FSDC was lower than the
price it gave to JII. Also, even if the dealership
agreement was not exclusive, it was breached
when petitioner in bad faith sold directly to FSDC
with whom JII had previously offered the subject
moral and exemplary damages, JII seeks an
affirmation of the ruling of the Court of Appeals
justifying the awards.
 SEACOM filed Reply defending the
jurisdiction of this Court over the instant petition
since the decision of the Court of Appeals was
based on a misapprehension of facts. SEACOM
insists that FSDCs purchase was made pursuant
to a public bidding, and even if SEACOM did not
participate thereon, JII would not necessarily
have closed the deal since thirty seven (37)
bidders participated. SEACOM contends that no
evidence was presented to prove that the
bidding was a fraudulent scheme of SEACOM and
FSDC. SEACOM further controverts JIIs
contention that JII did not take part in the
bidding as Tirso Jamandre was one of the
bidders and that SEACOM underpriced its
products to entice FSDC to buy directly from
it. In fine, JII is not entitled to the award of
unrealized profits and damages.
In its Rejoinder, private respondents insist
that there is an agency relationship, citing the
evidence showing that credit memos and not
cash vouchers were issued to JII by SEACOM for
every delivery from November 26, 1976 to
December 24, 1978. Private respondents
maintain that SEACOM torpedoed the emerging
deal between JII and FSDC after being informed
about it by JII by dealing directly with FSDC at a
lower price and after betraying JII, SEACOM
would cover up the deceit by conniving with
FSDC to post up a sham public bidding.
SEACOMs sur-rejoinder contains basically a
reiteration of its contention in previous
pleadings. Additionally, it is contended that
private respondents are barred from questioning
in their Rejoinder, the finding of the Court of
Appeals that there is no agency relationship
between the parties since this matter was not
raised as error in their comment.
The core issue is whether SEACOM acted in
bad faith when it competed with its own dealer
as regards the sale of farm machineries to FSDC.
Both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals held affirmatively; the trial court found
that JII was an agent of SEACOM and the act of
SEACOM in dealing directly with FSDC was
unfair and unjust to its agent, and that there was
fraud in the transaction between FSDC and
SEACOM to the prejudice of JII. On the other
hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was
no agency relationship between the parties but
SEACOM is nevertheless liable in damages for
having acted in bad faith when it competed with
its own dealer in the sale of the farm machineries
to FSDC. Both courts invoke as basis for the
award Article 19 of the Civil Code which reads as
follows:
"Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith.
The principle of abuse of rights stated in
the above article, departs from the classical
theory that he who uses a right injures no
one. The modern tendency is to depart from the
classical and traditional theory, and to grant
indemnity for damages in cases where there is
an abuse of rights, even when the act is not
illicit.[5]
Article 19 was intended to expand the
concept of torts by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to
provide specifically in statutory law.[6] If mere
fault or negligence in ones acts can make him
liable for damages for injury caused thereby,
with more reason should abuse or bad faith
make him liable. The absence of good faith is
essential to abuse of right. Good faith is an
honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another, even
through the forms or technicalities of the law,
together with an absence of all information or
belief of fact which would render the transaction
unconscientious. In business relations, it means
good faith as understood by men of affairs.[7]
While Article 19 may have been intended
as a mere declaration of principle[8], the cardinal
law on human conduct expressed in said article
has given rise to certain rules, e.g. that where a
person exercises his rights but does so
arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a
manner that is not in keeping with honesty and
good faith, he opens himself to liability.[9] The
elements of an abuse of rights under Article 19
are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.[10]
The issue whether JII is entitled to recovery
on its counterclaim for unrealized profit in the
twenty one (21) units of Mitsubishi power tillers
sold by SEACOM to FSDC was resolved by the
trial court in favor of JII on the basis of
documentary evidence[11] showing that (1) JII
has informed SEACOM as early as February 1977
of the promotions undertaken by JII for the sale
of 24 contracted units to FSDC and in connection
therewith, requested a 50% discount to make
the price competitive, and to increase the
warranty period for eight months to one year. In
said letter Jamandre clarified that they were not
amenable to SEACOMs offering directly to FSDC
and to be only given the usual overriding
commission as we have considerable
investments on this transaction. (2) In response,
the general sales manager of SEACOM declined
to give the requested 50% discount and offered a
less 30% less 10% up to end March xxx on cash
before delivery basis, granted the requested
extension of the warranty period and stated that
we are glad to note that you have quite a number
of units pending with the FSDC.
The trial court ruled that with said
information, SEACOM dealt directly with FSDC
and offered its units at a lower price, leaving
FSDC no choice but to accept the said offer of
(SEACOM).
In affirming the judgment of the of the trial
court, the Court of Appeals held that by virtue of
the dealership agreement the competition in the
market as regards the sale of farm equipment
shall be between JII, as the dealer of SEACOM,
and other companies, not as against SEACOM
itself, the Court stated:
However, SEACOM not satisfied with the
presence of its dealer JII in the market, joined the
competition even as against the latter, and
thereby changed the scenario of the competition
thereby rendering inutile the dealership
agreement which they entered into to the
manifest prejudice of JII. Hence the trial court
trial court was correct when it applied Art. 19 of
the Civil Code in the case at bar in that appellant
SEACOM acted in bad faith when it competed
with its own dealer as regards the sale of farm
machineries, thereby depriving appellee JII of the
opportunity to gain a clear profit of P85,000.00.
We find no cogent reason to overturn the
factual finding of the two courts that SEACOM
joined the bidding for the sale of the farm
equipment after it was informed that JII was
already promoting the sales of said equipment to
the FSDC. Moreover, the conclusion of the trial
court that the SEACOM offered FSDC a lower
price than the price offered by JII to FSDC is
supported by the evidence: the price offered by
JII to FSDC is P27,167 per unit[12] but the prices
at which SEACOM sold to FSDC were
at P22,867.00 for Model CT 83-2, P21,093.50 for
model CT 83-E, and P18,979.25 for model CT
534. The fact that SEACOM may have offered to
JII, in lieu of a requested 50% discount, a
discount effectively translating to 37% of the list
price and actually sold to FSDC at 35% less than
the list price[13] does not detract from the fact
that by participating in the bidding of FSDC, it
actually competed with its own dealer who had
earlier conducted demonstrations and promoted
its own products for the sale of the very same
equipment, Exh. N for the plaintiff confirms that
both SEACOM and Jamandre participated in the
bidding.[14] However, the SEACOM was awarded
the contract directly from Manila.[15] The
testimony of Tirso Jamandre that JII was the sole
representative of SEACOM in the local
demonstrations to convince the farmers and
cooperative officers to accept the Mitsubishi
brand of equipment in preference to other
brands, was unrebutted by SEACOM.
Clearly, the bad faith of SEACOM was
established. By appointing as a dealer of its
agricultural equipment, SEACOM recognized the
role and undertaking of JII to promote and sell
said equipment. Under the dealership
agreement, JII was to act as a middleman to sell
SEACOMs products, in its area of operations, i.e.
Iloilo and Capiz provinces, to the exclusion of
other places,[16] to send its men to Manila for
training on repair, servicing and installation of
the items to be handled by it, and to comply with
other personnel and vehicle requirements
intended for the benefit of the
dealership.[17] After being informed of the
demonstrations JII had conducted to promote
the sales of SEACOM equipment, including the
operations at JIIs expense conducted for five
months, and the approval of its facilities (service
and parts) by FSDC,[18] SEACOM participated in
the bidding for the said equipment at a lower
price, placing itself in direct competition with its
own dealer. The actuations of SEACOM are
tainted by bad faith.
Even if the dealership agreement was
amended to make it on a non-exclusive
basis,[19] SEACOM may not exercise its right
unjustly or in a manner that is not in keeping
with honesty or good faith; otherwise it opens
itself to liability under the abuse of right rule
embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code above-
quoted. This provision, together with the
succeeding article on human relation, was
intended to embody certain basic principles that
are to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the stability of
the social order.[20] What is sought to be written
into the law is the pervading principle of equity
and justice above strict legalism.[21]
We accordingly resolve to affirm the award
for unrealized profits. The Court of Appeals
noted that the trial court failed to specify to
which the two appellees the award for moral and
exemplary damages is granted. However, in view
of the fact that moral damages are not as a
general rule granted to a corporation, and that
Tirso Jamandre was the one who testified on his
feeling very aggrieved and on his mental anguish
and sleepless nights thinking of how SEACOM
dealt with us behind (our) backs,[22] the award
should go to defendant Jamandre, President of
JII.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from
is AFFIRMED with the modification that the
award of P2,000.00 in moral and exemplary
damages shall be paid to defendant Tirso
Jamandre.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP.,
and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.
Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.
Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.
CORTES, J.:
Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was
employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and
Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual
capacity as a purchasing agent and
administrative assistant to the engineering
operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY
discovered fictitious purchases and other
fraudulent transactions for which it lost several
thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who
actually discovered the anomalies and reported
them on November 10, 1972 to his immediate
superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner
Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive
Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE
MACKAY.
On November 11, 1972, one day after private
respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner
Hendry confronted him by stating that he was
the number one suspect, and ordered him to take
a one week forced leave, not to communicate
with the office, to leave his table drawers open,
and to leave the office keys.
On November 20, 1972, when private
respondent Tobias returned to work after the
forced leave, petitioner Hendry went up to him
and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias
was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He
was also instructed to submit specimen of his
handwriting, signature, and initials for
examination by the police investigators to
determine his complicity in the anomalies.
On December 6,1972, the Manila police
investigators submitted a laboratory crime
report (Exh. "A") clearing private respondent of
participation in the anomalies.
Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners
hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G.
Fernandez, who on December 10, 1972,
submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias
guilty. This report however expressly stated that
further investigation was still to be conducted.
Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner
Hendry issued a memorandum suspending
Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of
criminal charges against him.
On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle,
Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner,
after investigating other documents pertaining
to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted
a second laboratory crime report (Exh. "B")
reiterating his previous finding that the
handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing
in the checks and other documents involved in
the fraudulent transactions were not those of
Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on
Tobias also yielded negative results.
Notwithstanding the two police reports
exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the
fact that the report of the private investigator,
was, by its own terms, not yet complete,
petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a
complaint for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents, later amended to just
estafa. Subsequently five other criminal
complaints were filed against Tobias, four of
which were for estafa through Falsification of
commercial document while the fifth was for of
Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code
(Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of
Correspondence).lâwphî1.ñèt Two of these
complaints were refiled with the Judge Advocate
General's Office, which however, remanded them
to the fiscal's office. All of the six criminal
complaints were dismissed by the fiscal.
Petitioners appealed four of the fiscal's
resolutions dismissing the criminal complaints
with the Secretary of Justice, who, however,
affirmed their dismissal.
In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias
received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that
his employment has been terminated effective
December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed
the labor arbiter's decision. However, the
Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal
from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor
arbiter's decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary
of Labor's order with the Office of the President.
During the pendency of the appeal with said
office, petitioners and private respondent Tobias
entered into a compromise agreement regarding
the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with
the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO).
However, petitioner Hendry, without being
asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter
stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE
MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for
damages anchored on alleged unlawful,
malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of
petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness,
did not testify during the hearings. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, through
Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in
favor of private respondent by ordering
petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos
(P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral
damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the
Court of Appeals. On the other hand, Tobias
appealed as to the amount of damages. However,
the Court of Appeals, an a decision dated August
31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having
been denied, the instant petition for review
on certiorari was filed.
The main issue in this case is whether or not
petitioners are liable for damages to private
respondent.
Petitioners contend that they could not be made
liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their
right to dismiss private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent contends
that because of petitioners' abusive manner in
dismissing him as well as for the inhuman
treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must
indemnify him for the damage that he had
suffered.
One of the more notable innovations of the New
Civil Code is the codification of "some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE
CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers
of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the
old Code which merely stated the effects of the
law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated
certain fundamental precepts which were
"designed to indicate certain norms that spring
from the fountain of good conscience" and which
were also meant to serve as "guides for human
conduct [that] should run as golden threads
through society, to the end that law may
approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway
and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among
these principles is that pronounced in Article 19
which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed
not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in
the performance of one's duties. These standards
are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and
good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth
in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though
by itself legal because recognized or granted by
law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be held responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the government
of human relations and for the maintenance of
social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising
from a violation of law, provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who
contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim
that they did not violate any provision of law
since they were merely exercising their legal
right to dismiss private respondent. This does
not, however, leave private respondent with no
relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code
provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the
damage.
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless
gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims
of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have
actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.]
should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for
that untold number of moral wrongs which it is
impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes" [Id. it p. 40; See
also PNB v. CA, G.R. No. L-27155, May 18,1978,
83 SCRA 237, 247].
In determining whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid
test which can be applied. While the Court has
not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the
legal and factual circumstances called for its
application [See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co. of the
Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v.
CA, supra; Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v.
Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979,
94 SCRA 953; PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July
31,1981,106 SCRA 391; United General
Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-30205, March
15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA, G.R. No.
50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] the
question of whether or not the principle of abuse
of rights has been violated resulting in damages
under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable
provision of law, depends on the circumstances
of each case. And in the instant case, the Court,
after examining the record and considering
certain significant circumstances, finds that all
petitioners have indeed abused the right that
they invoke, causing damage to private
respondent and for which the latter must now be
indemnified.
The trial court made a finding that
notwithstanding the fact that it was private
respondent Tobias who reported the possible
existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner
Hendry "showed belligerence and told plaintiff
(private respondent herein) that he was the
number one suspect and to take a one week
vacation leave, not to communicate with the
office, to leave his table drawers open, and to
leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner
Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This,
petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of
whether or not it was private respondent Tobias
who reported the anomalies to petitioners, the
latter's reaction towards the former upon
uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An
employer who harbors suspicions that an
employee has committed dishonesty might be
justified in taking the appropriate action such as
ordering an investigation and directing the
employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the
resolve to uncover the truth would also be
expected from such employer. But the high-
handed treatment accorded Tobias by
petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this
reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to
continue when private respondent returned to
work on November 20, 1972 after his one week
forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias
was confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you
are the crook and swindler in this company."
Considering that the first report made by the
police investigators was submitted only on
December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the statement
made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern
of harassment during the investigations of
Tobias transgress the standards of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
The Court has already ruled that the right of the
employer to dismiss an employee should not be
confused with the manner in which the right is
exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If
the dismissal is done abusively, then the
employer is liable for damages to the employee
[Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood
Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA
771; See also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v.
Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September 27,1966, 18
SCRA 107] Under the circumstances of the
instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to
exercise in a legitimate manner their right to
dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to
recover damages under Article 19 in relation to
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
But petitioners were not content with just
dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts
were committed by petitioners against Tobias
after the latter's termination from work.
Towards the latter part of January, 1973, after
the filing of the first of six criminal complaints
against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to
protest the actions taken against him. In
response, Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations
by telling him to just confess or else the company
would file a hundred more cases against him
until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You
Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat
unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various
actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand,
the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as
Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a
"crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of
'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil
Code].
The next tortious act committed by petitioners
was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime
in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been
dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain
employment with RETELCO and as a result of
which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer
period of time. For this further damage suffered
by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held
liable for damages consistent with Article 2176
of the Civil Code. Petitioners, however, contend
that they have a "moral, if not legal, duty to
forewarn other employers of the kind of
employee the plaintiff (private respondent
herein) was." [Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15].
Petitioners further claim that "it is the accepted
moral and societal obligation of every man to
advise or warn his fellowmen of any threat or
danger to the latter's life, honor or property. And
this includes warning one's brethren of the
possible dangers involved in dealing with, or
accepting into confidence, a man whose honesty
and integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments,
rather than justify petitioners' act, reveal a
seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from
getting a job, even after almost two years from
the time Tobias was dismissed.
Finally, there is the matter of the filing by
petitioners of six criminal complaints against
Tobias. Petitioners contend that there is no case
against them for malicious prosecution and that
they cannot be "penalized for exercising their
right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing
criminal complaints against an employee who
was their principal suspect in the commission of
forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous
transactions which defrauded them of
substantial sums of money" [Petition, p. 10,
Rollo, p. 11].
While sound principles of justice and public
policy dictate that persons shall have free resort
to the courts for redress of wrongs and
vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto.
Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the right to
institute criminal prosecutions can not be
exercised maliciously and in bad faith [Ventura v.
Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38
SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V. Manila Electric
Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337,
the Court held that the right to file criminal
complaints should not be used as a weapon to
force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness.
To do so would be a clear perversion of the
function of the criminal processes and of the
courts of justice. And in Hawpia CA, G.R. No. L-
20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536 the Court
upheld the judgment against the petitioner for
actual and moral damages and attorney's fees
after making a finding that petitioner, with
persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints
against respondent, all of which were dismissed.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must
be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
design to vex and humiliate a person and that it
was initiated deliberately by the defendant
knowing that the charges were false and
groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R.
No. L-44190, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602].
Concededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not
render a person liable for malicious prosecution
[Inhelder Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May
301983122 SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by
the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a
ground for an award of damages for malicious
prosecution if there is no competent evidence to
show that the complainant had acted in bad faith
[Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January
28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].
In the instant case, however, the trial court made
a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in
filing the criminal complaints against Tobias,
observing that:
xxx
Defendants (petitioners
herein) filed with the Fiscal's
Office of Manila a total of six
(6) criminal cases, five (5) of
which were for estafa thru
falsification of commercial
document and one for
violation of Art. 290 of the
Revised Penal Code
"discovering secrets thru
seizure of correspondence,"
and all were dismissed for
insufficiency or lack of
evidence." The dismissal of
four (4) of the cases was
appealed to the Ministry of
Justice, but said Ministry
invariably sustained the
dismissal of the cases. As
above adverted to, two of
these cases were refiled with
the Judge Advocate General's
Office of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines to railroad
plaintiffs arrest and detention
in the military stockade, but
this was frustrated by a
presidential decree
transferring criminal cases
involving civilians to the civil
courts.
xxx
To be sure, when despite the
two (2) police reports
embodying the findings of Lt.
Dioscoro Tagle, Chief
Document Examiner of the
Manila Police Department,
clearing plaintiff of
participation or involvement
in the fraudulent transactions
complained of, despite the
negative results of the lie
detector tests which
defendants compelled
plaintiff to undergo, and
although the police
investigation was "still under
follow-up and a they were filed during the pendency of the illegal
supplementary report will be
submitted after all the
evidence has been gathered,"
defendants hastily filed six (6)
criminal cases with the city
Fiscal's Office of Manila, five
(5) for estafa thru falsification
of commercial document and
one (1) for violation of Art.
290 of the Revised Penal
Code, so much so that as was
to be expected, all six (6)
cases were dismissed, with
one of the investigating
fiscals, Asst. Fiscal de Guia,
commenting in one case that,
"Indeed, the haphazard way
this case was investigated is
evident. Evident likewise is
the flurry and haste in the
filing of this case against
respondent Tobias," there can
be no mistaking that
defendants would not but be
motivated by malicious and
unlawful intent to harass,
oppress, and cause damage to
plaintiff.
xxx
[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].
In addition to the observations made by the trial
court, the Court finds it significant that the
criminal complaints were filed during the
pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by
Tobias against petitioners. This explains the
haste in which the complaints were filed, which
the trial court earlier noted. But petitioners, to
prove their good faith, point to the fact that only
six complaints were filed against Tobias when
they could have allegedly filed one hundred
cases, considering the number of anomalous
transactions committed against GLOBE MACKAY.
However, petitioners' good faith is belied by the
threat made by Hendry after the filing of the first
complaint that one hundred more cases would
be filed against Tobias. In effect, the possible
filing of one hundred more cases was made to
hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of
Tobias. In fine, considering the haste in which
the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that
dismissal case against petitioners, the threat
made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were
filed notwithstanding the two police reports
exculpating Tobias from involvement in the
anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY,
coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases,
the Court is led into no other conclusion than
that petitioners were motivated by malicious
intent in filing the six criminal complaints
against Tobias.
Petitioners next contend that the award of
damages was excessive. In the complaint filed
against petitioners, Tobias prayed for the
following: one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) as actual damages; fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; eight
hundred thousand pesos (P800,000.00) as moral
damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as
attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court, after
making a computation of the damages incurred
by Tobias [See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp.
154-1551, awarded him the following: eighty
thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages;
two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as
moral damages; twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) as exemplary damages; thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees;
and, costs. It must be underscored that
petitioners have been guilty of committing
several actionable tortious acts, i.e., the abusive
manner in which they dismissed Tobias from
work including the baseless imputation of guilt
and the harassment during the investigations;
the defamatory language heaped on Tobias as
well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the
poison letter sent to RETELCO which resulted in
Tobias' loss of possible employment; and, the
malicious filing of the criminal complaints.
Considering the extent of the damage wrought
on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to
petitioners' contention, the amount of damages
awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the
circumstances.
Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of
damages was improper, invoking the principle of
damnum absque injuria. It is argued that "[t]he
only probable actual damage that plaintiff
(private respondent herein) could have suffered
was a direct result of his having been dismissed
from his employment, which was a valid and
legal act of the defendants-appellants
(petitioners herein).lâwphî1.ñèt " [Petition, p. 17;
Rollo, p. 18].
According to the principle of damnum absque
injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute
a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal
wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-
47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See
also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The
Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805,
August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle
finds no application in this case. It bears
repeating that even granting that petitioners
might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from
work, the abusive manner in which that right
was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for
which petitioners must now be held liable.
Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was
not only in connection with the abusive manner
in which he was dismissed but was also the
result of several other quasi-delictual acts
committed by petitioners.
Petitioners next question the award of moral
damages. However, the Court has already ruled
in Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December
26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express
provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil
Code, moral damages are recoverable in the
cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code."
Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error
in awarding moral damages to Tobias.
Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is
impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231
of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence," the
Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA
1, ruled that if gross negligence warrants the
award of exemplary damages, with more reason
is its imposition justified when the act performed
is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad
faith. As in the Zulueta case, the nature of the
wrongful acts shown to have been committed by
petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for
the award of exemplary damages to the latter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005]
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY
LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES,
a.k.a. AMAY BISAYA, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari,
petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel
Nikko)[1] and Ruby Lim assail the Decision[2] of
the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001
reversing the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well
as the Resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals dated
09 July 2002 which denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
The cause of action before the trial court
was one for damages brought under the human
relations provisions of the New Civil Code.
Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto
Reyes, more popularly known by the screen
name Amay Bisaya, alleged that at around 6:00
oclock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while
he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel
Nikko,[5] he was spotted by his friend of several
years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached
him.[6] Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a
party at the hotels penthouse in celebration of
the natal day of the hotels manager, Mr.
Masakazu Tsuruoka.[7] Mr. Reyes asked if she
could vouch for him for which she replied: of
course.[8] Mr. Reyes then went up with the party
of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which
was the latters present for the celebrant.[9] At the
penthouse, they first had their picture taken with
the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the
party of Dr. Filart.[10] After a couple of hours,
when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes
lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great
shock, shame and embarrassment, he was
stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who
claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive
Secretary thereof.[11] In a loud voice and within
the presence and hearing of the other guests who
were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby
Lim told him to leave the party (huwag ka nang
kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na
lang).[12] Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was
invited by Dr. Filart.[13] Dr. Filart, who was within
hearing distance, however, completely ignored
him thus adding to his shame and
humiliation.[14] Not long after, while he was still
recovering from the traumatic experience, a
Makati policeman approached and asked him to
step out of the hotel.[15] Like a common criminal,
he was escorted out of the party by the
policeman.[16] Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes
asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One
Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages
and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys
fees.[17]
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having
asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under
the ignominious circumstance painted by the
latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotels
Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20)
years.[18] One of her functions included
organizing the birthday party of the hotels
former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.[19] The
year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruokas
party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list
and extended invitations accordingly.[20] The
guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60)
of Mr. Tsuruokas closest friends and some hotel
employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of
those invited.[21] At the party, Ms. Lim first
noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a
drink.[22] Mindful of Mr. Tsuruokas wishes to
keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr.
Boy Miller, the captain waiter, to inquire as to
the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not
invited.[23] Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr.
Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.[24] As Dr. Filart
was engaged in conversation with another guest
and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she
inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms.
Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did
not invite Mr. Reyes.[25] Ms. Lim then requested
Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as
he was not invited.[26] Mr. Reyes, however,
lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms.
Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to
leave.[27] When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw
Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung
whom she later approached.[28] Believing that
Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other,
Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from
Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr.
Reyes to leave the party as he was not
invited.[29] Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms.
Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she
decided to speak to him herself as there were no
other guests in the immediate
vicinity.[30] However, as Mr. Reyes was already
helping himself to the food, she decided to
wait.[31] When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and
started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and
said: alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito.
Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain,
ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede
lang po umalis na kayo.[32] She then turned
around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show
enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he
began screaming and making a big scene, and
even threatened to dump food on her.[33]
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the
complaint before the lower court, also gave her
version of the story to the effect that she never
invited Mr. Reyes to the party.[34] According to
her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry
the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as
he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to
the penthouse but to Altitude 49.[35] When they
reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes
to go down as he was not properly dressed and
was not invited.[36] All the while, she thought that
Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw
him at the bar talking to Col. Batung.[37] Then
there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes
shouting.[38] She ignored Mr. Reyes.[39] She was
embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to
think that she invited him.[40]
After trial on the merits, the
court a quo dismissed the complaint,[41] giving
more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that
she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that
Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out
of the party as he was uninvited:
Plaintiff had no business being at the party
because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the
birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk of being
asked to leave for attending a party to which he
was not invited by the host. Damages are
pecuniary consequences which the law imposes
for the breach of some duty or the violation of
some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against
defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because
he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of
Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not
the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she
allowed him to join her and took responsibility
for his attendance at the party. His action against
defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must
therefore fail.[42]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed
the ruling of the trial court as it found more
commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes
that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice
within hearing distance of several guests:
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing
situation, telling him that he should not finish his
food and to leave the place within the hearing
distance of other guests is an act which is
contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for which
appellees should compensate the appellant for
the damage suffered by the latter as a
consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code).
The liability arises from the acts which are in
themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary
to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in
the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with
impunity intentionally cause damage to another
in a manner contrary to morals or good
customs.[43]
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the
actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several
people to inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes
exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled
for as she should have approached Dr. Filart first
and both of them should have talked to Mr.
Reyes in private:
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What
should have been done by appellee Lim was to
approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they
should have told appellant Reyes in private that
the latter should leave the party as the celebrant
only wanted close friends around. It is necessary
that Mrs. Filart be the one to approach appellant
because it was she who invited appellant in that
occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filarts invitation,
appellant could not have suffered such
humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally
liable.
...
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action
which are predicated upon mere rudeness or
lack of consideration of one person, which calls
not only protection of human dignity but respect
of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil
Code, every person who violates this duty
becomes liable for damages, especially if said
acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad
faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
simple negligence. It imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to
some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes
of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al.,
309 SCRA 603).[44]
Consequently, the Court of Appeals
imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr.
Violeta Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr.
Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2)
moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorneys
fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000).[45] On motion for reconsideration, the
Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as
the argument raised in the motion had been
amply discussed and passed upon in the decision
sought to be reconsidered.[46]
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel
Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of
Appeals seriously erred in
I.
NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI
NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS
OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-
CRASHER
II.
HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR.
FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN
RULING, AMAY BISAYA COULD NOT HAVE
SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION, WERE IT NOT
FOR DR. FILARTS INVITATION
III.
DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF
THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED
THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA
IV.
IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS
TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY,
CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN
ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN
THIS REGARD
V.
IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE
DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANTS BRIEF,
THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED
AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend
that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages
as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being
asked to leave (and being embarrassed and
humiliated in the process) as he was a gate-
crasher.
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to
which a person assents is not esteemed in law as
injury[47]) refers to self-inflicted injury[48] or to
the consent to injury[49] which precludes the
recovery of damages by one who has knowingly
and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even
if he is not negligent in doing so.[50] As
formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine
does not find application to the case at bar
because even if respondent Reyes assumed the
risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners,
under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code,
were still under obligation to treat him fairly in
order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule
and shame.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not
Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto
Reyes, a.k.a. Amay Bisaya, to leave the party
where he was not invited by the celebrant
thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles
19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and
if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel
Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with
her.
As the trial court and the appellate court
reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions
concerning the same facts and evidence of the
case, this Court is left without choice but to use
its latent power to review such findings of facts.
Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier
of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
and revising errors of law.[51] One of the
exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains
herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court.[52] The lower
court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right
to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked
to him politely and discreetly. The appellate
court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is
liable for damages as she needlessly
embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to
finish his food and to leave the place within
hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts,
however, were in agreement that it was Dr.
Filarts invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the
party.
The consequential question then is: Which
version is credible?
From an in depth review of the evidence,
we find more credible the lower courts findings
of fact.
First, let us put things in the proper
perspective.
We are dealing with a formal party in a
posh, five-star hotel,[53] for-invitation-only,
thrown for the hotels former Manager, a
Japanese national. Then came a person who was
clearly uninvited (by the celebrant)[54] and who
could not just disappear into the crowd as his
face is known by many, being an actor. While he
was already spotted by the organizer of the
party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated
the guest list, it did not yet appear that the
celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim,
mindful of the celebrants instruction to keep the
party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of
the gate-crasher in the most hush-hush manner
in order not to call attention to a glitch in an
otherwise seamless affair and, in the process,
risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former
boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the
presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect
badly on Ms. Lims ability to follow the
instructions of the celebrant to invite only his
close friends and some of the hotels personnel.
Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove
that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered
him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory
explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk
ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the
contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had
unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that
when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very close.
Close enough for him to kiss:
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that
Miss Lim approached you while
you were at the buffet table?
How close was she when she
approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly
kissed each other.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go
down? She was that close and
she shouted?
A: Yes. She said, wag kang kumain,
hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba
ka na lang.
Q: So, you are testifying that she did
this in a loud voice?
...
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be
heard by many.[55]
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part
of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose
him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely
that she would shout at him from a very close
distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel
business for twenty years wherein being polite
and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the
testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the
contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed
incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in
observing that
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to
plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave
the party was made such that they nearly kissed
each other, the request was meant to be heard by
him only and there could have been no intention
on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It
was plaintiffs reaction to the request that must
have made the other guests aware of what
transpired between them. . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested,
there was no need for the police to take him
out.[56]
Moreover, another problem with Mr.
Reyess version of the story is that it is
unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that
he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had
not presented any witness to back his story up.
All his witnesses Danny Rodinas, Pepito
Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that
it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party.[57]
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask
Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not
invited, cannot be made liable to pay for
damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer,
Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs
from that of its employee.[58]
Article 19, known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle of abuse
of rights,[59] is not a panacea for all human hurts
and social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
Elsewhere, we explained that when a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible.[60] The object of this article,
therefore, is to set certain standards which must
be observed not only in the exercise of ones
rights but also in the performance of ones
duties.[61]These standards are the following: act
with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith.[62] Its antithesis,
necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent
to injure. Its elements are the following: (1)
There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.[63] When Article
19 is violated, an action for damages is proper
under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article
20 pertains to damages arising from a violation
of law[64] which does not obtain herein as Ms.
Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr.
Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand,
states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21[65] refers to acts contra bonus
mores and has the following elements: (1) There
is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary
to morals, good custom, public order, or public
policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.[66]
A common theme runs through Articles 19
and 21,[67] and that is, the act complained of must
be intentional.[68]
As applied to herein case and as earlier
discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim
was driven by animosity against him. These two
people did not know each other personally
before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr.
Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for
Ms. Lims alleged abusive conduct except the
statement that Ms. Lim, being single at 44 years
old, had a very strong bias and prejudice against
(Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates
in her work at the hotel with foreign
businessmen.[69] The lameness of this argument awardee of a number of humanitarian
need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a organizations of the Philippines.[74] During his
complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes
Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing stressed that he had income[75] and nowhere did
to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures. he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. are bereft of any information as to the social and
Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim.
acceptable and humane under the circumstances. Consequently, the conclusion reached by the
In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is
the appellate courts declaration that Ms. Lims act without basis.
of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel
first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr.
invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lims
predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of exercise of a legitimate right done within the
consideration of one person, which calls not only bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his
protection of human dignity but respect of such to bear alone.
dignity.[70] Without proof of any ill-motive on her WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
part, Ms. Lims act of by-passing Mrs. Filart petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel
cannot amount to abusive conduct especially Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the
because she did inquire from Mrs. Filarts Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and
companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby
invite Mr. Reyes.[71] If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
of bad judgment which, if done with good Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104,
intentions, cannot amount to bad faith. dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No
Not being liable for both actual and moral costs.
damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel SO ORDERED.
Nikko be made answerable for exemplary
damages[72] especially for the reason stated by
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with
contempt because of the latters lowly station in
life. This has to be limited somewhere. In a
democracy, such a limit must be established.
Social equality is not sought by the legal
provisions under consideration, but due regard
for decency and propriety (Code Commission,
pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction
for public good and to avert further commission
of such acts, exemplary damages should be
imposed upon appellees.[73]
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted
findings is that it runs counter with the very facts
of the case and the evidence on hand. It is not
disputed that at the time of the incident in
question, Mr. Reyes was an actor of long
standing; a co-host of a radio program over
DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer
Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer
Imelda Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen
Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the
KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an
G.R. No. 201675 June 19, 2013
JUANITO ANG, for and in behalf of SUNRISE
MARKETING (BACOLOD), INC.,* Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES ROBERTO and RACHEL
ANG, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review1 assails the Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals-Cebu (CA-Cebu) dated 20
September 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 05546. The
CA-Cebu reversed and set aside the Order3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City
(RTC Bacolod) dated 27 September 2010 in
Commercial Court Case No. 09-070 entitled
Sunrise Marketing (Bacolod), Inc., represented
by Juanita Ang -v: Spouses Roberto and Rachel
Ang.
The Facts
Sunrise Marketing (Bacolod), Inc. (SMBI) is a
duly registered corporation owned by the Ang
family.4 Its current stockholders and their
respective stockholdings are as follows:5
Stockholder Number of Shares
Juanito Ang 8,750
Anecita Ang 1,250
Jeannevie Ang 2,500
Roberto Ang 8,750
Rachel Ang 3,750
Total 25,000
Juanito Ang (Juanito) and Roberto Ang (Roberto)
are siblings. Anecita Limoco-Ang (Anecita) is
Juanito’s wife and Jeannevie is their daughter.
Roberto was elected President of SMBI, while
Juanito was elected as its Vice President. Rachel
Lu-Ang (Rachel) and Anecita are SMBI’s
Corporate Secretary and Treasurer, respectively.
On 31 July 1995, Nancy Ang (Nancy), the sister of
Juanito and Roberto, and her husband, Theodore
Ang (Theodore), agreed to extend a loan to settle
the obligations of SMBI and other corporations
owned by the Ang family, specifically Bayshore
Aqua Culture Corporation, Oceanside Marine
Resources and JR Aqua Venture.6 Nancy and
Theodore issued a check in the amount of
$1,000,000.00 payable to "Juanito Ang and/or
Anecita Ang and/or Roberto Ang and/or Rachel
Ang." Nancy was a former stockholder of SMBI,
but she no longer appears in SMBI’s General
Information Sheets as early as 1996.7 Nancy and
Theodore are now currently residing in the
United States. There was no written loan
agreement, in view of the close relationship
between the parties. Part of the loan was also
used to purchase real properties for SMBI, for
Juanito, and for Roberto.8
On 22 December 2005, SMBI increased its
authorized capital stock to ₱10,000,000.00. The
Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock was
signed by Juanito, Anecita, Roberto, and Rachel
as directors of SMBI.9 Juanito claimed, however,
that the increase of SMBI’s capital stock was
done in contravention of the Corporation
Code.10 According to Juanito, when he and
Anecita left for Canada:
x x x Sps. Roberto and Rachel Ang took over the
active management of [SMBI]. Through the
employment of sugar coated words, they were
able to successfully manipulate the stocks
sharings between themselves at 50-50 under the
condition that the procedures mandated by the
Corporation Code on increase of capital stock be
strictly observed (valid Board Meeting). No such
meeting of the Board to increase capital stock
materialized. It was more of an accommodation
to buy peace x x x.11
Juanito claimed that payments to Nancy and
Theodore ceased sometime after 2006. On 24
November 2008, Nancy and Theodore, through
their counsel here in the Philippines, sent a
demand letter to "Spouses Juanito L.
Ang/Anecita L. Ang and Spouses Roberto L.
Ang/Rachel L. Ang" for payment of the principal
amounting to $1,000,000.00 plus interest at ten
percent (10%) per annum, for a total of
$2,585,577.37 within ten days from receipt of
the letter. 12 Roberto and Rachel then sent a
letter to Nancy and Theodore’s counsel on 5
January 2009, saying that they are not complying
with the demand letter because they have not
personally contracted a loan from Nancy and
Theodore.
On 8 January 2009, Juanito and Anecita executed
a Deed of Acknowledgment and Settlement
Agreement (Settlement Agreement) and an
Extra-Judicial Real Estate Mortgage (Mortgage).
Under the foregoing instruments, Juanito and
Anecita admitted that they, together with
Roberto and Rachel, obtained a loan from Nancy
and Theodore for $1,000,000.00 on 31 July 1995
and such loan shall be secured by:
a) Juanito and Anecita’s fifty percent
share over a parcel of land registered in
the name of SMBI;
b) a parcel of land registered in the
name of Juanito Ang;
c) Juanito’s fifty percent share in 7
parcels of land registered in his and
Roberto’s name;
d) a parcel of land registered in the
name of Roberto;
e) a parcel of land registered in the
name of Rachel; and
f) Roberto and Rachel’s fifty percent
share in 2 parcels of land registered in
the name of their son, Livingstone L.
Ang (Livingstone), and in another lot
registered in the name of Livingstone
and Alvin Limoco Ang.13
A certain Kenneth C. Locsin (Locsin) signed on
behalf of Nancy and Theodore, under a Special
Power of Attorney which was not attached as
part of the Settlement Agreement or the
Mortgage, nor included in the records of this
case.
Thereafter, Juanito filed a "Stockholder
Derivative Suit with prayer for an ex-parte Writ
of Attachment/Receivership" (Complaint) before
the RTC Bacolod on 29 January 2009. He alleged
that "the intentional and malicious refusal of
defendant Sps. Roberto and Rachel Ang to settle
their 50% share x x x of the total obligation x x x
will definitely affect the financial viability of
plaintiff SMBI."14 Juanito also claimed that he has
been "illegally excluded from the management
and participation in the business of [SMBI
through] force, violence and intimidation" and
that Rachel and Roberto have seized and carted
away SMBI’s records from its office.15
The Complaint sought the following reliefs:
a) Issuance of an ex-parte Writ of
Attachment and/or Garnishment, with
a Break Open Order covering the assets
of the spouses Roberto and Rachel Ang,
or any interest they may have against
third parties;
b) Placement of SMBI under
Receivership pending resolution of the
case;
c) Enforcement of Juanito’s right to
actively participate in the management
of SMBI;
d) Issuance of an Order compelling the
Spouses Roberto and Rachel Ang to:
i. Render an accounting of the
utilization of the loan
amounting to $2,585,577.37
or ₱120,229,347.26;
ii. Pay fifty percent of the
aforementioned loan,
amounting to ₱60,114,673.62;
iii. Explain why Nancy was
removed as a stockholder as
far as SMBI’s reportorial
requirements with the SEC
are concerned;
iv. Restore Juanito’s right to
actively manage the affairs of
the corporation; and
v. Pay attorney’s fees
amounting to ₱20,000.00.
On 29 January 2009, the RTC Bacolod issued an
Order16 granting the application for an ex-parte
writ of attachment and break open order. Atty.
Jerry Basiao, who filed an application for
appointment as Receiver of SMBI, was directed
by the RTC Bacolod to furnish the required
Receivership Bond.17 On the same date, Roberto
and Rachel moved to quash the writ of
attachment and set aside the break open order
and appointment of receiver.18 They claimed that
these were issued in violation of their right to
due process:
Records of this case would show that the
complaint was filed before the RTC Bacolod at
2:50 p.m. of January 29, 2009. x x x Counsel for
the defendant-spouses went to the RTC Bacolod
at around 3:00 p.m. on January 29, 2009 to
inquire on the status of the case and was
informed that the last pleading on record is his
entry of appearance with the conformity of the
defendant Rachel Ang. Counsel was however
informed by the clerk of court that the
Honorable Judge has already issued an order
directing the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment, receivership and break open order
but said order was not officially released yet x x
x. Due to the undersigned counsel’s insistence,
however, said clerk of court of this Honorable
Court furnished him a copy of said order x x x.
The clerk of court and the clerk in charge of civil
cases assured counsel that no writ of preliminary
attachment was prepared or issued x x x. Despite
such assurance x x x [and counsel’s advice that
they shall move to quash the order the following
morning], that afternoon, the clerk of court x x x
clandestinely, hurriedly and surreptitiously, for
reasons known only to her, x x x prepared the
writ of attachment x x x.19
In her Verified Answer Ad Cautelam which was
filed on 10 February 2009, Rachel prayed that
the Complaint be dismissed as it was not a bona
fide derivative suit as defined under the Interim
Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Controversies20 (Interim Rules). According to
Rachel, the Complaint, although labelled as a
derivative suit, is actually a collection suit since
the real party in interest is not SMBI, but Nancy
and Theodore:
The cause of action does not devolve on the
corporation as the alleged harm or wrong
pertains to the right of the Sps. Theodore and
Nancy Ang, as creditors, to collect the amount
allegedly owed to them. x x x
xxxx
That the instant suit is for the benefit of a non-
stockholder and not the corporation is obvious
when the primary relief prayed for in the
Complaint which is for the defendants "to pay
the amount of Php 60,114,673.62 plus interest
which is 50% of the loan obligations of plaintff
[SMBI] to its creditor Sps. Theodore and Nancy
Ang." Otherwise stated, the instant suit is
nothing but a complaint for sum of money
shamelessly masked as a derivative suit.21
Rachel also argued that the Complaint failed to
allege that Juanito "exerted all reasonable efforts
to exhaust all intra-corporate remedies available
under the articles of incorporation, by-laws, laws
or rules governing the corporation to obtain the
relief he desires," as required by the Interim
Rules.
During cross-examination, Juanito admitted that
there was no prior demand for accounting or
liquidation nor any written objection to SMBI’s
increase of capital stock. He also conceded that
the loan was extended by persons who are not
stockholders of SMBI. Thus, Rachel filed a Motion
for Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defenses
on 27 November 2009, arguing that in view of
Juanito’s admissions, the Complaint should be
dismissed pursuant to Section 1 of the Interim
Rules. Juanito filed his Opposition thereto on 8
January 2010,22 arguing that applying this
Court’s ruling in Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,23 the requirement for exhaustion of
intra-corporate remedies is no longer needed
when the corporation itself is "under the
complete control of the persons against whom
the suit is filed." Juanito also alleged that he and
Anecita were deceived into signing checks to pay
off bogus loans purportedly extended by Rachel’s
relatives in favor of SMBI. Some of the checks
were payable to cash, and were allegedly
deposited in Rachel’s personal account.24 He also
claimed that Rachel’s Motion is disallowed under
the Interim Rules.
On 9 February 2009, Juanito moved that Rachel
and her daughter, Em Ang (Em), as well as their
counsel, Atty. Filomeno Tan, Jr. (Atty. Tan) be
held in contempt. Juanito claimed that on the
date the writ of attachment and break open
order were issued, Atty. Tan, accompanied by
Rachel and Em, "arrogantly demanded from the
Clerk in charge of Civil Cases that he be furnished
a copy of the [said orders] x x x otherwise he will
tear the records of the subject commercial case."
Juanito also accused Atty. Tan of surreptitiously
photocopying the said orders prior to service of
the summons, Complaint, Writ of Attachment
and Attachment Bond. According to Juanito, the
purpose of obtaning a copy of the orders was to
thwart its implementation. Thus, when the
authorities proceeded to the SMBI premises to
enforce the orders, they found that the place was
padlocked, and that all corporate documents and
records were missing. On 14 December 2010, the
Sheriff and other RTC Bacolod employees then
filed a Verified Complaint against Atty. Tan
before this Court, which also contained the
foregoing allegations.25
Rachel then filed a Reply on 27 January 2010,
claiming that Juanito’s reliance on the Hi-Yield
case is misplaced:
The facts x x x of this case are strikingly different
from that in Hi-Yield Realty. In that case, the
Supreme Court noted that the complaining
stockholder was a minority stockholder.
However, in the case at bar, Juanito Ang is one of
the biggest stockholders of [SMBI]. x x x He is a
member of [SMBI’s] Board of Directors and is
even the vice-president thereof. Furthermore, in
Hi-Yield Realty, the Supreme Court noted that
the complaining stockholder was excluded from
the affairs of the corporation. However, the
evidence thus far presented, particularly Juanito
Ang’s admission, show that he and his wife,
Anecita, participate in the disbursement of
[SMBI’s] funds x x x.26
Juanito filed his Rejoinder on 2 March 2010.
The Ruling of the RTC Bacolod
On 27 September 2010, the RTC Bacolod issued
an Order which stated that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court
hereby rules that the present action is a
DERIVATIVE SUIT and the Motion to Dismiss
based on Affirmative Defenses raised by
defendants is DENIED for lack of merit.27
The RTC Bacolod found that the issuance of the
checks to settle the purported obligations to
Rachel’s relatives, as well as the removal of
Nancy as a stockholder in SMBI’s records as filed
with the SEC, shows that Rachel and Roberto
committed fraud. The Order likewise stated that
the requirement of exhaustion of intra-corporate
remedies is no longer necessary since Rachel and
Roberto exercised complete control over SMBI.
Aggrieved, Rachel filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the CA-Cebu.
The Ruling of the CA-Cebu
On 20 September 2011, the CA-Cebu
promulgated its Decision which reversed and set
aside the Order of the RTC Bacolod dated 27
September 2010. According to the CA-Cebu, the
Complaint filed by Juanito should be dismissed
because it is a harassment suit, and not a valid
derivative suit as defined under the Interim
Rules. The CA-Cebu also found that Juanito failed
to exhaust intra-corporate remedies and that the
loan extended by Nancy and Theodore was not
SMBI’s corporate obligation. There is nothing on
record to show that non-payment of the loan will
result in any damage or prejudice to SMBI.
Juanito then filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with Prayer for Voluntary Inhibition on 28
October 2011. In his Motion, Juanito pointed out
that Rachel filed her Petition for Certiorari
without previously filing a Motion for
Reconsideration, warranting the dismissal of the
said Petition. The CA-Cebu denied the Motion.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
The issues raised in the instant petition are:
I. Whether based on the allegations of
the complaint, the nature of the case is
one of a derivative suit or not.
Corollary to the above, whether the
Honorable Court of Appeals erred x x x
in ordering the dismissal of the
Complaint on the ground that the case
is not a derivative suit.
II. Whether the Honorable Court of
Appeals x x x seriously erred in
considering evidence aliunde, that is,
other than the four corners of the
complaint, in determining the nature of
the complaint, in utter violation of the
doctrine that the jurisdiction is
determined by law and allegations of
the complaint alone.
III. Granting arguendo, but without
necessarily admitting that the
complaint is not one of a derivative
suit, but only an ordinary civil action,
whether the Honorable Court of
Appeals x x x gravely erred in
dismissing the petition entirely, when
the Regional Trial Court a quo has
jurisdiction also over the case as an
ordinary civil action, and can just
proceed to hear the same as such.28
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
We uphold the CA-Cebu’s finding that the
Complaint is not a derivative suit. A derivative
suit is an action brought by a stockholder on
behalf of the corporation to enforce corporate
rights against the corporation’s directors,
officers or other insiders.29 Under Sections
2330 and 3631 of the Corporation Code, the
directors or officers, as provided under the by-
laws,32 have the right to decide whether or not a
corporation should sue. Since these directors or
officers will never be willing to sue themselves,
or impugn their wrongful or fraudulent
decisions, stockholders are permitted by law to
bring an action in the name of the corporation to
hold these directors and officers
accountable.33 In derivative suits, the real party
ininterest is the corporation, while the
stockholder is a mere nominal party.
This Court, in Yu v. Yukayguan,34 explained:
The Court has recognized that a stockholder’s
right to institute a derivative suit is not based on
any express provision of the Corporation Code,
or even the Securities Regulation Code, but is
impliedly recognized when the said laws make
corporate directors or officers liable for damages
suffered by the corporation and its stockholders
for violation of their fiduciary duties. Hence, a
stockholder may sue for mismanagement, waste
or dissipation of corporate assets because of a
special injury to him for which he is otherwise
without redress. In effect, the suit is an action for
specific performance of an obligation owed by
the corporation to the stockholders to assist its
rights of action when the corporation has been
put in default by the wrongful refusal of the
directors or management to make suitable
measures for its protection. The basis of a
stockholder’s suit is always one in equity.
However, it cannot prosper without first
complying with the legal requisites for its
institution. (Emphasis in the original)
Section 1, Rule 8 of the Interim Rules imposes
the following requirements for derivative suits:
(1) The person filing the suit must be a
stockholder or member at the time the
acts or transactions subject of the
action occurred and the time the action
was filed;
(2) He must have exerted all reasonable
efforts, and alleges the same with
particularity in the complaint, to
exhaust all remedies available under
the articles of incorporation, by-laws,
laws or rules governing the corporation
or partnership to obtain the relief he
desires;
(3) No appraisal rights are available for
the act or acts complained of; and
(4) The suit is not a nuisance or
harassment suit.
Applying the foregoing, we find that the
Complaint is not a derivative suit. The Complaint
failed to show how the acts of Rachel and
Roberto resulted in any detriment to SMBI. The
CA-Cebu correctly concluded that the loan was
not a corporate obligation, but a personal debt of
the Ang brothers and their spouses. The check
was issued to "Juanito Ang and/or Anecita Ang
and/or Roberto Ang and/or Rachel Ang" and not
SMBI. The proceeds of the loan were used for
payment of the obligations of the other
corporations owned by the Angs as well as the
purchase of real properties for the Ang brothers.
SMBI was never a party to the Settlement
Agreement or the Mortgage. It was never named
as a co-debtor or guarantor of the loan. Both
instruments were executed by Juanito and
Anecita in their personal capacity, and not in
their capacity as directors or officers of SMBI.
Thus, SMBI is under no legal obligation to satisfy
the obligation.
The fact that Juanito and Anecita attempted to
constitute a mortgage over "their" share in a
corporate asset cannot affect SMBI. The Civil
Code provides that in order for a mortgage to be
valid, the mortgagor must be the "absolute
owner of the thing x x x mortgaged."35 Corporate
assets may be mortgaged by authorized
directors or officers on behalf of the corporation
as owner, "as the transaction of the lawful
business of the corporation may reasonably and
necessarily require."36 However, the wording of
the Mortgage reveals that it was signed by
Juanito and Anecita in their personal capacity as
the "owners" of a pro-indiviso share in SMBI’s
land and not on behalf of SMBI:
This Mortgage is made and executed by and
between:
Spouses JUANITO and ANECITA ANG, of legal
age, Filipino citizens, residents of Sunrise
Marketing Building at Hilado Street, Capitol
Shopping Center, Bacolod City, hereinafter
referred to as the MORTGAGORS;
Spouses THEODORE and NANCY ANG, x x x
hereinafter referred to as the MORTGAGEES
represented in this instance through their
attorney-in-fact, Mr. Kenneth Locsin;
xxxx
In order to ensure payment x x x the
MORTGAGORS hereby CONVEY unto the
MORTGAGEES by way of EXTRA-JUDICIAL REAL
ESTATE MORTGAGE their 50% rights and
interests over the following real properties to
wit:
a. Those registered in the name of SUNRISE
MARKETING (BACOLOD), INC. x x x
x x x x37 (Emphasis supplied)
Juanito and Anecita, as stockholders of SMBI, are
not co-owners of SMBI assets. They do not own
pro-indiviso shares, and therefore, cannot
mortgage the same except in their capacity as
directors or officers of SMBI.
We also find that there is insufficient evidence to
suggest that Roberto and Rachel fraudulently
and wrongfully removed Nancy as a stockholder
in SMBI’s reportorial requirements. As early as
2005, when SMBI increased its capital stock,
Juanito and Anecita already knew that Nancy
was not listed as a stockholder of SMBI.
However, they attempted to rectify the error
only in 2009, when the Complaint was filed. That
it took four years for them to make any attempt
to question Nancy’s exclusion as stockholder
negates their allegation of fraud.
Since damage to the corporation was not
sufficiently proven by Juanito, the Complaint
cannot be considered a bona fide derivative suit.
A derivative suit is one that seeks redress for
injury to the corporation, and not the
stockholder. No such injury was proven in this
case.
The Complaint also failed to allege that all
available corporate remedies under the articles
of incorporation, by-laws, laws or rules
governing the corporation were exhausted, as
required under the Interim Rules. The CA-Cebu,
applying our ruling in the Yu case, pointed out:
x x x No written demand was ever made for the
board of directors to address private respondent
Juanito Ang’s concerns.1âwphi1
The fact that [SMBI] is a family corporation does
not exempt private respondent Juanito Ang from
complying with the Interim Rules. In the x x x Yu
case, the Supreme Court held that a family
corporation is not exempt from complying with
the clear requirements and formalities of the
rules for filing a derivative suit. There is nothing
in the pertinent laws or rules which state that
there is a distinction between x x x family
corporations x x x and other types of
corporations in the institution by a stockholder
of a derivative suit.38
Furthermore, there was no allegation that there
was an attempt to remove Rachel or Roberto as
director or officer of SMBI, as permitted under
the Corporation Code and the by-laws of the
corporation. Thus, the Complaint failed to satisfy
the requirements for a derivative suit under the
Interim Rules.
The CA-Cebu correctly ruled that the Complaint
should be dismissed since it is a nuisance or
harassment suit under Section 1(b) of the
Interim Rules. Section 1(b) thereof provides:
b) Prohibition against nuisance and harassment
suits. - Nuisance and harassment suits are
prohibited. In determining whether a suit is a
nuisance or harassment suit, the court shall
consider, among others, the following:
(1) The extent of the shareholding or
interest of the initiating stockholder or
member;
(2) Subject matter of the suit;
(3) Legal and factual basis of the
complaint;
(4) Availability of appraisal rights for
the act or acts complained of; and
(5) Prejudice or damage to the
corporation, partnership, or association
in relation to the relief sought.
In case of nuisance or harassment suits, the court
may, motu proprio or upon motion, forthwith
dismiss the case.
Records show that Juanito, apart from being Vice
President, owns the highest number of shares,
equal to those owned by Roberto. Also, as
explained earlier, there appears to be no damage
to SMBI if the loan extended by Nancy and
Theodore remains unpaid. The CA-Cebu
correctly concluded that "a plain reading of the
allegations in the Complaint would readily show
that the case x x x was mainly filed to collect a
debt allegedly extended by the spouses
Theodore and Nancy Ang to [SMBI]. Thus, the
aggrieved party is not SMBI x x x but the spouses
Theodore and Nancy Ang, who are not even x x x
stockholders."39
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM
the 20 September 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals-Cebu in CA-G.R. SP No. 05546.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 157632 December 6, 2006
JOSE S. ROQUE, JR., substituted by his wife
NORMA ROQUE, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME T. TORRES, substituted by his son
JAMES KENLEY M. TORRES, and the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55895, dated 21 March
2003, which reversed and set aside the
Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 104, in Civil Case No. Q-93-
14408, dated 8 April 1997, ordering respondent
to pay petitioner damages in the total amount
of P1,600,000.00 and attorney’s fees.
The instant case sprang from an action for
damages filed by the original petitioner, the late
Jose Roque, Jr., against respondent, the recently
deceased Jaime Torres, for injuries sustained by
petitioner on 27 August 1989, allegedly inflicted
by the security guards employed by respondent.
In this petition, the deceased petitioner Jose
Roque, Jr. is substituted by his wife Norma
Roque while respondent Jaime T. Torres, per
agreement of all his heirs, is herein represented
by his son James Kenley M. Torres.
Petitioner was the administrator of certain
parcels of land in Upper Boso-Boso, Antipolo,
Rizal, particularly Lots No. 13259 and 13260
covered by Original Certificates of Titles (OCTs)
No. NP-419 and NP-422, both registered in the
name of his son Rafael Roque. Sometime before
the incident, respondent, claiming to be the
owner of said property, hired security guards
from Anchor Security and Detective Agency,
namely Cesar Aquino, Alfredo Negro, and
Mariano Cabos, who allegedly barred petitioner
from entering the property and threatened him
with physical harm should he attempt to tend
the said land. As a result, petitioner filed a case
for grave threats against said security guards
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Rizal.
Prior to the incident, or on 9 September 1988,
respondent instituted an Action3 for cancellation
of OCTs No. NP-419 and NP-422 in the name of
petitioner’s son Rafael Roque before the RTC of
Antipolo which was dismissed by the trial court
in an Order4 dated 26 June 1989. According to
the court a quo, therein petitioner Torres’ action
was premature for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies in the Bureau of Lands,
consistent with the established doctrine that
where a party seeks for the cancellation of a Free
Patent, he must pursue his action in the proper
agency and a review by the court will not be
permitted unless administrative remedies have
been exhausted. The trial court also declared
that the said action was in effect an action for
reversion under Section 101 of the Public Land
Act, thus, the action should be in the name of the
government and not the private complainants.
Respondent appealed the dismissal before the
Court of Appeals, which later affirmed the
decision of the lower court in a Decision5 dated
11 June 1990. Respondent’s appeal to this Court
was also dismissed in a Resolution dated 11
February 1991.
Petitioner maintained that at around four o’clock
in the afternoon of 27 August 1989, he, together
with his housemaid Leilyn Saplot Kandt, Magno
Imperial, Jose Imperial, and Eliseo Pesito, visited
the said property and was surprised to see seven
security guards, including the above-mentioned
security guards, guarding the property upon
orders of respondent. Aquino, Negro, and Cabos
approached petitioner and asked: "Bakit wala ka
noong arraignment sa Antipolo noong August 16,
1989?"6 to which he replied that his presence
was not necessary since he was not the accused.
Thereafter, the said security guards asked him to
leave the property and uttered: "Bakit mo kami
kinakalaban? Utos ni Torres na ito’y bantayan
pagkat ito’y kanyang property raw!."Petitioner
showed his son’s titles to the property but the
security guards merely answered: "Fake ‘yan at
hindi kayo maaaring pumasok dito. Kayo ay dapat
paalisin." A security guard then cocked his
shotgun and warned petitioner to leave the
place. Petitioner offered to settle the dispute in
the office of Anchor Security Agency, through its
manager, Mrs. Nassam, but the security guards
merely replied: "Wala kaming pakialam kay
Nassam. Lahat ginagawa dito, lahat ay utos ni
Torres. At ‘yan ay sinusunod naming dahil si
Torres ang bumubuhay sa amin."
When petitioner refused to leave the premises,
Cabos threatened petitioner that should he stay
inside, Cabos would shoot him, so petitioner
immediately left the place. However, Cabos still
fired at him but missed. Petitioner ran fast to his
makeshift hut where Cabos followed him.
Petitioner ran to the back of his makeshift hut
and was shot again by Cabos, hitting petitioner
on the back. When petitioner fell, he turned and
saw Cabos and Negro shooting at him. At the
same time, Aquino was also firing at the
makeshift hut. After a while, the other security
guards, namely Sulla, Betasulo, and Romy
Mendoza, came, and together with Cabos and
Negro, mauled and kicked petitioner all over his
body until he lost consciousness.
As a result of the incident, petitioner was
hospitalized and placed under continuous
treatment and medication. Due to the multiple
gunshot wounds, hematoma, and contusions
sustained by petitioner, his left eye became 90 to
95% blind and his body was paralyzed from the
bustline down. Consequently, petitioner filed a
criminal case7for frustrated murder before the
RTC of Antipolo against the security guards.
Eventually, after suffering for more than nine
years, petitioner died.
On his part, respondent admits the existence of
the titles in the name of Rafael Roque but denies
the latter’s ownership over the property. He
further admits the dismissal of his case for
cancellation of Roque’s titles based on a
technical ground. Respondent likewise admits to
the posting of the security guards on the
property to guard the same from any intruder
but denies that they were his personal security
guards, and moreover claimed that they were
security guards of the Antipolo Landowners and
Farmers Association, Inc. (ALFAI), of which he
was president. Respondent further asserts that
being the President of ALFAI, his instruction to
the security guards was to prevent squatters or
intruders from entering the property and to
make use of reasonable force to repel aggression
in the event of any untoward incident.
After trial, the lower court, on 8 April 1997,
rendered judgment in favor of petitioner.
According to the court a quo:
After a thorough examination of the
evidence presented by both parties, the
Court is faced with the issue of:
"Whether or not defendant Torres can
be held liable for damages to herein
plaintiff as a result of the injuries
inflicted by the security guards
deployed in the property in question on
August 28, 1989 [sic].
There is no question that the security
guards involved in the shooting
incident on August 28, 1989 [sic] were
employed of [sic] Anchor Security and
Detective Agency. There is also no
question that the same security guards
were hired by defendant Torres to man
and guard the property in question in
Boso-Boso, Antipolo, Rizal. In this
simple scenario and in the event that
said security guards caused wrong to
others while in their tour of duty, the
law provides that the liability falls
on the employer being the principal.
On the contrary, for illegal or
harmful acts committed by the
security guards as[sic] per order of
the client or the one who hired them,
liability attaches to the latter. In the
instant case, the unlawful act
committed by the security guards
against the plaintiff is within the
strict compliance of the instruction
of the defendant. This is because of
the fact that defendant Torres
exercised direct supervision of the said
security guards. As a matter of fact, he
provided the guards with his school bus
to perform their duties effectively.
Hence, defendant Torres is liable for
the unlawful acts committed by the said
security guards against herein plaintiff.
Such unlawful acts would not have
been accomplished had defendant
Torres being their "employer" at that
time, not instructed them so. What
resulted to the shooting of the plaintiff
by the security guards cannot be given
justice except by indemnifying him.
And considering that plaintiff suffered
paralization of his body and blindness
in his left eye, notwithstanding the fact
 of incurring the amount of P300,000.00
as hospitalization and medical
expenses plus the continuous
medication up to the present, the Court
believes that the plaintiff should be
compensated. (Emphasis ours.)
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff as
against defendant Torres and the latter
is ordered to pay the plaintiff the
following:
a) the amount of P300,000.00
as actual damages;
b) the amount
of P1,000,000.00 as moral
damages;
c) the amount of P300,000.00
as exemplary damages; and
d) the amount of P50,000.00
as attorney’s fee.8
Aggrieved by the above judgment, respondent
lodged an appeal before the Court of Appeals.
According to respondent, he did not know that
the security guards would commit the alleged
aggressive acts until the commission thereof, and
that said security guards acted upon their own
judgment. Respondent claimed that petitioner
was an intruder and squatter on the property
who entered it without permission from
members of the ALFAI, the real owners of the
said property. Thus, respondent argued that
petitioner forcibly entered the property and that
the security guards merely repelled the unlawful
aggression.
Subsequently, the appellate court reversed the
RTC judgment and rendered a Decision, the
pertinent portions of which read:
It is appellee’s contention that
appellant as employer of the said
security guards is liable for the injuries
inflicted by the latter who acted under
his instructions to guard the subject
premises.
Verily, the obligation imposed under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code is
demandable not only for one’s own acts
or omissions but also for those persons
for whom, one is responsible. The
owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in exercise
of their duties and/or functions.
Relevantly, Article 2180 of the Civil
Code provides that:
Art. 2180. The obligation
imposed by article 2176 is not
demandable not only for one’s
own acts or omissions, but
also for those persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxxx
The owners and managers of
an establishment or
enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages
caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed
or on occasion of their
functions.
Under the facts obtaining, the above
provision of law does not apply. The
court a quo succinctly declared:
"There is no question that the
security guards involved in
the shooting incident on
August 28, 1989 were
employed (sic) of Anchor
Security Detective Agency.
There is also no question that
the same security guards
were hired by defendant
Torres to man and guard the
property in question in Boso-
Boso, Antipolo, Rizal.
xxxx
There is no question therefore that the
said security guards who inflicted the
injuries sustained by the appellee were
not employees of herein appellant. This
being so, the ruling in the case
of Soliman, Jr. vs. Tuazon applies, viz:
It is settled that where the
security agency, as here
recruits, hires and assigns the
work of its watchmen or
security guards, the agency is
the employer of such security
guards or watchmen. Liability
for illegal or harmful acts
committed by the security
guards attaches to the
employer agency, and not to
the clients or customers of
such agency.
At any rate, the appellant cannot be
held liable under Art. 33 of the Civil
Code as no evidence whatsoever, was
adduced to show his participation in
the commission of the acts complained
of. Neither was appellee able to prove
that appellant can be held liable in the
alternative under Article 2176 in
relation to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the complaint as well as the
counterclaim filed before the court a
quo is DISMISSED.9
With the reversal of the trial court judgment,
petitioner filed the instant appeal, raising the
following issues:
I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals
committed grave and reversible error
in ruling that petitioner failed to prove
by mere preponderance of evidence
that respondent Torres was involved in
any malevolent designs on petitioner;
II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals
committed grave and reversible error
in ruling that Article 2180 in relation to
Article 2176 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to the case at bar; and
III. Whether or not the Court of Appeals
committed grave and reversible error
in applying the case of Soliman, Jr. v.
Tuazon to the case at bar.
We agree with the Court of Appeals’ finding that
respondent cannot be held liable under Article
2180 of the Civil Code for the damages suffered
by petitioner because respondent is not the
employer of the security guards who inflicted the
injuries upon the person of the petitioner. As
reiterated in the recent case of Mercury Drug
Corporation v. Libunao:[10]
In Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, we held that
where the security agency recruits,
hires and assigns the works of its
watchmen or security guards to a
client, the employer of such guards or
watchmen is such agency, and not the
client, since the latter has no hand in
selecting the security guards. Thus, the
duty to observe the diligence of a good
father of a family cannot be demanded
from the said client:
x x x [I]t is settled in our jurisdiction
that where the security agency, as here,
recruits, hires and assigns the work of
its watchmen or security guards, the
agency is the employer of such guards
or watchmen. Liability for illegal or
harmful acts committed by the security
guards attaches to the employer
agency, and not to the clients or
customers of such agency. As a general
rule, a client or customer of a security
agency has no hand in selecting who
among the pool of security guards or
watchmen employed by the agency
shall be assigned to it; the duty to
observe the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection of the guards
cannot, in the ordinary course of
events, be demanded from the client
whose premises or property are
protected by the security guards.
x x x [T]he fact that a client company
may give instructions or directions to
the security guards assigned to it, does
not, by itself, render the client
responsible as an employer of the
security guards concerned and liable
for their wrongful acts or omissions.11
This conclusion, however, does not necessarily
preclude this Court from holding respondent
liable under the law for damages resulting from
the injuries inflicted on petitioner by the
unlawful acts of the security guards. As stressed
by petitioner in his Memorandum:
Assuming arguendo that the security
guards are not respondent’s employees,
the same does not constitute a valid
defense at all. Article 2176 of the Civil
Code provides that a person who, by act
or omission, causes damage to another
through fault or negligence may be held
liable in damages. By making it
appear that he owns the disputed
properties, putting security guards
thereat to inti[mi]date, harass or
 cause the rightful owner and his
representatives and by providing the
escape vehicle, more than sufficient
evidence was established on the civil
liability of private respondent under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
It must be emphasized that private
respondent committed all these overt
acts despite an earlier Decision by the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Branch 71, affirming Rafael Roque’s
ownership of the properties and
dismissing the case he (private
respondent) filed for the cancellation of
NP-419 and NP-422 in Rafael Roque’s
name. Had he not misrepresented to
the security guards that he owns the
properties and had he not hired
these security guards/common
thugs to secure the premises which
he does not own, then the untoward
incident would not have
happened. To allow private
respondent to escape liability, despite
his misdeeds, will not only result in
grave injustice to Jose Roque, Jr. who
eventually died after having been
paralyzed for several years as a result
of [the] incident but will likewise result
in the implied tolerance by this
Honorable Court of private
respondent’s disobedience or
disrespect of a lawful order/decision of
the trial court (RTC Branch 71,
Antipolo) which he failed or refused to
honor.12(Emphasis ours.)
Article 2176 of the Civil Code states that
"whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done." In the case
at bar, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the
fact that at the time of the shooting incident, the
titles to the disputed property were already
registered in the name of petitioner’s son, the
cancellation for title case filed by respondent
having been dismissed. In fact, during trial, the
offer for stipulation of petitioner’s counsel that
at the time of the shooting incident, there is a
valid and existing title in the name of petitioner’s
son which was never cancelled by the court, was
accepted by the respondent. Therefore, by hiring
the security guards to prevent entry, possibly
even by the registered owner, to the subject
property, titles to which he fully knew he did not
possess, respondent blatantly acted in bad faith.
Respondent’s unwarranted act of posting
security guards within the property, which he
clearly knew is registered in the name of
another, unduly placed petitioner at harm and
deprived him of his right to fully exercise his
privileges and duties as administrator of said
property. Respondent, by his grossly faulty acts,
paved the way to the infliction of injuries by the
security guards on petitioner.
Furthermore, respondent’s palpable display of
bad faith in claiming a superior right to the
property over petitioner’s son entitles petitioner
to damages resulting therefrom. In order that a
plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries
which he sustained, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff – a concurrence
of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility
by the person causing it.13 In other words, in
order that the law will give redress for an act
causing damage, the act must be not only hurtful,
but wrongful.14
In the case at bar, it is clear that respondent
violated the principle embodied in Article 19 of
the Civil Code which mandates that "every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith." When a right is exercised in a
manner which discards these norms resulting in
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed
for which the actor can be held accountable.15 As
we have stated in a previous case, if mere fault or
negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for
damages for injury caused thereby, with more
reason should abuse or bad faith make him
liable.16
With respect to the award of damages, we
sustain the ruling of the trial court. It is essential
in the award of damages that the claimant must
have satisfactorily proven during the trial the
existence of the factual basis of the damages and
its causal connection to defendant’s
acts.17 During trial, petitioner, through his own
testimony and that of his wife, was able to
establish that they have incurred actual damages
in the amount of P300,000.00 for the the property, the title of which is under the name
hospitalization of petitioner as a result of the of petitioner’s son, said act ultimately resulting
shooting and the mauling incident, thus, the in the paralysis and blindness of petitioner, we
award of actual damages in said amount is find the award of exemplary damages to be
proper. proper by way of correction for the public good
As regards the award of moral damages, we have of respondent’s flagrant display of bad faith.
ruled that there is no hard and fast rule in the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
determination of what would be a fair amount of for Review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of
moral damages, since each case must be the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55895 is
governed by its own peculiar circumstances.18 As hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
reflected in the records of the instant case, there Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
is no gainsaying the fact that petitioner, together City, Branch 104, in Civil Case No. Q-93-14408
with his family, had suffered physical suffering, ordering respondent Torres to pay petitioner
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and moral Roque the amount of P300,000.00 as actual
shock resulting from respondent’s acts which damages; the amount of P1,000,000.00 as moral
caused petitioner grave physical injuries damages; the amount of P300,000.00 as
eventually leading to his death. The several years exemplary damages; and the amount
of torment and agonizing on the part of the of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fee is
deceased petitioner and his family more than herebyREINSTATED.
justifiy the award of moral damages. It must be SO ORDERED.
emphasized that moral damages are not Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago,
intended to enrich the complainant at the Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
expense of a defendant.19 They are awarded only
to enable the injured parties to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral sufferings the injured parties
have undergone by reason of defendant’s
culpable action.20 In other words, the award of
moral damages is aimed at a restoration within
the limits of the possible, of the spiritual
status quo ante; and therefore it must be
proportionate to the suffering
inflicted.21 Therefore, in light of the sufferings
sustained by petitioner and his family, we are
inclined to sustain the award of P1,000,000.00 as
moral damages.
As to exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the
Civil Code provides that such damages may be
imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. While
exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a
matter of right, they need not be proved,
although plaintiff must show that he is entitled
to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be
awarded.22 In the case at bar, having determined
that petitioner is entitled to the award of actual
and moral damages as a result of the wanton act
of respondent in stationing security guards in
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,
vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May an educational institution be held liable for
damages for misleading a student into believing
that the latter had satisfied all the requirements
for graduation when such is not the case? This is
the issue in the instant petition for review
premised on the following undisputed facts as
summarized by the trial court and adopted by
the Court of Appeals (CA),1 to wit:
Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants'
College of Law from 1984 up to 1988.
In the first semester of his last year
(School year 1987-1988), he failed to
take the regular final examination in
Practice Court I for which he was given
an incomplete grade (Exhibits "2", also
Exhibit "H"). He enrolled for the second
semester as fourth year law student
(Exhibit "A") and on February 1, 1988
he filed an application for the removal
of the incomplete grade given him by
Professor Carlos Ortega (Exhibits "H-2",
also Exhibit "2") which was approved
by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after
payment of the required fee. He took
the examination on March 28, 1988. On
May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega
submitted his grade. It was a grade of
five (5). (Exhibits "H-4", also Exhibits
"2-L", "2-N").1âwphi1.nêt
In the meantime, the Dean and the
Faculty Members of the College of Law
met to deliberate on who among the
fourth year students should be allowed
to graduate. The plaintiff's name
appeared in the Tentative List of
Candidates for graduation for the
Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of
Second Semester (1987-1988) with the
following annotation:
JADER ROMEO A.
Def. Conflict of Laws — x-1-87-88,
Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to
submit transcript with S.O. (Exhibits
"3", "3-C-1", "3-C-2").
The 35th Investitures & Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for
Commencement Ceremonies for the damages alleging that he suffered moral shock,
candidates of Bachelor of Laws was mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 at reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and in the nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar
invitation for that occasion the name of examinations arising from the latter's
the plaintiff appeared as one of the negligence. He prayed for an award of moral and
candidates. (Exhibits "B", "B-6", "B-6- exemplary damages, unrealized income,
A"). At the foot of the list of the names attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
of the candidates there appeared In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner
however the following annotation: denied liability arguing mainly that it never led
This is a tentative list Degrees respondent to believe that he completed the
will be conferred upon these requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree
candidates who satisfactorily when his name was included in the tentative list
complete requirements as of graduating students. After trial, the lower
stated in the University court rendered judgment as follows:
Bulletin and as approved of WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
the Department of Education, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
Culture and Sports (Exhibit the plaintiff and against the defendant
"B-7-A"). ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the
The plaintiff attended the investiture sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FOUR
ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS
U.E., Recto Campus, during the program (P35,470.00) with legal rate of interest
of which he went up the stage when his from the filing of the complaint until
name was called, escorted by her (sic) fully paid, the amount of FIVE
mother and his eldest brother who THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as
assisted in placing the Hood, and his attorney's fees and the cost of suit.
Tassel was turned from left to right, Defendant's counterclaim is, for lack of
and he was thereafter handed by Dean merit, hereby dismissed.
Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper SO ORDERED.3
symbolical of the Law Diploma. His which on appeal by both parties was affirmed by
relatives took pictures of the occasion the Court of Appeals (CA) with modification. The
(Exhibits "C" to "C-6", "D-3" to "D-11"). dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
He tendered a blow-out that evening WHEREFORE, in the light of the
which was attended by neighbors, foregoing, the lower Court's Decision is
friends and relatives who wished him hereby AFFIRMED with the
good luck in the forthcoming bar MODIFICATION that defendant-
examination. There were pictures taken appellee, in addition to the sum
too during the blow-out (Exhibits "D" adjudged by the lower court in favor of
to "D-1"). plaintiff-appellant, is also ORDERED to
He thereafter prepared himself for the pay plaintiff-appellant the amount of
bar examination. He took a leave of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS
absence without pay from his job from for moral damages. Costs against
April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 defendant-appellee.
(Exhibit "G") and enrolled at the pre- SO ORDERED.4
bar review class in Far Eastern Upon the denial of its motion for
University. (Exhibits "F" to "F-2"). reconsideration, petitioner UE elevated the case
Having learned of the deficiency he to this Court on a petition for review under Rule
dropped his review class and was not 45 of the Rules of Court, arguing that it has no
able to take the bar examination.2 liability to respondent Romeo A. Jader,
considering that the proximate and immediate
cause of the alleged damages incurred by the
latter arose out of his own negligence in not
verifying from the professor concerned the
result of his removal exam.
The petition lacks merit.
When a student is enrolled in any educational or
learning institution, a contract of education is
entered into between said institution and the
student. The professors, teachers or instructors
hired by the school are considered merely as
agents and administrators tasked to perform the
school's commitment under the contract. Since
the contracting parties are the school and the
student, the latter is not duty-bound to deal with
the former's agents, such as the professors with
respect to the status or result of his grades,
although nothing prevents either professors or
students from sharing with each other such
information. The Court takes judicial notice of
the traditional practice in educational
institutions wherein the professor directly
furnishes his/her students their grades. It is the
contractual obligation of the school to timely
inform and furnish sufficient notice and
information to each and every student as to
whether he or she had already complied with all
the requirements for the conferment of a degree
or whether they would be included among those
who will graduate. Although commencement
exercises are but a formal ceremony, it
nonetheless is not an ordinary occasion, since
such ceremony is the educational institution's
way of announcing to the whole world that the
students included in the list of those who will be
conferred a degree during the baccalaureate
ceremony have satisfied all the requirements for
such degree. Prior or subsequent to the
ceremony, the school has the obligation to
promptly inform the student of any problem
involving the latter's grades and performance
and also most importantly, of the procedures for
remedying the same.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of
the result of the removal examination,
particularly at a time when he had already
commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot
be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of
good faith must be sufficiently established for a
successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in
a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the
Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest
intention to abstain from taking undue
advantage of another, even though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together with the
absence of all information or belief of facts,
would render the transaction
unconscientious.5 It is the school that has access
to those information and it is only the school that
can compel its professors to act and comply with
its rules, regulations and policies with respect to
the computation and the prompt submission of
grades. Students do not exercise control, much
less influence, over the way an educational
institution should run its affairs, particularly in
disciplining its professors and teachers and
ensuring their compliance with the school's rules
and orders. Being the party that hired them, it is
the school that exercises general supervision and
exclusive control over the professors with
respect to the submission of reports involving
the students' standing. Exclusive control means
that no other person or entity had any control
over the instrumentality which caused the
damage or injury.6
The college dean is the senior officer responsible
for the operation of an academic program,
enforcement of rules and regulations, and the
supervision of faculty and student services.7 He
must see to it that his own professors and
teachers, regardless of their status or position
outside of the university, must comply with the
rules set by the latter. The negligent act of a
professor who fails to observe the rules of the
school, for instance by not promptly submitting a
student's grade, is not only imputable to the
professor but is an act of the school, being his
employer.
Considering further, that the institution of
learning involved herein is a university which is
engaged in legal education, it should have
practiced what it inculcates in its students, more
specifically the principle of good dealings
enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code
which states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to
law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.
Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of
torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to provide
specifically in statutory law.8 In civilized society,
men must be able to assume that others will do
them no intended injury — that others will
commit no internal aggressions upon them; that
their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will
do so with due care which the ordinary
understanding and moral sense of the
community exacts and that those with whom
they deal in the general course of society will act
in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of
liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of
civilized society.9 Schools and professors cannot
just take students for granted and be indifferent
to them, for without the latter, the former are
useless.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to
inform the students of their academic status and
not wait for the latter to inquire from the former.
The conscious indifference of a person to the
rights or welfare of the person/persons who may
be affected by his act or omission can support a
claim for damages.10 Want of care to the
conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled
with a conscious knowledge of the cause
naturally calculated to produce them would
make the erring party liable.11 Petitioner ought
to have known that time was of the essence in
the performance of its obligation to inform
respondent of his grade. It cannot feign
ignorance that respondent will not prepare
himself for the bar exams since that is precisely
the immediate concern after graduation of an
LL.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably.
Petitioner cannot just give out its student's
grades at any time because a student has to
comply with certain deadlines set by the
Supreme Court on the submission of
requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner's
liability arose from its failure to promptly inform
respondent of the result of an examination and
in misleading the latter into believing that he had
satisfied all requirements for the course. Worth
quoting is the following disquisition of the
respondent court:
It is apparent from the testimony of
Dean Tiongson that defendant-appellee
University had been informed during
the deliberation that the professor in
Practice Court I gave plaintiff-appellant
a failing grade. Yet, defendant-appellee
still did not inform plaintiff-appellant of
his failure to complete the
requirements for the degree nor did
they remove his name from the
tentative list of candidates for
graduation. Worse, defendant-appellee
university, despite the knowledge that
plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice
Court I, againincluded plaintiff-
appellant's name in the "tentative list of
candidates for graduation which was
prepared after the deliberation and
which became the basis for the
commencement rites program. Dean
Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-
appellant's name was allowed to
remain in the tentative list of
candidates for graduation in the hope
that the latter would still be able to
remedy the situation in the remaining
few days before graduation day. Dean
Tiongson, however, did not explain
how plaintiff appellant Jader could have
done something to complete his
deficiency if defendant-appellee
university did not exert any effort to
inform plaintiff-appellant of his failing
grade in Practice Court I.12
Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the
professors to justify its own negligence that led
to the delayed relay of information to
respondent. When one of two innocent parties
must suffer, he through whose agency the loss
occurred must bear it.13 The modern tendency is
to grant indemnity for damages in cases where
there is abuse of right, even when the act is not
illicit.14 If mere fault or negligence in one's acts
can make him liable for damages for injury
caused thereby, with more reason should abuse
or bad faith make him liable. A person should be
protected only when he acts in the legitimate
exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with
prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts
with negligence or abuse.15
However, while petitioner was guilty of
negligence and thus liable to respondent for the
latter's actual damages, we hold that respondent
should not have been awarded moral damages.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals'
findings that respondent suffered shock, trauma
and pain when he was informed that he could
not graduate and will not be allowed to take the
bar examinations. At the very least, it behooved
on respondent to verify for himself whether he
has completed all necessary requirements to be
eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law
student, respondent should have been
responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs,
specifically those pertaining to his academic
achievement, are in order. Given these
considerations, we fail to see how respondent
could have suffered untold embarrassment in
attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the
bar review classes and not being able to take the
bar exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated
by his failure to take the bar, he brought this
upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied
all the requirements including his school
records, before preparing himself for the bar
examination. Certainly, taking the bar
examinations does not only entail a mental
preparation on the subjects thereof; there are
also prerequisites of documentation and
submission of requirements which the
prospective examinee must meet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the
sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred
Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest
of 6% per annum computed from the date of
filing of the complaint until fully paid; the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as
attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The
award of moral damages is DELEIED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines denial of petitioners motion to dismiss and directed 10. On several After another exchange of pleadings,[8] the
Supreme Court the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dinalupihan, Bataan, occasions, [respondent] went to RTC issued an Order[9] dated April 1, 2003 denying the
Manila Branch 5, to proceed with trial. Also assailed is the see the [petitioners] to get his Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the issues
Resolution[2] dated September 22, 2004 denying the ToR, but all of these were futile involved required an examination of the evidence,
FIRST DIVISION motion for reconsideration. for he was not even entertained which should be threshed out during trial. Petitioners
at the Office of the Dean. Worst, Motion for Reconsideration[10] was denied in an
UNIVERSITY OF G.R. No. 165569 Factual Antecedents he was treated like a criminal Order[11] dated August 1, 2003, so petitioners sought
SANTO forcing him to admit the fact that recourse before the CA.
TOMAS, GLENDA A. This case began with a Complaint[3] for Damages filed he did not enroll for the last three
VARGAS, by respondent Danes B. Sanchez (respondent) against (3) semesters of his schooling. Ruling of the Court of Appeals
MA. SOCORRO S. the University of Santo Tomas (UST) and its Board of [Petitioner] Dean tried to
GUANHING, Directors, the Dean and the Assistant Dean of the UST persuade the [respondent] to The CA affirmed the denial of petitioners Motion to
in their capacities College of Nursing, and the University Registrar for give the original copies of the Dismiss, and directed the RTC to proceed with trial.
as Dean and their alleged unjustified refusal to release the Class Cards which he has in his
Assistant Dean, Present: respondents Transcript of Records (ToR). The case possession. These are the only Issues
respectively, of was raffled to Branch 5 of the RTC of Dinalupihan, [bits of] evidence on hand to
the College of Bataan, and docketed as Civil Case No. DH-788-02. prove that he was in fact officially Petitioners seek recourse before us raising the
Nursing of the enrolled. [Respondent] did not following issues:
University of Santo CORONA, C. J., In his Complaint, respondent alleged that he give the said class cards and
Tomas, and Chairperson, graduated from UST on April 2, 2002 with a Bachelors instead gave photo copies to the 1) The CHED exercises quasi-judicial power over
RODOLFO N. VELASCO, JR., Degree of Science in Nursing. He was included in the [Petitioner] Dean. The Office of controversies involving school matters and has
CLAVIO, in his list of candidates for graduation and attended the Dean of Nursing of primary jurisdiction over respondents demand
capacity as LEONARDO-DE graduation ceremonies. On April 18, 2002, respondent [petitioner] UST became very for the release of his ToR. Thus, respondent failed
Registrar of the CASTRO, sought to secure a copy of his ToR with the UST strict in receiving documents to exhaust administrative remedies;
University of Santo DEL CASTILLO, and Registrars Office, paid the required fees, but was only from the [respondent]. [They
Tomas, given a Certificate of Graduation by the have] to be scrutinized first 2) Since respondent sought recourse with both
Petitioners, PEREZ, JJ. Registrar. Despite repeated attempts by the before the same are the CHED and the RTC, respondent violated the
respondent to secure a copy of his ToR, and received.Receiving, as rule against forum-shopping; and
- versus - submission of his class cards as proof of his enrolment, [respondent] believes, is merely a
UST refused to release his records, making it ministerial function [of] the 3) The Complaint failed to state a cause of action,
DANES B. SANCHEZ, Promulgated: impossible for him to take the nursing board [petitioners] and the documents since respondent admitted that he was not
Respondent. ________________July 29, examinations, and depriving him of the opportunity to presented for receiving need not enrolled in UST in the last three semesters prior
2010 make a living. The respondent prayed that the RTC be scrutinized especially so when to graduation.
x-------------------------------------------- order UST to release his ToR and hold UST liable for x x x they are not illegal.Copies of
-----------------------x actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, the class cards are hereto Our Ruling
DECISION and the costs of suit. attached as F hereof.[5]
DEL CASTILLO, J.: The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Instead of filing an Answer, petitioners filed a Motion The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
Where a valid cause of action exists, parties may not to Dismiss[4] where they claimed that they refused to After the parties filed their responsive does not apply in this case.
simply bypass litigation by the simple expediency of a release respondents ToR because he was not a pleadings,[6] petitioners filed a Supplement to their
Motion to Dismiss. Instead of abbreviating the registered student, since he had not been enrolled in Motion to Dismiss,[7] alleging that respondent sought The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
proceedings, it has had the opposite effect: the university for the last three semesters. They administrative recourse before the Commission on requires that where a remedy before an
unnecessary litigation for almost seven years. Here, in claimed that the respondents graduation, attendance Higher Education (CHED) through a letter-complaint administrative agency is provided, the administrative
particular, where any resolution of the case will in classes, and taking/passing of examinations were dated January 21, 2003. Thus, petitioners claimed that agency concerned must be given the opportunity to
depend on the appreciation of evidence, a full-blown immaterial because he ceased to be a student when he the CHED had primary jurisdiction to resolve matters decide a matter within its jurisdiction before an action
trial is necessary to unearth all relevant facts and failed to enroll during the second semester of school pertaining to school controversies, and the filing of the is brought before the courts.[12] Failure to exhaust
circumstances. year 2000-2001. They also sought the dismissal of the instant case was premature. administrative remedies is a ground for dismissal of
case on the ground that the complaint failed to state a the action.[13]
This petition for review on certiorari assails the cause of action, as paragraph 10 of the complaint Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Decision[1] dated July 20, 2004 of the Court of Appeals admitted that: In this case, the doctrine does not apply because
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79404 which affirmed the petitioners failed to demonstrate that recourse to the
CHED is mandatory or even possible in an action such (1) Section 33, which authorizes the CHED be called for under the As regards Section 72, it refers to a schools right to
as that brought by the respondent, which is essentially to cancel or revoke the graduation of any student circumstances. withhold the release of credentials due to suspension,
one for mandamus and damages. The doctrine of whose records are found to be fraudulent: expulsion, or non-payment of financial obligations or
exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of The Department reserves the property responsibility. None of these circumstances
numerous exceptions,[14] one of which is where the Section 33. Authority to Graduate right to cancel or revoke the is present, and there has been no intimation that
issues are purely legal and well within the jurisdiction Without Department Approval. graduation of any student whose respondents ToR has been withheld on any of these
of the trial court, as in the present case.[15] Petitioners One of the benefits which may be records are found to be grounds.
liability if any for damages will have to be decided by made available for accredited fraudulent.
the courts, since any judgment inevitably calls for the schools of the appropriate level is In any event, even if we were to assume that these
application and the interpretation of the Civil the authority to graduate provisions were applicable, the CHED remains without
Code.[16] As such, exhaustion of administrative students from accredited courses (2) Section 72, which permits the school to authority to adjudicate an action for damages.
remedies may be dispensed with. As we held in Regino or programs of study without withhold students credentials under
v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology:[17] prior approval of the Department, certainspecified circumstances, and authorizes the CH Respondent is not guilty of forum shopping
the conditions of which are as ED to issue a students credentials in case these are
x x x exhaustion of administrative follows: unlawfully withheld by the school: Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse
remedies is applicable when opinion in one
there is competence on the part a) The school head Section 72. Withholding of forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than
of the administrative body to act must furnish the Regional Office Credentials. The release of the by appeal or certiorari) in another, or when he
upon the matter complained of the region where the school is transfer credentials of any pupil institutes two or more actions or proceedings
of. Administrative agencies are situated a copy of its certificate of or student may be withheld for grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one
not courts; x x x neither [are they] accreditation. reasons of suspension, expulsion, or the other court would make a favorable
part of the judicial system, [or] or non-payment of financial disposition.[23] Here, there can be no forum shopping
deemed judicial tribunals. b) Within two weeks obligations or property precisely because the CHED is without quasi-judicial
Specifically, the CHED does not after the graduation exercise, the responsibility of the pupil or power, and cannot make any disposition of the case
have the power to award school shall submit to the student to the school. The whether favorable or otherwise. As we held
damages. Hence, petitioner Regional Office concerned an credentials shall be released as in Cabarrus, Jr. v. Bernas:[24]
could not have commenced her alphabetical list of graduates by soon as his obligation shall have
case before the course, accompanied by a been settled or the penalty of The courts, tribunal and
Commission. (Emphasis ours) certification under oath signed by suspension or expulsion lifted. agencies referred to under
the school registrar certifying that Circular No. 28-91, revised
In addition, the rule on primary jurisdiction applies the students listed (1) have However, if, after due inquiry, a Circular No. 28-91 and
only where the administrative agency exercises quasi- complied with all the school is found to have Administrative Circular No.
judicial or adjudicatory functions.[18] Thus, an essential requirements of the Department, unjustifiably refused to issue 04-94 are those vested with
requisite for this doctrine to apply is the actual (2) were conferred their transfer credentials or student judicial powers or quasi-
existence of quasi-judicial power.[19] However, respective certificates or degrees records, the Department may judicial powers and those who
petitioners have not shown that the CHED possesses on a specific date, (3) have issue the same without prejudice not only hear and determine
any such power to investigate facts or ascertain the complete scholastic records on to the imposition of appropriate controversies between
existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and file in the school, and (4) have administrative sanctions against adverse parties, but to make
draw conclusions.[20] Indeed, Section 8 of Republic Act their Form 137 for high school the school concerned. binding orders or
No. 7722[21] otherwise known as the Higher Education and Form IX for college, as the judgments. As succinctly put
Act of 1994, certainly does not contain any express case may be, in the custody of the by R.A. 157, the NBI is not
grant to the CHED of judicial or quasi-judicial power. school. This list shall be sufficient The most cursory perusal of these provisions shows performing judicial or quasi-
basis for issuing special orders, if that they are inapplicable. Section 33 concerns the judicial functions. The NBI
Petitioners also claim that even without any express still necessary. conditions and authority of accredited schools to cannot therefore be among
grant of quasi-judicial power by the legislature, the authorize the graduation of students without the prior those forums contemplated by
CHED is authorized to adjudicate the case filed by The school will be held fully liable authority of the CHED. Corollarily, the CHED may the Circular that can entertain
respondent on the strength of the following provisions for the veracity of the records cancel or revoke the graduation if it is found to be an action or proceeding, or
of the Manual of Regulations of Private Schools:[22] without prejudice to any legal fraudulent. We are not aware that the CHED has taken even grant any relief,
action, including revocation of any action to revoke the respondents graduation, declaratory or otherwise.
government recognition, as may though it is free to do so.
The Complaint states a cause of action
Under Rule 16, Section 1(g) of the Rules of
Court, a motion to dismiss may be made on the ground
that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of
action.[25] To clarify the essential test required to
sustain dismissal on this ground, we have explained
that [t]he test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a
petition, to constitute a cause of action, is whether
admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a
valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer of the petition.[26] Stated otherwise, a complaint
is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting
what appears solely on its face to be correct, the
plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.[27]
The Complaint makes the following
essential allegations: that petitioners unjustifiably
refused to release respondents ToR despite his having
obtained a degree from UST; that petitioners claim
that respondent was not officially enrolled is untrue;
that as a result of petitioners unlawful actions,
respondent has not been able to take the nursing
board exams since 2002; that petitioners actions
violated Articles 19-21 of the Civil Code; and that
petitioners should be ordered to release respondents
ToR and held liable for P400,000.00 as moral
damages,P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs of
suit, andP15,000.00 as actual damages. Clearly,
assuming that the facts alleged in the Complaint are
true, the RTC would be able to render a valid judgment
in accordance with the prayer in the Complaint.
Petitioners argue that paragraph 10 of the Complaint
contains an admission that respondent was not
officially enrolled at UST. Said paragraph reads:
10. On several
occasions, [respondent] went to
see the [petitioners] to get his
ToR, but all of these were futile
for he was not even entertained
at the Office of the Dean. Worst,
he was treated like a criminal
forcing him to admit the fact that
he did not enroll for the last three
(3) semesters of his schooling.
[Petitioner] Dean tried to
persuade the [respondent] to
give the original copies of the
Class Cards which he has in his
possession. These are the only SO ORDERED.
[bits of] evidence on hand to
prove that he was in fact officially
enrolled. [Respondent] did not
give the said class cards and
instead gave photo copies to the
[Petitioner] Dean. The Office of
the Dean of Nursing of
[petitioner] UST became very
strict in receiving documents
from the [respondent]. [They
have] to be scrutinized first
before the same are
received.Receiving, as
[respondent] believes, is merely a
ministerial function [of] the
[petitioners] and the documents
presented for receiving need not
be scrutinized especially so when
x x x they are not illegal.Copies of
the class cards are hereto
attached as F hereof.[28]
This statement certainly does not support
petitioners claim that respondent admitted that he
was not enrolled. On the contrary, any allegation
concerning the use of force or intimidation by
petitioners, if substantiated, can only serve to
strengthen respondents complaint for damages.
We fully agree with the RTCs finding that a
resolution of the case requires the presentation of
evidence during trial. Based on the parties allegations,
the issues in this case are far from settled. Was
respondent enrolled or not? Was his degree obtained
fraudulently? If so, why was he permitted by the
petitioners to graduate? Was there fault or negligence
on the part of any of the parties? Clearly, these are
factual matters which can be best ventilated in a full-
blown proceeding before the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated July 20, 2004 and the Resolution dated
September 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 79404 areAFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court
of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5, is DIRECTED to
continue the proceedings in Civil Case No. DH-788-
02 with all deliberate speed.
Costs against petitioners.
SECOND DIVISION
This case is about the right to recover damages
TITUS B. VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 180764 for alleged abuse of right committed by a
Petitioner, superior public officer in preventing a
Present: subordinate from doing her assigned task and
Carpio, J., Chairperson, being officially recognized for it.
- versus - Brion,
D The Facts
e and the Case
l the occasion, had a space where Rosquetas
Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta
C (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of
a the Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of
s the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered
t her courtesy resignation from that post on
i January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria
l Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office. But five
l months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her
o resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of
, tenure and that she had resigned against her will
on orders
A of her superior.[1]
b Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President
a Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to
d respondent Rosquetas position. Challenging such
, appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for
prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction against
a petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then
n Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of
d Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial
Court[2]P(RTC) of Manila in Civil Case 01-
e 101539. On August 27, 2001 the RTC issued a
r temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining
e Villanueva and the Finance Secretary[3] from
z implementing Valeras appointment. On August
, 28, 2001 the trial court superseded the TRO with
a writ of preliminary injunction.[4]
J replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven
J Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the
. Secretary of Finance challenged the injunction
EMMA M. ROSQUETA, order before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
Respondent. Promul SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued
gated: its own TRO, enjoining the implementation of the
RTCs injunction order.But the TRO lapsed after
January 19, 2010 60 days and the CA eventually dismissed the
x ------------------------------------------------------------- petition before it.
-------------------------- x
On November 22, 2001 while the
DECISION preliminary injunction in the quo warranto case
was again in force, petitioner Villanueva issued
ABAD, J.: Customs Memorandum Order 40-2001,
authorizing Valera to exercise the powers and
functions of the Deputy Commissioner.
During the Bureaus celebration of its
centennial anniversary in February 2002, its
special Panorama magazine edition featured all
the customs deputy commissioners, except
respondent Rosqueta. The souvenir program,
authorized by the Bureaus Steering Committee
headed by petitioner Villanueva to be issued on
picture was supposed to be but it instead stated
that her position was under
litigation. Meanwhile, the commemorative
billboard displayed at the Bureaus main gate
included Valeras picture but not Rosquetas.
On February 28, 2002 respondent
Rosqueta filed a complaint[5] for damages before
the RTC of Quezon City against petitioner
Villanueva in Civil Case Q-02-46256, alleging that
the latter maliciously excluded her from the
centennial anniversary memorabilia. Further,
she claimed that he prevented her from
performing her duties as Deputy Commissioner,
withheld her salaries, and refused to act on her
leave applications.Thus, she asked the RTC to
award her P1,000,000.00 in moral
damages, P500,000.00 in exemplary damages,
and P300,000.00 in attorneys fees and costs of
suit.
But the RTC dismissed[6] respondent
Rosquetas complaint, stating that petitioner
Villanueva committed no wrong and incurred no
omission that entitled her to damages.The RTC
found that Villanueva had validly and legally
months before the Bureaus centennial
anniversary.
But the CA reversed the RTCs
decision,[7] holding instead that petitioner
Villanuevas refusal to comply with the
preliminary injunction order issued in the quo
warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to
recover moral damages from him.[8]Citing the
abuse of right principle, the RTC said that
Villanueva acted maliciously when he prevented
Rosqueta from performing her duties, deprived
her of salaries and leaves, and denied her official
recognition as Deputy Commissioner by
excluding her from the centennial anniversary
memorabilia. Thus, the appellate court ordered
Villanueva to payP500,000.00 in moral
damages, P200,000.00 in exemplary damages
and P100,000.00 in attorneys fees and litigation
expenses. With the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, Villanueva filed this petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The Issue
Presented
The key issue presented in this case is
whether or not the CA erred in holding
petitioner Villanueva liable in damages to
respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the
preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued
in the quo warranto case (Civil Case 01-101539),
thus denying her of the right to do her job as
Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau and to be
officially recognized as such public officer.
The
Courts Ruling
Under the abuse of right principle
found in Article 19 of the Civil Code,[9] a person
must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act
in good faith. He would be liable if he instead
acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice
another. Complementing this principle are
Articles 20[10] and 21[11] of the Civil Code which
grant the latter indemnity for the injury he
suffers because of such abuse of right or duty.[12]
Petitioner Villanueva claims that he
merely acted on advice of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) when he
allowed Valera to assume the office as Deputy
Commissioner since respondent Rosqueta held
the position merely in a temporary capacity and
since she lacked the Career Executive Service
eligibility required for the job.
But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek
shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave
him. Surely, a government official of his rank
must know that a preliminary injunction order
issued by a court of law had to be obeyed,
especially since the question of Valeras right to
replace respondent Rosqueta had not yet been
properly resolved.
That petitioner Villanueva ignored the
injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite
Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law
the Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion of her
from the centennial anniversary memorabilia
was not an honest mistake by any
reckoning. Indeed, he withheld her salary and
prevented her from assuming the duties of the
position. As the Court said in Amonoy v. Spouses
Gutierrez,[13] a partys refusal to abide by a court
order enjoining him from doing an act, otherwise
lawful, constitutes an abuse and an unlawful
exercise of right.
That respondent Rosqueta was later
appointed Deputy Commissioner for another
division of the Bureau is immaterial. While such
appointment, when accepted, rendered the quo
warranto case moot and academic, it did not
have the effect of wiping out the injuries she
suffered on account of petitioner Villanuevas
treatment of her. The damage suit is an
independent action.
bonanza. They are given to ease the defendants
grief and suffering. Moral damages should
reasonably approximate the extent of hurt
caused and the gravity of the wrong done. Here,
that would be P200,000.00.
The Court affirms the grant of
exemplary damages by way of example or
correction for the public good but, in line with
the same reasoning, reduces it
to P50,000.00. Finally, the Court affirms the
award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses
but reduces it toP50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the
petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated April 30, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV
85931 withMODIFICATION in that petitioner
Titus B. Villanueva is ORDERED to pay
respondent Emma M. Rosqueta the sum
of P200,000.00 in moral damages, P50,000.00 in
exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 in attorneys
fees and litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.

The CA correctly awarded moral

damages to respondent Rosqueta. Such damages
may be awarded when the defendants
transgression is the immediate cause of the
plaintiffs anguish[14] in the cases specified in
Article 2219[15] of the Civil Code.[16]

Here, respondent Rosquetas colleagues

and friends testified that she suffered severe
anxiety on account of the speculation over her
employment status.[17] She had to endure being
referred to as a squatter in her workplace. She
had to face inquiries from family and friends
about her exclusion from the Bureaus centennial
anniversary memorabilia. She did not have to
endure all these affronts and the angst and
depression they produced had Villanueva abided
in good faith by the courts order in her
favor.Clearly, she is entitled to moral damages.

The Court, however, finds the award

of P500,000.00 excessive. As it held inPhilippine
Commercial International Bank v.
Alejandro,[18] moral damages are not a
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 147076. June 17, 2004]
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND
SEWERAGE SYSTEM, petitioner,vs.
ACT THEATER, INC., respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari filed by the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS),
seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] dated January 31, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58581, which affirmed
the civil aspect of the Decision[2] dated May 5,
1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 77, directing the petitioner MWSS to pay
the respondent Act Theater, Inc. damages and
attorneys fees.
The present case stemmed from the
consolidated cases of Criminal Case No. Q-89-
2412 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo
Tabian, et al., for violation of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 401, as amended by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 876, and Civil Case No. Q-88-768 entitledAct
Theater, Inc. v. Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System. The two cases were jointly
tried in the court a quo as they arose from the
same factual circumstances, to wit:
On September 22, 1988, four employees of
the respondent Act Theater, Inc., namely,
Rodolfo Tabian, Armando Aguilar, Arnel Concha
and Modesto Ruales, were apprehended by
members of the Quezon City police force for
allegedly tampering a water meter in violation of
P.D. No. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876. The
respondents employees were subsequently
criminally charged (Criminal Case No. Q-89-
2412) before the court a quo. On account of the
incident, the respondents water service
connection was cut off. Consequently, the
respondent filed a complaint for injunction with
damages (Civil Case No. Q-88-768) against the
petitioner MWSS.
In the civil case, the respondent alleged in
its complaint filed with the court a quo that the
petitioner acted arbitrarily, whimsically and
capriciously, in cutting off the respondents water
service connection without prior notice. Due to
lack of water, the health and sanitation, not only
of the respondents patrons but in the
surrounding premises as well, were adversely
affected. The respondent prayed that the
petitioner be directed to pay damages.
After due trial, the court a quo rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In Criminal Case No. Q-89-2412
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the four (4) above-named Accused are
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.[3]
In Civil Case No. Q-88-768
...
1. Ordering defendant MWSS to pay
plaintiff actual or
compensatory damages in the
amount ofP25,000.00; and to
return the sum of P200,000.00
deposited by the plaintiff for
the restoration of its water
services after its disconnection
on September 23, 1988;
2. Defendants counterclaim for
undercollection of P530,759.96
is dismissed for lack of merit;
3. Ordering defendant MWSS to pay
costs of suit;
4. Ordering defendant MWSS to pay
plaintiff the amount
of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees;
5. Making the mandatory injunction
earlier issued to plaintiff Act
Theater, Inc. permanent.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the civil
aspect of the aforesaid decision to the CA. The
appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal.
According to the CA, the court a quo correctly
found that the petitioners act of cutting off the
respondents water service connection without
prior notice was arbitrary, injurious and
prejudicial to the latter justifying the award of
damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Undaunted, the petitioner now comes to
this Court alleging as follows:
I reasonable to repel or prevent an actual or
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEAL[S] VALIDLY AFFIRMED THE DECISION
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN RESOLVING
THE PETITIONERS APPEAL;
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS VALIDLY UPHELD THE AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS FEES;
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEAL[S] CORRECTLY APPLIED THE
PROVISION OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE
APPLICABLE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 429 OF
THE SAME CODE.[5]
Preliminarily, the petitioner harps on the
fact that, in quoting the decretal portion of the
court a quos decision, the CA erroneously
typed P500,000 as the attorneys fees awarded in
favor of the respondent when the same should
only be P5,000. In any case, according to the
petitioner, whether the amount is P500,000
or P5,000, the award of attorneys fees is
improper considering that there was no
discussion or statement in the body of the
assailed decision justifying such award. The
petitioner insists that in cutting off the
respondents water service connection, the
petitioner merely exercised its proprietary right
under Article 429 of the Civil Code.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Article 429 of the Civil Code, relied upon by
the petitioner in justifying its act of
disconnecting the water supply of the
respondent without prior notice, reads:
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a
thing has the right to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this
purpose, he may use such force as may be
threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property.
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity
guaranteed under a constitution, statute or
decisional law, or recognized as a result of long
usage,[6] constitutive of a legally enforceable
claim of one person against the other.[7]
Concededly, the petitioner, as the owner of
the utility providing water supply to certain
consumers including the respondent, had the
right to exclude any person from the enjoyment
and disposal thereof. However, the exercise of
rights is not without limitations. Having the right
should not be confused with the manner by
which such right is to be exercised.[8]
Article 19 of the Civil Code precisely sets
the norms for the exercise of ones rights:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
When a right is exercised in a manner
which discards these norms resulting in damage
to another, a legal wrong is committed for which
actor can be held accountable.[9] In this case, the
petitioner failed to act with justice and give the
respondent what is due to it when the petitioner
unceremoniously cut off the respondents water
service connection. As correctly found by the
appellate court:
While it is true that MWSS had sent a notice of 31, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58581 is
investigation to plaintiff-appellee prior to the AFFIRMED in toto.
disconnection of the latters water services, this
was done only a few hours before the actual SO ORDERED.
disconnection. Upon receipt of the notice and in Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-
order to ascertain the matter, Act sent its Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
assistant manager Teodulo Gumalid, Jr. to the
MWSS office but he was treated badly on the
flimsy excuse that he had no authority to
represent Act. Acts water services were cut at
midnight of the day following the apprehension
of the employees. Clearly, the plaintiff-appellee
was denied due process when it was deprived of
the water services. As a consequence thereof, Act
had to contract another source to provide water
for a number of days. Plaintiff-appellee was also
compelled to deposit with MWSS the sum
of P200,000.00 for the restoration of their water
services.[10]

There is, thus, no reason to deviate from

the uniform findings and conclusion of the
court a quo and the appellate court that the
petitioners act was arbitrary, injurious and
prejudicial to the respondent, justifying the
award of damages under Article 19 of the Civil
Code.
Finally, the amount of P500,000 as
attorneys fees in that portion of the assailed
decision which quoted the fallo of the court a
quos decision was obviously a typographical
error. As attorneys fees, the court a quo awarded
the amount of P5,000 only. It was this amount, as
well as actual and compensatory damages
of P25,000 and the reimbursement of P200,000
deposited by the respondent for the restoration
of its water supply, that the CA affirmed, as it
expressly stated in its dispositive portion that
finding no cogent reason to reverse the appealed
Decision which is in conformity with the law and
evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED.[11]
The award of P5,000 as attorneys fees is
reasonable and warranted. Attorneys fees may
be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate
or incur expenses to protect his interest by
reason of an unjustified act of the other party.[12]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January
Republic of the Philippines 2006 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
Supreme Court 82610, which affirmed with modification the
Manila Resolution[2] dated September 2, 2003 of Branch
227 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC-Branch
227) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-02-
FIRST DIVISION 48341.
We partly reproduce below the facts of
ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, AURORA J. CIFRA, the case
G.R.
as No.
culled
171365
by the Court of Appeals from
FLORDELIZA J. ARCILLA, LOURDES J. CATALAN, the records:
ETHELINDA J. HOLT, BIENVENIDO R. JONGCO,
ARTEMIO R. JONGCO, JR. and JOEL JONGCO, Present: This case is an off-
shoot of an unlawful detainer
Petitioners, case filed by [herein
CORONA, C.J.,
petitioners] Ermelinda C.
Manaloto, Aurora J. Cifra,
Chairperson,
Flordeliza J. Arcilla, Lourdes J.
Catalan, Ethelinda J. Holt,
VELASCO,
BienvenidoJR., R. Jongco, Artemio
- versus - R. Jongco, Jr. and Joel Jongco
NACHURA,
against * [herein
respondent]. In said
LEONARDO-DE
complaint CASTRO,
for and
unlawful
detainer, it was alleged that
PEREZ,
they JJ.are the lessors of a
ISMAEL VELOSO III, residential house located at
No. 42 Big Horseshoe Drive,
Respondent. Horseshoe Village, Quezon
City [subject property] which
was leased to [respondent] at
Promulgated:
a monthly rental
of P17,000.00. The action was
instituted on the ground of
[respondents] failure to pay
October 6, 2010
rentals from May 23, 1997 to
December 22, 1998 despite
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
repeateddemands. [Responde
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
nt] denied the non-payment
of rentals and alleged that he
made an advance payment
of P825,000.00 when he paid
for the repairs done on the
DECISION leased property.
After trial, the
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) decided in favor of
Before Us is a Petition for Review [petitioners] by ordering
on Certiorari of the Decision[1] dated January 31, [respondent] to (a) vacate the
premises at No. 42 Big Appeals and the Supreme
Horseshoe Drive, Horseshoe Court, the decision of the RTC
Village, Quezon City; (b) pay dated November 29, 2000
[petitioners] the sum which reversed the decision
of P306,000.00 corresponding of the MeTC, became final and
to the rentals due from May executory.[3]
23, 1997 to November 22,
1998, and the sum Whilst respondents appeal of the
of P17,000.00 a month Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) judgment in the
thereafter until [respondent] unlawful detainer case was pending before the
vacates the premises; and (c) RTC-Branch 88, respondent filed before the RTC-
pay [petitioners] the sum Branch 227 on November 26, 2002 a Complaint
ofP5,000.00 as attorneys fees. for Breach of Contract and Damages[4] against
the petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-
On appeal to the 48341. The said complaint alleged two causes of
Regional Trial Court (RTC) action. The first cause of action was for damages
[Branch 88, Quezon City], the because the respondent supposedly suffered
MeTC decision was embarrassment and humiliation when
reversed. [Respondent] was petitioners distributed copies of the above-
ordered to pay arrearages mentioned MeTC decision in the unlawful
from May 23, 1997 up to the detainer case to the homeowners of Horseshoe
date of the decision but he Village while respondents appeal was still
was also given an option to pending before the Quezon City RTC-Branch
choose between staying in the 88. The second cause of action was for breach of
leased property or vacating contract since petitioners, as lessors, failed to
the same, subject to the make continuing repairs on the subject property
reimbursement by to preserve and keep it tenantable. Thus,
[petitioners] of one-half of the respondent sought the following from the
value of the improvements court a quo:
which it found to be in the
amountof P120,000.00. [Resp PRAYER
ondent] was also given the
right to remove said
improvements pursuant to WHEREFORE, premises
considered, it is respectfully
Article 1678 of the Civil Code,
should [petitioners] refuse to prayed that after hearing the
pay P60,000.00. court render a decision
against the [herein
When both parties petitioners] and in favor of
moved for the reconsideration the [herein respondent] by
of the RTC decision, the RTC
issued an Order dated 1. Ordering [petitioners] to
February 23, 2001 modifying pay [respondent] the
its previous ruling by following amounts:
increasing the value of the
improvements
from P120,000.00 a) P1,500,0
to P800,000.00. 00.00 as moral
damages and
After successive consequential
appeals to the Court of damages;
 b) P500,00 are just and equitable under 30, 2004 and he filed a Motion for thereon or to secure a copy
0.00 as exemplary the premises.[5] Reconsideration[11] of the same on May 3, thereof. Nevertheless, under
damages; 2004.The RTC-Branch 227, in another the circumstances of this case,
The petitioners filed an Omnibus Order[12] dated May 31, 2004, granted although court decisions are
c) P425,00 Motion[6] on February 18, 2003 praying for, respondents latest motion because it was public documents,
0.00 representing among other reliefs, the dismissal of respondents convinced that it is but appropriate and fair to distribution of the same
the difference of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02- both parties that this matter of whether or not during the pendency of an
expenses of the 48341. Petitioners argued that respondent had the Appeal was filed on time, be resolved by the appeal was clearly intended to
improvements no cause of action against them because the appellate court rather than by this Court. The cause [respondent] some
of P825,000.00 MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case was RTC-Branch 227 then ordered that the records of form of harassment and/or
and P400,000.00 a matter of public record and its disclosure to the the case be forwarded as soon as possible to the humiliation so that
pursuant to Art. public violated no law or any legal right of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. [respondent] would be
1678 of the Civil respondent. Moreover, petitioners averred that ostracized by his
Code; the respondents present Complaint for Breach of The Court of Appeals, in a neighbors. The appeal may
Contract and Damages was barred by prior Resolution[13] dated February 8, 2005, resolved have delayed the attainment
d) P594,00 judgment since it was a mere replication of to give due course to respondents appeal. Said of finality of the
0.00 representing respondents Answer with Compulsory appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 82610. determination of the rights of
interest for three (3) Counterclaim in the unlawful detainer case the parties and the execution
years from 1998 to before the MeTC.The said unlawful detainer case On January 31, 2006, the Court of in the unlawful detainer case
2000 on was already judicially decided with finality. Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. but it did not justify [herein
the P825,000.00 82610. The Court of Appeals fully agreed with petitioners] pre-emption of
advanced by the On September 2, 2003, the RTC-Branch the RTC-Branch 227 in dismissing respondents the outcome of the appeal. By
[respondent] at the 227 issued a Resolution dismissing respondents second cause of action (i.e., breach of contract) in distributing copies of the
rate of 24% per complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 for Civil Case No. Q-02-48341. The appellate court, MeTC decision, [petitioners]
annum; violating the rule against splitting of cause of however, held that RTC-Branch 227 should have appeared to have assumed
action, lack of jurisdiction, and failure to disclose proceeded with the trial on the merits of the first that the MeTC decision would
e) P250,00 the pendency of a related case. The RTC-Branch cause of action (i.e., damages) in Civil Case No. Q- simply be affirmed and
0.00 as 227 adjudged that Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 02-48341, because [a]lthough [herein therefore they tried to cause
compensation for involved the same facts, parties, and causes of respondent] may have stated the same factual the early ouster of
the [respondents] action as those in the unlawful detainer case, and antecedents that transpired in the unlawful [respondent] thinking that a
labor and efforts in the MeTC had already properly taken cognizance detainer case, such allegations were necessary to humiliated [respondent]
overseeing and of the latter case. give an overview of the facts leading to the would scurry out of the leased
attending the needs institution of another case between the parties premises. Clearly, there was
of contractors the before the RTC acting in its original evident bad faith intended to
repair/renovation of Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch jurisdiction.[14] mock [respondents] right to
the leased premises; 227 decision in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 on appeal which is a statutory
September 26, 2003. He filed a Motion for The Court of Appeals then went on to remedy to correct errors
f) P250,000 Reconsideration[7] of said judgment on October find that petitioners were indeed liable to which might have been
.00, plus 20% of all 10, 2003, which RTC-Branch 227 denied in an respondent for damages: committed by the lower court.
recoveries from Order[8] dated December 30, 2003.
[petitioners] No doubt, Thus, moral
and P2,500.00 per Respondent received a copy of the RTC- distributing the copies was damages may be awarded
hearing as attorneys Branch 227 order denying his Motion for primarily intended to since [petitioners] acted in
fees; Reconsideration on February 20, 2004, and he embarrass [herein bad faith. Bad faith does not
filed his Notice of Appeal[9] on March 1, respondent] in the simply connote bad judgment
g) Cost of 2004. However, the RTC-Branch 227, in an community he mingled in. We or negligence, it imports a
suit. Order[10] dated March 23, 2004, dismissed are not unmindful of the fact dishonest purpose or some
respondents appeal for being filed out of time. that court decisions are public moral obliquity and conscious
[Respondent] documents and the general doing of a wrong, a breach of
further prays for such other Respondent received a copy of the RTC- public is allowed access known duty through some
reliefs and remedies which Branch 27 order dismissing his appeal on April thereto to make inquiries motive or interest or ill will
that partakes of the nature of
fraud. However, an award of
moral damages would require
certain conditions to be met,
to wit: (1) first, there must be
an injury, whether physical,
mental or psychological,
clearly sustained by the
claimant; (2) second, there
must be culpable act or
omission factually
established; (3) third, the
wrongful act or omission of
the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant; and
(4) fourth, the award of
damages is predicated on any
of the cases stated in Article
2219 of the Civil Code.
But it must again be
stressed that moral damages
are emphatically not intended
to enrich a plaintiff at the
expense of the
defendant. When awarded,
moral damages must not be
palpably and scandalously
excessive as to indicate that it
was the result of passion,
prejudice or corruption on the
part of the trial court
judge. For this reason, this
Court finds an award
ofP30,000.00 moral damages
sufficient under the
circumstances.
On the other hand,
to warrant the award of
exemplary damages, the
wrongful act must be
accompanied by bad faith, and
an award of damages would
be allowed only if the guilty
party acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless or
malevolent
manner. Accordingly,
exemplary damages in the
amount of P10,000.00 is
appropriate.[15]
In the end, the Court of
Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, the
decision of the Regional Trial
Court is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the case
is dismissed only as to the
second cause of action. As to
the first cause of action,
[herein petitioners] are
ordered to pay [herein
respondent] moral damages
of P30,000.00 and exemplary
damages of P10,000.00.[16]
Hence, the instant Petition for Review.
Petitioners assert that respondents
appeal of the RTC-Branch 227 Resolution dated
September 2, 2003, which dismissed the latters
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341, was filed
out of time. Respondent received a copy of the
said resolution on September 26, 2003, and he
only had 15 days from such date to file his
appeal, or until October 11, 2003. Respondent,
instead, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
resolution onOctober 10, 2003, which left him
with only one more day to file his appeal. The
RTC-Branch 227 subsequently denied
respondents Motion for Reconsideration in an
Order dated December 30, 2003, which the
respondent received on February 20,
2004.Respondent only had until the following
day, February 21, 2004, to file the
appeal.However, respondent filed his Notice of
Appeal only on March 1, 2004. Hence,
petitioners conclude that the dismissal of
respondents complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-
48341 already attained finality.
Petitioners argue in the alternative that
the award of damages in respondents favor has
no factual and legal bases. They contend that the
Court of Appeals erred in awarding moral and
exemplary damages to respondent based on the appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals,
bare and unproven allegations in the latters under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
complaint and without the benefit of any hearing shall be taken within fifteen (15)
or trial. While the appellate court declared that days either from receipt of the original
RTC-Branch 227 should have proceeded with the judgment of the trial court or from receipt of the
trial on the merits involving the action for final order of the trial court dismissing or
damages, it surprisingly went ahead and ruled denying the motion for new trial or motion for
on petitioners liability for said damages even reconsideration. In Sumiran v. Damaso,[17] we
without trial. Even assuming for the sake of presented a survey of the cases applying the
argument that respondents allegations in his fresh period rule:
complaint are true, he still has no cause of action
for damages against petitioners, for the As early as 2005, the Court
disclosure of a court decision, which is part of categorically declared in Neypes v.
public record, did not cause any legal and Court of Appeals that by virtue of the
compensable injury to respondent. power of the Supreme Court to amend,
repeal and create new procedural rules
Respondent, on the other hand, in all courts, the Court is allowing a
maintains that his appeal of the September 2, fresh period of 15 days within which
2003 Resolution of the RTC-Branch 227 to the to file a notice of appeal in the RTC,
Court of Appeals was timely filed and that the counted from receipt of the order
same was aptly given due course. In addition, dismissing or denying a motion for
respondent asserts that the appellate court was new trial or motion for
correct in holding petitioners liable for damages reconsideration. This would
even without any hearing or trial since standardize the appeal periods
petitioners, in filing their omnibus motion provided in the Rules and do away with
praying for the dismissal of respondents the confusion as to when the 15-day
complaint on the ground of no cause of action, appeal period should be counted. Thus,
were deemed to have hypothetically admitted as the Court stated:
true the allegations in said complaint.
To recapitulate, a party-
The petition is partly meritorious. litigant may either file his
notice of appeal within 15
We note, at the outset, that the days from receipt of the
propriety of the dismissal by the RTC-Branch Regional Trial Court's
227 of respondents second cause of action decision or file it within 15
against petitioners (e.g., for breach of contract) days from receipt of the
was no longer disputed by the parties. Thus, the order (the "final order")
present appeal pertains only to respondents first denying his motion for new
cause of action (e.g., for damages), and in trial or motion for
connection therewith, we are called upon to reconsideration. Obviously,
resolve the following issues: (1) whether the new 15-day period may
respondent timely filed his appeal of the be availed of only if either
Resolution dated September 2, 2003 of the RTC- motion is filed; otherwise,
Branch 227 before the Court of Appeals; and (2) the decision becomes final
whether respondent is entitled to the award of and executory after the
moral and exemplary damages. lapse of the original appeal
We answer the first issue on the period provided in Rule 41,
timeliness of respondents appeal affirmatively. Section 3.
Jurisprudence has settled the fresh The foregoing ruling of the
period rule, according to which, an ordinary Court was reiterated
in Makati Insurance Co., Inc. v.
Reyes, to wit:
Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v.
Court of Appeals, promulgated on 14
September 2005 while the present
Petition was already pending before us.
x x x.x x x x
With the advent of the
"fresh period rule" parties
who availed themselves of
the remedy of motion for
reconsideration are now
allowed to file a notice of
appeal within fifteen days
from the denial of that
motion.
The "fresh period rule" is not
inconsistent with Rule 41,
Section 3 of the Revised Rules
of Court which states that the
appeal shall be taken "within
fifteen (15) days from notice
of judgment or final order
appealed from." The use of the
disjunctive word "or" signifies
disassociation and
independence of one thing
from another. It should, as a
rule, be construed in the sense
which it ordinarily implies.
Hence, the use of "or" in the
above provision supposes
that the notice of appeal
may be filed within 15 days
from the notice of judgment
or within 15 days from
notice of the "final order," x
x x.x x x x
notice of "final order"
appealed from.
Taking our bearings
from Neypes, in Sumaway v.
Urban Bank, Inc., we set aside
the denial of a notice of appeal
which was purportedly filed
five days late. With the fresh
period rule, the 15-day period
within which to file the notice
of appeal was counted from
notice of the denial of the
therein petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
We followed suit in Elbia v.
Ceniza, wherein we applied
the principle granting a fresh
period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of
appeal, counted from receipt
of the order dismissing a
motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration or
any final order or resolution.
Thereafter, in First Aqua
Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of
the Philippine Islands, we held
that a party-litigant may now
file his notice of appeal either
within fifteen days from
receipt of the original decision
or within fifteen days from
the receipt of the order
denying the motion for
reconsideration.
In De los Santos v. Vda. de
Mangubat, we applied the
same principle of "fresh
period rule," expostulating
that procedural law refers to
the adjective law which
prescribes rules and forms of
procedure in order that courts
may be able to administer
justice. Procedural laws do
not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive
law, or the general rule
against the retroactive
operation of statutes. The
"fresh period rule" is
irrefragably procedural,
prescribing the manner in
which the appropriate period
for appeal is to be computed
or determined and, therefore,
can be made applicable to
actions pending upon its
effectivity, such as the present
case, without danger of
violating anyone else's
rights.[18] (Emphases
supplied.)
Also in Sumiran, we
recognized the retroactive
application of the fresh period
rule to cases pending and
undetermined upon its
effectivity:
The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases
where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to
the date of promulgation of Neypes
on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained
by the Court in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v.
Homena-Valencia, stating thus:
The determinative issue is
whether the "fresh period"
rule announced in Neypes
could retroactively apply in
cases where the period for
appeal had lapsed prior to 14
September 2005 when
Neypes was
promulgated. That question
may be answered with the
guidance of the general rule
that procedural laws may
be given retroactive effect
to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of
their passage, there being
no vested rights in the rules
of procedure. Amendments
to procedural rules are
procedural or remedial in
character as they do not
create new or remove vested
rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already
existing.[19] (Emphases
supplied.)
In the case before us, respondent
received a copy of the Resolution dated
September 2, 2003 of the RTC-Branch 227
dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-
48341 on September 26, 2003. Fourteen days
thereafter, on October 10, 2003, respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said
resolution. The RTC-Branch 227 denied
respondents Motion for Reconsideration in an
Order dated December 30, 2003, which the
respondent received on February 20,
2004. On March 1, 2004, just afternine
days from receipt of the order denying his
Motion for Reconsideration, respondent already
filed his Notice of Appeal. Clearly, under the
fresh period rule, respondent was able to file his
appeal well-within the prescriptive period of 15
days, and the Court of Appeals did not err in
giving due course to said appeal in CA-G.R. CV
No. 82610.
We likewise agree with the Court of
Appeals that the RTC-Branch 227 should not
have dismissed respondents complaint for
damages on the ground of failure to state a cause
of action.
According to Rule 2, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court, a cause of action is the act or
omission by which a party violates a right of
another.
When the ground for dismissal is that
the complaint states no cause of action, such fact
can be determined only from the facts alleged in
the complaint and from no other, and the court
cannot consider other matters aliunde. The test,
therefore, is whether, assuming the allegations of
fact in the complaint to be true, a valid judgment
could be rendered in accordance with the prayer
stated therein.[20]
Respondent made the following
allegations in support of his claim for damages
against petitioners:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
 28. After the obligation on the part of the named defendant to untold number of moral
promulgation of the 29. That from the respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an wrongs which is impossible
Metropolitan Trial Court of its time the said decision was act or omission on the part of such defendant for human foresight to
Decision dated August 3, distributed to said members violative of the right of the plaintiff or provide specifically in
1999, ordering the [herein homeowners, the constituting a breach of the obligation of statutory law. If mere fault or
respondent] and all person [respondent] became the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter negligence in ones acts can
claiming rights under him to subject of conversation or talk may maintain an action for recovery of make him liable for damages
of the town and by virtue of damages.[22] We find that all three elements exist for injury caused thereby,
(a) Vacate which [respondents] good in the case at bar. Respondent may not have with more reason should
the leased name within the community specifically identified each element, but it may be abuse or bad faith make him
premises; or society where he belongs sufficiently determined from the allegations in liable. The absence of good
(b) pay the was greatly damaged; his his complaint. faith is essential to abuse of
[herein reputation was besmirched; right. Good faith is an honest
petitioners [respondent] suffered First, respondent filed the complaint to intention to abstain from
] the sum sleepless night and serious protect his good character, name, and taking any unconscientious
of P306,00 anxiety. [Respondent], who is reputation. Every man has a right to build, keep, advantage of another, even
0.00 as the grandson of the late and be favored with a good name. This right is through the forms or
unpaid Senator Jose Veloso and protected by law with the recognition of slander technicalities of the law,
rentals Congressman Ismael Veloso, and libel as actionable wrongs, whether as together with an absence of
from May was deprived of political criminal offenses or tortuous conduct.[23] all information or belief of fact
23, 1997 to career and to start with was which would render the
November to run as candidate for Second, petitioners are obliged to transaction
22, 1998; Barangay Chairman within respect respondents good name even though unconscientious. In business
and their area which was being they are opposing parties in the unlawful relations, it means good faith
(c) pay the offered to him by the detainer case. As Article 19 of the Civil Code as understood by men of
sum homeowners but this offer requires, [e]very person must, in the exercise of affairs.
of P5,000.0 has started to fade and his rights and in the performance of his duties,
0 as ultimately totally vanished act with justice, give everyone his due, and While Article 19 may
attorneys after the distribution of said observe honesty and good faith. A violation of have been intended as a mere
fees; Decision. Damages to his good such principle constitutes an abuse of rights, a declaration of principle, the
names and reputations and tortuous conduct. We expounded in Sea cardinal law on human
But while said Decision was other damages which he Commercial Company, Inc. v. Court of conduct expressed in said
still pending appeal with the suffered as a consequence Appeals[24] that: article has given rise to
Regional Trial Court, the thereof, may be reasonably certain rules, e.g. that where a
[petitioners], through compensated for at The principle of person exercises his rights but
[petitioner] Manaloto, already least P1,500,000.00 as moral abuse of rights stated in the does so arbitrarily or unjustly
distributed copies of said and consequential damages. above article, departs from or performs his duties in a
Decision to some of the the classical theory that he manner that is not in keeping
homeowners of Horseshoe 30. In order to deter who uses a right injures no with honesty and good faith,
Village, who personally know [petitioners] and others from one. The modern tendency is he opens himself to liability.
the [respondent]. This act is a doing as abovementioned, to depart from the classical The elements of an abuse of
direct assault or character [petitioners] should likewise and traditional theory, and to rights under Article 19
assassination on the part of be assessed exemplary grant indemnity for damages are: (1) there is a legal right
the [respondent] because as damages in the amount in cases where there is an or duty; (2) which is exercised
stated in the said decision, of P500,000.00.[21] abuse of rights, even when the in bad faith; (3) for the sole
[respondent] has been staying act is not illicit. intent of prejudicing or
in the premises but did not or injuring another.[25]
refused to pay his monthly A cause of action (for damages) exists if Article 19 was
rentals for a long period of the following elements are present: (1) a right in intended to expand the Petitioners are also expected to respect
time when in truth and in fact favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and concept of torts by granting respondents dignity, personality,
was untrue. under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an adequate legal remedy for the privacy and peace of mind under
Article 26 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ART. 26. Every
person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other
persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may
not constitute a criminal
offense, shall produce a cause
of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying
into the privacy of anothers
residence;
(2) Meddling
with or disturbing the private
life or family relations of
another;
(3) Intriguing
to cause another to be
alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or
humiliating another on
account of his religious
beliefs, lowly station in life,
place of birth, physical defect,
or other personal condition.
Thus, Article 2219(10) of the Civil Code
allows the recovery of moral damages for acts
and actions referred to in Article 26, among
other provisions, of the Civil Code.
In Concepcion v. Court of Appeals,[26] we
explained that:
The philosophy behind Art. 26
underscores the necessity for
its inclusion in our civil
law. The Code Commission
stressed in no uncertain terms
that the human personality
must be exalted.The
sacredness of human
personality is a concomitant
consideration of every plan
for human amelioration. The
touchstone of every system of
law, of the culture and
civilization of every country,
is how far it dignifies man. If
the statutes insufficiently
protect a person from being
unjustly humiliated, in short,
if human personality is not
exalted - then the laws are
indeed defective. Thus, under
this article, the rights of
persons are amply protected,
and damages are provided for
violations of a persons
dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind.
It is petitioners
position that the act imputed
to him does not constitute any
of those enumerated in Arts.
26 and 2219. In this respect,
the law is clear. The violations
mentioned in the codal
provisions are not exclusive
but are merely examples and
do not preclude other similar
or analogous acts. Damages
therefore are allowable for
actions against a persons
dignity, such as profane,
insulting, humiliating,
scandalous or abusive
language. Under Art. 2217 of
the Civil Code, moral damages
which include physical
suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury, although
incapable of pecuniary
computation, may be
recovered if they are the
proximate result of the
defendants wrongful act or
omission.[27]
And third, respondent alleged that the
distribution by petitioners to Horseshoe Village
homeowners of copies of the MeTC decision in
the unlawful detainer case, which was adverse to
respondent and still on appeal before the RTC-
Branch 88, had no apparent lawful or just
purpose except to humiliate respondent or
assault his character. As a result, respondent
suffered damages becoming the talk of the town
and being deprived of his political career.
Petitioners reason that respondent has
no cause of action against them since the MeTC
decision in the unlawful detainer case was part
of public records.
It is already settled that the public has a
right to see and copy judicial records and
documents.[28] However, this is not a case of the
public seeking and being denied access to
judicial records and documents. The controversy
is rooted in the dissemination by petitioners of
the MeTC judgment against respondent to
Horseshoe Village homeowners, who were not
involved at all in the unlawful detainer case,
thus, purportedly affecting negatively
respondents good name and reputation among
said homeowners. The unlawful detainer case
was a private dispute between petitioners and
respondent, and the MeTC decision against
respondent was then still pending appeal before
the RTC-Branch 88, rendering suspect
petitioners intentions for distributing copies of
said MeTC decision to non-parties in the
case. While petitioners were free to copy and
distribute such copies of the MeTC judgment to
the public, the question is whether they did so
with the intent of humiliating respondent and
destroying the latters good name and reputation
in the community.
Nevertheless, we further declare that
the Court of Appeals erred in already awarding
moral and exemplary damages in respondents
favor when the parties have not yet had the
chance to present any evidence before the RTC-
Branch 227. In civil cases, he who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it by a preponderance
of evidence. It is incumbent upon the party
claiming affirmative relief from the court to
convincingly prove its claim. Bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence are not equivalent
to proof under our Rules. In short, mere
allegations are not evidence.[29]
At this point, the finding of the Court of
Appeals of bad faith and malice on the part of
petitioners has no factual basis. Good faith is
presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the
duty to prove the same. Good faith refers to the
state of the mind which is manifested by the acts
of the individual concerned. It consists of the
intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of
another. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not
simply connote bad judgment to simple
negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong, a breach of known duty due to some
motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the
nature of fraud.Malice connotes ill will or spite
and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable
harm.[30]
We cannot subscribe to respondents
argument that there is no more need for the
presentation of evidence by the parties since
petitioners, in moving for the dismissal of
respondents complaint for damages,
hypothetically admitted respondents
allegations. The hypothetical admission of
respondents allegations in the complaint only
goes so far as determining whether said
complaint should be dismissed on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action. A finding that
the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action
does not necessarily mean that the complaint is
meritorious; it shall only result in the
reinstatement of the complaint and the hearing
of the case for presentation of evidence by the
parties.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated January 31, 2006
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82610
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The
award of moral and exemplary damages made by
the Court of Appeals in favor of respondent
Ismael Veloso III is DELETED. The complaint of
respondent Ismael Veloso III in Civil Case No. Q-
02-48341 is hereby REINSTATED before Branch
227 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
only in so far as the first cause of action is
concerned. The said court isDIRECTED to hear
and dispose of the case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 147614. January 29, 2004]
H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC., petitioner,
vs. MARINA PROPERTIES
CORPORATION, JESUS K. TYPOCO SR.
and TAN YU, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
There is unjust enrichment when a building
contractor is denied payment for increased labor
cost validly incurred and additional work validly
rendered with the owners express or implied
agreement.
The Case
The Petition for Review[1] before the Court,
filed under Rule 45, seeks the reversal of the
Decision[2] dated March 29, 2001, issued by the
Court of Appeals[3] in CA-GR CV No. 60975.The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new
one entered DISMISSING the [petitioners]
Complaint, AND PARTIALLY GRANTING THE
[RESPONDENT-CORPORATIONS]
COUNTERCLAIM, IN THAT THE [PETITIONER] IS
DIRECTED TO PAY UNTO THE [RESPONDENT-
CORPORATION] THE SUM OF P4,604,579.00
in ACTUAL DAMAGES PLUS P3,549,416.00 AS
AND FOR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.[4]
The Facts
The facts of the case, summarized by the
Court of Appeals (CA), are as follows:
[Respondent] MARINA PROPERTIES
CORPORATION (MPC for brevity) is engaged in
the business of real estate development. On May
10, 1988, MPC entered into a contract[5] with
[Petitioner] H.[L.] CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC.
(HLC) to construct Phase III of a condominium
complex called MARINA BAYHOMES
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT, consisting of
townhouses and villas, totaling 31 housing units,
for a total consideration of P38,580,609.00,
within a period of 365 days from receipt of
Notice to Proceed.The original completion date
of the project was May 16, 1989, but it was
extended to October 31, 1989 with a grace
period until November 30, 1989.[6]
The contract was signed by Jovencio F. Cinco,
president of MPC, and Honorio L. Carlos,
president of HLC.
On December 15, 1989, HLC instituted this case
for sum of money against not only MPC but also
against the latters alleged president,
[Respondent] Jesus K. Typoco, Sr. (Typoco) and
[Respondent] Tan Yu (Tan), seeking the payment
of various sums with an aggregate amount
of P14 million pesos, broken down as follows:
a) P7,065,885.03 for costs of labor escalation,
change orders and material price escalation;
b) P2,000,000.00 as additional compensatory
damages, exclusive of the cost of suit.
c) P3,147,992.00 representing retention money
allegedly withheld by MPC on HLCs Progress
Billings as of January 1990, and
d) P2,000,000.00 representing the value of
construction materials allegedly
withheld/detained by MPC.
Traversing the allegations of the complaint,
[respondents] filed separate answers, whereby
the two individual [respondents] alleged that
they are not parties to the Construction Contract
and Amendatory Contract and are therefore not
liable to HLC. [Respondent] MPC on the other
hand alleged that the [petitioner] has no cause of
action against it and that it (HLC) is not entitled
to its various claims. MPC interposed a
counterclaim in the aggregate sum
of P68,296,227.14 for actual and compensatory
damages, liquidated damages, unliquidated
advances, and attorneys fees.[7]
On May 15, 1997, the trial court[8] ruled as
follows:[9]
WHEREFORE, premises above considered,
judgment is hereby rendered for [Petitioner] H.L.
CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC. and as against
[Respondents] MARINA PROPERTIES
CORPORATION, TAN YU, and JESUS K. TYPOCO,
SR., who are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, the [petitioner], as follows:
1. the amount of P7,065,885.03, representing
unpaid labor escalation costs, change orders and
material price escalations, plus 12% interest per
annum from date of filing of the complaint, until
fully paid;
2. the amount of P3,147,992.39 representing the
10% retention money withheld by the
[respondents] [from] [petitioners] progress
billing as of January 1990, plus 12% interest per
annum from the date of filing of the complaint,
until fully paid;
3. the amount of P2,000,000.00 representing the
value of construction materials and the like
detained by the [respondents], plus 12% legal
interest from the date of filing of the complaint,
until fully paid;
4. the sum equivalent to 15% of the principal
sum as and by way of attorneys fees; and to
5. [p]ay the costs of this suit.
The counterclaim for liquidated damages, are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of
evidence. Liquidated damages can only be
awarded under paragraph 2 of the amended
construction contract that extended the
completion period and mainly on the finding of
the 85% substantial completion of the project,
and that the delay and stoppage of the project
was caused by [respondents] default in payment
of [the] progress billings that would have
allowed [petitioner] to have the capability to
continue and complete the project.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA held that respondents
were not liable for escalations in the cost of labor
and construction materials, because of the
following reasons: (1) the contract between the
parties was for a lump sum consideration, which
did not allow for cost escalation; and (2)
petitioner failed to show any basis for the award
sought.
Respondents were also absolved from
paying for change orders and extra work,
inasmuch as there was no supplemental
agreement covering them as required in the
main Construction Contract. Although Progress
Billing No. 24 apparently indicates that extra
work was rendered by petitioner, this claim is
not supported by sufficient evidence.
The CA further failed to find any basis for
the release of the 10 percent retention fee. The
Construction Contract had provided that such
release would be made only under certain
conditions, none of which was complied with, as
petitioner failed to complete the work
required.Furthermore, MPC was not held liable
for detained or withheld construction materials,
since petitioner had eventually withdrawn them.
Nothing in the records indicated any
personal liability on the part of Typoco and
Tan.Moreover, they had nothing to assume, as
MPC was not held liable to petitioner.
Furthermore, the CA ruled that petitioner
was liable for actual and liquidated damages. The
latter had abandoned the project prior to its
completion; hence, MPC contracted out the work
to another entity and incurred actual damages in
excess of the remaining balance of the contract
price. In addition, the Construction Contract had
stipulated payment of liquidated damages in an
amount equivalent to 1/1000 of the contract
price for each calendar day of delay.
Hence, this Petition.[10]
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the
following issues:
a. Whether or not the respondents
are liable to pay the petitioner its
claim for price escalation of
construction materials and labor
cost escalation.
b. Whether or not the respondents
are liable to the petitioner for cost
of change orders and extra works.
c. Whether or not the respondents
are liable to the petitioner for the
ten percent retention money.
d. Whether or not the respondents
are liable to pay the petitioner
attorneys fees.
e. Whether or not the respondents
are liable to the petitioner for the
cost of illegally detained
materials.
f. Whether or not the respondents
Jesus Typoco Sr., and Tan Yu are
jointly and solidarily liable to the
petitioner for the latters claims.
g. Whether or not the petitioner is
liable to the respondents for
actual and liquidated damages.[11]
In simpler terms, the issues to be resolved
are as follows:
(1) Whether petitioner is entitled to (a) a
price escalation for labor and material cost, (b)
the cost of change orders and extra work, (c) the
release of the 10 percent retention money, (d)
the cost of illegally detained materials, and (e)
attorneys fees
(2) Whether Typoco and Tan are solidarily
liable with MPC
(3) Whether petitioner is liable for actual
and liquidated damages
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Liability for Additional Costs
Petitioner argues that it is entitled to price
escalation for both labor and materials, because
MPC was delayed in paying for its
obligations. The former admits that it
is normally not entitled to any price increase for
labor and materials, because a contractor is
expected to build into its price a contingency
factor to protect it from cost increases that may
occur during the contract period.[12]It justifies its
claim, however, on the ground that a contractor
cannot be expected to anticipate price
increases beyond the original contract
period. Respondents, on the other hand, aver
that it was delayed in finishing the project;
hence, it is not entitled to any price increase.
It must be pointed out that the reason for
the CAs denial of petitioners claim was that the
contract between the parties was for a lump sum
consideration, and petitioner was guilty of delay
in completing the project.
Labor and Material
Cost Escalation
We agree with petitioner that it is entitled
to price escalation, but only for the labor
component of Progress Billing No. 24. The
Construction Contract contains the following
provision on the considerations therefor:
6.1 For and in consideration of the
true and faithful
performance of the
work by the
CONTRACTOR, the
OWNER shall pay the
Lump Sum Contract
Price of PESOS:THIRTY
EIGHT MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED EIGHTY
THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED NINE
(P38,580,609.00)
broken down as shown
in the Bid Form. No cost
escalation shall be
allowed except on the
labor component of the
work x x x.[13]
Since the Contract allows escalation only of
the labor component, the implication is that
material cost escalations are barred. There
appears to be no provision, either in the original
or in the amended contract, that would justify
billing of increased cost of
materials. Furthermore, no evidence -- like
official economic data showing an increase in the
price index of construction materials -- was even
adduced by petitioner to prove that there had
indeed been increases in material costs.[14]
Petitioner attempts to pass off these cost
escalations as a form of damages suffered by it as
a natural consequence of the delay in the
payment of billings and claims for additional
work. It argues that the baseless and malicious
refusal to pay for those claims renders
respondents liable for damages under Article
2201 of the Civil Code.
We disagree. Without tackling the issue of
delay, we find that the contentious Progress
Billing No. 24 contains no claim for material cost
escalation. The other unsettled bills claimed by
petitioner are those for change orders or extra
work, which have not been shown to be related
to the increase in cost of materials. Dealt with in
separate contracts between the parties were
such claims, the costs of which were to be
determined and agreed upon only when
required by MPC.Materials used for those
additional jobs were to be purchased only when
the work was contracted, not prior thereto. As
admitted by petitioner, expenses for change
orders/additional work were not included in the
agreed contract price[15] and, hence, were not
subject to increases.
MPC admits that the labor cost escalation
clause was adopted by the parties to safeguard
the contractor against losses in the event that,
during the execution of the Contract, the
government would order a minimum wage
adjustment, which would then inflate the labor
cost.[16]Respondents deny liability for this added
expense because, according to the Contract, the
allowance for labor cost escalation is available
only within the duration of the original
construction period.
We clarify. The claimed cost of labor
escalation pertains to the period September 1 to
December 15, 1989, in the amount
of P170,722.10; and December 16 to January 27,
1990,P45,983.91. During those periods,
petitioner had not yet incurred any delay in the
project, originally stipulated to be finished by
May 16, 1989. But by mutual agreement, the
period was extended up to October 31, 1989,
with a grace period until November 30, 1989.
Furthermore, a legislated wage increase
became effective after the expiration of the
original period.[17] Respondents are, therefore,
liable for this increase in labor cost, because they
allowed petitioner to continue working on the
project until April 20, 1990 (even beyond
November 30, 1989).
MPC argues that to allow the claim for
labor cost escalation would be to reward
petitioner for incurring delay, thereby breaching
a contractual obligation.
This contention is untenable. Before the
expiration of the extended period, petitioner was
not yet in delay. It was granted by MPC an
extension to complete the project until
November 30, 1989.Moreover, despite the
expiration of the extended period, MPC allowed
it to continue working on the project until the
former took over and awarded that project to
another contractor. Hence, labor costs were
actually incurred by petitioner until April 20,
1990. It was thus entitled to reimbursement for
labor cost escalation until that date. MPC cannot
now be allowed to question the true valuation of
the additional labor because, instead of
submitting to an independent evaluator, it
violated the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
issued by the trial court and hired another
contractor to finish the project.
Noteworthy is the fact that MPC paid for
the labor cost escalation during the period
August 1-15, 1989,[18] which was past the
expiration of the original period. Apparently, it
thereafter stopped paying for labor cost
escalation in response to the suit filed against it
by petitioner.
The CA denied the labor cost escalation
claim because, despite having billed MPC
therefor, petitioner accepted payments that did
not include such claim. The appellate court
construed the acceptance by petitioner as a
waiver of the latters right to be reimbursed for
the increased labor cost.
We believe that this position is
untenable. The CA mistook Exhibits C-7-B[19] and
D-1[20] as bills coming from petitioner, when in
truth they were Accomplishment Evaluation
Sheets issued by MPC. The notation labor
escalation not included in the said Exhibits was
an admission on the part of MPC that it had not
paid such amount, upon the advice of Atty. Jose
C. Laureta, its resident counsel. According to him,
petitioner should be faulted for having incurred
labor cost increases after the expiration of the
original period (after May 16, 1989). Not having
waived such increases, it should thus bear
them.[21]
To allow MPC to acquire the partially
accomplished project without paying for labor
cost escalation validly incurred would constitute
unjust enrichment at the expense of
petitioner.[22] There is unjust enrichment under
Article 22 of the Civil Code when (1) a person is
unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is
derived at the expense of or with damages to
another.[23] Since petitioner had rendered
services that were accepted by MPC, then the
former should be compensated for them.Labor
cost escalation, in this case, has already been
earned by petitioner.
Change Orders and Extra Work
Petitioner claims entitlement to
compensation for change orders and extra work
that were covered by construction
memoranda. MPC counters, however, that the
former never presented any cost estimate for
additional work. The estimate would have
formed the basis for a consensual agreement and
a computation of actual accomplishment, for
which MPC could have been unilaterally
billed. Worse, the extra work was allegedly
assessed by its engineer to be worth
onlyP705.41.
We side with petitioner. The General
Conditions to the Construction Contract
provides:
13. CLAIMS FOR EXTRA AND FORCE ACCOUNT
WORK:
If the Contractor claims that any construction by
drawings or otherwise involve extra cost under
this Contract, he shall give the Owner and/or the
Architect, written notice thereof within a
reasonable time after receipt of such
instructions, and in any event before proceeding
to execute the work, except in emergency
endangering life or property. No such claim shall
be valid unless so made.
Extra work for which no price is
provided in the proposal shall
be covered by a supplementary
agreement to be signed by both
parties before such work is
commenced. [24]
The CA is correct in holding that there is no
supplemental agreement covering the claimed
extra work and change orders. Exhibits C-1, C-2,
C-2-A, C-3 and C-4 show billings for extra work
sent by petitioner to MPC. But the former did not
submit in evidence the alleged construction
memoranda covering them. Neither were they
mentioned in the letter[25] of Roilo Golez dated
November 24, 1989.
Progress Billing No. 24, which pertained to
the project as covered by the Construction
Contract, did not mention any claim for extra
work or change orders. These additional jobs
were covered by separate bills other than the
twenty-four Progress Billings sent by petitioner.
MPC, however, never denied having
ordered additional work. In Item No. 12 of its
Amended Answer,[26] it averred that petitioners
claim for change orders and extra work were
premature.Limneo P. Miranda, respondents
work engineer, manifested that additional work
was indeed done, but that claims therefor were
not settled for the following reasons: (1)
reconciliation between the parties was never
completed due to the absence of petitioners
representative in scheduled meetings; (2)
difference in opinion on the proper valuation of
the additional work, as MPC wanted to use the
net quantity method, while petitioner preferred
the gross method; and (3) some claims were
rejected by MPC, because they had not been
properly approved in accordance with the
Contract.[27]
Evidence on record further reveals that
MPC approved some change order jobs despite
the absence of any supplementary agreement. In
its Over-all Summary of Reconciled Quantities as
of September 6, 1989 (Annex C),[28] it valued
petitioners valid claim therefor
at P79,340.52. After noting that the claim had
extremely been bloated, Atty. Laureta, in-house
counsel for respondent corporation, affirmed as
valid the amount stated in the summary.[29]
Petitioner may have failed to show the
construction memoranda covering its claim, but
it inarguably performed extra work that was
accepted by MPC. Hence, we will consider Annex
C as the proper valuation thereof.
Under the principle of quantum meruit, a
contractor is allowed to recover the reasonable
value of the thing or services rendered despite
the lack of a written contract, in order to avoid
unjust enrichment.[30] Quantum meruit means
that in an action for work and labor, payment
shall be made in such amount as the plaintiff
reasonably deserves.[31] To deny payment for a
building almost completed and already occupied
would be to permit unjust enrichment at the
expense of the contractor.[32]
The CA held that since Billing No. 24 did
not include any claim for additional work, such
work had presumably been previously paid
for. This reasoning is not correct. It is beyond
dispute that the change orders and extra work
were billed separately from the usual progress
billings petitioner sent to MPC.
Retention Money
The CA denied the claim for the 10 percent
retention money, because petitioner had failed to
comply with the conditions under paragraph 6.3
of the Construction Contract. On the other hand,
the latter avers that these conditions were
deemed fulfilled under Article 1186 of the Civil
Code because, when its contract was terminated,
MPC prevented the fulfillment of those
conditions. It would allegedly be unfair and
unreasonable for petitioner to guarantee a
project finished by another contractor.
We disagree with petitioner. In the
construction industry, the 10 percent retention
money is a portion of the contract price
automatically deducted from the contractors
billings, as security for the execution of
corrective work -- if any -- becomes
necessary. This amount is to be released one
year after the completion of the project, minus
the cost of corrective work.[33] The conditions for
its release are stated in the Construction
Contract as follows:
6.3 In all cases, however, payment of
the progress billings
shall be subject to
 deduction of twenty
percent (20%)
recoupment of the
downpayment, ten
percent (10%) retention
and expanded
withholding tax on
CONTRACTORS
income. Upon issuance
of the Certificate of
Completion of the work
by the OWNER and upon
submission of Guaranty
Bond, Ninety Percent
(90%) of the retained
amount shall be
released to the
CONTRACTOR and the
balance thereof shall be
released by the OWNER
within thirty (30) days
after the expiration of
the guaranty period
which is 365 days after
issuance of the
certificate of
completion. [34]
None of the foregoing conditions were
satisfied; hence, the CA was correct in forfeiting
the retention fee. The completion of the work
was stipulated in the Contract to be within 365
days from the issuance of a Notice to Proceed or
until May 16, 1989. Then the period was
extended up to November 30, 1989. Petitioner
worked on the project till April 20, 1990. It was
given by MPC ample time and two extensions to
complete the project. The simple truth is that in
failing to finish the project, the former failed to
fulfill a prerequisite for the release of the
retention money.
Detained Materials
Petitioner claims cost reimbursement of
illegally detained materials, as it was allowed to
withdraw them from the site only after two years
from the unilateral termination of the
Contract. By 1992, only 30 percent of the
materials detained were salvageable, while the
rest had depreciated.
This contention has no merit. According to
the CAs ruling, the only proof that MPC detained
materials belonging to petitioner was the denial
of the request, contained in the latters February
1990 letter,[35] for the release of used form
lumber. Aside from that letter, however, no other
attempt was shown to have been made by
petitioner to obtain its request. It should have
tried again to do so before claiming that
respondents unreasonably prevented it from
removing its construction materials from the
premises. As to the other materials, there was
absolutely no attempt to remove them from the
construction site. Hence, we cannot say that
these were ever withheld from petitioner.
Detention is not proved by Atty. Lauretas
letter[36] dated July 4, 1992, allowing petitioner
to remove its materials from the site. The letter
was merely a directive for it to clear out its
belongings therefrom, in view of the hiring of a
second contractor to finish the project.
Moreover, in a specifically designated yard
inside the construction site, petitioner
maintained a warehouse that was guarded by its
own security complement and completely
inaccessible to MPC personnel.[37] It therefore
had control over those materials and should
have made provisions to keep them safe from the
elements and from pilferage.
Attorneys Fees
Petitioner argues that it is entitled to
attorneys fees based on Article 2208 of the Civil
Code, because (1) respondents act or omission
has compelled it to litigate with third persons or
to incur expenses to protect its interest; and (2)
respondents acted in gross and evident bad faith
in refusing to satisfy its plainly valid, just and
demandable claim.
The grant of some of the claims of
petitioner does not change the fact that it did not
finish the project. Attorneys fees are not granted
every time a party prevails in a suit, because no
premium should be placed on the right to
litigate.[38] Petitioner is not, after all, blameless in
the present controversy. Just because MPC
withheld some payments from petitioner does
not mean that the former was in gross or evident
bad faith. MPC had claims that it wanted to offset
with those of the latter.
Second Issue:
Typoco and Tans Liabilities
Petitioner claims that Respondents Jesus
Typoco and Tan Yu are solidarily liable with
MPC.
We concur with the CA that these two
respondents are not liable. Section 31 of the
Corporation Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68)
provides:
Section 31. Liability of directors, trustees or
officers. Directors or trustees who willfully and
knowingly vote for or assent to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation or who are
guilty of gross negligence or bad faith x x x shall
be liable jointly and severally for all damages
resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation,
its stockholders and other persons.
The personal liability of corporate officers
validly attaches only when (a) they assent to a
patently unlawful act of the corporation; or (b)
they are guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in
directing its affairs; or (c) they incur conflict of
interest, resulting in damages to the corporation,
its stockholders or other persons.[39]
The records are bereft of any evidence that
Typoco acted in bad faith with gross or
inexcusable negligence, or that he acted outside
the scope of his authority as company
president.The unilateral termination of the
Contract during the existence of the TRO was
indeed contemptible -- for which MPC should
have merely been cited for contempt of court at
the most -- and a preliminary injunction would
have then stopped work by the second
contractor. Besides, there is no showing that the
unilateral termination of the Contract was null
and void.
Respondent Tan is not an officer or a
director of MPC. His participation is limited to an
alleged conversation between him and Engineer
Mario Cornista, petitioners project
manager.Supposedly, the former verbally agreed
therein to guarantee the payment of the latters
progress billings. We find no satisfactory
evidence to show respondents alleged solidary
liability to petitioner.
Third Issue:
Liability for Actual and Liquidated Damages
Petitioner avers that it should be
exonerated from the counterclaims for actual
and liquidated damages, because its failure to
complete the project was due to respondents
acts.
Central to the resolution of this issue is the
question of which party was in delay. Aside from
the contentious Progress Billing No. 24, there are
no other unpaid claims. The bills for extra work
and change orders, aside from those for the
beams and columns, were premature and still
subject to reconciliation and adjustment. Hence,
we cannot hold MPC liable for them.
In comparison, petitioner did not fulfill its
contractual obligations. It could not totally pass
the blame to MPC for hiring a second contractor,
because the latter was allowed to terminate the
services of the contractor.
10.1 The OWNER shall have the right
to terminate this
Contract in the event
that the CONTRACTOR
incurs a fifteen percent
(15%) or greater
slippage in the
prosecution of the
overall work evaluated
against the Project
 schedule as indicated by
the critical path of the
approved PERT/CPM
network for the Project
or as amended by Art. II
herein.
Either party shall have the right to terminate this
Contract for reason of violation or non-
compliance by the other party of the terms and
conditions herein agreed upon.[40]
As of November 30, 1989, petitioner
accomplished only approximately 80 percent of
the project. In other words, it was already in
delay at the time. In addition, Engineer Miranda
testified that it would lose money even if it
finished the project;[41] thus, respondents
already suspected that it had no intention of
finishing the project at all.
Petitioner was in delay and in breach of
contract. Clearly, the obligor is liable for
damages that are the natural and probable
consequences of its breach of
obligation.[42] Petitioner was already paid by
MPC in the amount of P31,435,187 out of the
total contract price of P38,580,609; thus,
only P7,145,422 remained outstanding. In order
to finish the project, the latter had to contract the
services of a second construction firm
for P11,750,000. Hence, MPC suffered actual
damages in the amount of P4,604,579 for the
completion of the project.
Petitioner is also liable for liquidated
damages as provided in the Contract,[43] the
pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows:
4.1 Time is an essential feature of this
Contract and in the
event that the
CONTRACTOR fails to
complete the contracted
work within the
stipulated time inclusive
of any granted extension
of time, the
CONTRACTOR shall pay
the OWNER, as
liquidated damages, the
amount of one over one the expiration of the grace period in the
thousand (1/1000) of Amended Contract until February 1, 1990, when
the value of the contract it effectively abandoned the project.
price for each and every
calendar day of delay WHEREFORE, the Petition is
(Sundays and Holidays partly GRANTED and the assailed
included), not to exceed Decision MODIFIED.Petitioner is AWARDED labor
15% of [the] Contract cost escalation in the sum of P1,196,202 and cost
of extra work in the sum of P79,340.52. In all
amount, in the
completion of the work other respects, the appealed Decision
is AFFIRMED.
as specified in Article II
above. It is understood SO ORDERED.
that the liquidated
damages herein Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Ynares-
provided are fixed, Santiago and Carpio, JJ., concur.
agreed upon and not by Azcuna, J., on official leave - official
way of penalty, and as business.
such, the OWNER shall
not be further required
to prove that he has
incurred actual damages
to be entitled thereto.In
the case of such delays,
the OWNER is hereby
authorized to deduct the
amount of liquidated
damages from any
money due or which
may become due the
CONTRACTOR in this or
any other contract or to
collect such amount
from the CONTRACTORs
performance bond
whichever is convenient
and expeditious to the
OWNER.
Liquidated damages are those that the
parties agree to be paid in case of a breach.[44] As
worded, the amount agreed upon answers for
damages suffered by the owner due to delays in
the completion of the project. Under Philippine
laws, these damages take the nature of
penalties.[45] A penal clause is an accessory
undertaking to assume greater liability in case of
a breach. It is attached to an obligation in order
to ensure performance.
Thus, as held by the CA, petitioner is bound
to pay liquidated damages for 92 days, or from
SECOND DIVISION On October 21, 1988, petitioner, (3) years or thirty-six Counterclaims,[10] Almario denied the existence
Vicente S. Almario (Almario), was hired by (36) months. of any agreement with PAL that he would have to
VICENTE S. ALMARIO, G.R. No. respondent, Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), as a render service to it for three years after his
P 170928 Boeing 747 Systems Engineer. 3. In view of the training failing which he would reimburse the
e foregoing, we urge you training costs. He pointed out that the 1991-
t Present: On April 28, 1995, Almario, then about to reconsider your 1994 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
i 39 years of age[1] and a Boeing 737 (B-737) First proposed resignation between PAL and the Airline Pilots Association
t QUISUMBING,* J., ChairOfficer at PAL, successfully bid for the higher otherwise you will be of the Philippines (ALPAP), of which he was a
i person, position of Airbus 300 (A-300) First required to reimburse member,[11] carried no such agreement.
o SANDOVAL- Officer.[2] Since said higher position required the Company an
n GUTIERREZ,** additional training, he underwent, amount equivalent to Almario thus prayed for the award of
e CARPIO,*** atPALs expense, more than five months of the cost of your actual damages on account of PALswithholding
r CARPIO MORALES, training consisting of ground schooling professional training of the necessary clearances which he needed in
, TINGA, and inManila and flight simulation and the damaged [sic] order to obtain his lawful benefits, and moral
VELASCO, in Melbourne, Australia.[3] caused to the and exemplary damages for malicious
JR., JJ. Company.[5] (Emphasis prosecution and unjust harassment.[12]
After completing the training course, and underscoring
Promulgate Almario served as A-300 First Officer of PAL, but supplied) PAL, in its Reply to Defendants Answer
- versus - d: after eight months of service as such or and Answer to Counterclaim,[13] argued as
September on September 16, 1996, he tendered his follows:
11, 2007 resignation, for personal reasons, Despite receipt of the letter, Almario pushed
effective October 15, 1996.[4] through with his resignation. The right of PAL to be reimbursed for
training expenses is based on Article
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, On September 27, 1996, PALs Vice By letter of October 9, XXIII, Section 1 of the 1991-1994
INC., President for Flight Operations sent Almario a 1996, Almarios counsel sought PALs explanation Collective Bargaining
R letter, the pertinent portions of which read: behind itsSeptember 27, 1996 letter considering Agreement (CBA, for brevity)
e that Almario did not sign anything regarding any andwhich was taken from the decision
s xxxx reimbursement.[6] PAL did not of the Secretary of Labor.
p reply, prompting Almarios counsel to send two
o 2. Our records show that letters dated January 6, 1997 and February 10, [The Secretary of Labor] ruled that a
n you have been trained 1997 following-up PALs reply, as well as the pilot should remain in the position
d by the Company as release of Almarios clearances which he needed where he is upon reaching the age of
e A300 First Officer to avail of his benefits.[7] fifty-seven (57), irrespective of
n starting on 04 whether or not he has previously
t September 1995 and On February 11, 1997, PAL filed a qualified in the Companys turbo-jet
. have completed said Complaint[8] against Almario before the Makati operations. The rationale behind this is
training on 08 Regional Trial Court (RTC), for reimbursement that a pilot who will be compulsorily
February 1996.As you of P851,107 worth of training costs, attorneys retired at age sixty (60) should no
are aware the fees equivalent to 20% of the said amount, and longer be burdened with training for a
Company invested costs of litigation. PAL invoked the existence of new position.
heavily on your an innominate contract of do ut facias (I give that
professional training in you may do) withAlmario in that by spending for Thus, Article XXIII, Section 1 of the
the estimated amount his training, he would render service to it until CBA provide[s]:
of PHP786,713.00 on the costs of training were recovered in at least
x------------------------------------- the basis that you three (3) years.[9] Almario having resigned Pilots fifty-seven (57) years of
-------------x continue to serve the before the 3-year period, PAL prayed that he age shall be frozen in their
Company for a should be ordered to reimburse the costs for his position.Pilots who are less
DECISION definite period of training. than fifty-seven (57) years of
time which is age provided they have
CARPIO MORALES, J.: approximately three In his Answer with Special and previously qualified in any
Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory companys turbo-jet aircraft
shall be permitted to occupy 1- Dismissing the plaintiffs denied,[22] Almario filed the instant Petition for legal ground justifying
any position in the companys complaint; Certiorari [sic] (Under Rule 45),[23] raising the the entitlement to a
turbo-jet fleet. 2- Ordering the plaintiff to pay the following issues: benefit and therefore,
defendant: negating claims of
a higher position is A. Whether the Court of unjust enrichment;
because they have only a- the amount of P312,425.00 as Appeals committed
three (3) years left before actual damages with legal interest from reversible error D. Whether the failure of
the mandatory retirement the filing of the counterclaim; in interpreting the private respondent to
age [of 60] and to send them b- the amount of P500,000.00 as Collective Bargaining honor and provide the
to training at that age, PAL exemplary damages; Agreement between Family Trip Pass
would no longer be able to c- the amount of P150,000.00 as Philippine Airlines, Inc. Benefit in the
recover whatever training attorneys fees; (PAL) and the Airline equivalent amount of
expenses it will have to d- the costs of the suit. Pilots Association of US$ 49,824.00 which
incur. the Philippines petitioner and his
SO ORDERED.[17] (ALPAP) as an family were not able to
Simply put, the foregoing provision ordinary civil law avail of within the one
clearly and unequivocally recognizes the contract applying (1) year from date of
prohibitive training cost principle such On appeal by both parties,[18] the Court ordinary contract law separation due to the
that it will take a period of at least three of Appeals, by Decision[19] dated March 31, 2005, principles which actions of PAL
(3) years before PAL could recover from reversed the trial courts decision. It is contrary to the amounts to unjust
the training expenses it found Almario liable under the CBAbetween PAL ruling of the Supreme enrichment;
incurred.[14] (Emphasis and underscoring and ALPAP and, in any event, under Article 22 of Court
supplied) the Civil Code. Thus it disposed: inSamahang Manggaga E. Whether or not
wa sa Top Form respondent is liable for
WHEREFORE, the Manufacturing-United malicious prosecution[.
By Decision[15] of October 25, 2000, appealed Decision Workers of the ][24] (Underscoring
Branch 147 of the Makati RTC, finding no is REVERSED and SET Philippines (SMTFM- supplied)
provision in the CBA between PAL and ALPAP ASIDE. In lieu thereof, a new UWP) v. NLRC and,
stipulating that a pilot who underwent a training judgment is therefore, erroneously
course for the position of A-300 First Officer hereby ENTERED, as reading into the CBA a Almario insists on the absence of any
must serve PAL for at least three years failing follows: (a) Appellee Vicente clause that was not written contract or explicit provision in the CBA
which he should reimburse the training Almario is hereby ordered agreed to during the obliging him to reimburse the costs incurred by
expenses, rendered judgment in favor to pay appellant Philippine negotiation and not PAL for his training. And he argues:
of Almario. Airlines, Inc. the sum of Five expressly stated in the
Hundred Fifty Nine Thousand, CBA; [T]here can be no
The trial court denied Almarios claim Seven Hundred [T]hirty Nine unjust enrichment because
for moral damages, however.[16] It denied & 9/100 Pesos (P559, B. Whether the Court of petitioner was entitled to the
too Almarios claim for the monetary equivalent 739.90) with six percent (6%) Appeals committed benefit of training when his
of his family trip pass benefits (worth interest as above-computed; reversible error bid was accepted, and
US$49,824), it holding that the same had been and (b) the award of in holding that Article x x x PAL did not suffer any
forfeited as he did not avail of them within one exemplary damages and 22 of the Civil Code can injury because the failure to
year from the date of his separation. attorneys fees in favor be applied to recover include a reimbursement
of appellee is training costs which provision in the CBA was
Thus the trial court disposed: hereby DELETED.[20] (Emphas were never agreed to freely entered into by the
is in the nor included as negotiating parties;
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, original; underscoring supplie reimbursable expenses
the Court hereby renders judgment in d) under the CBA; xxxx
favor of defendant Vicente Almario and
against the plaintiff: C. Whether the availing It is not disputed
His Motion for by petitioner of a that the petitioner merely
Reconsideration[21] having been required training is a entered a bid for a
 higher position, and that company. Complianc In N.S. Case No. 11-506-87, In re Labor (55) shall be frozen in the
when he was accepted based e with a CBA is Dispute at the Philippine Airlines, Inc., the position they currently
on seniority and qualification, mandated by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and occupy at that time and shall
the position was awarded to expressed policy to Employment (DOLE), passing on the failure of be ineligible for any further
him. It is also not disputed give protection to PAL and ALPAP to agree on the terms and movement to any other
that petitioner [had] not labor. In the same conditions for the renewal of their CBA which positions.
asked, requested, or vein, CBA provisions expired on December 31, 1987 and construing
demanded for the training. It should be construed Section 1 of Article XXIII of the 1985-1987 CBA, PALs contention is
came when his bid was liberally rather than held: basically premised on
accepted by PAL; narrowly and prohibitive training
technically, and the xxxx costs. The return on this
Because the training courts must place a investment in the form of
was provided when the bid practical and Section 1, Article the pilot promoted is
was accepted, the acceptance realistic XXIII of the 1985-1987 CBA allegedly five (5)
of the bid was the basis and construction upon provides: years. Considering the pilots
legal ground for the training; it, giving due age, the chances of full
consideration to Pilots fifty-five (55) years of recovery [are] asserted to be
Therefore, the context in age or over who have not quite slim.
since there is a legal ground which it is previously qualified in any
for the entitlement of the negotiated and Company turbo-jet aircraft ALPAP opposed the
training, contrary to the ruling purpose which it is shall not be permitted to bid proposal and argued that the
of the Court of Appeals, there intended to into the Companys turbo-jet training cost is offset by the
can be no unjust serve. This is operations. Pilots fifty-five pilots maturity, expertise and
enrichment;[25] (Underscoring founded on the (55) years of age or over who experience.
supplied) dictum that a CBA is have previously qualified in
not an ordinary the companys turbo-jet By way of
contract but one operations may be by-passed compromise, we rule that a
The petition fails. impressed with at Company option, however, pilot should remain in the
public interest. It any such pilot shall be paid position where he is upon
As reflected in the above-enumerated goes without saying, the by-pass pay effective upon reaching age fifty-seven (57),
issues raised by Almario, he cites the case however, that only the date a junior pilot starts to irrespective of whether or not
ofSamahang Manggagawa sa Top Form provisions occupy the bidded position. he has previously qualified in
Manufacturing-United Workers of the Philippines embodied in the the Companys turbo-jet
(SMTFM-UWP) v. NLRC[26] (Manggagawa) in CBA should be so x x x PAL x x x proposed to amend the operations. The rationale beh
support of his claim that the appellate court interpreted and provision in this wise: ind this is that a pilot who will
erred in interpreting the CBA as an ordinary civil complied be compulsorily retired at age
law contract and in reading into it a clause that with. Where a The compulsory retirement sixty (60) should no longer be
was not agreed to during the negotiation and not proposal raised by a age for all pilots is sixty (60) burdened with training for a
expressly stated in the CBA. contracting party years. Pilots who reach the new position. But if a pilot is
does not find print in age of fifty-five (55) years and only at age fifty-five (55), and
On the contrary, the ruling the CBA, it is not a over without having promotional positions are
in Manggagawa supports PALs position. Thus part thereof and the previously qualified in any available, he should still be
this Court held: proponent has no Company turbo-jet aircraft considered and promoted if
claim whatsoever to shall not be permitted to qualified, provided he has
The CBA is its occupy any position in the previously qualified in any
the law between the implementation.[27] ( Companys turbo-jet company turbo-jet aircraft. In
contracting parties Emphasis and fleet. Pilots fifty-four (54) the latter case,
the collective underscoring years of age and over are the prohibitive training
bargaining supplied) ineligible for promotion to costs are more than offset
representative and any position in Group I. Pilots by the maturity, expertise,
the employer- reaching the age of fifty-five and experience of the pilot.
 Q: At the time the defendant Agreement between permitted to occupy
Thus, the was accepted for Philippine Airlines any position in the
provision on age limit training as A300 and the Airline Pilot companys Turbo-jet
should now read: First Officer, would Association of Fleet, why do you
you know what was the Philippines.[32] say this is the basis
Pilots fifty-seven (57) years of the governing policy for the three (3) year
age shall be frozen in their or practice of xxxx period within which
positions.Pilots fifty-five (55) Philippine Airlines a pilot must render
[sic] years of age provided that was being Atty. Parinas: service to the
they have previously qualified employed regarding Q: Can you point to the company after
in any company turbo-jet the training cost[s] provision in this completing the
aircraft shall be permitted to for the pilots? agreement relating training?
occupy any position in the to the three (3) year [Witness]
companys turbo-jet Witness: period you stated a A: The reason why 57 years
fleet.[28] (Emphasis and A: The company has to spend while ago? old is placed here in
underscoring supplied) for the training of the Collective
the pilots and after NOTE: Witness going over the Bargaining
The above-quoted provision of Section 1 of that document shown to Agreement [is that]
Article XXIII of the 1985-1987 CBA,as construed the companyexpecti him by counsel. it is expected that
by the DOLE Secretary, was substantially ng that services you serve the
incorporated in the 1991-1994 CBA between will be rendered in Witness: position for three
PAL and ALPAP[29] as follows: order to recover A: It is on page 99 of (3) years because
the cost[s] of the Collective the retirement age
Pilots fifty-seven training. Bargaining is at 60, therefore, if
(57) years of age shall be Agreement, Article you are past 57
frozen in their position. Pilots Atty. Parinas: 23, Miscellaneous. years old, it will fall
who are less than fifty-seven Q: You stated that the pilot short of the three (3)
(57) years of age provided must serve the Atty. Parinas: I would like to years recovery
they have previously qualified company after manifest that this period for the
in any companys turbo-jet completing the provision pointed company. So it was
aircraft shall be permitted to training, for how out by the witness is established that
occupy any position in the long after already marked [anyone] past 57
companys turbo-jet fleet.[30] completing the as Exhibit B-1 by the years old will not be
training? plaintiff. allowed to train for
another
The same section of Article XXIII of the 1991- Witness: xxxx position.[33] (Emphas
1994 CBA was reproduced in the 1994-2000 A: At least for three (3) years. is and underscoring
CBA.[31] [Atty. Parinas] supplied)
Q: Mr. witness, Exhibit B-1
Arturo Gabanton, PALs Senior Vice Atty. Parinas: states in part
President for Flight Operations, testifying Q: What is your basis in that Pilots, 57 years It bears noting that when Almario took
onPALs policy or practice on underwriting the saying that a pilot of age shall be the training course, he was about 39 years old,
training costs of its pilots at the time Almariowas must serve the frozen in their 21 years away from the retirement age of
trained, with the expectation of company after position. Pilots who 60. Hence, with the maturity, expertise, and
benefiting therefrom in order to recover the cost completing the are less than 57 experience he gained from the training course,
of training, explained: training? years of age he was expected to serve PAL for at least three
provided they have years to offset the prohibitive costs thereof.
Witness: been previously
A: That is embodied in the qualified in any The pertinent provision of the CBA and
Atty. Parinas: Collective companys Turbo-Jet its rationale aside, contrary to Almariosclaim,
Bargaining Aircraft shall be Article 22 of the Civil Code which reads:

Art. 22. Every
person who through an act of
performance by another, or
any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of
something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same
to him,
applies.
This provision on unjust enrichment recognizes
the principle that one may not enrich himself at
the expense of another. An authority on Civil
Law[34] writes on the subject, viz:
Enrichment of the
defendant consists in every
patrimonial, physical, or
moral advantage, so long as it
is appreciable in money. It
may consist of some positive
pecuniary value incorporated
into the patrimony of the
defendant, such as: (1) the
enjoyment of a thing
belonging to the
plaintiff; (2) the benefits from
service rendered by the
plaintiff to the
defendant; (3) the acquisition
of a right, whether real or
personal; (4) the increase of
value of property of the
defendant; (5) the
improvement of a right of the
defendant, such as the
acquisition of a right of
preference; (6) the
recognition of the existence of
a right in the defendant; and
(7) the improvement of the
conditions of life of the
defendant.
xxxx
The enrichment of Training
the defendant must have a Cost P851,107.00
correlative prejudice, Less: Appellees corr
disadvantage, or injury to the esponding 8 months
plaintiff. This prejudice may Service after training
consist, not only of the loss of [P850,107.00
property or thedeprivation of divided by 36
its enjoyment, but also of non- months (3 years)
payment of compensation for = P23,640.86 x 8
a prestation or service months] 189,126.88
rendered to the defendant Equals P661,980.12
without intent to donate on Less: Accrued
the part of the plaintiff, or Benefits 102,240.22
thefailure to acquire Net Reimbursable
something which the latter Amount or P559,739.90[36]
would have obtained. The Appellees Outstand
injury to the plaintiff, ing Account **********,
however, need not be the
cause of the enrichment of the
defendant. It is enough that Almario must pay PAL the sum of P559,739.90,
there be some relation to bear the legal interest rate of 6% per annum
between them, that the from the filing of PALs complaint on February
enrichment of the defendant 11, 1997 until the finality of this decision.
would not have been
produced had it not been for In light of the foregoing discussions on
the fact from which the injury the main issue, the Court finds it unnecessary to
to the plaintiff is dwell on the other issues raised
derived.(Underscoring by Almario. Suffice it to state that the appellate
supplied)[35] courts disposition thereof is, as its decision
reflects, well-taken.
Admittedly, PAL invested for the WHEREFORE, the petition
training of Almario to enable him to acquire a is DENIED and the decision appealed from
higher level of skill, proficiency, or technical isAFFIRMED.
competence so that he could efficiently discharge
the position of A-300 First Officer. Given that, Costs against petitioner.
PAL expected to recover the training costs by
availing of Almarios services for at least three SO ORDERED.
years. The expectation of PAL was not fully
realized, however, due to Almarios resignation
after only eight months of service following the
completion of his training course. He cannot,
therefore, refuse to reimburse the costs of
training without violating the principle of unjust
enrichment.
Following the computation by the
appellate court which was arrived at by
offsetting the respective claims of the parties, viz:
Republic of the Philippines Bonito-III, and Bonito-IV, with a total area of perform the obligations set
SUPREME COURT 288.8656 hectares, situated in Barangay forth in the RAWOP, i.e., to On June 7, 2000, J.G. Realty filed a
Manila Luklukam, Sitio Bagong undertake development Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation
SECOND DIVISION Bayan, Municipality of Jose Panganiban, works within 2 years from the of the RAWOP[9] with the Legaspi City POA,
Camarines Norte. The parties also executed a execution of the Agreement; Region V, docketed as DENR Case No. 2000-01
BENGUET CORPORATION, G.R. No. 163101 Supplemental Agreement[5] dated June 1, and entitled J.G. Realty v. Benguet.
Petitioner, 1987. The mining claims were covered by MPSA b. Violation of the
Present: Application No. APSA-V-0009 jointly filed by J.G. Contract by allowing high On March 19, 2001, the POA issued a
- versus - QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, Realty as claimowner and Benguet as operator. graders to operate on our Decision,[10] dwelling upon the issues of (1)
CARPIO, claim. whether the arbitrators had jurisdiction over the
CARPIO MORALES, In the RAWOP, Benguet obligated itself to perfect case; and (2) whether Benguet violated the
TINGA, and the rights to the mining claims and/or otherwise c. No stipulation RAWOP justifying the unilateral cancellation of
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT VELASCO, acquire the mining rights to the mineral claims. was provided with respect to the RAWOP by J.G. Realty. The dispositive
JR., JJ. Within 24 months from the execution of the the term limit of the RAWOP. portion stated:
AND NATURAL RESOURCES RAWOP, Benguet should also cause the
-MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD examination of the mining claims for the purpose d. Non-payment WHEREFORE,
and J.G. REALTY AND MINING Promulgated: of determining whether or not they are worth of the royalties thereon as premises considered, the June
CORPORATION, developing with reasonable probability of provided in the RAWOP.[7] 01, 1987 [RAWOP] and its
Respondents. February 13, 2008 profitable production. Benguet undertook also to Supplemental Agreement is
x------------------------------------------------------------- furnish J.G. Realty with a report on the hereby declared cancelled and
----------------------------x examination, within a reasonable time after the In response, Benguets Manager for without effect. BENGUET is
completion of the examination. Moreover, also Legal Services, Reynaldo P. Mendoza, wrote J.G. hereby excluded from the
DECISION within the examination period, Benguet shall Realty a letter dated March 8, 1999,[8] therein joint MPSA Application over
VELASCO, JR., J.: conduct all necessary exploration in accordance alleging that Benguet complied with its the mineral claims
with a prepared exploration program. If it obligations under the RAWOP by investing PhP denominated as BONITO-I,
The instant petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of chooses to do so and before the expiration of the 42.4 million to rehabilitate the mines, and that BONITO-II, BONITO-III and
Court seeks the annulment of the December 2, examination period, Benguet may undertake to the commercial operation was hampered by the BONITO-IV.
2002 Decision[1] and March 17, 2004 develop the mining claims upon written notice to non-issuance of a Mines Temporary Permit by
Resolution[2] of the Department of Environment J.G. Realty. Benguet must then place the mining the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) which SO ORDERED.
and Natural Resources-Mining Adjudication claims into commercial productive stage within must be considered as force majeure, entitling
Board (DENR-MAB) in MAB Case No. 0124-01 24 months from the written notice.[6] It is also Benguet to an extension of time to prosecute
(Mines Administrative Case No. R-M-2000-01) provided in the RAWOP that if the mining claims such permit. Benguet further claimed that the Therefrom, Benguet filed a Notice of
entitled Benguet Corporation (Benguet) v. J.G. were placed in commercial production by high graders mentioned by J.G. Realty were Appeal[11] with the MAB on April 23, 2001,
Realty and Mining Corporation (J.G. Realty). The Benguet, J.G. Realty should be entitled to a already operating prior to Benguets taking over docketed as Mines Administrative Case No. R-M-
December 2, 2002 Decision upheld the March 19, royalty of five percent (5%) of net realizable of the premises, and that J.G. Realty had the 2000-01. Thereafter, the MAB issued the
2001 Decision[3] of the MAB Panel of Arbitrators value, and to royalty for any production done by obligation of ejecting such small scale miners. assailed December 2, 2002 Decision. Benguet
(POA) which canceled the Royalty Agreement Benguet whether during the examination or Benguet also alleged that the nature of the then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
with Option to Purchase (RAWOP) dated June 1, development periods. mining business made it difficult to specify a assailed Decision which was denied in the March
1987[4] between Benguet and J.G. Realty, and time limit for the RAWOP. Benguet then argued 17, 2004 Resolution of the MAB. Hence, Benguet
excluded Benguet from the joint Mineral Thus, on August 9, 1989, the Executive Vice- that the royalties due to J.G. Realty were in fact in filed the instant petition.
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) President of Benguet, Antonio N. Tachuling, its office and ready to be picked up at any time. It
application over four mining claims. The March issued a letter informing J.G. Realty of its appeared that, previously, the practice by J.G. The Issues
17, 2004 Resolution denied Benguets Motion for intention to develop the mining claims. However, Realty was to pick-up checks from Benguet
Reconsideration. on February 9, 1999, J.G. Realty, through its representing such royalties. However, starting
President, Johnny L. Tan, then sent a letter to the August 1994, J.G. Realty allegedly refused to 1. There was
The Facts President of Benguet informing the latter that it collect such checks from Benguet. Thus, Benguet serious and palpable error
was terminating the RAWOP on the following posited that there was no valid ground for the when the Honorable Board
On June 1, 1987, Benguet and J.G. Realty entered grounds: termination of the RAWOP. It also reminded J.G. failed to rule that the
into a RAWOP, wherein J.G. Realty was Realty that it should submit the disagreement to contractual obligation of the
acknowledged as the owner of four mining a. The fact that arbitration rather than unilaterally terminating parties to arbitrate under the
claims respectively named as Bonito-I, Bonito-II, your company has failed to the RAWOP.
 Royalty Agreement is To summarize, there
mandatory. are sufficient legal footings
authorizing a review of the
2. The Honorable MAB Decision under Rule 43
Board exceeded its of the Rules of
jurisdiction when it sustained Court. First, Section 30 of
the cancellation of the Royalty Article VI of the 1987
Agreement for alleged breach Constitution, mandates that
of contract despite the [n]o law shall be passed
absence of evidence. increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme
3. The Questioned Court as provided in this
Decision of the Honorable Constitution without its
Board in cancelling the advice and consent. On the
RAWOP prejudice[d] the other hand, Section 79 of RA
substantial rights of Benguet No. 7942 provides that
under the contract to the decisions of the MAB may be
unjust enrichment of JG reviewed by this Court on a
Realty.[12] petition for review by
certiorari. This provision is
obviously an expansion of the
Restated, the issues are: (1) Should the Courts appellate jurisdiction,
controversy have first been submitted to an expansion to which this
arbitration before the POA took cognizance of Court has not consented.
the case?; (2) Was the cancellation of the RAWOP Indiscriminate enactment of
supported by evidence?; and (3) Did the legislation enlarging the
cancellation of the RAWOP amount to unjust appellate jurisdiction of this
enrichment of J.G. Realty at the expense of Court would unnecessarily
Benguet? burden it.
The Courts Ruling Second, when the
Supreme Court, in the
Before we dwell on the substantive exercise of its rule-making
issues, we find that the instant petition can be power, transfers to the CA
denied outright as Benguet resorted to an pending cases involving a
improper remedy. review of a quasi-judicial
The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act bodys decisions, such transfer
No. (RA) 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of relates only to procedure;
1995 states, A petition for review by certiorari hence, it does not impair the
and question of law may be filed by the substantive and vested rights
aggrieved party with the Supreme Court within of the parties. The aggrieved
thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or partys right to appeal is
decision of the [MAB]. preserved; what is changed is
only the procedure by which
However, this Court has already invalidated such the appeal is to be made or
provision in Carpio v. Sulu Resources decided. The parties still have
Development Corp.,[13] ruling that a decision of a remedy and a competent
the MAB must first be appealed to the Court of tribunal to grant this remedy.
Appeals (CA) under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
before recourse to this Court may be had. We Third, the Revised
held, thus: Rules of Civil Procedure
included Rule 43 to provide a
uniform rule on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies. Under
the rule, appeals from their
judgments and final orders
are now required to be
brought to the CA on a
verified petition for review. A
quasi-judicial agency or body
has been defined as an organ
of government, other than a
court or legislature, which
affects the rights of private
parties through either
adjudication or rule-making.
MAB falls under this
definition; hence, it is no
different from the other
quasi-judicial bodies
enumerated under Rule 43.
Besides, the introductory
words in Section 1 of Circular
No. 1-91among these agencies
areindicate that the
enumeration is not exclusive
or conclusive and
acknowledge the existence of
other quasi-judicial agencies
which, though not expressly
listed, should be deemed
included therein.
Fourth, the Court
realizes that under Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 as
amended by RA No. 7902,
factual controversies are
usually involved in decisions
of quasi-judicial bodies; and
the CA, which is likewise
tasked to resolve questions of
fact, has more elbow room to
resolve them. By including
questions of fact among the
issues that may be raised in
an appeal from quasi-judicial
agencies to the CA,
Section 3 of Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-
95 and Section 3 of Rule 43
explicitly expanded the list of
such issues.
According to Section
3 of Rule 43, [a]n appeal
under this Rule may be taken
to the Court of Appeals within
the period and in the manner
herein provided whether the
appeal involves questions of
fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law.
Hence, appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies even only on
questions of law may be
brought to the CA.
Fifth, the judicial
policy of observing the
hierarchy of courts dictates
that direct resort from
administrative agencies to
this Court will not be
entertained, unless the
redress desired cannot be
obtained from the
appropriate lower tribunals,
or unless exceptional and
compelling circumstances
justify availment of a remedy
falling within and calling for
the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction.[14]
The above principle was reiterated in Asaphil
Construction and Development Corporation v.
Tuason, Jr. (Asaphil).[15] However,
the Carpio ruling was not applied toAsaphil as
the petition in the latter case was filed in 1999 or
three years before the promulgation of Carpio in
2002. Here, the petition was filed on April 28,
2004 when theCarpio decision was already
applicable, thus Benguet should have filed the
appeal with the CA.
Petitioner having failed to properly
appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the decision of
the MAB has become final and executory. On this
ground alone, the instant petition must be
denied.
 Even if we entertain the petition
although Benguet skirted the appeal to the CA
via Rule 43, still, the December 2, 2002 Decision
and March 17, 2004 Resolution of the DENR-
MAB in MAB Case No. 0124-01 should be
maintained.
First Issue: The case should have first been
brought to
voluntary arbitration before the POA
Secs. 11.01 and 11.02 of the RAWOP pertinently
provide:
11.01 Arbitration
Any disputes, differences or
disagreements between
BENGUET and the OWNER
with reference to anything
whatsoever pertaining to this
Agreement that cannot be
amicably settled by them shall
not be cause of any action of
any kind whatsoever in any
court or administrative
agency but shall, upon notice
of one party to the other, be
referred to a Board of
Arbitrators consisting of three
(3) members, one to be
selected by BENGUET,
another to be selected by the
OWNER and the third to be
selected by the
aforementioned two
arbitrators so appointed.
xxxx
11.02 Court Action
No action shall be instituted in
court as to any matter in
dispute as hereinabove stated,
except to enforce the decision
of the majority of the
Arbitrators.[16]
Thus, Benguet argues that the POA should have
first referred the case to voluntary arbitration
before taking cognizance of the case, citing Sec. 2
of RA 876 on persons and matters subject to
arbitration.
On the other hand, in denying such argument,
the POA ruled that:
While the parties may
establish such stipulations
clauses, terms and conditions
as they may deem convenient,
the same must not be
contrary to law and public
policy. At a glance, there is
nothing wrong with the terms
and conditions of the
agreement. But to state that
an aggrieved party cannot
initiate an action without
going to arbitration would be
tying ones hand even if there
is a law which allows him to
do so.[17]
The MAB, meanwhile, denied Benguets
contention on the ground of estoppel, stating:
Besides, by its own act,
Benguet is already estopped
in questioning the jurisdiction
of the Panel of Arbitrators to
hear and decide the case. As
pointed out in the appealed
Decision, Benguet initiated
and filed an Adverse Claim
docketed as MAC-R-M-2000-
02 over the same mining
claims without undergoing
contractual arbitration. In this
particular case (MAC-R-M-
2000-02) now subject of the
appeal, Benguet is likewise in
estoppel from questioning the
competence of the Panel of
Arbitrators to hear and decide
in the summary proceedings
J.G. Realtys petition, when
Benguet itself did not merely
move for the dismissal of the
case but also filed an Answer
with counterclaim seeking
affirmative reliefs from the
Panel of Arbitrators.[18]
Moreover, the MAB ruled that the contractual
provision on arbitration merely provides for an
additional forum or venue and does not divest
the POA of the jurisdiction to hear the case.[19]
In its July 20, 2004 Comment,[20] J.G. Realty
reiterated the above rulings of the POA and MAB.
It argued that RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995 is a special law which should prevail
over the stipulations of the parties and over a
general law, such as RA 876. It also argued that
the POA cannot be considered as a court under
the contemplation of RA 876 and that
jurisprudence saying that there must be prior
resort to arbitration before filing a case with the
courts is inapplicable to the instant case as the
POA is itself already engaged in arbitration.
On this issue, we rule for Benguet.
Sec. 2 of RA 876 elucidates the scope of
arbitration:
Section 2. Persons
and matters subject to
arbitration.Two or more
persons or parties may
submit to the arbitration of
one or more arbitrators any
controversy existing
between them at the time of
the submission and which
may be the subject of an
action, or the parties to any
contract may in such
contract agree to settle by
arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising between
them. Such submission or
contract shall be valid,
enforceable and
irrevocable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law for
the revocation of any
contract.
Such submission or
contract may include
question[s] arising out of
valuations, appraisals or other
controversies which may be
collateral, incidental,
precedent or subsequent to
any issue between the parties.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In RA 9285 or the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Act of 2004, the Congress reiterated the efficacy
of arbitration as an alternative mode of dispute
resolution by stating in Sec. 32 thereof that
domestic arbitration shall still be governed by
RA 876. Clearly, a contractual stipulation that
requires prior resort to voluntary arbitration
before the parties can go directly to court is not
illegal and is in fact promoted by the State. Thus,
petitioner correctly cites several cases whereby
arbitration clauses have been upheld by this
Court.[21]
Moreover, the contention that RA 7942 prevails
over RA 876 presupposes a conflict between the
two laws. Such is not the case here. To reiterate,
availment of voluntary arbitration before resort
is made to the courts or quasi-judicial agencies of
the government is a valid contractual stipulation
that must be adhered to by the parties. As stated
in Secs. 6 and 7 of RA 876:
Section 6. Hearing by
court.A party aggrieved by
the failure, neglect or
refusal of another to
perform under an
agreement in writing
providing for arbitration
may petition the court for
an order directing that such
arbitration proceed in the
manner provided for in
such agreement. Five days
notice in writing of the
hearing of such application
shall be served either
personally or by registered
mail upon the party in
default. The court shall hear
the parties, and upon being
satisfied that the making of
the agreement or such
failure to comply therewith
is not in issue, shall make
an order directing the
parties to proceed to
arbitration in accordance
with the terms of the
agreement. If the making of
the agreement or default be
in issue the court shall
proceed to summarily hear
such issue. If the finding be
that no agreement in
writing providing for
arbitration was made, or
that there is no default in
the proceeding thereunder,
the proceeding shall be
dismissed. If the finding be
that a written provision for
arbitration was made and
there is a default in
proceeding thereunder, an
order shall be made
summarily directing the
parties to proceed with the
arbitration in accordance
with the terms thereof.
xxxx
Section 7. Stay of
civil action.If any suit or
proceeding be brought upon
an issue arising out of an
agreement providing for the
arbitration thereof, the court
in which such suit or
proceeding is pending, upon
being satisfied that the issue
involved in such suit or
proceeding is referable to
arbitration, shall stay the
action or proceeding until an
arbitration has been had in
accordance with the terms of
the agreement: Provided, That
the applicant, for the stay is
not in default in proceeding
with such arbitration.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In other words, in the event a case that should
properly be the subject of voluntary arbitration
is erroneously filed with the courts or quasi-
judicial agencies, on motion of the defendant, the
court or quasi-judicial agency shall determine
whether such contractual provision for
arbitration is sufficient and effective. If in
affirmative, the court or quasi-judicial agency
shall then order the enforcement of said
provision. Besides, in BF Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, we already ruled:
In this connection, it
bears stressing that the lower
court has not lost its
jurisdiction over the case.
Section 7 of Republic Act No.
876 provides that
proceedings therein have only
been stayed. After the special
proceeding of arbitration has
been pursued and completed,
then the lower court may
confirm the award made by
the arbitrator.[22]
J.G. Realtys contention, that prior resort to
arbitration is unavailing in the instant case
because the POAs mandate is to arbitrate
disputes involving mineral agreements, is
misplaced. A distinction must be made between
voluntary and compulsory arbitration. InLudo
and Luym Corporation v. Saordino, the Court had
the occasion to distinguish between the two
types of arbitrations:
Comparatively, in Reformist
Union of R.B. Liner, Inc. vs.
NLRC, compulsory arbitration
has been defined both as the
process of settlement of labor
disputes by a government
agencywhich has the
authority to investigate and
to make an award which is
binding on all the parties, and
as a mode of arbitration
where the parties are
compelled to accept the
resolution of their dispute
through arbitration by a third
party. While a voluntary
arbitrator is not part of the
governmental unit or labor
departments personnel, said
arbitrator renders arbitration
services provided for under
labor laws.[23] (Emphasis
supplied.)
There is a clear distinction between compulsory
and voluntary arbitration. The arbitration
provided by the POA is compulsory, while the
nature of the arbitration provision in the RAWOP
is voluntary, not involving any government
agency. Thus, J.G. Realtys argument on this
matter must fail.
As to J.G. Realtys contention that the provisions
of RA 876 cannot apply to the instant case which
involves an administrative agency, it must be
pointed out that Section 11.01 of the RAWOP
states that:
[Any controversy with regard
to the contract] shall not be
cause of any action of any
kind whatsoever in any court
or administrative
agency but shall, upon notice
of one party to the other, be
referred to a Board of
Arbitrators consisting of three
(3) members, one to be
selected by BENGUET,
another to be selected by the
OWNER and the third to be
selected by the
aforementioned two arbiters
so appointed.[24] (Emphasis
supplied.)
There can be no quibbling that POA is a quasi-
judicial body which forms part of the DENR, an
administrative agency. Hence, the provision on
mandatory resort to arbitration, freely entered
into by the parties, must be held binding against
them.[25]
In sum, on the issue of whether POA should have
referred the case to voluntary arbitration, we
find that, indeed, POA has no jurisdiction over
the dispute which is governed by RA 876, the
arbitration law.
However, we find that Benguet is already
estopped from questioning the POAs
jurisdiction. As it were, when J.G. Realty filed
DENR Case No. 2000-01, Benguet filed its answer
and participated in the proceedings before the
POA, Region V. Secondly, when the adverse
March 19, 2001 POA Decision was rendered, it
filed an appeal with the MAB in Mines
Administrative Case No. R-M-2000-01 and again
participated in the MAB proceedings. When the
adverse December 2, 2002 MAB Decision was
promulgated, it filed a motion for
reconsideration with the MAB. When the adverse
March 17, 2004 MAB Resolution was issued,
Benguet filed a petition with this Court pursuant
to Sec. 79 of RA 7942 impliedly recognizing
MABs jurisdiction. In this factual milieu, the
Court rules that the jurisdiction of POA and that
of MAB can no longer be questioned by Benguet
at this late hour. What Benguet should have done
was to immediately challenge the POAs
jurisdiction by a special civil action for certiorari
when POA ruled that it has jurisdiction over the
dispute. To redo the proceedings fully
participated in by the parties after the lapse of
seven years from date of institution of the
original action with the POA would be anathema
to the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.
Second Issue: The cancellation of the RAWOP
was supported by evidence
The cancellation of the RAWOP by the
POA was based on two grounds: (1) Benguets
failure to pay J.G. Realtys royalties for the mining
claims; and (2) Benguets failure to seriously
pursue MPSA Application No. APSA-V-0009 over
the mining claims.
As to the royalties, Benguet claims that
the checks representing payments for the
royalties of J.G. Realty were available for pick-up
in its office and it is the latter which refused to
claim them. Benguet then thus concludes that it
did not violate the RAWOP for nonpayment of
royalties. Further, Benguet reasons that J.G.
Realty has the burden of proving that the former
did not pay such royalties following the principle
that the complainants must prove their
affirmative allegations.
With regard to the failure to pursue the
MPSA application, Benguet claims that the
lengthy time of approval of the application is due
to the failure of the MGB to approve it. In other
words, Benguet argues that the approval of the
application is solely in the hands of the MGB.
Benguets arguments are bereft of
merit.
Sec. 14.05 of the RAWOP provides:
14.05 Bank Account
OWNER shall maintain a bank
account at ___________ or any
other bank from time to time
selected by OWNER with
notice in writing to BENGUET
where BENGUET shall deposit
to the OWNERs credit any and
all advances and payments
which may become due the
OWNER under this Agreement
as well as the purchase price
herein agreed upon in the
event that BENGUET shall
exercise the option to
purchase provided for in the
Agreement. Any and all
deposits so made by
BENGUET shall be a full and
complete acquittance and
release to [sic] BENGUET
from any further liability to
the OWNER of the amounts
represented by such
deposits. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Evidently, the RAWOP itself provides for the
mode of royalty payment by Benguet. The fact
that there was the previous practice whereby J.G.
Realty picked-up the checks from Benguet is
unavailing. The mode of payment is embodied in
a contract between the parties. As such, the
contract must be considered as the law between
the parties and binding on both.[26] Thus, after
J.G. Realty informed Benguet of the bank account
where deposits of its royalties may be made,
Benguet had the obligation to deposit the checks.
J.G. Realty had no obligation to furnish Benguet
with a Board Resolution considering that the
RAWOP itself provided for such payment
scheme.
Notably, Benguets claim that J.G. Realty
must prove nonpayment of its royalties is both
illogical and unsupported by law and
jurisprudence.
The allegation of nonpayment is not a
positive allegation as claimed by Benguet.
Rather, such is a negative allegation that does
not require proof and in fact transfers the
burden of proof to Benguet. Thus, this Court
ruled in Jimenez v. National Labor Relations
Commission:
As a general rule,
one who pleads payment has
the burden of proving it. Even
where the plaintiff must
allege non-payment, the
general rule is that the burden
rests on the defendant to
prove payment, rather than
on the plaintiff to prove non-
payment. The debtor has the
burden of showing with
legal certainty that the
obligation has been
discharged by
payment.[27] (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the instant case, the obligation of
Benguet to pay royalties to J.G. Realty has been
admitted and supported by the provisions of the
RAWOP. Thus, the burden to prove such
obligation rests on Benguet.
It should also be borne in mind that MPSA
Application No. APSA-V-0009 has been pending
with the MGB for a considerable length of time. enrichment under Article 22
Benguet, in the RAWOP, obligated itself to requires two conditions: (1)
perfect the rights to the mining claims and/or that a person is benefited
otherwise acquire the mining rights to the without a valid basis or
mineral claims but failed to present any evidence justification, and (2) that such
showing that it exerted efforts to speed up and benefit is derived at anothers
have the application approved. In fact, Benguet expense or damage.
never even alleged that it continuously followed-
up the application with the MGB and that it was There is no unjust
in constant communication with the government enrichment when the
agency for the expeditious resolution of the person who will benefit has
application. Such allegations would show that, a valid claim to such
indeed, Benguet was remiss in prosecuting the benefit.[28] (Emphasis
MPSA application and clearly failed to comply supplied.)
with its obligation in the RAWOP.
Third Issue: There is no unjust enrichment in Clearly, there is no unjust enrichment in the
the instant case instant case as the cancellation of the RAWOP,
which left Benguet without any legal right to
Based on the foregoing discussion, the participate in further developing the mining
cancellation of the RAWOP was based on valid claims, was brought about by its violation of the
grounds and is, therefore, justified. The RAWOP. Hence, Benguet has no one to blame but
necessary implication of the cancellation is the itself for its predicament.
cessation of Benguets right to prosecute MPSA
Application No. APSA-V-0009 and to further WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition,
develop such mining claims. and AFFIRM the December 2, 2002 Decision and
March 17, 2004 Resolution of the DENR-MAB in
In Car Cool Philippines, Inc. v. Ushio Realty and MAB Case No. 0124-01 upholding the
Development Corporation, we defined unjust cancellation of the June 1, 1987 RAWOP. No
enrichment, as follows: costs.
SO ORDERED.
We have held that
[t]here is unjust enrichment
when a
person unjustly retains a
benefit to the loss of another,
or when a person retains
money or property of another
against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity
and good conscience. Article
22 of the Civil Code provides
that [e]very person who
through an act of performance
by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at
the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground,
shall return the same to him.
The principle of unjust
FIRST DIVISION Before Us are two consolidated contractor encounter underground works were not part of the original contract and
Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 obstruction during drilling such as should be treated as extra work. In a letter
ADVANCED of the Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the footings, tie beams, piles, and any other dated 9 September 1997, New World informed
FOUNDATION Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals which incidental impenetrable obstruction, AFCSC of the formersrejection of the 21
CONSTRUCTION affirmed with modification the Decision[2] of the the contractor shall be paid on the November 1996 proposal of AFCSC regarding the
SYSTEMS Construction Industry Arbitration Commission actualdaywork expenses for equipment exclusion of the removal of underground
CORPORATION, (CIAC) awarding Advanced Foundation and manpower plus 25% overhead obstructions from the original scope of work
Petitioner, Construction Systems Corporations (AFCSC) (sic). and AFCSCs claim for compensation for alleged
- versus - claim against New World Properties and 1.6.3. Should the underground extra work. New World maintained that the
Ventures, Inc. (New World) in the total amount obstruction cannot be recover the alleged additional works were all part of the
of P10,700,384.00 with interest, as well as the contractor shall notify the owner in contract signed by both parties.
NEW WORLD Resolution dated 3 May 2000 denying both writing which in turn refer to the
PROPERTIES parties Motion for Partial Reconsideration. structural engineer for further After removing the underground
AND VENTURES, instructions provided however that the obstructions and incorporating the change in the
INC., Sometime in November 1996, New contractor will not entail delay and scope of work, the construction of the bored
World conducted a bidding for the construction stand by in the faithful execution of the piles were completed only on 27 November
Respondent. of 69 bored piles which would form the work. Idle time shall be charge as per 1997, or more than eight months after the
foundation of the 36- actual operating expenses of original date of 24 February 1997 contemplated
x------------- storey World TradeExchange Building it planned manpower and equipment subject to in the contract.
-----------x to erect on a parcel of land it owned the evaluation of the owners engineer Subsequently, during the early part of
in Binondo, Manila. representative (sic) 1998, New World informed AFCSC of its
NEW WORLD New World did not respond to said intention to test the bored piles constructed on
PROPERTIES After inspecting the site and conducting proposal but instead directed AFCSC to proceed the project site to check their structural
AND VENTURES, soil investigation, the bidding participants with the construction. On 29 November 1996, integrity. The tests to be conducted consisted of
INC., submitted their respective bids. On 18 November both parties signed the contract for the sonic logging test, dynamic pile test, and pile
1996, New World notified AFCSC of the construction of the 69 bored integrity test. Results of the testing showed that
Petitioner. acceptance of its bid to construct the 69 bored piles. AFCSCs proposal, however, was not five piles were found defective, namely, Pile Nos.
piles for the lump sum of Thirty-six Million Pesos incorporated in said contract. 9, 21, 25, 49, and 62. The high-strain dynamic
- versus - (P36,000,000.00). During the subsistence of the test (PDA) done to Pile No. 21, which was the
contract, New World directed AFCSC to make the only pile subjected to said test in order to
On 20 November 1996, New following changes and additional works: 1) the determine its load capacity, revealed that it had a
ADVANCED World issued to AFCSC the Notice to Proceed addition of one bored pile; 2) the increase in the load capacity of only 800 metric tons, far less
FOUNDATION Work wherein AFCSC was instructed to pile depths from 55m. to 60m. with respect to 23 than the required 1,200 metric tons.
CONSTRUCTION commence work on 27 November 1996 and bored piles and from 55m. to70m. with respect When it came time to settle the
SYSTEMS complete the same by 24 February 1997. Under to 47 bored piles; 3) the increase in the diameter accounts, the parties found that their respective
CORPORATION, said notice, it was stated that in case of delay in of six bored piles from 1.5m. to 1.8m.; and 4) the records of accounts were at variance with each
Respondent. the completion of the project, AFCSC would change in the compressive strength of concrete other. Thus, on 29 May 1998, AFCSC,
pay New World liquidated damages in the from 3,000 psito 4,000 psi for all piles. Due to represented by Engr. Joel S. Arceo, and New
June 21, 2006 amount of P36,000.00 per calendar day of delay. said changes in the scope of work, AFCSC World, represented by Engr. GaudencioLambino,
informedNew World in a letter dated 13 January reconciled the amount due to AFCSC and arrived
DECISION
After the issuance of the Notice to 1997 that the original contract price at the sum of P6,326,318.72as the unpaid
Proceed, but before the signing of the contract, ofP36,000,000.00 would increase balance of the original contract price
AFCSC, on 21 November 1996, proposed an to P48,400,000.00. and P2,133,658.46 as the cost of the change
amendment to the contract conditions, to wit: Thereafter, sometime in August 1997, orders after deducting the liquidated damages
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1.6 Excluded in the contractor scope of AFCSC billed New World the costs of the change due to New World for the delay incurred by
work shall be as follows: orders in addition to the original contract AFCSC.
1.6.2. Removal ofUndergroud price. Included in said billing is the cost of the
Obstruction: - The contractor shall removal of underground obstructions in the New World, however, refused to pay its
execute probing of underground project site as well as the installation of sonic outstanding obligations to AFCSC due to the
obstruction on each pile pipes to be used to conduct load tests on the defective bored piles. On 2 June 1998, AFCSC
position. Should the bored piling bored piling works. AFCSC claimed that these made a final demand upon New World to pay the
consolidated billing in the amount
of P23,478,251.29 consisting of the reconciled
amount of P8,515,396.63, and the cost of
removing the underground obstructions, sonic
pipe installation, build up of pile test cap, soil
investigation and crane rental.
Upon New Worlds continuous refusal
to pay its obligation, AFCSC filed a Request for
Adjudication before the CIAC[3] on 2 July
1998. Among the issues submitted for resolution
by the parties were whether or not the removal
of underground obstructions, installation of
sonic pipes, build up of pile test cap, soil
investigation, and crane rental constitute
additional works which will entitle AFCSC to its
claim of additional pay; and whether or not
AFCSC was in delay, thus making it liable for
liquidated damages.
In the Decision dated 8 December
1998, the CIAC disposed of the controversy in
this wise:
The bone of
contention is whether or not
the removal of underground
obstruction is part of the
scope of the work of the
contractor as claimed by the
respondents or is extra work
as claimed by the contractor.
xxxx
It is clear to us that
this controversy could have
been avoided if the owners
designers had clearly stated
the contractors scope of
work. The bid documents
failed to give bidders of the
lump-sum bids details of the
underground obstruction or
at least made provisions for
the treatment of the parties
reciprocal obligations in the
event such obstruction is
encountered.Upon the other
hand, the contractor, one
which is experienced in
foundation work, had been
remiss in its obligation to
obtain as much information as
possible on the contingency
that the unknown obstruction
would impede its work and
make it more costly, or at
least provided a qualification
in its bid so as to make clear
its right to claim contract
price and time adjustment
caused by such
obstruction. Assuming,
therefore, that these
omissions of both parties may
be treated as acts in bad faith,
we shall have to apply the rule
that in such case, their rights
and obligations shall be
resolved as if both had acted
in good faith up to the time of
the bid.
xxxx
x x x We also reviewed the bid
of the claimant as well as the
bids of the other bidders
made on a form supplied
by New World. The items
mentioned in the bid form
indicated the general pay
items of work of the
contractor, but it does not
mention anything about the
removal of obstruction. Mr.
Chika G. Go, however, argued
that the item on removal of
obstruction fell under the
item miscellaneous.
[t.s.n., October 19,1998, pp.
56-57] We reject this
argument as facetious. The
removal of underground
obstruction is a major item
of work and cannot be
understood as being
subsumed under the
general heading
miscellaneous.
The removal of xxxx
underground obstruction, in
our view, is covered by the In its Reply, claimant alleged
General Conditions of in its paragraph 9 that:
Contract which provide as 9. Claimant did not cover up several
follows: bored piles before the same were
tested [par.4.14, Answer]. This is yet
Should the Contractor another of many reckless allegations
encounter subsurface or that discredit the whole
latent physical conditions Answer. Claimant was not the
differing materially from contractor for the mat foundation (the
those indicated, or unknown flooring of the basement which is
physical conditions at the site constructed on top of the bored piles)
of an unusual nature differing and accordingly, had nothing to do with
materially from those cover[ing] up the bored piles.
ordinarily encountered the
Owners Representative shall 10. It was only after the bored piles
be promptly notified of such were covered up by the mat foundation
conditions before they are contractor that respondents informed
disturbed. The Owners claimant of the results of the pile
Representative shall testing rendering it impossible for
thereupon promptly claimant to challenge definitively the
investigate the conditions at results and, more importantly, to
the site and if he finds that undertake remedial work on the five
they do so materially differ [5] piles alleged found defective.
and cause an increase or
decrease in the cost, or the We accept the
time required for foregoing assertions in pars. 9
performance of the Contract, and 9.1 of the claimant as
an equitable adjustment will being in accord with industry
be made and the Contract practice, and as being
modified in accordance with consistent with the facts.
existing laws on the matter or
as agreed upon the provided The issue, therefore,
for [sic] under the Contract. boils down to whether or not
the cost of testing shall be for
xxxx the account of claimant or
of New World.
We have no
hesitation, therefore, in At the outset, it must
holding that the removal of be stressed that Clause 38.4 of
underground obstructions the General Conditions cover
by the claimant falls under tests of contractor-supplied
Clause 56.2 of the General materials such as concrete,
Conditions which should cement, or rebars, not
therefore be treated as finished products. In
extra work. accordance with accepted
industry practice, this
On the additional provision, which is also a
sub-issues: standard provision in
construction contracts, is not
interpreted to include tests on
finished structural
members. It does not cover,
for example, tests on the
reinforced concrete column of
a building to see if it can carry
35 floors above or test a
girder to check if it carry the
designed seismic load.
The claim of the
claimant is for the
installation of sonic pipes
amounting to P320,000.00;
for built-up of pile test cap,
to P104,002.33; for crane
rental, P75,000.00 and for
soil investigation,
P60,000.00 should be for
the account of New
World.However, claimant
agreed that it will absorb the
cost of the soil investigation if
the contract is awarded to
it. Further, since the
installation of sonic pipes was
defective in 34 out of 69 piles,
we reduce to a corresponding
extent the claimants claim for
sonic pipe installation. x x x
We also find that
claimant should be liable for
part of the cost of the sonic
pipes defectively installed by
it. x x x
Issue No. 2 concerns
liquidated damages. As
formulated, the issue
submitted for resolution is
this: Whether or not claimant
was in delay and, as such,
whether it is liable to pay
respondent liquidated
damages. If it is found to be
liable, how much liquidated
damaged should be awarded
to the respondent?
xxxx
Article 7.1 of the
contract provides that: 7.1
The OWNER may, at any time,
by a written order, make
changes in the schedule and
work required under this
Agreement. If any
such changes causes an
increase or decrease in the
work or the time required for
performing the work, an
equitable adjustment shall be
made of the contract price and
completion date upon mutual
agreement of the parties
reflecting such adjustments by
way of a written variation
order subject to the
negotiation by both
parties. [Underscoring
supplied]
Clause 49.2.4 of the
General Conditions provide
that The Contractor shall be
entitled to claim an
adjustment of his Contract
Time where: [i] the amount of
additional work under a
Change Order, or [ii] special
circumstances had occurred,
so as to fairly entitle the
Contractor to an extension of
Contract Time.
In light of the facts,
and in our discussion above
of the changes made, it is
clear that we have found
that indeed there were
circumstances fairly
entitling the claimant to an
extension of its contract
period.
xxxx
We examined the
numerous exhibits submitted
by the claimant all mentioning
directly or indirectly
compensation to it for extra
work performed. x x x In none
of these exhibits did
claimant request an
extension of the contract
period. Engr.
Joel S. Arceos comprehensive
12-page affidavit failed to
mention any letter or request
for the adjustment of the
completion time due to extra
works.
Claimant, in its
memorandum, dismisses the
request for time extension as
a mere formality. [See
claimants Memorandum,
p.12] We do not agree. The
contract provides that the
contractor shall pay
liquidated damages for
delay unless the period for
completion of the work is
extended by the owner. The
procedure for requesting
extension of time and for
the approval of the request
by the owner is laid out. We
have not been shown why
these important provisions
of the contract between the
parties should be treated by
us as a mere formality. [See
Clauses 49.3.1 and 49.3.2 of
the General Conditions] We
accordingly hold that claimant
is not entitled to extension of
time for the extra works
performed and is accordingly
liable to the respondent for
liquidated damages in
accordance with the contract.
xxxx
We note, however,
that the purpose of giving
punctual notice of claim for
time extension is to enable the
owner immediately to
investigate the actual basis of
the claim, decide whether or
not to grant the request, and
in case the request is granted,
to fix the period of extension
of Contract Time. In this case,
the claimant submitted Exhs.
R to R-138 to show on a daily
basis the removal of
obstruction and each report is
acknowledged received by the
owners
representative. Thus, New
World was not unaware of
the difficulty attending the
removal of
obstruction. There is no
showing of material
prejudice caused to New
World by the failure of
claimant to give formal
notice of its extension of
time to request time
extension. Incidentally, no
evidence has been presented
to show that the claimant
lacked workers, materials
and/or equipment as a result
of which there was a slippage
in the work. Liquidated
damages are imposed as a
penalty for delay. [See Article
1226, Civil Code] As such, a
contract provision for the
imposition of liquidated
damages shall be strictly
construed.According to
Article 1229, Civil Code, The
judge shall equitably reduce
the penalty when the
principal obligation has been
partly or
irregularly complied with by
the debtor. Even if there has
been no performance, the
penalty may be reduced by
the courts if it is iniquitous or
unconscionable. [See also
Article 2227, Civil Code.]
 In view of the
circumstances of the case,
taking into account the fact
that there was no material
prejudice caused to New
World by the failure of
claimant to request extension
of the completion time,
applying Articles 1229 and
2227 of the Civil Code, we
have decided to reduce the
amount of liquidated damages
to P1,000,000.00.
The most difficult
issue submitted for resolution
is a highly technical one,
namely: Did the result of the
test piles accurately
determine the capacity of the
piles?
xxxx
The test results were
evaluated by Dr. Benjamin
R. Buencuseso, Jr. who
submitted his own report
on June 5, 1998 [Exh. K]
Dr. Buensuceso testified that
he is a registered civil
engineer from 1979; that he
took his post-graduate studies
in Bangkok where he earned a
doctorate degree in geo-
technical engineering; that he
was associate professor in a
university in Japan where he
taught foundations; that from
1993 he taught on a full-time
basis at the University of the
Philippines; that he is also a
consultant to various
companies with particular
emphasis on pile testing; and
that he started dynamic pile
testing since 1993 and he has
been doing this type of
consultancy since 1996 [t.s.n.,
October 19, 1998, p. 15] In his
report [Exh. K],
Dr. Buensuceso made the
following conclusion: In
closing, my evaluation of the
results of the various pile
tests conducted at the World
Trade Exchange Center
Project shows that the defects
found for all the test piles are
not critical from
a geotechnical engineering
standpoint.Inasmuch as these
defects do not result to a
significant reduction in the
skin resistance provided by
the soils surrounding the
predominantly frictional
piles. However, the effects of
the presence of a 2m layer of
contaminated concrete cover
in Pile Nos. 9, 25, 46 and 62,
the structuralcapacity and
behavior of the subject piles
should be evaluated by the
Structural Engineer.
xxxx
We find that only one pile test
was done to assess both
integrity and capacity. The
other tests simply evaluated
qualitatively pile
integrity. [Exh. K] A pile
capacity in this context is
meant to carry vertical loads
and is dependent on any of
three factors, namely:
integrity, skin friction and
end-bearing.
A total of 34 piles were
tested. A total of 35 tests were
conducted. Pile No. 25 was
tested twice, one by sonic
logging and the second, for
pile integrity. The pile
integrity tests resulted in a
finding that all piles, except
Pile No. 9, were of acceptable
integrity. Pile No. 9 was found
to have defects in the lower
portion of the pile shift. Pile
No. 25 which was subjected to
sonic logging and pile
integrity tests, passed the
integrity test but the result of
the sonic test was
inconclusive.
Engr. Rogelio Menguito gave
his formula for computing the
capacity of each pile. The
formula he gave is the
standard formula meant to
determine the capacity of a
reinforced concrete column
with loads and reaction at
each end and is not generally
applicable to piles which are
laterally supported
throughout its length and
with skin friction
capabilities. The capacity of a
pile, with length of 70 meters,
and at the project site, the soil
quality of which is described
in three soil investigation
reports, is normally
determined by skin friction
and point bearing
which Engr.Menguito merely
considered as factors of
safety. As admitted by him
during the hearing, he had no
mathematical or technical
basis for his conclusion, and
that the bored poles could
actually carry a load much
heavier than 800 tons.
xxxx
We found support for this
view from two recognized
authorities. The first is Peck,
Hanson
andThorburns Foundation
Engineering, in which it was
stated that a point bearing
pile is sometimes erroneously
regarded as a structural
member that transfers its load
like a column from the top of
the pile to the bottom where it
is delivered to the underlying
rock or soil. [At p. 182, a
photocopy of this page is
hereto attached as Annex
A] The second are
H.G. Poulos and E.H. Davis,
who in their book, Pile
Foundation, Analysis and
Design, set the general
equation for the ultimate
capacity of a pile. A photocopy
of the page where the
equation appeared is hereto
attached as Annex B] It is
clear from this equation that
the ultimate capacity of a pile
is dependent on skin friction
and end-bearing and not a
pile acting as a column. Other
that a pile driven in water or
on very soft soil, a pile is
laterally supported on its
entire length. Hence, it does
not act as a reinforced
concrete column subjects to
buckling. Because of the
above discussion, the Arbitral
Panel is of the opinion that the
test results were inconclusive
and did not truly measure the
capacity of the
piles. Engr. Menguitos use of
the result and his admission
that all the values for pile
capacities were simply based
on assumptions without any
or technical basis [t.s.n., pp.
113-116] seriously
undermines the value of his
recommendation to reduce
the capacity of the piles and
tends to give the impression
that this was an
accommodation to a client.
xxxx
AWARD
We find that:

[a] As admitted by New
World, claimant is entitled to
the balance of the contract
price amounting
to P6,326,318.72 and the cost
of approved change orders
amounting toP2,133,658.46
or the total amount
of P8,459,977.17.
[b] Since the foregoing is a
liquidated amount as due
from June 2, 1998, we
order New Worldto pay
claimant the foregoing
amount of P8,459,977.17 plus
interest at 6% per annum
fromJune 2, 1998. The amount
which has accrued as interest
from that date to December 2,
1998 isP253,799.32.
[c] Claimant is entitled to
payment for and hereby
order New World to pay
claimant the cost of additional
works consisting of the
removal of underground
obstructions and the conduct
of various tests ordered by
the latter amounting
to P8,366,336.55.
[d] Claimant is entitled to
payment for the installation of
34 sonic pipes in the amount
ofP157,681.16.
The foregoing amount to a
total of P17,237,794.20.
On the counterclaims, we find
for New World and order
claimant to pay it the
following amounts:
[a] P190,141.30 representing
the value of sonic pipes which
were defectively installed by
claimant;
[b] P1,000,000 as liquidated
damages for delay; and
[c] P5,347,268.90 as the cost
of the five [5] bored piles
which were found defective,
or the total amount
of P6,537,410.20.
All other claims and
counterclaims are dismissed.
After offsetting the amount
due claimant from respondent
and the amount due
respondent from claimant,
there is a balance
of P10,700,384. which New
World is hereby ordered to
pay claimant. This amount
shall earn interest at 6% per
annum from the date of this
award.
The arbitration fees and
expenses have been paid
initially on a pro rata basis. In
light of the findings above, no
change in the above sharing of
expenses is
warranted.[4] [Emphases ours]
Aggrieved by the Decision of the
CIAC, New World filed a Petition for Review of
the said decision before the Court of
Appeals. On 31 January 2000, the appellate court
rendered the assailed Decision. According to the
Court of Appeals:
But for one point, the appeal
lacks merit.
One. The pronouncements of
CIAC on the question of
whether the removal of
underground obstructions
was covered by the contract
between the parties are
evidently conclusions of
law. This is so because the
conclusions drawn by an
adjudicatory body from a set
of facts is a question of
law. (Pilar Development
Corporation v. IAC, 146 SCRA
215; Cunanan v. de Lazatin, 74
Phil. 719)Consequently, the
window for review is fully
open for this Court to examine
the correctness of said
conclusions.
Try as it might, this Court
cannot share the view of CIAC
that respondents November
21, 1996 proposals (Exhibit 7)
to exclude the removal of
underground obstructions
from the scope of work in the
contract (Exhibit A) and to
treat them as extra work was
impliedly admitted by
petitioner. CIACs conclusion
contravenes No. 9 of the
Terms of Reference (TOR)
reproduced above which
expressly states that such
proposals were refused by
respondent.
Neither can this Court go
along with CIAC in its
determination that said
proposals modified
respondents bid offer so that
when the contract was signed
without petitioner expressly
rejecting the proposals, the
same were deemed impliedly
accepted. The reasoning is
quite strained. The proposals
were made on November 21,
1996 while the contract was
signed on November 29,
1996. The contract was the
documentation of the
agreement between the
parties arising from
respondents bid and
petitioners award (Exhibit
5). When the parties signed
the contract which did not
contain the proposals, what
was logically implied was not
the acceptance of the
proposals but their
rejection. The proposals were
actually nothing more than
counter offers which were not
accepted and, therefore, did
not ripen into a perfected
agreement. (Art. 1319, Civil
Code).
But this Court fully agrees
with CIAC that the removal of
the underground obstructions
was covered by Clause 56.2 of
the General Conditions of the
Contract.
xxxx
It is clear to this Court that
petitioner did not agree with
respondents proposals but in
order to address the latters
concern about underground
obstructions, the parties
adopted Clause
56.2. Therefore, the
contractual rule governing
underground obstructions
was the above-quoted Clause
56.2.
But alas, respondent did not
comply with said
stipulation. Respondent did
not formally notify the
petitioner about the
underground obstruction that
it encountered, hence, the
petitioner did not conduct its
investigation to verify the
existence and nature of the
obstructions. The mechanism
for a modification of the
contract and an equitable
adjustment of the contract
price was not set in motion
through the fault of
respondent.
The vital question then is: For
its fault in not complying with
the steps provided for in the
above-quoted stipulation,
should respondent be left
alone to shoulder the heavy
cost of he removal of the
obstruction?
xxxx
It is not disputed that the
removal of the underground
obstructions was a major
work entailing additional
expense and extra working
time. The experts and CIAC
agreed that such work was
not covered by the scope of
work in the contract. That
determination is logical and
correct. Petitioners rejection
of this holding and its
insistence post factum that
such major work was
embraced in the scope of
work in the contract puts to
doubt its good faith and
fairness. This stance may be
perceived as taking advantage
of the imprudence of
respondent in not faithfully
observing the requirements of
Clause 56.2 above quoted.
To deny respondent any relief
for the expenses it incurred
and the extra time that it
spent in removing the
underground obstructions is
to allow the petitioner to
unjustly enrich itself at the
expense of the
respondent. That is anathema
to the great principle of
equity. When it becomes clear
as in this case that the
application to the law
insensu strictione would
result in patently unjust
juridical situation, a court of
justice which is also a court of
equity is called upon to
exercise
its equitas juridictio in order
to refine the rough edges of
the rules and avoid
injustice. The Code
Commission which drafted
the Civil Code justifies a resort
to equity stating beautifully
that every good law draws its
breath of life from morals,
from those principles written
with the words of fire in the
conscience of
man. Appropriately, these
guides for human conduct
should run as golden threads
through society, to the end
that law may approach its
supreme ideal which is the
sway and dominance of
justice. (Report of the Code
Commission, pp. 4041).
Inspired by such profound
pronouncements, this Court,
invoking its equity
jurisdiction and in order to
prevent unjust enrichment
and manifest injustice, holds
that respondent should be
accorded a relief. But then
respondent should not expect
for a full recovery of its claim
for it should realize that it had
been contractually negligent
not just once but several
times. The cost of the removal
of the underground
obstructions was
P8,025,836.37. This Court
allows respondent
aconcessional award of one-
half (1/2) of said amount
which is P4,012,918.18.
xxxx
Petitioner
protests CIACs lowering of the
amount of liquidated damages
due it from P7.2 million to P1
million on the justification
that petitioner did not suffer
any material
prejudice. This Court, rejects
petitioners protest. The
reasons not justCIACs finding
that petitioner did not suffer
material damage given by
the CIAC for reducing the
claimed liquidated damages
are clear, logical and
correct. The law gives a wide
degree of discretion to trial
courts and quasi-judicial
bodies to determine the
amount of damages
recoverable as long as there is
ample evidence to support the
same. In the absence of a clear
case of abuse of discretion, as
in the present case, there is no
reason for this Court to
unsettle CIACs determination
of the proper and
conscionable liquidated
damages due the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, this Court renders
judgment MODIFYING the
appealed Decision in this
wise:
I. FOR PETITIONER
The respondent Advanced
Foundation Construction
Systems Corporation is
hereby ordered to pay the
petitioner New World
Properties and Ventures, Inc.
the following:
1. Php190,141.30 representing the
value of sonic pipes which were
defectively installed by respondent;
2. Php1,000,000.00 as liquidated
damages for delay; and
3. Php5,347,268.90 as cost of the five
(5) bored piles which were found
defective, or a total amount of
P6,537,410.20.
II. FOR RESPONDENT:
The petitioner is hereby ordered to pay
the respondent the following:
1. Php8,459,977.17 as the sum of the
balance on the contract price
amounting to Php6,326,318.72 and cost
of approved change orders amounting
to Php2,133,658.46 plus six (6) percent
interest per annum on said total
amount (Php8,459,977.17) from June 2,
1998 until fully paid;
2. Php4,353,418.37 as cost of
additional works consisting of the
removal of the underground
obstructions and the cost of various
tests; and
3. Php157,681.16 as payment for the
installation of 34 sonic pipes. shall earn
six (6%) percent interest per annum
from the date of this decision.[5]
The Motion for Partial Reconsideration of both
parties having been denied, both New World and
AFCSC filed their respective Petitions for Review
before this Court.
The resolution of the instant case lies in
the determination of two pivotal issues, namely:
(1) Which between New World and AFCSC
should shoulder the expenses incurred for the
removal of the underground obstructions and
the conduct of the pile tests; and (2) Whether or
not AFCSC is liable for liquidated damages for its
failure to complete the construction work by 24
February 1997.
At this point, We find it necessary to
reiterate that our jurisprudence is replete with
the rule that findings of fact of quasi-judicial
bodies which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters,
are accorded not only with respect but even
finality if they are supported by substantial
evidence.[6] This is because there are certain
cases which require the expertise, specialized
skills, and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies because technical matters
or intricate questions of facts are involved.[7]
In the case at bar, it would seem that
the CIAC, in interpreting the contract covering
the construction work in the light of the facts
present in the case, was guided by the prevailing
practices in the construction industry. The
members of the three-man panel, all equipped
with considerable knowledge and training in the
field of engineering and significant experience in
construction industry arbitration, reconciled the
conflicting claims of both parties by applying
industry accepted practice with respect to the
treatment of removal of underground
obstructions and the conduct of pile
tests. According to the panel, the removal of
underground obstruction is a major item of work
and it cannot be understood as being subsumed
under the general heading miscellaneous and
should therefore be treated as extra work. With
respect to the pile tests, the CIAC stated that in
accordance with accepted industry practice, the
provisions in the contract only cover tests of
contractor-supplied materials and not tests on
finished products to see whether it can carry a
certain load.
In light of the ratiocination of the CIAC
that the removal of underground obstruction is a
major item of work and cannot merely be
contemplated as a miscellaneous item in a
construction bid and must therefore be
considered as extra work, We conclude that
there was nothing in the bid nor in the contract
explicitly discussing the obligations of both
parties in the event that the contractor will
encounter underground obstructions in the
project site and may be constrained to remove
the same.
However, there is a provision in the
contract that can be made applicable in the case
of underground obstructions, which the CIAC
and the Court of Appeals have correctly pointed
out, to wit:
56.2. Should the
Contractor encounter
subsurface or latent physical
conditions differing materially
from those indicated, or
unknown physical conditions
at the site of an unusual
nature differing materially
from those ordinarily
encountered and generally
recognized as inherent in the
work of character provided
for in the Contract, the
Owners Representative shall
be promptly notified of such
conditions before they are
disturbed. The Owners
Representative shall
thereupon promptly
investigate the conditions at
the site and if he finds that
they do so materially differ
and cause an increase or
decrease in the cost, or the
time required for
performance of the Contract,
an equitable adjustment will
be made and the Contract
modified in accordance with
existing laws on the matter or
as agreed upon the provided
for [sic] under the Contract.
The appellate court laid stress the fact
that AFCSC failed to comply with the stipulations
of the abovequoted provision. According to the
Court of Appeals, in failing to formally
notify New World regarding the underground
obstructions that it has encountered, AFCSC
failed to set in motion the mechanism for a
modification of the contract and the equitable
adjustment of the contract price. Thus, for such
negligence, the appellate court reduced the
original award of the CIAC to only one-half of the
cost of the removal of the underground
obstructions.
We do not agree. As explained by the
appellate court itself, the experts and CIAC have
agreed that the removal of the underground
obstructions was not covered by the scope of
work in the contract. It is not disputed though
that the same was a major work entailing
additional expenses and extra working
time. Neither was it denied that such major work
was indeed necessary for the successful
completion of the project. Indeed, to deny AFCSC
relief for the expenses it incurred in removing
said obstructions would result in allowing New
World to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of
AFCSC. Equity necessarily dictates that New
World be held liable for the expenses incurred
for the extra work conducted for its sole
benefit. Further, it cannot be said that New
World was not made aware of the existence of
the underground obstruction nor of the
additional expense that would be necessary for
its removal. As heretofore stated, AFCSC, on 21
November 1996, sent a proposal to New World
regarding the additional expenses that would be
incurred in the instance that the contractor shall
encounter underground obstructions; however,
New World never responded to said proposal
until 9 September 1997, when it informed AFCSC
of the rejection of said proposal or almost ten
(10) months after said proposal was first offered,
and after all the necessary extra work had been
accomplished.
Article 22 of the Civil Code which
embodies the
maxim, Nemo ex alteriusincommode debet lecuple
tari (no man ought to be made rich out of
anothers injury) states:
Art. 22. Every
person who through an act of
performance by another, or
any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of
something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same
to him.[8]
The above-quoted article is part of the chapter of
the Civil Code on Human Relations, the
provisions of which were formulated as basic
principles to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order, x x x designed to
indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience, x x x guides human
conduct [that] should run as golden threads
through society to the end that law may
approach its supreme ideal which is the sway
and dominance of justice.[9] Hence, to allow New
World to acquire the finished project at a price
far below its actual construction cost would
undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for
the bank to the prejudice of AFCSC. Such unjust
enrichment, as previously discussed, is not
allowed by law.[10]
AFCSC submitted proof before the CIAC
of the additional cost of manpower and
equipment usage for the removal of the
underground obstructions and other supporting
documents, the veracity of which was never
questioned by New World. In fact, New
World did not question the necessity of
removing the underground obstructions nor the
facts on the bases of which the claim for extra
work due to underground obstructions were
made. As found by the CIAC and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, the cost of the removal of the
underground obstructions
was P8,025,836.37. Beyond cavil, AFCSC is
entitled to full payment of the expenses incurred
for the removal of the underground obstructions.
As to the question of which between
AFCSC and New World should shoulder the
expenses for the pile tests, We uphold the ruling
of the CIAC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
that the pile tests conducted should be for the
account of New World in accordance with the
accepted practice in the construction
industry. We see no reason to disregard the
determination of the CIAC on this matter. This
being in accordance with the established
principle that determination of certain questions
of fact falling within the peculiar technical
expertise of an administrative agency, must be
accorded great respect, if not finality by this
Court. A long line of cases establish the basis rule
that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such
agencies.[11] Therefore, AFCSC is entitled to the
payment of the total amount
of P336,683.48 consisting of P157,681.15 for SO ORDERED.
sonic pipe installation; P104,002.33 for build up
of pile test cap; and P75,000.00 for crane rental.

Finally, with respect to the issue of

whether or not AFCSC is liable for liquidated
damages for its failure to complete the
construction work by the contract date of 24
February 1997, We agree with the findings of the
CIAC that AFCSC never sent notice to New World
regarding a request for extension of time to
finish the work despite the existence of
circumstances fairly entitling it to an extension
of the contract period. Thus,AFCSC, must bear
some consequences for the delay in the
completion of the project and for disregarding
the owners right to determine the length of
extension to be given to the contractor and to
consequently adjust the period to finish the extra
work.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated31 January
2000, which modified the Decision dated 8
December 1998 of the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission, is hereby MODIFIED in
that New World Properties and Ventures, Inc is
hereby ordered to pay Advanced Foundation
Construction Systems Corporation the following
amounts:

1. P8,025,836.37 as cost
of additional work
consisting of the
removal of the
underground
obstructions;
2. P336,683.48 as costs
for the various test
conducted consisting
ofP157,681.15 for sonic
pipe
installation; P104,002.3
3 for build up of pile test
cap; and P75,000.00 for
crane rental.

The remainder of the same Decision of

the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27155 May 18, 1978
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, RITA GUECO
TAPNIO, CECILIO GUECO and THE PHILIPPINE
AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC., respondents.
Medina, Locsin, Coruña, & Sumbillo for petitioner.
Manuel Lim & Associates for private respondents.
ANTONIO, J.:
Certiorari to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No.
34185, ordering petitioner, as third-party
defendant, to pay respondent Rita Gueco Tapnio,
as third-party plaintiff, the sum of P2,379.71,
plus 12% interest per annum from September
19, 1957 until the same is fully paid, P200.00
attorney's fees and costs, the same amounts
which Rita Gueco Tapnio was ordered to pay the
Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc.,
to be paid directly to the Philippine American
General Insurance Co., Inc. in full satisfaction of
the judgment rendered against Rita Gueco
Tapnio in favor of the former; plus P500.00
attorney's fees for Rita Gueco Tapnio and costs.
The basic action is the complaint filed by
Philamgen (Philippine American General
Insurance Co., Inc.) as surety against Rita Gueco
Tapnio and Cecilio Gueco, for the recovery of the
sum of P2,379.71 paid by Philamgen to the
Philippine National Bank on behalf of
respondents Tapnio and Gueco, pursuant to an
indemnity agreement. Petitioner Bank was made
third-party defendant by Tapnio and Gueco on
the theory that their failure to pay the debt was
due to the fault or negligence of petitioner.
The facts as found by the respondent Court of
Appeals, in affirming the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, are quoted hereunder:
Plaintiff executed its Bond, Exh. A, with
defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio as principal, in
favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch at
San Fernando, Pampanga, to guarantee the
payment of defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio's
account with said Bank. In turn, to guarantee the
payment of whatever amount the bonding
company would pay to the Philippine National
Bank, both defendants executed the indemnity
agreement, Exh. B. Under the terms and
conditions of this indemnity agreement,
whatever amount the plaintiff would pay would
earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum, plus
attorney's fees in the amount of 15 % of the
whole amount due in case of court litigation.
The original amount of the bond was for
P4,000.00; but the amount was later reduced to
P2,000.00.
It is not disputed that defendant Rita Gueco
Tapnio was indebted to the bank in the sum of
P2,000.00, plus accumulated interests unpaid,
which she failed to pay despite demands. The
Bank wrote a letter of demand to plaintiff, as per
Exh. C; whereupon, plaintiff paid the bank on
September 18, 1957, the full amount due and
owing in the sum of P2,379.91, for and on
account of defendant Rita Gueco's obligation
(Exhs. D and D-1).Plaintiff, in turn, made several
demands, both verbal and written, upon
defendants (Exhs. E and F), but to no avail.
Defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio admitted all the
foregoing facts. She claims, however, when
demand was made upon her by plaintiff for her
to pay her debt to the Bank, that she told the
Plaintiff that she did not consider herself to be
indebted to the Bank at all because she had an
agreement with one Jacobo-Nazon whereby she
had leased to the latter her unused export sugar
quota for the 1956-1957 agricultural year,
consisting of 1,000 piculs at the rate of P2.80 per
picul, or for a total of P2,800.00, which was
already in excess of her obligation guaranteed by
plaintiff's bond, Exh. A. This lease agreement,
according to her, was with the knowledge of the
bank. But the Bank has placed obstacles to the
consummation of the lease, and the delay caused
by said obstacles forced 'Nazon to rescind the
lease contract. Thus, Rita Gueco Tapnio filed her
third-party complaint against the Bank to
recover from the latter any and all sums of
money which may be adjudged against her and
in favor of the plaitiff plus moral damages,
attorney's fees and costs.
Insofar as the contentions of the parties herein
are concerned, we quote with approval the
following findings of the lower court based on
the evidence presented at the trial of the case:
It has been established during the trial that Mrs.
Tapnio had an export sugar quota of 1,000 piculs
for the agricultural year 1956-1957 which she
did not need. She agreed to allow Mr. Jacobo C.
Tuazon to use said quota for the consideration of
P2,500.00 (Exh. "4"-Gueco). This agreement was
called a contract of lease of sugar allotment.
At the time of the agreement, Mrs. Tapnio was
indebted to the Philippine National Bank at San
Fernando, Pampanga. Her indebtedness was
known as a crop loan and was secured by a
mortgage on her standing crop including her
sugar quota allocation for the agricultural year
corresponding to said standing crop. This
arrangement was necessary in order that when
Mrs. Tapnio harvests, the P.N.B., having a lien on
the crop, may effectively enforce collection
against her. Her sugar cannot be exported
without sugar quota allotment Sometimes,
however, a planter harvest less sugar than her
quota, so her excess quota is utilized by another
who pays her for its use. This is the arrangement
entered into between Mrs. Tapnio and Mr.
Tuazon regarding the former's excess quota for
1956-1957 (Exh. "4"-Gueco).
Since the quota was mortgaged to the P.N.B., the
contract of lease had to be approved by said
Bank, The same was submitted to the branch
manager at San Fernando, Pampanga. The latter
required the parties to raise the consideration of
P2.80 per picul or a total of P2,800.00 (Exh. "2-
Gueco") informing them that "the minimum lease
rental acceptable to the Bank, is P2.80 per picul."
In a letter addressed to the branch manager on
August 10, 1956, Mr. Tuazon informed the
manager that he was agreeable to raising the
consideration to P2.80 per picul. He further
informed the manager that he was ready to pay
said amount as the funds were in his folder
which was kept in the bank.
Explaining the meaning of Tuazon's statement as
to the funds, it was stated by him that he had an
approved loan from the bank but he had not yet
utilized it as he was intending to use it to pay for
the quota. Hence, when he said the amount
needed to pay Mrs. Tapnio was in his folder
which was in the bank, he meant and the
manager understood and knew he had an
approved loan available to be used in payment of
the quota. In said Exh. "6-Gueco", Tuazon also
informed the manager that he would want for a
notice from the manager as to the time when the
bank needed the money so that Tuazon could
sign the corresponding promissory note.
Further Consideration of the evidence discloses
that when the branch manager of the Philippine
National Bank at San Fernando recommended
the approval of the contract of lease at the price
of P2.80 per picul (Exh. 1 1-Bank), whose
recommendation was concurred in by the Vice-
president of said Bank, J. V. Buenaventura, the
board of directors required that the amount be
raised to 13.00 per picul. This act of the board of
directors was communicated to Tuazon, who in
turn asked for a reconsideration thereof. On
November 19, 1956, the branch manager
submitted Tuazon's request for reconsideration
to the board of directors with another
recommendation for the approval of the lease at
P2.80 per picul, but the board returned the
recommendation unacted upon, considering that
the current price prevailing at the time was
P3.00 per picul (Exh. 9-Bank).
The parties were notified of the refusal on the
part of the board of directors of the Bank to
grant the motion for reconsideration. The matter
stood as it was until February 22, 1957, when
Tuazon wrote a letter (Exh. 10-Bank informing
the Bank that he was no longer interested to
continue the deal, referring to the lease of sugar
quota allotment in favor of defendant Rita Gueco
Tapnio. The result is that the latter lost the sum
of P2,800.00 which she should have received
from Tuazon and which she could have paid the
Bank to cancel off her indebtedness,
The court below held, and in this holding we
concur that failure of the negotiation for the
lease of the sugar quota allocation of Rita Gueco
Tapnio to Tuazon was due to the fault of the
directors of the Philippine National Bank, The
refusal on the part of the bank to approve the
lease at the rate of P2.80 per picul which, as
stated above, would have enabled Rita Gueco
Tapnio to realize the amount of P2,800.00 which
was more than sufficient to pay off her
indebtedness to the Bank, and its insistence on
the rental price of P3.00 per picul thus
unnecessarily increasing the value by only a
difference of P200.00. inevitably brought about
the rescission of the lease contract to the damage
and prejudice of Rita Gueco Tapnio in the
aforesaid sum of P2,800.00. The
unreasonableness of the position adopted by the
board of directors of the Philippine National
Bank in refusing to approve the lease at the rate
of P2.80 per picul and insisting on the rate of
P3.00 per picul, if only to increase the retail
value by only P200.00 is shown by the fact that
all the accounts of Rita Gueco Tapnio with the
Bank were secured by chattel mortgage on
standing crops, assignment of leasehold rights
and interests on her properties, and surety
bonds, aside from the fact that from Exh. 8-Bank,
it appears that she was offering to execute a real
estate mortgage in favor of the Bank to replace
the surety bond This statement is further
bolstered by the fact that Rita Gueco Tapnio
apparently had the means to pay her obligation
fact that she has been granted several value of
almost P80,000.00 for the agricultural years
from 1952 to 56. 1
Its motion for the reconsideration of the decision
of the Court of Appeals having been denied,
petitioner filed the present petition.
The petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals erred:
(1) In finding that the rescission of the lease
contract of the 1,000 piculs of sugar quota
allocation of respondent Rita Gueco Tapnio by
Jacobo C. Tuazon was due to the unjustified
refusal of petitioner to approve said lease
contract, and its unreasonable insistence on the
rental price of P3.00 instead of P2.80 per picul;
and
(2) In not holding that based on the statistics of
sugar price and prices of sugar quota in the
possession of the petitioner, the latter's Board of
Directors correctly fixed the rental of price per
picul of 1,000 piculs of sugar quota leased by
respondent Rita Gueco Tapnio to Jacobo C.
Tuazon at P3.00 per picul.
Petitioner argued that as an assignee of the sugar
quota of Tapnio, it has the right, both under its
own Charter and under the Corporation Law, to
safeguard and protect its rights and interests
under the deed of assignment, which include the
right to approve or disapprove the said lease of
sugar quota and in the exercise of that authority,
its
Board of Directors necessarily had authority to
determine and fix the rental price per picul of the
sugar quota subject of the lease between private
respondents and Jacobo C. Tuazon. It argued
further that both under its Charter and the
Corporation Law, petitioner, acting thru its
Board of Directors, has the perfect right to adopt
a policy with respect to fixing of rental prices of
export sugar quota allocations, and in fixing the
rentals at P3.00 per picul, it did not act
arbitrarily since the said Board was guided by
statistics of sugar price and prices of sugar
quotas prevailing at the time. Since the fixing of
the rental of the sugar quota is a function lodged
with petitioner's Board of Directors and is a
matter of policy, the respondent Court of Appeals
could not substitute its own judgment for that of
said Board of Directors, which acted in good
faith, making as its basis therefore the prevailing
market price as shown by statistics which were
then in their possession.
Finally, petitioner emphasized that under the
appealed judgment, it shall suffer a great
injustice because as a creditor, it shall be
deprived of a just claim against its debtor
(respondent Rita Gueco Tapnio) as it would be
required to return to respondent Philamgen the
sum of P2,379.71, plus interest, which amount
had been previously paid to petitioner by said
insurance company in behalf of the principal
debtor, herein respondent Rita Gueco Tapnio,
and without recourse against respondent Rita
Gueco Tapnio.
We must advert to the rule that this Court's
appellate jurisdiction in proceedings of this
nature is limited to reviewing only errors of law,
accepting as conclusive the factual fin dings of
the Court of Appeals upon its own assessment of
the evidence. 2
The contract of lease of sugar quota allotment at
P2.50 per picul between Rita Gueco Tapnio and
Jacobo C. Tuazon was executed on April 17,
1956. This contract was submitted to the Branch
Manager of the Philippine National Bank at San
Fernando, Pampanga. This arrangement was
necessary because Tapnio's indebtedness to
petitioner was secured by a mortgage on her
standing crop including her sugar quota
allocation for the agricultural year
corresponding to said standing crop. The latter
required the parties to raise the consideration to
P2.80 per picul, the minimum lease rental
acceptable to the Bank, or a total of P2,800.00.
Tuazon informed the Branch Manager, thru a
letter dated August 10, 1956, that he was
agreeable to raising the consideration to P2.80
per picul. He further informed the manager that
he was ready to pay the said sum of P2,800.00 as
the funds were in his folder which was kept in
the said Bank. This referred to the approved loan
of Tuazon from the Bank which he intended to
use in paying for the use of the sugar quota. The
Branch Manager submitted the contract of lease
of sugar quota allocation to the Head Office on
September 7, 1956, with a recommendation for
approval, which recommendation was concurred
in by the Vice-President of the Bank, Mr. J. V.
Buenaventura. This notwithstanding, the Board
of Directors of petitioner required that the
consideration be raised to P3.00 per picul.
Tuazon, after being informed of the action of the
Board of Directors, asked for a reconsideration
thereof. On November 19, 1956, the Branch
Manager submitted the request for
reconsideration and again recommended the
approval of the lease at P2.80 per picul, but the
Board returned the recommendation unacted,
stating that the current price prevailing at that
time was P3.00 per picul.
On February 22, 1957, Tuazon wrote a letter,
informing the Bank that he was no longer
interested in continuing the lease of sugar quota
allotment. The crop year 1956-1957 ended and
Mrs. Tapnio failed to utilize her sugar quota,
resulting in her loss in the sum of P2,800.00
which she should have received had the lease in
favor of Tuazon been implemented.
It has been clearly shown that when the Branch
Manager of petitioner required the parties to
raise the consideration of the lease from P2.50 to
P2.80 per picul, or a total of P2,800-00, they
readily agreed. Hence, in his letter to the Branch
Manager of the Bank on August 10, 1956, Tuazon
informed him that the minimum lease rental of
P2.80 per picul was acceptable to him and that
he even offered to use the loan secured by him
from petitioner to pay in full the sum of
P2,800.00 which was the total consideration of
the lease. This arrangement was not only
satisfactory to the Branch Manager but it was
also approves by Vice-President J. V.
Buenaventura of the PNB. Under that
arrangement, Rita Gueco Tapnio could have
realized the amount of P2,800.00, which was
more than enough to pay the balance of her
indebtedness to the Bank which was secured by
the bond of Philamgen.
There is no question that Tapnio's failure to
utilize her sugar quota for the crop year 1956-
1957 was due to the disapproval of the lease by
the Board of Directors of petitioner. The issue,
therefore, is whether or not petitioner is liable
for the damage caused.
As observed by the trial court, time is of the
essence in the approval of the lease of sugar
quota allotments, since the same must be utilized
during the milling season, because any allotment
which is not filled during such milling season
may be reallocated by the Sugar Quota
Administration to other holders of
allotments. 3 There was no proof that there was
any other person at that time willing to lease the
sugar quota allotment of private respondents for
a price higher than P2.80 per picul. "The fact that
there were isolated transactions wherein the
consideration for the lease was P3.00 a picul",
according to the trial court, "does not necessarily
mean that there are always ready takers of said
price. " The unreasonableness of the position
adopted by the petitioner's Board of Directors is
shown by the fact that the difference between
the amount of P2.80 per picul offered by Tuazon
and the P3.00 per picul demanded by the Board
amounted only to a total sum of P200.00.
Considering that all the accounts of Rita Gueco
Tapnio with the Bank were secured by chattel
mortgage on standing crops, assignment of
leasehold rights and interests on her properties,
and surety bonds and that she had apparently
"the means to pay her obligation to the Bank, as
shown by the fact that she has been granted
several sugar crop loans of the total value of
almost P80,000.00 for the agricultural years
from 1952 to 1956", there was no reasonable
basis for the Board of Directors of petitioner to
have rejected the lease agreement because of a
measly sum of P200.00.
While petitioner had the ultimate authority of
approving or disapproving the proposed lease
since the quota was mortgaged to the Bank, the
latter certainly cannot escape its responsibility
of observing, for the protection of the interest of
private respondents, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand in approving or
disapproving the lease of said sugar quota. The Separate Opinions
law makes it imperative that every person "must
in the exercise of his rights and in the BARREDO, J., concurring:
performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith, 4 This petitioner failed to do. Certainly, it concurs on the basis of Article 19 of the Civil
knew that the agricultural year was about to Code, or at least, of equity. He reserves his
expire, that by its disapproval of the lease opinion on the matter of torts relied upon in the
main opinion.
private respondents would be unable to utilize
the sugar quota in question. In failing to observe
the reasonable degree of care and vigilance Separate Opinions
which the surrounding circumstances
reasonably impose, petitioner is consequently BARREDO, J., concurring:
liable for the damages caused on private
respondents. Under Article 21 of the New Civil
Code, "any person who wilfully causes loss or concurs on the basis of Article 19 of the Civil
Code, or at least, of equity. He reserves his
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall opinion on the matter of torts relied upon in the
main opinion.
compensate the latter for the damage." The
afore-cited provisions on human relations were
intended to expand the concept of torts in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy
for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically
provide in the statutes. 5
A corporation is civilly liable in the same manner
as natural persons for torts, because "generally
speaking, the rules governing the liability of a
principal or master for a tort committed by an
agent or servant are the same whether the
principal or master be a natural person or a
corporation, and whether the servant or agent be
a natural or artificial person. All of the
authorities agree that a principal or master is
liable for every tort which he expressly directs or
authorizes, and this is just as true of a
corporation as of a natural person, A corporation
is liable, therefore, whenever a tortious act is
committed by an officer or agent under express
direction or authority from the stockholders or
members acting as a body, or, generally, from the
directors as the governing body." 6
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Fernando, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ.,
concur.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198967, March 07, 2016
JOSE EMMANUEL P. GUILLERMO, Petitioner,
v. CRISANTO P. USON, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to annul and set aside the Court of
Appeals Decision1 dated June 8, 2011 and
Resolution2 dated October 7, 2011 in CA � G.R.
SP No. 115485, which affirmed in toto the
decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).
The facts of the case follow.
On March 11, 1996, respondent Crisanto P. Uson
(Uson) began his employment with Royal Class
Venture Phils., Inc. (Royal Class Venture) as an
accounting clerk.3 Eventually, he was promoted
to the position of accounting supervisor, with a
salary of Php13,000.00 a month, until he was
allegedly dismissed from employment on
December 20, 2000.4
On March 2, 2001, Uson filed with the Sub-
Regional Arbitration . Branch No. 1, Dagupan
City, of the NLRC a Complaint for Illegal
Dismissal, with prayers for backwages,
reinstatement, salaries and 13thmonth pay,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees against Royal Class Venture.5
Royal Class Venture did not make an appearance
in the case despite its receipt of summons.6
On May 15, 2001, Uson filed his Position
Paper7 as complainant.
On October 22, 2001, Labor Arbiter Jose G. De
Vera rendered a Decision8 in favor of the
complainant Uson and ordering therein
respondent Royal Class Venture to reinstate him
to his former position and pay his backwages,
13th month pay as well as moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
Royal Class Venture, as the losing party, did not
file an appeal of the decision.9 Consequently,
upon Uson's motion, a Writ of Execution10 dated
February 15, 2002 was issued to implement the
Labor Arbiter's decision.
On May 17, 2002, an Alias Writ of
Execution11 was issued. But with the judgment
still unsatisfied, a Second Alias Writ of
Execution12 was issued on September 11, 2002.
Again, it was reported in the Sheriff's Return that
the Second Alias Writ of Execution dated
September 11, 2002 remained "unsatisfied."
Thus, on November 14, 2002, Uson filed a Motion
for Alias Writ of Execution and to Hold Directors
and Officers of Respondent Liable for
Satisfaction of the Decision.13The motion quoted
from a portion of the Sheriffs Return, which
states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On September 12, 2002, the undersigned
proceeded at the stated present business office
address of the respondent which is at Minien
East, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan to serve the writ
of execution. Upon arrival, I found out that the
establishment erected thereat is not [in] the
respondent's name but JOEL and SONS
CORPORATION, a family corporation owned by
the Guillermos of which, Jose Emmanuel F.
Guillermo the General Manager of the
respondent, is one of the stockholders who
received the writ using his nickname "Joey," [and
who] concealed his real identity and pretended
that he [was] the brother of Jose, which [was]
contrary to the statement of the guard-on-duty
that Jose and Joey [were] one and the same
person. The former also informed the
undersigned that the respondent's (sic)
corporation has been dissolved.
On the succeeding day, as per [advice] by the
[complainant's] counsel that the respondent has
an account at the Bank of Philippine Islands
Magsaysay Branch, A.B. Fernandez Ave.,
Dagupan City, the undersigned immediately
served a notice of garnishment, thus, the bank
replied on the same day stating that the
respondent [does] not have an account with the
branch.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On December 26, 2002, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R.
Rimando issued an Order15 granting the motion
filed by Uson. The order held that officers of a
corporation are jointly and severally liable for
the obligations of the corporation to the
employees and there is no denial of due process
in holding them so even if the said officers were
not parties to the case when the judgment in
favor of the employees was rendered.16 Thus, the
Labor Arbiter pierced the veil of corporate
fiction of Royal Class Venture and held herein
petitioner Jose Emmanuel Guillermo (Guillermo),
in his personal capacity, jointly and severally
liable with the corporation for the enforcement
of the claims of Uson.17
Guillermo filed, by way of special appearance, a
Motion for Reconsideration/To Set Aside the
Order of December 26, 2002.18 The same,
however, was not granted as, this time, in an
Order dated November 24, 2003, Labor Arbiter
Ni� a Fe S. Lazaga-Rafols sustained the findings
of the labor arbiters before her and even
castigated Guillenno for his unexplained absence
in the prior proceedings despite notice,
effectively putting responsibility on Guillermo
for the case's outcome against him.19
On January 5, 2004, Guillermo filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the above Order,20 but the
same was promptly denied by the Labor Arbiter
in an Order dated January 7, 2004.21
On January 26, 2004, Uson filed a Motion for
Alias Writ of Execution,22 to which Guillermo
filed a Comment and Opposition on April 2,
2004.23
On May 18, 2004, the Labor Arbiter issued an
Order24 granting Uson's Motion for the Issuance
of an Alias Writ of Execution and rejecting
Guillermo's arguments posed in his Comment
and Opposition.
Guillermo elevated the matter to the NLRC by
filing a Memorandum of Appeal with Prayer for a
(Writ of) Preliminary Injunction dated June 10,
2004.25cralawred
In a Decision26 dated May 11, 2010, the NLRC
dismissed Guillermo's appeal and denied his
prayers for injunction.
On August 20, 2010, Guillermo filed a Petition
for Certiorari27 before the Court of Appeals,
assailing the NLRC decision.
On June 8, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered
its assailed Decision28 which denied Guillermo's
petition and upheld all the findings of the NLRC.
The appellate court found that summons was in
fact served on Guillermo as President and
General Manager of Royal Class Venture, which
was how the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction
over the company.29 But Guillermo subsequently
refused to receive all notices of hearings and
conferences as well as the order to file Royal
Class Venture's position paper.30 Then, it was
learned during execution that Royal Class
Venture had been dissolved.31 However, the
Court of Appeals held that although the
judgment had become final and executory, it may
be modified or altered "as when its execution
becomes impossible or unjust."32 It also noted
that the motion to hold officers and directors like
Guillermo personally liable, as well as the notices
to hear the same, was sent to them by registered
mail, but no pleadings were submitted and no
appearances were made by anyone of them
during the said motion's pendency.33 Thus, the
court held Guillermo liable, citing jurisprudence
that hold the president of the corporation liable
for the latter's obligation to illegally dismissed
employees.34 Finally, the court dismissed
Guillermo's allegation that the case is an intra-
corporate controversy, stating that jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations in the complaint
and the character of the relief sought.35
From the above decision of the appellate court,
Guillermo filed a Motion for
Reconsideration36 but the same was again
denied by the said court in the assailed
Resolution37 dated October 7, 2011.
Hence, the instant petition.
Guillermo asserts that he was impleaded in the
case only more than a year after its Decision had
become final and executory, an act which he
claims to be unsupported in law and
jurisprudence.38 He contends that the decision
had become final, immutable and unalterable
and that any amendment thereto is null and
void.39 Guillermo assails the so-called "piercing
the veil" of corporate fiction which allegedly
discriminated against him when he alone was
belatedly impleaded despite the existence of
other directors and officers in Royal Class
Venture.40 He also claims that the Labor Arbiter
has no jurisdiction because the case is one of an
intra-corporate controversy, with the
complainant Uson also claiming to be a
stockholder and director of Royal Class
Venture.41
In his Comment,42 Uson did not introduce any
new arguments but merely cited verbatim the
disquisitions of the Court of Appeals to counter
Guillermo's assertions in his petition.
To resolve the case, the Court must confront the
issue of whether an officer of a corporation may
be included as judgment obligor in a labor case
for the first time only after the decision of the
Labor Arbiter had become final and executory,
and whether the twin doctrines of "piercing the
veil of corporate fiction" and personal liability of
company officers in labor cases apply.
The petition is denied.
In the earlier labor cases of Claparols v. Court of
Industrial Relations43 and A.C. Ransom Labor
Union-CCLU v. NLRC,44 persons who were not
originally impleaded in the case were, even
during execution, held to be solidarity liable with
the employer corporation for the latter's unpaid
obligations to complainant-employees. These
included a newly-formed corporation which was
considered a mere conduit or alter ego of the
originally impleaded corporation, and/or the
officers or stockholders of the latter
corporation.45 Liability attached, especially to the
responsible officers, even after final judgment
and during execution, when there was a failure
to collect from the employer corporation the
judgment debt awarded to its
workers.46 In Naguiat v. NLRC,47 the president of
the corporation was found, for the first time on
appeal, to be solidarily liable to the dismissed
employees. Then, in Reynoso v. Court of
Appeals,48 the veil of corporate fiction was
pierced at the stage of execution, against a
corporation not previously impleaded, when it
was established that such corporation had
dominant control of the original party
corporation, which was a smaller company, in
such a manner that the latter's closure was done
by the former in order to defraud its creditors,
including a former worker.
The rulings of this Court in A.C. Ransom, Naguiat,
and Reynoso, however, have since been
tempered, at least in the aspects of the lifting of
the corporate veil and the assignment of
personal liability to directors, trustees and
officers in labor cases. The subsequent cases
of McLeod v. NLRC,49Spouses Santos v.
NLRC50 and Carag v. NLRC,51 have all established,
save for certain exceptions, the primacy of
Section 3152 of the Corporation Code in the
matter of assigning such liability for a
corporation's debts, including judgment
obligations in labor cases. According to these
cases, a corporation is still an artificial being
invested by law with a personality separate and
distinct from that of its stockholders and from
that of other corporations to which it may be
connected.53 It is not in every instance of
inability to collect from a corporation that the
veil of corporate fiction is pierced, and the
responsible officials are made liable. Personal
liability attaches only when, as enumerated by
the said Section 31 of the Corporation Code,
there is a wilfull and knowing assent to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation, there is gross
negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of
the corporation, or there is a conflict of interest
resulting in damages to the
corporation.54 Further, in another labor
case,Pantranco Employees Association (PEA-
PTGWO), et al. v. NLRC, et al.,55 the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil is held to apply only
in three (3) basic areas, namely: ( 1) defeat of
public convenience as when the corporate fiction
is used as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing
obligation; (2) fraud cases or when the corporate
entity is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or
defend a crime; or (3)alter ego cases, where a
corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere
alter ego or business conduit of a person, or
where the corporation is so organized and
controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to
make it merely an instrumentality, agency,
conduit or adjunct of another corporation. In the
absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific
provision of law making a corporate officer
liable, such corporate officer cannot be made
personally liable for corporate
liabilities.56 Indeed, in Reahs Corporation v.
NLRC,57 the conferment of liability on officers for
a corporation's obligations to labor is held to be
an exception to the general doctrine of separate
personality of a corporation.
It also bears emphasis that in cases where
personal liability attaches, not even all officers
are made accountable. Rather, only the
"responsible officer," i.e., the person directly
responsible for and who "acted in bad faith" in
committing the illegal dismissal or any act
violative of the Labor Code, is held solidarily
liable, in cases wherein the corporate veil is
pierced.58 In other instances, such as cases of so-
called corporate tort of a close corporation, it is
the person "actively engaged" in the
management of the corporation who is held
liable.59 In the absence of a clearly identifiable
officer(s) directly responsible for the legal
infraction, the Court considers the president of
the corporation as such officer.60
The common thread running among the
aforementioned cases, however, is that the veil
of corporate fiction can be pierced, and
responsible corporate directors and officers or
even a separate but related corporation, may be
impleaded and held answerable solidarily in a
labor case, even after final judgment and on
execution, so long as it is established that such
persons have deliberately used the corporate
vehicle to unjustly evade the judgment
obligation, or have resorted to fraud, bad faith or
malice in doing so. When the shield of a separate
corporate identity is used to commit wrongdoing
and opprobriously elude responsibility, the
courts and the legal authorities in a labor case
have not hesitated to step in and shatter the said
shield and deny the usual protections to the
offending party, even after final judgment. The
key element is the presence of fraud, malice or
bad faith. Bad faith, in this instance, does not
connote bad judgment or negligence but imports
a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a
known duty through some motive or interest or
ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.61
As the foregoing implies, there is no hard and
fast rule on when corporate fiction may be
disregarded; instead, each case must be
evaluated according to its peculiar
circumstances.62 For the case at bar, applying the
above criteria, a finding of personal and solidary
liability against a corporate officer like Guillermo
must be rooted on a satisfactory showing of
fraud, bad
faith or malice, or the presence of any of the
justifications for disregarding the corporate
fiction. As stated in McLeod,63 bad faith is a
question of fact and is evidentiary, so that the
records must first bear evidence of malice before
a finding of such may be made.
It is our finding that such evidence exists in the
record. Like the A. C. Ransom, and Naguiat cases,
the case at bar involves an apparent family
corporation. As in those two cases, the records of
the present case bear allegations and evidence
that Guillermo, the officer being held liable, is the
person responsible in the actual running of the
company and for the malicious and illegal
dismissal of the complainant; he, likewise, was
shown to have a role in dissolving the original
obligor company in an obvious "scheme to avoid
liability" which jurisprudence has always looked
upon with a suspicious eye in order to protect
the rights of labor.64
Part of the evidence on record is the second page
of the verified Position Paper of complainant
(herein respondent) Crisanto P. Uson, where it
was clearly alleged that Uson was "illegally
dismissed by the President/General Manager of
respondent corporation (herein petitioner) Jose
Emmanuel P. Guillermo when Uson exposed the
practice of the said President/General Manager
of dictating and undervaluing the shares of stock
of the corporation."65 The statement is proof that
Guillermo was the responsible officer in charge
of running the company as well as the one who
dismissed Uson from employment. As this sworn
allegation is uncontroverted - as neither the
company nor Guillermo appeared before the
Labor Arbiter despite the service of summons
and notices - such stands as a fact of the case,
and now functions as clear evidence of
Guillermo's bad faith in his dismissal of Uson
from employment, with the motive apparently
being anger at the latter's reporting of unlawful
activities.
Then, it is also clearly reflected in the records
that it was Guillermo himself, as President and
General Manager of the company, who received
the summons to the case, and who also
subsequently and without justifiable cause
refused to receive all notices and orders of the
Labor Arbiter that followed.66This makes
Guillermo responsible for his and his company's
failure to participate in the entire proceedings
before the said office. The fact is clearly narrated
in the Decision and Orders of the Labor Arbiter,
Uson's Motions for the Issuance of Alias Writs of
Execution, as well as in the Decision of the NLRC
and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals,67 which Guillermo did not dispute in
any of his belated motions or pleadings,
including in his petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals and even in the petition
currently before this Court.68 Thus, again, the
same now stands as a finding of fact of the said
lower tribunals which binds this Court and
which it has no power to alter or
revisit.69Guillermo's knowledge of the case's
filing and existence and his unexplained refusal
to participate in it as the responsible official of
his company, again is an indicia of his bad faith
and malicious intent to evade the judgment of
the labor tribunals.
Finally, the records likewise bear that Guillermo
dissolved Royal Class Venture and helped
incorporate a new firm, located in the same
address as the former, wherein he is again a
stockl1older. This is borne by the Sherif11s
Return which reported: that at Royal Class
Venture's business address at Minien East, Sta.
Barbara, Pangasinan, there is a new maliciously and illegally dismissed as an
establishment named "Joel and Sons Accounting Supervisor by Guillermo, the
Corporation," a family corporation owned by the Company President and General Manager, an
Guillermos in which Jose Emmanuel F. Guillermo allegation that was not even disputed by the
is again one of the stockholders; that Guillermo latter nor by Royal Class Venture. It raised no
received the writ of execution but used the intra-corporate relationship issues between him
nickname "Joey" and denied being Jose and the corporation or Guillermo; neither did it
Emmanuel F. Guillermo and, instead, pretended raise any issue regarding the regulation of the
to be Jose's brother; that the guard on duty corporation. As correctly found by the appellate
confirmed that Jose and Joey are one and the court, Uson's complaint and redress sought were
same person; and that the respondent centered alone on his dismissal as an employee,
corporation Royal Class Venture had been and not upon any other relationship he had with
dissolved.70 Again, the facts contained in the the company or with Guillermo. Thus, the matter
Sheriffs Return were not disputed nor is clearly a labor dispute cognizable by the labor
controverted by Guillermo, either in the hearings tribunals.chanrobleslaw
of Uson's Motions for Issuance of Alias Writs of
Execution, in subsequent motions or pleadings, WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court
or even in the petition before this Court. of Appeals Decision dated June 8, 2011 and
Essentially, then, the facts form part of the Resolution dated October 7, 2011 in CA� G.R.
records and now stand as further proof of
SP No. 115485 are AFFIRMED.
Guillermo's bad faith and malicious intent to
evade the judgment obligation.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
The foregoing clearly indicate a pattern or
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Perez, Reyes,
scheme to avoid the obligations to Uson and
and Jardeleza, JJ.,
frustrate the execution of the judgment award,
concur.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
which this Court, in the interest of justice, will
not countenance.
As for Guillermo's assertion that the case is an
intra-corporate controversy, the Court sustains
the finding of the appellate court that the nature
of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are
determined by the allegations of the complaint at
the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein.71 Although
Uson is also a stockholder and director of Royal
Class Venture, it is settled in jurisprudence that
not all conflicts between a stockholder and the
corporation are intra-corporate; an examination
of the complaint must be made on whether the
complainant is involved in his capacity as a
stockholder or director, or as an employee.72 If
the latter is found and the dispute does not meet
the test of what qualities as an intra-� corporate
controversy, then the case is a labor case
cognizable by the NLRC and is not within the
jurisdiction of any other tribunal.73 In the case at
bar, Uson's allegation was that he was
Republic of the Philippines net earnings of Roberto Luna, In G.R. No. 57362, the petition for review of Jose It thus appears that the
SUPREME COURT P12,000.00 as compensatory and Luis dela Rosa was denied for lack of merit questions in esse are with
Manila damages, and P50,000.00 for on October 5, 1981. Subsequently, they informed respect to the award for
the loss of his companionship, that the decision sought to be reviewed was not unearned net earnings —
SECOND DIVISION with legal interest from the yet final because the Lunas had a pending should the award be
date of this decision; plus motion for reconsideration. For prematurity, this P450,000.00 only or should it
attorney's fees in the sum of Court set aside all previous resolutions. On be P1,650,000.00 as originally
G.R. No. L-62988 February 28, 1985 P50,000.00, and the costs of February 16, 1983, acting upon the motion and adjudged; and whether the
suit. (Record on Appeal, p. manifestation of the petitioners, they were award for attorney's fees shall
FELINA RODRIGUEZ-LUNA, JOSE R. LUNA and 35.) required to file an amended petition within also be with interest at the
ROBERTO R. LUNA, JR., petitioners, thirty days from notice. On June 20, 1983, this legal rate.
vs. The defendants appealed to the defunct Court of Court resolved: "For failure of the petitioners to
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE Appeals which in a decision dated May 22, 1979, file an amended petition as required, this case is The Court takes notice that
COURT, JOSE E. DELA ROSA and LUIS DELA affirmed in toto that of the trial court. (Rollo, p. hereby DISMISSED and the dismissal is final." the wrongful death occurred
ROSA,respondents. 48.) However, upon a motion for reconsideration as early as January 18, 1970,
filed by the defendants-appellants, the Court of The instant case — G.R. No. 62988 — is the and that until now the process
Ezequiel S. Consulta for petitioners. Appeals, in a resolution dated June 19, 1981, separate appeal of the Lunas. Their petition of litigation is not yet over. In
modified its judgment thus: contains the following prayer: the meantime the value of the
David M. Castro for respondents. Philippine peso has been
WHEREFORE, the decision 1. That the petition be given seriously eroded so that the
rendered in this case is due course; heirs of the deceased may
hereby modified insofar as the ultimately have a greatly
judgment ordering the depreciated judgment. In the
ABAD SANTOS, J.: 2. That after notice and interest of justice, the private
defendants to pay, jointly and hearing, judgment be
severally, the sum of P respondents are hereby
rendered, setting aside or ordered to PAY to the
This is a petition to review a decision of the 1,650,000.00 to plaintiffs with modifying the RESOLUTION of
defunct Court of Appeals. The petitioners are the legal interest from July 5, petitioners within thirty (30)
respondent Court of Appeals days from notice the following
heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a 1973, is concerned. In lieu dated June 19, 1981, attached
vehicular collision. The collision took place on thereof, defendants are amounts adjudged against
as Annex "A" to the petition, them: P450,000.00 for
January 18, 1970, at the go-kart practice area in hereby ordered to pay only insofar as it reduced the
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. Those plaintiffs, jointly and unearned net earnings of the
unearned net earnings to deceased; (P12,000.00 as
involved were the go-kart driven by the severally, the sum of Four P450,000.00, s• as to affirm
deceased, a business executive, and a Toyota car Hundred Fifty Thousand compensatory damages;
the trial court's finding as to P50,000.00 for the loss of his
driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years Pesos (P450,000.00) as the unearned net earnings of
who had no driver's license. unearned net earnings of companionship with legal
the deceased in the amount of interest from July 3, 1973; and
Roberto R. Luna, with legal P1,650,000.00;
interest thereon from the date P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
In a suit for damages brought by the heirs of
Roberto R. Luna against Luis dela Rosa and his of the filing of the complaint
until the whole amount shall 3. Ordering that the award of Still to be resolved shall be the
father Jose dela Rosa, the Court of First Instance attorney's fees shall also be
of Manila in Civil Case No. 81078, rendered the have been totally paid. following: whether the award
with interest, at the legal rate. for unearned net earnings
following judgment: (Rollo, p. 27.)
The rest of the other shall be increased to
dispositions in the judgment a P1,650,000.00; and whether
WHEREFORE, judgment is On June 27, 1983, the petition was given due the award for attorney's fees
hereby rendered sentencing quo stand. (Rollo, pp. 33-34.)
course. (Rollo, pp. 122-123.) shall also be with interest at
the defendants Luis dela Rosa the legal rate. The costs will
and Jose dela Rosa to pay, Both parties filed separate petitions for review of be adjudged as a matter of
jointly and severally, to the the appellate court's decision. In the light of the foregoing, the resolution
stated: course. (Rollo, p. 123.)
plaintiffs the sum of
P1,650,000.00 as unearned
The private respondents failed to pay the
amounts and when required to explain they said
that they had no cash money. Accordingly, this
Court directed the trial court to issue a writ of
execution but the attempt of the special sheriff to
enter the private respondent's premises so that
he could make an inventory of personal
properties was thwarted by guards and this
Court had to direct the Chief of the Philippine
Constabulary to assist in enforcing the writ of
execution. The execution yielded only a nominal
amount. In the meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now
of age, married with two children, and living in
Madrid, Spain with an uncle but only casually
employed. It is said: "His compensation is hardly
enough to support his family. He has no assets of
his own as yet." (Rollo, p. 208.)
1. On the amount of the award.
The award of P1,650,000.00 was based on two
factors, namely: (a) that the deceased Roberto R.
Luna could have lived for 30 more years; and (b)
that his annual net income was P55,000.00,
computed at P75,000.00 annual gross income
less P20,000.00 annual personal expenses.
This is what the trial court said on Luna's life
expectancy:
According to the American
Experience Table of Mortality,
at age 33 the life expectancy
of Roberto Luna was 33.4
years, and under the
Commissioner Standard
Ordinary, used by our
domestic insurance
companies since 1968 for
policies above P5,000.00 his
life expectancy was 38.51
years. Dr. Vicente Campa,
medical director of San Miguel
Corporation, testified that he
was the regular physician of
Roberto Luna since his
marriage to Felina Rodriguez
in 1957. He said that except
for a slight anemia which he
had ten years earlier, Roberto
Luna was of good health.
Allowing for this condition, he
could reasonably expect to
have a life expectancy of 30
years. (Record on Appeal, p.
33.)
The Court of Appeals in sustaining the trial
court's conclusion said:
We have not been persuaded
to disturb the conclusion that
the deceased had a life
expectancy of thirty years. At
the time of Luna's death, he
was only thirty-three years
old and in the best of health.
With his almost perfect
physical condition and his
sound mind, the expectation
that he could have lived for
another thirty years is
reasonable, considering that
with his educational
attainment, his social and
financial standing, he had the
means of staying fit and
preserving his health and
well-being. That he could have
lived at least until the age of
sixty-three years is an
assessment which is more on
the conservative side in view
of the testimony of Dr. Vicente
Campa that the general life
expectancy nowadays had
gone up to seventy years.
(Rollo, p. 45.)
The Court of Appeals likewise sustained the trial
court in respect of Luna's annual income and
expense. This is what the trial court said:
Roberto Luna was 33 years
old when he died, and was
survived by his wife Felina
Rodriguez-Luna, and two
children, Roberto Jr., 13 years,
and Jose, 12 years. His wife
was 35 years old at the time.
He declared a gross income of
P16,900.00 for 1967 (Exhibit
I), P29,700,000 for 1968
(Exhibit H) and P45,117.69
for 1969 (Exhibit G). He had
investments in various
corporations amounting to
P136,116.00 (Exhibits K, M,
M-1, N, N-1 to N-3, O, O-1, P, Q
and R) and was the president
and general manager of
Rodlum Inc.; general manager
of Esso Greenhills Service
Center; Assistant manager of
Jose Rodriguez Lanuza Sons;
director of Steadfast
Investment Corporation;
chairman and treasurer of
Greenhills Industrial
Corporation; vice-president of
Oasis, Inc.; director of Nation
Savings Association; director
of Arlun Taxi; and treasurer of
National Association of
Retired Civil Employees.
... . His income tax returns
show an increase in his
income in the short period of
three years. It is reasonable to
expect that it would still go
higher for the next fifteen
years and reach a minimum of
P75,000.00 a year. The
potential increase in the
earning capacity of a deceased
person is recognized by the
Supreme Court. ... the court
believes that the expected
gross earnings of Roberto
Luna should be fixed in the
sum of P75,000.00 a year for
the period of his life
expectancy of 30 years, but
deducting his personal
expenses which, because of
his business and social
standing the court in the
amount of P20,000.00 a year,
in accordance with the rulings
of the Supreme Court. (Record
on Appeal, pp. 32-34.)
Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by
the dela Rosas, the Court of Appeals took into
account the fact "that the deceased Roberto R.
Luna had been engaged in car racing as a sport,
having participated in tournaments both here
and abroad;" it said that Luna's habit and
manner of life should be "one of the factors
affecting the value of mortality table in actions
for damages;" and, consequently, concluded that
Luna could not have lived beyond 43 years. The
result was that the 30-year life expectancy of
Luna was reduced to 10 years only.
Further on the motion for reconsideration, the
Court of Appeals ruled in respect of Luna's
annual personal expenses:
... . Considering the escalating
price of automobile gas which
is a key expenditure in
Roberto R. Luna's social
standing, We should increase
that amount to P30,000.00 as
the would be personal
expenses of the deceased per
annum. (Rollo, p. 33.)
The Court of Appeals then determined the
amount of the award thus: P75,000.00 annual
gross income less P30,000.00 annual personal
expenses leaves P45,000.00 multiplied by 10
years of life expectancy and the product is
P450,000.00.
The petitioners contend that the Court of
Appeals erred when by its resolution of June 19,
1981, it reduced Luna's life expectancy from 30
to 10 Years and increased his annual personal
expenses from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00. We
sustain the petitioners.
The Court of Appeals, in reducing Luna's life
expectancy from 30 to 10 years said that his
habit and manner of life should be taken into
account, i.e. that he had been engaged in car
racing as a sport both here and abroad - a
dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten
his life expectancy. That Luna had engaged in car
racing is not based on any evidence on record.
That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the
correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot
be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts
are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles,
only slightly larger than foot-pedalled four
wheeled conveyances. It was error on the part of
the Court of Appeals to have disturbed the
determination of the trial court which it had
previously affirmed.
Similarly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to
reduce the net annual income of the deceased by
increasing his annual personal expenses but
without at the same time increasing his annual
gross income. It stands to reason that if his
annual personal expenses should increase
because of the "escalating price of gas which is a
key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social
standing" [a statement which lacks complete
basis], it would not be unreasonable to suppose
that his income would also increase considering
the manifold sources thereof.
In short, the Court of Appeals erred in modifying
its original decision.
2. Attorney's fees — with or without interest at
the legal rate.
The trial court awarded attorney's fees to the
petitioners in the sum of P50,000.00. This award
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its
decision of May 22, 1979. The resolution of June
19, 1981, reaffirmed the award. The two
decisions as well as the resolution do not provide
for interest at the legal rate to be tacked to the
award.
The petitioners now pray that the award of
attorney's fees be with interest at the legal rate
from the date of the filing of the complaint. There
is merit in this prayer. The attorney's fees were
awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-
delict case and under the circumstances interest
as part thereof may be adjudicated at the
discretion of the court. (See Art. 2211, Civil
Code.) As with the other damages awarded, the
interest should accrue only from the date of the
trial court's decision.
The private respondents invoke Elcano vs. Hill, L-
24803, May 26,1977; 77 SCRA 98, where it was
held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code applied to
Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald Hill, his
son but since Reginald had attained age, as a
matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill had
become merely subsidiary to that of his son. It is
now said that Luis dela Rosa, is now married and
of legal age and that as a matter of equity the
liability of his father should be subsidiary only.
We are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict
law in this case because to do so will not serve
the ends of justice. Luis dela Rosa is abroad and
beyond the reach of Philippine courts. Moreover,
he does not have any property either in the
Philippines or elsewhere. In fact his earnings are
insufficient to support his family.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated June 19, 1981, is hereby set aside;
its decision dated May 22, 1979, is reinstated
with the sole modification that the award for
attorney's fees shall earn interest at the legal
rate from July 5, 1973, the date of the trial
court's decision. Costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Gutierrez, Jr. and De la
Fuente, * JJ., concur.
Makasiar (Chairman), J., I reserve my vote.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22253 July 30, 1971
LINDAY PALEYAN, for her own and behalf of
her Minor children, namely: TERESA,
FORTUNATO, VENANCIO and JOSE, all
surnamed PALEYAN, plaintiff-appellants,
vs.
CARLOS BANGKILI and VICTORIA BANGKILI
alias CUYOYAN, defendants-appellees.
Felix T. Diaz, Jr. for plaintiffs-appellants.
Apolonio Barrera for defendants-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Plaintiffs are the widow and children of Balos
Paleyan, who was killed by defendant Carlos
Bangkili. At the time of the commission of the
offense Carlos Bangkili, a minor of 19 years, was
living with his mother, defendant Victoria
Bangkili. As a result of the death of Balos Paleyan
and of the wounding of another victim, Carlos
Bangkili was accused of the crime of homicide
with less serious physical injuries in Criminal
Case No. 898 of the Court of First Instance of
Mountain Province. On November 21, 1960,
upon his plea of guilty, he was sentenced
accordingly, but the decision made no
pronouncement as to the civil indemnity which
should be paid to the heirs of the deceased. On
April 3, 1961 the plaintiffs filed the present
action for damages against Carlos Bangkili and
his mother, Victoria Bangkili.
After trial the court a quo rendered its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
Court hereby orders the
dismissal of the complaint
against the defendant Victoria
Bangkili and renders
judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the
defendant Carlos Bangkili and
ordering said defendant, to:
(1) Pay the plaintiffs the sum
of P6,000.00 as indemnity for
the death of Balos Paleyan;
(2) Pay the plaintiffs the sum
of P1,000.00 as moral
damages;
(3) Pay the plaintiffs the sum
of P500.00 for the amount of
expenses incurred;
(4) Pay the plaintiffs the sum
of P500.00 as attorney's fees;
and
(5) Pay the costs.
In dismissing the complaint against Victoria
Bangkili the trial court held that under Article
101 of the Revised Penal Code Victoria Bangkili
could not be held civilly liable for the criminal
act of her minor son, who was already 19 years
of age at the time he committed the offense; and
that Article 2180 of the New Civil Code was not
applicable for it covers only obligations arising
from quasi-delicts and not to those arising from
crimes. The plaintiffs moved to reconsider the
dismissal of the complaint as against defendant
Victoria Bangkili, and upon denial of the motion
instituted the instant appeal.
The judgment as against Carlos Bangkili is not
now questioned. Neither of the parties has
appealed therefrom. The liability of the said
defendant is therefore a closed matter. The only
issue upon which both the appellants and the
appellee have submitted this case is whether or
not the latter, as the mother of Carlos who had
him in her custody at the time he committed the
offense, should be adjudged liable with him for
the amount which he was sentenced to pay,
considering that he was then a minor of 19 years.
The issue is not of first impression. It has been
resolved in the cases of Exconde vs. Capuno, 101
Phil. 843;Araneta vs. Arreglado, 104 Phil.
529; Fuellas vs. Cadano, No.
L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961; and Salen, et al. vs. Balce,
107 Phil. 748. In this last-mentioned case the
defendant Balce, father of Gumersindo Balce, a
minor of less than 18 years who was living with
him, was sued on his subsidiary liability for the
civil indemnity adjudged in the criminal case for
homicide wherein Gumersindo had been found
guilty. The trial court dismissed the case, stating
that the subsidiary civil liability of the defendant
must be determined under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, and not under Article 2180
of the New Civil Code. In reversing the decision
this Court, thru Mr. Justice Bautista Angelo, held:
It is true that under Article
101 of the Revised Penal
Code, a father is made civily
liable for the acts committed
by his son only if the latter is
an imbecile, an insane, under
9 years of age, or over 9 but
under 15 years of age, who
acts without discernment,
unless it appears that there is
no fault or negligence on his
part. This is because a son
who commits the act under
any of those conditions is by
law exempt from criminal
liability (Article 12,
subdivisions 1, 2 and 3,
Revised Penal Code). The idea
is not to leave the act entirely
unpunished but to attach
certain civil liability to the
person who has the
delinquent minor under his
legal authority or control. But
a minor over 15 who acts with
discernment is not exempt
from criminal liability, for
which reason the Code is
silent as to the subsidiary
liability of his parents should
he stand convicted. In that
case, resort should be had to
the general law which is our
Civil Code.
The particular law that
governs this case is Article
2180, the pertinent portion of
which provides: "The father
and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for damages
caused by the minor children
who live in their company."
To hold that this provision
does not apply to the instant
case because it only covers
obligations which arise from
quasi-delicts and not
obligations which arise from
criminal offenses, would
result in the absurdity that
while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the
father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the
damage caused by his or her
son, no liability would attach
if the damage is caused with
criminal intent. Verily, the
void that apparently exists in
the Revised Penal Code is
subserved by this particular
provision of our Civil Code, as
may be gleaned from some
recent decisions of this court
which cover equal or identical
cases.
While the decision just cited referred to the
subsidiary liability of the father whose son had
been sentenced to pay civil indemnity in the
criminal case, the reasons given by this Court in
applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code hold true
with greater cogency in this case, where the
allegations in the complaint show that herein
appellee was sued directly under the said
provision, in that she "failed and neglected to
exercise the proper care and vigilance over her
ward and minor child and as a consequence of
such failure and neglect, the said Carlos Bangkili
committed the wrongful act herein complained
of." Even more to the point is the case of Araneta
vs. Arreglado, supra. There the minor Dario
Arreglado entered a plea of guilty on a charge of
frustrated homicide, but the court suspended
proceedings pursuant to Article 80 of the
Revised Penal Code in view of the fact that he
was only 14 years of age. A civil suit was
thereafter filed by the offended party against the
said accused and his parents for the recovery of
damages. The ruling of the lower court holding
the said parents liable was affirmed, although
with some modification as to the amount
awarded.

The appellee here agrees that Article 2180 is

applicable in this case, but submits that its
application should be relaxed, considering that
her son, although living with her, was already 19
years of age and hence mature enough to have a
mind of his own. This fact is not a legal defense,
however, and does not exempt the appellant
from her responsibility as parent and natural
guardian. Article 2180 does not provide for any
exemption except proof that the defendant
parent "observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage." There is
no such proof in this case.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is

reversed with respect to defendant-appellee
Victoria Bangkili, and she is hereby adjudged
liable solidarily with her
co-defendant for the amounts awarded in said
judgment, with costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro,

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Dizon, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-53064 September 25, 1980
FELIX LANUZO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SY BON PING and SALVADOR
MENDOZA, defendants-appellants.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Appeal certified to Us by the Court of
Appeals 1 as it involves pure legal questions.
On November 25, 1969, a Complaint for damages
was instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur (Civil Case No. 6847) by plaintiff
Felix Lanuzo against Sy Bon Ping, the owner and
operator of a freight truck bearing Plate No. T-
57266, and his driver, Salvador Mendoza. As
alleged therein, at about five o'clock in the
afternoon of July 24, 1969, while Salvador
Mendoza was driving the truck along the
national highway in the Barrio of San Ramon,
Nabua, Camarines Sur, and because of his
reckless negligence, we rammed into the
residential house and store of plaintiff. As a
result, the house and store were completely
razed to the ground causing damage to plaintiff
in the total amount of P13,000.00. Plaintiff
averred that by reason thereof he became
destitute as he lost his means of livelihood from
the store which used to give him a monthly
income of P300.00.
The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground
that another action, Criminal Case No. 4250 for
Damage to Property through Reckless
Imprudence, was pending in the Municipal Court
of Nabua, Camarines Sur, between the same
parties for the same cause. Plaintiff opposed the
dismissal stressing that he had made an express
reservation in the criminal case to institute a
civil action for damages separate and distinct
from the criminal suit.
The lower Court denied the Motion to Dismiss
for lack of merit.
On August 13, 1970, the trial Court rendered a
default judgment in plaintiff's favor, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered (a) ordering
the defendants to pay jointly
and severally the amount of
P13,000.00 as damages,
resulting to the loss of the
store including the
merchandise for sale therein,
the residential house of mixed
materials, furnitures, clothing
and households fixtures; (b)
ordering the said defendants
to pay jointly and severally
P300.00 monthly from July
24, 1969 which represents
plaintiff's monthly income
from his store until the whole
amount of P13,000.00 is fully
paid; and (c) for attorney's
fees an amount equivalent to
20% of the total amount
claimed by the plaintiff, plus
the costs of this suit.
Defendants' "Motion for Reconsideration and/or
New Trial and To Set Aside Order of Default" was
denied.
Upon elevation by the defendants of the case to
the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 48399-R) they
urged that the civil action was prematurely
instituted in view of Rule 111, section 3,
providing in part that "after the criminal action
has been commenced the civil action cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been rendered
in the criminal action." Additionally, they
contended that even assuming their liability, the
lower Court nevertheless committed an error in
holding them jointly and severally liable.
On February 20, 1980, the Court of Appeals
certified the case to this instance on pure
questions of law.
We start from the fundamental premise, clearly
enunciated as early as the case of Barredo vs.
Garcia, et al., 2that:
A distinction exists between
the civil liability arising from
a crime and the responsibility
for cuasi-delitos or culpa-
extracontractual. The same
negligent act causing damages
may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under
article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, or create an
action forcuasi-delito or culpa
extracontractual under
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. Plaintiffs were free to
choose which remedy to
enforce.
Plaintiff's reservation before the Municipal Court
in the criminal case of his right to institute a civil
action separately is quoted hereunder in full:
UNDERSIGNED offended
party in the above-entitled
case before this Honorable
Court respectfully alleges:
1. That this action which was
commenced by the Chief of
Police included in the
complaint the claim of the
undersigned for civil liability;
2. That the undersigned is
reserving his right to institute
the civil action for damages,
docketed as Civil Case No.
6847 of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur,
against accused herein and his
employer;
WHEREFORE, it is
respectfully prayed that
reservation be made of record
therein and that the civil
aspect of the above-entitled
case be not included herein.
xxx xxx xxx 3
The terms of plaintiff's reservation clearly and
unmistakably make out a case for quasi-delict.
This is also evident from the recitals in plaintiff's
Complaint averring the employer-employee
relationship between the appellants, alleging
that damages to the house and store were caused
by the fact that Salvador Mendoza had driven the
truck "recklessly, with gross negligence and
imprudence, without observance of traffic rules
and regulations and without regard to the safety
of persons and property", and praying that
appellants be held jointly and solidarity liable for
damages. These are, basically, what should be
alleged in actions based on quasi-delict. 4
As it is quite apparent that plaintiff had
predicated his present claim for damages
on quasi-delict, he is not barred from proceeding
with this independent civil suit. The institution
of a criminal action cannot have the effect of
interrupting the civil action based on quasi-
delict. 5 And the separate civil action for quasi-
delict may proceed independently and regardless
of the result of the criminal case, 6 except that a
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or commission of the defendant. 7
The civil action referred to in Sections 3(a) and
(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which
should be suspended after the institution of the
criminal action, is that arising from delict, and
not the civil action based on quasi-delictor culpa
aquiliana.
We come now to the subject of liability of the
appellants herein. For his own negligence in
recklessly driving the truck owned and operated Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and
by his employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza, is Guerrero, JJ., concur.
primarily liable under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. On the other hand, the liability of his
employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary and direct
under Article 2180 of the same Code, which
explicitly provides:

Employers shall be liable for

the damages caused by their
employees and household
helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are
not engaged in any business
or industry.

For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut

the legal presumption of his negligence in the
selection and supervision of this employee, 8 he
is likewise responsible for the damages caused
by the negligent act of his employee (driver)
Salvador Mendoza, and his liability is primary
and solidary.

... What needs only to be

alleged under the aforequoted
provision (Article 2180, Civil
Code) is that the employee
(driver) has, by his negligence
(quasi-delict) caused damage
to make the employer,
likewise, responsible for the
tortious act of the employee,
and his liability is, as earlier
observed, primary and
solidary 9

But although the employer is solidarity liable

with the employee for damages, the employer
may demand reimbursement from his employee
(driver) for whatever amount the employer will
have to pay the offended party to satisfy the
latter's claim. 10

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby

affirmed. Costs against defendants-appellants.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27730 January 21, 1974
PRIMA MALIPOL, in her own behalf and as
guardian ad litem of her minor children,
LYDIA MALIJAN, JOSEFINA MALIJAN,
TEODORA MALIJAN, and SEBASTIAN
MALIJAN, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
LILY LIM TAN and ERNESTO
LABSAN, defendants-appellants.
Edgardo Moncada for plaintiffs-appellees.
Achacoso, Ocampo and Simbulan for defendants-
appellants.
ZALDIVAR, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
Appeal on questions of law from the decision
dated July 1, 1966, a judgment by default, and
from the order dated October 10, 1966, of the
Court of First Instance of Batangas in its Civil
Case No. 1732 which denied defendants-
appellants' motion to lift the order of default
and for a new trial and which considered the
judgment by default as standing with full
force and effect.
In the evening of February 6, 1965, at about
8:35 o'clock, Pantaleon Malijan, who was
walking with his companion Leonardo
Amante on the shoulder of the road in Barrio
San Felix, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was hit by a
gasoline tanker and was thrown to the
ground. While he was sprawling on the
ground Malijan was run over by the tanker's
right wheel that got detached from its axle.
Malijan's companion, with the aid of the
barrio captain, brought Malijan to the San
Pablo City Hospital where he died that same
night, the cause of death being "possible
traumatic cerebral hemorrhage due to
vehicular accident."
The gasoline tanker with Plate No. T-52573,
series of 1964, driven at the time of the
accident by herein appellant Ernesto Labsan,
was being used in connection with the
gasoline business of the owner, the herein
appellant Lily Lim Tan.
Representations and demands for payment of
damage having been ignored by appellants,
appellees filed on May 18, 1966 a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Batangas
praying that appellants be condemned to pay,
jointly and severally, the damages as
specified in said complaint. The appellees are
the mother and the minor brothers and
sisters of the deceased Pantaleon Malijan.
Appellants were duly served with summons
on May 19, 1966, but they failed to file their
answer within the reglementary period. Upon
appellees' motion of June 8, 1966 the trial
court, in an order dated June 10, 1966,
declare the appellants in default, and
appellees were permitted to present their
evidence in the absence of the appellants.
The trial court rendered a decision, dated
July 1, 1966, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the
averments in the complaint
as supported by the
evidence to be reasonable
and justified, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs and against
the defendants. The
defendant driver, Ernesto
Labsan, is ordered (1) to
pay the sum of P2,100.00 to
the plaintiffs for expenses
for hospitalization, medical
treatment, vigil and burial
of Pantaleon Malijan; (2) to
pay to the plaintiffs the sum
of P6,000.00 for the death of
said victim; (3) to pay to the
plaintiffs the sum of
P20,000.00 for the loss of
earnings of said deceased
for a period of five years;
(4) to pay to the plaintiffs
the sum of P5,000.00 for
moral damages; (5) to pay
to the plaintiffs the sum of
P2,000.00 for attorney's
fees and P500.00 for
incidental and litigation
expenses; and (6) to pay the
costs of the suit. Should
Ernesto Labsan not be able
to pay the foregoing
damages, they shall be paid
for by defendant Lily Lim
Tan, who by law, being the
owner and operator of the
gasoline tanker that
featured in the accident, is
subsidiarily liable.
Copy of the decision was received by the
appellees August on 23, 1966.
A motion for execution was filed on August
26, 1966 by appellees but the trial court held
its resolution in abeyance until September
22, 1966 when the judgment would become
final.
On September 21, 1966 appellants filed a
verified motion to lift the order of default and
for a new trial, alleging that they were
deprived of their day in court when the order
of default was issued and a decision rendered
after; that they had good and valid defenses,
namely: (a) that the accident which gave rise
to the case was due to force majeure; (b) that
appellant Ernesto Labsan was without fault in
the accident that gave rise to the case; and (c)
that appellant Lily Lim Tan had exercised the
due diligence required of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. Finding said
motion to be without merit, the trial court
denied the same on October 10, 1966. Hence,
this appeal wherein appellants made
assignment of errors, as follows:
(a) The trial court erred in
finding that appellants took
the complaint for granted
by reason of the fact that
appellants referred to their
lawyer the complaint for
answer only after the lapse
of eleven (11) days from
receipt thereof ;
(b) The trial court erred in
not holding that the mistake
committed by the late Atty.
Daniel Chavez in giving the
wrong date of receipt by
appellants of the summons
and the complaint to Atty.
Romulo R. de Castro on June
10, 1966 due to the
abnormal mental condition
of the late Atty. Daniel
Chavez on June 10, 1966
which thereafter resulted in
the commission of suicide
by the latter on June 17,
1966, constitutes the
mistake and accident in law
which warrant the relief
from default and the
granting of the new trial;
(c) The trial court erred in
not holding that the fact
that appellants, through
Atty. Romulo R. de Castro,
filed on June 10, 1966 a
motion for extension of
time to file answer, and
thereafter actually did file
their answer to the
complaint on June 20, 1966
wherein they alleged good,
valid and meritorious
defenses against the claim
of plaintiffs in the
 complaint, should warrant
favorable consideration of
appellants' motion to lift
order of default and for new
trial; and
(d) The trial court erred in
not holding that the fact
that appellants' motion to
lift order of default and for
new trial.
1. In support of their first assignment of
error, counsel for appellants contends that
the finding of the trial court, that the
appellants took the complaint for granted
when they referred the complaint to their
lawyer only on the eleventh day after receipt
thereof, was unwarranted, because
appellants had 15 days from receipt of the
summons and complaint to answer and their
lawyer, the late Atty. Daniel Chavez, after the
complaint was referred to him on the
eleventh day, had still four days to file the
answer, which he could very well do
inasmuch as he was well acquainted with the
facts because he was the lawyer of appellant
Ernesto Labsan in Criminal Case No. 2200 of
Court of First Instance of Batangas for
homicide thru reckless imprudence — which
case arose from the very accident subject of
appellees' complaint; that appellant Lily Lim
Tan, furthermore, had instructed her
employee, Eleuterio Dizon, to handcarry the
summons and to deliver it to nobody except
to Atty. Chavez; that Atty. Chavez, in a
distance telephone conversation with
appellant Lily Lim Tan, assured the latter that
he would attend to the complaint.
We do not find merit in the contention of
counsel for appellants. It is within the sound
discretion of the court to set aside an order of
default and to permit a defendant to file his
answer and to be heard on the merits even
after the reglementary period for the filing of
the answer has expired, but it is not error, or
an abuse of discretion, on the part of the
court to refuse to set aside its order of default
and to refuse to accept the answer where it
finds no justifiable reason for the delay in the
filing of the answer. In the motions for
reconsideration of an order of default, the
moving party has the burden of showing such
diligence as would justify his being excused
from not filing the answer with the
reglementary period as provided by the
Rules of Court, otherwise these guidelines for
an orderly and expeditious procedure would
be rendered meaningless.1 Unless it is shown
clearly that a party has justifiable reason for
the delay the court will not ordinarily
exercise its discretion in his favor.2
In the instant case, We agree with the trial court
that appellants have not shown that they
exercised such diligence as an ordinary prudent
person would exercise, to have the answer filed
within the reglementary period. Appellant Lily
Lim Tan admitted in her affidavit3 that she
received the summons and copy of the complaint
on May 19, 1966, and that having read the
complaint she found out that she was being sued,
together with her driver, for damages in
connection with the accident of February 6, 1965
at Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The damages asked in
the complaint amounts to P36,600.00. The
summons required them to answer the
complaint within 15 days from receipt thereof,
and warned them that should they fail to answer
within said period the plaintiffs would take
judgment against them for the relief demanded
in the complaint. The damages demanded was
not a negligible sum, and appellant Lily Lim Tan,
who is a business woman, should have
considered the matter a serious one. Ordinary
prudence would dictate that she should concern
herself about the matter, that she should refer
said complaint with the least possible delay to
her lawyer. But, for reasons she did not explain,
she referred the complaint to her lawyer only
after the lapse of ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, i.e., on May 30, 1966. She should have
considered that four days might not be sufficient
time for her lawyer to prepare and file the
answer.
Appellants, however, contend that their lawyer,
Atty. Chavez, could very well prepare the answer
within the remaining four days of the
reglementary period, for he was conversant with
the facts of the case. Be that as it may, the fact
was that Atty. Chavez failed to file the answer.
Because Atty. Chavez assured her, in their long
distance telephone conversation that he would
take care the complaint, appellant Lily Lim Tan
took for granted that the answer would be filed
on time. Said appellant should have checked
before the expiration of the period for filing the
answer whether the complaint was really taken
care of, or not. But this, appellant Lily Lim Tan
failed to do, and this is another instance showing
her lack of concern over the complaint. There
was, therefore, no showing of due diligence on
the part of appellants which would excuse their
failure to file their answer on time. There is no
showing either that the other appellant, Ernesto
Labsan, had taken any step to have an answer
filed in his behalf — evidently he was relying on
his employer.
2. In support of the second assignment of error,
appellants contend that the facts show that on
June 10, 1966, Atty. Chavez, who was then acting
strangely, endorsed the summons and complaint
to Atty. Romulo R. de Castro; that upon inquiry
by Atty. de Castro from Atty. Chavez the latter
informed him that the summons was served on
appellants on May 30, 1966; that appellant Lily
Lim Tan, who was assured by Atty. Chavez in
their long distance telephone conversation that
the complaint would be attended to, could not,
by the exercise of ordinary diligence, have
foreseen, and avoided, the circumstance that at
the time she referred the summons to Atty.
Chavez, the latter was already in an abnormal
condition which later resulted in his committing
suicide on June 17, 1966; that it was Atty.
Chavez's abnormal condition and his having
given to Atty. de Castro the wrong date of the
receipt of the summons by the appellees that
caused the delay in the filing of the answer; that
said circumstances constituted mistake and
accident which entitled appellants to relief from
default and a grant of new trial.
Appellants' contention that the delay in filing the
answer was due to mistake and accident is
untenable.
The mistake, according to appellants, consisted
in Atty. Chavez's having told Atty. de Castro on
June 10, 1966 that appellants received the
summons and complaint on May 30, 1966. Even
if Atty. Chavez had told Atty. de Castro the
correct date, that is, that appellants received the
summons on May 19, 1966, the answer could not
have been filed on time by Atty. de Castro,
because the reglementary period for filing the
answer expired on June 3, 1966, and it was
already June 10, 1966, when the complaint was
endorsed by Atty. Chavez to Atty. de Castro.
The accident, according to appellants' counsel,
consisted in Atty. Chavez's being in an abnormal
condition at the time the complaint was given to
him on May 30, 1966. This claim of appellants is
not supported by the record.
The record does not show that Atty. Chavez was
suffering from an abnormal mind on May 30,
1966. His actuations on May 30 were those that
could be expected of a normal person. Atty.
Chavez asked the employee of appellant Lily Lim
Tan about the date when his employer received
the summons and complaint, and because the
employee could not give him the desired
information Atty. Chavez placed a long distance
telephone call to appellant Lily Lim Tan to ask
about said date. This action of Atty. Chavez
showed that he was very much aware that the
reglementary period within which the answer
should be filed was to be computed from the
date of the receipt of the summons and the
complaint. It also showed that Atty. Chavez knew
the easiest and the most practical means to get
the information that he needed — that was by a
long distance telephone call to his client, Lily Lim
Tan. These actuations of Atty. Chavez showed
that he knew the importance of the matter at
hand, and he was exercising the ordinary and
reasonable care over the interests of his client.
These specific actions of Atty. Chavez indicated
that as of May 30, 1966 he had a sound mind.
It is claimed by appellants that on June 10, 1966
Atty. Chavez endorsed the complaint to Atty. de
Castro, and told the latter that the summons and
complaint were received by the appellants on
May 30, 1966. It is further claimed by appellants
that this information given by Atty. Chavez —
that the summons and complaint were received
by the appellants on May 30, 1966 — was the
mistake that caused the delay of the filing of the
answer. But it should be noted that on June 10,
1966 when Atty. Chavez endorsed the complaint
to Atty. de Castro and informed the latter that
the summons and complaint were received by
the appellants on May 30, 1966, the period
within which the answer should be filed had
already expired — the expiry date being June 3,
1966.<äre||anº•1àw>There is no showing that
between May 30, when Atty. Chavez received the
summons and complaint from the employee of
Lily Lim Tan, and June 3, 1973 Atty. Chavez was
incapacitated to file the answer. And so it is clear
that before the case was endorsed to Atty. de
Castro, the appellants were already in default.
The failure to file the answer on time may well
be attributed to the mistake or "negligence of
Atty. Chavez. The appellants are bound by the
mistakes, and may suffer by the negligence, of
their lawyer. In fact, on June 8, 1966, or two days
before Atty. Chavez endorsed the case to Atty. de
Castro, the appellees had filed a motion in court
to declare the defendants (now the appellants) in
default. The moves taken by Atty. de Castro — in
filing a motion for extension of time to file an
answer on June 10, 1966, and in finally filing an
answer on June 20, 1966 — were already late.
The fact that Atty. Chavez committed suicide on
June 17, 1966 does not necessarily prove that he
was abnormal, incompetent or insane on May 30,
1966. Although there is a judicial declaration
that a sane man would not commit suicide,
cognizance is nevertheless taken of the fact that
circumstances at some given time may impel a
person to commit suicide.4 The probative value
of suicide in determining the sanity of a person is
dependent on the factual situation in each case.
Such matters as the reasons for the act of self-
destruction, the circumstances indicating the
person's state of mind at the time, and other
pertinent facts must be considered. The
appellants had not indicated to the trial court
any circumstance from which the trial court
could form an opinion of the mental condition of
Atty. Chavez before he committed suicide. The
trial court, therefore, did not err when it did not
favorably consider the claim of the appellant that
their failure to file their answer to the complaint
was due to accident or mistake, as contemplated
in Section 3 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.
3. In support of the third assignment of error,
appellants argue that acting on the wrong
information given by Atty. Chavez, Atty. Romulo
de Castro filed on June 10, 1966 a motion for an
extension of 20 days within which to file an
answer and that he did file the answer with
good, valid and meritorious defenses on June 20,
1966; that on June 27, 1966 when appellees
were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte,
the motion for extension of time and the answer
already formed part of the records of the case;
that inasmuch as the late filing of the answer was
due to accident and mistake, and appellants had
good, valid, and meritorious defenses, the
motion to lift the order of default and for new
trial should have been favorably considered by
the court.5
Let it be noted that the lower court rendered its
decision on July 1, 1966, and the appellees
received notice of said decision on August 23,
1966. The decision would have become final on
September 22, 1966. On September 21, 1966 the
appellants filed their motion to lift the order of
default and for new trial. The motion of the
appellants therefore, was in the nature of a
motion for a new trial based on fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence under
paragraph (a) of Section 1 of Rule 37 of the Rules
of Court. Under Section 2 of said Rule 37 the
moving party must show that he has a
meritorious defense. The facts constituting the
movant's good and substantial defense, which he
may prove if the petition were granted, must be
shown in the affidavit which should accompany
the motion for a new trial.6 In the instant case,
the motion to lift the order of default and for new
trial as well as the affidavit of merits
accompanying the motion did not contain clear
statements of the facts constituting a good and
valid defense which the appellants might prove if
they were given a chance to introduce
evidence.<äre||anº•1àw> The allegations in the
motion that defendants have good and valid
defenses, namely: that the accident which gave
rise to the case was force majeure; that
defendant Ernesto Labsan is absolutely without
fault in the accident that gave rise to the case;
and that defendant Lily Lim Tan has exercised
due diligence required of a good father of a
family to prevent damage7, are mere conclusions
which did not provide the court with any basis
for determining the nature and merit of the
probable defense. An affidavit of merit should
state facts, and not mere opinion or conclusions
of law.
Hence the trial court correctly denied the motion
to set aside order of default and for new trial.
We must, however, point out a flaw in the
decision of the lower court. It is stated in the
decision appealed from that the driver, Ernesto
Labsan, was primarily liable for the payment of
damages adjudged therein, and the appellant Lily
Lim Tan, being the owner and operator of the
gasoline tanker that figured in the accident, is
subsidiarily liable, that is, liable only in case
Ernesto Labsan was not able to pay. This is not
correct. The action in the instant case was
brought not to demand civil liability arising from
a crime. The complaint makes no mention of a
crime having been committed, much less of the
driver Ernesto Labsan having been convicted of a
crime. But there is an allegation in the complaint
that Ernesto Labsan was the authorized driver of
the truck that figured in the accident, which
truck was operated by appellant Lily Lim Tan in
connection with her gasoline business. The
prayer in the complaint, furthermore, sought to
hold appellants jointly and solidarily liable for
damages. The instant action, therefore, was
based, as the complaint shows, on quasi
delict.8 Under Article 218 of the Civil Code, which
treats of quasi delicts, the liability of the owners
and managers of an establishment or enterprise
for damages caused by their employees is
primary and direct, not subsidiary.9 The
employer, however, can demand from his
employee reimbursement of the amount which
he paid under his liability. 10 The employer,
appellant Lily Lim Tan, must be held primarily
and directly, not subsidiarily, liable for damages
awarded in the decision of the lower court. This
is, of course, without prejudice to the right of
appellant Lily Lim Tan to demand from her co-
appellant Ernesto Labsan reimbursement of the
damages that she would have to pay to appellees.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, dated July 1, 1966, as
modified in accordance with the observations
We made in the preceding paragraph, and the
order, dated October 10, 1966, denying
appellants' motion for the lifting of the order of
default and for new trial, in Civil Case No. 1732,
are affirmed. Costs against defendants-appellees.
It is so ordered.
Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Aquino, JJ.,
concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Separate Opinions
FERNANDEZ, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the dispositive part of the decision
and the correctness of its premise that the
liability of appellant Lily Lim Tan is primary and
direct, and that her motion to set aside the order
of default and the decision rendered thereafter
as a result of an ex parte hearing is in the nature
of a motion for new trial which must be denied
for insufficiency of the affidavit of merit
accompanying said motion.
Lawyers preparing an affidavit of merit should
be reminded that it must contain facts which if
believed by the court would support a valid
defense, because a motion for new trial should
not be granted if it would be a mere exercise in
futility in so far as the attainment of justice is
concerned.
However, I am not ready to join the majority in
its pronouncements in connection, with the
negligence involved in this case. The provisions
of the Rules of Court should be interpreted
liberally to afford every litigant his day in court.
Under this principle, I consider the negligence of
appellant Lily Lim Tan and her first lawyer Atty.
Daniel Chavez to be excusable. Said appellant
had a right to rely upon Atty. Chavez when she
indorsed her case to him that he would be able to
prepare and file the answer for her during the
remaining four days of the fifteen-day period
which commenced on May 19, 1966, or
otherwise file a motion to extend the time to file
the same. After all, it is a simple case for damages
due to reckless imprudence of appellant's driver,
resulting in the death of the victim.
Considering that Atty. Chavez committed suicide
on June 17, 1966, his troubled mind which
probably led to his tragic end should be a
sufficient explanation of his negligence in
misinforming Atty. Romulo R. de Castro, the
lawyer to whom he indorsed the case of Lily Lim
Tan on June 10, 1966 that Lily Lim Tan received
the summons on May 30, 1966, and not on May
19, 1966.
I am not ready to attribute to Atty. Romulo R. de
Castro any negligence. He had a right to rely on
the information given him by Atty. Chavez that
summons was received for the filing of the
answer only on May 30, 1966. Atty. de Castro, to
gain enough time, filed on the same day the case
was indorsed to him by Atty. Chavez a motion for
extension of time within which to file the answer
which was actually filed on June 20, 1966.
All these, notwithstanding, this is a time as good
as any to impress upon litigants and lawyers
alike the necessity of stamping or writing on any
pleading, process, order or decision in any court
case the time and date of its receipt and the
affixing thereon of the initials of the person
receiving the same. For, human memory once in
a while for some and very often for others, fails
in the correct remembrance of dates and events.
If this had been done by Lily Lim Tan and Atty.
Chavez in this case with respect to the summons,
the late filing of the answer which resulted in
default and a decision rendered after an ex-
parte hearing, could have been avoided.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDEZ, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the dispositive part of the decision
and the correctness of its premise that the
liability of appellant Lily Lim Tan is primary and
direct, and that her motion to set aside the order
of default and the decision rendered thereafter
as a result of an ex parte hearing is in the nature
of a motion for new trial which must be denied
for insufficiency of the affidavit of merit
accompanying said motion.
Lawyers preparing an affidavit of merit should
be reminded that it must contain facts which if
believed by the court would support a valid
defense, because a motion for new trial should
not be granted if it would be a mere exercise in
futility in so far as the attainment of justice is
concerned.
However, I am not ready to join the majority in
its pronouncements in connection, with the
negligence involved in this case. The provisions
of the Rules of Court should be interpreted
liberally to afford every litigant his day in court.
Under this principle, I consider the negligence of
appellant Lily Lim Tan and her first lawyer Atty.
Daniel Chavez to be excusable. Said appellant
had a right to rely upon Atty. Chavez when she
indorsed her case to him that he would be able to
prepare and file the answer for her during the
remaining four days of the fifteen-day period
which commenced on May 19, 1966, or
otherwise file a motion to extend the time to file
the same. After all, it is a simple case for damages
due to reckless imprudence of appellant's driver,
resulting in the death of the victim.
Considering that Atty. Chavez committed suicide
on June 17, 1966, his troubled mind which
probably led to his tragic end should be a
sufficient explanation of his negligence in
misinforming Atty. Romulo R. de Castro, the
lawyer to whom he indorsed the case of Lily Lim
Tan on June 10, 1966 that Lily Lim Tan received
the summons on May 30, 1966, and not on May
19, 1966.
I am not ready to attribute to Atty. Romulo R. de
Castro any negligence. He had a right to rely on
the information given him by Atty. Chavez that
summons was received for the filing of the
answer only on May 30, 1966. Atty. de Castro, to
gain enough time, filed on the same day the case
was indorsed to him by Atty. Chavez a motion for
extension of time within which to file the answer
which was actually filed on June 20, 1966.
All these, notwithstanding, this is a time as good
as any to impress upon litigants and lawyers
alike the necessity of stamping or writing on any
pleading, process, order or decision in any court
case the time and date of its receipt and the
affixing thereon of the initials of the person
receiving the same. For, human memory once in
a while for some and very often for others, fails
in the correct remembrance of dates and events.
If this had been done by Lily Lim Tan and Atty.
Chavez in this case with respect to the summons,
the late filing of the answer which resulted in
default and a decision rendered after an ex-
parte hearing, could have been avoided.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-21353 and L-21354 May 20,
1966
GREGORIO ANURAN, MARIA MALIGAYA,
LAPAZ LARO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
PEPITO BUÑO, PEDRO GAHOL, LUISA
ALCANTARA, GUILLERMO RAZON, ANSELMO
MALIGAYA and CEFERINA ARO, respondents.
Victoriano A. Endaya for petitioners.
Trinidad and Borromeo for respondents Buño, et
al.
Contreras and Adapon for respondents Razon, et
al.
BENGZON, C.J.:
At noon of January 12, 1958, a passenger jeepney
was parked on the road to Taal, Batangas. A
motor truck speeding along, negligently bumped
it from behind, with such violence that three of
its passengers died, even as two others
(passengers too) suffered injuries that required
their confinement at the Provincial Hospital for
many days.
So, in February 1958 these suits were instituted
by the representatives of the dead and of the
injured, to recover consequently damages
against the driver and the owners of the
truck and also against the driver and the owners
of the jeepney.
The Batangas Court of First Instance, after trial,
rendered judgment absolving the driver of the
jeepney and its owners, but it required the truck
driver and the owners thereof to make
compensation.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals
insisting that the driver and the owners of the
jeepney should also be made liable for damages.
The last mentioned court, upon reviewing the
record, declared that:
It is admitted that at about noontime on
January 13, 1958, the passenger
jeepney owned by defendants spouses
Pedro Gahol and Luisa Alcantara,
bearing plate No. TPU-13548, then
being driven by their regular driver,
defendant Pepito Buño was on its
regular route travelling from Mahabang
Ludlud, Taal, Batangas, towards the
poblacion of the said municipality.
When said passenger jeepney crossed
the bridge separating Barrios
Mahabang Ludlud and Balisong, Taal,
Batangas, it had fourteen passengers,
excluding the driver, according to the
testimony of defendant Buño (pp. 12
and 18, t.s.n. July 17, 1958), or sixteen
passengers according to the testimony
of plaintiff Edita de Sagun, (pp. 9, 12
and 13, t.s.n. June 26, 1958). However,
the fact remains that the vehicle was
overloaded with passengers at the time,
because according to the partial
stipulation of facts "the maximum
capacity of the jeepney bearing plate
No. TPU-13548 of said defendants was
eleven (11) passengers including the
driver. (Printed Record on Appeal, pp.
35, 37.)
After crossing the bridge, defendant
Buño stopped his vehicle in order to
allow one of his passengers to alight.
But he so parked his jeepney in such a
way that one-half of its width (the left
wheels) was on the asphalted
pavement of the road and the other
half, on the right shoulder of said road
(pp. 21-22, t.s.n. May 26, 1958; p. 12
t.s.n. July 17, 1958). Approximately five
minutes later and before Buño could
start his vehicle, a speeding water
truck, which bore plate No. T-17526
and owned by defendants-spouses
Anselmo Maligaya and Ceferina Aro,
then being driven by Guillermo Razon
from the direction of Mahabang Ludlud,
Taal, Batangas, towards the poblacion
of that municipality, violently smashed
against the parked jeepney from
behind, causing it to turn turtle into a
nearby ditch.
Then said Appellate Court went on to affirm the
exoneration of the jeepney driver and of its
owners. It explained that although "the driver of
the ill-starred vehicle was not free from fault, for
he was guilty of an antecedent negligence in
parking his vehicle with a portion thereof
occupying the asphalted road", it considered the
truck driver guilty of greater negligence which
was the efficient cause of the collision; and
applying the doctrine of the "last clear
chance"1 said Court ordered the owners of the
truck to pay, solidarily with its driver, damages
as follows:
x x x the sum of P6,000.00 for the death
of their daughter Emelita, another sum
of P5,000.00 as moral damages and the
sum of P500.00 as actual damages, and
to plaintiffs Simplicio, Alberto, Avelina
and Alfredo, all surnamed Arriola, and
represented by their guardian ad
litem Agustin Arriola, the sum of
P6,000.00 for the death of their natural
mother, Leonor Masongsong, another
sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages the
sum of P3,600.00 for loss of earning
capacity of said deceased and the sum
of P850.00 as actual damages.
The plaintiffs brought the matter to this Supreme
Court insisting that the driver and the owners of
the jeepneyshould also be made liable.
We gave due course to the petition for review,
because we thought the decision meant
exoneration of the carrier from liability to its
passengers, notwithstanding the negligence of its
driver.
Upon further and more extended consideration
of the matter, we have become convinced that
error of law was committed in releasing the
jeepney from liability. It must be remembered
that the obligation of the carrier to transport its
passengers safely is such that the New Civil Code
requires "utmost diligence" from the carriers
(Art. 1755) who are "presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they have observed extraordinary
diligence" (Art. 1756). In this instance, this legal
presumption of negligence is confirmed by the
Court of Appeals' finding that the driver of the
jeepney in question was at fault in parking the
vehicle improperly. It must follow that the driver
— and the owners — of the jeepney must
answer for injuries to its passengers.
The principle about the "last clear chance" would
call for application in a suit between the owners
and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does
not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the
jeepney and its owners on the ground that the
other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
Now as to damages. The driver and the owners
of the truck have not appealed from the Court of
Appeals' assessment. The plaintiffs (petitioners)
have not asked here for a greater amount of
indemnity. They merely pray for a declaration
that Pepito Buño, Pedro Gahol and Luisa
Alcantara (the driver and the owners of the
jeepney, respectively) be declared jointly and
severally liable with the other
defendants.1äwphï1.ñët
Wherefore, affirming the decision under review,
we hereby modify it in the sense prayed for by
plaintiffs-petitioners. The three defendants last
mentioned are required to pay solidarily with
the other defendants-respondents the amounts
fixed by the appealed decision. Costs of both
appeals against said three defendants. So
ordered.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon,
Regala, Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.
Barrera, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., took no part.
SECOND DIVISION Aringay, La Union, and bounded on the south by WHEREAS, the SECOND
a chapel of the respondent. PARTY is willing to contract FIRST PARTY - 60%
the intended digging of septic SECOND PARTY - 40%
JOHN KAM BIAK Y. G.R. No. 160283 The gasoline station supposedly needed tank for the first party.
CHAN, JR., additional sewerage and septic tanks for its 6. In the event that valuable
P e t i t i o n e r, Present: washrooms. In view of this, the services of WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY objects are found outside the
Dioscoro Ely Yoro (Yoro), a retired general of the and SECOND PARTY has (sic) property line during the said
Armed Forces of the Philippines, was procured agreed verbally as to the digging, the same shall be
by petitioner, as the former was allegedly a compensation of the said divided among the parties as
PUNO, construction contractor in the locality. digging of septic tank. follows:
Chairman,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Petitioner and Yoro executed a Memorandum of WHEREFORE, for and in FIRST PARTY - 35%
Agreement[3] (MOA) on 28 February 1995 which consideration of the terms SECOND PARTY - 65%
CALLEJO, SR., is reproduced hereunder: and covenants hereinbelow
set forth, the FIRST PARTY 7. In case government or
TINGA, and MEMORANDUM OF hereby AGREES and ALLOWS military interference or
AGREEMENT the SECOND PARTY to outside intervention is
IGLESIA NI CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. undertake the digging of the imminent, the FIRST PARTY
CRISTO, INC., KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE parcel of land for the hereby reserves the option to
R e s p o n d e n t. PRESENTS: exclusive purpose of having a stop the digging at any stage
septic tank. thereof.
This MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT, executed this TERMS AND COVENANTS IN WITNESS
Promulgated:
28th day of February, 1995, by WHEREOF, We have hereunto
and between: 1. The SECOND PARTY shall set our hands on the day and
contract the said digging; year first above-written at
JOHN Y. CHAN, of Aringay, La Union.[4]
October 14, 2005
legal age, single, and a 2. The FIRST PARTY shall
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - resident of Aringay, La Union, have complete control over Diggings thereafter commenced. After
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -x now and hereinafter called the number of personnel who some time, petitioner was informed by the
the FIRST PARTY; will be entering the property members of the respondent that the digging
for said contract; traversed and penetrated a portion of the land
GEN. ELY E. YORO, belonging to the latter. The foundation of the
DECISION Jr., of legal age, married, and a 3. The digging shall be chapel was affected as a tunnel was dug directly
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: resident of Damortis, Sto. allowed for a period of three under it to the damage and prejudice of the
Tomas, La Union, hereinafter (3) weeks only, commencing respondent.
Before Us is a petition for review referred to as the SECOND on March 28, 1995, unless
on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the PARTY: extended by agreement of the On 18 April 1995, a Complaint[5] against
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65976, dated parties; petitioner and a certain Teofilo Oller, petitioners
25 September 2003. Said Decision denied the WITNESSETH that: engineer, was filed by the respondent before the
petitioners appeal from the decision of the WHEREAS, the 4. Any damage within or RTC, La Union, Branch 31, docketed therein as
Regional Trial Court (RTC), La Union, Branch 31, FIRST PARTY is the owner of outside the property of the Civil Case No. A-1646. Petitioner and Oller filed
in Civil Case No. A-1646. a parcel of land located at Sta. FIRST PARTY incurred during an Answer with Third-Party
Rita, Aringay, La Union. the digging shall be borne by Complaint[6] impleading Yoro as third-party
THE FACTS the SECOND PARTY; defendant.
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY,
The antecedents of the instant case are quite desires to dig a septic tank for 5. In the event that valuable Yoro filed an Answer to the Third-Party
simple. its perusal in the property objects are found on the Complaint[7] dated 13 July 1995. An Amended
bordering Iglesia ni Cristo. property, the same shall be and Supplemental Complaint[8] dated 30 August
The Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by divided among the parties as 1995 was later filed by the respondent already
the petitioner. It is located in Sta. Rita East, follows: naming Yoro as a party-defendant, to which the
petitioner and Oller filed an Answer.[9] Yoro filed (P20,000.00) as litigation (a) The award of moral CROSS-CLAIM OF THE
his own Answer.[10] expenses. damages in the amount PETITIONER AGAINST
of P500,000.00 is hereby YORO.[22]
After four years of hearing the case, the trial Defendant TEOFILO deleted.
court promulgated its Decision[11] holding that OLLER is absolved of any civil (b) The award of exemplary ISSUE
the diggings were not intended for the liability. damages is hereby reduced
construction of sewerage and septic tanks but to P50,000.00. Drawn from the above assignment of errors, the
were made to construct tunnels to find hidden Any counterclaim solitary issue that needs to be resolved is:
treasure.[12] The trial court adjudged the filed against PLAINTIFF (c) The award of attorneys
petitioner and Yoro solidarily liable to the IGLESIA NI CRISTO fees and litigation expenses is
respondent on a 35%-65% basis (the petitioner is dismissed.[13] hereby reduced
liable for the 35%), and absolving Oller from any to P30,000.00.[20] WHETHER OR NOT THE
liability, viz: MEMORANDUM OF
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal[14] dated 18 Undeterred, petitioner instituted the instant case AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO
WHEREFORE, this August 1999. Yoro filed his own Notice of before this Court. On 15 December 2004, the BY THE PETITIONER AND
Court renders judgment in Appeal[15] dated 20 August 1999. instant petition was given due course.[21] YORO HAS THE EFFECT OF
favor of plaintiff IGLESIA NI MAKING THE
CRISTO and against In a Resolution[16] dated 19 November 1999, the ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS LATTERSOLELY RESPONSIBL
defendants JOHN KAMBIAK trial court disallowed Yoros appeal for failure to E FOR DAMAGES TO THE
CHAN and DIOSCORO ELY pay the appellate court docket and other lawful Petitioner assigns as errors the following: RESPONDENT.
YORO, JR. who are fees within the reglementary period for taking an
respectively solidarily liable appeal.[17] In view of Yoros failure to I THE RULINGS OF THE COURT
to PLAINTIFF on a 35%-65% appropriately file an appeal, an order was issued
basis, with JOHN CHAN taking for the issuance of a Writ of Execution as against THE COURT OF APPEALS Petitioner avers that no liability should attach to
the 35% tab, Ordering the two him only, the dispositive portion of which reads: ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE him by laying the blame solely on Yoro. He
(2) aforesaid DEFENDANTS to DECISION OF THE REGIONAL argues that the MOA executed between him and
pay PLAINTIFF the following WHEREFORE, TRIAL COURT (BRANCH 31, Yoro is the law between them and must be given
amounts: premises considered, this AGOO, LA UNION) weight by the courts. Since nothing in the MOA
Court GRANTS the motion of PARTICULARLY IN SAYING goes against the law, morals, good customs and
1. SIX HUNDRED plaintiff Iglesia ni Cristo for THAT THE BASIS OF THE public policy, it must govern to absolve him from
THIRTY-THREE THOUSAND the issuance of a Writ of SOLIDARY OBLIGATION OF any liability.[23] Petitioner relies heavily in
FIVE HUNDRED NINETY-FIVE Execution as against Dioscoro PETITIONER AND YORO VIS-- Paragraph 4 of the MOA, which is again
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS Ely Yoro, Jr. only.[18] VIS PLAINTIFF IS BASED NOT reproduced hereunder:
(P633,595.50); representing ON THE MOA BUT ON TORT
ACTUAL DAMAGES;
II
2. FIVE HUNDRED The petitioners appeal to the Court of Appeals, 4. Any damage within or
THOUSAND PESOS on the other hand, was given due course.[19] On THE COURT OF APPEALS outside the property of the
(P500,000.00) representing 25 September 2003, the Court of Appeals ERRED IN NOT GIVING FIRST PARTY incurred during
MORAL DAMAGES; rendered its Decision denying the appeal. It EFFECT TO THE MOA WHICH the digging shall be borne by
affirmed the trial court but with modifications. SHOULD EXONERATE THE the SECOND PARTY.
3. TEN MILLION The decretal portion of the decision states: PETITIONER FROM ALL
LIABILITIES TO THE PRIVATE In answer to this, the respondent asserts that the
PESOS (P10,000,000.00) as
RESPONDENT MOA should not absolve petitioner from any
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; WHEREFORE, the appeal is
liability. This written contract, according to the
hereby DENIED. The assailed
III respondent, clearly shows that the intention of
4. FIFTY THOUSAND decision in Civil Case No. A-
the parties therein was to search for hidden
PESOS (P50,000.00) as 1646 is hereby AFFIRMED
THE COURT OF APPEALS treasure. The alleged digging for a septic tank
plaintiffs attorneys fees; and with MODIFICATIONS as
ERRED IN NOT was just a cover-up of their real intention.[24] The
follows:
APPRECIATING THE THIRD- aim of the petitioner and Yoro to intrude and
5. TWENTY
PARTY COMPLAINT AS surreptitiously hunt for hidden treasure in the
THOUSAND PESOS
respondents premises should make both parties
liable.[25]
At this juncture, it is vital to underscore the
findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals as to what was the real intention of the
petitioner and Yoro in undertaking the
excavations. The findings of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals on this point are in
complete unison. Petitioner and Yoro were in
quest for hidden treasure[26] and, undoubtedly,
they were partners in this endeavor.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, held in part:
The basis of their
solidarity is not the
Memorandum of Agreement
but the fact that they have
become joint tortfeasors.
There is solidary liability only
when the obligation expressly
so states, or when the law or
the nature of the obligation
requires solidarity.[27]
We find no compelling reason to disturb this
particular conclusion reached by the Court of
Appeals. The issue, therefore, must be ruled in
the negative.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
Based on this provision of law, the requisites of
quasi-delict are the following:
(a) there must be an act or
omission;
(b) such act or omission
causes damage to another;
(c) such act or commission is
caused by fault or negligence;
and
(d) there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between
the parties.
All the requisites are attendant in the instant
case. The tortious act was the excavation which
caused damage to the respondent because it was
done surreptitiously within its premises and it
may have affected the foundation of the chapel.
The excavation on respondents premises was
caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-
existing contractual relation between the
petitioner and Yoro on the one hand, and the
respondent on the other.
For the damage caused to respondent,
petitioner and Yoro are jointly liable as they are
joint tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility of two
or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict
is solidary.[28]
The heavy reliance of petitioner in
paragraph 4 of the MOA cited earlier cannot
steer him clear of any liability.
As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are
all the persons who command, instigate,
promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a
tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done
for their benefit.[29]
Indubitably, petitioner and Yoro
cooperated in committing the tort. They even
had provisions in their MOA as to how they
would divide the treasure if any is found within
or outside petitioners property line. Thus, the
MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner from
liability, is the very noose that insures that he be
so declared as liable.
Besides, petitioner cannot claim that he
did not know that the excavation traversed the
respondents property. In fact, he had two (2) of
his employees actually observe the diggings, his and liability of the defendants
security guard and his engineer Teofilo Oller.[30] are so interwoven and
dependent as to be
Coming now to the matter on damages, the inseparable, in which case, the
respondent questions the drastic reduction of modification of the appealed
the exemplary damages awarded to it. It may be judgment in favor of appellant
recalled that the trial court awarded exemplary operates as a modification to
damages in the amount of P10,000,000.00 but Gen. Yoro who did not appeal.
same was reduced by the Court of Appeals In this case, the liabilities of
to P50,000.00. Gen. Yoro and appellant being
solidary, the above exception
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed applies.[34]
by way of example or correction for the public
good.[31] In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
may be granted if the defendant acted with gross Appeals dated 25 September 2003 is AFFIRMED
negligence.[32] By gross negligence is meant such with MODIFICATION as to the award of
entire want of care as to raise a presumption that exemplary damages, which is hereby increased
the person in fault is conscious of the probable to P100,000.00. Costs against petitioner.
consequences of carelessness, and is indifferent,
or worse, to the danger of injury to person or
property of others.[33]
SO ORDERED.
Surreptitiously digging under the respondents
chapel which may weaken the foundation
thereof, thereby endangering the lives and limbs
of the people in worship, unquestionably
amounts to gross negligence. Not to mention the
damage that may be caused to the structure
itself. The respondent may indeed be awarded
exemplary damages.
For such tortious act done with gross negligence,
the Court feels that the amount awarded by the
Court of Appeals is inadequate. The exemplary
damages must correspondingly be increased
to P100,000.00.
The modification made by this Court to the
judgment of the Court of Appeals must operate
as against Yoro, for as fittingly held by the
court a quo:
While it is settled
that a party who did not
appeal from the decision
cannot seek any relief other
than what is provided in the
judgment appealed from,
nevertheless, when the rights
Republic of the Philippines 2. The action is barred by a UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled
SUPREME COURT prior judgment which is now DEFENDANTS THAT - with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the
Manila final and or in res-adjudicata; parties has favored Us with a copy of the
I decision of acquittal, presumably because
SECOND DIVISION 3. The complaint had no cause appellants do not dispute that such indeed was
of action against defendant the basis stated in the court's decision. And so,
THE PRESENT ACTION IS when appellants filed their complaint against
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977 Marvin Hill, because he was NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT
relieved as guardian of the appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin
ALSO A VIOLATION OF Hill, on account of the death of their son, the
other defendant through SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in emancipation by marriage. appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-
their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito RULE 111, OF THE REVISED referred to.
Elcano, deceased,plaintiffs-appellants, RULES OF COURT, AND THAT
vs. (P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111,
Appeal.]) RULES OF COURT IS As We view the foregoing background of this
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as case, the two decisive issues presented for Our
father and Natural Guardian of said APPLICABLE;
resolution are:
minor, defendants-appellees. was first denied by the trial court. It was only
upon motion for reconsideration of the II
defendants of such denial, reiterating the above 1. Is the present civil action for damages barred
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants. by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
grounds that the following order was issued: THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A wherein the action for civil liability, was not
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees. PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS reversed?
Considering the motion for NOW FINAL OR RES-
reconsideration filed by the ADJUDICTA;
BARREDO, J.: defendants on January 14, 2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of
1965 and after thoroughly the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
III notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the
Appeal from the order of the Court of First examining the arguments
Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 therein contained, the Court time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,
in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. finds the same to be THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI- though a minor, living with and getting
Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to meritorious and well- DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO subsistenee from his father, was already legally
dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs founded. 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, married?
for recovery of damages from defendant ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE
Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the INSTANT CASE; and The first issue presents no more problem than
WHEREFORE, the Order of
occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin this Court on December 8, the need for a reiteration and further
Hill, with whom he was living and getting 1964 is hereby reconsidered IV clarification of the dual character, criminal and
subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son by ordering the dismissal of civil, of fault or negligence as a source of
of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, the above entitled case. THAT THE COMPLAINT obligation which was firmly established in this
when criminally prosecuted, the said accused STATES NO CAUSE OF jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In
was acquitted on the ground that his act was not ACTION AGAINST that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a
criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, SO ORDERED. scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the
DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL
coupled with mistake." BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa
Quezon City, Philippines, AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER criminal or delito and mereculpa or fault, with
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the January 29, 1965. (p. 40, DEFENDANT THROUGH pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme
following grounds: Record [p. 21, Record on EMANCIPATION BY Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians,
Appeal.) MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.) and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the
same given act can result in civil liability not only
1. The present action is not under the Penal Code but also under the Civil
only against but a violation of Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito,
the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
section 1, Rule 107, which is of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee
now Rule III, of the Revised resolution the following assignment of errors: Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in
Rules of Court; Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First The, above case is pertinent
THE LOWER COURT ERRED Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was because it shows that the
IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY acquitted on the ground that his act was not same act machinist. come
under both the Penal Code
and the Civil Code. In that
case, the action of the agent
killeth unjustified and
fraudulent and therefore
could have been the subject of
a criminal action. And yet, it
was held to be also a proper
subject of a civil action under
article 1902 of the Civil Code.
It is also to be noted that it
was the employer and not the
employee who was being
sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the
defendant in the above case
could have been prosecuted in
a criminal case because his
negligence causing the death
of the child was punishable by
the Penal Code. Here is
therefore a clear instance of
the same act of negligence
being a proper subject matter
either of a criminal action
with its consequent civil
liability arising from a crime
or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for
fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code.
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the
separate individuality of
a cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana, under the Civil
Code has been fully and
clearly recognized, even with
regard to a negligent act for
which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case
and for which, after such a
conviction, he could have
been sued for this civil
liability arising from his
crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in
the case just cited, this Court
specifically applied article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is
thus that although J. V. House
could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or
simple negligence and not
only punished but also made
civilly liable because of his
criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court
awarded damages in an
independent civil action for
fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code.
(p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors,
and cases already invoked
should ordinarily be sufficient
to dispose of this case. But
inasmuch as we are
announcing doctrines that
have been little understood, in
the past, it might not he
inappropriate to indicate their
foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal
Code in articles 365 punishes
not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If we were
to hold that articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code refer
only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, accordingly
to the literal import of article
1093 of the Civil Code, the
legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very
little scope and application in
actual life. Death or injury to
persons and damage to
property- through any degree
of negligence - even the
slightest - would have to be
Idemnified only through the
principle of civil liability
arising from a crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere
would remain for cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana? We
are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to
bring about a situation so
absurd and anomalous. Nor
are we, in the interpretation
of the laws, disposed to
uphold the letter that killeth
rather than the spirit that
giveth life. We will not use the
literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost
lifeless a principle of such
ancient origin and such full-
grown development as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito,
which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to
1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code.
Secondary, to find the accused
guilty in a criminal case, proof
of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is required, while in a
civil case, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to make
the defendant pay in damages.
There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can
not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be
made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise. there would be
many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs.
"Ubi jus Idemnified remedium."
(p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad
sweep of the provisions of
both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code on this subject,
which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of
spheres already discussed,
and for lack of understanding
of the character and efficacy
of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up
a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the
civil responsibility arising
from a crime, forgetting that
there is another remedy,
which is by invoking articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method
is allowed by, our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered
practically useless and
nugatory the more
expeditious and effective
remedy based on culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra-
contractual. In the present
case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course.
But we believe it is high time
we pointed out to the harms
done by such practice and to
restore the principle of
responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles
1902 et seq. of the Civil Code
to its full rigor. It is high time
we caused the stream of
quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own
natural channel, so that its
waters may no longer be
diverted into that of a crime
under the Penal Code. This
will, it is believed, make for
the better safeguarding or
private rights because it
realtor, an ancient and
additional remedy, and for the
further reason that an
independent civil action, not
depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a
criminal prosecution, and
entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is
more likely to secure
 adequate and efficacious
redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might
get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts
from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence
of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein
referred to contemplate only acts of negligence
and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper
reflection would reveal that the thrust of the
pronouncements therein is not so limited, but
that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa.
This can be seen in the reference made therein to
the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of
February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case
of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed,
Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force
here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that
obligations "which are derived from acts or
omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject
of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers
to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the
underline qualification, "not punishable by law",
that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an
ultimo construction or interpretation of the
letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the
spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e
will not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito,
which is conserved and made enduring in
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code."
And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of
the Code Commission that drafted the original
text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that
the said Code, which was enacted after the
Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not
punishable by law," thereby making it clear that
the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts
which are criminal in character or in violation of
the penal law, whether voluntary or matter.
Thus, the corresponding provisions to said
Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article
1162, simply says, "Obligations derived
from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book,
(on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More
precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the
new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for
fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the
defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The
foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at
first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact
nature of criminal and civil negligence. The
former is a violation of the criminal law, while
the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of
ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual"
or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as
clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an
accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability
arising from criminal negligence, but for
damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa
aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double
recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p.
162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to
literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bacobo about construction
that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather
than that which is literal that killeth the intent of
the lawmaker should be observed in applying
the same. And considering that the preliminary
chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code
definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts
criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32)
from the civil responsibility arising from crime
fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under
Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also
the same separability, it is "more congruent with
the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in
harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the
felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic.
Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do
hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault
or negligencia covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
estinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal
Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability forquasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not
a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect
of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the
possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is
also Our considered opinion that the conclusion
of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from
responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is
terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by
marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or
by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable
the minor to administer his property as though
he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or
alienate or encumber real property without the
consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He
can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation
imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsible. The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company." In the
instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald,
although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence in question. Factually, therefore,
Reginald was still subservient to and dependent
on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to
Manresa, the reason behind the joint and
solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the
obligation of the parent to supervise their minor
children in order to prevent them from causing
damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the
clear implication of Article 399, in providing that
a minor emancipated by marriage may not,
nevertheless, sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents, is that such
emancipation does not carry with it freedom to
enter into transactions or do any act that can
give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id.,
Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing
someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise
stated, the marriage of a minor child does not
relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that
the child, while still a minor, does not give
answerable for the borrowings of money and
alienation or encumbering of real property
which cannot be done by their minor married
child without their consent. (Art. 399;
Manresa, supra.)
same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited
by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil.
576, 579).

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article

2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However,
inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of Separate Opinions
age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill
has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son. AQUINO, J, concurring:

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is
reversed and the trial court is ordered to
proceed in accordance with the foregoing
opinion. Costs against appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second
Division.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any
culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged
by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus
expressed is undoubtedly board enough to
include any rational conception of liability for
the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de
PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See
article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the
infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the
injured person in the same manner and to the
same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited
by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil.
576, 579)

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J, concurring:

Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any

culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged
by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus
expressed is undoubtedly board enough to
include any rational conception of liability for
the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de
PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See
article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the
infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the
injured person in the same manner and to the
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 34840 September 23, 1931
NARCISO GUTIERREZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BONIFACIO GUTIERREZ, MARIA V. DE
GUTIERREZ, MANUEL GUTIERREZ, ABELARDO
VELASCO, and SATURNINO
CORTEZ, defendants-appellants.
L.D. Lockwood for appellants Velasco and Cortez.
San Agustin and Roxas for other appellants.
Ramon Diokno for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an action brought by the plaintiff in the
Court of First Instance of Manila against the five
defendants, to recover damages in the amount of
P10,000, for physical injuries suffered as a result
of an automobile accident. On judgment being
rendered as prayed for by the plaintiff, both sets
of defendants appealed.
On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and an
automobile of private ownership collided while
attempting to pass each other on the Talon
bridge on the Manila South Road in the
municipality of Las Piñas, Province of Rizal. The
truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo
Velasco, and was owned by Saturnino Cortez.
The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio
Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and was owned
by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr. and Mrs.
Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the collision, the
father was not in the car, but the mother,
together will several other members of the
Gutierrez family, seven in all, were
accommodated therein. A passenger in the
autobus, by the name of Narciso Gutierrez, was
en route from San Pablo, Laguna, to Manila. The
collision between the bus and the automobile
resulted in Narciso Gutierrez suffering a fracture
right leg which required medical attendance for
a considerable period of time, and which even at
the date of the trial appears not to have healed
properly.
It is conceded that the collision was caused by
negligence pure and simple. The difference
between the parties is that, while the plaintiff
blames both sets of defendants, the owner of the
passenger truck blames the automobile, and the
owner of the automobile, in turn, blames the
truck. We have given close attention to these
highly debatable points, and having done so, a
majority of the court are of the opinion that the
findings of the trial judge on all controversial
questions of fact find sufficient support in the
record, and so should be maintained. With this
general statement set down, we turn to consider
the respective legal obligations of the
defendants.
In amplification of so much of the above
pronouncement as concerns the Gutierrez
family, it may be explained that the youth
Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur, that he
was driving at an excessive rate of speed, and
that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he
lost his head and so contributed by his
negligence to the accident. The guaranty given by
the father at the time the son was granted a
license to operate motor vehicles made the
father responsible for the acts of his son. Based
on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of
article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone
and not the minor or the mother, would be liable
for the damages caused by the minor.
We are dealing with the civil law liability of
parties for obligations which arise from fault or
negligence. At the same time, we believe that, as
has been done in other cases, we can take
cognizance of the common law rule on the same
subject. In the United States, it is uniformly held
that the head of a house, the owner of an
automobile, who maintains it for the general use
of his family is liable for its negligent operation
by one of his children, whom he designates or
permits to run it, where the car is occupied and
being used at the time of the injury for the
pleasure of other members of the owner's family
than the child driving it. The theory of the law is connection with other adjudications of this court,
that the running of the machine by a child to lead us to conclude that a total sum for the
carry other members of the family is within the plaintiff of P5,000 would be fair and reasonable.
scope of the owner's business, so that he is liable The difficulty in approximating the damages by
for the negligence of the child because of the monetary compensation is well elucidated by the
relationship of master and servant. (Huddy On divergence of opinion among the members of the
Automobiles, 6th ed., sec. 660; Missell vs. Hayes court, three of whom have inclined to the view
[1914], 91 Atl., 322.) The liability of Saturnino that P3,000 would be amply sufficient, while a
Cortez, the owner of the truck, and of his fourth member has argued that P7,500 would be
chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different none too much.
basis, namely, that of contract which, we think,
has been sufficiently demonstrated by the In consonance with the foregoing rulings, the
allegations of the complaint, not controverted, judgment appealed from will be modified, and
and the evidence. The reason for this conclusion the plaintiff will have judgment in his favor
reaches to the findings of the trial court against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez,
concerning the position of the truck on the Abelardo Velasco, and Saturnino Cortez, jointly
bridge, the speed in operating the machine, and and severally, for the sum of P5,000, and the
the lack of care employed by the chauffeur. While costs of both instances.
these facts are not as clearly evidenced as are
those which convict the other defendant, we
nevertheless hesitate to disregard the points Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand,
emphasized by the trial judge. In its broader Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
aspects, the case is one of two drivers
approaching a narrow bridge from opposite
directions, with neither being willing to slow up
and give the right of way to the other, with the
inevitable result of a collision and an accident.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The defendants Velasco and Cortez further I vote for an indemnity of P7,500.
contend that there existed contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, consisting
principally of his keeping his foot outside the
truck, which occasioned his injury. In this
connection, it is sufficient to state that, aside
from the fact that the defense of contributory
negligence was not pleaded, the evidence
bearing out this theory of the case is
contradictory in the extreme and leads us far
afield into speculative matters.
The last subject for consideration relates to the
amount of the award. The appellee suggests that
the amount could justly be raised to P16,517, but
naturally is not serious in asking for this sum,
since no appeal was taken by him from the
judgment. The other parties unite in challenging
the award of P10,000, as excessive. All facts
considered, including actual expenditures and
damages for the injury to the leg of the plaintiff,
which may cause him permanent lameness, in
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10134 June 29, 1957
SABINA EXCONDE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE
CAPUNO, defendants-appellees.
Magno T. Bueser for appellant.
Alver Law Offices and Edon B. Brion and Vencedor
A. Alimario for appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused
of double homicide through reckless imprudence
for the death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado
Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna (Criminal Case No. 15001).
During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of
the deceased Isidoro Caperina, reserved her
right to bring a separate civil action for damages
against the accused. After trial, Dante Capuno
was found guilty of the crime charged and, on
appeal, the Court Appeals affirmed the decision.
Dante Capuno was only (15) years old when he
committed the crime.
In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed
the present action against Delfin Capuno and his
son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the
aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of
her son Isidoro Caperiña. Defendants set up the
defense that if any one should be held liable for
the death of Isidoro Caperina, he is Dante
Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the
time of the accident, the former was not under
the control, supervision and custody, of the
latter. This defense was sustained by the lower
court and, as a consequence it only convicted
Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the
complaint. From decision, plaintiff appealed to
the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to
us on the ground that the appeal only involves
questions of law.
It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of
the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the
Bilintawak Elementary School situated in a
barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31,
1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose
Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city
school's supervisor. From the school Dante, with
other students, boarded a jeep and when the
same started to run, he took hold of the wheel
and drove it while the driver sat on his left side.
They have not gone far when the jeep turned
turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon
and Isidore Caperiña, died as a consequence. It
further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of
Dante, was not with his son at the time of the
accident, nor did he know that his son was going
to attend a parade. He only came to know it
when his son told him after the accident that he
attended the parade upon instruction of his
teacher.
The only issue involved in this appeal is whether
defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly
liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante,
for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro
Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor
Dante Capuno.
The case comes under Article 1903 of the
Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, which
provides:
ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by
the next preceding articles is
enforceable not only for personal acts
and omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom another is
responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are liable for
any damages caused by the minor
children who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts
and trades are liable for any damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices
while they are under their custody.
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno
is liable for the damages in question jointly and
severally with his son Dante because at the time
the latter committed the negligent act which
resulted in the death of the victim, he was a
minor and was then living with his father, and
inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the
civil liability of the father is evident. And so,
plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in
relieving the father from liability.
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under
the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of
arts and trades are liable for any damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they
are under their custody", but this provision only
applies to an institution of arts and trades and
not to any academic educational institution
(Padilla, Civil Law, 1953, Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See
12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557). Here Dante capuno
was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary
School and as part of his extra-curricular activity,
he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal
upon instruction of the city school's supervisor.
And it was in connection with that parade that
Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and
while driving it, the accident occurred. In the
circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of
that school, nor the city school's supervisor,
could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante
because he was not then a student of an institute
of arts and trades as provided by law.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the
father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, for any damages that may be caused by
the minor children who live with them, is
obvious. This is necessary consequence of the
parental authority they exercise over them
which imposes upon the parents the "duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them and instructing them
in proportion to their means", while, on the other
hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish
them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155,
Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they
can relieve themselves of this liability is if they
prove that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the
damage(Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish
Civil Code). This defendants failed to prove.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
modified in the sense that defendants Delfin
Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff,
jointly and severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as
damages, and the costs of action.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Labrador and Endencia,
JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
After mature consideration I believe we should
affirm the judgement relieving the father of
liability. I can see no sound reason for limiting
Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts
and trades and not to academic ones. What
substantial difference is there between them in
so far as, concerns the proper supervision and
vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be seriously
contended that an academic teacher is exempt
from the duty of watching do not commit a tort
to the detriment of third persons, so long as they
are in a position to exercise authority and
supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the
phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil
Code, the words "arts and trades" does not
qualify "teachers" but only "heads of
establishments". The phrase is only an updated
version of the equivalent terms "preceptors y
artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil
Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of
the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in
some culpa in vigilando that the parents,
teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in
the exercise of their authority, it would seem
clear that where the parent places the child
under the effective authority of the teacher, the
latter, and not the parent, should be the one
answerable for the torts committed while under
his custody, for the very reason that the parent is
not supposed to interfere with the discipline of
the school nor with the authority and
supervision of the teacher while the child is
under instruction. And if there is no authority,
there can be no responsibility.

In the case before us, there is no question that

the pupil, Dante Capuno, was instructed by the
City School Supervisor to attend the Rizal
parade. His father could not properly refuse to
allow the child to attend, in defiance of the
school authorities. The father had every reason
to assume that in ordering a minor to attend a
parade with other children, the school
authorities would provide adequate supervision
over them. If a teacher or scout master was
present, then he should be the one responsible
for allowing the minor to drive the jeep without
being qualified to do so. On the other hand, if no
teacher or master was at hand to watch over the
pupils, the school authorities are the ones
answerable for that negligence, and not the
father.

At any rate, I submit that the father should not be

held liable for a tort that he was in no way able
to prevent, and which he had every right to
assume the school authorities would avoid.
Having proved that he trusted his child to the
custody of school authorities that were
competent to exercise vigilance over him, the
father has rebutted the presumption of Art. 1903
and the burden of proof shifted to the claimant to
show actual negligence on the part of the parent
in order to render him liable.

Padilla and Reyes, A., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines with 6% annual interest thereon until paid. The
SUPREME COURT Court of Appeals modified the judgment by
Manila reducing the moral damages to P3,000.00. An
appeal was taken to this tribunal solely on
EN BANC questions of law.
Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of
G.R. No. L-14409 October 31, 1961
defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both
13 years old, on September 16, 1954. They were
AGAPITO FUELLAS, petitioner, classmates at St. Mary's High School, Dansalan
vs. City. In the afternoon of September 16, 1954,
ELPIDIO CADANO, ET AL., respondents. while Pepito was studying his lessons in the
classroom, Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto
Ambrosio Padilla, Feliciano C. Tumale and Cabanok and surreptitiously placed it inside the
Roberto R. Reverente for petitioner. pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to
Valerio V. Rovira for respondents. return the pencil, it was Pepito who returned the
same, an act which angered Rico, who held the
neck of Pepito and pushed him to the floor.
PAREDES, J.:
Villamira, a teacher, separated Rico and Pepito
and told them to go home. Rico went ahead, with
For serious physical injuries sustained by Pepito
Pepito following. When Pepito had just gone
Cadano, son of plaintiff-appellee Elpidio Cadano, down of the schoolhouse, he was met by Rico,
two separate actions were instituted, Civil Case
still in an angry mood. Angelito Aba, a classmate,
No. 583, filed on October 1, 1954, for damages told the two to shake hands. Pepito extended his
against Agapito Fuellas, father of the minor Rico
hand to Rico. Instead of accepting the proffer to
Fuellas, who caused the injuries, and Criminal shake hands, Rico held Pepito by the neck and
Case No. 1765, against Rico Fuellas, filed on
with his leg, placed Pepito out of balance and
November 11, 1954, for serious physical injuries. pushed him to the ground. Pepito fell on his right
They were tried jointly. On May 18, 1956, a side with his right arm under his body,
judgment of conviction in the criminal case was whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. While Rico
rendered, finding Rico Fuellas guilty of the was in such position, Pepito suddenly cried out
offense charged. No pronouncement as to his "My arm is broken." Rico then got up and went
civil liability was made, the trial judge having away. Pepito was helped by others to go home.
ruled that the same "shall be determined in Civil That same evening Pepito was brought to the
Case No. 583 of this Court." On May 25, 1956, the Lanao General Hospital for treatment (Exh. 4).
same court, rendered judgment in the civil case An X-Ray taken showed that there was a
making defendant therein, now appellant complete fracture of the radius and ulna of the
Agapito Fuellas, liable under Art. 2180 of the right forearm which necessitated plaster casting
new Civil Code for the following damages: — (Exhs. A, B and D). On November 20, 1954, more
than a month after Pepito's release from the
hospital, the plaster cast was removed. And up to
For medicine, etc. P1,000.00
the last day of hearing of the case, the right
forearm of Pepito was seen to be shorter than
For moral damages 6,000.00
the left forearm, still in bandage and could not be
fully used.
As exemplary damages 2,000.00
As attorney's fees 600.00 It is contended that in the decision of the Court
of Appeals, the petitioner-appellant was ordered
Total P9,600.00 to pay damages for the deliberate injury caused
by his son; that the said court held the petitioner
liable pursuant to par. 2 of Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code, in connection with Art. 2176 of the same
Code; that according to the last article, the act of
the minor must be one wherein "fault or
negligence" is present; and that there being no
fault or negligence on the part of petitioner-
appellant's minor son, but deliberate intent, the
above mentioned articles are not applicable, for
the existence of deliberate intent in the
commission of an act negatives the presence of
fault or negligence in its commission. Appellant,
therefore, submits that the appellate Court erred
in holding him liable for damages for the
deliberate criminal act of his minor son.
The above-mentioned provisions of the Civil
Code states: —
Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this chapter. (Article
2176)
The obligations imposed by article
2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible
for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx (Article 2180).
In the case of Araneta vs. Arreglado, G.R. No. L-
11394, prom. September 9, 1958, Benjamin
Araneta was talking with other students of the
Ateneo de Manila, seated atop a low ruined wall.
Dario Arreglado, a former student of the Ateneo,
chanced to pass by. The boys twitted him on his
leaving the Ateneo and enrolling in the De la
Salle College. Arreglado, resenting the banter,
pulled a Japanese luger pistol (licensed in the
name of his father Juan Arreglado), fired the
same at Araneta, hitting him in the lower jaw.
Dario was indicted for frustrated homicide and
pleaded guilty. But in view of his youth, he being
only 14 years of age, the Court suspended the
proceedings (Art. 80 of the Revised Penal Code).
Thereafter, action was instituted by Araneta and
his father against Juan Arreglado, his wife and
their son Dario to recover material, moral and
exemplary damages. The Court of First Instance
sentenced the Arreglados to pay P3,943.00 as
damages and attorney's fees. The Aranetas
appealed in view of the meager amount of
indemnity awarded. This tribunal affirmed the
decision but increased the indemnity to
P18,000.00. This decision was predicated upon
the fact that Arreglado's father had acted
negligently in allowing his son to have access to
the pistol used to injure Benjamin. And this was
the logical consequence of the case, considering
the fact that the civil law liability under Article
2180 is notrespondeat superior but the
relationship of pater familias which bases the
liability of the father ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of his minor son
(Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison, 55 Phil. 23), and
that if an injury is caused by the fault or
negligence of his minor son, the law presumes
that there was negligence on the part of his
father (Bahia vs. Litonjua y Leynes, 30 Phil., 625).
In an earlier case (Exconde vs. Capuno, et al., G.R.
No. L-10132, prom. June 29, 1957), holding the
defendants jointly and severally liable with his
minor son Dante for damages, arising from the
criminal act committed by the latter, this
tribunal gave the following reasons for the rule:
—
The civil liability which the law
imposes upon the father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, for
any damages that may be caused by the
minor children who live with them, is
obvious. This is a necessary
consequence of the parental authority
they exercise over them which imposes
upon the parents the "duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their
 company, educating them in proportion
to their means", while on the other
hand, gives them the "right to correct
and punish them in moderation" (Arts.
134 and 135, Spanish Civil Code). The
only way by which they can relieve
themselves of this liability is if they
prove that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage (Art. 1903, last
paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This,
defendants failed to prove.
And a noted Spanish commentator said: —
Since children and wards do not yet
have the capacity to govern themselves,
the law imposes upon the parents and
guardians the duty of exercising special
vigilance over the acts of their children
and wards in order that damages to
third persons due to the ignorance, lack
of foresight or discernment of such
children and wards may be avoided. If
the parents and guardians fail to
comply with this duty, they should
suffer the consequences of their
abandonment or negligence by
repairing the damage caused" (12
Manresa, 649-650). (See also Arts. 311
and 316, Civil Code).
It is further argued that the only way by which a
father can be made responsible for the criminal
act of his son committed with deliberate intent
and with discernment, is an action based on the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
subsidiary liability of the parents; that the minor
Fuellas having been convicted of serious physical
injuries at the age of 13, the provisions of par. 3
of Art. 12, Revised Penal Code, could have been
applied, but having acted with discernment, Art.
101 of the same Code can not include him. And
as par. 2, of Art. 101, states that "the exemption
from criminal liability established in
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in
subdivision 4 of Art. 11 of this Code does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall
be enforced subject to the following rules: First,
in cases of subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of Article 12,
the civil liability for acts committed by an
imbecile or insane person and by a person under
nine years of age or by one over nine but under
fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment, shall devolve upon those having
such person under their legal authority or
control, unless it appears that there was no fault
or negligence on their part," the appellant
concluded that this provision covers only a
situation where a minor under 15 but over 9
years old commits a criminal act "without
discernment."
In the recent case of Salen and Salbanera vs. Jose
Balce, G.R. No. L-14414, April 27, 1960; 57 Off.
Gaz. No. 37, p. 6603, September 11, 1961, the
defendant Balce was the father of a minor
Gumersindo Balce, below 18 years of age who
was living with him. Gumersindo was found
guilty of homicide for having killed Carlos Salen,
minor son of plaintiffs. The trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the case, stating that the
civil liability of the minor son of defendant
arising from his criminal liability must be
determined under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code and not under Art. 2180 of the new
Civil Code. In reversing the decision, this tribunal
held: —
It is true that under Art. 101 of the
Revised Penal Code, a father is made
civilly liable for the acts committed by
his son only if the latter is an imbecile,
an insane, under 9 years of age, or over
9 but under 15 years of age, who acts
without discernment, unless it appears
that there is no fault or negligence on
his part. This is because a son who
commits the act under any of those
conditions is by law exempt from
criminal liability (Article 12,
subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal
Code). The idea is not to leave the act
entirely unpunished but to attach
certain civil liability to the person who
has the delinquent minor under his
legal authority or control. But a minor
over 15 who acts with discernment is
not exempt from criminal liability, for
which reason the Code is silent as to
the subsidiary liability of his parents Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion,
should he stand convicted. In that case, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.
resort should be had to the general law Bautista and Barrera, JJ., took no part.
which is our Civil Code.
The particular law that governs this
case is Article 2180, the pertinent
portion of which provides: "The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsible for
damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company." To hold
that this provision does not apply to the
instant case because it only covers
obligations which arise from quasi-
delicts and not obligations which arise
from criminal offenses, would result in
the absurdity that while for an act
where mere negligence intervenes the
father or mother may stand subsidiarily
liable for the damage caused by his or
her son, no liability would attach if the
damage is caused with criminal intent.
Verily, the void apparently exists in the
Revised Penal Code is subserved by this
particular provision of our Civil Code,
as may be gleaned from some recent
decisions of this Court which cover
equal or identical cases.
Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the
Court of Appeals on the basis of the evidence
submitted therein by both parties, independently
of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault
or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the
action in the present case was instituted, is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from fault of negligence under
the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind
the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated,
any discussion as to the minor's criminal
responsibility is of no moment.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is dismissed, the
decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against the petitioner.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970
MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor
represented by her father ULISES P. CUADRA,
ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ALFONSO MONFORT, defendant-appellant.
Rodolfo J. Herman for plaintiffs-appellees.
Luis G. Torres and Abraham E. Tionko for
defendant-appellant.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an action for damages based on quasi-
delict, decided by the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental favorably to the plaintiffs and
appealed by the defendant to the Court of
Appeals, which certified the same to us since the
facts are not in issue.
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa
Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the
Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. On
July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them,
together with three other classmates, to weed
the grass in the school premises. While thus
engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic
headband, an ornamental object commonly worn
by young girls over their hair. Jokingly she said
aloud that she had found an earthworm and,
evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the
object at her. At that precise moment the latter
turned around to face her friend, and the object
hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she
rubbed the injured part and treated it with some
powder. The next day, July 10, the eye became
swollen and it was then that the girl related the
incident to her parents, who thereupon took her
to a doctor for treatment. She underwent
surgical operation twice, first on July 20 and
again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the
hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of
which the parents spent the sum of P1,703.75.
Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria
Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her
right eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the
parents in behalf of their minor daughter against
Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father,
the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as
actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages;
and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs
of the suit.
The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability
of a parent for an act of his minor child which
causes damage to another under the specific
facts related above and the applicable provisions
of the Civil Code, particularly Articles 2176 and
2180 thereof, which read:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by provisions of this
Chapter.
ART 2180. The obligation
imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity are
responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of
in this Article shall cease
when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to
prevent damage.
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by
Article 2176 is the fault or negligence
accompanying the act or the omission, there
being no willfulness or intent to cause damage
thereby. When the act or omission is that of one
person for whom another is responsible, the
latter then becomes himself liable under Article
2180, in the different cases enumerated therein,
such as that of the father or the mother under
the circumstances above quoted. The basis of
this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in
Article 2176, fault or negligence, which is
presumed from that which accompanied the
causative act or omission. The presumption is
merely prima facieand may therefore be
rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference
that may be drawn from the last paragraph of
Article 2180, which states "that the
responsibility treated of in this Article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage."
Since the fact thus required to be proven is a
matter of defense, the burden of proof
necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is
the exact degree of diligence contemplated, and
how does a parent prove it in connection with a
particular act or omission of a minor child,
especially when it takes place in his absence or
outside his immediate company? Obviously there
can be no meticulously calibrated measure
applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all
the diligence of a good father of the family to
prevent damage," it implies a consideration of
the attendant circumstances in every individual
case, to determine whether or not by the
exercise of such diligence the damage could have
been prevented.
In the present case there is nothing from which it
may be inferred that the defendant could have
prevented the damage by the observance of due
care, or that he was in any way remiss in the
exercise of his parental authority in failing to
foresee such damage, or the act which caused it.
On the contrary, his child was at school, where it
was his duty to send her and where she was, as
he had the right to expect her to be, under the
care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as
the act which caused the injury was concerned, it
was an innocent prank not unusual among
children at play and which no parent, however
careful, would have any special reason to
anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it
reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed
any trait in the child's character which would
reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for
which the blame could be attributed to her
parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little
commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy
that befell her. But if the defendant is at all
obligated to compensate her suffering, the
obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in
court, but only the moral compulsion of good
conscience.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the
complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement
as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro,
Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Fernando, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
I am afraid I cannot go along with my esteemed
colleagues in holding that the act of appellant's
daughter does not constitute fault within the
contemplation of our law or torts. She was 13
years and should have known that by jokingly
saying "aloud that she had found an earthworm
and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed
the object at her," it was likely that something
would happen to her friend, as in fact, she was
hurt.

As to the liability of appellant as father, I prefer

to hold that there being no evidence that he had
properly advised his daughter to behave
properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her
classmate and playmates, he can be liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in
the record to show that he had done anything at
all to even try to minimize the damage caused
upon plaintiff child.

# Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., dissenting:

I am afraid I cannot go along with my esteemed

colleagues in holding that the act of appellant's
daughter does not constitute fault within the
contemplation of our law or torts. She was 13
years and should have known that by jokingly
saying "aloud that she had found an earthworm
and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed
the object at her," it was likely that something
would happen to her friend, as in fact, she was
hurt.

As to the liability of appellant as father, I prefer

to hold that there being no evidence that he had
properly advised his daughter to behave
properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her
classmate and playmates, he can be liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in
the record to show that he had done anything at
all to even try to minimize the damage caused
upon plaintiff child.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and
AURELIA TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON.
ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20,
Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and
CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a
minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted
in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for
damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil
Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo,
Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner
spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's
natural parents against respondent spouses
Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents with whom he was living at the time of
the tragic incident. In addition to this case for
damages, a criminal information or Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence was filed
[Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto
Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and
exempted from criminal liability on the ground
that he bad acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981,
the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a
petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in
Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition
for adoption was grunted on, 18 November
1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed
Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc,
Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of
the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that
not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely
the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were
indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents
from the moment the successful petition for
adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since
Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with
his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing
and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed
petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent
natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not
indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's
Decision on 7 December 1987. Within the 15-day
reglementary period, or on 14 December 1987,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
followed by a supplemental motion for
reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It
appearing, however, that the motions failed to
comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Revised Rules of Court — that notice of the
motion shall be given to all parties concerned at
least three (3) days before the hearing of said
motion; and that said notice shall state the time
and place of hearing — both motions were
denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18
April 1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners filed a
notice of appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988,
the trial court dismissed the notice at appeal, this
time ruling that the notice had been filed beyond
the 15-day reglementary period ending 22
December 1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a
petitionfor mandamus and certiorari questioning
the trial court's Decision dated 3 December 1987
and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June
1988, The Court of Appeals dismissed the period for appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v.
petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their Court of Appeals: 3
right to appeal.
Dismissal of appeal; purely on
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners technical grounds is frowned
once again contend that respondent spouses upon where the policy of the
Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the courts is to encourage
action for damages caused by the acts of their hearings of appeal on their
minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of this merits. The rules of procedure
Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) ought not be applied in a very
whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss rigid technical sense, rules of
of their right to appeal, may still file the instant procedure are used only to
Petition; conversely, whether the Court may still help secure not override,
take cognizance of the case even through substantial justice. if d
petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time; technical and rigid
and (2) whether or not the effects of adoption, enforcement of the rules is
insofar as parental authority is concerned may made their aim would be
be given retroactive effect so as to make the defeated. 4
adopting parents the indispensable parties in a
damage case filed against their adopted child, for 2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's
acts committed by the latter, when actual
voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with
custody was yet lodged with the biological an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-
parents.
delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil
Code provides:
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion
(and supplemental motion) for reconsideration
Whoever by act or omission
filed before the trial court, not having complied causes damage to another,
with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41,
there being fault or
and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of negligence, is obliged to pay
Court, were considered pro forma and hence did
for the damage done. Such
not interrupt and suspend the reglementary fault or negligence, if there is
period to appeal: the trial court held that the
no pre-existing contractual
motions, not having contained a notice of time relation between the parties,
and place of hearing, had become useless pieces
is called a quasi-delict . . .
of paper which did not interrupt the
reglementary period. 1 As in fact repeatedly held
by this Court, what is mandatory is the service of Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil
the motion on the opposing counsel indicating liability upon the father and, in case of his death
the time and place of hearing. 2 or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that
may be caused by a minor child who lives with
them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
In view, however, of the nature of the issue
raised in the instant. Petition, and in order that
substantial justice may be served, the Court, The obligation imposed by
article 2176 is demandable
invoking its right to suspend the application of
technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, not only for one's own acts or
elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been omissions, but also for those
seasonably filed before the trial court, and the of persons for whom one is
motion (and supplemental motion) for responsible.
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial
court as having interrupted the reglementary
 The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for
the damages caused by
the minor children who live in
their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of
in this Article shall cease
when the person herein
mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to
prevent damage. (Emphasis
supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of
what is frequently designated as vicarious
liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence"
under Anglo-American tort law, where a person
is not only liable for torts committed by himself,
but also for torts committed by others with
whom he has a certain relationship and for
whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability
is made a natural or logical consequence of the
duties and responsibilities of parents — their
parental authority — which includes the
instructing, controlling and disciplining of the
child. 5 The basis for the doctrine of vicarious
liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v.
Manila Railroad Co. 6 in the following terms:
With respect to extra-
contractual obligation arising
from negligence, whether of
act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature
to elect — and our Legislature
has so elected — to limit such
liability to cases in which the
person upon whom such an
obligation is imposed is
morally culpable or, on the
contrary, for reasons of public
policy. to extend that liability,
without regard to the lack of
moral culpability, so as to
include responsibility for the
negligence of those persons
whose acts or omissions are
imputable, by a legal fiction, to
others who are in a position to
exercise an absolute or limited
control over them. The
legislature which adopted our
Civil Code has elected to limit
extra-contractual liability —
with certain well-defined
exceptions — to cases in
which moral culpability can be
directly imputed to the persons
to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in
having failed to exercise due
care in one's own acts, or
in having failed to exercise due
care in the selection and
control of one's agent or
servants, or in the control of
persons who, by reasons of
their status, occupy a position
of dependency with respect to
the person made liable for
their conduct. 7(Emphasis
Supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents
for the torts of their minor children
living with them, may be seen to be
based upon the parental authority
vested by the Civil Code upon such
parents. The civil law assumes that
when an unemancipated child living
with its parents commits a tortious
acts, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural
duty closely to supervise the child who
is in their custody and control. Parental
liability is, in other words, anchored
upon parental authority coupled with
presumed parental dereliction in the
discharge of the duties accompanying
such authority. The parental dereliction
is, of course, only presumed and the
presumption can be overtuned under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof
that the parents had exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by
Adelberto with an air rifle occured when
parental authority was still lodged in respondent
Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor
Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural
parents who had then actual custody of the
minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to
the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however,
stoutly maintain that because a decree of
adoption was issued by the adoption court in
favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority
was vested in the latter as adopting parentsas of
the time of the filing of the petition for
adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot
Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses
contend that they were therefore free of any
parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly
tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of
the Child and Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads
as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. —
If, after considering the report
of the Department of Social
Welfare or duly licensed child
placement agency and the
evidence submitted before it,
the court is satisfied that the
petitioner is qualified to
maintain, care for, and
educate the child, that the
trial custody period has been
completed, and that the best
interests of the child will be
promoted by the adoption, a
decree of adoption shall be
entered, which shall be
effective he date the original
petition was filed. The decree
shall state the name by which
the child is thenceforth to be
known. (Emphasis supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that
the above Article 36 should be read in
relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. —
The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority
vested in the natural parents,
except where the adopter is
the spouse of the surviving
natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
and urge that their Parental authority must be
deemed to have been dissolved as of the time the
Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted,
under the Civil Code, the basis of parental
liability for the torts of a minor child is the
relationship existing between the parents and
the minor child living with them and over whom,
the law presumes, the parents exercise
supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
Article 58 Torts — Parents
and guardians are responsible
for the damage caused by the
child under their parental
authority in accordance with
the civil Code. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the
Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the
requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act,
shall have beer in the actual custody of the
parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing
damage:
 Art. 221. Parents and other
persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable
for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or
omissions of their
unemancipated children living
in their company and under
their parental authority
subject to the appropriate
defenses provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is
properly regarded as having been retroactively
transferred to and vested in the adopting
parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air
rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that
retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the
adopting parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physically
custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect
may perhaps be given to the granting of the
petition for adoption where such is essential to
permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage
in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case,
however, to hold that parental authority had
been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura
spouses so as to burden them with liability for a
tortious act that they could not have foreseen
and which they could not have prevented (since
they were at the time in the United States and
had no physical custody over the child
Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable.
Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent
with the philosophical and policy basis
underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put
a little differently, no presumption of parental
dereliction on the part of the adopting parents,
the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since
Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control
at the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code
fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article 35
provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No
petition for adoption shall be
finally granted unless and Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero,
until the adopting parents are concur.
given by the courts a
supervised trial custody
period of at least six months to
assess their adjustment and
emotional readiness for the
legal union. During the period
of trial custody, parental
authority shall be vested in the
adopting parents. (Emphasis
supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is
provisionally vested in the adopting parents
during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the
issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely
because the adopting parents are given actual
custody of the child during such trial period. In the
instant case, the trial custody period either had
not yet begun or bad already been completed at
the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case,
actual custody of Adelberto was then with his
natural parents, not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent
Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents,
were indispensable parties to the suit for
damages brought by petitioners, and that the
dismissal by the trial court of petitioners'
complaint, the indispensable parties being
already before the court, constituted grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6
September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners'
complaint filed before the trial court is hereby
REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that
court for further proceedings consistent with
this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc
spouses. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR
MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court, seeks to annul the March 17, 2010
Decision1 of the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-
0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v.
Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime
Services, Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is not a
beneficiary of the deceased employee under
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended by PD 626.2
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was
employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime
Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk
Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was
enrolled under the government's Employees'
Compensation Program (ECP).3 Unfortunately,
on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board
the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John,
which led to his untimely death the following
day.4
John was, at the time of his death, childless and
unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome, John’s biological mother and,
allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a
claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the
Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando
City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office,
in a letter dated June 10, 20095 addressed to
petitioner, denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due
course to your claim because you are no longer
considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he
was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based
on documents you submitted to us.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees’
Compensation Commission (ECC), which
affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch
through the assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby dismissed for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union
branch and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s
entitlement to the death benefits sought after
under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer
be considered John’s primary beneficiary. As
culled from the records, John and his sister
Elizabeth were adopted by their great
grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio
Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in
Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial
Court in Laoag City dated February 4, 1985,
which decree of adoption attained
finality.8Consequently, as argued by the agencies,
it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary
beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC
reasoned, would petitioner qualify as John’s
secondary beneficiary even if it wereproven that
Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC
ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended,
provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the
"dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who are the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent
parentsand subject to the restrictions imposed
on dependent children, the illegitimate children
and legitimate descendants who are the
secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the
dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
considered as a primary beneficiary when there
are no other dependent children who are
qualified and eligible for monthly income
benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above
provision relates to the legitimate parent of the
covered member, as provided for by Rule XV,
Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation. This Commission
believes that the appellant is not considered a
legitimate parent of the deceased, having given
up the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C.
Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her
of the statusas the legitimate parent of the
deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic]
to the biological parent of the adopted child shall
now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this
case, the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as
amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to
file the claim, is the adoptive father of the
deceased and not herein appellant.9(Emphasis
supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by
the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the
petition:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is
contrary to evidence on record.
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave
abuse in denying the just, due and
lawful claims of the petitioner as a
lawful beneficiary of her deceased
biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC committed
grave abuse of discretion in not giving
due course/denying petitioner’s
otherwise meritorious motion for
reconsideration.11
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are
the biological parents of the covered, but legally
adopted, employee considered secondary
beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate
cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent
with the evidence on record
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the
ECC denied petitioner’s claim for death benefits
is that eventhough she is John’s biological
mother, it was allegedly not proven that his
adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. As
intimated by the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the
records as to whether the legally adoptive
parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would
immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner]
for Social Security benefits. Hence, absent such
proof of death of the adoptive father, this
Commission will presume him to be alive and
well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the
benefit being the primary beneficiary of the
deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is
indeed a qualified beneficiary under the Social
Security law, in view of her status as other
beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally
provided by law to the primary beneficiary, in
this case the adoptive father since he is still alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC
on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative
agencies are generally accorded great respect, if
not finality, by the courts by reason of the special
knowledge and expertise of said administrative
agenciesover matters falling under their
jurisdiction.12 However, in the extant case, the
ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence
offered by the petitioner – Cornelio’s death
certificate.13
Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears
that John’s adoptive father died on October 26,
1987,14 or only less than three (3) years since the
decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which
attained finality.15 As such, it was error for the
ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven
that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already
passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the
legitimate parents is contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not
petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim
in view of John’s work-related demise. The
pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167
(j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this
Title unless the context indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse
until he remarries and dependent children, who
are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence,
the dependent parents and subject to the
restrictions imposed on dependent children, the
illegitimate children and legitimate descendants
who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided,
that the dependent acknowledged natural child
shall be considered as a primary beneficiary
when there are no other dependent children who
are qualified and eligible for monthly income
benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article
177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o approve rules
and regulations governing the processing of
claims and the settlement of disputes arising
therefrom as prescribed by the System," the ECC
has issued the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation, interpreting the above-cited
provision as follows:
RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be
either primary or secondary, and determined
atthe time of employee’s death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be
considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse
living with the employee at
the time of the employee’s
death until he remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated,
legally adopted or
acknowledged natural
children, who are unmarried
not gainfully employed, not
over 21 years of age, or over
21 years of age provided that
he is incapacitated and
incapable of self - support due
to physicalor mental defect
which is congenital or
acquired during minority;
Provided, further, that a
dependent acknowledged
natural child shall be
considered as a primary
beneficiary only when there
are no other dependent
children who are qualified
and eligible for monthly
income benefit; provided
finally, that if there are two or
more acknowledged natural
children, they shall be
counted from the youngest
and without substitution, but
not exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be
considered secondary:
(1) The legitimate
parentswholly dependent
upon the employee for regular
support;
(2) The legitimate
descendants and illegitimate
children who are unmarried,
not gainfully employed, and
not over 21 years of age, or
over 21 years of age
providedthat he is
incapacitated and incapable of
self - support dueto physical
or mental defect which is
congenital or acquired during
minority. (Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s
claim on the ground that she is no longer the
deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by the
implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the
adoption decree severed the relation between
John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of
the status of a legitimate parent, and,
consequently, that of being a secondary
beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation deviates from the
clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code,
as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as
amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC
indulged in an unauthorized administrative
legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art.
167 of the Code an interpretation not
contemplated by the provision. Pertinent in
elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones, and their violation or non-observance shall
not beexcused by disuse, or custom or practice to
the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco
Corporation16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making
power must be confined to details for regulating
the mode or proceedings in order to carry into
effect the law as it has been enacted, and it
cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute. Administrative
regulations must always be in harmony with the
provisions of the law because any resulting
discrepancy between the two will always be
resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis
supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of
the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation is patently a wayward restriction
of and a substantial deviation from Article 167
(j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the
phrase "dependent parents" to refer to
"legitimate parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory
construction was resolved by this Court in Diaz
v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives"
should be construed in its general acceptation.
Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in
the Code, is not defined by it. In
accordancetherefore with the canons of
statutory interpretation, it should beunderstood
to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch
as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt
generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not
make a distinction prevents us from making one:
Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera
debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term
relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive
sense thanit is used and intended is not
warranted by any rule ofinterpretation. Besides,
he further states that when the law intends to
use the termin a more restrictive sense, it
qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in
Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and
when used in a statute it embraces not only
collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the
person spoken of, unless the context indicates
that it was used in a more restrictive or limited
sense — which as already discussed earlier, is
not so in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the
phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand
ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot
be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what
the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents"
should, therefore, include all parents, whether
legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature
or by adoption. When the law does not
distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly,
"dependent parents" are parents, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by
adoption,who are in need of support or
assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched,
clearly shows that Congress did not intend to
limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely
legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive,
Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the
dependent parents and subject to the
restrictions imposed on dependent children, the
illegitimate children and legitimate descendants
who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the
lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to
mean legitimate parents, then it would have
simply said descendants and not "legitimate
descendants." The manner by which the
provision in question was crafted undeniably
show that the phrase "dependent parents" was
intended to cover all parents – legitimate,
illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules
on Employees’ Compensation is in contravention
of the equal protection clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the
Labor Code provision is an affront to the
Constitutional guarantee of equal protection
under the laws for the rule, as worded, prevents
the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming
benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as
amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such
postulation cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
It requires public bodies and institutions to treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner.18 In other words, the concept of equal
justice under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions
between individuals solely on differences that
are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective.19
The concept of equal protection, however, does
not require the universal application of the laws
to all persons or things without distinction. What
it simply requires isequality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification.
Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be
valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The
test has four requisites: (1) The classification
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification."20
In the instant case, there is no compelling
reasonable basis to discriminate against
illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited
rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim
of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably
failed the test of reasonableness since the
classification is not germane to the law being
implemented. We see no pressing government
concern or interest that requires protection so as
to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried
parents on one hand and the rationale behind
the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can
better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD
626 – that employees and their dependents may
promptly secure adequate benefits in the event
of work-connected disability or death - will be
better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code
is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting
secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate
ones, there can be no other course of action to
take other than to strikedown as
unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as
appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the
Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional
violation of the adverted rule, the ECC extended
illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims
for and receive death benefitsby equating
dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of
parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the
ECC in its assailed Decision, had petitioner not
given up John for adoption, she could have still
claimed death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the
rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain
to those who exercise parental authority over
the employee enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only
in the assailed Decision wherein such
qualification was made. In addition, assuming
arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its
boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code
provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents,
and that the commission properly equated
legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can
still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then
about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental
authority over John was severed. However, lest it
be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed,
aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the
adoptive parent died less than three (3) years
after the adoption decree, John was still a minor,
at about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death
is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under
such circumstance, parental authority should be
deemed to have reverted in favor of the
biological parents. Otherwise, taking into
account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a
personal relationship and that there are no
collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who
was then left to care for the minor adopted child
if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and
legal custody in favor of the biological parents is
not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act
No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition
[for rescission of adoption] is granted, the
parental authority of the adoptee's biological
parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the
Department shall be restored if the adoptee is
still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal
rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the
adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
(emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by
analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned.1âwphi1 The manner herein of
terminating the adopter’s parental authority,
unlike the grounds for rescission,23 justifies the
retention of vested rights and obligations
between the adopter and the adoptee, while the
consequent restoration of parental authority in
favor of the biological parents, simultaneously,
ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is
not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by
analogy, especially since RA 8552 was enacted
after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a
lacuna in the law as to which provision shall
govern contingencies in all fours with the factual
milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We
are guided by the catena of cases and the state
policies behind RA 855224 wherein the
paramount consideration is the best interest of
the child, which We invoke to justify this
disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of
the child that someone will remain charged for
his welfare and upbringing should his or her
adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to
perform his duties as a parent at a time the
adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our
mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of
the adopter, no one else could reasonably be
expected to perform the role of a parent other
than the adoptee’s biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact
that even though parental authority is severed
by virtue of adoption, the ties between the
adoptee and the biological parents are not
entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the
biological parents, insome instances, are able to
inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from
Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the
estate of the adopted shall be governed by the
following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate,
or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted
concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the
entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the
parents or ascendants and the other half, by the
adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the
adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal
or intestate succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death,
which was prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the
New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child,
leaving no children or descendants, his parents
and relatives by consanguinity and not by
adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the
biological parents retain their rights of
succession tothe estate of their child who was
the subject of adoption. While the benefits
arising from the death of an SSS covered
employee do not form part of the estateof the
adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or
intestate succession at least reveals the policy on
the rights of the biological parents and those by
adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits
from the adopted. In the same way that certain
rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation,
so too should certain obligations, which, We rule,
include the exercise of parental authority, in the
event of the untimely passing of their minor
offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave
undetermined the fate of a minor child whose
second chance ata better life under the care of
the adoptive parents was snatched from him by
death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted
child’s quality of life might have been better off
not being adopted at all if he would only find
himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that
Cornelio’s death at the time of John’sminority
resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s
parental authority over the adopted child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17,
the fact of petitioner’s dependence on John can 2010 is bereft of legal basis. Cornelio’s adoption
be established from the documentary evidence of John, without more, does not deprive
submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the petitioner of the right to receive the benefits
records, petitioner, prior to John’s adoption, was stemming from John’s death as a dependent
a housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984, parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during
leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption
But since she was unable to "give a bright future already died, then the death benefits under the
to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue
consented to Cornelio’s adoption of Johnand solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining
Elizabeth in 1985. beneficiary.
Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
reveal, both petitioner and John repeatedly The March 17, 2010 Decision of the Employees'
reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-
Norte" as their residence. In fact, this 18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
veryaddress was used in John’s Death The ECC is hereby directed to release the
Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the
of Personal Injury or Loss of Life accomplished deceased covered employee John Colcol to
by the master of the vessel boarded by petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome.
John.26 Likewise, this is John’s known address as
per the ECC’s assailed Decision.27Similarly, this No costs.
same address was used by petitioner in filing her
claim before the SSS La Union branch and,
thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it SO ORDERED.
can be assumed that aside from having been
restored parental authority over John, petitioner
indeed actually execised the same, and that they
lived together under one roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named
petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his
benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the
"Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not
cover compensation for work-related deaths or
injury and expressly allows the designation of
beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the
member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act
of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least
evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner
as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence
of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during
John’s minority, the restoration ofpetitioner’s
parental authority, the documents showing
singularity of address, and John’s clear intention
to designate petitioner as a beneficiary -
effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled
to death benefit claims as a secondary
beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 139751-52. January 26, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
NOEL DARILAY, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The Spouses Pascual and Gemma Arganda
were the parents of five children, the eldest of
whom was Marilyn who was born on October 24,
1988.[1] The second child, Ailyn, was born
on September 14, 1990.[2] The couple and their
children resided in Sitio Magrimpong, Sta. Cruz,
Tinambac, Camarines Sur.[3] The couple knew the
appellant, Noel Darilay, their 15-year-old
barriomate because he and his friends
frequented their house.
At 7:30 a.m. on April 19, 1997, Hercules
Bon was in the house of his uncle at
Magrimpong, Sta. Cruz, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. At about 8:00 a.m., his cousin, the
appellant, arrived. Their friend, Jose Delfino, also
arrived. They had a drinking spree and
consumed two bottles of gin. After about thirty
minutes, the appellant left because his father had
arrived and was looking for him.[4]
At about 9:00 a.m., Marilyn and Ailyn were
asked by their parents to buy tinapa (dried fish)
from a store about half a kilometer away from
their residence. They used a foot path to get to
the store. After buying the dried fish, they
walked back home. Momentarily, they saw the
appellant emerge from a catmon tree.[5] He
struck Ailyn twice with a piece of wood on her
back and boxed her on the left side of her face.
She felt excruciating pain on her back and face,
and all over her body. She fell unconscious.[6] The
appellant then struck Marilyn twice on the back
with the piece of wood. He then carried Ailyn to a
grassy area and left her there. When Ailyn
regained her bearings, she looked for Marilyn
but the appellant and her sister were nowhere to
be found.[7]
Ailyn then rushed back home and told her
mother what happened to her and
Marilyn.[8] Their neighbor, Allan Candelaria, then
rushed to the farm where Pascual worked as a
laborer and informed him of what happened to
his daughters.[9] Pascual hurried home and
looked for Marilyn in Sitio Magrimpong and
within the vicinity of the river, to no avail. He
rushed back home and after a while left again to
resume his search for Marilyn. Again, he failed to
find her.[10] He searched anew for his daughter
with the help of neighbors at around1:00 p.m.,
again to no avail.
At 11:00 a.m. earlier that day, Andres
Arganda, the victims uncle reported the incident
to the police station. SPO1 Teresito Porteza,
SPO1 Ernesto Ablaza and PO3 Antonio Pacardo
rushed to the scene.[11] With the help of tanods,
they searched for Marilyn in the place where the
appellant attacked the girls. About 15 meters
away, they found a yellow-and-white-colored
dress,[12] white panties,[13] and a slipper bearing
the name of Marilyn. The dress was torn.[14] In
the meantime, Bon went back home and was
informed that the appellant was wanted for the
injuries of Ailyn and Marilyn. He looked for the
appellant and found him in the house of
Jose Delfino.[15]
While the policemen were conducting their
investigation, the appellant arrived accompanied
by PO3 Antonio Pacardo. When asked where
Marilyn was, he told the police that she was
about 30 meters away. Upon the policemens
failure to find the girl, the appellant finally told
them where Marilyn was and volunteered to
accompany them to the place. The policemen, the
appellant and Pascual Arganda then left and
proceeded to Palinao River, at Sitio Palinao,
Binalay, Tinambac. They found Marilyns body in
a grassy area near bushes and trees along
the Palinao River.[16] She was lying face down,
her legs spread apart and was completely
naked. There was blood on her nose, her mouth,
and her vagina. Her hair was disheveled.
Photographer John Francis Madrigal took
pictures of Marilyn at the place where she was
found.[17] The policemen arrested the appellant
and had him detained in jail.
Municipal Health Officer Dr. Salvador
V. Betito, Jr., performed an autopsy of the
cadaver and prepared a report thereon which
contained the following findings:
Post-mortem examination findings:
1. Abrasions, multiple, face.
2. Avulsion, 1 cm. x 3 cms., chin.
3. Abrasions, multiple, left and right shoulder
and anterior chest wall.
4. Depressed fractures, occipital bone of the
head.
5. Abrasions, multiple, posterior chest wall.
Vaginal Examination:
a. Labia majora blood-stained, slightly
prominent and distinctly
gaping.
b. Lacerations big, at six oclock position.
c. Vaginal canal reddened, presence of oozing
blood.
Conclusions: She had sexual intercourse with a
man.
Cause of Death: Internal hemorrhage secondary
to depressed fractures of the skull.[18]
The doctor testified that the most fatal
wound inflicted on Marilyn was wound no. 4. He
also examined Ailyn and signed a report stating
that the victim sustained the following injuries:
Medical Certificate of Ailyn Arganda
Pertinent Physical Examination Findings:
1. Contusion, occipital aspect of the head.
2. Abrasions, multiple, posterior aspect of the
chest.
3. Contusion, left zygomatic aspect of the face.[19]
The appellant was charged of attempted
murder under an Amended Information filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur,
Branch 63, docketed as Criminal Case No.
RTC97-202, the accusatory portion of which
reads:
That on or about the 19th day of April 1997, at
Sitio Magrimpong, Barangay Sta. Cruz,
Municipality of Tinambac, Province
of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts by then and there with treachery
and abuse of superior strength assaulting and
hitting with a piece of wood one AILYN
ARGANDA, a seven (7) year old child, who as a
consequence thereof, lost consciousness but the
accused was not able to perform all the acts of
execution which should have produced the
felony intended by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance, that is, due to her tenacity to live and
the fact that she was not fatally hit when she was
struck with the said piece of wood, to the
damage and prejudice of said offended party.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[20]
The appellant was, likewise, charged with
rape with homicide in an Amended Information
filed in the same court, docketed as Criminal
Case No. RTC97-201, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about the 19th day of April 1997,
at Sitio Magrimpong, Barangay Sta. Cruz,
Municipality of Tinambac, Province of Camarines
Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd design did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously strike with a piece of
wood one Marilyn Arganda, an eight (8) year old
child as a consequence thereof she lost
consciousness and when said child victim was
thus unconscious or while hovering between life
and death, accused Noel Darilay did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously in
order to satisfy his lust, had carnal knowledge
with said child victim by means of force as a
result of which Marilyn Arganda suffered an
untimely and cruel death, to the damage and
prejudice of the private offended party.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[21]
A joint trial of the two cases thereafter
ensued.
On September 5, 1997, the appellant was
arraigned, assisted by counsel, and entered a
plea of not guilty to the crimes charged.
The Case for the Appellant
The appellant denied killing and raping
Marilyn and attempting to kill Ailyn. He claimed
that Hercules Bon and Jose Delfino hit Ailyn and
Marilyn and that it was also them who raped and
killed Marilyn. Although he was present when
Bon and Delfino committed the crimes, he could
do nothing to prevent them.
The appellant testified that he was 15 years
old. He was inveigled by Hercules Bon to indulge
and use rugby in the evening of April 18,
1997. At 7:30 a.m. the next day, April 19, 1997,
he was in their house at Tinambac, Sta. Cruz,
Camarines Sur, with his family: his parents, the
Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay; and his
siblings Christopher, Zarina, Midel, Francia and
Shirley. When Bon fetched him, they proceeded
to the house of Jose Delfino, also
in Sitio Tinambac, Sta. Cruz, Magrimpong, where
they had a drinking spree. Not content, they
went to the riverbank and continued drinking.
They were already inebriated.[22] They saw
Marilyn and Ailyn pass by on their way to the
store of Salvacion San Andres. Bon ordered him
and Delfino to follow the girls. They did as they
were told. Ailyn, who was walking ahead of her
sister, was grabbed by Delfino and the appellant,
while Bon overtook Marilyn. Delfino then hit
Ailyn. The latter fell to the ground, face
down. Delfino and the appellant left Ailyn and
went back to where Bon was. The latter
proposed that they bring Marilyn to the other
side of the riverbank. The appellant and Delfino
agreed. Bon and Delfino carried Marilyn, while
the appellant followed. When they reached their
destination, Bon and Delfino took turns in raping
Marilyn.
The appellant testified that he wanted to
prevent his companions from assaulting the
victim but he was afraid because Bon and Delfino
were armed with bladed weapons.[23]Besides, he
was already drunk and much weaker than his
companions who had taken illicit drugs.[24] He
then left the place and went home, leaving
Bon, Delfino and Marilyn behind.Policemen later
arrived at their house and arrested and
handcuffed him. He was told that Ailyn had
pointed to him as the one who abducted Marilyn.
The appellant insisted that Bon and Delfino were
the culprits.[25] He was brought to the municipal
hall where policemen forced him to admit raping
and killing Marilyn. He denied raping and killing
the girl and told the policemen that Bon and
Delfino were the ones who raped and killed
her.[26] It was he who pointed to the policemen
and also accompanied them to where Marilyns
body was found.[27]
After trial, the court rendered judgment
convicting the appellant of rape with homicide in
Criminal Case No. RTC97-201, and attempted
murder in Criminal Case No. RTC97-202.The
court appreciated in favor of the appellant the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority,
but sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for rape
with homicide. The decretal portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
accused Noel Darilay is found guilty of the
offense of Rape with Homicide in Crim. Case No.
RTC97-201 and guilty of the offense of
Attempted Murder in Crim. Case No. RTC97-202.
He is ordered to suffer the following penalties:
1. In Crim. Case No. RTC97-201, Rape with
Homicide, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua;
2. To pay the heirs of Marilyn Arganda the
following:
a. P75,000.00 for her death;
b. P30,000.00 for moral damages;
c. P10,000.00 for exemplary damages;
d. P20,000.00 for actual damages;
3. In Crim. Case No. RTC97-202, accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the following
penalties:
a. To suffer the penalty of imprisonment of TWO
(2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4)
MONTHS of arresto mayor in its medium period;
b. To pay the heirs of Ailyn Arganda the amount
of P20,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the
costs.
The accused being a minor, his father Manuel
Darilay is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of
Marilyn Arganda and Ailyn Arganda the
foregoing civil liabilities under Article 201, P.D.
No. 603 as amended (Child and Youth Welfare
Code).
SO ORDERED.[28]
On appeal, the appellant assails the
decision of the trial court contending that:
I and killed Marilyn as Ailyn herself admitted that
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIMES OF
ATTEMPTED MURDER AND RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE WHEN THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING
THE PRIVILEGE[D] MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY UNDER ARTICLE
68, PAR. 1, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. RTC97-201.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING
THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 192 OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 603.[29]
The appellant avers that it was physically
impossible for him to have raped and killed
Marilyn in the vicinity of the Palinao River. As
testified to by SPO1 Teresito Porteza, one has to
cross the river, then three-feet deep and strewn
with big stones, to reach the place where
Marilyns body was found. The appellant
reasoned that since he was only 15 years old at
the time, it is inconceivable that he could single-
handedly carry a girl who weighed 18 kilos to a
distance of one kilometer, even crossing the
three-feet deep river in the process.
The appellant asserts that all things
considered, his testimony that Bon and Delfino
carried Marilyn across the Palinao River and
brought her to the other side is believable. He
also claims that Ailyn failed to see Bon and
Delfino because they were covered by grasses,
the tallest of which were two feet
high. Ailyns testimony, that the appellant hit her
at the back, is highly improbable considering
that the evidence shows that the appellant
approached her head on. The appellant insists
that the prosecutor failed to prove that he raped
she did not see the appellant rape and kill her
sister. As such, it was a travesty for the trial
court to convict him of rape with homicide,
relying solely on Ailyns testimony that he struck
Marilyn on the back twice with a piece of wood.
The contentions of the appellant do not
hold water.
First. SPO1 Porteza declared that the
portion of the Palinao river which he and his
companions crossed to reach the place where
Marilyn was found is the ordinary place where
people use to pass in going to the other side of Q Where do you reside? What if anything happened when which he was holding, what if
the river.[30] If ordinary people cross the river on the way going home? The anything did he do next to you?
through that portion, there is no reason why the A Magrimpong. witness has already answered,
appellant could not have done the same. In fact, anyway. Proceed. A He punched me at my left
Q What barrio? cheekbone (sic).
the appellant and the policemen were able to
cross the river without much ado when they A Tinambac. PROS. CU:
Q After you were punched by Noel
went to the place where Marilyn was found. Q You said that while on your way Darilay, what if anything did he
Q Did you go with your sister to buy
Second. The appellant testified that he tinapa? home, something do to Marilyn?
himself crossed the river when Bon happened. What was this event
A Yes, sir. that happened? A He also struck Marilyn at her back.
and Delfino carried Marilyn, although he claimed
that he merely accompanied them. ATTY. TAYER: A Suddenly, Noel Darilay came out Q And how many times did Noel
from he were (sic). Darilay strike your Ate Marilyn?
Third. The appellant was a young man in Q Objection Your Honor.
the prime of his life while Marilyn was a girl Q Where did he come from? A Twice also, sir.
under 12 years old, only 4 feet tall. It was, thus, PROS. CU:
not impossible for him to have carried her across A From a catmon tree. Q What, if anything, did you feel when
the river to the other side and dump her nearby, This is a follow-up question, Your you were struck by Noel Darilay
under the cover of bushes and trees to prevent Honor. Q When you saw Noel Darilay with that piece of wood?
her body from being discovered. suddenly came out from a
COURT: catmon tree, what if anything A I felt pain all over my body.
Fourth. The trial court gave credence and transpired next? Q What about when you were
Already answered.
full probative weight to the testimony of punched by Noel Darilay on
Ailyn. The legal aphorism is that the findings of PROS. CU: A He struck us.
your left cheek, what, if
facts of the trial court, its calibration of the Q What if anything was Noel Darilay anything, did you feel?
testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of Q Where did you buy tinapa or
smoked fish? holding?
their probative weight, as well as its conclusions, A My face was very painful.
based on its findings are accorded by the A A wood.
A Ate Arlyn (sic). Q After Noel Darilay struck your Ate
appellate court high respect, if not conclusive
effect. The appellant failed to convince the court Q Were you able to buy tinapa? Q Who was the person whom Noel Marilyn twice also at her back
that the trial court ignored, misunderstood or Darilay struck first? with that piece of wood, what if
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of A Yes, sir. anything happened next?
...
substance which if considered will change the
Q So, after you bought smoked fish, A He threw us on the grassy portion.
outcome of the case. Ailyn testified how the COURT:
what if anything, did you do
appellant mercilessly waylaid her and Marilyn as Q Who first was carried by Noel
next with your Ate Marilyn? Witness may answer. Who is the
they were on their way home, and that she Darilay to be thrown in a grassy
immediately told her mother that the appellant A We went home. first one? portion then?
had attacked them, and that her sister was
Q While on your way home with your A I was the one, sir. A I was the one, sir.
nowhere to be found:
Ate Marilyn, what, if anything, PROS. CU:
Q How is Marilyn related to you? happened? Q Why were you not able to escape,
Q In what portion of your body Ailyn?
A She is my sister. A Something happened, sir. were you struck at? A Because my body was very painful.
Q Who is older? ATTY. TAYER: A At my back. Q For how long did you find yourself
A Marilyn. We will object to that, no basis. on that state or condition in the
Q How many times?
place where you were thrown
Q Where were you and your Ate PROS. CU: A Two (2) times. at?
Marilyn when you were asked
by your mother to buy tinapa? What, if anything, happened. Q Now, after you were struck by Noel A Half an hour, sir.
COURT: Darilay with that piece of wood
A We were still inside the house.
Q Were you able to go back to your A I told my mother that Noel struck
house, Ailyn? us.
A Yes, sir. Q Do you know the person of Noel
Darilay?
Q What time did you go back to your
house? A Yes, sir.[31]
A Around 9:00 oclock in the morning. Despite intense and grueling cross-
examination by the appellants
Q Was your Ate Marilyn with you counsel, Ailyn remained steadfast and
when you went back to your
unrelenting.
house?
Fifth. The appellant was merely clutching
ATTY. TAYER:
at straws when he attempted to pin the criminal
Objection, leading. liability on Bon and Delfino for the injuries
sustained by Ailyn and the rape and death of
COURT: Marilyn. If, indeed, Bon and Delfino were
involved, Ailyn would have said so when she
Sustained. testified. Moreover, Ailyn identified the appellant
PROS. CU: as the only culprit. There is no evidence on
record that Ailyn harbored any ill or devious
Q Were you alone when you went motive to point to the appellant as the sole
back? perpetrator of the crime, for which the latter
could be meted the capital penalty, if
ATTY. TAYER: convicted.Hence, Ailyns testimony is entitled to
full probative weight. We agree with the
Objection, leading.
disquisitions of the trial court, thus:
COURT:
These foregoing circumstantial evidence pieced
Reform your question.
together, points to the accused as the rapist-
PROS. CU: murderer of 8-year-old Marilyn Arganda. The
testimony of Ailyn Arganda identifying the
Q Who was with you when you went accused having struck her and her sister on the
home? very day of April 19,
1997 between 8:30 and 9:00 oclock in the
A I have no companion, sir.
morning at Magrimpong, Tinambac, Camarines
Q Why, where was, if you know, your Sur is consistent with truth considering that it
Ate Marilyn? was even admitted by the accused that about
that time, they were following the two (2)
A She was gone and I did not sisters. However, the defense of the accused was
anymore find her. that it was Hercules Bon who had struck Marilyn
Arganda while Ailyn Arganda was walking ahead
Q When you arrived at your residence of Marilyn was struck by Jose Delfino. This
or house, who was the person
statement of the accused is quite unbelievable
inside the house?
over the statement of Ailyn Arganda even [if] she
testified that she was so definite that it was
A My mother, sir.
accused Noel Darilay who was alone at that time
Q So, what, if anything, did you tell to who struck her and her sister. Ailyn Arganda
your mother? although she was only 8 years old is a very much
qualified witness despite her tender age because
as observed by the court, she was narrating the
incident in a straightforward manner. Because of
her tender age, she was asked by the prosecution
whether she knows that she has to tell the truth
and nothing but the truth in giving her testimony
in court and she answered, yes, and she even
testified that telling a lie is bad. Her testimony
was likewise corroborated by the findings of Dr.
Betito who conducted an autopsy
examination on the cadaver of Marilyn Arganda
and conducted a medical examination on the
injuries of Ailyn Arganda. The findings of Dr.
Betito was that Marilyn Arganda suffered
injuries on her head which were fatal and would
cause internal hemorrhage that caused her death
while in the physical examination that he
conducted on Ailyn Arganda. Dr. Betito testified
that he had found contusion and abrasion on the
back of the head of Ailyn Arganda and also
contusion on the left face of Ailyn Arganda. Ailyn
Arganda had testified clearly that she was
hit twice by the accused and hit the back of her
head and she was punched hitting her cheek and
this was corroborated then by the findings of Dr.
Betito. Likewise, she testified that her sister was
also struck hitting her on the head and the
findings of Dr. Betito on the cadaver of Marilyn
Arganda was that she had injuries on her head
which may be caused by a hard object. His alibi
that he was not the one who had struck Marilyn
and Ailyn Arganda and pointing to Hercules Bon
and Jose Delfino is unbelievable considering that
Ailyn Arganda positively identified him to be the
one who both (sic) struck her and her sister
Marilyn on April 19, 1997.[32]
[T]he testimony of Ailyn Arganda was made in a
straightforward manner and all the facts that she
has narrated jibed with the findings of the doctor
who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of
Marilyn and conducted the medical examination
on her. Her testimonies even remained the same
and she remained unshaken during the cross-
examination. The witness who is of tender age
such as Ailyn Arganda is a credible witness
because usually children of tender age cannot be
coached and had to tell the truth of what she had
experienced. The court has no doubt as to the
truthfulness of the testimony of Ailyn Arganda
which is consistent with common experience in
the natural course of things coupled with the fact
that it was corroborated by an expert witness
who conducted [an] examination both on Ailyn
Arganda herself and on the cadaver of Marilyn
Arganda.
The testimony of children of sound mind is likely
to be more correct and truthful than that of older
persons, so that once established that they have
fully understood the character and nature of an
oath, their testimony should be given full
credence. (Julio Marco vs. CA and People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 117561, June 11, 1997).[33]
The Crime Committed by the
Appellant in Criminal
Case No. RTC97-202
We agree with the ruling of the trial court
that the appellant is guilty of attempted murder
for the injuries sustained by Ailyn. Under Article
6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt
to commit a felony when the offender
commences the commission of a felony by direct
acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some causes or accident
other than his own spontaneous
desistance. In People v. Lizada,[34] we held:
The Supreme Court of Spain, in its decision of
March 21, 1892, declared that for overt acts to
constitute an attempted offense, it is necessary
that their objective be known and established or
such that acts be of such nature that they
themselves should obviously disclose the
criminal objective necessarily intended, said
objective and finality to serve as ground for
designation of the offense.[35]
For one to be criminally liable for a
consummated, frustrated or attempted homicide
or murder, there must be, on the part of the
accused, an intent to kill the victim. Intent to kill
is an internal act but may be proved by
evidence, inter alia, that the accused used a lethal
weapon; the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim; and by the
words uttered by the malefactor before, at the
time or immediately after the infliction of the
injuries on the victim.[36] In this case, the
prosecution proved that the appellant intended
to kill the victim Ailyn because (a) he used a
piece of wood; (b) he struck Ailyn twice on the
back and boxed her on the face; (c) he threw her
to the ground and dragged her to a grassy area;
(d) he left Ailyn all by herself. There is evidence
on record that the injuries sustained by Ailyn
were mortal and could have caused her death.
She recovered from her injuries in less than 5
days but not more than 9 days. Furthermore, the
crime was qualified by treachery because Ailyn,
who was only 7 years old at the time, could not
defend herself against the appellants physical
assault. Hence, the appellant is guilty of
attempted murder.
The Crime Committed by the
Appellant in Criminal Case
No. RTC97-201
The appellant asserts that there was no
eyewitness to the rape and killing of Marilyn. He
contends that the prosecution failed to prove
that the appellant raped the victim and killed her
on the occasion or by reason of the said rape. He
should thus be acquitted of the said crime. For its
part, the Office of the Solicitor General avers that
as gleaned from the evidence on record and the
findings of the trial court in its decision, the
prosecution adduced circumstantial evidence to
prove that the appellant raped the victim and
killed her on the occasion or by reason of said
crime. Hence, it asserts, the trial court did not err
in convicting the appellant of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide.
We agree with the appellant that the
prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to
prove that he raped and killed Marilyn on the
occasion or by reason of the said crime.
However, direct evidence is not indispensable to
prove the guilt of the accused for the crime
charged; it may be proved by circumstantial
evidence. In People v. Delim,[37] we held, thus:
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of
collateral facts and circumstances from which
the existence of the main fact may be inferred
according to reason and common experience.
What was once a rule of ancient practicability is
now entombed in Section 4, Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence which states that
circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to
as indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient
as anchor for a judgment of conviction if the
following requisites concur:
x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived have been established; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to
warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
The prosecution is burdened to prove the
essential events which constitute a compact
mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of
each being confirmed by the proof of the other,
and all without exception leading by mutual
support to but one conclusion: the guilt of the
accused for the offense charged. For
circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to
support a conviction, all the circumstances must
be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. If the prosecution
adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to
prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the
accused to controvert the evidence of the
prosecution.[38]
We are convinced that, based on the
evidence on record and as declared by the trial
court in its decision, the prosecution adduced
circumstantial evidence to prove beyond cavil
that it was the appellant who raped and killed
Marilyn on the occasion or by reason of the
rape. Hence, he is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape with homicide, a special complex
crime.
First. The appellant alone waylaid Ailyn
and Marilyn while the two were walking home
after buying tinapa. The appellant hit Ailyn twice
with a piece of wood on her back and boxed the
left side of her face, rendering her
unconscious. The appellant also struck Marilyn
with a piece of wood on the back. After dragging
Ailyn to a grassy area, he left her there.
Second. When Ailyn regained
consciousness, Marilyn and the appellant were
nowhere to be found.
Third. The torn dress, the pair of panties,
and a slipper were found about 15 meters away
from where the two young girls were waylaid by
the appellant.
Fourth. The appellant testified that he
himself accompanied the policemen and pointed
to the place where Marilyns body was dumped,
completely naked, with blood oozing from her
nose and vagina.
We are convinced that the appellant raped
Marilyn about 15 meters from where he had
earlier waylaid Ailyn. He then carried Marilyn
across the river where he killed her to prevent
her from revealing to the authorities that she
was raped. The appellant hid her body under the
bushes and trees to thus prevent police
authorities from discovering that he killed
Marilyn. Irrefragably, Marilyn was killed by
reason of the rape. The killing of a child, barely 9
years old, is murder. Nonetheless, the appellant
is guilty of rape with homicide because the latter
crime is used in its generic sense.
The Proper Penalties Against the Appellant
As found by the trial court, the appellant
was over 9 years but under 15 years old when he
committed the crime. The appellant acted with
discernment when he committed the same.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
the imposable penalty should be reduced by two
degrees. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, rape
with homicide is punishable by death. Reducing
the penalty by two degrees, the imposable
penalty is reclusion temporal, from which the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty should
be taken. To determine the minimum of the
penalty, it should be reduced by one degree,
which is prision mayor. Applying the
indeterminate sentence law and taking into
account how the ghastly crime was committed,
the appellant should be sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from 6 years and one
day of prision mayorin its medium period, as
minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
For attempted murder, the trial court
sentenced the appellant to an indeterminate
penalty, from 2 months and one day to 4 months
of arresto mayor. The penalty imposed by the
trial court is erroneous. The penalty of
consummated murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is reclusion
perpetua to death. The imposable penalty should
be reduced by two degrees under Article 68 of
the Revised Penal Code because the appellant is
a minor. As reduced, the penalty is reclusion
temporal.[39] Reclusion temporal should be
reduced by two degrees lower, conformably to
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code which
is prision correccional. This penalty should be
reduced by one degree, which is arresto mayor,
to determine the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty. Accordingly, the appellant should be
sentenced to a straight penalty of four (4)
months. It goes without saying that if the trial
court decides to impose on the accused a penalty
of imprisonment of one year or less, it should
impose a straight penalty and not an
indeterminate penalty.
Civil Liability for the Crimes
Considering that at the time of the
commission of the crime, the appellant was a
minor under the parental authority of his
parents, the Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay
are primarily and directly liable for the damages
sustained by the heirs of the victims Marilyn
and Ailyn Arganda.[40] Consequently, the Spouses
Manuel and Julieta Darilay are hereby ordered,
jointly and severally, in Criminal Case No.
RTC97-201, to pay to the heirs of the victim
Marilyn Arganda, the amount of P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity;[41] P50,000.00 as moral
damages;[42] and P28,000.00 as exemplary -
damages.[43] The prosecution failed to adduce
evidence in support of actual damages; hence,
the heirs of the victim are not entitled
thereto. They are, however, entitled to temperate
damages in the amount of P25,000.00.[44]
In Criminal Case No. RTC97-202, the
Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay are hereby
ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
to Ailyn Arganda, the amount of P25,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Camarines Sur, Branch 63, is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case No. RTC97-
201, the appellant is found guilty of rape with
homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminatepenalty from six (6)
years of prision mayor in its medium period, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as maximum.The Spouses Manuel and
Julieta Darilay, are hereby ordered to pay, jointly
and severally, to the heirs of the victim Marilyn
Arganda P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
In Criminal Case No. RTC97-202, the
appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of attempted murder under Article 248 in
relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code,
and is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of four (4) months. The Spouses Manuel
and Julieta Darilay, are ordered to pay, jointly
and severally, to Ailyn Arganda the amount
ofP25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Chairman, Quisumbing, Austria-
Martinez and Tinga, JJ., concur.
 is suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease.
Thus, based on the medical report6submitted by
Republic of the Philippines Sto. Domingo, the Company terminated Ranida’s
SUPREME COURT employment for failing the physical
Manila examination.7
THIRD DIVISION When Ranida informed her father, Ramon, about
her ailment, the latter suffered a heart attack and
was confined at the Bataan Doctors Hospital.
G.R. No. 168512 March 20, 2007 During Ramon’s confinement, Ranida underwent
another HBs Ag test at the said hospital and the
ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR., doing business result8 indicated that she is non-reactive. She
under the name and style COMMUNITY informed Sto. Domingo of this development but
DIAGNOSTIC CENTER and BU was told that the test conducted by CDC was
CASTRO,1 Petitioners, more reliable because it used the Micro-Elisa
vs. Method.
RANIDA D. SALVADOR and RAMON
SALVADOR, Respondents.
Thus, Ranida went back to CDC for confirmatory
testing, and this time, the Anti-HBs test
DECISION conducted on her indicated a "Negative" result.9
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Ranida also underwent another HBs Ag test at
the Bataan Doctors Hospital using the Micro-
This is a petition for review2 under Rule 45 of the Elisa Method. The result indicated that she was
Rules of Court assailing the February 27, 2004 non-reactive.10
Decision3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 58668 finding petitioner Orlando D. Garcia Ranida submitted the test results from Bataan
liable for gross negligence; and its June 16, 2005 Doctors Hospital and CDC to the Executive
Resolution4 denying petitioner’s motion for Officer of the Company who requested her to
reconsideration. undergo another similar test before her re-
employment would be considered. Thus, CDC
On October 1, 1993, respondent Ranida D. conducted another HBs Ag test on Ranida which
Salvador started working as a trainee in the indicated a "Negative" result.11 Ma. Ruby G.
Accounting Department of Limay Bulk Handling Calderon, Med-Tech Officer-in-Charge of CDC,
Terminal, Inc. (the Company). As a prerequisite issued a Certification correcting the initial result
for regular employment, she underwent a and explaining that the examining medical
medical examination at the Community technologist (Garcia) interpreted the delayed
reaction as positive or reactive.12
Diagnostic Center (CDC). Garcia who is a medical
technologist, conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B
Surface Antigen) test and on October 22, 1993, Thereafter, the Company rehired Ranida.
CDC issued the test result5indicating that Ranida
was "HBs Ag: Reactive." The result bore the On July 25, 1994, Ranida and Ramon filed a
name and signature of Garcia as examiner and complaint13 for damages against petitioner
the rubber stamp signature of Castro as Garcia and a purportedly unknown pathologist
pathologist. of CDC, claiming that, by reason of the erroneous
interpretation of the results of Ranida’s
When Ranida submitted the test result to Dr. Sto. examination, she lost her job and suffered
Domingo, the Company physician, the latter serious mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless
apprised her that the findings indicated that she
nights, while Ramon was hospitalized and lost
business opportunities.
On September 26, 1994, respondents amended
their complaint14 by naming Castro as the
"unknown pathologist."
Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence
and incompetence and reiterated the scientific
explanation for the "false positive" result of the
first HBs Ag test in his December 7, 1993 letter
to the respondents.15
For his part, Castro claimed that as pathologist,
he rarely went to CDC and only when a case was
referred to him; that he did not examine Ranida;
and that the test results bore only his rubber-
stamp signature.
On September 1, 1997,16 the trial court
dismissed the complaint for failure of the
respondents to present sufficient evidence to
prove the liability of Garcia and Castro. It held
that respondents should have presented Sto.
Domingo because he was the one who
interpreted the test result issued by CDC.
Likewise, respondents should have presented a
medical expert to refute the testimonies of
Garcia and Castro regarding the medical
explanation behind the conflicting test results on
Ranida.17
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals
which reversed the trial court’s findings, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one
entered ORDERING defendant-appellee Orlando
D. Garcia, Jr. to pay plaintiff-appellant Ranida D.
Salvador moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount
of P50,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount
of P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.18
The appellate court found Garcia liable for
damages for negligently issuing an erroneous
HBs Ag result. On the other hand, it exonerated
Castro for lack of participation in the issuance of
the results.
After the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, Garcia filed the instant petition.
The main issue for resolution is whether the
Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision of the
trial court, correctly found petitioner liable for
damages to the respondents for issuing an
incorrect HBsAG test result.
Garcia maintains he is not negligent, thus not
liable for damages, because he followed the
appropriate laboratory measures and
procedures as dictated by his training and
experience; and that he did everything within his
professional competence to arrive at an
objective, impartial and impersonal result.
At the outset, we note that the issues raised are
factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent
or not is a question of fact which we cannot pass
upon in a petition for review on certiorari which
is limited to reviewing errors of law.19
Negligence is the failure to observe for the
protection of the interest of another person that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand,20 whereby
such other person suffers injury. For health care
providers, the test of the existence of negligence
is: did the health care provider either fail to do
something which a reasonably prudent health
care provider would have done, or that he or she
did something that a reasonably prudent health
care provider would not have done; and that
failure or action caused injury to the patient;21 if
yes, then he is guilty of negligence.
Thus, the elements of an actionable conduct are:
1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate
causation.
All the elements are present in the case at bar.
Owners and operators of clinical laboratories
have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as
rules and regulations, purposely promulgated to
protect and promote the health of the people by
preventing the operation of substandard,
improperly managed and inadequately
supported clinical laboratories and by improving
the quality of performance of clinical laboratory
examinations.22 Their business is impressed with
public interest, as such, high standards of
performance are expected from them.
In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we
found the owner of a furniture shop liable for the
destruction of the plaintiff’s house in a fire which
started in his establishment in view of his failure
to comply with an ordinance which required the
construction of a firewall. In Teague v.
Fernandez, we stated that where the very injury
which was intended to be prevented by the
ordinance has happened, non-compliance with
the ordinance was not only an act of negligence,
but also the proximate cause of the death.23
In fine, violation of a statutory duty is negligence.
Where the law imposes upon a person the duty
to do something, his omission or non-
performance will render him liable to whoever
may be injured thereby.
Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4688,
otherwise known as The Clinical Laboratory Law,
provides:
Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to be
professionally in-charge of a registered clinical
laboratory unless he is a licensed physician duly
qualified in laboratory medicine and authorized
by the Secretary of Health, such authorization to
be renewed annually.
No license shall be granted or renewed by the
Secretary of Health for the operation and
maintenance of a clinical laboratory unless such
laboratory is under the administration, direction
and supervision of an authorized physician, as
provided for in the preceding paragraph.
Corollarily, Sections 9(9.1)(1), 11 and
25(25.1)(1) of the DOH Administrative Order No.
49-B Series of 1988, otherwise known as the
Revised Rules and Regulations Governing the
Registration, Operation and Maintenance of
Clinical Laboratories in the Philippines, read:
Sec. 9. Management of the Clinical Laboratory:
9.1 Head of the Clinical Laboratory: The head is
that person who assumes technical and
administrative supervision and control of the
activities in the laboratory.
For all categories of clinical laboratories, the
head shall be a licensed physician certified by the
Philippine Board of Pathology in either Anatomic
or Clinical Pathology or both provided that:
(1) This shall be mandatory for all categories of
free-standing clinical laboratories; all tertiary
category hospital laboratories and for all
secondary category hospital laboratories located
in areas with sufficient available pathologist.
xxxx
Sec. 11. Reporting: All laboratory requests shall
be considered as consultations between the
requesting physician and pathologist of the
laboratory. As such all laboratory reports on
various examinations of human specimens shall
be construed as consultation report and shall
bear the name of the pathologist or his associate.
No person in clinical laboratory shall issue a
report, orally or in writing, whole portions
thereof without a directive from the pathologist
or his authorized associate and only to the
requesting physician or his authorized
representative except in emergencies when the
results may be released as authorized by the
pathologist.
xxxx
Sec. 25. Violations:
25.1 The license to operate a clinical laboratory
may be suspended or revoked by the
Undersecretary of Health for Standards and
Regulation upon violation of R.A. 4688 or the
rules and regulations issued in pursuance
thereto or the commission of the following acts
by the persons owning or operating a clinical
laboratory and the persons under their
authority.
(1) Operation of a Clinical Laboratory without a
certified pathologist or qualified licensed
physician authorized by the Undersecretary of
Health or without employing a registered
medical technologist or a person not registered
as a medical technologist in such a position.
And Section 29(b) of R.A. No. 5527, otherwise
known as The Philippine Medical Technology Act
of 1969, reads:
Section 29. Penal Provisions.- Without prejudice
to the provision of the Medical Act of 1959, as
amended relating to illegal practice of Medicine,
the following shall be punished by a fine of not
less than two thousand pesos nor more than five
thousand pesos, or imprisonment for not less
than six months nor more than two years, or
both, in the discretion of the court:
xxxx
(b) Any medical technologist, even if duly
registered, who shall practice medical
technology in the Philippines without the
necessary supervision of a qualified pathologist
or physician authorized by the Department of
Health;
From the foregoing laws and rules, it is clear that
a clinical laboratory must be administered,
directed and supervised by a licensed physician
authorized by the Secretary of Health, like a
pathologist who is specially trained in methods
of laboratory medicine; that the medical
technologist must be under the supervision of
the pathologist or a licensed physician; and that
the results of any examination may be released
only to the requesting physician or his
authorized representative upon the direction of
the laboratory pathologist.
These rules are intended for the protection of the
public by preventing performance of
substandard clinical examinations by
laboratories whose personnel are not properly
supervised. The public demands no less than an
effective and efficient performance of clinical
laboratory examinations through compliance
with the quality standards set by laws and
regulations.
We find that petitioner Garcia failed to comply
with these standards.
First, CDC is not administered, directed and
supervised by a licensed physician as required
by law, but by Ma. Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed
Medical Technologist.24 In the License to Open
and Operate a Clinical Laboratory for the years
1993 and 1996 issued by Dr. Juan R. Nañagas,
M.D., Undersecretary for Health Facilities,
Standards and Regulation, defendant-appellee
Castro was named as the head of
CDC.25 However, in his Answer with
Counterclaim, he stated:
3. By way of affirmative and special defenses,
defendant pathologist further avers and plead as
follows:
Defendant pathologist is not the owner of the
Community Diagnostic Center nor an employee
of the same nor the employer of its employees.
Defendant pathologist comes to the Community
Diagnostic Center when and where a problem is
referred to him. Its employees are licensed under
the Medical Technology Law (Republic Act No.
5527) and are certified by, and registered with,
the Professional Regulation Commission after
having passed their Board Examinations. They
are competent within the sphere of their own
profession in so far as conducting laboratory
examinations and are allowed to sign for and in
behalf of the clinical laboratory. The defendant
pathologist, and all pathologists in general, are
hired by laboratories for purposes of complying
with the rules and regulations and orders issued
by the Department of Health through the Bureau
of Research and Laboratories. Defendant
pathologist does not stay that long period of time
at the Community Diagnostic Center but only
periodically or whenever a case is referred to
him by the laboratory. Defendant pathologist
does not appoint or select the employees of the
laboratory nor does he arrange or approve their
schedules of duty.26
Castro’s infrequent visit to the clinical laboratory
barely qualifies as an effective administrative
supervision and control over the activities in the
laboratory. "Supervision and control" means the
authority to act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty;
restrain the commission of acts; review, approve,
revise or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate officials or units.27
Second, Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of
respondent Ranida without the supervision of
defendant-appellee Castro, who admitted that:
[He] does not know, and has never known or
met, the plaintiff-patient even up to this time nor
has he personally examined any specimen, blood,
urine or any other tissue, from the plaintiff-
patient otherwise his own handwritten signature
would have appeared in the result and not
merely stamped as shown in Annex "B" of the
Amended Complaint.28
Last, the disputed HBsAG test result was
released to respondent Ranida without the
authorization of defendant-appellee Castro.29
Garcia may not have intended to cause the
consequences which followed after the release of
the HBsAG test result. However, his failure to
comply with the laws and rules promulgated and
issued for the protection of public safety and
interest is failure to observe that care which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would
observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a
breach of duty.
Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct SO ORDERED.
consequence of Garcia’s failure to comply with
the mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted.
She was terminated from the service for failing
the physical examination; suffered anxiety
because of the diagnosis; and was compelled to
undergo several more tests. All these could have
been avoided had the proper safeguards been
scrupulously followed in conducting the clinical
examination and releasing the clinical report.
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
The foregoing provision provides the legal basis
for the award of damages to a party who suffers
damage whenever one commits an act in
violation of some legal provision.30 This was
incorporated by the Code Commission to provide
relief to a person who suffers damage because
another has violated some legal provision.31
We find the Court of Appeals’ award of moral
damages reasonable under the circumstances
bearing in mind the mental trauma suffered by
respondent Ranida who thought she was
afflicted by Hepatitis B, making her "unfit or
unsafe for any type of employment."32 Having
established her right to moral damages, we see
no reason to disturb the award of exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees. Exemplary
damages are imposed, by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages,33 and attorney’s fees may be recovered
when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages
are awarded.34
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58668 dated February
27, 2004 finding petitioner Orlando D. Garcia, Jr.
guilty of gross negligence and liable to pay to
respondents ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
₱25,000.00 as attorney’s fees, is AFFIRMED.
SECOND DIVISION (gun store) in Baguio City. Respondent is the placed it on top of the table. SO ORDERED.[4]
owner of the gun store. Attracted by the sight of the
ALFREDO P. PACIS and G.R. No. 169467 gun, the young Alfred Dennis
CLEOPATRA D. PACIS, The facts as found by the trial court are as Pacis got hold of the same. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In
Petitioners, Present: follows: Matibag asked Alfred Dennis its Decision[5] dated 11 May 2005, the Court of
Pacis to return the gun. The Appeals reversed the trial courts Decision and
CARPIO, J., On January 19, 1991, Alfred latter followed and handed absolved respondent from civil liability under
Chairperson, Dennis Pacis, then 17 years the gun to Matibag. It went off, Article 2180 of the Civil Code.[6]
- versus - BRION, old and a first year student at the bullet hitting the young
DEL CASTILLO, the Baguio Colleges Alfred in the head. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
ABAD, and Foundation taking up BS which the Court of Appeals denied in its
PEREZ, JJ. Computer Science, died due to A criminal case for homicide was filed against Resolution dated 19 August 2005.
JEROME JOVANNE a gunshot wound in the head Matibag before branch VII of this Court. Matibag,
MORALES, which he sustained while he however, was acquitted of the charge against Hence, this petition.
Respondent. Promulgated: was at the Top Gun Firearm[s] him because of the exempting circumstance of
February 25, and Ammunition[s] Store accident under Art. 12, par. 4 of the Revised The Trial Courts Ruling
2010 located at Upper Mabini Penal Code.
Street, Baguio City. The gun The trial court held respondent civilly liable for
store was owned and the death of Alfred under Article 2180 in relation
operated by defendant Jerome By agreement of the parties, to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.[7] The trial court
Jovanne Morales. the evidence adduced in the held that the accidental shooting of Alfred which
criminal case for homicide caused his death was partly due to the
With Alfred Pacis at the time of the shooting against Matibag was negligence of respondents employee Aristedes
were Aristedes Matibag and Jason Herbolario. reproduced and adopted by Matibag (Matibag). Matibag and Jason Herbolario
x-------------------------------------
They were sales agents of the defendant, and at them as part of their evidence (Herbolario) were employees of respondent
-------------x
that particular time, the caretakers of the gun in the instant case.[3] even if they were only paid on a commission
store. basis. Under the Civil Code, respondent is liable
On 8 April 1998, the trial court rendered its for the damages caused by Matibag on the
The bullet which killed Alfred Dennis Pacis was decision in favor of petitioners. The dispositive occasion of the performance of his duties, unless
DECISION fired from a gun brought in by a customer of the portion of the decision reads: respondent proved that he observed the
gun store for repair. diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
CARPIO, J.: WHEREFORE, premises the damage. The trial court held that
The gun, an AMT Automag II Cal. 22 Rimfire considered, judgment is respondent failed to observe the required
The Case Magnum with Serial No. SN-H34194 (Exhibit Q), hereby rendered in favor of diligence when he left the key to the drawer
was left by defendant Morales in a drawer of a the plaintiffs [Spouses Alfredo containing the loaded defective gun without
This petition for review[1] assails the 11 May table located inside the gun store. P. Pacis and Cleopatra D. instructing his employees to be careful in
2005 Decision[2] and the 19 August 2005 Pacis] and against the handling the loaded gun.
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Defendant Morales was in Manila at the time. His defendant [Jerome Jovanne
No. 60669. employee Armando Jarnague, who was the Morales] ordering the The Court of Appeals Ruling
regular caretaker of the gun store was also not defendant to pay plaintiffs
The Facts around. He left earlier and requested sales (1) P30,000.00 as indemnity The Court of Appeals held that respondent
agents Matibag and Herbolario to look after the for the death of Alfred Pacis; cannot be held civilly liable since there was no
On 17 January 1995, petitioners Alfredo P. Pacis gun store while he and defendant Morales were (2) P29,437.65 as actual damages for the employer-employee relationship between
and Cleopatra D. Pacis (petitioners) filed with away. Jarnague entrusted to Matibag and hospitalization and burial respondent and Matibag. The Court of Appeals
the trial court a civil case for damages against Herbolario a bunch of keys used in the gun store expenses incurred by the found that Matibag was not under the control of
respondent Jerome Jovanne Morales which included the key to the drawer where the plaintiffs; respondent with respect to the means and
(respondent). Petitioners are the parents of fatal gun was kept. (3) P100,000.00 as methods in the performance of his work. There
Alfred Dennis Pacis, Jr. (Alfred), a 17-year old compensatory damages; can be no employer-employee relationship
student who died in a shooting incident inside It appears that Matibag and (4) P100,000.00 as moral damages; where the element of control is absent. Thus,
the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store Herbolario later brought out (5) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees. Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not apply in
the gun from the drawer and this case and respondent cannot be held liable.
 failure to
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that do so
even if respondent is considered an employer of constitutes
Matibag, still respondent cannot be held liable negligence.
since no negligence can be attributed to him. As x x x.
explained by the Court of Appeals:
Defendant-appellant
Granting arguendo that an maintains that he is not guilty
employer-employee of negligence and lack of due
relationship existed between care as he did not fail to
Aristedes Matibag and the observe the diligence of a
defendant-appellant, we find good father of a family. He
that no negligence can be submits that he kept the
attributed to him. firearm in one of his table
drawers, which he locked and
Negligence is best exemplified in the case of such is already an indication
Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. 809). The test of that he took the necessary
negligence is this: diligence and care that the
said gun would not be
x x x. Could accessible to anyone. He puts
a prudent [sic] that his store is engaged
man, in the in selling firearms and
position of ammunitions. Such items
the person which areper se dangerous are
to whom kept in a place which is
negligence properly secured in order that
is the persons coming into the
attributed, gun store would not be able to
foresee take hold of it unless it is done
harm to the intentionally, such as when a
person customer is interested to
injured as a purchase any of the firearms,
reasonable ammunitions and other
consequenc related items, in which case,
e of the he may be allowed to handle
course the same.
about to be
pursued? If We agree. Much as We
so, the law sympathize with the family of
imposes a the deceased, defendant-
duty on the appellant is not to be blamed.
actor to He exercised due diligence in
refrain keeping his loaded gun while
from that he was on a business trip in
course or Manila. He placed it inside the
take drawer and locked it. It was
precaution taken away without his
against its knowledge and authority.
mischievou Whatever happened to the
s results, deceased was purely
and the accidental.[8]
The Issues This case for damages arose out of the accidental
shooting of petitioners son. Under Article
Petitioners raise the following issues: 1161[10] of the Civil Code, petitioners may
enforce their claim for damages based on the
I. THE APPELLATE COURT civil liability arising from the crime under Article
COMMITTED SERIOUS 100[11] of the Revised Penal Code or they may
ERROR IN RENDERING opt to file an independent civil action for
THE DECISION AND damages under the Civil Code. In this case,
RESOLUTION IN instead of enforcing their claim for damages in
QUESTION IN the homicide case filed against Matibag,
DISREGARD OF LAW petitioners opted to file an independent civil
AND JURISPRUDENCE BY action for damages against respondent whom
REVERSING THE ORDER they alleged was Matibags employer. Petitioners
OF THE REGIONAL based their claim for damages under Articles
TRIAL COURT (BRANCH 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
59) OF BAGUIO CITY
NOTWITHSTANDING Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer
CLEAR, AUTHENTIC under Article 103[12] of the Revised Penal
RECORDS AND Code,[13] the liability of the employer, or any
TESTIMONIES person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the
PRESENTED DURING Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a
THE TRIAL WHICH persons own negligence. Article 2176 states:
NEGATE AND
CONTRADICT ITS Art. 2176. Whoever by act or
FINDINGS. omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or
II. THE APPELLATE COURT negligence, is obliged to pay
COMMITTED GRAVE, for the damage done. Such
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN fault or negligence, if there is
RENDERING THE no pre-existing contractual
DECISION AND relation between the parties,
RESOLUTION IN is called quasi-delict and is
QUESTION BY governed by the provisions of
DEPARTING FROM THE this Chapter.
ACCEPTED AND USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS THEREBY This case involves the accidental discharge of a
IGNORING THE FACTUAL firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular
FINDINGS OF THE No. 9, entitled the Policy on Firearms and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT Ammunition Dealership/Repair, a person who is
(BRANCH 59) OF BAGUIO in the business of purchasing and selling of
CITY SHOWING firearms and ammunition must maintain basic
PETITIONERS CLEAR security and safety requirements of a gun dealer,
RIGHTS TO THE AWARD otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will
OF DAMAGES.[9] be suspended or canceled.[14]
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of
someone who has in his possession or under his
The Ruling of the Court control an instrumentality extremely dangerous
in character, such as dangerous weapons or
We find the petition meritorious. substances. Such person in possession or control
of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to
take exceptional precautions to prevent any
injury being done thereby.[15] Unlike the
ordinary affairs of life or business which involve
little or no risk, a business dealing with
dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a
higher degree of care.

As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to

be knowledgeable about firearms safety and
should have known never to keep a loaded
weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of
harm or injury to others. Respondent has the
duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are
not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded
and separate from ammunition when the
firearms are not needed for ready-access
defensive use.[16] With more reason, guns
accepted by the store for repair should not be
loaded precisely because they are defective and
may cause an accidental discharge such as what
happened in this case. Respondent was clearly
negligent when he accepted the gun for repair
and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring
first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the
defective gun should have been stored in a vault.
Before accepting the defective gun for repair,
respondent should have made sure that it was
not loaded to prevent any untoward accident.
Indeed, respondent should never accept a
firearm from another person, until the cylinder
or action is open and he has personally checked
that the weapon is completely unloaded.[17] For
failing to insure that the gun was not loaded,
respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore,
it was not shown in this case whether
respondent had a License to Repair which
authorizes him to repair defective firearms to
restore its original composition or enhance or
upgrade firearms.[18]
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree
of care and diligence required of a good father of
a family, much less the degree of care required of
someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as
would exempt him from liability in this case.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET
ASIDE the 11 May 2005 Decision and the 19
August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 60669. We REINSTATE the
trial courts Decision dated 8 April 1998.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-25142 March 25, 1975
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and
FELIX PANGALANGAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC.,
ARCHIMEDES J. BALINGIT and FERNANDO
PINEDA, defendants-appellees.
Angel A. Sison for plaintiffs-appellants.
Fidel Zosimo U. Canilao for defendants-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix
Pangalangan appealed on pure questions of law
from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac, dismissing their complaint against
Archimedes J. Balingit.
The dismissal was based on the ground that
Balingit as the manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., which together with Fernando
Pineda and Balingit, was sued for damages in an
action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, is
not the manager of an establishment
contemplated in article 2180 of the Civil Code
(Civil Case No. 3865).
In the complaint for damages filed by the bus
company and Pangalangan against Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda,
it was alleged that on November 24, 1962,
Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned
by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the
national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The
truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan,
which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping,
Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was
damaged and could not be used for seventy-nine
days, thus depriving the company of earnings
amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the
manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
Among the defenses interposed by the
defendants in their answer was that Balingit was
not Pineda's employer.
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be
dismissed on the ground that the bus company
and the bus driver had no cause of action against
him. As already stated, the lower court dismissed
the action as to Balingit. The bus company and
its driver appealed.
The Civil Code provides:têñ.£îhqwâ£
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation
imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
The owners and managers of
an establishment or
enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages
caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed
or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their
employees and household
helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are
not engaged in any business
or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of
in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage.
(1903a)
The novel and unprecedented legal issue in this
appeal is whether the terms "employers" and
"owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise" (dueños o directores de un
establicimiento o empresa) used in article 2180 of
the Civil Code, formerly article 1903 of the old
Code, embrace the manager of a corporation
owning a truck, the reckless operation of which
allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from
which the damage arose.
We are of the opinion that those terms do not
include the manager of a corporation. It may be
gathered from the context of article 2180 that
the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish
version) is used in the sense of "employer".
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no
tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be
fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with
the vehicular accident already mentioned
because he himself may be regarded as
an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc.
Thus, it was held "que es dependiente, a los
efectos de la responsabilidad subsidiaria
establecida en el num 3.0del (art.) 1903,
el director de un periodico explotado por una
sociedad, porque cualquiera que sea su jerarquia
y aunque Ileve la direccion de determinadas
convicciones politicas no por eso deja de estar
subordinado a la superior autoridad de la
Empresa" (Decision of Spanish Supreme Court
dated December 6, 1912 cited in 12 Manresa,
Codigo Civil Español 5th Ed. 662; 1913
Enciclopedia Juridica Española 992).
The bus company and its driver, in their
appellants' brief, injected a new factual issue
which was not alleged in their complaint. They
argue that Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. is
merely a business conduit of Balingit because out
of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200,
Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40,000 and
they paid P10,000 on their subscription, while
the other incorporators, namely, Rodolfo
Limjuco, Ponciano Caparas and Rafael Suntay
paid P250.25 and P25, respectively.
That argument implies that the veil of corporate
fiction should be pierced and that Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his wife should
be treated as one and the same civil personality.
We cannot countenance that argument in this
appeal. It was not raised in the lower court. The
case has to be decided on the basis of the
pleadings filed in the trial court where it was
assumed that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. has
a personality separate and distinct from that of
the Balingit spouses.
The legal issue, which the plaintiffs-appellants
can ventilate in this appeal, is one which was
raised in the lower court and which is within the
issues framed by the parties (Sec. 18, Rule 46,
Rules of Court).
When a party deliberately adopts a certain
theory and the case is decided upon that theory
in the court below, he will not be permitted to
change his theory on appeal because, to permit
him to do so, could be unfair to the adverse party
(2 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court,
1970 Ed. p. 505).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of
dismissal is affirmed. Costs against the plaintiffs-
appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and
Fernandez, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Republic of the Philippines 2) Cord compression 2nd to Thus, on January 19, 1982, the trial court Ordering the defendants
SUPREME COURT the injury with paralysis of rendered a decision finding all the defendants jointly and severally to pay
Manila the lower extremity, inability liable for damages under Articles 1172 and 2176 the plaintiff the sum of
THIRD DIVISION to defecate and urinate. (E of the New Civil Code. The dispositive portion of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
G.R. No. 73928 August 31, 1987 Exh. A, Exhibits for the the decision reads: (pp. 129- 130, Original
JOSE E. GENSON, petitioner, plaintiff-appellant, Original Records).
vs. Records.) WHEREFORE, this court
SPS. EDUARDO ADARLE and SHERLITA MARI- orders the defendants to pay The petitioner appealed to the Intermediate
ON, and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE The medical certificate also reported that: to plaintiff the amounts stated Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of
COURT,respondents. in the complainant's prayer as the trial court and further ordered the
The patient recovered the use follows: defendants to pay P5,000.00 exemplary
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: damages. Defendant Candelario Marcelino was,
This is a Petition for review which seeks to set of his urinary bladder and
was able to defecate 2 months Ordering the defendants however, absolved from liability.
aside the decision in CA-G.R. No. 00783 on the
ground that the findings of the respondent Court after surgery. He is paralyzed jointly and severally to pay
of Appeals are based on misapprehension of from the knee down to his the plaintiff the sum of 312.00 In its decision, the appellate court ruled:
facts and conflict with those of the trial court and toes. He can only sit on a monthly from September 8,
that the conclusions drawn therefrom are based wheel chair. The above 1979 until his release from That payloader owned by the
on speculations and conjectures. residual damage is permanent the hospital. Government, as found by the
2nd to the injury incurred by lower court, should not have
Mr. Adarle, he is still confined Ordering the defendants been operated that Saturday,
Arturo Arbatin was the successful bidder in the in the Hospital. (idem)
sale at public auction of junk and other jointly and severally to pay September 8, 1979, a
unserviceable government property located at the plaintiff the sum of Saturday, a non-working
the compound of the Highway District Engineer's While still in the hospital, the private respondent P7,410.63 for hospital holiday. There is no official
Office of Roxas City. Private respondent Eduardo instituted the action below for damages against expenses up to January 14, order from the proper
Adarle was hired as a laborer by Arbatin to Arbatin, his employer; Buensalido, the payloader 1980 and an additional authorities authorizing
gather and take away scrap iron from the said operator; Candelario Marcelino, the civil amount for further Arbatin and plaintiff to work
compound with a daily wage of P12.00 or about engineer; and petitioner, the Highway District hospitalization until the and Buensalido to operate the
312.00 a month. Engineer. release of plaintiff from the payloader on that day inside
hospital; the Highway compound.
During the trial on the merits, the petitioner put Thereabouts, we can logically
On September 8, 1979, at 4:00 o'clock in the deduce that Arbatin and
morning, on a Saturday and a non-working day, up the defense that he had no knowledge of or Ordering the defendants
participation in the accident and that, when it jointly and severally to pay plaintiff went to the
while the private respondent was tying a cable to compound to work with the
a pile of scrap iron to be loaded on a truck inside happened, he was not present in the government the plaintiff the sum of at least
compound. Apart from the fact that it was a P100,000.00 as actual and previous knowledge and
the premises of the compound, and while the consent of Highway District
bucket of the payloader driven by Ramon Saturday and a non-working day, he was in Iloilo. compensatory damages,
As part of his evidence, the petitioner presented considering that plaintiff Engineer Jose E. Genson. And
Buensalido was being raised, the bucket allowed him, probably upon
suddenly fell and hit Adarle on the right back a memorandum directed to a certain Mr. Orlando Eduardo Adarle is totally
Panaguiton ordering the latter to take charge of incapacitated for any the request of Arbatin. We
portion of his head just below the nape of his have noted that Genson
neck. Adarle was rushed to the St. Anthony the district until his return (Exh. 1). employment for life;
testified that his office does
Hospital, Roxas City. According to the medical not authorize work on
certificate issued by the attending physician, the The trial court found that, with the exception of Ordering the defendants Saturdays.
private respondent suffered the following the petitioner, all of the defendants were present jointly and severally to pay
injuries: at the Highway's compound when the accident the plaintiff the sum of
occurred. However, it still adjudged the P20,000.00 as moral damages Genson testified that he was
petitioner liable for damages because the and another sum for in Iloilo from September 9
1) Comminuted fracture of the and 10, 1979. The accident
vertebral body of 13 with petitioner was supposed to know what his men exemplary damages which we
do with their government equipment within an leave to the sound discretion occurred on September 8, in
extreme Kyphosis of the the morning. In his answer,
segment by x-ray. area under his supervision. of the Honorable Court;
Genson did not allege his
 presence in Iloilo on
September 9 and 10 ... .
We fully concur with the
lower court's conclusions
regarding the physical
presence of appellants inside
the compound on that fateful
day, pursuant to a previous
understanding with Arbatin
for plaintiff to work on the
scrap iron and for Buensalido
to operate the payloader
inside the compound. Arbatin
and plaintiff would not go to
the compound on that
Saturday, if there was no
previous understanding with
Genson and Buensalido.
The liability of Genson is
based on fault, intentional and
voluntary or negligent
(Eleano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 106;
Jimena v. Lincallo, 63 O.G.
11,15, 8 C. A.R. 2567). He gave
permission to Arbatin,
plaintiff and Buensalido to
work on Saturday, a non-
working day, in contravention
of his office' rules and
regulations outlawing work
on Saturdays.. (pp. 29-30,
Rollo)
In this present petition, the petitioner contends
that the appellate court committed a palpable
error when it ruled that the petitioner was
present when the accident happened and that he
had given permission to the other defendants to
work on a Saturday, a non-working day. The
petitioner argues that considering these were
the facts relied upon by the said court in holding
that he was negligent and thus liable for
damages, such a conclusion, is without basis.
The petitioner further contends that the
appellate court erred in not holding that the suit
against the petitioner was, in effect, a suit against
the government and, therefore, should be
dismissed under the principle of non-suability of
the state.
As regards the petitioner's second contention,
we hold that the petitioner's Identification as the
Highway District Engineer in the complaint filed
by the private respondent did not result in the
said complaint's becoming a suit against the
government or state.
In Belizar v. Brazas, (2 SCRA 526), we ruled that
"the fact that the duties and positions of the
defendants are indicated does not mean that
they are being sued in their official capacities,
especially as the present action is not one against
the Government." Furthermore, the accident in
the case at bar happened on a non-working day
and there was no showing that the work
performed on that day was authorized by the
government. While the equipment used belongs
to the Government, the work was private in
nature, for the benefit of a purchaser of junk. As
we have held in the case of Republic v.
Palacio (23 SCRA 899,906).
xxx xxx xxx
the ISU liability thus arose
from tort and not from
contract, and it is a well-
entrenched rule in this
jurisdiction, embodied in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, that the
State is liable only for torts
caused by its special agents,
specially commissioned to
carry out the acts complained
of outside of such agent's
regular duties (Merritt v.
Insular Government, supra;
Rosete v. Auditor General, 81
Phil. 453) There being no
proof that the making of the
tortious inducement was
authorized, neither the State
nor its funds can be made
liable therefor.
Therefore, the defense of the petitioner that he
cannot be made liable under the principle of
non-suability of the state cannot be sustained.
With regard to the main contention of the
petitioner that the appellate court based its
conclusions on an erroneous finding of fact, we
agree with him that the appellate court's finding
that he was present within the premises when
the accident happened is not supported by
evidence indisputably showing that he was
indeed there.
Since the evidence fails to establish petitioner
Genson's presence when the payloader's bucket
fell on the head of Mr. Adarle, any liability on his
part would be based only on his alleged failure to
exercise proper supervision over his
subordinates (See Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263,
267-268).
According to the trial court, Mr. Genson
authorized work on a Saturday when no work
was supposed to be done. It stated that the
petitioner should know what his men do with
their government equipment and he should
neither be lax nor lenient in his supervision over
them.
The petitioner contends that:
1. No evidence on record
exists that Genson gave
authority to Adarle and
Arbatin, either verbally or in
writing, to enter the work
inside the Highways
Compound on September 8,
1979;
2. Genson never knew or met
Arbatin until the trial of the
case. This fact was never
denied by Arbatin nor
rebutted by Adarle. How then
could Genson have ordered or
allowed Arbatin to enter the
Highways Compound with
Adarle?
3. Adarle himself repeatedly
admitted that Arbatin, his
employer, gave him the
instructions to enter the
compound, thus:
Q. Now particularly on September 8, 1979,
did Arbatin ask you to go to the compound in the
Highway?
A. Yes sr.
Q. Are you sure of that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where did he say that to you?
A. We went to the Highway compound for many
times already and that was the time when I met
the incident.
Q. The particular day in question September 8.
1979, did you see Arturo Arbatin and he asked
you to go the compound on that day?
A. That date was included on the first day when
"he instructed us to gather scrap ironuntil that
work could be finished." (pp. 25-26, tsn., October
10, 1980) (Emphasis supplied)
Q. Who told you to work there?
A. "Through the instruction of Arturo Arbatin"
(pp. 32, tsn., Oct. 10, 1980) (Emphasis supplied)
(pp. 12-13, Rollo).
Insofar as work on a Saturday is concerned, and
assuming Mr. Genson verbally allowed it, we see
nothing wrong in the petitioner's authorizing
work on that day. As a matter of fact, it could
even be required that the hauling of junk and
unserviceable equipment sold at public
auction must be done on non-working days. The
regular work of the District Engineer's office
would not be disturbed or prejudiced by a
private bidder bringing in his trucks and
obstructing the smooth flow of traffic and the Nevertheless, it is a well- acquaintance or probably for inordinate gain."
daily routine within the compound. Obviously, it settled principle of law that a (p. 31, Rollo).
would also be safer for all concerned to effect the public official may be liable in
clearing of the junk pile when everything is his personal private capacity There is no showing from the records that
peaceful and quiet. for whatever damage he may Genson received anything which could be called
have caused by his act done "inordinate gain." It is possible that he permitted
There is no showing from the records that it is with malice and in bad faith, work on a Saturday to accomodate an
against regulations to use government cranes (Mindanao realty Corp. v. acquaintance but it is more plausible that he
and payloaders to load items sold at public Kintanar, 6 SCRA 814) or simply wanted to clear his compound of junk and
auction on the trucks of the winning bidder. The beyond the scope of his the best time for the winning bidder to do it was
items were formerly government property. authority or jurisdiction. (the on a non-working day.
Unless the contract specifies otherwise, it may be Philippine Racing Club v.
presumed that all the parties were in agreement Bonifacio, G.R. No. L-11844,
August 31, 1960) The At any rate, we see no malice, bad faith, or gross
regarding the use of equipment already there for negligence on the part of Genson to hold him
that purpose. Of course, it would be different if question, therefore, is
whether petitioner did act in liable for the acts of Buensalido and Arbatin.
the junk pile is in a compound where there is no
equipment for loading or unloading and the any of the manner aforesaid.
cranes or payloaders have to be brought there. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate
Petitioner contends that, Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED and SET
contrary to the holding of the ASIDE. The complaint against Jesus Genson is
There is likewise no sufficient basis for the DISMISSED.
"master-servant" doctrine in tort law to apply. respondent Court of Appeals,
Buensalido was not working overtime as a he was not sued in his
government employee. It is doubtful if the personal capacity, but in his SO ORDERED.
district engineer can be considered an official capacity. Neither was
"employer" for purposes of tort liability who malice or bad faith alleged Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ.,
may be liable even if he was not there. No against him in the complaint, concur.
evidence was presented to show that an much less proven by the
application for overtime work or a claim for evidence, as the respondent
overtime pay from the district engineer's office court made no such finding of
was ever filed. It is more logical to presume that malice or bad faith.
Buensalido, the operator of the payloader, was
trying to earn a little money on the side from the Examining the allegations of
junk buyer and that his presence in the the complaint and reviewing
compound on that Saturday was a purely private the evidence it would indeed
arrangement. From the records of this case, we be correct to say that
are not disposed to rule that a supervisor who petitioner was sued in his
tolerates his subordinates to moonlight on a official capacity, and that the
non-working day in their office premises can be most that was imputed to him
held liable for everything that happens on that is act of culpable neglect,
day. It would have been preferable if Mr. Arbatin inefficiency and gross
brought his own payloader operator and indifference in the
perhaps, his own equipment but we are not performance of his official
dealing with sound office practice in this case. duties. Verily, this is not
The issue before us is subsidiary liability for tort imputation of bad faith or
comitted by a government employee who is malice, and what is more was
moonlighting on a non-working day. not convincingly proven.

This Court ruled in Dumlao v. Court of According to the respondent court, "Genson and
Appeals (114 SCRA 247, 251): Buensalido divested themselves of their public
positions and privileges to accomodate an
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 82248 January 30, 1992
ERNESTO MARTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MANILA
ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondents.
Roberto M. Cabangis for petitioner.
Benjamin R. Reonal for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
This case turns on the proper application of the
familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his
allegation.
Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car
bearing license plate No. NPA-930. At around 2
o'clock in the morning of May 11, 1982, while
being driven by Nestor Martin, it crashed into a
Meralco electric post on Valley Golf Road, in
Antipolo, Rizal. The car was wrecked and the
pole severely damaged. Meralco subsequently
demanded reparation from Ernesto Martin, but
the demand was rejected. It thereupon sued him
for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
alleging inter alia that he was liable to it in the
sum of P17,352.00 plus attorney's fees and
litigation costs as the employer of Nestor Martin.
The petitioner's main defense was that Nestor
Martin was not his employee.
After the plaintiff had rested, the defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that no evidence had been adduced to show that
Nestor Martin was his employee. The motion
was denied. The case was considered submitted
for decision with the express waiver by the
defendant of his right to present his own
evidence. The defendant thus did not rebut the
plaintiff's allegation that he was Nestor Martin's
employer.
In the decision dated August 27, 1985, Judge
Eutropio Migriño held in favor of the plaintiff,
awarding him the amount claimed, with 12%
interest, and P4,000.00 attorney's fees, plus
costs.1 The decision was seasonably elevated to
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed it in toto on
February 22, 1988, 2 prompting this petition for
review.
The petition has merit.
It is important to stress that the complaint for
damages was filed by the private respondent
against only Ernesto Martin as alleged employer
of Nestor Martin, the driver of the car at the time
of the accident. Nestor Martin was not
impleaded. The action was based on tort under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, providing in part
that:
Employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their
employees and household
helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are
not engaged in any business
or industry.
The above rule is applicable only if there is an
employer-employee relationship although it is
not necessary that the employer be engaged in
any business or industry. It differs in this sense
from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
which requires that the employer be engaged in
an industry to be subsidiarily liable for the felony
committed by his employee in the course of his
employment.
Whether or not engaged in any business or
industry, the employer under Article 2180 is
liable for the torts committed by his employees
within the scope of their assigned task. But it is
necessary first to establish the employment
relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must
show, to hold the employer liable, that the
employee was acting within the scope of his
assigned task when the tort complained of was
committed. It is only then that the defendant, as
employer, may find it necessary to interpose the
defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee as allowed in that
article. 3
In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever was
adduced by the plaintiff to show that the
defendant was the employer of Nestor Martin at
the time of the accident. The trial court
merely presumed the existence of the employer-
employee relationship and held that the
petitioner had not refuted that presumption. It
noted that although the defendant alleged that
he was not Nestor Martin's employer, "he did not
present any proof to substantiate his allegation."
As the trial court put it:
There is no need to stretch
one's imagination to realize
that a car owner entrusts his
vehicle only to his driver or to
anyone whom he allows to
drive it. Since neither plaintiff
nor defendant has presented
any evidence on the status of
Nestor Martin, the Court
presumes that he was at the
time of the incident, an
employee of the defendant. It
is elementary that he who
makes an allegation is
required to prove the same.
Defendant alleges that Nestor
Martin was not his employee
but he did not present any
proof to substantiate his
allegation. While it is true
plaintiff did not present
evidence on its allegation that
Nestor Martin was
defendant's employee, the
Court believes and so holds,
that there was no need for
such evidence. As above
adverted to, the Court can
proceed on the presumption
that one who drives the motor
vehicle is an employee of the
owner thereof.
A presumption is defined as an inference as to
the existence of a fact not actually known, arising
from its usual connection with another which is
known, 4 or a conjecture based on past
experience as to what course human affairs
ordinarily take. 5 It is either a presumption juris,
or of law, or a presumption hominis, or of fact. 6
There is no law directing the deduction made by
the courts below from the particular facts
presented to them by the parties. Such deduction
is not among the conclusive presumptions under
Section 2 or the disputable presumptions under
Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. In
other words, it is not a presumption juris.
Neither is it a presumption hominis, which is a
reasonable deduction from the facts proved
without an express direction of law to that
effect. 7 The facts proved, or not denied, viz., the
ownership of the car and the circumstances of
the accident, are not enough bases for the
inference that the petitioner is the employer of
Nestor Martin.
In the modern urban society, most male persons
know how to drive and do not have to employ
others to drive for them unless this is needed for
business reasons. Many cannot afford this
luxury, and even if they could, may consider it an
unnecessary expense and inconvenience. In the
present case, the more plausible assumption is
that Nestor Martin is a close relative of Ernesto
Martin and on the date in question borrowed the
car for some private purpose. Nestor would
probably not have been accommodated if he
were a mere employee for employees do not
usually enjoy the use of their employer's car at
two o'clock in the morning.
As the employment relationship between
Ernesto Martin and Nestor Martin could not be
presumed, it was necessary for the plaintiff to
establish it by evidence. Meralco had the burden
of proof, or the duty "to present evidence on the
fact in issue necessary to establish his claim" as
required by Rule 131, Section 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Failure to do this was fatal to its
action.
It was enough for the defendant to deny the
alleged employment relationship, without more,
for he was not under obligation to prove this
negative
averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui
negat. 8 This Court has consistently applied the
ancient rule that "if the plaintiff, upon whom
rests the burden of proving his cause of action,
fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts
upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is
under no obligation to prove his exception or
defense." 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the respondent court is REVERSED,
and Civil Case No. 48045 in the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 151, is DISMISSED, with
costs against the respondent. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Griño-
Aquino and Medidialdea, JJ., concur.

The case of Amor v. Soberano, 10 a Court of

Appeals decision not elevated to this Court, was
misapplied by the respondent court in support of
the petitioner's position. The vehicle involved in
that case was a six-by-six truck, which
reasonably raised the factual presumption that it
was engaged in business and that its driver was
employed by the owner of the vehicle. The case
at bar involves a private vehicle as its license
plate indicates. No evidence was ever offered
that it was being used for business purposes or
that, in any case, its driver at the time of the
accident was an employee of the petitioner.

It is worth mentioning in this connection that

in Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals, 1
1 the owner of the jeep involved in the accident

was absolved from liability when it was shown

that the driver of the vehicle was not employed
as such by the latter but was a "working scholar"
as that term is defined by the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code. 12 He was
assigned to janitorial duties. Evidence was
introduced to establish the employment
relationship but it failed nonetheless to hold the
owner responsible. Significantly, no similar
evidence was even presented in the case at bar,
the private respondent merely relying on its
mere allegation that Nestor Martin was the
petitioner's employee. Allegation is not
synonymous with proof.

The above observations make it unnecessary to

examine the question of the driver's alleged
negligence or the lack of diligence on the part of
the petitioner in the selection and supervision of
his employee. These questions have not arisen
because the employment relationship
contemplated in Article 1860 of the Civil Code
has not been established.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32774 October 14, 1930
BALBINO CUISON, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
NORTON & HARRISON CO., TELESFORO
BINOYA Y ALMINANZA and FRANCISCO
BAUTISTA Y CRUZ,defendants.
NORTON & HARRISON CO., appellee.
Vicente Sotto for appellant.
Gibbs and McDonough for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an action brought by the father to recover
damages in the amount of P30,000 for the death
of his son, alleged to have been caused by the
negligence of the defendant. The answer pleaded
the general issue. The judgment in the Court of
First Instance absolved the defendant from the
complaint, without pronouncement as to costs.
A succinct statement of the facts will be first
undertaken as follows: On the afternoon of
August 9, 1928, Moises Cuison, a boy 7 years of
age, the son of the plaintiff, was on his way to the
Santa Mesa School, in the City of Manila, in
company with his sister Marciana. As they came
near to the fire station, some large pieces of
lumber on a truck which had stopped fell from it
pinning the boy beneath, and causing his almost
instant death. The truck in questioned was
owned by Antonio Ora. It was driven by Felix
Jose, with Telesforo Binoya as thewashing and
Francisco Bautista as the helper, the two latter
being youths less than18 years of age. Jose
Binoya, and Bautista were employees of Ora. The
truck was rented by Ora to Norton & Harrison
Co. On the truck were the letters "N-H," which
were the first letters of the firm name. Ora was in
the employ of Norton & Harrison Co. as
a capataz. It was his duty as such employee to
direct the loading and transportation of the
lumber. When the accident occurred the lumber
had become loosened, and it was to rearrange it
that the truck halted, without, however, there
arrangement having been made before the
pieces of lumber had fallen and killed the boy.
Important details were not brought out in the
testimony, although it would have been easy to
supply those details. The most important
question of fact to determine was the
relationship of Ora to Norton & Harrison Co.,
whether he was a servant of the company or an
independent contractor. In view of the debatabel
facts found in the record, and in view of the
propriety of obtaining as much enlightenment as
possible on the main issue, it is deemed
advisable to set forth a considerable portion of
Ora's testimony. He testified:
Q. Do you know the truck T-101? — A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Whose is that truck ? — A. Mine.
Q. Showing you this document which I
ask to be marked Exhibit 1(certificate
of ownership of a truck ) state what is
that document? — A.This is the
document of my truck.
Q. On August 9,1928, when, according
to the complaint, the boy Moises Cuison
was killed, was that truck used? — A.
Yes, sir.
Q. For Whom? — A. For me.
Q. For what kind of work? — A. For
loading lumber.
Q. Lumber of whom? — A. Of Norton &
Harrison Co.
Q. Where was the lumber to be taken?
— A. To Santa Mesa.
Q. What was the agreement between
you and Norton & Harrison Co.
regarding the transportation of lumber
to Santa Mesa?
xxx xxx xxx
A. The truck carried the lumber which I
contracted with Norton & Harrison for
transportation to certain places. I had
an agreement with Norton & Harrison
to carry and transport lumber coming
from its lumber yard to the place of its
destination.
Q. Did you rent the truck to Norton &
Harrison monthly or annually? — A. By
the cubic foot, depending upon the
distance travelled.
xxx
Q. Do you know Telesforo Binoya y
Alminanza and Francisco Bautista y
Cruz? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Had they anything to do with the
loading of the lumber of Norton &
Harrison on the truck?
xxx xxx xxx
A. The said Bautista and Binoya were
not the ones who did the loading on my
truck. There were other persons
stronger than these two who did the
loading.
Q. What I mean to say is whether
Binoya and Bautista, on August 9,1928,
when the truck went to the office of
Norton & Harrison to carry lumber to
Santa Mesa, had anything to do with the
loading of the lumber on said truck ? —
A. No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. In your agreement with Norton &
Harrison for the transportation of
lumber, who was under the obligation
to load the lumber on the truck?
xxx xxx xxx
A. I have already said that the
agreement with Norton & Harrison was
to load the lumber on my truck and
take it to its destination.
JUDGE:
Q. But who was to do the loading of the
lumber, your men or their men? — A.
My men.
xxx xxx
Q. You said that you are an employee?
— A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where are you employed? — A. In
the firm of Norton & Harrison.
Q. Since when? — A. Since 1911.
Q. In what capacity? — A. As foreman.
Q. What kind of work do you have? —
A. Foreman.
Q. Capataz? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. And as foreman, are you in charge of
paying the wages of the workers? — A.
No, sir.
Q. Therefore you are the capataz who
directs the loading and transportation
of lumber? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please see Exhibit 1 of the plaintiff
and state if truck T-101 is what appears
therein? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you admit that the condition of
that truck on August 9, 1928, is as it
appears in this photograph? — A. yes,
sir.
 Q. What explanation can you give the
court accounting for the sign 'N- H'
which appears on the coach box of the
truck? — A. The sign 'N-H' appearing
there means that the lumber belongs to
Norton & Harrison.
Q. And as a foreman of Norton &
Harrison, do you receive any salary? —
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How much? — A. P200.
Q. You said that you entered into a
contract with Norton & Harrison, do
you have a copy of that contract? — A.
No, sir, we had an agreement and not a
contract.
Q. Verbal agreement? — A. Yes,sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. How do you collect the rent of the
truck, monthly or daily? — A. It
depends upon the cargo and the
distance travelled.
Q. Daily? — A. If I have loaded three
times, then I have three collections.
Q. Do you issue receipts therefor? — A.
Yes,sir.
Q. Have you any with you? — A. I don't
have.
Q. Can that truck of yours be rented by
anybody? — A. No, sir.
Q. Only by Norton & Harrison? — A.
Only for my work.
Q. Do you have with you any books of
account pertaining to the business of
your truck? — A. No, sir.
Q. Not even a note? — A. I don't have.
Q. Not even the firm of Norton &
Harrison? — A. They may have because
the number of truck and the total
number of board feet appear on every
receipt.
Q. As owner of the truck, don't you have
any note? — A. No, sir.
Q. Is that truck No. T-101 the only one
you have? — A. I Have some more.
Q. Some more? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. For rent? — A. For my own
use. 1awph!l.net
Q. For the exclusive use of Norton &
Harrison ? — A. I have a lime factory,
and they are used for the
transportation lime.
Q. But this truck T-101 is exclusively
intended to be rented by Norton &
Harrison? — A. It is not rented
exclusively to Norton & Harrison. I use
it in my other contracts to carry
cargoes, and also to carry lime.
Q. For the exclusive use of Norton &
Harrison ? — A. No, sir, I use it also for
the transportation of lime.
It is evident from the foregoing that Ora was a
contractor and an employee at the same time of
Norton & Harrison Co. Reverting now to the law,
counsel for neither party has considered it
necessary to assist the court in this regard.
However, just as the ascertainment of the facts is
important, so is it important to have before us
the applicable law.
The Penal Code makes provisions for the civil
liability of persons criminally liable, and
establishes subsidiary liability for persons and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies and misdemeanors committed by their
servants in the discharge of their duties. (Penal
Code, arts. 17-20.) In this instance, recurring to
the facts, it should have been mentioned that the
two youths, Binoya and Bautista, pleaded guilty
to the crime of homicide through reckless
negligence, and were sentenced accordingly.
The basis of civil law liability is not respondeat
superior but the relationship of paterfamilias.
This theory bases the liability of the master
ultimately on his own negligece and not on that
of his servant. (Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes
[1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad
Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768. As to Porto Rico, see
Acosta vs. Porto Rico Gas Co. [1915], 7 Porto Rico
Fed., 475; and Ortiz vs. Ezquiaga [1918], 10
Porto Rico Fed., 350.) Article 1902 of the Civil
Code provides:
Any person who by an act or omission
causes damage to another by his fault
or negligence shall be liable for the
damage so done. Article 1903,
paragraphs 4 and 7 of the same Code
provides:
Owners or directors of any
establishment or business are, in the
same way, liable for any damages
caused by their employees while
engaged in the branch of the service in
which employed, or an occasion of the
performance of their duties.
The liability imposed by this article
shall cease in case the persons subject
thereto prove that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.
It is well to repeat that under the civil law an
employer is only liable for the negligence of his
employees in the discharge of their respective
duties. The defense of independent contractor
would be a valid one in the Philippines just as it
would be in the United States. Here Ora was a
contractor, but it does not necessarily follow that
he was an independent contractor. The reason
for this distinction is that the employer retained
the power of directing and controlling the work.
The chauffeur and the two persons on the truck
were the employees of Ora, the contractor, but
Ora, the contractor, was an employee of Norton
& Harrison Co., charged with the duty of
directing the loading and transportation of the
lumber. And it was the negligence in loading the
lumber and the use of minors on the truck which
caused the death of the unfortunate boy. On the
facts and the law, Ora was not an independent
contractor, but was the servant of the defendant,
and for his negligence defendant was
responsible.
Conceding that the record discloses a most
unusual state of facts, and conceding that the
evidence is not as ample as it should be,
nevertheless on the record as it is and on the law
as it is, it is incumbent on the court to rule that
error was committed in the lower court in not
awarding the father of the dead boy damages for
the wrongful death of his son. It has been the
practice of this court in cases of death through
negligence, in the absence of special proof, to
allow the sum of P1,000. (Manzanares vs. Moreta
[1918], 38 Phil., 821; Bernal and Enverso vs.
House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant [1930],
54 Phil., 327.) Judgment will be reversed, and in
the court of origin another judgment will issue in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
for the sum of P1,000. So ordered, without
special finding as to costs in either instance.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL., J., concurring:
I concur in the result.
I am of the opinion, however, that the case at bar
is governed by the provisions of article 20 in
connection with article 17 of the Penal Code and
article 1092 of the Civil Code, and not by the
provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the latter
Code.

Ora was a foreman of the defendants Norton and

Harrison for the loading and unloading of their
lumber the falling of which caused the death of
the son of the plaintiff Balbino Cuison. As such
foreman, Ora was the agent or employee of
Norton and Harrison. In the performance of his
duties as such foreman, he used the services of
Francisco Bautista and Telesforo Binoya for the
loading and unloading of said lumber, thus
making them his employees in such work, and
consequently the employees of Norton and
Harrison through him.

Under the provisions of article 20 of the Penal

Code persons and corporations engaged in any
kind of industry are subsidiarily liable for
felonies and misdemeanors committed by their
employees. There is in the complaint filed in the
present action sufficient allegation that the said
Francisco Bautista and Telesforo Binoya
committed the crime of homicide through
reckless imprudence in the handling of the
lumber of Norton and Harrison and that they
were the employees of said firm. Norton and
Harrison are therefore civilly liable for the crime
of homicide through reckless negligence
committed by their said employees, such liability
being of subsidiary nature.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 104658. April 7, 1993.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION,
petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
CLARITA T. CAMACHO, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for
petitioner.
Yolanda Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for
private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAWS AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION;
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP;
FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING
EXISTENCE THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — It is
firmly settled that the existence or non-existence
of the employer-employee relationship is
commonly to be determined by examination of
certain factors or aspects of that relationship.
These include: (a) the manner of selection and
engagement of the putative employee; (b) the
mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or
absence of a power to control the putative
employee's conduct, although the latter is the
most important element . . . As aptly held by the
trial court, petitioner did not exercise control
and supervision over Feliciano with regard to
the manner in which he conducted the hydro-
pressure test. All that petitioner did, through its
Field Engineer, Roberto Mitra, was relay to
Feliciano the request of private respondent for a
hydro-pressure test, to determine any possible
leakages in the storage tanks in her gasoline
station. The mere hiring of Feliciano by
petitioner for that particular task is not the form
of control and supervision contemplated by law
which may be the basis for establishing an
employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and Feliciano. The fact that there was
no such control is further amplified by the
absence of any shell representative in the job site
at the time when the test was conducted.
Roberto Mitra was never there. Only Feliciano
and his men were. True, it was petitioner who
sent Feliciano to private respondent's gasoline
station to conduct the hydro-pressure test as per
the request of private respondent herself. But
this single act did not automatically make
Feliciano an employee of petitioner. As discussed
earlier, more than mere hiring is required. It
must further be established that petitioner is the
one who is paying Feliciano's salary on a regular
basis; that it has the power to dismiss said
employee, and more importantly, that petitioner
has control and supervision over the work of
Feliciano. The last requisite was sorely missing
in the instant case.
2. ID.; JOB CONTRACTING; REQUISITES;
HALLMARKS OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.
— Section 8 of Rule VIII, Book III of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides:
"Sec. 8. Job contracting. — There is job
contracting permissible under the Code if the
following conditions are met: (1) The contractor
carries on an independent business and
undertakes the contract work on his own
account under his own responsibility according
to his own manner and method, free from the
control and direction of his employer or
principal in all matters connected with the
performance of the work except as to the results
thereof; and (2) The contractor has substantial
capital or investment in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises, and
other materials which are necessary in the
conduct of his business." Feliciano is
independently maintaining a business under a
duly registered business name, "JFS Repair and
Maintenance Service," and is duly registered
with the Bureau of Domestic Trade. He does not
enjoy a fixed salary but instead charges a lump
sum consideration for every piece of work he
accomplishes. If he is not able to finish his work,
he does not get paid, as what happened in this
case. Further, Feliciano utilizes his own tools and
equipment and has a complement of workers.
Neither is he required to work on a regular basis.
Instead, he merely awaits calls from clients such
as petitioner whenever repairs and maintenance
services are requested. Moreover, Feliciano does
not exclusively service petitioner because he can
accept other business but not from other oil
companies. All these are the hallmarks of an
independent contractor.
3. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICTS; INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS OWN
ACTS AND OMISSIONS. — Being an independent
contractor, Feliciano is responsible for his own
acts and omissions. As he alone was in control
over the manner of how he was to undertake the
hydro-pressure test, he alone must bear the
consequences of his negligence, if any, in the
conduct of the same.
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J p:
Was the hydro-pressure test of the underground
storage tank in private respondent Clarita T.
Camacho's gasoline station conducted by an
independent contractor or not? A negative
answer will make petitioner Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation (Shell, for brevity) liable
for the said independent contractor's acts or
omissions; otherwise, no. This is the issue that
this Court is called upon to resolve in this case.
The facts are as follows:
Private respondent Clarita T. Camacho (private
respondent for short) was the operator of a
gasoline station in Naguilian Road, Baguio City,
wherein she sells petitioner Shell's petroleum
products. Sometime in April 1983, private
respondent requested petitioner to conduct a
hydro-pressure test on the underground storage
tanks of the said station in order to determine
whether or not the sales losses she was incurring
for the past several months were due to leakages
therein. Petitioner acceded to the said request
and on April 27, 1983, one Jesus "Jessie"
Feliciano together with other workers, came to
private respondent's station with a Job Order
from petitioner to perform the hydro-pressure
test.
On the same day, Feliciano and his men drained
the underground storage tank which was to be
tested of its remaining gasoline. After which,
they filled the tank with water through a water
hose from the deposit tank of private
respondent. Then, after requesting one of private
respondent's gasoline boys to shut off the water
when the tank was filled, Feliciano and his men
left. At around 2:00 a.m. the following day,
private respondent saw that the water had
reached the lip of the pipe of the underground
storage tank and so, she shut off the water
faucet.
At around 5:30 a.m., private respondent's
husband opened the station and started selling
gasoline. But at about 6:00 a.m., the customers
who had bought gasoline returned to the station
complaining that their vehicles stalled because
there was water in the gasoline that they bought.
On account of this, private respondent was
constrained to replace the gasoline sold to the
said customers. However, a certain Eduardo
Villanueva, one of the customers, filed a
complaint with the police against private
respondent for selling the adulterated gasoline.
In addition, he caused the incident to be
published in two local newspapers.
Feliciano, who arrived later that morning, did
not know what caused the water pollution of the
gasoline in the adjacent storage tank. So he
called up Nick Manalo, Superintendent of Shell's
Poro Point Installation at San Fernando, La
Union, and referred the matter to the latter.
Manalo went up to Baguio in the afternoon to
investigate. Thereafter, he and Feliciano again
filled with water the underground storage tank
undergoing hydro-pressure test whereat they
noticed that the water was transferring to the
other tanks from whence came the gasoline
being sold. Manalo asked permission from Shell's
Manila Office to excavate the underground pipes
of the station. Upon being granted permission to
do so, Feliciano and his men began excavating
the driveway of private respondent's station in
order to expose the underground pipeline. The
task was continued by one Daniel "Danny"
Pascua who replaced Feliciano, Pascua removed
the corroded pipeline and installed new
independent vent pipe for each storage tank.
Meanwhile, petitioner undertook to settle the
criminal complaint filed by Villanueva.
Subsequently, Villanueva filed an Affidavit of
Desistance, 1 declaring, inter alia —
"THAT, after careful evaluation of the
surrounding circumstances, especially the
explanation of the representatives of SHELL
Phils., that the gasoline tanks of Mrs. Camacho
were subject to Hydro test, in such a way that
water was used for the said test, I believe that
she may not have had anything to do with the
filling of water in the tank of my car;
xxx xxx xxx
THAT, said representatives of SHELL Phils. have
interceded for and in behalf of Mrs. Camacho and
have fully satisfied my claim against her.
THAT, in view of all the foregoing I do not intend
to prosecute the case and I am therefore asking
for the dismissal of the case against Mrs.
Camacho."
Thereafter, private respondent demanded from
petitioner the payment of damages in the
amount of P10,000.00. Petitioner, instead,
offered private respondent additional credit line
and other beneficial terms, which offer was,
however, rejected. cdrep
Subsequently, or on October 12, 1983, private
respondent filed before the trial court a
complaint for damages against petitioner due to
the latter's alleged negligence in the conduct of
the hydro-pressure test in her gasoline station.
For its part, petitioner denied liability because,
according to it, the hydro-pressure test on the
underground storage tanks was conducted by an
independent contractor.
The trial court dismissed private respondent's
complaint for damages for the reason that:
"The hydro-pressure test which brought about
the incident was conducted by Jesus Feliciano,
who was neither an employee nor agent nor
representative of the defendant. Jesus Feliciano
is responsible for his own acts and omissions. He
alone was in control of the manner of how he is
to undertake the hydro-pressure test.
Considering that the conduct of said hydro-
pressure test was under the sole and exclusive
control and supervision of Jesus Feliciano, the
overflow with water causing the same to sip into
the adjoining tank cannot be attributed to the
fault or negligence of defendant. 2
From the adverse decision of the trial court,
private respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals which court reversed the decision of the
trial court. Thus,
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision being
appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and, in lieu
thereof, another rendered ordering defendant to
pay plaintiff:
1. P100,000.00 as moral damages;
2. P2,639.25 and P15,000.00 representing the
actual losses suffered by plaintiff as a result of
the water pollution of the gasoline.
No costs.
SO ORDERED." 3
Petitioner moved to have the above decision
reconsidered but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated March 9, 1992. Hence, this
recourse.
As stated at the very outset, the pivotal issue in
this case is whether or not petitioner should be
held accountable for the damage to private
respondent due to the hydro-pressure test
conducted by Jesus Feliciano.
It is a well-entrenched rule that an employer-
employee relationship must exist before an
employer may be held liable for the negligence of
his employee. It is likewise firmly settled that the
existence or non-existence of the employer-
employee relationship is commonly to be
determined by examination of certain factors or
aspects of that relationship. These include: (a)
the manner of selection and engagement of the
putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of
wages; (c) the presence or absence of a power to
control the putative employee's conduct, 4
although the latter is the most important
element. 5
In this case, respondent Court of Appeals held
petitioner liable for the damage caused to
private respondent as a result of the hydro-
pressure test conducted by Jesus Feliciano due to
the following circumstances: 6
1. Feliciano was hired by petitioner;
2. He received his instructions from the Field
Engineer of petitioner, Mr. Roberto Mitra;
3. While he was at private respondent's service
station, he also received instructions from Nick
Manalo, petitioner's Poro Point Depot
Superintendent;
4. Instructions from petitioner's Manila Office
were also relayed to him while he was at .the job
site at Baguio City;
5. His work was under the constant supervision
of petitioner's engineer;
6. Before he could complete the work, he was
instructed by Mr. Manalo, petitioner's
Superintendent, to discontinue the same and it
was turned over to Daniel Pascua, who was
likewise hired by petitioner.
Based on the foregoing, respondent Court of
Appeals concluded that Feliciano was not an
independent contractor but was under the
control and supervision of petitioner in the
performance of the hydro-pressure test, hence, it
held petitioner liable for the former's acts and
omissions.
We are not in accord with the above finding of
respondent Court of Appeals. As aptly held by
the trial court, petitioner did not exercise control
and supervision over Feliciano with regard to
the manner in which he conducted the hydro-
pressure test. All that petitioner did, through its
Field Engineer, Roberto Mitra, was relay to
Feliciano the request of private respondent for a
hydro-pressure test, to determine any possible
leakages in the storage tanks in her gasoline
station. The mere hiring of Feliciano by
petitioner for that particular task is not the form
of control and supervision contemplated by may
be the basis for establishing an employer-
employee relationship between petitioner and
Feliciano. The fact that there was no such control
is further amplified by the absence of any Shell
representative in the job site time when the test
was conducted. Roberto Mitra was never there.
Only Feliciano and his men were.
True, it was petitioner who sent Feliciano to
private respondent's gasoline station in conduct
the hydro-pressure test as per the request of
private respondent herself. But this single act did
not automatically make Feliciano an employee of
petitioner. As discussed earlier, more than mere
hiring is required. It must further be established
that petitioner is the one who is paying Felicia's
salary on a regular basis; that it has the power to
dismiss said employee, and more importantly,
that petitioner has control and supervision over
the work of Feliciano. The last requisite was
sorely missing in the instant case.
A careful perusal of the records will lead to the
conclusion that Feliciano is an independent
contractor. Section 8 of Rule VIII, Book III of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
provides:
"Sec. 8. Job contracting. — There is job
contracting permissible under the Code if the
following conditions are met:
(1) The contractor carries on an independent WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed
business and undertakes the contract work on decision of respondent Court of Appeals is
his own account under his own responsibility hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial
according to his own manner and method, free court REINSTATED. Without pronouncement as
from the control and direction of his employer or to costs.
principal in all matters connected with the
performance of the work except as to the results SO ORDERED.
thereof; and
Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ .,
(2) The contractor has substantial capital or concur.
investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, work premises, and other materials
which are necessary in the conduct of his
business."

Feliciano is independently maintaining a

business under a duly registered business name,
"JFS Repair and Maintenance Service," and is
duly registered with the Bureau of Domestic
Trade. 7 He does not enjoy a fixed salary but
instead charges a lump sum consideration for
every piece of work he accomplishes. 8 If he is
not able to finish his work, he does not get paid,
as what happened in this case. 9 Further,
Feliciano utilizes his own tools and equipment
and has a complement of workers. Neither is he
required to work on a regular basis. Instead, he
merely awaits calls from clients such as
petitioner whenever repairs and maintenance
services are requested. Moreover, Feliciano does
not exclusively service petitioner because he can
accept other business but not from other oil
companies. 10 All these are the hallmarks of an
independent contractor.

Being an independent contractor, Feliciano is

responsible for his own acts and omissions. As
he alone was in control over the manner of how
he was to undertake the hydro-pressure test, he
alone must bear the consequences of his
negligence, if any, in the conduct of the same.

Anent the issue of damages, the same has been

rendered moot by the failure of private
respondent to establish an employer-employee
relationship between petitioner and Feliciano.
Absent said relationship, petitioner cannot be
held liable for the acts and omissions of the
independent contractor, Feliciano.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15247 February 28, 1962
DE LEON BROKERAGE CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and ANGELINE
STEEN, respondents.
Abelardo P. Cecilio and H. Datuin, Jr. for
petitioner.
Vergara and Dayut for respondents.
BENGZON , C.J.:
Review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila which ordered petitioner and
its employee, Augusto Luna, to pay jointly and
severally to respondent Angeline Steen
P12,18370 as actual and moral damages, and
attorney's fees.
The awards were for injuries said respondent
suffered as a result of the collision between the
passenger jeepney in which she was riding, and
petitioner's cargo truck reclessly driven by its
employee, Luna, and for which the latter had
been prosecuted and convicted of the crime of
homicide with physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence.In the criminal action against Luna
(and the driver of the passenger jeepney, who
was, however, acquitted), respondent had
reserved her right to file a separate civil action.
After a judgment of conviction had been
rendered, respondent filed in the court of first
inst ance of Manila, an action for recovery of
damages against Luna and petitioner.As proof of
Luna's negligence, she presented during the
hearing the judgment of conviction in the
criminal case, Exh. B; and likewise established
her claim for actual, moral and exemplary
damages. Defendants, that is, Luna and
petitioner, sought to prove by means of the
former's testimony that he was not engaged in
the performance of his duties at the time of the
accident.
Said court rendered judgment — which on
appeal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals —
holding petitioner and Luna solidarily liable to
respondent for the sums of P1,183.70 for actual
expenses; P3,000.00 for unpaid medical fees;
P7,000.00 as moral damages; and P1,000.00 as
attorney'sfees; all amount to earn legal interest
from the filing of the complaint, plus costs.
Seeking reversal of such affirmance by the
AppellanteCourt, De Leon Brokerage Claims that:
(1) the allegations in respondent's complaint
were so ambiguous that it was not clear whether
she was suing for damages resulting from a
quasi-delict or for civil liability arising from
crime,but since the averments therein are more
characteristic of an action of the latter nature,
the same, as against petitioner, is premature for
failure to allege the insolvency of its employee;
(2) the judgment of conviction Exh. B, is not
admissible against it as evidence of a quasi-delict;
(3)the employee, Luna, was not in the discharge
of his dutiesat the time of the accident; and (4) it
cannot be held solidarily liable with Luna for
damages.
The court of origin and the appellate court
correctly considered respondent's complaint to
be based on a quasidelict.She alleged that she
suffered unjuries because of the carelessness and
imprudence of petitioner's chauffeur who was
driving the cargo truck TH-776 belonging to
petitioner,which truck collided with the
passenger jeepney wherein shwe was riding.
Since averment had been made of the employer-
employee relationship and of the damages
caused by the employee on occasion of his
function, there is a clear statement of a right of
action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The
complaint does not, and did not have to allege
that petitioner did not exercise due deligence in
choosing and supervising Luna, because this is a
matter of defense.
Contrary to petitioner's view, respondent is
holding it liable for its own lack of car. Her
allegation "that the acts of the defendants above
described consitutute gross negligence and
recklessness", plainly refers to petitioner's act of
employing Luna as driver of its cargo truck, and
to Luna's careless manner of driving it.
Whatever doubts remain as to the nature of
respondent's action are resolved by her prayer
that petitioner and its employee be held
solidarily liable.
According to petitioner, what causes confusion
as to the nature of respondent's action are the
allegations of Luna's conviction (a copy of the
judgment of conviction was attached of her civil
action — circumstances, petitionerargues, which
infallibly characterize an action for civil
indemnityunder the criminal code.
But respondent clearly did not base her suit on
the criminal conviction. This fact, it is true, was
alleged in a paragraph separate from her
allegation of Luna's negligene as having been the
cause of her injuries; but mention of the criminal
conviction merely tended to support her claim
that Luna had been recklessly negligent in
driving the truck. Being evidentiary, the
allegation could have beeb
dusregarded. 1äwphï1.ñët
Respondent neither had to wait for the
termination of the criminal proceeding nor to
reserve in the same her right to file a separate
civil action.1 She waited for the results of the
criminal action because she wanted to besure
which driver and respective employer she could
rightly sue, since both Luna and the driver of the
passenger jeepney were prosecuted. An she
reserved because otherwise, the court in the
criminal proceeding would have awarded her
indemnity, since the civil action for recoveryof
civil liablity arising from the offense is deemed
instuted with the criminal action.2 In such event,
she would no longer be able to file the separate
civil action contemplated by the civil code, not
because of failure to reserve the same but
because she would have already received
indemnity forher injuries.3
Plainly, the reservation made in the criminal
action does not preclude a subsequent action
based on a quasi-delict.It cannot be inferred
therefrom that respondent had chosento file the
very civil action she had reserved. The only
conclusionthat can reasonably be drawn is that
she did not want the question of damages
threshed out in the criminal action, but preferred
to have this issue decided in a separate civil
action.
At any rate, if respondent's complaint, which was
clear enough, had created confusion in
petitioner's mind as to the foundation of her
cause of action, then it should have moved for a
more definite statement of the same before the
trial.
However, it seems that petitioner understood
quite wellthat it was being held liablie under the
civil code. In its answer, it alleged as an
affirmative defense that in the selection and
supervision of its employees and drivers, it had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family — a defense available only to an employer
being sued for a quasi-delict. Petitioner arques
that, not knowing the nature of respondent's
action and deciding to play it safe,it put up
defense both against a suit for quasi-delict and
against an action for civil liability arising from
crime. Yet,it did not aver that the complaint
failed to alleged that its employee was insolvent
— the defense consistent with an action against
an employer for subsidiary liabilityunder the
criminal code. What it alleged was that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action as
against it,which could nt be sustained since the
complaint sufficientlyalleges an action based
on quasi-delict and the court could validly have
granted respondent's prayer for relief.4
Considering that the judgment of conviction, Exh.
B,had been admitted without objection, its
competency can no longer be questioned on
appeal.5 It established the factof Luna's
negligence, giving rise to the presumption that
petitioner had been negligent in the selection unconscionable considering that the case was
and supervisionof its employees.6 And petitioner appealed to this Court.
failed to prove that it had exercised such
requisite care and deligence as would relieve it IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of
from responsibility. the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed with
costs.
But, was Luna in the performance of his duties at
the time of the colision? He testified that on the Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
day of the accident he had been instructed to go Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ.,
to Pampanga, from there to proceed to Nueva concur.
Ecija, but that after unloading his cargo in Barrera, J., took no part.
Pampanga, he at once returned to
Manila.However, his reason for immediately
returning to Manilais not clear. He could have
returned for purposes of repair. It does not
appear that he was on an errand of his own. In
the absence of determinative proof that the
deviationwas so complete as would constitute a
cessation orsuspension of his service, petitioner
should be held liable,7 In fact, the Court of
Appeals disbelieved the alleged violationof
instructions.

Since both Luna and petitioner are responsible

for the quasi-delict, their liablity is solidary8,
although the latter can recover from the former
whatever sums it pays to respondent.9

Petitioner invites attention to Art. 2184, of the

Civil Code, and insists that it is only in the
instance covered thereby — when the owner of
the motor vehicle is riding therein at the time of
the mishap — that the employer becomes
solidarily liable with the driver for any accident
resulting from the latter's negligence. That
article refers to owners of vehicles who are not
included in the terms of Art. 2180 "as owners of
an establishement or enterprise."

As alternative remedy, petitioner asks that the

damages awarded be reduced. The moral
damages of P7,000.00 is amply justified by the
pain and disfigurement suffered byrespondent, a
pretty girl of sixteen (at the time of theaccident),
whose left arm had been scraped bare of flesh
from shoulder to elbow because of the accident.
As a result, she had to undergo seven operations
which cost P3,000.00 — a reasonable enough
sum. Attorney's fees of P1,000.00 is not
Republic of the Philippines 542 from her restaurant at Marcos
SUPREME COURT highway to her home at Palanza Street,
Manila Araneta Avenue. She was travelling
along Aurora Blvd. with a companion,
FIRST DIVISON Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the
direction of Manila. Before reaching A.
Lake Street, she noticed something
G.R. No. 115024 February 7, 1996 wrong with her tires; she stopped at a
lighted place where there were people,
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner, to verify whether she had a flat tire and
vs. to solicit help if needed. Having been
COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and told by the people present that her rear
ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents. right tire was flat and that she cannot
reach her home in that car's condition,
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x- she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x 1/2 feet away, put on her emergency
lights, alighted from the car, and went
to the rear to open the trunk. She was
G.R. No. 117944 February 7, 1996 standing at the left side of the rear of
her car pointing to the tools to a man
RICHARD LI, petitioner, who will help her fix the tire when she
vs. was suddenly bumped by a 1987
COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant
VALENZUELA, respondents. Richard Li and registered in the name
of defendant Alexander Commercial,
DECISION Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was
thrown against the windshield of the
car of the defendant, which was
KAPUNAN, J.: destroyed, and then fell to the ground.
She was pulled out from under
These two petitions for review defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules severed up to the middle of her thigh,
of Court stem from an action to recover damages with only some skin and sucle
by petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional connected to the rest of the body. She
Trial Court of Quezon City for injuries sustained was brought to the UERM Medical
by her in a vehicular accident in the early Memorial Center where she was found
morning of June 24, 1990. The facts found by the to have a "traumatic amputation, leg,
trial court are succinctly summarized by the left up to distal thigh (above knee)".
Court of Appeals below: She was confined in the hospital for
twenty (20) days and was eventually
fitted with an artificial leg. The
This is an action to recover damages
based on quasi-delict, for serious expenses for the hospital confinement
(P120,000.00) and the cost of the
physical injuries sustained in a
vehicular accident. artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by
defendants from the car insurance.
Plaintiff's version of the accident is as
follows: At around 2:00 in the morning In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for
of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes moral damages in the amount of P1
Valenzuela was driving a blue million, exemplary damages in the
Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU amount of P100,000.00 and other
medical and related expenses
amounting to a total of P180,000.00,
including loss of expected earnings.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he
was negligent. He was on his way home,
travelling at 55 kph; considering that it
was raining, visibility was affected and
the road was wet. Traffic was light. He
testified that he was driving along the
inner portion of the right lane of Aurora
Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta
Avenue, when he was suddenly
confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake
Street, San Juan, with a car coming from
the opposite direction, travelling at 80
kph, with "full bright lights".
Temporarily blinded, he instinctively
swerved to the right to avoid colliding
with the oncoming vehicle, and
bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not
see because it was midnight blue in
color, with no parking lights or early
warning device, and the area was
poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense
that the left rear portion of plaintiff's
car was protruding as it was then "at a
standstill diagonally" on the outer
portion of the right lane towards
Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He
confirmed the testimony of plaintiff's
witness that after being bumped the car
of the plaintiff swerved to the right and
hit another car parked on the sidewalk.
Defendants counterclaimed for
damages, alleging that plaintiff was
reckless or negligent, as she was not a
licensed driver.
The police investigator, Pfc. Felic
Ramos, who prepared the vehicular
accident report and the sketch of the
three cars involved in the accident,
testified that the plaintiff's car was
"near the sidewalk"; this witness did
not remember whether the hazard
lights of plaintiff's car were on, and did
not notice if there was an early warning
device; there was a street light at the
corner of Aurora Blvd. and F. Roman,
about 100 meters away. It was not
mostly dark, i.e. "things can be seen" (p.
16, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).
A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio
Rodriguez, testified that after plaintiff
alighted from her car and opened the
trunk compartment, defendant's car
came approaching very fast ten meters
from the scene; the car was
"zigzagging". The rear left side of
plaintiff's car was bumped by the front
right portion of defendant's car; as a
consequence, the plaintiff's car
swerved to the right and hit the parked
car on the sidewalk. Plaintiff was
thrown to the windshield of
defendant's car, which was destroyed,
and landed under the car. He stated
that defendant was under the influence
of liquor as he could "smell it very well"
(pp. 43, 79, tsn, June 17, 1991).
After trial, the lower court sustained the
plaintiff's submissions and found defendant
Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable
for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
The trial court likewise held Alexander
Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and
severally liable for damages pursuant to Article
2180. It ordered the defendants to jointly and
severally pay the following amounts:
1. P41,840.00, as actual damages,
representing the miscellaneous
expenses of the plaintiff as a result of
her severed left leg;
2. The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the
unrealized profits because of the
stoppage of plaintiff's Bistro La Conga
restaurant three (3) weeks after the
accident on June 24, 1990; (b)
P20,000.00, a month, as unrealized
profits of the plaintiff in her Bistro La
Conga restaurant, from August, 1990
until the date of this judgment and (c)
P30,000.00, a month for unrealized
profits in plaintiff's two (2) beauty
 salons from July, 1990 until the date of
this decision;
3. P1,000,000.00, in moral damages;
4. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;
5. P60,000.00, as reasonable attorney's
fees; and
6. Costs.
As a result of the trial court's decision,
defendants filed an Omnibus Motion for New
Trial and for Reconsideration, citing testimony in
Criminal Case O.C. No. 804367 (People vs.
Richard Li), tending to show that the point of
impact, as depicted by the pieces of glass/debris
from the parties' cars, appeared to be at the
center of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. The trial
court denied the motion. Defendants forthwith
filed an appeal with the respondent Court of
Appeals. In a Decision rendered March 30, 1994,
the Court of Appeals found that there was "ample
basis from the evidence of record for the trial
court's finding that the plaintiff's car was
properly parked at the right, beside the sidewalk
when it was bumped by defendant's
car."1 Dismissing the defendants' argument that
the plaintiff's car was improperly parked, almost
at the center of the road, the respondent court
noted that evidence which was supposed to
prove that the car was at or near center of the
right lane was never presented during the trial of
the case.2 The respondent court furthermore
observed that:
Defendant Li's testimony that he was
driving at a safe speed of 55 km./hour
is self serving; it was not corroborated.
It was in fact contradicted by
eyewitness Rodriguez who stated that
he was outside his beerhouse located at
Aurora Boulevard after A. Lake Street,
at or about 2:00 a.m. of June 24, 1990
when his attention was caught by a
beautiful lady (referring to the plaintiff)
alighting from her car and opening the
trunk compartment; he noticed the car
of Richard Li "approaching very fast ten
(10) meters away from the scene";
defendant's car was zigzagging",
although there were no holes and
hazards on the street, and "bumped the
leg of the plaintiff" who was thrown
against the windshield of defendant's
care, causing its destruction. He came
to the rescue of the plaintiff, who was
pulled out from under defendant's car
and was able to say "hurting words" to
Richard Li because he noticed that the
latter was under the influence of liquor,
because he "could smell it very well" (p.
36, et. seq., tsn, June 17, 1991). He knew
that plaintiff owned a beerhouse in Sta.
Mesa in the 1970's, but did not know
either plaintiff or defendant Li before
the accident.
In agreeing with the trial court that the
defendant Li was liable for the injuries sustained
by the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals, in its
decision, however, absolved the Li's employer,
Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any liability
towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela and
reduced the amount of moral damages to
P500,000.00. Finding justification for exemplary
damages, the respondent court allowed an
award of P50,000.00 for the same, in addition to
costs, attorney's fees and the other damages. The
Court of Appeals, likewise, dismissed the
defendants' counterclaims.3
Consequently, both parties assail the respondent
court's decision by filing two separate petitions
before this Court. Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944,
contends that he should not be held liable for
damages because the proximate cause of the
accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela's own
negligence. Alternatively, he argues that in the
event that this Court finds him negligent, such
negligence ought to be mitigated by the
contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma.
Lourdes Valenzuela assails the respondent
court's decision insofar as it absolves Alexander
Commercial, Inc. from liability as the owner of
the car driven by Richard Li and insofar as it
reduces the amount of the actual and moral
damages awarded by the trial court.4
As the issues are intimately related, both
petitions are hereby consolidated.
It is plainly evident that the petition for review in
G.R. No. 117944 raises no substantial questions
of law. What it, in effect, attempts to have this
Court review are factual findings of the trial
court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals
finding Richard Li grossly negligent in driving
the Mitsubishi Lancer provided by his company
in the early morning hours of June 24, 1990. This
we will not do. As a general rule, findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are binding and
conclusive upon us, and this Court will not
normally disturb such factual findings unless the
findings of fact of the said court are palpably
unsupported by the evidence on record or unless
the judgment itself is based on a
misapprehension of facts.5
In the first place, Valenzuela's version of the
incident was fully corroborated by an
uninterested witness, Rogelio Rodriguez, the
owner-operator of an establishment located just
across the scene of the accident. On trial, he
testified that he observed a car being driven at a
"very fast" speed, racing towards the general
direction of Araneta Avenue.6 Rodriguez further
added that he was standing in front of his
establishment, just ten to twenty feet away from
the scene of the accident, when he saw the car hit
Valenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield
of the defendant's Mitsubishi Lancer, from where
she eventually fell under the defendant's car.
Spontaneously reacting to the incident, he
crossed the street, noting that a man reeking
with the smell of liquor had alighted from the
offending vehicle in order to survey the
incident.7 Equally important, Rodriguez declared
that he observed Valenzuela's car parked parallel
and very near the sidewalk,8 contrary to Li's
allegation that Valenzuela's car was close to the
center of the right lane. We agree that as
between Li's "self-serving" asseverations and the
observations of a witness who did not even
know the accident victim personally and who
immediately gave a statement of the incident
similar to his testimony to the investigator
immediately after the incident, the latter's
testimony deserves greater weight. As the court
emphasized:
The issue is one of credibility and from
Our own examination of the transcript,
We are not prepared to set aside the
trial court's reliance on the testimony
of Rodriguez negating defendant's
assertion that he was driving at a safe
speed. While Rodriguez drives only a
motorcycle, his perception of speed is
not necessarily impaired. He was
subjected to cross-examination and no
attempt was made to question .his
competence or the accuracy of his
statement that defendant was driving
"very fast". This was the same
statement he gave to the police
investigator after the incident, as told
to a newspaper report (Exh. "P"). We
see no compelling basis for
disregarding his testimony.
The alleged inconsistencies in
Rodriguez' testimony are not borne out
by an examination of the testimony.
Rodriguez testified that the scene of the
accident was across the street where
his beerhouse is located about ten to
twenty feet away (pp. 35-36, tsn, June
17, 1991). He did not state that the
accident transpired immediately in
front of his establishment. The
ownership of the Lambingan se
Kambingan is not material; the
business is registered in the name of
his mother, but he explained that he
owns the establishment (p. 5, tsn, June
20, 1991). Moreover, the testimony that
the streetlights on his side of Aurora
Boulevard were on the night the
accident transpired (p. 8) is not
necessarily contradictory to the
testimony of Pfc. Ramos that there was
a streetlight at the corner of Aurora
Boulevard and F. Roman Street (p. 45,
tsn, Oct. 20, 1991).
 With respect to the weather condition,
Rodriguez testified that there was only
a drizzle, not a heavy rain and the rain
has stopped and he was outside his
establishment at the time the accident
transpired (pp. 64-65, tsn, June 17,
1991). This was consistent with
plaintiff's testimony that it was no
longer raining when she left Bistro La
Conga (pp. 10-11, tsn, April 29, 1991).
It was defendant Li who stated that it
was raining all the way in an attempt to
explain why he was travelling at only
50-55 kph. (p. 11, tsn, Oct. 14, 1991). As
to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that it
was raining, he arrived at the scene
only in response to a telephone call
after the accident had transpired (pp.
9-10, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991). We find no
substantial inconsistencies in
Rodriguez's testimony that would
impair the essential integrity of his
testimony or reflect on his honesty. We
are compelled to affirm the trial court's
acceptance of the testimony of said
eyewitness.
Against the unassailable testimony of witness
Rodriguez we note that Li's testimony was
peppered with so many inconsistencies leading
us to conclude that his version of the accident
was merely adroitly crafted to provide a version,
obviously self-serving, which would exculpate
him from any and all liability in the incident.
Against Valenzuela's corroborated claims, his
allegations were neither backed up by other
witnesses nor by the circumstances proven in
the course of trial. He claimed that he was
driving merely at a speed of 55 kph. when "out of
nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in
front of him, which was (the) plaintiff's car". He
alleged that upon seeing this sudden
"apparition" he put on his brakes to no avail as
the road was slippery.9
One will have to suspend disbelief in order to
give credence to Li's disingenuous and patently
self-serving asseverations. The average
motorist alert to road conditions will have no
difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at
the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the
visibility of the street, and the road conditions on
a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like
Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample time
to react to the changing conditions of the road if
he were alert - as every driver should be - to
those conditions. Driving exacts a more than
usual toll on the senses. Physiological "fight or
flight" 10 mechanisms are at work, provided such
mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol,
exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.11 Li's failure to react
in a manner which would have avoided the
accident could therefore have been only due to
either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was
driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by
Rodriguez; and 2) that he was under the
influence of alcohol.12 Either factor working
independently would have diminished his
responsiveness to road conditions, since
normally he would have slowed down prior to
reaching Valenzuela's car, rather than be in a
situation forcing him to suddenly apply his
brakes. As the trial court noted (quoted with
approval by respondent court):
Secondly, as narrated by defendant
Richard Li to the San Juan Police
immediately after the incident, he said
that while driving along Aurora Blvd.,
out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon
lancer right in front of him which was
plaintiff's car, indicating, again, thereby
that, indeed, he was driving very fast,
oblivious of his surroundings and the
road ahead of him, because if he was
not, then he could not have missed
noticing at a still far distance the
parked car of the plaintiff at the right
side near the sidewalk which had its
emergency lights on, thereby avoiding
forcefully bumping at the plaintiff who
was then standing at the left rear edge
of her car.
Since, according to him, in his narration
to the San Juan Police, he put on his
brakes when he saw the plaintiff's car
in front of him, but that it failed as the
road was wet and slippery, this goes to
show again, that, contrary to his claim,
he was, indeed, running very fast. For,
were it otherwise, he could have easily
completely stopped his car, thereby
avoiding the bumping of the plaintiff,
notwithstanding that the road was wet
and slippery. Verily, since, if, indeed, he
was running slow, as he claimed, at
only about 55 kilometers per hour,
then, inspite of the wet and slippery
road, he could have avoided hitting the
plaintiff by the mere expedient or
applying his brakes at the proper time
and distance.
It could not be true, therefore, as he
now claims during his testimony, which
is contrary to what he told the police
immediately after the accident and is,
therefore, more believable, that he did
not actually step on his brakes but
simply swerved a little to the right
when he saw the on-coming car with
glaring headlights, from the opposite
direction, in order to avoid it.
For, had this been what he did, he
would not have bumped the car of the
plaintiff which was properly parked at
the right beside the sidewalk. And, it
was not even necessary for him to
swerve a little to the right in order to
safely avoid a collision with the on-
coming car, considering that Aurora
Blvd. is a double lane avenue separated
at the center by a dotted white paint,
and there is plenty of space for both
cars, since her car was running at the
right lane going towards Manila on the
on-coming car was also on its right lane
going to Cubao.13
Having come to the conclusion that Li was
negligent in driving his company-issued
Mitsubishi Lancer, the next question for us to
determine is whether or not Valenzuela was
likewise guilty of contributory negligence in
parking her car alongside Aurora Boulevard,
which entire area Li points out, is a no parking
zone.
We agree with the respondent court that
Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory
negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of
the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to
the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
standard to which he is required to conform for
his own protection.14 Based on the foregoing
definition, the standard or act to which,
according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to
have conformed for her own protection was not
to park at all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a
no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to
recognize that an actor who is confronted with
an emergency is not to be held up to the
standard of conduct normally applied to an
individual who is in no such situation. The law
takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed
in threatening or dangerous situations and does
not require the same standard of thoughtful and
reflective care from persons confronted by
unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions.15
Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this
Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals,16 an individual
who suddenly finds himself in a situation of
danger and is required to act without much time
to consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to
be a better solution, unless the emergency was
brought by his own negligence.17
Applying this principle to a case in which the
victims in a vehicular accident swerved to the
wrong lane to avoid hitting two children
suddenly darting into the street, we held, in Mc
Kee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,18 that the
driver therein, Jose Koh, "adopted the best
means possible in the given situation" to avoid
hitting the children. Using the "emergency rule"
the Court concluded that Koh, in spite of the fact
that he was in the wrong lane when the collision
with an oncoming truck occurred, was not guilty
of negligence.19
While the emergency rule applies to those cases
in which reflective thought, or the opportunity to
adequately weigh a threatening situation is
absent, the conduct which is required of an
individual in such cases is dictated not
exclusively by the suddenness of the event which
absolutely negates thoroughful care, but by the
over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman
driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire
on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping
at a point which is both convenient for her to do
so and which is not a hazard to other motorists.
She is not expected to run the entire boulevard
in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark
street or alley where she would likely find no
one to help her. It would be hazardous for her
not to stop and assess the emergency (simply
because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is
a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle
would be both a threat to her safety and to other
motorists. In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon
reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close
to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat tire. To
avoid putting herself and other motorists in
danger, she did what was best under the
situation. As narrated by respondent court: "She
stopped at a lighted place where there were
people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and
to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the
people present that her rear right tire was flat
and that she cannot reach her home she parked
along the sidewalk, about 1 1/2 feet away,
behind a Toyota Corona Car."20 In fact,
respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the
investigator on the scene of the accident
confirmed that Valenzuela's car was parked very
close to the sidewalk.21 The sketch which he
prepared after the incident showed Valenzuela's
car partly straddling the sidewalk, clear and at a
convenient distance from motorists passing the
right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact was
itself corroborated by the testimony of witness
Rodriguez.22
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela
did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by
the emergency and could not be considered to
have contributed to the unfortunate
circumstances which eventually led to the
amputation of one of her lower extremities. The
emergency which led her to park her car on a
sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her
own making, and it was evident that she had
taken all reasonable precautions.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only
negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on
the night of the accident. "Negligence, as it is
commonly understood is conduct which creates
an undue risk of harm to others."23 It is the
failure to observe that degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.24 We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila
Railroad Company,25 that negligence is the want
of care required by the circumstances.
The circumstances established by the evidence
adduced in the court below plainly demonstrate
that Li was grossly negligent in driving his
Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was
driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a
heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle
rendering the street slippery. There is ample
testimonial evidence on record to show that he
was under the influence of liquor. Under these
conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with
changing conditions on the road were
significantly lessened. As Presser and Keaton
emphasize:
[U]nder present day traffic conditions,
any driver of an automobile must be
prepared for the sudden appearance of
obstacles and persons on the highway,
and of other vehicles at intersections,
such as one who sees a child on the
curb may be required to anticipate its
sudden dash into the street, and his
failure to act properly when they
appear may be found to amount to
negligence.26
Li's obvious unpreparedness to cope with the
situation confronting him on the night of the
accident was clearly of his own making.
We now come to the question of the liability of
Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li's employer. In
denying liability on the part of Alexander
Commercial, the respondent court held that:
There is no evidence, not even
defendant Li's testimony, that the visit
was in connection with official matters.
His functions as assistant manager
sometimes required him to perform
work outside the office as he has to
visit buyers and company clients, but
he admitted that on the night of the
accident he came from BF Homes
Paranaque he did not have "business
from the company" (pp. 25-26, ten,
Sept. 23, 1991). The use of the company
car was partly required by the nature of
his work, but the privilege of using it
for non-official business is a "benefit",
apparently referring to the fringe
benefits attaching to his position.
Under the civil law, an employer is
liable for the negligence of his
employees in the discharge of their
respective duties, the basis of which
liability is not respondeat superior, but
the relationship of pater familias, which
theory bases the liability of the master
ultimately on his own negligence and
not on that of his servant (Cuison v.
Norton and Harrison Co., 55 Phil. 18).
Before an employer may be held liable
for the negligence of his employee, the
act or omission which caused damage
must have occurred while an employee
was in the actual performance of his
assigned tasks or duties (Francis High
School vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA
341). In defining an employer's liability
for the acts done within the scope of
the employee's assigned tasks, the
Supreme Court has held that this
includes any act done by an employee,
in furtherance of the interests of the
employer or for the account of the
employer at the time of the infliction of
the injury or damage (Filamer Christian
Institute vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 212 SCRA 637). An employer is
expected to impose upon its employees
the necessary discipline called for in
the performance of any act
"indispensable to the business and
beneficial to their employer" (at p.
645).
In light of the foregoing, We are unable
to sustain the trial court's finding that
since defendant Li was authorized by
the company to use the company car
"either officially or socially or even
bring it home", he can be considered as
using the company car in the service of
his employer or on the occasion of his
functions. Driving the company car was
not among his functions as assistant
manager; using it for non-official
purposes would appear to be a fringe
benefit, one of the perks attached to his
position. But to impose liability upon
the employer under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, earlier quoted, there must
be a showing that the damage was
caused by their employees in the
service of the employer or on the
occasion of their functions. There is no
evidence that Richard Li was at the
time of the accident performing any act
in furtherance of the company's
business or its interests, or at least for
its benefit. The imposition of solidary
liability against defendant Alexander
Commercial Corporation must
therefore fail.27
We agree with the respondent court that the
relationship in question is not based on the
principle of respondeat superior, which holds the
master liable for acts of the servant, but that
of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately
falls upon the employer, for his failure to
exercise the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of his
employees. It is up to this point, however, that
our agreement with the respondent court ends.
Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard
expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, 28we
are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander
Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable
for the damage caused by the accident of June 24,
1990.
First, the case of St. Francis High School vs. Court
of Appeals29 upon which respondent court has
placed undue reliance, dealt with the subject of a
school and its teacher's supervision of students
during an extracurricular activity. These cases
now fall under the provision on special parental
authority found in Art. 218 of the Family Code
which generally encompasses all authorized
school activities, whether inside or outside
school premises.
Second, the employer's primary liability under
the concept of pater familias embodied by Art
2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is
quasi-delictual or tortious in character. His
liability is relieved on a showing that he
exercised the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of its
employees. Once evidence is introduced showing
that the employer exercised the required amount
of care in selecting its employees, half of the
employer's burden is overcome. The question of
diligent supervision, however, depends on the
circumstances of employment.
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the
employer has exercised diligent supervision of
its employee during the performance of the
latter's assigned tasks would be enough to
relieve him of the liability imposed by Article
2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
The employer is not expected to exercise
supervision over either the employee's private
activities or during the performance of tasks
either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated
to the employee's tasks. The case at bench
presents a situation of a different character,
involving a practice utilized by large companies
with either their employees of managerial rank
or their representatives.
It is customary for large companies to provide
certain classes of their employees with courtesy
vehicles. These company cars are either wholly
owned and maintained by the company itself or
are subject to various plans through which
employees eventually acquire their vehicles after
a given period of service, or after paying a token
amount. Many companies provide liberal "car
plans" to enable their managerial or other
employees of rank to purchase cars, which, given
the cost of vehicles these days, they would not
otherwise be able to purchase on their own.
Under the first example, the company actually
owns and maintains the car up to the point of
turnover of ownership to the employee; in the
second example, the car is really owned and
maintained by the employee himself. In
furnishing vehicles to such employees, are
companies totally absolved of responsibility
when an accident involving a company-issued
car occurs during private use after normal office
hours?
Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance,
which provide cars under the first plan, require
rigorous tests of road worthiness from their
agents prior to turning over the car (subject of
company maintenance) to their representatives.
In other words, like a good father of a family,
they entrust the company vehicle only after they
are satisfied that the employee to whom the car
has been given full use of the said company car
for company or private purposes will not be a
threat or menace to himself, the company or to
others. When a company gives full use and
enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it in
effect guarantees that it is, like every good father,
satisfied that its employee will use the privilege
reasonably and responsively.
In the ordinary course of business, not all
company employees are given the privilege of
using a company-issued car. For large companies
other than those cited in the example of the
preceding paragraph, the privilege serves
important business purposes either related to
the image of success an entity intends to present
to its clients and to the public in general, or - for
practical and utilitarian reasons - to enable its
managerial and other employees of rank or its
sales agents to reach clients conveniently. In
most cases, providing a company car serves both
purposes. Since important business transactions
and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts
of situations and under all kinds of guises, the
provision for the unlimited use of a company car
therefore principallyserves the business and
goodwill of a company and only incidentally the
private purposes of the individual who actually
uses the car, the managerial employee or
company sales agent. As such, in providing for a
company car for business use and/or for the
purpose of furthering the company's image, a
company owes a responsibility to the public to
see to it that the managerial or other employees
to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a
company issued car are able to use the company
issue capably and responsibly.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager
of Alexander Commercial, Inc. In his testimony
before the trial court, he admitted that his
functions as Assistant Manager did not require
him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as
he was required quite often to perform work
outside the office, visiting prospective buyers
and contacting and meeting with company
clients. 30 These meetings, clearly, were not
strictly confined to routine hours because, as a
managerial employee tasked with the job of
representing his company with its clients,
meetings with clients were both social as well as
work-related functions. The service car assigned
to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore
enabled both Li - as well as the corporation - to
put up the front of a highly successful entity,
increasing the latter's goodwill before its
clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li
and its clients by providing the former with a
convenient mode of travel.
Moreover, Li's claim that he happened to be on
the road on the night of the accident because he
was coming from a social visit with an officemate
in Paranaque was a bare allegation which was
never corroborated in the court below. It was
obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came
from his officemate's place, the same could give
rise to speculation that he and his officemate had
just been from a work-related function, or they
were together to discuss sales and other work
related strategies.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not
demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it
exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of the family in entrusting its company car to Li.
No allegations were made as to whether or not
the company took the steps necessary to
determine or ascertain the driving proficiency
and history of Li, to whom it gave full and
unlimited use of a company car.31 Not having
been able to overcome the burden of
demonstrating that it should be absolved of
liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said
company, based on the principle of bonus pater
familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable
with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma.
Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
Finally, we find no reason to overturn the
amount of damages awarded by the respondent
court, except as to the amount of moral damages.
In the case of moral damages, while the said
damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff
at the expense of a defendant, the award should
nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering
inflicted. In the instant case we are of the opinion
that the reduction in moral damages from an
amount of P1,000,000.00 to P800,000,00 by the
Court of Appeals was not justified considering
the nature of the resulting damage and the
predictable sequelae of the injury.
As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela underwent a traumatic amputation of
her left lower extremity at the distal left thigh
just above the knee. Because of this, Valenzuela
will forever be deprived of the full ambulatory
functions of her left extremity, even with the use
of state of the art prosthetic technology. Well
beyond the period of hospitalization (which was
paid for by Li), she will be required to undergo
adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the
shrinkage of the stump from the process of
healing.
These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic
replacements and months of physical and
occupational rehabilitation and therapy. During
her lifetime, the prosthetic devise will have to be
replaced and re-adjusted to changes in the size of
her lower limb effected by the biological changes
of middle-age, menopause and aging. Assuming
she reaches menopause, for example, the
prosthetic will have to be adjusted to respond to
the changes in bone resulting from a precipitate
decrease in calcium levels observed in the bones
of all post-menopausal women. In other words,
the damage done to her would not only be
permanent and lasting, it would also be
permanently changing and adjusting to the
physiologic changes which her body
would normally undergo through the years. The
replacements, changes, and adjustments will
require corresponding adjustive physical and
occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it
has been documented, are painful.
The foregoing discussion does not even scratch
the surface of the nature of the resulting damage
because it would be highly speculative to
estimate the amount of psychological pain,
damage and injury which goes with the sudden
severing of a vital portion of the human body. A
prosthetic device, however technologically
advanced, will only allow a reasonable amount of
functional restoration of the motor functions of
the lower limb. The sensory functions are
forever lost. The resultant anxiety, sleeplessness,
psychological injury, mental and physical pain
are inestimable.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
Pursuant to Article 21801 of the Civil Code that
acknowledges responsibility under a
relationship of patria potestas, a person may be
held accountable not only for his own direct
culpable act or negligence but also for those of
others albeit predicated on his own supposed
failure to exercise due care in his supervisory
authority and functions. In the case of an
employer, that vicarious liability attaches only
when the tortious conduct of the employee
relates to, or is in the course of, his employment.
The question to ask should be whether, at the
time of the damage or injury, the employee is
engaged in the affairs or concerns of the
employer or, independently, in that of his own.
While an employer incurs no liability when an
employee's conduct, act or omission is beyond
the range of employment,2 a minor deviation
from the assigned task of an employee, however,
does not affect the liability of an employer.3

As the amount of moral damages are subject to

this Court's discretion, we are of the opinion that
the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial
court is in greater accord with the extent and
nature of the injury - physical and psychological -
suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li's grossly
negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the
early morning hours of the accident.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the

decision of the Court of Appeals is modified with
the effect of REINSTATING the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines on February 8, 1989 an action for damages
SUPREME COURT against Benigno Torzuela and herein private
Manila respondents Safeguard Investigation and
Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or
SECOND DIVISION Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"),
alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. The
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-1751
among others alleges the following:
G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995 1. . . .
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf Defendants SAFEGUARD
and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN INVESTIGATION AND
ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON SECURITY CO., INC.,
II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners, (Defendant Safeguard) and
vs. SUPERGUARD SECURITY
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth CORPORATION (Defendant
Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his Superguard) are corporations
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional duly organized and existing in
Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon accordance with Philippine
City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND laws, with offices at 10th
SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD Floor, Manufacturers
SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents. Building, Inc., Plaza Santa
Cruz, Manila. They are
impleaded as alternative
defendants for, while the
BIDIN, J.: former appears to be the
employer of defendant
BENIGNO TORZUELA
This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal (defendant TORZUELA), the
of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated latter impliedly acknowledged
October 29, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 which responsibility for the acts of
affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court defendant TORZUELA by
dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-1751, and its extending its sympathies to
resolution dated November 17, 1991 denying plaintiffs.
herein, petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Defendant BENIGNO
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: TORZUELA is of legal age, an
employee of defendant
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between SAFEGUARD and/or
Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay defendant SUPERGUARD and,
occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang at the time of the incident
Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno complained of, was under
Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said their control and supervision.
carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. ...
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow 3. On December 7, 1988 at
of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own around 8:00 a.m., defendant
behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed TORZUELA, while he was on
duty as security guard at the
"Big Bang sa Alabang,"
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila shot and killed
NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a
.38 caliber revolver belonging
to defendant SAFEGUARD,
and/or SUPERGUARD (per
Police Report dated January 7,
1989, copy attached as Annex
A);
4. The incident resulting in
the death of NAPOLEON V.
DULAY was due to the
concurring negligence of the
defendants. Defendant
TORZUELA'S wanton and
reckless discharge of the
firearm issued to him by
defendant SAFEGUARD
and/or SUPERGUARD was the
immediate and proximate
cause of the injury, while the
negligence of defendant
SAFEGUARD and/or
SUPERGUARD consists in its
having failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision and
control of its employee to
avoid the injury.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, pp. 117-118)
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory,
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees. The said Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 was
raffled to Branch 84 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, presided by respondent Judge
Teodoro Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent
SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the complaint does not state a valid
cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that
Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the
scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act
of shooting was committed with deliberate
intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is
governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a
person guilty of a felony. —
Every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly
liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a
complaint for damages based on negligence
under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as
the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the
civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to
quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code. In addition, the private respondent
argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is
premature considering that the conviction of
Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua
non for the employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo,
p. 55-59).
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion
praying that it be excluded as defendant on the
ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its
employees (Rollo, p. 96).
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that
their cause of action against the private
respondents is based on their liability under
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation
imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their
employees and household
 helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not
engaged in any business or an
industry.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners contended that a suit against
alternative defendants is allowed under Rule 3,
Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, the
inclusion of private respondents as alternative
defendants in the complaint is justified by the
following: the Initial Investigation Report
prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that
Torzuela is an employee of SAFEGUARD; and
through overt acts, SUPERGUARD extended its
sympathies to petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).
Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21,
1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide
was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati and was docketed as Criminal Case No.
89-1896.
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino
issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion
to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for
exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge
held that the complaint did not state facts
necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-
delict since it does not mention any negligence
on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon
Dulay or that the same was done in the
performance of his duties. Respondent judge
ruled that mere allegations of the concurring
negligence of the defendants (private
respondents herein) without stating the facts
showing such negligence are mere conclusions of
law (Rollo, p. 106). Respondent judge also
declared that the complaint was one for damages
founded on crimes punishable under Articles
100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as
distinguished from those arising from, quasi-
delict. The dispositive portion of the order dated
April 13, 1989 states:
WHEREFORE, this Court holds
that in view of the material
and ultimate facts alleged in
the verified complaint and in
accordance with the
applicable law on the matter
as well as precedents laid
down by the Supreme Court,
the complaint against the
alternative defendants
Superguard Security
Corporation and Safeguard
Investigation and Security Co.,
Inc., must be and (sic) it is
hereby dismissed. (Rollo, p.
110)
The above order was affirmed by the respondent
court and petitioners' motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied.
Petitioners take exception to the assailed
decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not
limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts
that are intentional and voluntary, citing
Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195 [1990]). Thus,
petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of shooting
Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict
actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code.
Petitioners further contend that under Article
2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents
are primarily liable for their negligence either in
the selection or supervision of their employees.
This liability is independent of the employee's
own liability for fault or negligence and is
distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil
action against the employer may therefore
proceed independently of the criminal action
pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioners submit that the question of
whether Torzuela is an employee of respondent
SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better
resolved after trial.
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act
of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article
33 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 33. In cases of
defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action
for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Rule 111. . . . .
Sec. 3. When civil action may
proceed independently — In
the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent
civil action which has been
reserved may be brought by
the offended party, shall
proceed independently of the
criminal action, and shall
require only a preponderance
of evidence. (Emphasis
supplied)
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has
been held to include consummated, frustrated
and attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners
maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is
unnecessary since the civil action can proceed
independently of the criminal action. On the
other hand, it is the private respondents'
argument that since the act was not committed
with negligence, the petitioners have no cause of
action under Articles 2116 and 2177 of the New
Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in
Article 2177 is not applicable to acts committed
with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-
offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to
death, aside from being purely personal, was
done with deliberate intent and could not have
been part of his duties as security guard. And
since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers
only: acts done within the scope of the
employee's assigned tasks, the private
respondents cannot be held liable for damages.
We find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being
prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of
Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal
and civil actions. When a
criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil
action , reserves his right to
institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes
recovery of indemnity under
the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32,
33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission
of the accused. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent
civil action before the prosecution in the criminal
action presents evidence is even far better than a
compliance with the requirement of express
reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely
what the petitioners opted to do in this case.
However, the private respondents opposed the
civil action on the ground that the same is
founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as
the shooting was not attended by negligence.
What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the
petitioner's cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by
the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting
the cause of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158
SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or
suit and the law to govern it is to be determined
not by the claim of the party filing the action,
made in his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for
relief. (De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis
Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982]). An examination
of the complaint in the present case would show
that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are
invoking their right to recover damages against
the private respondents for their vicarious
responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno
Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon
Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
complaint.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties
is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents,
there is no justification for limiting the scope of
Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or
omissions resulting from negligence. Well-
entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176
covers not only acts committed with negligence,
but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional. As far back as the definitive case of
Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court
already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers
to "fault or negligence," covers
not only acts "not punishable
by law" but also acts criminal
in character; whether
intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action against
the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed,
if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages
on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of
civil liability referred to in
Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act
considered as quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or
has not been committed by
the accused. Briefly stated, We
here hold, in reiteration of
Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be
punishable by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case
of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191
SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court held:
Article 2176, whenever it
refers to "fault or negligence,"
covers not only acts criminal in
character, whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a civil action
lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not
he is prosecuted or found
guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not
allowed, (if the tortfeasor is
actually also charged
criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two
cases vary. [citing Virata v.
Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472]
(Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents submit that the word
"intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate
obiter, and should be read as "voluntary" since
intent cannot be coupled with negligence as
defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the absence of more substantial reasons, this
Court will not disturb the above doctrine on the
coverage of Article 2176.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33
of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries
intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in
Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that
the actions for damages allowed thereunder
are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical
injuries" in Article 33 has already been
construed to include bodily injuries causing
death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the
Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v.
Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime
of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal
Code. It includes not only physical injuries but
also consummated, frustrated, and attempted
homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293
[1983]). Although in the Marcia case (supra), it
was held that no independent civil action may be
filed under Article 33 where the crime is the
result of criminal negligence, it must be noted
however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case
at bar, is charged with homicide, not with
reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant
in Marcia was charged with reckless
imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action
based on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their
liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal
Code; and that they are not liable for Torzuela's
act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a
security guard. It having been established that
the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners
may proceed directly against Torzuela and the
private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is
caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after
selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The
liability of the employer under Article 2180 is
direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee
and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176
SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent
upon the private respondents to prove that they
exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their
employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of
negligence but also acts which are intentional
and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the
part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's
complaint simply because it failed to make
allegations of attendant negligence attributable
to private respondents.
With respect to the issue of whether the
complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of
action, the general rule is that the allegations in a
complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against the defendants if, admitting the
facts alleged, the court can render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer therein. A cause of action exist if the
following elements are present, namely: (1) a
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created; sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of
(2) an obligation on the part of the named action, the complaint must show that the claim
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; for relief does not exist rather than that a claim
and (3) an act or omission on the part of such has been defectively stated, is ambiguous,
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board,
constituting a breach of the obligation of the 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter sustained an injury to their rights under the law,
may maintain an action for recovery of damages it would be more just to allow them to present
(Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA 33 evidence of such injury.
[1992]); Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993]) WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of
This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, the Court of Appeals as well as the Order of the
that the complaint sufficiently alleged an Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are
actionable breach on the part of the defendant hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No.
Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or Q-89-1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial
SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint Court for trial on the merits. This decision is
alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon immediately executory.
Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the
shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; SO ORDERED.
and that either SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and
responsible for his acts. This does not operate Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ.,
however, to establish that the defendants below concur.
are liable. Whether or not the shooting was
actually reckless and wanton or attended by
negligence and whether it was actually done
within the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether
the private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family; and whether the
defendants are actually liable, are questions
which can be better resolved after trial on the
merits where each party can present evidence to
prove their respective allegations and defenses.
In determining whether the allegations of a
complaint are sufficient to support a cause of
action, it must be borne in mind that the
complaint does not have to establish or allege
the facts proving the existence of a cause of
action at the outset; this will have to be done at
the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel
Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a
complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which
the complaint can be maintained, the same
should not be dismissed regardless of the
defenses that may be assessed by the defendants
(Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992]
citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40570 January 30, 1976
TEODORO C. UMALI, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANGEL BACANI, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch IX of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan and FIDEL H.
SAYNES, respondents.
Julia M. Armas for petitioner.
Antonio de los Reyes for private respondent.
ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan Branch
IX, in Civil Case No. U2412, entitled, "Fidel H.
Saynes, plaintiff-appellee versus Teodoro C.
Umali, defendant-appellant", which found the
death by electrocution of Manuel Saynes, a boy of
3 years and 8 months, as "due to the fault or
negligence of the defendant (Umali) as owner
and manager of the Alcala Electric Plant",
although the liability of defendant is mitigated by
the contributory negligence of the parents of the
boy "in not providing for the proper and delegate
supervision and control over their son The
dispositive part of the decision reads as follows:
Wherefore, the Court hereby
renders judgment in favor of
the plaintiff by ordering the
defendant to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
for the death of his son,
Manuel Saynes; the sum of
One Thousand Two Hundred
Pesos (P1,200.00) for actual
expenses for and in
connection with the burial of
said deceased child, and the
further sum of Three
Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00)
for moral damages and Five
Hundred (P500.00) Pesos as
reasonable attorney's fee, or a
total of Nine Thousand Seven
Hundred (P9,700.00) Pesos,
and to pay the costs of this
suit. It Is So Ordered.
Undisputed facts appearing of record are:
On May 14, 1972, a storm
with strong rain hit the
Municipality of Alcala
Pangasinan, which started
from 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon and lasted up to
about midnight of the same
day. During the storm, the
banana plants standing on an
elevated ground along the
barrio road in San Pedro Ili of
said municipality and near the
transmission line of the Alcala
Electric Plant were blown
down and fell on the electric
wire. As a result, the live
electric wire was cut, one end
of which was left hanging on
the electric post and the other
fell to the ground under the
fallen banana plants.
On the following morning, at
about 9:00 o'clock barrio
captain Luciano Bueno of San
Pedro Iii who was passing by
saw the broken electric wire
and so he warned the people
in the place not to go near the
wire for they might get hurt.
He also saw Cipriano
Baldomero, a laborer of the
Alcala Electric Plant near the
place and notified him right
then and there of the broken
line and asked him to fix it,
but the latter told the barrio
captain that he could not do it
but that he was going to look
for the lineman to fix it.
Sometime after the barrio
captain and Cipriano
Baldomero had left the place,
a small boy of 3 years and 8
months old by the name of
Manuel P. Saynes, whose
house is just on the opposite
side of the road, went to the
place where the broken line
wire was and got in contact
with it. The boy was
electrocuted and he
subsequently died. It was only
after the electrocution of
Manuel Saynes that the
broken wire was fixed at
about 10:00 o'clock on the
same morning by the lineman
of the electric plant.
Petitioner claims that he could not be liable
under the concept of quasi-delict or tort as
owner and manager of the Alcala Electric Plant
because the proximate cause of the boy's death
electrocution could not be due to any negligence
on his part, but rather to a fortuitous event-the
storm that caused the banana plants to fall and
cut the electric line-pointing out the absence of
negligence on the part of his employee Cipriano
Baldomero who tried to have the line repaired
and the presence of negligence of the parents of
the child in allowing him to leave his house
during that time.
A careful examination of the record convinces Us
that a series of negligence on the part of
defendants' employees in the Alcala Electric
Plant resulted in the death of the victim by
electrocution. First, by the very evidence of the
defendant, there were big and tall banana plants
at the place of the incident standing on an
elevated ground which were about 30 feet high
and which were higher than the electric post
supporting the electric line, and yet the
employees of the defendant who, with ordinary
foresight, could have easily seen that even in
case of moderate winds the electric line would
be endangered by banana plants being blown
down, did not even take the necessary
precaution to eliminate that source of danger to
the electric line. Second, even after the
employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were
already aware of the possible damage the storm
of May 14, 1972, could have caused their electric
lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life and
property, they did not cut off from the plant the
flow of electricity along the lines, an act they
could have easily done pending inspection of the
wires to see if they had been cut. Third,
employee Cipriano Baldomero was negligent on
the morning of the incident because even if he
was already made aware of the live cut wire, he
did not have the foresight to realize that the
same posed a danger to life and property, and
that he should have taken the necessary
precaution to prevent anybody from
approaching the live wire; instead Baldomero
left the premises because what was foremost in
his mind was the repair of the line, obviously
forgetting that if left unattended to it could
endanger life and property.
On defendants' argument that the proximate
cause of the victim's death could be attributed to
the parents' negligence in allowing a child of
tender age to go out of the house alone, We could
readily see that because of the aforementioned
series of negligence on the part of defendants'
employees resulting in a live wire lying on the
premises without any visible warning of its
lethal character, anybody, even a responsible
grown up or not necessarily an innocent child,
could have met the same fate that befell the
victim. It may be true, as the lower Court found
out, that the contributory negligence of the
victim's parents in not properly taking care of
the child, which enabled him to leave the house
alone on the morning of the incident and go to a
nearby place cut wire was very near the house
(where victim was living) where the fatal fallen
wire electrocuted him, might mitigate
respondent's liability, but we cannot agree with
petitioner's theory that the parents' negligence
constituted the proximate cause of the victim's
death because the real proximate cause was the
fallen live wire which posed a threat to life and
property on that morning due to the series of
negligence adverted to above committed by
defendants' employees and which could have
killed any other person who might by accident
get into contact with it. Stated otherwise, even if
the child was allowed to leave the house
unattended due to the parents' negligence, he
would not have died that morning where it not
for the cut live wire he accidentally touched.
Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the
negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim
in this case) was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendants' lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This
law may be availed of by the petitioner but does
not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's
liability for injury caused by his employees
negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article
2180 of the Civil Code, which states:
Notwithstanding diligent efforts, we fail to fired
any reversible error committed by the trial Court
in this case, either in its appreciation of the
evidence on questions of facts or on the
interpretation and application of laws
government quasi-delicts and liabilities
emanating therefrom. The inevitable conclusion
is that no error amounting to grave abuse of
discretion was committed and the decision must
be left untouched.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court
dated June 27, 1974 is affirmed.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma
and Martin, JJ., concur.

The owner and manager of an

establishment or enterprise
are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their
employees in the service of
the branches in which the
latter are employed or on tile
occasion of their functions.

The negligence of the employee is presumed to

be the negligence of the employer because the
employer is supposed to exercise supervision
over the work of the employees. This liability of
the employer is primary and direct (Standard
Vacuum Oil Co. vs. Tan and Court of Appeals, 107
Phil. 109). In fact the proper defense for the
employer to raise so that he may escape liability
is to prove that he exercised, the diligence of the
good father of the family to prevent damage not
only in the selection of his employees but also in
adequately supervising them over their work.
This defense was not adequately proven as
found by the trial Court, and We do not find any
sufficient reason to deviate from its finding.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 160039. June 29, 2004]
RAYMUNDO ODANI SECOSA, EL BUENASENSO
SY and DASSAD
WAREHOUSING and PORT SERVICES,
INCORPORATED,petitioners, vs.
HEIRS OF ERWIN SUAREZ
FRANCISCO,respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
dated February 27, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No.
61868, which affirmed in toto the June 19,
1998 decision[2] of Branch 20 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 96-79554.
The facts are as follows:
On June 27, 1996, at around 4:00 p.m.,
Erwin Suarez Francisco, an eighteen year old
third year physical therapy student of
the Manila Central University, was riding a
motorcycle along Radial 10 Avenue, near the
Veteran Shipyard Gate in the City of Manila. At
the same time, petitioner, Raymundo Odani
Secosa, was driving an Isuzu cargo truck with
plate number PCU-253 on the same road. The
truck was owned by petitioner, Dassad
Warehousing and Port Services, Inc.
Traveling behind the motorcycle driven by
Francisco was a sand and gravel truck, which in
turn was being tailed by the Isuzu truck driven
by Secosa. The three vehicles were traversing the
3wsouthbound lane at a fairly high speed. When
Secosa overtook the sand and gravel truck, he
bumped the motorcycle causing Francisco to
fall. The rear wheels of the Isuzu truck then ran
over Francisco, which resulted in his
instantaneous death. Fearing for his life,
petitioner Secosa left his truck and fled the scene
of the collision.[3]
Respondents, the parents of Erwin
Francisco, thus filed an action for damages
against Raymond Odani Secosa, Dassad
Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. and Dassads
president, El Buenasucenso Sy. The complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-79554 of the
RTC ofManila, Branch 20.
On June 19, 1998, after a full-blown trial,
the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of
herein respondents, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs ordering the defendants to pay
plaintiffs jointly and severally:
1. The sum of P55,000.00 as actual and
compensatory damages;
2. The sum of P20,000.00 for the repair of the
motorcycle;
3. The sum of P100,000.00 for the loss of earning
capacity;
4. The sum of P500,000.00 as moral damages;
5. The sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
6. The sum of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees plus
cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the appealed
decision in toto.[4]
Hence the present petition, based on the
following arguments:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER DASSAD DID
NOT EXERCISE THE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD
FATHER OF A FAMILY IN THE SELECTION AND
SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES WHICH IS
NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 2180 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND RELATED
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT IN HOLDING PETITIONER EL
BUENASENSO SY SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH
PETITIONERS DASSAD AND SECOSA IN
VIOLATION OF THE CORPORATION LAW AND
RELATED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
III.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS
AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
AWARDING P500,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES
IS MANIFESTLY ABSURD, MISTAKEN AND
UNJUST.[5]
The petition is partly impressed with merit.
On the issue of whether petitioner Dassad
Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees, we
find the assailed decision to be in full accord with
pertinent provisions of law and established
jurisprudence.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
On the other hand, Article 2180, in pertinent
part, states:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible x x x.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry x x x.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
Based on the foregoing provisions, when an
injury is caused by the negligence of an
employee, there instantly arises a presumption
that there was negligence on the part of the
employer either in the selection of his employee
or in the supervision over him after such
selection. The presumption, however, may be
rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the
employer that it exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee. Hence, to evade
solidary liability for quasi-delict committed by
an employee, the employer must adduce
sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of
care.[6]
How does an employer prove that he
indeed exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee? The case of Metro Manila Transit
Corporation v. Court of Appeals[7] is instructive:
In fine, the party, whether plaintiff or defendant,
who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the
burden of presenting at the trial such amount of
evidence required by law to obtain a favorable
judgment[8] . . . In making proof in its or his case,
it is paramount that the best and most complete
evidence is formally entered.[9]
Coming now to the case at bar, while there is no
rule which requires that testimonial evidence, to
hold sway, must be corroborated by
documentary evidence, inasmuch as the
witnesses testimonies dwelt on mere
generalities, we cannot consider the same as
sufficiently persuasive proof that there was
observance of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees. Petitioners attempt to
prove its deligentissimi patris familias in the
selection and supervision of employees through
oral evidence must fail as it was unable to
buttress the same with any other evidence,
object or documentary, which might obviate the
apparent biased nature of the testimony.[10]
Our view that the evidence for petitioner MMTC
falls short of the required evidentiary quantum
as would convincingly and undoubtedly prove its
observance of the diligence of a good father of a
family has its precursor in the underlying
rationale pronounced in the earlier case of
Central Taxicab Corp. vs. Ex-Meralco Employees
Transportation Co., et al.,[11] set amidst an almost
identical factual setting, where we held that:
The failure of the defendant company to produce
in court any record or other documentary proof
tending to establish that it had exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its drivers and
buses, notwithstanding the calls therefor by both
the trial court and the opposing counsel, argues
strongly against its pretensions.
We are fully aware that there is no hard-and-fast
rule on the quantum of evidence needed to prove
due observance of all the diligence of a good
father of a family as would constitute a valid
defense to the legal presumption of negligence
on the part of an employer or master whose
employee has by his negligence, caused damage
to another. x x x (R)educing the testimony of
Albert to its proper proportion, we do not have
enough trustworthy evidence left to go by. We
are of the considered opinion, therefore, that the
believable evidence on the degree of care and
diligence that has been exercised in the selection
and supervision of Roberto Leon y Salazar, is not
legally sufficient to overcome the presumption of
negligence against the defendant company.
The above-quoted ruling was reiterated in
a recent case again involving the Metro Manila
Transit Corporation,[12] thus:
In the selection of prospective employees,
employers are required to examine them as to
their qualifications, experience, and service
records.[13] On the other hand, with respect to
the supervision of employees, employers should
formulate standard operating procedures,
monitor their implementation, and impose
disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. To
establish these factors in a trial involving the
issue of vicarious liability, employers must
submit concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.
In this case, MMTC sought to prove that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family with respect to the selection of employees
by presenting mainly testimonial evidence on its
hiring procedure. According to MMTC, applicants
are required to submit professional driving
licenses, certifications of work experience, and
clearances from the National Bureau of
Investigation; to undergo tests of their driving
skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision; and, to
complete training programs on traffic rules,
vehicle maintenance, and standard operating
procedures during emergency cases.
xxxxxxxxx
Although testimonies were offered that in the
case of Pedro Musa all these precautions were
followed, the records of his interview, of the
results of his examinations, and of his service
were not presented. . . [T]here is no record that
Musa attended such training programs and
passed the said examinations before he was
employed. No proof was presented that Musa did
not have any record of traffic violations. Nor
were records of daily inspections, allegedly
conducted by supervisors, ever presented. . . The
failure of MMTC to present such documentary
proof puts in doubt the credibility of its
witnesses.
Jurisprudentially, therefore, the employer
must not merely present testimonial evidence to
prove that he observed the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision
of his employee, but he must also support such
testimonial evidence with concrete or
documentary evidence. The reason for this is to
obviate the biased nature of the employers
testimony or that of his witnesses.[14]
Applying the foregoing doctrines to the
present case, we hold that petitioner Dassad
Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. failed to
conclusively prove that it had exercised the
requisite diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its employees.
Edilberto Duerme, the lone witness
presented by Dassad Warehousing and Port
Services, Inc. to support its position that it had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its
employees, testified that he was the one who
recommended petitioner Raymundo Secosa as a
driver to Dassad Warehousing and Port Services,
Inc.; that it was his duty to scrutinize the
capabilities of drivers; and that he believed
petitioner to be physically and mentally fit for he
had undergone rigid training and attended the
PPA safety seminar.[15]
Petitioner Dassad Warehousing and Port
Services, Inc. failed to support the testimony of
its lone witness with documentary evidence
which would have strengthened its claim of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees. Such an omission is fatal to its
position, on account of which, Dassad can be
rightfully held solidarily liable with its co-
petitioner Raymundo Secosa for the damages
suffered by the heirs of Erwin Francisco.
However, we find that petitioner El
Buenasenso Sy cannot be held solidarily liable
with his co-petitioners. While it may be true that
Sy is the president of petitioner Dassad
Warehousing and Port Services, Inc., such fact is
not by itself sufficient to hold him solidarily
liable for the liabilities adjudged against his co-
petitioners.
It is a settled precept in this jurisdiction
that a corporation is invested by law with a
personality separate from that of its
stockholders or members.[16] It has a personality
separate and distinct from those of the persons
composing it as well as from that of any other
entity to which it may be related. Mere
ownership by a single stockholder or by another
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock
of a corporation is not in itself sufficient ground
for disregarding the separate corporate
personality.[17] A corporations authority to act
and its liability for its actions are separate and
apart from the individuals who own it.[18]
The so-called veil of corporation fiction
treats as separate and distinct the affairs of a
corporation and its officers and stockholders. As
a general rule, a corporation will be looked upon
as a legal entity, unless and until sufficient
reason to the contrary appears. When the notion
of legal entity is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or
defend crime, the law will regard the corporation
as an association of persons.[19] Also, the
corporate entity may be disregarded in the
interest of justice in such cases as fraud that may
work inequities among members of the
corporation internally, involving no rights of the
public or third persons. In both instances, there
must have been fraud and proof of it. For the
separate juridical personality of a corporation to
be disregarded, the wrongdoing must be clearly
and convincingly established.[20] It cannot be
presumed.[21]
The records of this case are bereft of any
evidence tending to show the presence of any
grounds enumerated above that will justify the
piercing of the veil of corporate fiction such as to
hold the president of Dassad Warehousing and
Port Services, Inc. solidarily liable with it.
The Isuzu cargo truck which ran over
Erwin Francisco was registered in the name of
Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc., and
not in the name of El Buenasenso Sy. Raymundo
Secosa is an employee of Dassad Warehousing
and Port Services, Inc. and not of El Buenasenso
Sy. All these things, when taken collectively,
point toward El Buenasenso Sys exclusion from
liability for damages arising from the death of
Erwin Francisco.
Having both found Raymundo Secosa and
Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc.
liable for negligence for the death of Erwin
Francisco on June 27, 1996, we now consider the
question of moral damages which his parents,
herein respondents, are entitled to
recover.Petitioners assail the award of moral
damages of P500,000.00 for being manifestly
absurd, mistaken and unjust. We are not
persuaded.
Under Article 2206, the spouse, legitimate
and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish for the death of the deceased.
The reason for the grant of moral damages has
been explained in this wise:
. . . the award of moral damages is aimed at a
restoration, within the limits possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must
be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The
intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives
of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of
affection for him and bears no relation
whatsoever with the wealth or means of the
offender.[22]
In the instant case, the spouses Francisco
presented evidence of the searing pain that they
felt when the premature loss of their son was
relayed to them. That pain was highly evident in
the testimony of the father who was forever
deprived of a son, a son whose untimely death
came at that point when the latter was nearing
the culmination of every parents wish to educate
their children. The death of Francis has indeed
left a void in the lives of the respondents.
Antonio Francisco testified on the effect of the
death of his son, Francis, in this manner:
Q: (Atty. Balanag): What did you do
when you learned that your son
was killed on June 27, 1996?
A: (ANTONIO FRANCISCO): I boxed
the door and pushed the image
of St. Nio telling why this
happened to us.
Q: Mr. Witness, how did you feel
when you learned of the
untimely death of your son,
Erwin Suares (sic)?
A: Masakit po ang mawalan ng anak.
Its really hard for me, the
thought that my son is dead.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: How did your family react to the
death of Erwin Suarez
Francisco?
A: All of my family and relatives were Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban,
felt (sic) sorrow because they Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
knew that my son is (sic) good.
Q: We know that it is impossible to
put money terms(s) [on] the life
of [a] human, but since you are
now in court and if you were to
ask this court how much would
you and your family
compensate? (sic)
A: Even if they pay me millions, they
cannot remove the anguish of
my son (sic).[23]
Moral damages are emphatically not
intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of
the defendant. They are awarded to allow the
former to obtain means, diversion or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he has undergone due to the
defendants culpable action and must, perforce,
be proportional to the suffering inflicted.[24] We
have previously held as proper an award of
P500,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of a
deceased family member who died in a vehicular
accident. In our 2002 decision in Metro Manila
Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et
al.,[25] we affirmed the award of moral damages
of P500,000.00 to the heirs of the victim, a
mother, who died from injuries she sustained
when a bus driven by an employee of the
petitioner hit her. In the case at bar, we likewise
affirm the portion of the assailed decision
awarding the moral damages.
Since the petitioners did not question the
other damages adjudged against them by
the courta quo, we affirm the award of these
damages to the respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
assailed decision is AFFIRMED with
theMODIFICATION that petitioner El Buenasenso
Sy is ABSOLVED from any liability adjudged
against his co-petitioners in this case.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 156037 May 28, 2007
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
SEBASTIAN M. BAKING, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari1 assailing the
Decision2 dated May 30, 2002 and Resolution
dated November 5, 2002 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 57435, entitled "Sebastian M.
Baking, plaintiff-appellee, versus Mercury Drug
Co. Inc., defendant-appellant."
The facts are:
On November 25, 1993, Sebastian M. Baking,
respondent, went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for
a medical check-up. On the following day, after
undergoing an ECG, blood, and hematology
examinations and urinalysis, Dr. Sy found that
respondent’s blood sugar and triglyceride were
above normal levels. Dr. Sy then gave respondent
two medical prescriptions – Diamicron for his
blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his
triglyceride.
Respondent then proceeded to petitioner
Mercury Drug Corporation (Alabang Branch) to
buy the prescribed medicines. However, the
saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron
as a prescription for Dormicum. Thus, what was
sold to respondent was Dormicum, a potent
sleeping tablet.
Unaware that what was given to him was the
wrong medicine, respondent took one pill of
Dormicum on three consecutive days –
November 6, 1993 at 9:00 p.m., November 7 at
6:00 a.m., and November 8 at 7:30 a.m.
On November 8 or on the third day he took the
medicine, respondent figured in a vehicular
accident. The car he was driving collided with
the car of one Josie Peralta. Respondent fell
asleep while driving. He could not remember
anything about the collision nor felt its impact.
Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a
bearing on his physical and mental state at the
time of the collision, respondent returned to Dr.
Sy’s clinic. Upon being shown the medicine, Dr.
Sy was shocked to find that what was sold to
respondent was Dormicum, instead of the
prescribed Diamicron.
Thus, on April 14, 1994, respondent filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 80 of
Quezon City a complaint for damages against
petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-
20193.
After hearing, the trial court rendered its
Decision dated March 18, 1997 in favor of
respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, by
preponderance of evidence, the Court hereby
renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant ordering the latter to pay
mitigated damages as follows:
1. ₱250,000.00 as moral damages;
2. ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses;
3. plus ½% of the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision,
affirmed in toto the RTC judgment. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied in a Resolution dated November 5, 2002.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Decision of the
Court of Appeals is not in accord with law or
prevailing jurisprudence.
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that
the petition lacks merit and, therefore, should be
denied.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. Whether petitioner was negligent,
and if so, whether such negligence was
the proximate cause of respondent’s
accident; and
2. Whether the award of moral
damages, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, and cost of the suit is
justified.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
To sustain a claim based on the above provision,
the following requisites must concur: (a) damage
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of
the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damage incurred by the
plaintiff.3
There is no dispute that respondent suffered
damages.
It is generally recognized that the drugstore
business is imbued with public interest. The
health and safety of the people will be put into
jeopardy if drugstore employees will not
exercise the highest degree of care and diligence
in selling medicines. Inasmuch as the matter of
negligence is a question of fact, we defer to the
findings of the trial court affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.
Obviously, petitioner’s employee was grossly
negligent in selling to respondent Dormicum,
instead of the prescribed Diamicron. Considering
that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and
death for a buying patient, the said employee
should have been very cautious in dispensing
medicines. She should have verified whether the
medicine she gave respondent was indeed the
one prescribed by his physician. The care
required must be commensurate with the danger
involved, and the skill employed must
correspond with the superior knowledge of the
business which the law demands.41awphi1.nét
Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of
the accident was respondent’s negligence in
driving his car.
We disagree.
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that
produces injury in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, such that the result would not have
occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is
determined from the facts of each case, upon a
combined consideration of logic, common sense,
policy, and precedent.5
Here, the vehicular accident could not have
occurred had petitioner’s employee been careful
in reading Dr. Sy’s prescription. Without the
potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it
was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep
while driving his car, resulting in a collision.
Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of
the same Code which states:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment
or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage.
It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent
employee is liable for the damages caused by the
latter. When an injury is caused by the
negligence of an employee, there instantly arises
a presumption of the law that there has been
negligence on the part of the employer, either in
the selection of his employee or in the
supervision over him, after such selection. The
presumption, however, may be rebutted by a
clear showing on the part of the employer that
he has exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision
of his employee.6 Here, petitioner's failure to
prove that it exercised the due diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employee will make it
solidarily liable for damages caused by the latter.
As regards the award of moral damages, we hold
the same to be in order. Moral damages may be
awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act
or omission is the proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish, Likewise, the award for attorney’s fees and
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, litigation expenses should be deleted. Well-
wounded feelings, moral shock, social enshrined is that "an award for attorney’s fees
humiliation, and similar injury in the cases must be stated in the text of the court’s decision
specified or analogous to those provided in and not in the dispositive portion
Article 2219 of the Civil Code.7 only"(Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
(Solidbank) v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 193
Respondent has adequately established the [1995] and Keng Hua Paper Products, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 286 SCRA 257 [1998]). This is also
factual basis for the award of moral damages
when he testified that he suffered mental true with the litigation expenses where the body
of the decision discussed nothing for its basis.
anguish and anxiety as a result of the accident
caused by the negligence of petitioner’s
employee. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The
challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57435 are
There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining
what would be a fair and reasonable amount of AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that
(a) the award of moral damages to respondent is
moral damages, since each case must be
governed by its own peculiar facts. However, it reduced from ₱250,000.00 to ₱50,000.00; (b)
petitioner is likewise ordered to pay said
must be commensurate to the loss or injury
suffered.8 Taking into consideration the respondent exemplary damages in the amount of
attending circumstances here, we are convinced ₱25,000.00; and (c) the award of attorney’s fees
that the amount awarded by the trial court is and litigation expenses is deleted.
exorbitant. Thus, we reduce the amount of moral
damages from ₱250,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 only. Costs against petitioner.
In addition, we also deem it necessary to award SO ORDERED
exemplary damages. Article 2229 allows the
grant of exemplary damages by way of example
or correction for the public good. As mentioned
earlier, the drugstore business is affected with
public interest. Petitioner should have exerted
utmost diligence in the selection and supervision
of its employees. On the part of the employee
concerned, she should have been extremely
cautious in dispensing pharmaceutical products.
Due to the sensitive nature of its business,
petitioner must at all times maintain a high level
of meticulousness. Therefore, an award of
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00
is in order.1awphi1.nét
On the matter of attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation, it is settled that the reasons or grounds
for the award thereof must be set forth in the
decision of the court.9 Since the trial court’s
decision did not give the basis of the award, the
same must be deleted. In Vibram Manufacturing
Corporation v. Manila Electric Company,10 we
held:
Republic of the Philippines that his left eye was reddish. He also had and explanation,[24] De Leon filed a complaint for pay ONE HUNDRED
Supreme Court difficulty reading.[5] On the same evening, he met damages against Mercury Drug.[25] THOUSAND PESOS (Php
Manila a friend for dinner at the Foohyui 100,000.00).
Restaurant. The same friend happened to be a Mercury Drug denied that it was negligent and
THIRD DIVISION doctor, Dr. Charles Milla, and had just arrived therefore liable for damages.[26] It pointed out To serve as a
from abroad.[6] that the proximate cause of De Leons warning to those in the field
unfortunate experience was his own of dispensing medicinal drugs
MERCURY DRUG G.R. No. 165622 Aside from exchanging pleasantries, negligence.[27] He should have first read and discretion of the highest
CORPORATION De Leon consulted Dr. Milla about his irritated checked to see if he had the right eye solution degree is expected of them,
and AURMELA GANZON, Present: left eye.[7] The latter prescribed the drugs before he used any on his eye.[28] He could have Mercury Drug Store and
Petitioners, Cortisporin Opthalmic and Ceftin to relieve his also requested his sheriff to do the same before defendant Aurmila (sic)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., eye problems.[8] Before heading to work the the latter applied the medicine on such a delicate Ganzon are ordered to pay
following , morning, part of his body.[29] plaintiff the amount of THREE
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, De Leon went to theBetterliving, Paraaque, HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO, branch of Mercury Drug Store Corporation to Also, Mercury Drug explained that there is no (Php 300,000.00) as
buy theN prescribed medicines.[9] He showed his available medicine known as Cortisporin exemplary damages.
A prescription to petitioner Aurmela Ganzon, a Opthalmic in the Philippine
C pharmacist assistant.[10] Subsequently, he paid market.[30] Furthermore, what was written on Due to defendants
H for and took the medicine handed over by the piece of paper De Leon presented to Ganzon callous reaction to the
U Ganzon.[11] was Cortisporin Solution.[31] Accordingly, she mistake done by their
gave him the only available Cortisporin Solution employee which forced
Promulgated: At his chambers, De Leon requested his in the market. plaintiff to litigate, Defendant
RAUL DE LEON, sheriff to assist him in using the eye drops.[12] As (sic) Mercury Drug Store is to
Respondent. October instructed, the sheriff applied 2-3 drops on Moreover, even the piece of paper pay plaintiff attorneys fees
17, 2008 respondents left eye.[13] Instead of relieving his De Leon presented upon buying the medicine ofP50,000.00 plus litigation
irritation, respondent felt searing pain.[14] He can not be considered as proper expenses.
x------------------------------------- immediately rinsed the affected eye with water, prescription.[32] It lacked the required
-------------x but the pain did not subside.[15] Only then did he information concerning the attending doctors SO ORDERED.[35]
discover that he was given the wrong medicine, name and license number.[33] According to
DECISION Cortisporin Otic Solution.[16] Ganzon, she entertained De Leons purchase In ruling in favor of De Leon,
request only because he was a regular customer the RTC ratiocinated:
REYES, R.T., J.: of their branch.[34]
De Leon returned to the same Mercury
IN REALITY, for the druggist, mistake is Drug branch, with his left eye still red and RTC Disposition
negligence and care is no defense.[1] Sa isang teary.[17] When he confronted Ganzon The proximate cause of the ill
parmasyutika, ang pagkakamali ay why he was given ear drops, instead of the On April 30, 2003, the RTC rendered fate of plaintiff was defendant
kapabayaan at ang pagkalinga ay hindi prescribed eye drops,[18] she did not apologize judgment in favor of respondent, the dispositive Aurmila (sic) Ganzons
angkop na dipensa. and instead brazenly replied that she was unable portion of which reads: negligent exercise of said
to fully read the prescription.[19] In fact, it was discretion. She gave a
This is a petition for review on certiorari[2] of her supervisor who apologized andinformed WHEREFORE, the court finds prescription drug to a
two Resolutions[3] of the Court of Appeals De Leon that they do not have stock of the for the plaintiff. customer who did not have
(CA). The first Resolution granted respondents needed Cortisporin Opthalmic.[20] the proper form of
motion to dismiss while the second denied For pecuniary loss s prescription, she did not take
petitioners motion for reconsideration. De Leon wrote Mercury Drug, through its uffered, Mercury Drug Store is a good look at said
president, Ms. Vivian K. Askuna, about the days to pay ONE HUNDRED FIFTY- prescription, she merely
incident.[21] It did not merit any THREE PESOS AND TWENTY- presumed plaintiff was
The Facts response.[22] Instead, two sales persons went to FIVE CENTAVOS (Php looking for Cortisporin Otic
his office and informed him that their supervisor 153.25), the value of the Solution because it was the
Respondent Raul T. De Leon was the presiding was busy with other matters.[23] Having been medicine. only one available in the
judge of Branch 258, Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied his simple desire for a written apology As moral damages market and she further
in Paraaque.[4] On October 17, 1999, he noticed defendants is (sic) ordered to presumed that by merely
 putting the drug by the
counter wherein plaintiff
looked at it, paid and took the
drug without any objection
meant he understood what he
was buying.[36]
The RTC ruled that although De Leon may have
been negligent by failing to read the medicines
label or to instruct his sheriff to do so, Mercury
Drug was first to be negligent.[37] Ganzon
dispensed a drug without the requisite
prescription.[38] Moreover, she did so without
fully reading what medicine was exactly being
bought.[39] In fact, she presumed that since what
was available was the drug Cortisporin Otic
Solution, it was what De Leon was attempting to
buy.[40] Said the court:
When the injury is
caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee, there
instantly arises a presumption
of law that there was
negligence on the part of the
employer or employer either
in the selection of the servant
or employee, or in the
supervision over him after the
selection or both.
xxxx
The theory bases the
responsibility of the master
ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of
his servant.[41]
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling,
Mercury Drug and Ganzon elevated the matter to
the CA. Accordingly, they filed their respective
briefs. Raising technical grounds, DeLeon moved
for the appeals dismissal.
CA Disposition
On July 4, 2008, the CA issued a
resolution which granted De Leons motion and
dismissed the appeal. Said the appellate court:
As pointed out by
the plaintiff-appellee, the
Statement of Facts, Statement
of the Case, Assignment of
Errors/issues, Arguments/
Discussions in the Brief make
no references to the pages of
the records. We find this
procedural lapse justify the
dismissal of the appeal,
pursuant to Section 1(f), Rule
50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure x x x.[42]
xxxx
The premise that underlies all
appeals is that they are merely
rights which arise form a
statute; therefore, they must be
exercised in the manner
prescribed by law. It is to this
end that rules governing
pleadings and practice before
the appellate court were
imposed. These rules were
designed to assist the appellate
court in the accomplishment of
its tasks, and overall, to enhance
the orderly administration of
justice.
xxxx
x x x If the statement of fact is
unaccompanied by a page
reference to the record, it may
be stricken or disregarded all
together.[43]
On October 5, 2004, the CA denied Mercury
Drugs and Ganzons joint motion for
reconsideration. Although mindful that litigation
is not a game of technicalities,[44] the CA found no
persuasive reasons to relax procedural rules in
favor of Mercury Drug and Ganzon.[45] The CA
opined:
In the case under
consideration, We find no
faithful compliance on the
part of the movants that will
call for the liberal application CONSIDERING THAT THE
of the Rules. Section 1(f) of ASSAILED DECISION ON
Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of APPEAL IS CLUSTERED WITH
Civil Procedure explicitly ERRORS AND IN CONTRAST
provides that an appeal may WITH THE DECISIONS OF
be dismissed by the Court of THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
Appeals, on its own motion or COURT.[47] (Underscoring
on that of the appellee, for supplied)
want of page references to the
records as required in Section Our Ruling
13 of Rule 44 of the same
rules[46] The appeal succeeds in part.
Issues Dismissal of an appeal under Rule 50 is
discretionary.
Petitioner has resorted to the present
recourse and assigns to the CA the following In several cases,[48] this Court stressed
errors: that the grounds for dismissal of an appeal under
Section 1 of Rule 50[49] are discretionary upon
I the appellate court. The very wording of the rule
THE HONORABLE COURT OF uses the word may instead of shall. This
APPEALS ERRED IN indicates that it is only directory and not
DISMISSING PETITIONERS mandatory.[50] Sound discretion must be
APPEAL BASED ON THE exercised in consonance with the tenets of
CASES OF DE LIANA VS. justice and fair play, keeping in mind the
CA (370 SCRA circumstances obtaining in each case.[51]
349) AND HEIRS OF
PALOMINIQUE VS. CA (134 The importance of an appellants brief cannot be
SCRA 331). gainsaid. Its purpose is two-fold: (1) to present
II to the court in coherent and concise form the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF point and questions in controversy; and (2) to
APPEALS COMMITTED assist the court in arriving at a just and proper
GRAVE ABUSE OF conclusion.[52] It is considered a vehicle of
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING counsel to convey to the court the essential facts
PETITIONERS APPEAL of a clients case, a statement of the questions of
DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL law involved, the law to be applied, and the
COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION application one desires of it by the court.[53]
1(F), RULE 60 AND SECTION
13, RULE 44 OF THE RULES The absence of page reference to the record is a
OF COURT. ground for dismissal. It is a requirement
intended to ultimately aid the appellate court in
III arriving at a just and proper conclusion of the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF case.[54] However, as earlier discussed, such
APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT dismissal is not mandatory, but discretionary on
FAVORED MERE the part of the appellate court.
TECHNICALITY OVER
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE This Court has held that the failure
WHICH WILL CERTAINLY to properly cite reference to the original
CAUSE GRAVE records is not a fatal procedural
INJUSTICE AND GREAT lapse.[55] When citations found in the
PREJUDICE TO PETITIONER appellants brief enable the court to
expeditiously locate the portions of the
record referred to, there is substantial
compliance with the requirements of Section
13(c), (d), and (f) of Rule 44.[56]
In De Leon v. CA,[57] this Court ruled that
the citations contained in the appellants brief
sufficiently enabled the appellate court to
expeditiously locate the portions of the record
referred to. They were in substantial compliance
with the rules. The Court said:
Nothing in the
records indicate that it was
exercised capriciously,
whimsically, or with a view of
permitting injury upon a
party litigant. For the same
reasons, we hold that the
respondent Court of Appeals
did not err when it did not
dismiss the appeal based on
the allegation that appellants
brief failed to comply with the
internal rules of said court.[58]
Similar to the instant case, the
appellants brief in Yuchengco v. Court of
Appeals[59] contained references to Exhibits and
Transcript of Stenographic Notes and
attachments. These were found to have
substantially complied with the requirements of
Section 13(c) and (d) of Rule 44.
x x x The Appellants brief may
not have referred to the exact
pages of the records, however,
the same is not fatal to their
cause since the references
they made enabled the
appellate court to
expeditiously locate the
portions referred to. x x x[60]
It is true that in De Liano v. Court of
Appeals,[61] this Court held that a statement of
facts unaccompanied by a page reference to the
record may be presumed to be without support
in the record and may be stricken or disregarded
altogether. However, the instant case is not on all
fours with De Liano.
In De Liano, the appellants brief lacked
a Subject Index and a Table of Cases and
Authorities.[62] Moreover, the Statement of the
Case, Statements of Facts, and Statements of
Arguments had no page references to the
record.[63] When notified of such defects,
defendants-appellants failed to amend their brief
to conform to the rules.[64]Instead, they
continued to argue that their errors were
harmless.[65] All these omissionsand non-
compliance justified the dismissal of the appeal
by the CA.[66]
In the case under review, although
there were no page references to the records,
Mercury Drug and Ganzon referred to the
exhibits, TSN, and attachments of the
case.Despite its deficiencies, the brief is sufficient
in form and substance as to apprise the appellate
court of the essential facts, nature of the case, the
issues raised, and the laws necessary for the
disposition of the same.
Reliance on Heirs of Palomique v. Court
of Appeals[67] is likewise misplaced. InHeirs of
Palomique, the appellants brief did not at all
contain a separate statement of facts.[68] This
critical omission, together with the failure to
make page references to the record to support
the factual allegations, justified the dismissal of
the appeal.[69]
Rules of procedure are intended to
promote, not to defeat, substantial justice. They
should not be applied in a very rigid and
technical sense.[70] For reasons of justice and
equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the
stringent rules governing appeals.[71] It has, in
the past, refused to sacrifice justice for
technicality.[72]
However, brushing aside technicalities,
petitioners are still liable. Mercury Drug and
Ganzon failed to exercise the highest degree
of diligence expected of them.
Denying that they were negligent,
Mercury Drug and Ganzon pointed out that De
Leons own negligence was the proximate cause
of his injury. They argued that any injury would
have been averted had De Leon exercised due
diligence before applying the medicine on his
eye. Had he cautiously read the medicine bottle
label, he would have known that he had the
wrong medicine.
Mercury Drug and Ganzon can not
exculpate themselves from any liability. As active
players in the field of dispensing medicines to
the public, the highest degree of care and
diligence is expected of them.[73] Likewise,
numerous decisions, both here and abroad, have
laid salutary rules for the protection of human
life and human health.[74] In the United
States case of Tombari v. Conners,[75] it was ruled
that the profession of pharmacy demands care
and skill, and druggists must exercise care of a
specially high degree, the highest degree of care
known to practical men. In other words,
druggists must exercise the highest practicable
degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most
exact and reliable safeguards
consistent with the reasonable conduct of the
business, so that human life may not constantly
be exposed to the danger flowing from the
substitution of deadly poisons for harmless
medicines.[76]
In Fleet v. Hollenkemp,[77] the US
Supreme Court ruled that a druggist that sells to
a purchaser or sends to a patient one drug for
another or even one innocent drug, calculated to
produce a certain effect, in place of another sent
for and designed to produce a different effect,
cannot escape responsibility, upon the alleged
pretext that it was an accidental or innocent
mistake. His mistake, under the most favorable
aspect for himself, is negligence. And such
mistake cannot be countenanced or tolerated, as
it is a mistake of the gravest kind and of the most
disastrous effect.[78]
Smiths Admrx v. Middelton[79] teaches
Us that one holding himself out as competent to
handle drugs, having rightful access to them, and
relied upon by those dealing with him to exercise
that high degree of caution and care called for by
the peculiarly dangerous nature of the business,
cannot be heard to say that his mistake by which
he furnishes a customer the most deadly of drugs
for those comparatively harmless, is not in itself
gross negligence.[80]
In our own jurisdiction, United States v.
Pineda[81] and Mercury Drug Corporation v.
Baking are illustrative.[82] In Pineda, the
potassium chlorate demanded by complainant
had been intended for his race horses. When
complainant mixed with water what he thought
and believed was potassium chlorate, but which
turned out to be the potently deadly barium
chlorate, his race horses died of poisoning only a
few hours after.
The wisdom of such a decision is
unquestionable. If the victims had been human
beings instead of horses, the damage and loss
would have been irreparable.[83]
In the more recent Mercury Drug, involving no
less than the same petitioner corporation,
Sebastian Baking went to the Alabang branch of
Mercury Drug[84] and presented his prescription
for Diamicron, which the pharmacist misread as
Dormicum.[85] Baking was given a potent
sleeping tablet, instead of medicines to stabilize
his blood sugar.[86] On the third day of taking the
wrong medicine, Baking figured in a vehicular
accident.[87] He fell asleep while driving.[88]
This Court held that the proximate cause of the
accident was the gross negligence of the
pharmacist who gave the wrong medicine to
Baking. The Court said:
x x x Considering
that a fatal mistake could be a
matter of life and death for a
buying patient, the said
employee should have been
very cautious in dispensing
medicines. She should have
verified whether the medicine
she gave respondent was
indeed the one prescribed by
his physician. The care
required must be
commensurate with the
danger involved, and the skill
 employed must correspond
with the superior knowledge
of the business which the law
demands.[89]
This Court once more reiterated that
the profession of pharmacy demands great care
and skill. It reminded druggists to exercise the
highest degree of care known to practical men.
In cases where an injury is caused by the
negligence of an employee, there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there has
been negligence on the part of the employer,
either in the selection or supervision of ones
employees. This presumption may be
rebutted by a clear showing that the
employer has exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of the
family.[90] Mercury Drug failed to overcome
such presumption.[91]
Petitioners Mercury Drug and Ganzon
have similarly failed to live up to high standard
of diligence expected of them as pharmacy
professionals. They were grossly negligent in
dispensing ear drops instead of the prescribed
eye drops to De Leon. Worse, they have once
again attempted to shift the blame to their victim
by underscoring his own failure to read the label.
As a buyer, De Leon relied on the
expertise and experience of Mercury Drug and
its employees in dispensing to him the right
medicine.[92] This Court has ruled that in the
purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and seller
do not stand at arms length.[93] There exists an
imperative duty on the seller or the druggist to
take precaution to prevent deathor injury to any
person who relies on ones absolute honesty and
peculiar learning.[94] The Court emphasized:
x x x The nature of
drugs is such that
examination would not avail
the purchaser anything. It
would be idle mockery for the
customer to make an
examination of a compound of
which he can know nothing.
Consequently, it must be that
the druggist warrants that he x x x Article 2229
will deliver the drug called allows the grant of exemplary
for.[95] damages by way of example
or correction for the public
Mercury Drug and Ganzons defense good. As mentioned earlier,
that the latter gave the only available Cortisporin the drugstore business is
solution in the market deserves scant affected by public
consideration. Ganzon could have easily verified interest. Petitioner should
whether the medicine she gave De Leon was, have exerted utmost diligence
indeed, the prescribed one or, at the very least, in the selection and
consulted her supervisor. Absent the required supervision of its
certainty in the dispensation of the medicine, she employees. On the part of the
could have refused De Leons purchase of the employee concerned, she
drug. should have been extremely
cautious in dispensing
The award of damages is proper and shall pharmaceutical
only be reduced considering the peculiar products. Due to the sensitive
facts of the case. Moral damages include nature of its business,
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious petitioner must at all times
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded maintain a high level of
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and meticulousness. Therefore, an
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary award of exemplary damages
computation, moral damages may be recovered in the amount of P25,000.00
if they are the proximate result of defendants is in order.[101] (Emphasis
wrongful act or omission.[96] supplied)
Moral damages are not intended to impose a It is generally recognized that the
penalty to the wrongdoer or to enrich the drugstore business is imbued with public
claimant at the expense of defendant.[97] There is interest.This can not be more real for Mercury
no hard and fast rule in determining what would Drug, the countrys biggest drugstore chain. This
be a fair and reasonable amount of moral Court can not tolerate any form of negligence
damages since each case must be governed by its which can jeopardize the health and safety of its
peculiar circumstances.[98] However, the award loyal patrons. Moreover, this Court will not
of damages must be commensurate to the loss or countenance the cavalier manner it treated
injury suffered.[99] De Leon. Not only does a pharmacy owe a
customer the duty of reasonable care, but it is
Taking into consideration the attending also duty-bound to accord one with respect.
facts of the case under review, We find the
amount awarded by the trial court to be WHEREFORE, the petition
excessive. Following the precedent case is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decisions of the
ofMercury Drug, We reduce the amount CA and the RTC in Paraaque City are AFFIRMED
from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 only.[100] In WITH MODIFICATION, in that the award of
addition, We also deem it necessary to reduce moral and exemplary damages is reduced
the award of exemplary damages from the to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively.
exorbitant amount of P300,000.00 to P25,000.00
only. SO ORDERED.
This Court explained the propriety of
awarding exemplary damages in the
earlierMercury Drug case:
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
Before the Court is a petition for review
SECOND DIVISION on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision[1] dated January 2, 2006
and the Resolution[2] dated March 30, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
THE HEIRS OF REDENTOR COMPLETO and ELPIDIO ABIAD,
68405. G.R. No. 172200
Petitioners,
Present:
The Facts
The facts of the case are as follows:
CARPIO, J.,
Respondent Amando C. Albayda, Jr. (Albayda) is
Chairperson,
a Master Sergeant of the Philippine Air Force,
527th Base Security Squadron, 520th Airbase,
Philippine NACHURA,
Air Force, located at Villamor Air Base
- versus - (VAB), Pasay City. Petitioner Redentor Completo
(Completo),PERALTA,
now represented by his heirs, was
the taxi driver of a Toyota Corolla, bearing Plate
ABAD,owned
No. PYD-128, and and operated by co-
petitioner Elpidio Abiad (Abiad).[3] Albayda and
Completo MENDOZA,
figured inJJ.an accident along the
intersection of 8th and 11th Streets, VAB. Albayda
filed a complaint for damages before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of PasayCity. The case
Promulgated:
was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-1333.[4]
SGT. AMANDO C. ALBAYDA, JR.,
The amended complaint alleged that, on August
Respondent.
27, 1997, while Albayda was on his way to the
July 6, 2010
office to report for duty, riding a bicycle
along 11th Street, the taxi driven by Completo
bumped and sideswiped him, causing serious
x------------------------------------------------------------------- physical injuries. Albayda was brought to the
-----------------x Philippine Air Force General Hospital (PAFGH)
inside VAB. However, he was immediately
transferred to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Medical Center (AFPMC) on V. Luna
Road, Quezon City, because there was a fracture
in his left knee and there was no orthopedic
doctor available at PAFGH. From August 27,
1997 until February 11, 1998, he was confined
DECISION therein. He was again hospitalized at PAFGH
from February 23, 1998 until March 22, 1998.[5]
Conciliation between the parties before
the barangay failed. Thus, Albayda filed a
NACHURA, J.: complaint for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence against Completo before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. On the other
hand, Completo filed a counter-charge of damage
to property through reckless imprudence against
Albayda. On January 13, 1998, the Office of the
City Prosecutor issued a
resolution,[6] recommending the filing of an
information for reckless imprudence resulting in
physical injuries against Completo. The counter-
charge of damage to property was recommended
dismissed.[7]
The case was raffled to
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 45, where Albayda manifested his
reservation to file a separate civil action for
damages against petitioners Completo and
Abiad.[8]
Albayda alleged that the proximate cause of the
incident which necessitated his stay in the
hospital for approximately seven (7) months was
the negligence of Completo who, at the time of
the accident, was in the employ of Abiad. The
pain he suffered required him to undergo
medical physiotherapy for a number of years to
regain normality of his left knee joint, and he
claimed that he incurred actual damages totaling
Two Hundred Seventy-Six Thousand Five
Hundred Fifty Pesos (P276,550.00), inclusive of
his anticipated operations.[9]
He further stated that aggravating the physical
sufferings, mental anguish, frights, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation
resulting from his injuries, his wife abandoned
him in May 1998, and left their children in his
custody. He thus demanded the amount of Six
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00) as
moral damages. He likewise asked for exemplary
damages in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) and attorneys
fees of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00), plus One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) per court appearance.[10]
In his answer to the amended complaint,
Completo alleged that, on August 27, 1997, he
was carefully driving the taxicab along 8th Street,
VAB, when suddenly he heard a strange sound
from the rear right side of the taxicab. When he
stopped to investigate, he found Albayda lying on
the road and holding his left leg. He immediately
rendered assistance and brought Albayda to
PAFGH for emergency treatment.[11]
Completo also asserted that he was an
experienced driver who, in accordance with
traffic rules and regulations and common
courtesy to his fellow motorists, had already
reduced his speed to twenty (20) kilometers per
hour even before reaching the intersection of
8thand 11th Streets. In contrast, Albayda rode his
bicycle at a very high speed, causing him to
suddenly lose control of the bicycle and hit the
rear door on the right side of the taxicab.[12]
The deep indentation on the rear right door of
the taxicab was caused by the impact of Albaydas
body that hit the taxicab after he had lost control
of the bicycle; while the slight indentation on the
right front door of the taxicab was caused by the
impact of the bike that hit the taxicab after
Albayda let go of its handles when he had lost
control of it.[13]
Completo maintained that Albayda had no cause
of action. The accident and the physical injuries
suffered by Albayda were caused by his own
negligence, and his purpose in filing the
complaint was to harass petitioners and unjustly
enrich himself at their expense.[14]
After submission of the parties respective
pleadings, a pretrial conference was held. On
December 8, 1998, the RTC issued a pretrial
order. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.[15]
Albayda presented himself, Michael Navarro
(Navarro), Dr. Rito Barrosa, Jr. (Dr. Barrosa), Dr.
Armando Sta. Ana, Jr., Dr. Ranny Santiago, (Dr.
Santiago), and Dr. Manuel Fidel Magtira (Dr.
Magtira) as witnesses in open court.[16]
On direct examination, Navarro testified that, on
August 27, 1997, at around 1:45 p.m., he saw a
taxicab, with Plate No. PYD-128, coming
from 11th Street, running at an unusual speed.
The normal speed should have been twenty-five
(25) kilometers per hour. He was at the corner of
9th and 8th Streets when the taxicab passed by
him. The side of the bicycle was hit by the taxicab
at the intersection of 11th and 8th Streets. He saw
Albayda fall to the ground, grimacing in pain. The
taxicab at that moment was about ten (10)
meters away from Albayda. On cross-
examination, Navarro reiterated that the taxicab
was running quite fast. The bicycle ridden by
Albayda reached the intersection of 8th and
11thStreets before the taxicab hit it.[17]
Dr. Santiago, the orthopedic surgeon who treated
Albayda when the latter was admitted at AFPMC,
testified that the cause of the injury was hard
impact, and recommended an operation to
alleviate the suffering. On cross-examination, he
said that there was a separation of the fragments
of the proximal leg, the injured extremity, called
levia. They placed the victim on knee traction or
calcaneal traction,[18] in order to avoid further
swelling. They bore the calcanean bone with a
stainless steel pin so that they could put five
percent (5%) of the body weight of the patient to
cool down the leg. He treated Albayda for three
(3) months. He recommended surgery, but the
victim had other medical problems, like an
increase in sugar level, and they were waiting for
the availability of the implant. The implant was
supposed to be placed on the lateral aspect of the
proximal leg or the levia, the part with the
separation. It was a long implant with screws.[19]
Dr. Magtira testified that Albayda was
readmitted at AFPMC on January 25, 1999
because of complaints of pain and limitation of
motion on the knee joint. Upon evaluation, the
pain was caused by traumatic arthritis brought
about by malunion of the lateral trivial condial.
An operation of the soft tissue release was
conducted for him to mobilize his knee joint and
attain proper range of motion. After the
operation, Albayda attained functional range of
motion, but because of subsisting pain, they had
to do osteoplasty[20] of the malunion, which was
another operation. On cross-examination, Dr.
Magtira testified that he rendered free medical
service at AFPMC.[21]
Albayda testified that he was thirty-six (36)
years old and a soldier of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines. On August 27, 1997, at around
1:40 p.m., he was riding his bike on his way to
the office, located on 916 Street, VAB. He had to
stop at the corner of 11th and 8th Streets because
an oncoming taxicab was moving fast. However,
the taxicab still bumped the front tire of his bike,
hit his left knee and threw him off until he fell
down on the road. The taxicab stopped about ten
meters away, and then moved backwards. Its
driver, Completo, just stared at him. When
somebody shouted to bring him to the hospital,
two (2) persons, one of whom was Dr. Barrosa,
helped him and carried him into the taxicab
driven by Completo, who brought him to
PAFGH.[22]
Upon examination, it was found that Albayda
suffered fracture in his left knee and that it
required an operation. No orthopedic doctor was
available at PAFGH. Thus, he was transferred
that same afternoon to AFPMC, where he was
confined until February 11, 1998.[23]
At AFPMC, Albaydas left leg was drilled on and
attached to traction. When his leg was drilled, it
was so painful that he had to shout. After his
release from the hospital, he continued to suffer
pain in his leg. He underwent reflexology and
therapy which offered temporary relief from
pain. But after some time, he had to undergo
therapy and reflexology again.[24]
On January 25, 1999, Albayda was readmitted at
AFPMC and operated on. On June 24, 1999, he
was operated on again. Wire and screw were
installed so that he could bend his knee.
Nonetheless, he continued to suffer pain. As of
the date of his testimony in court, he was
scheduled for another operation in January
2000, when the steel that would be installed in
his leg arrives.[25]
For his food, Albayda spent Thirty Pesos
(P30.00) each day during his six (6) months of
confinement; for his bed pan, One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000.00); for his twice weekly
reflexology, Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00)
every session since April 1997; for his
caretaker, P300.00 per day for six months. He
also asked for P600,000.00 in moral damages
because Completo did not lend him a helping
hand, and he would be suffering deformity for
the rest of his life. He demanded P25,000.00 as
attorneys fees andP1,000.00 for every court
appearance of his lawyer.[26]
On cross-examination, Albayda testified that, on driver of the taxicab alighted, carried Albayda,
the date of the incident, he was the base guard at and brought him to the hospital.[32]
VAB, and his duty was from 2 p.m. to 8 p.m. That
afternoon, he was not in a hurry to go to his When questioned by the trial court, Panican
place of work because it was only about 1:45 testified that the bicycle was running fast and
p.m., and his place of work was only six (6) that he saw it bump the taxicab. The taxicab
meters away. After the accident, he was brought already passed the intersection of 11th and
to PAFGH, and at 3:00 p.m., he was brought to 8thStreets when the bicycle arrived.[33]
the AFPMC. When he was discharged from the
hospital, he could no longer walk.[27] Abiad testified that, aside from being a soldier,
Dr. Barrosas testimony during cross- he was also a franchise holder of taxicabs and
examination emphasized that he was with 2 passenger jeepneys. When Completo applied as a
other persons when he carried Albayda into the driver of the taxicab, Abiad required the former
taxicab driven by Completo. He was certain that to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and drivers
it was not Completo who carried the victim into license. Completo never figured in a vehicular
the taxicab. It was only a matter of seconds when accident since the time he was employed in
he rushed to the scene of the accident. The February 1997. Abiad averred that Completo
taxicab backed up fifteen (15) seconds later. was a good driver and a good man. Being the
Albayda lay 2 meters away from the corner of operator of taxicab, Abiad would wake up early
8th and 11th Streets.[28] and personally check all the taxicabs.[34]
Completo, Abiad, and Benjamin Panican On July 31, 2000, the trial court rendered a
(Panican) testified for the defense.[29] decision,[35] the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Completo alleged that he had been employed as
taxi driver of FOJS Transport, owned by Abiad, WHEREFORE, judgment is
since February 1997. On August 27, 1997, he was hereby rendered in favor of
driving the taxicab, with Plate No. PYD-128, from the plaintiff [Albayda] and
10:00 a.m. At around 1:45 p.m., he was on his against the defendants
way home when a bicycle bumped his taxicab at [Completo and Abiad].
the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets, VAB. The Accordingly, the defendants
bicycle was travelling from south to north, and [Completo and Abiad] are
he was going east coming from the west. The hereby ordered to pay the
bicycle was coming from 11th Street, while he plaintiff [Albayda] the
was travelling along 8th Street.[30] following sum:
On cross-examination, Completo testified that 1. P46,000.00 as actual
when Albayda hit the rear right door of the damages;
taxicab, the latter fell to the ground. When he
heard a noise, he immediately alighted from the 2. P400,000.00 as moral
taxicab. He denied that he stopped about 10 damages; [and]
meters away from the place where Albayda fell.
He carried Albayda and drove him to the 3. P25,000.00 as attorneys
hospital.[31] fees.
Panican testified that he worked as an
airconditioner technician in a shop located Costs against the defendants
on 8thStreet corner 11th Street. On the date and [Completo and Abiad].
time of the incident, he was working in front of
the shop near the roadside. He saw a bicycle SO ORDERED.[36]
bump the rear right side of the taxicab. Then, the
Completo and Abiad filed an appeal. The CA
affirmed the trial court with modification in a
Decision[37] dated January 2, 2006, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the appeal
is DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed Decision dated
31 July 2000 rendered by
the Regional Trial Court of Pas
ay City, Branch 117, in Civil
Case No. 98-1333 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1. the award of Php 46,000.00
as actual damages
is DELETED;
2. temperate damages in the
amount of Php 40,000.00 is
awarded in favor of appellee;
3. moral damages in favor of
appellee is REDUCED to Php
200,000.00;
4. appellants Redentor
Completo and Elpidio Abiad
are solidarily liable to pay
appellee Amando C. Albayda,
Jr. said temperate and moral
damages, as well as the
attorneys fees in the amount
of Php 25,000.00 awarded by
the trial court;
5. the temperate and moral
damages shall earn legal
interest at 6% per
annum computed from the
date of promulgation of Our
Decision;
6. upon finality of Our
Decision, said moral and
temperate damages shall earn
legal interest at the rate of
12% per annum, in lieu of
6% per annum, until full
payment. Costs against
appellants.
SO ORDERED.[38]
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners presented the following issues for
resolution: (1) whether the CA erred in finding
that Completo was the one who caused the
collision;
(2) whether Abiad failed to prove that he
observed the diligence of a good father of the
family; and (3) whether the award of moral and
temperate damages and attorneys fees to
Albayda had no basis.[39]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is bereft of merit.
I. On Negligence
The issues raised by petitioners essentially delve
into factual matters which were already passed
upon by the RTC and the CA. Conclusions and
findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to
great weight on appeal and should not be
disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons,
because the trial court is in a better position to
examine real evidence, as well as to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the
case. The fact that the CA adopted the findings of
fact of the trial court makes the same binding
upon this Court. Well-settled is the rule that the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.[40] To be
sure, findings of fact of lower courts are deemed
conclusive and binding upon the Supreme Court,
save only for clear and exceptional
reasons,[41] none of which is present in the case
at bar.
The instant case involved a collision between a
taxicab and a bicycle which resulted in serious
physical injuries to the bicycle rider, Albayda. It
is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has
the burden of proving by a preponderance of
evidence the motorists breach in his duty of care
owed to the plaintiff, that the motorist was
negligent in failing to exercise the diligence
required to avoid injury to the plaintiff, and that
such negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury suffered.[42]
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that
whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict. In this regard, the question of the
motorist's negligence is a question of fact.
It was proven by a preponderance of evidence
that Completo failed to exercise reasonable
diligence in driving the taxicab because he was
over-speeding at the time he hit the bicycle
ridden by Albayda. Such negligence was the sole
and proximate cause of the serious physical
injuries sustained by Albayda. Completo did not
slow down even when he approached the
intersection of 8th and 11th Streets of VAB. It was
also proven that Albayda had the right of way,
considering that he reached the intersection
ahead of Completo.
The bicycle occupies a legal position that is at
least equal to that of other vehicles lawfully on
the highway, and it is fortified by the fact that
usually more will be required of a motorist than
a bicyclist in discharging his duty of care to the
other because of the physical advantages the
automobile has over the bicycle.[43]
At the slow speed of ten miles per hour, a
bicyclist travels almost fifteen feet per second,
while a car traveling at only twenty-five miles
per hour covers almost thirty-seven feet per
second, and split-second action may be
insufficient to avoid an accident. It is obvious
that a motor vehicle poses a greater danger of
harm to a bicyclist than vice versa.
Accordingly, while the duty of using reasonable
care falls alike on a motorist and a bicyclist, due
to the inherent differences in the two vehicles,
more care is required from the motorist to fully
discharge the duty than from the
bicyclist.[44] Simply stated, the physical
advantages that the motor vehicle has over the
bicycle make it more dangerous to the bicyclist
than vice versa.[45]
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the
obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those persons for whom
one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their employees, but the
employers responsibility shall cease upon proof
that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an
employee, a legal presumption instantly arises
that the employer was negligent. This
presumption may be rebutted only by a clear
showing on the part of the employer that he
exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of his
employee. If the employer successfully
overcomes the legal presumption of negligence,
he is relieved of liability. In other words, the
burden of proof is on the employer.[46]
The trial courts finding that Completo failed to
exercise reasonable care to avoid collision with
Albayda at the intersection of 11th and 8th Streets
of VAB gives rise to liability on the part of
Completo, as driver, and his employer Abiad. The
responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for quasi-delict is solidary.[47] The civil
liability of the employer for the negligent acts of
his employee is also primary and direct, owing to
his own negligence in selecting and supervising
his employee.[48] The civil liability of the
employer attaches even if the employer is not
inside the vehicle at the time of the collision.[49]
In the selection of prospective employees,
employers are required to examine them as to
their qualifications, experience, and service
records. On the other hand, with respect to the
supervision of employees, employers should
formulate standard operating procedures,
monitor their implementation, and impose
disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. To
establish these factors in a trial involving the
issue of vicarious liability, employers must
submit concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.[50]
Abiad testified that before he hired Completo, he
required the latter to show his bio-data, NBI
clearance, and drivers license. Abiad likewise
stressed that Completo was never involved in a
vehicular accident prior to the instant case, and
that, as operator of the taxicab, he would wake
up early to personally check the condition of the
vehicle before it is used.
The protestation of Abiad to escape liability is
short of the diligence required under the
law. Abiads evidence consisted entirely of
testimonial evidence, and the unsubstantiated
and self-serving testimony of Abiad was
insufficient to overcome the legal presumption
that he was negligent in the selection and
supervision of his driver.
II. On Damages
The CA rightfully deleted the award of actual
damages by the RTC because Albayda failed to
present documentary evidence to establish with
certainty the amount that he incurred during his
hospitalization and treatment for the injuries he
suffered. In the absence of stipulation, actual
damages are awarded only for such pecuniary
loss suffered that was duly proved.[51]
While the amount of actual damages was not
duly established with certainty, the Court
recognizes the fact that, indeed, Albayda
incurred a considerable amount for the
necessary and reasonable medical expenses, loss
of salary and wages, loss of capacity to earn
increased wages, cost of occupational therapy,
and harm from conditions caused by prolonged
immobilization. Temperate damages, more than
nominal but less than compensatory damages,
may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty.[52] Temperate damages
must be reasonable under the
circumstances.[53] Thus, the Court finds the
award of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) as temperate damages reasonable
under the circumstances.
Doubtless, Albayda suffered immeasurable pain WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
because of the incident caused by petitioners Decision dated January 2, 2006 and the
negligence. The CA explained: Resolution dated March 30, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68405 are
The court vicariously feels the hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, viz.:
pain the plaintiff [Albayda]
suffered a number of times. (1) The estate of the late Redentor Completo and
After he was bumped by Elpidio Abiad are solidarily liable to pay One
defendants cab, he cried in Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), as
pain. When the doctors bore temperate damages, and Five Hundred Thousand
holes into his left knee, he Pesos (P500,000.00), as moral damages;
cried in pain. When he was
tractioned, when he was (2) The temperate and moral damages hereby
subjected to an operation awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of
after operation he suffered six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the
pain. When he took the promulgation of this Decision. Upon finality of
witness stand to testify, he this Decision, an interest rate of twelve percent
walked with crutches, his left (12%) per annum shall be imposed on the
knee in bandage, stiff and amount of the temperate and moral damages
unfuctional. Pain was written until full payment thereof.
[on] his face. He does deserve
moral damages.[54] Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Moral damages are awarded in quasi-delicts
causing physical injuries. The permanent
deformity and the scar left by the wounds
suffered by Albayba will forever be a reminder of
the pain and suffering that he had endured and
continues to endure because of petitioners
negligence. Thus, the award of moral damages in
the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) is proper.
Finally, an interest rate of six percent (6%) per
annum is due on the amount ofP100,000.00, as
temperate damages, and P500,000.00, as moral
damages, which we have awarded. The 6% per
annum interest rate on the temperate and moral
damages shall commence to run from the date of
the promulgation of this Decision. Upon finality
of the Decision, an interest rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum shall be imposed on the
amount of the temperate and moral damages
until full payment thereof.[55]
The award of attorneys fees is hereby deleted for
failure to prove that petitioners acted in bad
faith in refusing to satisfy respondents just and
valid claim.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9331 July 31, 1957
JOSE A. ORTALIZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CORADO ECHARRI, defendant-appelee.
Parreno and Tonogbanua for appellant.
Hilado and Hilado for appellees.
ENDENCIA, J.:
Plaintiff-appellant seeks the reversal of the order
of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental dismissing the case on the ground
that the complaint does not state a cause of
action.
On February 19, 1953, plaintiff filed in the court
below a complaint wherein, after stating the
legal personalities of the parties, he averred the
following:
2. That the plaintiff is the lawful father
of the child, Winston Ortaliz, had in
legitimate wedlock with Elena Lucasan;
3. That on or about December 18, 1953,
at the corner of Washington and
Justicia Streets, Bacolod City,
Philippines, the Studebaker Sedan Car
with Plate No. 35-1138 of the
defendant struck the plaintiff's son,
Winston Ortaliz, causing upon him
physical injuries as a result of which he
was taken to the Occidental Negros
Provincial Hospital as evidenced by the
medical certificate herewith attached
and marked as Annex "A" of this
complaint;
4. That the said Studebaker Sedan Car
with Plate No. 35-1138 was at the time
of the accident, driven and controlled
by Segundino Estanda, a driver under
the employ of the defendant, without
due care and diligence and with
negligence and recklessness and
violation of traffic rules and
regulations;
5. That an information was filed in the
Municipal Court of the City of Bacolod
which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 2607 against the said Segundino
Estanda for the crime of Slight Physical
Inuries Through Reckless Imprudence,
a copy of said information is hereto
attached marked as Annex "B" and
made an integral part of this complaint;
6. That the said Segundino Estanda
pleaded guilty to the crime charge in
the Information and he was finally
sentenced to suffer the penalty of five
(5) days of Arresto Menor and to pay
the costs in a Decision rendered in said
case, copy of which Decision is hereto
attached marked as Annex "C" and
made an integral part of this complaint;
7. That the said Decision, Annex "C" has
long become final and said Segundino
Estanda has already served the penalty
metted to him by virtue thereof; .
8. That the plaintiff has suffered
damages in the form of expenses paid
for the hospitalization, medicines,
physicians' fees and incidental expense
of his son, Winston Ortaliz, in the
amount of P446.58;
9. That the plaintiff, by reason of the
accident met by his said son, Winston
Ortaliz, as above-stated, through the
fault, negligence and recklessness of
Segundino Estanda for whose acts the
defendant is responsible because he
was at the time employed by him
(defendant) as his driver, has also
suffered, because of the mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and moral shock,
moral damages in the amount of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000), Philippine
Currency;
10. That the boy, Winston Ortaliz, was
strong, robust and happy before the
accident that caused on him physical
Injuries which necessitated his
hospitalization and medical attention,
and was not suffering nor had he ever
suffered from any illness;
11. That demands have been made on
the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P2,446.55 for actual,
consequential and moral damages, but
the defendants refused and still refuses
to pay the same and that by reason of
the refusal of the defendant, the
plaintiff was forced to secure the
services of an attorney paying the latter
the sum of P500.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed
that a decision be rendered;
1. Sentencing the defendant to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P2,446.55 for the
actual, consequential and moral
damages plus an additional sum of
P500 for attorney's fees;
2. To pay the costs of this suit, and
3. Plaintiff be granted any other remedy
that is just and equitable and proper in
law.
On March 18, 1953, the defendant-appellee filed
a motion to dismiss wherein, after admitting the
ownership of the Studebaker Sedan car with
plate No. 35-1138, he alleged the following:
(a) That the case at bar is one for
recovery of damages arising from the
crime of Slight Physical Injuries as
borne out by the allegations of the
complaint itself.
(b) That defendant is being sued in his
capacity as the employer of the
perpetrator of the said crime,
Segundino Estanda, and, as deducible
from the allegations of the complaint,
for defendant's supposed subsidiary
civil liability arising therefrom under
the Revised Penal Code.
(d) That the complaint does not allege
that defendant was nor is engaged in
any business or industry in conjunction
with which he has at any time used the
said car, much less on the occasion of
the alleged accident, nor the defendant
had at any time put out the said car for
hire.
(e) That the obligation or liability of
defendant, if any, for the damages
alleged in the complaint, being an
obligation arising from a criminal
offense, is governed by Article 1161 of
the Civil Code, which, in turn, makes the
penal laws applicable thereto.
(f) That, under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is essential, in
order for an employer to be liable
subsidiarily for felonies committed by
his employee, that the former be
engaged in some kind of industry, and
that the employer had committed the
crime in the discharge of his duties in
connection with such industry.
(g) That, therefore, defendant cannot
be held subsidiarily liable for the crime
committed by his driver as alleged in
plaintiff's complaint.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, defendant
respectfully prays this Hon. Court to
 dismiss the complaint, the same having
failed to state a cause of action, with
costs.
Thereafter the parties submitted their respective
memoranda on whether the complaint failed to
state a cause of action and the Court, after taking
into consideration the arguments advanced by
the parties, dismissed the complaint.
Plaintiff now contends that under paragraph 2 of
Article 2884 of the Civil Code and paragraph 1
and 5 of Article 2180, a sufficient cause of action
has been clearly alleged in the disputed
complaint and therefore the same should not
have been dismissed. Article 2180 in part
provides:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by
article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omission but also for
those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
and Article 2184 in its last paragraph provides:
If the owner was not in the motor
vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180
are applicable.
Having in view the aforequoted provisions of law
and those of Article 2176 to the effect that
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done", there seems
to be good reason to support plaintiff's
contention that the complaint in question states
sufficient cause of action. Defendant-appellee,
however, claims that there is no allegation in the
complaint that "the defendant was engaged in
some kind of industry and that the employee had
committed the crime in the discharge of his
duties in connection with such industry," hence
the defendant cannot be held subsidiarily liable
for the crime committed by his driver and
therefore the complaint failed to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. But
paragraph 5 of Article 2180 refutes this
contention for it clearly provides that
"Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or
industry."
Defendant-appellee also contends that when the
judgment in Criminal Case No. 2607 of the
Municipal Court of Bacolod was rendered against
the driver Segundino Estanda, plaintiff did not
reserve the civil action and thus he lost his right
thereto and consequently the present action
against the defendant-appellee would not lie.
This contention, however, is untenable, for
Article 33 of the Civil Code clearly provides:
ART. 33. In cases of physical injuries, a
civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal entered by
the lower court is hereby revoked and the case
remanded to said court for further proceedings.
Without costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor,
Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Felix,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7664 August 29, 1958
MR. AND MRS. AMADOR C. ONG, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT, defendant-appellee.
Tomas Tria Tirona for appellants.
Government Corporate Counsel Ambrosio Padilla
and Juan C. Jimenez for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiffs spouses seek to recover from
defendant, a government-owned corporation,
the sum of P50,000 as damages, P5,000 as
funeral expenses, and P11,000 as attorneys' fees,
for the death of their son Dominador Ong in one
of the swimming pools operated by defendant.
Defendant admits the fact that plaintiffs' son was
drowned in one of its swimming pools but avers
that his death was caused by his own negligence
or by unavoidable accident. Defendant also avers
that it had exercised due diligence in the
selection of, and supervision over, its employees
and that it had observed the diligence required
by law under the circumstances.
After trial, the lower court found that the action
of plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed the
complaint without pronouncement as to costs.
Plaintiffs took the case on appeal directly to this
Court because the amount involved exceeds the
sum of P50,000.
Defendant owns and operates three recreational
swimming pools at its Balara filters, Diliman,
Quezon City, to which people are invited and for
which a nominal fee of P0.50 for adults and
P0.20 for children is charged. The main pool it
between two small pools of oval shape known as
the "Wading pool" and the "Beginners Pool."
There are diving boards in the big pools and the
depths of the water at different parts are
indicated by appropriate marks on the wall. The
care and supervision of the pools and the users
thereof is entrusted to a recreational section
composed of Simeon Chongco as chief, Armando
Rule, a male nurse, and six lifeguards who had
taken the life-saving course given by the
Philippine Red Cross at the YMCA in Manila. For
the safety of its patrons, defendant has provided
the pools with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line,
saving kit and a resuscitator. There is also a
sanitary inspector who is in charge of a clinic
established for the benefit of the patrons.
Defendant has also on display in a conspicuous
place certain rules and regulations governing the
use of the pools, one of which prohibits the
swimming in the pool alone or without any
attendant. Although defendant does not maintain
a full-time physician in the swimming pool
compound, it has however a nurse and a sanitary
inspector ready to administer injections or
operate the oxygen resuscitator if the need
should arise.
In the afternoon of July 5, 1952, at about 1:00
o'clock, Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high
school student and boy scout, and his brothers
Ruben and Eusebio, went to defendant's
swimming pools. This was not the first time that
the three brothers had gone to said natatorium
for they had already been there four or five times
before. They arrived at the natatorium at about
1:45 p.m. After paying the requisite admission
fee, they immediately went to one of the small
pools where the water was shallow. At about
4:35 p.m., Dominador Ong told his brothers that
he was going to the locker room in an adjoining
building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing
this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool
leaving Dominador in the small pool and so they
did not see the latter when he left the pool to get
a bottle of coke. In that afternoon, there were
two lifeguards on duty in the pool compound,
namely, Manuel Abaño and Mario Villanueva.
The tour of duty of Abaño was from 8:00 to
12:00 in the morning and from 2:00 to 6:00 in
the afternoon, and of Villanueva from 7:30 to
11:30 a.m. and from 12:30 to 4:30 p.m. Between
4:00 to 5:00 that afternoon, there were about
twenty bathers inside the pool area and Manuel
Abaño was going around the pools to observe the
bathers in compliance with the instructions of
his chief.
Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were
in the pool area informed a bather by the name
of Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody was
swimming under water for quite a long time.
Another boy informed lifeguard Manuel Abaño of
the same happening and Abaño immediately
jumped into the big swimming pool and
retrieved the apparently lifeless body of
Dominador Ong from the bottom. The body was
placed at the edge of the pool and Abaño
immediately applied manual artificial
respiration. Soon after, male nurse Armando
Rule came to render assistance, followed by
sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who, after
being called by phone from the clinic by one of
the security guards, boarded a jeep carrying with
him the resuscitator and a medicine kit, and
upon arriving he injected the boy with
camphorated oil. After the injection, Vicente left
on a jeep in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the
University of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Abaño
continued the artificial manual respiration, and
when this failed to revive him, they applied the
resuscitator until the two oxygen tanks were
exhausted. Not long thereafter, Dr. Ayuyao
arrived with another resuscitator, but the same
became of no use because he found the boy
already dead. The doctor ordered that the body
be taken to the clinic.
In the evening of the same day, July 5, 1952, the
incident was investigated by the Police
Department of Quezon City and in the
investigation boys Ruben Ong and Andres Hagad,
Jr. gave written statements. On the following day,
July 6, 1952, an autopsy was performed by Dr.
Enrique V. de los Santos, Chief, Medico Legal
Division, National Bureau of Investigation, who
found in the body of the deceased the following:
an abrasion on the right elbow lateral aspect;
contusion on the right forehead; hematoma on
the scalp, frontal region, right side; a congestion
in the brain with petechial subcortical
hemorrhage, frontal lobe; cyanosis on the face
and on the nails; the lung was soggy with fine
froth in the bronchioles; dark fluid blood in the
heart; congestion in the visceral organs, and
brownish fluid in the stomach. The death was
due to asphyxia by submersion in water.
The issue posed in this appeal is whether the
death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed
to the negligence of defendant and/or its
employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover
damages.
The present action is governed by Article 2176 in
relation to Article 2080 of the new Civil Code.
The first article provides that "whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damages done." Such fault or negligence is called
quasi-delict. Under the second article, this
obligation is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible. In addition, we may
quote the following authorities cited in the
decision of the trial court:
"The rule is well settled that the
owners of resorts to which people
generally are expressly or by
implication invited are legally bound to
exercise ordinary care and prudence in
the management and maintenance of
such resorts, to the end of making them
reasonably safe for visitors" (Larkin vs.
Saltair Beach Co., 30 Utah 86, 83 Pac.
686).
"Although the proprietor of a
natatorium is liable for injuries to a
patron, resulting from lack of ordinary
care in providing for his safety, without
the fault of the patron, he is not,
however, in any sense deemed to be the
insurer of the safety of patrons. And the
death of a patron within his premises
does not cast upon him the burden of
excusing himself from any presumption
of negligence" (Bertalot vs. Kinnare. 72
Ill. App. 52, 22 A. L. R. 635; Flora vs.
 Bimini Water Co., 161 Cal. 495, 119 Pac.
661). Thus in Bertalot vs. Kinnare,
supra, it was held that there could be no
recovery for the death by drowning of a
fifteen-year boy in defendant's
natatorium, where it appeared merely
that he was lastly seen alive in water at
the shallow end of the pool, and some
ten or fifteen minutes later was
discovered unconscious, and perhaps
lifeless, at the bottom of the pool, all
efforts to resuscitate him being without
avail.
Since the present action is one for damages
founded on culpable negligence, the principle to
be observed is that the person claiming damages
has the burden of proving that the damage is
caused by the fault or negligence of the person
from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of
his employees (Walter A. Smith & Co. vs.
Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517).
The question then that arises is: Have appellants
established by sufficient evidence the existence
of fault or negligence on the part of appellee so
as to render it liable for damages for the death of
Dominador Ong?
There is no question that appellants had striven
to prove that appellee failed to take the
necessary precaution to protect the lives of its
patrons by not placing at the swimming pools
efficient and competent employees who may
render help at a moment's notice, and they
ascribed such negligence to appellee because the
lifeguard it had on the occasion minor Ong was
drowning was not available or was attending to
something else with the result that his help came
late. Thus, appellants tried to prove through the
testimony of Andres Hagad, Jr. and Ruben Ong
that when Eusebio Ong and Hagad, Jr. detected
that there was a drowning person in the bottom
of the big swimming pool and shouted to the
lifeguard for help, lifeguard Manuel Abaño did
not immediately respond to the alarm and it was
only upon the third call that he threw away the
magazine he was reading and allowed three or
four minutes to elapse before retrieving the body
from the water. This negligence of Abaño, they
contend, is attributable to appellee.
But the claim of these two witnesses not only
was vehemently denied by lifeguard Abaño, but
is belied by the written statements given by
them in the investigation conducted by the Police
Department of Quezon City approximately three
hours after the happening of the accident. Thus,
these two boys admitted in the investigation that
they narrated in their statements everything
they knew of the accident, but, as found by the
trial, nowhere in said statements do they state
that the lifeguard was chatting with the security
guard at the gate of the swimming pool or was
reading a comic magazine when the alarm was
given for which reason he failed to immediately
respond to the alarm. On the contrary, what
Ruben Ong particularly emphasized therein was
that after the lifeguard heard the shouts for
help, the latter immediately dived into the pool to
retrieve the person under water who turned out
to be his brother. For this reason, the trial court
made this conclusion: "The testimony of Ruben
Ong and Andres Hagad, Jr. as to the alleged
failure of the lifeguard Abaño to immediately
respond to their call may therefore be
disregarded because they are belied by their
written statements. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence to
show that appellee has taken all necessary
precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its
patrons or prevent accident which may cause
their death. Thus, it has been shown that the
swimming pools of appellee are provided with a
ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen
resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The
bottom of the pools is painted with black colors
so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display
in a conspicuous place within the area certain
rules and regulations governing the use of the
pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are
all trained as they had taken a course for that
purpose and were issued certificates of
proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule
prepared by their chief and arranged in such a
way as to have two guards at a time on duty to
look after the safety of the bathers. There is a
male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic
provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are
security guards who are available always in case
of emergency.
The record also shows that when the body of
minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the
pool, the employees of appellee did everything
possible to bring him back to life. Thus, after he
was placed at the edge of the pool, lifeguard
Abaño immediately gave him manual artificial
respiration. Soon thereafter, nurse Armando
Rule arrived, followed by sanitary inspector
Iluminado Vicente who brought with him an
oxygen resuscitator. When they found that the
pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector
immediately injected him with camphorated oil.
When the manual artificial respiration proved
ineffective they applied the oxygen resuscitator
until its contents were exhausted. And while all
these efforts were being made, they sent for Dr.
Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines
who however came late because upon examining
the body he found him to be already dead. All of
the foregoing shows that appellee has done what
is humanly possible under the circumstances to
restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is
unfair to hold it liable for his death.
Sensing that their former theory as regards the
liability of appellee may not be of much help,
appellants now switch to the theory that even if
it be assumed that the deceased is partly to be
blamed for the unfortunate incident, still
appellee may be held liable under the doctrine of
"last clear chance" for the reason that, having the
last opportunity to save the victim, it failed to do
so.
We do not see how this doctrine may apply
considering that the record does not show how
minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The
only thing the record discloses is that minor Ong
informed his elder brothers that he was going to
the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that
from that time on nobody knew what happened
to him until his lifeless body was retrieved. The
doctrine of last clear chance simply means that
the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of defendant where
it appears that the latter, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to claimant
notwithstanding his negligence. Or, "As the
doctrine usually is stated, a person who has the
last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of
his opponent or the negligence of a third person
which is imputed to his opponent, is considered
in law solely responsible for the consequences of
the accident." (38 Am. Jur. pp. 900-902)
It goes without saying that the plaintiff
himself was not free from fault, for he
was guilty of antecedent negligence in
planting himself in the wrong side of
the road. But as we have already stated,
the defendant was also negligent; and
in such case the problem always is to
discover which agent is immediately
and directly responsible. It will be
noted that the negligent acts of the two
parties were not contemporaneous,
since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the
plaintiff by an appreciable interval.
Under these circumstances, the law is
that a person who has the last clear
chance to avoid the impending harm
and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other party.
(Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil., 809)
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into
the big swimming pool and it being apparent
that he went there without any companion in
violation of one of the regulations of appellee as
regards the use of the pools, and it appearing
that lifeguard Aba_¤_o responded to the call for
help as soon as his attention was called to it and
immediately after retrieving the body all efforts
at the disposal of appellee had been put into play
in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that
there is no room for the application of the
doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute
liability to appellee..
The last clear chance doctrine can
never apply where the party charged is
required to act instantaneously, and if
the injury cannot be avoided by the
application of all means at hand after
the peril is or should have been
discovered; at least in cases in which
 any previous negligence of the party
charged cannot be said to have
contributed to the injury. O'Mally vs.
Eagan, 77 ALR 582, 43 Wyo. 233, 350,
2, P2d 1063. (A.L.R. Digest, Vol. 8, pp.
955-956)

Before closing, we wish to quote the following

observation of the trial court, which we find
supported by the evidence: "There is (also) a
strong suggestion coming from the expert
evidence presented by both parties that
Dominador Ong might have dived where the
water was only 5.5 feet deep, and in so doing he
might have hit or bumped his forehead against
the bottom of the pool, as a consequence of
which he was stunned, and which to his
drowning. As a boy scout he must have received
instructions in swimming. He knew, or have
known that it was dangerous for him to dive in
that part of the pool."

Wherefore, the decision appealed from being in

accordance with law and the evidence, we
hereby affirm the same, without pronouncement
as to costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes,

A., Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix,
JJ.,concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22533 February 9, 1967
PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L.
RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and
ANDRES BONIFACIO, respondents.
Placido B. Ramos and Renato L. Ramos for
petitioners.
Trinidad & Borromeo for respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
On June 30, 1958 Placido and Augusto Ramos
sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I.1 and
Andres Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance of
Manila as a consequence of a collision, on May
10, 1958, involving the car of Placido Ramos and
a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPESI-COLA. Said
car was at the time of the collision driven by
Augusto Ramos, son and co-plaintiff of Placido.
PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven by
its driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio.
After trial the Court of First Instance rendered
judgment on April 15, 1961, finding Bonifacio
negligent and declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not
sufficiently proved its having exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio,
solidarily, were ordered to pay the plaintiffs
P2,638.50 actual damages; P2,000.00 moral
damages; P2,000.00 as exemplary damages; and,
P1,000.00 attorney's fees, with costs.
Not satisfied with this decision, the defendants
appellee to the Court of Appeals.
Said Court, on January 15, 1964, affirmed the
trial court's judgment insofar as it found
defendant Bonifacio negligent, but modified it by
absolving defendant PEPSI-COLA from liability,
finding that, contrary to the plaintiffs'
contention, PEPSI-COLA sufficiently proved due
diligence in the selection of its driver Bonifacio.
Plaintiffs thereupon appealed to Us through this
petition for review of the Court of Appeals'
decision. And appellants would argue before this
Court that defendant PEPSI-COLA's evidence
failed to show that it had exercised due diligence
in the selection of its driver in question.
Said point, as stated, was resolved by the Court
of Appeals in PEPSI-COLA's favor, thus:
The uncontradicted testimony of Juan
T. Anasco, personnel manager of
defendant company, was to the effect
that defendant driver was first hired as
a member of the bottle crop in the
production department; that when he
was hired as a driver, 'we had size [sic]
him by looking into his background,
asking him to submit clearances,
previous experience, physical
examination and later on, he was sent
to the pool house to take the usual
driver's examination, consisting of:
First, theoretical examination and
second, the practical driving
examination, all of which he had
undergone, and that the defendant
company was a member of the Safety
Council. In view hereof, we are of the
sense that defendant company had
exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the choice or selection of
defendant driver'. In the case ofCampo
vs. Camarote No. L-9147 (1956), 53 O.G.
2794, cited in appellee's brief, our
Supreme Court had occasion to put it
down as a rule that "In order that the
defendant may be considered as having
exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family, he should not have
been satisfied with the mere possession
of a professional driver's license; he
should have carefully examined the
applicant for employment as to his
qualifications, his experiences and
record of service." Defendant Company
has taken all these steps.2
Appellants herein seek to assail the foregoing
portion of the decision under review by taking
issue with the testimony of Anasco upon which
the findings of due diligence aforestated are
rested. Thus, it is now contended that Añasco
being PEPSI-COLA's employee, is a biased and
interested witness; and that his testimony is not
believable.
It is rather clear, therefore, that appellants would
raise herein an issue of fact and credibility,
something as to which this Court has
consistently respected the findings of the Court
of Appeals, with some few exceptions, which do
not obtain herein.3
Stated differently, Añascos credibility is not for
this Court now to re-examine. And said witness
having been found credible by the Court of
Appeals, his testimony, as accepted by said
Court, cannot at this stage be assailed. As We
said in Co Tao vs. Court of Appeals, L-9194, April
25, 1957, assignments of error involving the
credibility of witnesses and which in effect
dispute the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals, cannot be reviewed in these
proceedings. For a question to be one of law it
must involve no examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants
or any of them. 4 And the distinction is well-
known: There is a question of law in a given case
when the doubt or difference arises as to what
the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a
question of fact when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts.5
From all this it follows that for the purposes of
this appeal, it must be taken as established that,
as testified to by Añasco, PEPSI-COLA did in fact
carefully examine the driver-applicant Bonifacio
as to his qualifications, experiences and record of
service, taking all steps mentioned by the Court
of Appeals in its decision already
quoted.1äwphï1.ñët
Such being the case, there can be no doubt that
PEPSI-COLA exercised the required due diligence
in the selection of its driver. As ruled by this
Court in Campo vs. Camarote 53 O.G. 2794, 2797:
"In order that the defendant may be considered
as having exercised all diligence of a good father
of a family, he should not be satisfied with the
mere possession of a professional driver's
license; he should have carefully examined the
applicant for employment as to his qualifications,
his experience and record of service."
It should perhaps be stated that in the instant
case no question is raised as to due diligence in
the supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its driver.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides inter alia:
... The owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion
of their functions.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this
Article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
And construing a similar provision of
the old Civil Code, this Court said
in Bahia vs. Litonjua, 30 Phil. 624, 627:
From this article two things are
apparent: (1) That when an injury is
caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after the selection, or both;
and (2) that the presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure, and
consequently may be rebutted. It
 follows necessarily that if the employer
shows to the satisfaction of the court
that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is
relieved from liability.
As pointed out, what appellants here contend as
not duly proved by PEPSI-COLA is only due
diligence in the selection of its driver. And,
parenthetically, it is not surprising that
appellants thus confine their arguments to this
aspect of due diligence, since the record — as
even appellants' brief (pp. 13-17) reflects in
quoting in part the testimony of PEPSI-COLA's
witness — would show sufficient evidence to
establish due diligence in the supervision by
PEPSI-COLA of its drivers, including Bonifacio.
Appellants' other assignment of errors are
likewise outside the purview of this Court's
reviewing power. Thus, the question of whether
PEPSI- COLA violated the Revised Motor Vehicle
Law and rules and regulations related thereto,
not having been raised and argued in the Court
of Appeals, cannot be ventilated herein for the
first time. 6 And the matter of whether or not
PEPSI-COLA did acts to ratify the negligent act of
its driver is a factual issue not proper herein.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
May 16, 1967
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Petitioners seek a reconsideration1 of Our
decision2 in the instant case affirming in toto the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
absolving respondent PEPSI-COLA from liability.
In Our decision, We refrained from passing on
the merits of the question whether PEPSI-COLA,
in operating the tractor-truck and trailer,
violated the Rev. Motor Vehicle Law3 and the
rules and regulations related thereto, for the
procedural reason that it did not appear to have
been raised before the Court of Appeals.
It now appears, however, that said question was
raised in a motion to reconsider filed with the
Court of Appeals which resolved the same
against petitioners. Due consideration of the
matter on its merits, convinces Us that the
decision of the Court of Appeals should still be
affirmed in toto.
Petitioners impute to PEPSI-COLA the violation
of subpars. 1 and 4(d), par. (a), Sec. 27 of M.V.O.
Administrative Order No. 1, dated Sept. 1, 1951,
in that at the time of the collision, the trailer-
truck, which had a total weight of 30,000 kgms.,
was (a) being driven at a speed of about 30 k.p.h.
or beyond the 15 k.p.h. limit set and (b) was not
equipped with a rear-vision mirror nor provided
with a helper for the driver.
The cited provisions read:
SECTION 27. Registration, operation,
and inspection of truck-trailer
combinations, semi-trailers, and
tractors.
(a) No trailer or semi-trailer having a
gross weight of more than 2,000
kilograms and is not equipped with
effective brakes on at least two
opposite wheels of the rear axle and are
so controlled that the brakes will act in
unison with or preceding the effective
action of the brakes of the tractor-truck
shall be registered for operation on
public highways of the Philippines;
provided, that the trialers without
brakes may be registered from year to
year for operation under the following
conditions:
1. No such trailer shall be operated at
any time at a speed in excess of 15
kilometers per hour in conjunction
with a tractor-truck, the actual gross
weight of which is less than twice the
weight of the trailer.
xxx xxx xxx
4(d) Tractor-trucks shall be either
equipped with rear-vision mirror to
enable the driver to see vehicles
approaching mirror the rear or shall
carry a helper who shall be so stationed
on the truck or trailer that he will
constantly have a view of the rear. He
shall be provided with means of
effectively signalling to the driver to
give way to overtaking vehicles.
4(e) No truck and trailer combination
shall be operated at a speed greater
than 30 kilometers per hour.
It will be noted that the 15 k.p.h. limit
in subpar. 1, supra, refers only to
trailers or semi-trailers having a gross
weight of more than 2,000 kgms., AND
which are "not equipped with effective
brakes on at least two opposite wheels,
of the rear axle and are so controlled
that the brakes will act in unison with
or preceding the effective action of the
brakes of the tractor-truck..." This is the
condition set in the proviso in par.
(a),supra, wherein "trailers without
[such] brakes may be registered from
year to year for operation ..." i.e., they
should not "be operated at any time at a
speed in excess of 15 kilometers per
hour in conjunction with a tractor-
truck ...". But there was no finding by
the Court of Appeals that the truck-
trailer here did not have such brakes. In
the absence of such fact, it is subpar.
4(e), supra, that will apply. And
petitioners admit that the truck-trailer
was being driven at about 30 k.p.h.
It is a fact that driver Bonifacio was not
accompanied by a helper on the night of the
collision since he was found to be driving alone.
However, there is no finding that the tractor-
truck did not have a rear-vision mirror. To be
sure, the records disclose that Pat. Rodolfo
Pahate, the traffic policeman who went to the
collision scene, testified that he saw the tractor-
truck there but he does not remember if it had
any rear vision mirror.4 This cannot prove lack of
rear-vision mirror. And the cited provision —
subpar. 4(d) — is complied if either of the two
alternatives, i.e., having a rear-vision mirror or a
helper, is present. Stated otherwise, said
provision is violated only where there is a
positive finding that the tractor-truck did not
have both rear-vision mirror and a helper for the
driver.
Petitioners also charge PEPSI-COLA with having
violated par. (b) of Sec. 8-A of the Rev. Motor
Vehicle Law, providing that:
No motor vehicle operating as a single
unit shall exceed the following
dimensions:
Overall width ................ 2.5 meters.
xxx xxx xxx
since there was an express finding that
the truck-trailer was 3 meters wide.
However, Sec. 9 (d) of the same law, as
amended, providing that —
SEC. 9. Special permits, fees for.-The
chief of the Motor Vehicles Office with
the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications shall
establish regulations and a tariff of
additional fees under which special
permits may be issued in the discretion
of the Chief of the Motor Vehicles Office
or his deputies, for each of the following
special cases, and without such special
permit, no such motor vehicles shall be
operated on the public highways.
 xxx xxx xxx has observed the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. The Bahia case merely
(d) For registration or use of a motor clarified what that diligence consists of, namely,
vehicle exceeding the limit of permissible diligence in the selection and supervision of the
dimensions specified in subsections (b) driver-employee.
and (c) of section eight-A
hereof. (Emphasis supplied) Neither could We apply the respondent
superior principle. Under Article 2180 of the Civil
xxx xxx xxx Code, the basis of an employer's liability is his
own negligence, not that of his employees. The
former is made responsible for failing to
expressly allows the registration, or use properly and diligently select and supervise his
of motor vehicles exceeding the limits erring employees. We do not — and have never
of permissible dimensions specified in — followed the respondent superior rule.8 So,
subsec. (b) of Sec. 8-A. So, to conclude the American rulings cited by petitioners, based
that there was a violation of law — as they are on said doctrine, are not
which undisputably constitutes authoritative here.
negligence, at the very least — it is not
enough that the width of the tractor-
truck exceed the limit in Sec. 8-A; in In view of the foregoing, the motion for
addition, it must also appear that there reconsideration is hereby denied.
was no special permit granted under
Sec. 9. Unfortunately for petitioners, Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala,
that vital factual link is missing. There Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
was no proof much less any finding to concur.
that effect. And it was incumbent upon
petitioners-appellants to have proved
lack of such permit since the tractor-
truck and the trailer were
registered.5 Compliance with law and
regularity in the performance of official
duty — in this case, the issuance of
proper registration papers — are
presumed6and prevail over mere
surmises. Having charged a violation of
law, the onus of substantiating the
same fell upon petitioners-appellants.
Hence, the conclusion that there was a
violation of the law lacks factual basis.

Petitioners would also have

Us abandon the Bahia ruling.7 In its stead, We are
urged to apply the Anglo-American doctrine
of respondent superior. We cannot however,
abandon the Bahia ruling without going against
the explicit mandate of the law. A motor vehicle
owner is not an absolute insurer against all
damages caused by its driver. Article 2180 of our
Civil Code is very explicit that the owner's
responsibility shall cease once it proves that it
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992
FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
HON. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV,
Roxas City and POTENCIANO KAPUNAN,
SR., respondents.
Bedona & Bedona Law Office for petitioner.
Rhodora G. Kapunan for private respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The private respondents, heirs of the late
Potenciano Kapunan, seek reconsideration of the
decision rendered by this Court on October 16,
1990 (Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of
Appeals, 190 SCRA 477) reviewing the appellate
court's conclusion that there exists an employer-
employee relationship between the petitioner
and its co-defendant Funtecha. The Court ruled
that the petitioner is not liable for the injuries
caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the
latter was not an authorized driver for whose
acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily
answerable, and that Funtecha was merely a
working scholar who, under Section 14, Rule X,
Book III of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code is not considered
an employee of the petitioner.
The private respondents assert that the
circumstances obtaining in the present case call
for the application of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code since Funtecha is no doubt an employee of
the petitioner. The private respondents maintain
that under Article 2180 an injured party shall
have recourse against the servant as well as the
petitioner for whom, at the time of the incident,
the servant was performing an act in furtherance
of the interest and for the benefit of the
petitioner. Funtecha allegedly did not steal the
school jeep nor use it for a joy ride without the
knowledge of the school authorities.
After a re-examination of the laws relevant to the
facts found by the trial court and the appellate
court, the Court reconsiders its decision. We
reinstate the Court of Appeals' decision penned
by the late Justice Desiderio Jurado and
concurred in by Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and
Serafin E. Camilon. Applying Civil Code
provisions, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court decision which ordered the payment of the
P20,000.00 liability in the Zenith Insurance
Corporation policy, P10,000.00 moral damages,
P4,000.00 litigation and actual expenses, and
P3,000.00 attorney's fees.
It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working
student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar
of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the
school, an employee even if he was assigned to
clean the school premises for only two (2) hours
in the morning of each school day.
Having a student driver's license, Funtecha
requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was
allowed, to take over the vehicle while the latter
was on his way home one late afternoon. It is
significant to note that the place where Allan
lives is also the house of his father, the school
president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the
house where Funtecha was allowed free board
while he was a student of Filamer Christian
Institute.
Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha
only after driving down a road, negotiating a
sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road
was clear. (TSN, April 4, 1983, pp. 78-79)
According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving
truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that
they had to swerve to the right to avoid a
collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if
something had bumped against the vehicle, but
they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy
jeep swerved towards the pedestrian,
Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane
in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit
him. Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his
advise to swerve to the right. (Ibid., p. 79) At the
time of the incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the
jeep had only one functioning headlight.
Allan testified that he was the driver and at the
same time a security guard of the petitioner-
school. He further said that there was no specific
time for him to be off-duty and that after driving
the students home at 5:00 in the afternoon, he
still had to go back to school and then drive
home using the same vehicle.
Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the
school president where both Allan and Funtecha
reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of
the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that
he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to
fetch students in the morning of the next school
day.
It is indubitable under the circumstances that the
school president had knowledge that the jeep
was routinely driven home for the said purpose.
Moreover, it is not improbable that the school
president also had knowledge of Funtecha's
possession of a student driver's license and his
desire to undergo driving lessons during the
time that he was not in his classrooms.
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle
home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha
definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha
was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment
or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the
service for which the jeep was intended by the
petitioner school. (See L. Battistoni v. Thomas,
Can SC 144, 1 D.L.R. 577, 80 ALR 722 [1932]; See
also Association of Baptists for World
Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc.
124 SCRA 618 [1983]). Therefore, the Court is
constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha
in taking over the steering wheel was one done
for and in behalf of his employer for which act
the petitioner-school cannot deny any
responsibility by arguing that it was done
beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The
clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks"
for purposes of raising the presumption of
liability of an employer, includes any act done by
an employee, in furtherance of the interests of
the employer or for the account of the employer
at the time of the infliction of the injury or
damage. (Manuel Casada, 190 Va 906, 59 SE 2d
47 [1950]) Even if somehow, the employee
driving the vehicle derived some benefit from
the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of
the employer is determined by answering the
question of whether or not the servant was at
the time of the accident performing any act in
furtherance of his master's business. (Kohlman v.
Hyland, 210 NW 643, 50 ALR 1437 [1926];
Jameson v. Gavett, 71 P 2d 937 [1937])
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules
implementing the Labor Code, on which the
petitioner anchors its defense, was promulgated
by the Secretary of Labor and Employment only
for the purpose of administering and enforcing
the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of
employment. Particularly, Rule X of Book III
provides guidelines on the manner by which the
powers of the Labor Secretary shall be exercised;
on what records should be kept; maintained and
preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of
working scholars from, and inclusion of resident
physicians in the employment coverage as far as
compliance with the substantive labor
provisions on working conditions, rest periods,
and wages, is concerned.
In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the
enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The
Court, thus, makes the distinction and so holds
that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is
not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages
instituted by an injured person during a
vehicular accident against a working student of a
school and against the school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor
dispute on conditions of employment between
an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It
invokes a claim brought by one for damages for
injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a
person, against both doer-employee and his
employer. Hence, the reliance on the
implementing rule on labor to disregard the
primary liability of an employer under Article
2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An
implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an
employer as a shield to avoid liability under the
substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
There is evidence to show that there exists in the
present case an extra-contractual obligation
arising from the negligence or reckless
imprudence of a person "whose acts or
omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to
other(s) who are in a position to exercise an
absolute or limited control over (him)." (Bahia v.
Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624 [1915])
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer.
He need not have an official appointment for a
driver's position in order that the petitioner may
be held responsible for his grossly negligent act,
it being sufficient that the act of driving at the
time of the incident was for the benefit of the
petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not
the school driver or was not acting within the
scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the
petitioner of the burden of rebutting the
presumption juris tantum that there was
negligence on its part either in the selection of a
servant or employee, or in the supervision over
him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its
having exercised the required diligence of a good
father of a family over its employees Funtecha
and Allan.
The Court reiterates that supervision includes
the formulation of suitable rules and regulations
for the guidance of its employees and the
issuance of proper instructions intended for the
protection of the public and persons with whom
the employer has relations through his
employees. (Bahia v. Litonjua and
Leynes, supra, at p. 628; Phoenix Construction, v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353
[1987])
An employer is expected to impose upon its even for a short while. For the purpose of
employees the necessary discipline called for in recovering damages under the prevailing
the performance of any act indispensable to the circumstances, it is enough that the plaintiff and
business and beneficial to their employer. the private respondent heirs were able to
establish the existence of employer-employee
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown relationship between Funtecha and petitioner
that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as Filamer and the fact that Funtecha was engaged
would prohibit any one of its employees from in an act not for an independent purpose of his
taking control over its vehicles if one is not the own but in furtherance of the business of his
official driver or prohibiting the driver and son employer. A position of responsibility on the part
of the Filamer president from authorizing of the petitioner has thus been satisfactorily
another employee to drive the school vehicle. demonstrated.
Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove
that it had imposed sanctions or warned its WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of
employees against the use of its vehicles by the decision dated October 16, 1990 is hereby
persons other than the driver. GRANTED. The decision of the respondent
appellate court affirming the trial court decision
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay is REINSTATED.
damages for injury arising from the unskilled
manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. SO ORDERED.
(Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768, 772
[1918]). In the absence of evidence that the Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ.,
petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good concur.
father of a family in the supervision of its
employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious
liability for acts or omissions of its employees.
(Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263 [1976]; Poblete v.
Fabros, 93 SCRA 200 [1979]; Kapalaran Bus
Liner v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]; Franco
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 331
[1989]; Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa,
179 SCRA 384 [1989]) The liability of the
employer is, under Article 2180, primary and
solidary. However, the employer shall have
recourse against the negligent employee for
whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the
plaintiff.
It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the
school jeep, Allan Masa, was not made a party
defendant in the civil case for damages. This is
quite understandable considering that as far as
the injured pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano
Kapunan, was concerned, it was Funtecha who
was the one driving the vehicle and presumably
was one authorized by the school to drive. The
plaintiff and his heirs should not now be left to
suffer without simultaneous recourse against the
petitioner for the consequent injury caused by a
janitor doing a driving chore for the petitioner
FIRST DIVISION nature. He, however, found himself locked inside
and unable to get out. Timothy started to panic
CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. G.R. No. 150920 and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled
and SPOUSES EDGARDO L. LIMON several times for help. When no help arrived he
and SYLVIA S. LIMON, Present: decided to open the window to call for help. In
Petitioners, the process of opening the window, Timothy
went right throughD and fell down three stories.
Timothy A was hospitalized and given medical
treatmentVI for serious multiple physical injuries.
D and kicked the door of said
An actionE, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
was filedJR by respondents against the CLC, the
members ., of its Board of Directors, namely
SpousesC.Edgardo and Sylvia Limon, Alfonso Cruz,
Carmelo J. Narciso and Luningning Salvador, and
the Administrative
(C Officer of Marymount School,
Ricardoh Pilao. In its defense,[2] CLC maintained
that there
ai was nothing defective about the
lockingrmechanism of the door and that the fall
of Timothy
m was not due to its fault or negligence.
CLC further
a maintained that it had exercised the
due care n) and diligence of a good father of a
family , to ensure the safety, well-being and
- versus - QUISUMBING, convenience of its students.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, After trial, the court a quo found in favor of
CARPIO, and respondents and ordered petitioners CLC and
AZCUNA, JJ. Spouses Limon to pay respondents, jointly and
TIMOTHY TAGARIO, assisted by severally,P200,253.12 as actual and
his parents BASILIO TAGORIO and Promulgated: compensatory damages, P200,000 as moral
HERMINIA TAGORIO, damages, P50,000 as exemplary
Respondents. November damages,25, P100,000 as attorneys fees and the
2005 costs of the suit. The trial court disregarded the
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
corporate fiction of CLC and held the Spouses
------x Limo4444wn personally liable because they
were the ones who actually managed the affairs
DECISION of the CLC.
AZCUNA, J.: Petitioners CLC and the Spouses Limon appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals.
This petition started with a tort case filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati by Timothy On September 28, 2001, the Court of
Tagorio and his parents, Basilio R. Tagorio and Appeals[3] affirmed the decision in toto.
Herminia Tagorio, docketed as Civil Case No. 91- Petitioners elevated the case to this Court under
1389. The complaint[1] alleged that during the Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, after their motion
school year 1990-1991, Timothy was a Grade IV for reconsideration was denied by Resolution of
student at Marymount School, an academic November 23, 2001.[4]
institution operated and maintained by Child
Learning Center, Inc. (CLC). In the afternoon of Petitioners question several factual findings of
March 5, 1991, between 1 and 2 p.m., Timothy the trial court, which were affirmed by the Court
entered the boys comfort room at the third floor of Appeals, namely:[5]
of the Marymount building to answer the call of
1. That
respondent was allegedly
trapped inside the boys
comfort room located at the
third floor of the school
building on March 5, 1991;
2. That
respondent allegedly banged
comfort room several times to
attract attention and that he
allegedly yelled thereat for
help which never came;
3. That
respondent was allegedly
forced to open the window of
said comfort room to seek
help;
4. That the
lock set installed at the boys
comfort room located in the
third floor of the school
building on March 5, 1991
was allegedly defective and
that the same lock set was
involved in previous incidents
of alleged malfunctioning;
5. That
petitioner Child Learning
Center, Inc. allegedly failed to
install iron grills in the
window of the boys comfort
room at the third floor of the
school building;
6. That
petitioner Child Learning
Center, Inc. allegedly failed to
exercise the due care of a
good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of
its employees;
7. That the
proximate cause of
respondents accident was
allegedly not due to his own
contributory negligence;
8. That
there was an alleged basis to
apply the legal principle of
piercing the veil of corporate
entity in resolving the issue of
alleged liability of petitioners
Edgardo L. Limon and Sylvia
S. Limon;
9. That
there was alleged basis for
petitioners to pay respondent
actual, moral and exemplary
damages, plus attorneys fees;
10. That there
was an alleged basis in not
awarding petitioners prayer
for moral and exemplary
damages, including attorneys
fees.
Generally, factual findings of the trial
court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final
and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (8) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and (9) when the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the absence of evidence and are contradicted by
the evidence on record.[6]
 On the basis of the records of this case,
this Court finds no justification to reverse the
factual findings and consider this case as an
exception to the general rule.
In every tort case filed under Article
2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other
person for whose act he must respond; and (3)
the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence and the damages incurred.[7]
Fault, in general, signifies a voluntary
act or omission which causes damage to the right
of another giving rise to an obligation on the part
of the actor to repair such damage. Negligence is
the failure to observe for the protection of the
interest of another person that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand. Fault requires the
execution of a positive act which causes damage
to another while negligence consists of the
omission to do acts which result in damage to
another.[8]
In this tort case, respondents contend
that CLC failed to provide precautionary
measures to avoid harm and injury to its
students in two instances: (1) failure to fix a
defective door knob despite having been notified
of the problem; and (2) failure to install safety
grills on the window where Timothy fell from.
The trial court found that the lock was
defective on March 5, 1991:[9]
The door knob was
defective. After the incident of
March 5, 1991, said door knob
was taken off the door of the
toilet where Timothy was in.
The architect who testified
during the trial declared that
although there were standard
specifications for door knobs
for comfort room[s], and he
designed them according to
that requirement, he did not
investigate whether the door
knob specified in his plans
during the construction [was]
actually put in place. This is so
because he did not verify
whether the door knob he
specified w[as] actually put in
place at the particular comfort
room where Timothy was
barred from getting outside.
(TSN, pp. 19-20, December 8,
1994).
The Court of Appeals held that there
was no reason to disturb the factual
assessment:[10]
After having perused
the records, We fail to see any
indication of whim or
arbitrariness on the part of
the trial magistrate in his
assessment of the facts of the
case. That said, We deem it
not to be within Our business
to recast the factual
conclusions reached by the
court below.
Petitioners would make much of the
point that no direct evidence was presented to
prove that the door knob was indeed defective
on the date in question.
The fact, however, that Timothy fell out
through the window shows that the door could
not be opened from the inside. That sufficiently
points to the fact that something was wrong with
the door, if not the door knob, under the
principle of res ipsa loquitor. The doctrine of res
ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was
of such character as to warrant an inference that
it would not have happened except for the
defendants negligence; (2) the accident must
have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged
with the negligence complained of; and (3) the
accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the person injured.[11] Petitioners are clearly
answerable for failure to see to it that the doors
of their school toilets are at all times in working
condition. The fact that a student had to go
through the window, instead of the door, shows
that something was wrong with the door.
As to the absence of grills on the
window, petitioners contend that there was no
such requirement under the Building Code.
Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as
petitioners themselves point out, was
approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that
it was within reach of a student who finds the
regular exit, the door, not functioning.
Petitioners, with the due diligence of a good
father of the family, should have anticipated that
a student, locked in the toilet by a non-working
door, would attempt to use the window to call
for help or even to get out. Considering all the
circumstances, therefore, there is sufficient basis
to sustain a finding of liability on petitioners
part.
Petitioners argument that CLC
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its
employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees is
applicable where the employer is being held
responsible for the acts or omissions of others
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.[12] In this
case, CLCs liability is under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, premised on the fact of its own
negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are
properly maintained.
Our pronouncement that Timothy
climbed out of the window because he could not
get out using the door, negates petitioners other
contention that the proximate cause of the
accident was Timothys own negligence. The
injuries he sustained from the fall were the
product of a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any intervening cause, that
originated from CLCs own negligence.
We, however, agree with petitioners
that there was no basis to pierce CLCs separate
corporate personality. To disregard the
corporate existence, the plaintiff must prove: (1)
Control by the individual owners, not mere
majority or complete stock ownership, resulting
in complete domination not only of finances but
of policy and business practice in respect to a
transaction so that the corporate entity as to this
transaction had at the time no separate mind,
will or existence of its own; (2) such control
must have been used by the defendant to commit
fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a
statutory or other positive legal duty, or a
dishonest and unjust act in contravention of the
plaintiffs legal right; and (3) the control and
breach of duty must proximately cause the injury
or unjust loss complained of. The absence of
these elements prevents piercing the corporate
veil.[13] The evidence on record fails to show that
these elements are present, especially given the
fact that plaintiffs complaint had pleaded that
CLC is a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines.
On 9th and 10th points raised
concerning the award of damages, the resolution
would rest on factual determinations by the trial
court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and no
legal issue warrants our intervention.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly granted and
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50961 dated
September 28, 2001 and November 23, 2001,
respectively, are MODIFIED in that petitioners
Spouses Edgardo and Sylvia Limon are absolved
from personal liability. The Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED in all other respects.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION respondents damages for the injuries sustained requires continuous medical and rehabilitation (P2,973,000.00)
by respondent Stephen Huang, son of treatment. actual
respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang. damages;

Respondents fault petitioner Del 2. As

MERCURY DRUGG.R. No. 172122 First, the facts: Rosario for committing gross negligence and compensatory
CORPORATION and reckless imprudence while driving, and damages:
ROLANDO Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation petitioner Mercury Drug for failing to exercise
a. Twenty
J. DEL ROSARIO, (Mercury Drug) is the registered owner of a six- the diligence of a good father of a family in the Three
Present: wheeler 1990 Mitsubishi Truck with plate selection and supervision of its driver.
Million
Petitioners, number PRE 641 (truck). It has in its employ Four
PUNO, C.J., petitioner Rolando J. del Rosario as Hundred
Chairperson, In contrast, petitioners allege that the
driver. Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Sixty One
immediate and proximate cause of the accident
Huang are the parents of respondent Stephen Thousand,
SANDOVAL- was respondent Stephen Huangs
Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI and Sixty-
GUTIERREZ, recklessness. According to petitioner Del
Sedan with plate number PTT 775 (car). Two Pesos
Rosario, he was driving on the left innermost
lane when the car bumped the trucks front right (P23,461,0
CORONA, These two vehicles figured in a road
tire. The truck then swerved to the left, smashed 62.00) for
- versus - accident on December 20, 1996 at around 10:30
into an electric post, crossed the center island, life care
AZCUNA, and p.m. within the municipality of Taguig, Metro
and stopped on the other side of the cost of
Manila. Respondent Stephen Huang was driving Stephen;
GARCIA, JJ. highway. The car likewise crossed over the
the car, weighing 1,450 kg., while petitioner Del
center island and landed on the same portion of b. Ten Million
Rosario was driving the truck, weighing 14,058
C-5. Further, petitioner Mercury Drug claims that Pesos
kg. Both were traversing the C-5 Highway, north
it exercised due diligence of a good father of a (P10,000,0
bound, coming from the general direction of family in the selection and supervision of all its
SPOUSES RICHARDPromulgated: 00.00) as
Alabang going to Pasig City. The car was on the
HUANG and CARMEN employees. and for lost
left innermost lane while the truck was on the
HUANG, and STEPHEN or
next lane to its right, when the truck suddenly
HUANG, impaired
June 22, 2007 swerved to its left and slammed into the front The trial court, in its Decision dated
right side of the car. The collision hurled the car September 29, 2004, found petitioners Mercury earning
Respondents. capacity of
over the island where it hit a lamppost, spun Drug and Del Rosario jointly and severally liable
around and landed on the opposite lane. The to pay respondents actual, compensatory, moral Stephen;
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - truck also hit a lamppost, ran over the car and and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and 3. Four Million
-----------------------x zigzagged towards, and finally stopped in front litigation expenses. The dispositive portion Pesos
of Buellah Land Church. reads: (P4,000,000.00)
WHEREFORE, as moral
DECISION At the time of the accident, petitioner judgment is rendered finding damages;
Del Rosario only had a Traffic Violation Receipt defendants Mercury Drug 4. Two Million
(TVR). His drivers license had been confiscated Corporation, Inc. and Rolando Pesos
PUNO, C.J.: because he had been previously apprehended for del Rosario, jointly and (P2,000,000.00)
reckless driving. severally liable to pay as exemplary
plaintiffs Spouses Richard Y. damages; and
On appeal are the Decision[1] and Huang and Carmen G. Huang,
The car, valued at P300,000.00, was a and Stephen Huang the 5. One Million
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. total wreck. Respondent Stephen Huang Pesos
CV No. 83981, dated February 16, 2006 and following amounts:
sustained massive injuries to his spinal cord, (P1,000,000.00)
March 30, 2006, respectively which affirmed head, face, and lung. Despite a series of 1. Two Million as attorneys
with modification the Decision[3] of the Regional operations, respondent Stephen Huang is Nine Hundred fees and
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, dated paralyzed for life from his chest down and Seventy Three litigation
September 29, 2004. The trial court found Thousand Pesos expense.[4]
petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay
 On February 16, 2006, the Court of EVIDENCES COMPLETELY 4. The heavier vehicle was
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court PRESENTED BY THE DISREGARDING THE driving at the innermost
but reduced the award of moral damages PETITIONERS HEREIN EVIDENCES left lane, while the lighter
to P1,000,000.00. The appellate court also AND PROCEEDED TO PRESENTED BY THE vehicle was at its right.
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by RENDER ITS DECISION PETITIONERS HEREIN
petitioners. BASED ON WHICH Dr. Daza testified that given the foregoing
PRESUMPTIONS AND CONTRADICTED SUCH assumptions, if the lighter vehicle hits the right
PERSONAL OPINIONS TESTIMONIES NOT front portion of the heavier vehicle, the general
Hence, this appeal. OF PEOPLE WHO ARE ONLY THROUGH ORAL direction of the light vehicle after the impact
NOT WITNESSES TO TESTIMONIES BUT AS would be to the right side of the heavy vehicle,
Petitioners cite the following grounds THE ACCIDENT; WELL AS not the other way around. The truck, he opined,
for their appeal: DOCUMENTARY is more difficult to move as it is heavier. It is the
D. IN AWARDING
EVIDENCES.[5] car, the lighter vehicle, which would move to the
1. That the subject Decision DAMAGES IN FAVOR
right of, and away from the truck. Thus, there is
which dismissed the appeal of OF RESPONDENTS
very little chance that the car will move towards
petitioners herein but HEREIN; We affirm the findings of the trial court
the opposite side, i.e., to the left of the truck.
AFFIRMED WITH and the appellate court that petitioner Del
E. IN FINDING THAT
MODIFICATION the decision Rosario was negligent. The evidence does not
MERCURY DRUG
of the Regional Trial Court, support petitioners claim that at the time of the Dr. Daza also gave a further study on
CORPORATION
Branch 64, Makati City, in that accident, the truck was at the left inner lane and the basis of the same assumptions except that
FAILED TO EXERCISE
the award of moral damages that it was respondent Stephen Huangs car, at its the car is on the left side of the truck, in
THE DILIGENCE
was reduced toP1,000,000.00 right, which bumped the right front side of the accordance with the testimony of respondent
REQUIRED IN
and its Resolution dated SUPERVISING ITS truck. Firstly, petitioner Del Rosario could not Stephen Huang. Dr. Daza concluded that the
March 30, 2006, which precisely tell which part of the truck was hit by general direction of the car after impact would
EMPLOYEES DESPITE
dismissed outright the Motion the car,[6] despite the fact that the truck was be to the left of the truck. In this situation, the
OVERWHELMING
for Reconsideration must be snub-nosed and a lot higher than the middle island against which the car was pinned
EVIDENCE
set aside because the car. Petitioner Del Rosario could not also explain would slow down the car, and enable the truck to
PRESENTED BY
Honorable Court of Appeals why the car landed on the opposite lane of C-5 catch up and hit the car again, before running
PETITIONER
committed reversible error: which was on its left side. He said that the car did over it.[8]
COMPANY;
not pass in front of him after it hit him or under
A. IN DENYING F. IN FINDING THAT him or over him or behind him.[7] If the truck
OUTRIGHTLY THE PETITIONER were really at the left lane and the car were at its To support their thesis, petitioners
MOTION FOR ROLANDO DEL right, and the car hit the truck at its front right tried to show the damages that the truck
RECONSIDERATION ROSARIO WAS side, the car would not have landed on the sustained at its front right side. The attempt does
ON ALLEGEDLY BEING NEGLIGENT IN opposite side, but would have been thrown to not impress. The photographs presented were
FILED OUT OF TIME DRIVING THE TRUCK the right side of the C-5 Highway.Noteworthy on taken a month after the accident, and Rogelio
FOR ONE DAY; AT THE TIME OF this issue is the testimony of Dr. Marlon Rosendo Pantua, the automechanic who repaired the
ACCIDENT AND H. Daza, an expert in the field of physics. He truck and authenticated the photographs,
B. IN ACCORDING
TOTALLY conducted a study based on the following admitted that there were damages also on the
GREATER WEIGHT TO
DISREGARDING THE assumptions provided by respondents: left side of the truck.[9]
THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BY THE EVIDENCES
1. Two vehicles collided;
RESPONDENTS PRESENTED DURING
Worse still, petitioner Del Rosario
HEREIN AND THE TRIAL OF THE 2. One vehicle is ten times further admitted that after the impact, he lost
COMPLETELY CASE. heavier, more massive control of the truck and failed to apply his
DISREGARDING THE than the other; brakes. Considering that the car was smaller and
G. IN PRESENTING ONLY
DEFENSE IN THE DECISION 3. Both vehicles were lighter than the six-wheeler truck, the impact
INTERPOSED BY THE TESTIMONIES moving in the same allegedly caused by the car when it hit the truck
PETITIONERS HEREIN; FAVORABLE TO THE direction and at the same could not possibly be so great to cause petitioner
RESPONDENTS speed of about 85 to 90 to lose all control that he failed to even step on
C. IN DISREGARDING
HEREIN AND kilometers per hour; the brakes. He testified, as follows:
COMPLETELY ALL
ATTY. DIAZ:
May I proceed, Your
Honor. You were able to
apply the brakes, were
you sir?
WITNESS:
No more, sir, because I
went over the island.
ATTY. DIAZ:
Because as you said you
lost control, correct sir?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. DIAZ:
In other words, sir from
the time your truck was
hit according to you up to
the time you rested on
the shoulder, you
traveled fifty meters?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir, about that
distance.
ATTY. DIAZ:
And this was despite the
fact that you were only
traveling at the speed of
seventy five kilometers
per hour, jumped over
the island, hit the
lamppost, and traveled
the three lanes of the
opposite lane of C-5
highway, is that what you
want to impress upon
this court?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.[10]
We therefore find no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals. The evidence proves petitioner Del
Rosarios negligence as the direct and proximate
cause of the injuries suffered by respondent
Stephen Huang. Petitioner Del Rosario failed to
do what a reasonable and prudent man would
have done under the circumstances.
We now come to the liability of
petitioner Mercury Drug as employer of Del
Rosario. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever
by act or omission causes
damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The
obligation imposed by article
2176 is demandable not only
for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxx
The owners and
managers of an establishment
or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages
caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed
or on the occasion of their
functions.
xxx
The liability of the employer under Art.
2180 of the Civil Code is direct or immediate. It is
not conditioned on a prior recourse against the
negligent employee, or a prior showing of which occurred in 1996 was held twelve
insolvency of such employee. It is also joint and years ago in 1984.
solidary with the employee.[11]
It also appears that petitioner Mercury
To be relieved of liability, petitioner Drug does not provide for a back-up driver for
Mercury Drug should show that it exercised the long trips. At the time of the accident, petitioner
diligence of a good father of a family, both in the Del Rosario has been out on the road for more
selection of the employee and in the supervision than thirteen hours, without any
of the performance of his duties. Thus, in the alternate. Mrs. Caamic testified that she does not
selection of its prospective employees, the know of any company policy requiring back-up
employer is required to examine them as to their drivers for long trips.[14]
qualifications, experience, and service
records.[12] With respect to the supervision of its
employees, the employer should formulate Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed
standard operating procedures, monitor their to show that it exercised due diligence on the
supervision and discipline over its employees. In
implementation, and impose disciplinary
fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner Del
measures for their breach. To establish
Rosario was driving without a license. He was
compliance with these requirements, employers
holding a TVR for reckless driving. He testified
must submit concrete proof, including
that he reported the incident to his superior, but
documentary evidence.[13]
nothing was done about it. He was not
suspended or reprimanded.[15] No disciplinary
In the instant case, petitioner action whatsoever was taken against petitioner
Mercury Drug presented testimonial Del Rosario. We therefore affirm the finding that
evidence on its hiring procedure. According petitioner Mercury Drug has failed to discharge
to Mrs. Merlie Caamic, the Recruitment and its burden of proving that it exercised due
Training Manager of petitioner Mercury diligence in the selection and supervision of its
Drug, applicants are required to take employee, petitioner Del Rosario.
theoretical and actual driving tests, and
psychological examination. In the case of
We now consider the damages which
petitioner Del Rosario, however,
respondents should recover from the petitioners.
Mrs. Caamic admitted that he took the
driving tests and psychological examination
when he applied for the position of Delivery The trial court awarded the following
Man, but not when he applied for the amounts:
position of Truck Man. Mrs. Caamic also
1. Two Million Nine
admitted that petitioner Del Rosario used
Hundred Seventy-Three
a Galant which is a light vehicle, instead of a
truck during the driving tests. Further, no Thousand Pesos
tests were conducted on the motor skills (P2,973,000.00)actual
damages;
development, perceptual speed, visual
attention, depth visualization, eye and hand
2. As compensatory
coordination and steadiness of petitioner
damages:
Del Rosario. No NBI and police clearances
were also presented. Lastly, petitioner Del a. Twenty-Three
Rosario attended only three driving Million Four
seminars on June 30, 2001, February 5, Hundred Sixty One
2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only Thousand, and Sixty-
seminar he attended before the accident Two Pesos
(P23,461,062.00) for
 life care cost of failure, sepsis and severe bed sores, osteoporosis
Stephen; and fractures, and other spinal cord injury-
related conditions. He will be completely
b. Ten Million Pesos
dependent on the care and support of his
(P10,000,000.00) as
family. We thus affirm the award
and for lost or
of P23,461,062.00 for the life care cost of
impaired earning
respondent Stephen Huang, based on his average
capacity of Stephen; monthly expense and the actuarial computation
3. Four Million Pesos of the remaining years that he is expected to live;
(P4,000,000.00) as moral and the conservative amount of P10,000,000.00,
damages; as reduced by the trial court, for the loss or
impairment of his earning
4. Two Million Pesos capacity,[17] considering his age, probable life
(P2,000,000.00) as expectancy, the state of his health, and his
exemplary damages; and mental and physical condition before the
5. One Million Pesos accident. He was only seventeen years old,
nearly six feet tall and weighed 175 pounds. He
(P1,000,000.00) as
was in fourth year high school, and a member of
attorneys fees and
the school varsity basketball team. He was also
litigation expense.
class president and editor-in-chief of the school
annual. He had shown very good leadership
The Court of Appeals affirmed the qualities. He was looking forward to his college
decision of the trial court but reduced the award life, having just passed the entrance
of moral damages to P1,000,000.00. examinations of the University of the Philippines,
De La Salle University, and the University of Asia
and the Pacific. The University of Sto. Tomas
With regard to actual damages, Art. even offered him a chance to obtain an athletic
2199 of the Civil Code provides that [E]xcept as scholarship, but the accident prevented him from
provided by law or by stipulation one is entitled attending the basketball try-outs. Without doubt,
to an adequate compensation only for such he was an exceptional student. He excelled both
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly in his academics and extracurricular
proved x x x. In the instant case, we uphold the undertakings. He is intelligent and motivated, a
finding that the actual damages claimed by go-getter, as testified by Francisco Lopez,
respondents were supported by receipts. The respondent Stephen Huangs godfather and a
amount of P2,973,000.00 represented cost of bank executive.[18] Had the accident not
hospital expenses, medicines, medical services happened, he had a rosy future ahead of him. He
and supplies, and nursing care services provided wanted to embark on a banking career, get
respondent Stephen from December 20, 1996, married and raise children. Taking into account
the day of the accident, until December 1998. his outstanding abilities, he would have enjoyed
a successful professional career in banking. But,
as Mr. Lopez stated, it is highly unlikely for
Petitioners are also liable for all
damages which are the natural and probable someone like respondent to ever secure a job in
a bank. To his knowledge, no bank has ever hired
consequences of the act or omission complained
of.[16] The doctors who attended to respondent a person suffering with the kind of disability as
Stephen Huangs.[19]
Stephen are one in their prognosis that his
chances of walking again and performing basic
body functions are nil. For the rest of his life, he We likewise uphold the award of moral
will need continuous rehabilitation and therapy and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
to prevent further complications such as
pneumonia, bladder and rectum infection, renal
The award of moral damages is aimed
at a restoration, within the limits of the possible,
of the spiritual status quo ante.[20] Moral
damages are designed to compensate and
alleviate in some way the physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury
unjustly caused a person. Although incapable of
pecuniary computation, they must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.[21] The
amount of the award bears no relation
whatsoever with the wealth or means of the
offender.
In the instant case, respondent Stephen
Huang and respondent spouses Richard and
Carmen Huang testified to the intense suffering
they continue to experience as a result of the
accident. Stephen recounted the nightmares and
traumas he suffers almost every night when he
relives the accident. He also gets depression
when he thinks of his bleak future. He feels
frustration and embarrassment in needing to be
helped with almost everything and in his
inability to do simple things he used to
do. Similarly, respondent spouses and the rest of
the family undergo their own private
suffering. They live with the day-to-day
uncertainty of respondent Stephen Huangs
condition. They know that the chance of full
recovery is nil. Moreover, respondent Stephen
Huangs paralysis has made him prone to many
other illnesses. His family, especially
respondent spouses, have to make themselves
available for Stephen twenty-four hours a
day. They have patterned their daily life around
taking care of him, ministering to his daily needs,
altering the lifestyle to which they had been
accustomed.
Respondent Carmen Huangs brother
testified on the insensitivity of petitioner
Mercury Drug towards the plight of
respondent. Stephen, viz.:
Maybe words cannot
describe the anger that we
feel towards the
defendants.All the time that
we were going through the
crisis, there was none (sic) a
single sign of nor offer of help,
any consolation or anything
whatsoever. It is funny
because, you know, I have
many colleagues, business
associates, people even as far
as United States, Japan, that I
probably met only once, when
they found out, they make a
call, they sent card, they write
small notes, but from the
defendant, absolute
silence. They didnt care, and
worst, you know, this is a
company that have (sic) all the
resources to help us. They
were (sic) on our part, it was
doubly painful because we
have no choice but to go back
to them and buy the
medicines that we need for
Stephen. So, I dont know how
someone will really have no
sense of decency at all to at
least find out what happened
to my son, what is his
condition, or if there is
anything that they can do to
help us.[22]
On the matter of exemplary damages,
Art. 2231 of the Civil Code provides that in cases
of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. The records show that at the time of
the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving
without a license because he was previously
ticketed for reckless driving. The evidence also
shows that he failed to step on his brakes
immediately after the impact. Had petitioner Del
Rosario done so, the injuries which respondent
Stephen sustained could have been greatly
reduced. Wanton acts such as that committed by
petitioner Del Rosario need be suppressed; and
employers like petitioner Mercury Drug should
be more circumspect in the observance of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. The award of exemplary damages in
favor of the respondents is therefore justified.

With the award of exemplary damages,

we also affirm the grant of attorneys fees to
respondents.[23] In addition, attorneys fees may
be granted when a party is compelled to litigate
or incur expenses to protect his interest by
reason of an unjustified act of the other party.[24]

Cost against petitioners.

IN VIEW THEREOF, the petition

is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated February 16, 2006 and
March 30, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
83981, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12986 March 31, 1966
THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and
SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the HEIRS OF
DOMINGA ONG,petitioners-appellants,
vs.
CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and
THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-
appellees.
Ross, Selph, Carrascoso and Janda for the
respondents.
Bernabe Africa, etc. for the petitioners.
MAKALINTAL., J.:
This case is before us on a petition for review of
the decision of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed that of the Court of First Instance of
Manila dismissing petitioners' second amended
complaint against respondents.
The action is for damages under Articles 1902
and 1903 of the old Civil Code. It appears that in
the afternoon of March 18, 1948 a fire broke out
at the Caltex service station at the corner of
Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It
started while gasoline was being hosed from a
tank truck into the underground storage, right at
the opening of the receiving tank where the
nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread
to and burned several neighboring houses,
including the personal properties and effects
inside them. Their owners, among them
petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.),
Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged
owner of the station and the second as its agent
in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of
both of them was attributed as the cause of the
fire.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found
that petitioners failed to prove negligence and
that respondents had exercised due care in the
premises and with respect to the supervision of
their employees.
The first question before Us refers to the
admissibility of certain reports on the fire
prepared by the Manila Police and Fire
Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Portions of
the first two reports are as follows:
1. Police Department report: —
Investigation disclosed that at
about 4:00 P.M. March 18,
1948, while Leandro Flores
was transferring gasoline
from a tank truck, plate No. T-
5292 into the underground
tank of the Caltex Gasoline
Station located at the corner
of Rizal Avenue and Antipolo
Street, this City, an unknown
Filipino lighted a cigarette and
threw the burning match stick
near the main valve of the
said underground tank. Due to
the gasoline fumes, fire
suddenly blazed. Quick action
of Leandro Flores in pulling
off the gasoline hose
connecting the truck with the
underground tank prevented
a terrific explosion. However,
the flames scattered due to
the hose from which the
gasoline was spouting. It
burned the truck and the
following accessorias and
residences.
2. The Fire Department report: —
In connection with their allegation that
the premises was (sic) subleased for
the installation of a coca-cola and
cigarette stand, the complainants
furnished this Office a copy of a
photograph taken during the fire and
which is submitted herewith. it appears
in this picture that there are in the
premises a coca-cola cooler and a rack
which according to information
gathered in the neighborhood
contained cigarettes and matches,
installed between the gasoline pumps
and the underground tanks.
The report of Captain Tinio reproduced
information given by a certain Benito Morales
regarding the history of the gasoline station and
what the chief of the fire department had told
him on the same subject.
The foregoing reports were ruled out as "double
hearsay" by the Court of Appeals and hence
inadmissible. This ruling is now assigned as
error. It is contended: first, that said reports
were admitted by the trial court without
objection on the part of respondents; secondly,
that with respect to the police report (Exhibit V-
Africa) which appears signed by a Detective
Zapanta allegedly "for Salvador Capacillo," the
latter was presented as witness but respondents
waived their right to cross-examine him
although they had the opportunity to do so; and
thirdly, that in any event the said reports are
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule
under section 35 of Rule 123, now Rule 130.
The first contention is not borne out by the
record. The transcript of the hearing of
September 17, 1953 (pp. 167-170) shows that
the reports in question, when offered as
evidence, were objected to by counsel for each of
respondents on the ground that they were
hearsay and that they were "irrelevant,
immaterial and impertinent." Indeed, in the
court's resolution only Exhibits J, K, K-5 and X-6
were admitted without objection; the admission
of the others, including the disputed ones,
carried no such explanation.
On the second point, although Detective
Capacillo did take the witness stand, he was not
examined and he did not testify as to the facts
mentioned in his alleged report (signed by
Detective Zapanta). All he said was that he was
one of those who investigated "the location of
the fire and, if possible, gather witnesses as to
the occurrence, and that he brought the report
with him. There was nothing, therefore, on which
he need be cross-examined; and the contents of
the report, as to which he did not testify, did not
thereby become competent evidence. And even if
he had testified, his testimony would still have
been objectionable as far as information
gathered by him from third persons was
concerned.
Petitioners maintain, however, that the reports
in themselves, that is, without further
testimonial evidence on their contents, fall
within the scope of section 35, Rule 123, which
provides that "entries in official records made in
the performance of his duty by a public officer of
the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law,
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated."
There are three requisites for admissibility
under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry
was made by a public officer, or by another
person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b)
that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or
other person had sufficient knowledge of the
facts by him stated, which must have been
acquired by him personally or through official
information (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 3 [1957] p. 398).
Of the three requisites just stated, only the last
need be considered here. Obviously the material
facts recited in the reports as to the cause and
circumstances of the fire were not within the
personal knowledge of the officers who
conducted the investigation. Was knowledge of
such facts, however, acquired by them through
official information? As to some facts the sources
thereof are not even identified. Others are
attributed to Leopoldo Medina, referred to as an
employee at the gas station were the fire
occurred; to Leandro Flores, driver of the tank
truck from which gasoline was being transferred
at the time to the underground tank of the
station; and to respondent Mateo Boquiren, who
could not, according to Exhibit V-Africa, give any
reason as to the origin of the fire. To qualify their
statements as "official information" acquired by
the officers who prepared the reports, the
persons who made the statements not only must
have personal knowledge of the facts stated but
must have the duty to give such statements for
record.1
The reports in question do not constitute an
exception to the hearsay rule; the facts stated
therein were not acquired by the reporting
officers through official information, not having
been given by the informants pursuant to any
duty to do so.
The next question is whether or not, without
proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to
presume negligence on the part of appellees.
Both the trial court and the appellate court
refused to apply the doctrine in the instant case
on the grounds that "as to (its) applicability ... in
the Philippines, there seems to he nothing
definite," and that while the rules do not prohibit
its adoption in appropriate cases, "in the case at
bar, however, we find no practical use for such
doctrine." The question deserves more than such
summary dismissal. The doctrine has actually
been applied in this jurisdiction, in the case
of Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development
Co. (CA-G.R. No. 3240-R, September 20, 1949),
wherein the decision of the Court of Appeals was
penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes now a member
of the Supreme Court.
The facts of that case are stated in the decision as
follows:
In the afternoon of May 5, 1946, while
the plaintiff-appellee and other
companions were loading grass
between the municipalities of Bay and
Calauan, in the province of Laguna,
with clear weather and without any
wind blowing, an electric transmission
wire, installed and maintained by the
defendant Philippine Power and
Development Co., Inc. alongside the
road, suddenly parted, and one of the
broken ends hit the head of the plaintiff
as he was about to board the truck. As a
result, plaintiff received the full shock
of 4,400 volts carried by the wire and
was knocked unconscious to the
ground. The electric charge coursed
through his body and caused extensive
and serious multiple burns from skull
to legs, leaving the bone exposed in
some parts and causing intense pain
and wounds that were not completely
healed when the case was tried on June
18, 1947, over one year after the
mishap.
The defendant therein disclaimed liability on the
ground that the plaintiff had failed to show any
specific act of negligence, but the appellate court
overruled the defense under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. The court said:
The first point is directed against the
sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence to
place appellant on its defense. While it
is the rule, as contended by the
appellant, that in case of
noncontractual negligence, or culpa
aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to establish that the proximate
cause of his injury was the negligence
of the defendant, it is also a recognized
principal that "where the thing which
caused injury, without fault of the
injured person, is under the exclusive
control of the defendant and the injury
is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not occur if he having such
control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of
the explanation, that the injury arose
from defendant's want of care."
And the burden of evidence is shifted to
him to establish that he has observed
due care and diligence. (San Juan Light
& Transit Co. v. Requena, 244, U.S. 89,
56 L. ed. 680.) This rule is known by the
name ofres ipsa loquitur (the
transaction speaks for itself), and is
peculiarly applicable to the case at bar,
where it is unquestioned that the
plaintiff had every right to be on the
highway, and the electric wire was
under the sole control of defendant
company. In the ordinary course of
events, electric wires do not part
suddenly in fair weather and injure
people, unless they are subjected to
unusual strain and stress or there are
defects in their installation,
maintenance and supervision; just as
barrels do not ordinarily roll out of the
warehouse windows to injure
passersby, unless some one was
negligent. (Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H & Co.
722; 159 Eng. Reprint 299, the leading
case that established that rule).
Consequently, in the absence of
contributory negligence (which is
admittedly not present), the fact that
the wire snapped suffices to raise a
reasonable presumption of negligence
in its installation, care and
maintenance. Thereafter, as observed
by Chief Baron Pollock, "if there are any
facts inconsistent with negligence, it is
for the defendant to prove."
It is true of course that decisions of the Court of
Appeals do not lay down doctrines binding on
the Supreme Court, but we do not consider this a
reason for not applying the particular doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur in the case at bar. Gasoline is a
highly combustible material, in the storage and
sale of which extreme care must be taken. On the
other hand, fire is not considered a fortuitous
event, as it arises almost invariably from some
act of man. A case strikingly similar to the one
before Us is Jones vs. Shell Petroleum
Corporation, et al., 171 So. 447:
Arthur O. Jones is the owner of a
building in the city of Hammon which
in the year 1934 was leased to the Shell
Petroleum Corporation for a gasoline
filling station. On October 8, 1934,
during the term of the lease, while
gasoline was being transferred from
the tank wagon, also operated by the
Shell Petroleum Corporation, to the
underground tank of the station, a fire
started with resulting damages to the
building owned by Jones. Alleging that
the damages to his building amounted
to $516.95, Jones sued the Shell
Petroleum Corporation for the recovery
of that amount. The judge of the district
court, after hearing the testimony,
concluded that plaintiff was entitled to
a recovery and rendered judgment in
his favor for $427.82. The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit reversed
this judgment, on the ground the
testimony failed to show with
reasonable certainty any negligence on
the part of the Shell Petroleum
Corporation or any of its agents or
employees. Plaintiff applied to this
Court for a Writ of Review which was
granted, and the case is now before us
for decision.1äwphï1.ñët
In resolving the issue of negligence, the Supreme
Court of Louisiana held:
Plaintiff's petition contains two distinct
charges of negligence — one relating to
the cause of the fire and the other
relating to the spreading of the gasoline
about the filling station.
Other than an expert to assess the
damages caused plaintiff's building by
the fire, no witnesses were placed on
the stand by the defendant.
Taking up plaintiff's charge of
negligence relating to the cause of the
fire, we find it established by the record
that the filling station and the tank
truck were under the control of the
defendant and operated by its agents or
employees. We further find from the
uncontradicted testimony of plaintiff's
witnesses that fire started in the
underground tank attached to the
filling station while it was being filled
from the tank truck and while both the
tank and the truck were in charge of
and being operated by the agents or
employees of the defendant, extended
to the hose and tank truck, and was
 communicated from the burning hose,
tank truck, and escaping gasoline to the
building owned by the plaintiff.
Predicated on these circumstances and
the further circumstance of defendant's
failure to explain the cause of the fire or
to show its lack of knowledge of the
cause, plaintiff has evoked the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. There are many
cases in which the doctrine may be
successfully invoked and this, we think,
is one of them.
Where the thing which caused the
injury complained of is shown to be
under the management of defendant or
his servants and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have its
management or control use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
absence of explanation by defendant,
that the accident arose from want of
care. (45 C.J. #768, p. 1193).
This statement of the rule of res ipsa
loquitur has been widely approved and
adopted by the courts of last resort.
Some of the cases in this jurisdiction in
which the doctrine has been applied
are the following, viz.: Maus v.
Broderick, 51 La. Ann. 1153, 25 So. 977;
Hebert v. Lake Charles Ice, etc., Co., 111
La. 522, 35 So. 731, 64 L.R.A. 101, 100
Am. St. Rep. 505; Willis v. Vicksburg,
etc., R. Co., 115 La. 63, 38 So. 892; Bents
v. Page, 115 La. 560, 39 So. 599.
The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case
applies with equal force here. The gasoline
station, with all its appliances, equipment and
employees, was under the control of appellees. A
fire occurred therein and spread to and burned
the neighboring houses. The persons who knew
or could have known how the fire started were
appellees and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and
reasonable inference that the incident happened
because of want of care.
In the report submitted by Captain Leoncio
Mariano of the Manila Police Department (Exh.
X-1 Africa) the following appears:
Investigation of the basic complaint
disclosed that the Caltex Gasoline
Station complained of occupies a lot
approximately 10 m x 10 m at the
southwest corner of Rizal Avenue and
Antipolo. The location is within a very
busy business district near the Obrero
Market, a railroad crossing and very
thickly populated neighborhood where
a great number of people mill around t
until
gasoline
tever be theWactjvities of these
peopleor lighting a cigarette cannot be
excluded and this constitute a
secondary hazard to its operation
which in turn endangers the entire
neighborhood to conflagration.
Furthermore, aside from precautions
already taken by its operator the
concrete walls south and west
adjoining the neighborhood are only 2-
1/2 meters high at most and cannot
avoid the flames from leaping over it in
case of fire.
Records show that there have been two
cases of fire which caused not only
material damages but desperation and
also panic in the neighborhood.
Although the soft drinks stand had
been eliminated, this gasoline service
station is also used by its operator as a
garage and repair shop for his fleet of
taxicabs numbering ten or more,
adding another risk to the possible
outbreak of fire at this already small
but crowded gasoline station.
The foregoing report, having been submitted by
a police officer in the performance of his duties
on the basis of his own personal observation of
the facts reported, may properly be considered
as an exception to the hearsay rule. These facts,
descriptive of the location and objective
circumstances surrounding the operation of the
gasoline station in question, strengthen the
presumption of negligence under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, since on their face they called
for more stringent measures of caution than
those which would satisfy the standard of due
diligence under ordinary circumstances. There is
no more eloquent demonstration of this than the
statement of Leandro Flores before the police
investigator. Flores was the driver of the
gasoline tank wagon who, alone and without
assistance, was transferring the contents thereof
into the underground storage when the fire
broke out. He said: "Before loading the
underground tank there were no people, but
while the loading was going on, there were
people who went to drink coca-cola (at the coca-
cola stand) which is about a meter from the hole
leading to the underground tank." He added that
when the tank was almost filled he went to the
tank truck to close the valve, and while he had
his back turned to the "manhole" he, heard
someone shout "fire."
Even then the fire possibly would not have
spread to the neighboring houses were it not for
another negligent omission on the part of
defendants, namely, their failure to provide a
concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames
from leaping over it. As it was the concrete wall
was only 2-1/2 meters high, and beyond that
height it consisted merely of galvanized iron
sheets, which would predictably crumple and
melt when subjected to intense heat. Defendants'
negligence, therefore, was not only with respect
to the cause of the fire but also with respect to
the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.
There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in
his amended answer to the second amended
complaint that "the fire was caused through the
acts of a stranger who, without authority, or
permission of answering defendant, passed
through the gasoline station and negligently
threw a lighted match in the premises." No
evidence on this point was adduced, but
assuming the allegation to be true — certainly
any unfavorable inference from the admission
may be taken against Boquiren — it does not
extenuate his negligence. A decision of the
Supreme Court of Texas, upon facts analogous to
those of the present case, states the rule which
we find acceptable here. "It is the rule that those
who distribute a dangerous article or agent, owe
a degree of protection to the public
proportionate to and commensurate with a
danger involved ... we think it is the generally
accepted rule as applied to torts that 'if the
effects of the actor's negligent conduct actively
and continuously operate to bring about harm to
another, the fact that the active and substantially
simultaneous operation of the effects of a third
person's innocent, tortious or criminal act is also
a substantial factor in bringing about the harm,
does not protect the actor from liability.'
(Restatement of the Law of Torts, vol. 2, p. 1184,
#439). Stated in another way, "The intention of
an unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not
sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from
consequences of negligence, if such negligence
directly and proximately cooperates with the
independent cause in the resulting injury."
(MacAfee, et al. vs. Traver's Gas Corporation, 153
S.W. 2nd 442.)
The next issue is whether Caltex should be held
liable for the damages caused to appellants. This
issue depends on whether Boquiren was an
independent contractor, as held by the Court of
Appeals, or an agent of Caltex. This question, in
the light of the facts not controverted, is one of
law and hence may be passed upon by this Court.
These facts are: (1) Boquiren made an admission
that he was an agent of Caltex; (2) at the time of
the fire Caltex owned the gasoline station and all
the equipment therein; (3) Caltex exercised
control over Boquiren in the management of the
state; (4) the delivery truck used in delivering
gasoline to the station had the name of CALTEX
painted on it; and (5) the license to store
gasoline at the station was in the name of Caltex,
which paid the license fees. (Exhibit T-Africa;
Exhibit U-Africa; Exhibit X-5 Africa; Exhibit X-6
Africa; Exhibit Y-Africa).
In Boquiren's amended answer to the second
amended complaint, he denied that he directed
one of his drivers to remove gasoline from the
truck into the tank and alleged that the "alleged
driver, if one there was, was not in his employ,
the driver being an employee of the Caltex (Phil.)
Inc. and/or the owners of the gasoline station." It
is true that Boquiren later on amended his
answer, and that among the changes was one to
the effect that he was not acting as agent of
Caltex. But then again, in his motion to dismiss
appellants' second amended complaint the
ground alleged was that it stated no cause of
action since under the allegations thereof he was
merely acting as agent of Caltex, such that he
could not have incurred personal liability. A
motion to dismiss on this ground is deemed to be
an admission of the facts alleged in the
complaint.
Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station
as well as the equipment therein, but claims that
the business conducted at the service station in
question was owned and operated by Boquiren.
But Caltex did not present any contract with
Boquiren that would reveal the nature of their
relationship at the time of the fire. There must
have been one in existence at that time. Instead,
what was presented was a license agreement
manifestly tailored for purposes of this case,
since it was entered into shortly before the
expiration of the one-year period it was intended
to operate. This so-called license agreement
(Exhibit 5-Caltex) was executed on November
29, 1948, but made effective as of January 1,
1948 so as to cover the date of the fire, namely,
March 18, 1948. This retroactivity provision is
quite significant, and gives rise to the conclusion
that it was designed precisely to free Caltex from
any responsibility with respect to the fire, as
shown by the clause that Caltex "shall not be
liable for any injury to person or property while
in the property herein licensed, it being
understood and agreed that LICENSEE
(Boquiren) is not an employee, representative or
agent of LICENSOR (Caltex)."
But even if the license agreement were to
govern, Boquiren can hardly be considered an
independent contractor. Under that agreement
Boquiren would pay Caltex the purely nominal
sum of P1.00 for the use of the premises and all
the equipment therein. He could sell only Caltex
Products. Maintenance of the station and its
equipment was subject to the approval, in other
words control, of Caltex. Boquiren could not
assign or transfer his rights as licensee without
the consent of Caltex. The license agreement was
supposed to be from January 1, 1948 to
December 31, 1948, and thereafter until
terminated by Caltex upon two days prior
written notice. Caltex could at any time cancel
and terminate the agreement in case Boquiren
ceased to sell Caltex products, or did not conduct
the business with due diligence, in the judgment
of Caltex. Termination of the contract was
therefore a right granted only to Caltex but not to
Boquiren. These provisions of the contract show
the extent of the control of Caltex over Boquiren.
The control was such that the latter was virtually
an employee of the former.
Taking into consideration the fact that
the operator owed his position to the
company and the latter could remove
him or terminate his services at will;
that the service station belonged to the
company and bore its tradename and
the operator sold only the products of
the company; that the equipment used
by the operator belonged to the
company and were just loaned to the
operator and the company took charge
of their repair and maintenance; that
an employee of the company
supervised the operator and conducted
periodic inspection of the company's
gasoline and service station; that the
price of the products sold by the
operator was fixed by the company and
not by the operator; and that the
receipts signed by the operator
indicated that he was a mere agent, the
finding of the Court of Appeals that the
operator was an agent of the company
and not an independent contractor
should not be disturbed.
To determine the nature of a contract
courts do not have or are not bound to
rely upon the name or title given it by
the contracting parties, should thereby
a controversy as to what they really
had intended to enter into, but the way
the contracting parties do or perform
their respective obligations stipulated
or agreed upon may be shown and
inquired into, and should such
performance conflict with the name or
title given the contract by the parties,
the former must prevail over the latter.
(Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd.
vs. Firemens' Insurance Company of
Newark, New Jersey, 100 Phil. 757).
The written contract was apparently
drawn for the purpose of creating the
apparent relationship of employer and
independent contractor, and of
avoiding liability for the negligence of
the employees about the station; but
the company was not satisfied to allow
such relationship to exist. The evidence
shows that it immediately assumed
control, and proceeded to direct the
method by which the work contracted
for should be performed. By reserving
the right to terminate the contract at
will, it retained the means of
compelling submission to its orders.
Having elected to assume control and
to direct the means and methods by
which the work has to be performed, it
must be held liable for the negligence of
those performing service under its
direction. We think the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the verdict of the
jury. (Gulf Refining Company v. Rogers,
57 S.W. 2d, 183).
Caltex further argues that the gasoline stored in
the station belonged to Boquiren. But no cash
invoices were presented to show that Boquiren
had bought said gasoline from Caltex. Neither
was there a sales contract to prove the same.
As found by the trial court the Africas sustained a
loss of P9,005.80, after deducting the amount of
P2,000.00 collected by them on the insurance of
the house. The deduction is now challenged as
erroneous on the ground that Article 2207 of the
New Civil Code, which provides for the
subrogation of the insurer to the rights of the
insured, was not yet in effect when the loss took
place. However, regardless of the silence of the
law on this point at that time, the amount that
should be recovered be measured by the
damages actually suffered, otherwise the
principle prohibiting unjust enrichment would
be violated. With respect to the claim of the heirs
of Ong P7,500.00 was adjudged by the lower
court on the basis of the assessed value of the
property destroyed, namely, P1,500.00,
disregarding the testimony of one of the Ong
children that said property was worth P4,000.00.
We agree that the court erred, since it is of
common knowledge that the assessment for
taxation purposes is not an accurate gauge of fair
market value, and in this case should not prevail
over positive evidence of such value. The heirs of
Ong are therefore entitled to P10,000.00.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is
reversed and respondents-appellees are held
liable solidarily to appellants, and ordered to pay
them the aforesaid sum of P9,005.80 and
P10,000.00, respectively, with interest from the
filing of the complaint, and costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and
Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 148923. August 11, 2005]
VICENTE LAMIS and SANDIGAN PROTECTIVE
& INVESTIGATION AGENCY,
INC., petitioners, vs. DAVID Y.
ONG, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review
on certiorari filed by Vicente Lamis and Sandigan
Protective & Investigation Agency, Inc. assailing
the Decision[1] dated March 13, 2001 of the Court
of Appeals and its Resolution dated June 28,
2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 61034, entitled David Y.
Ong, petitioner, versus Vicente Lamis and
Sandigan Protective & Investigation Agency, Inc.,
respondents.
The facts as shown by the records are:
Sandigan Protective and Investigation
Agency, Inc. (Sandigan), petitioner, was the
security agency providing security services at
the Manila Chinese Cemetery. The visiting hours
were at 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Sandigan
instructed the security guards not to allow any
one to enter the cemetery from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00
a.m.
On September 20, 1994, Vicente Lamis, also
a petitioner, was the guard assigned at the south
gate of the cemetery for the 6:00 p.m. to 6:00
a.m. slot.
Around 3:00 in the morning, a Mitsubishi
Lancer, with a PSM 679 plate, driven by David Y.
Ong, herein respondent, arrived at the south gate
of the cemetery. He beeped his car and continued
doing so, but Lamis did not open the gate.
Eventually, he went outside the gate and
informed respondent that being beyond visiting
hours, he cannot enter the cemetery. Suddenly,
respondent accelerated the speed of his car,
trying to enter the cemetery. This irked Lamis.
He closed the gate and took a shot gun entrusted
to him by one of the roving guards.
About thirty minutes thereafter,
respondents car returned at full speed toward
the closed gate where Lamis was standing. He
fired a warning shot but respondent did not stop
his car. Lamis fired another warning shot.
Respondent then alighted from his car. Seeing it
was closed, he got inside the car, but before he
could do so, Lamis shot him, hitting his right arm,
left hip, and right waist. He managed to drive to
the Chinese General Hospital where he was
examined and treated. Thereafter, the hospital
guard reported the incident to the police who
immediately conducted an investigation.
Petitioner Sandigan conducted its own
investigation but did not turn over to the police
the firearm used by Lamis.
Subsequently, Sandigan paid Lamis mother
the amount spent for his medical expenses.
Meanwhile, he was given another job but he
absented from work without leave. Thus, he was
suspended and eventually dismissed from the
service.
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Manila a
complaint for frustrated homicide against Lamis,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-J-27836.
Later, or on March 31, 1995, respondent
also filed a complaint for damages against both
petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-73446.
On March 20, 1998, the trial court rendered a
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
defendants Vicente Lamis and Sandigan
Protective & Investigation Agency, Inc. are
ordered to pay jointly and solidarily to plaintiff
the following amounts:
1. Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) as
moral damages;
2. Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P300,000.00) as
exemplary damages;
3. Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as
attorneys fees, and;
4. The costs of suit.
The respective counterclaims of the defendants
are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered
the assailed Decision affirming the trial courts
judgment, holding that:
xxx
We do not agree with the appellants (now
petitioners).
xxx
Indeed, the acts of appellant Lamis were not the
result of negligence but were deliberate and
intentionalconstituting, as they were, delictual
acts for which he was even charged
of Frustrated Homicide in People versus
Vicente Lamis, Criminal Case No. 94-J-
27836 (Exhibit H). Hence, we agree with the
court a quothat appellant Lamis plea of having
acted in complete self-defense in shooting the
appellee with two (2) guns and, hence, not civilly
liable to the appellee, is barren of merit.
xxx
The appellants fault the court a quo for not
giving approbation to appellant Lamis plea of
having acted in self-defense. But, then, case law
has it that the findings of facts of the trial court,
its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the
parties, the probative weight accorded by the
court a quo of the evidence of the parties and its
conclusions anchored on its findings, are
accorded by the Appellate Court, high respect, if
not, conclusive effect, because of the unique
advantage of the trial court of observing, at close,
range, the demeanor and conduct of the
witnesses as they regale the court with their
respective testimonies.
xxx
Our Supreme Court expostulated in Maria A.
Dulay, et al. versus Court of Appeals, et al., 293
SCRA 720 that the law is not limited, in scope, to
acts or omissions resulting from negligence. It
also includes acts committed with negligence
and acts that are voluntary and intentional,
whether such acts are delictual or not and
whether or not the defendant is prosecuted in a
criminal case independently and separately from
the civil action instituted by the aggrieved party
for the recovery of damages against the
offending party x x x.
xxx
The next issue that comes to fore is whether or
not appellant Sandigan mustered the requisite
quantum of evidence to prove that it exercised
due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and its supervision of its employees to
prevent damage/injuries.
xxx
In the present recourse, appellant Sandigan
failed to discharge its burden. The appellant
relied solely on a copy of its Rules and
Regulations, Exhibit 1, and the testimony of
Salvador Manansala to discharge its burden.
xxx
Appellant Sandigans utter neglect was made
more pronounced when it failed to adduce in
evidence any copy of its Report on the shooting
incident involving appellant Lamis. Neither did it
surrender to the police authorities the .38 caliber
gun and shotgun used by appellant Lamis in
shooting the appellee.
xxx
The appellants, however, plead that the awards
for damages be reduced because of the flagrant
violation by the appellee of the curfew imposed
by the management of the cemetery. We are not
inclined to agree to appellants plea. We find and
consider the awards by the court a
quo reasonable in the light of the factual milieu
in the present recourse.
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the Appellate Court denied
the same in its Resolution dated June 28, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition for review
on certiorari raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER, CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD, THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY
DISMISSED PETITIONER LAMIS PLEA OF SELF-
DEFENSE.
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
CORRECTLY HELD PETITIONER SANDIGAN
LIABLE DESPITE THE FACT THAT SANDIGAN
EXERCISED DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION
AND SUPERVISION OF ITS SECURITY GUARDS.
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS, DESPITE
LACK OF BASIS TO SUPPORT ANY FINDING OF
LIABILITY AGAINST PETITIONERS, CORRECTLY
AWARDED DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT.
Anent the first and second issues,
petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that: (a) petitioner Lamis did not
act in self-defense, and (b) petitioner Sandigan
failed to prove that it exercised due diligence in
the selection and supervision of its security
guards.
The first two issues are
obviously questions of fact. Certainly, such
matters mainly require a calibration of the
evidence or a determination of the credibility of
the witnesses presented by the parties and the
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, their relation to each other and to
the whole, and the probabilities of the
situation.[3]
The well-entrenched rule is that questions
of fact may not be the subject of an appeal
bycertiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, as this recourse is
generally confined to questions of law.[4] Under
the said Rule, the jurisdiction of this Court over
cases brought to it is limited to the review and
rectification of errors of law committed by the
lower court.
Moreover, it is doctrinally settled that
where the trial courts factual findings are
adopted and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as
in this case, the same are final and conclusive
and may not be reviewed by this Court.[5] It bears
emphasis that in the appreciation of evidence,
the Appellate Court accords due deference to the
trial courts factual findings because the latter
had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses when they testified during the trial
and, therefore, is in a better position to
determine their credibility.[6] Thus, we find no
compelling reason to overturn the factual
findings and conclusion of law by the Court of
Appeals relative to the first and second issues.
With respect to the third issue, petitioners
maintain that there is no legal basis for the trial
courts award of damages.
As earlier stated, the trial court found that
Lamis act of shooting the respondent was
deliberate and intentional, hence, both
petitioners are jointly and solidarily liable to
respondent for damages.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that
Whoever by an act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. x x x. The
obligation imposed by this Article is demandable
not only for ones own wrongful acts or
omissions, but also for those persons for whom
one is responsible.[7] Thus, petitioner Sandigan,
being the employer of petitioner Lamis, is
likewise liable for damages caused by the
latter.[8]
As stated earlier, petitioner Sandigan
already paid the medical expenses (or actual
damages) incurred by respondent.
We find, however, that the trial court erred
in awarding to respondent moral damages in the
sum of P500,000.00, exemplary damages
of P300,000.00 and attorneys fee in the amount
ofP50,000.00. These amounts are quite
excessive. We have held that although the trial
court is given the discretion to determine the
amount of such damages, the appellate court
may modify or change the amount awarded
when it is inordinate,[9] as in this case.
It bears stressing that the award of moral
damages is meant to compensate the claimant
for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused
by the defendants wrongful acts.[10] Although
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount
must somehow be proportional to and in
approximation of the suffering
inflicted.[11] Moral damages are not intended to
impose a penalty to the wrongdoer,[12] neither to
enrich the claimant at the expense of the
defendant.[13] There is no hard-and-fast rule in
determining what would be a fair and reasonable
amount of moral damages, since each case must
be governed by its own peculiar facts. Trial
courts are given discretion in determining
the amount, with the limitation that it should
not be palpably and scandalously
excessive.[14] We hold that an award to
respondent ofP30,000.00, instead
of P500,000.00, as moral damages is reasonable.
Likewise, we are convinced that the award
of exemplary damages should be reduced
fromP300,000.00 to P25,000.00. Such damages
are imposed not to enrich the claimant and
impoverish the defendant but to serve as a
deterrent against, or as a negative incentive to
curb, socially deleterious actions.[15]
Finally, an award of P20,000.00 as
attorneys fee is deemed sufficient considering
that the suit involved is merely for damages.
Attorneys fee may be awarded when a party is
compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect
his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the
other party,[16]as in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
assailed Decision dated March 13, 2001 and
Resolution dated June 28, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61034 are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense
that petitioners are ordered to pay respondent
(a)P30,000.00 as moral damages, (b) P25,000.00
as exemplary damages, and (c) P20,000.00 as
attorneys fee. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Carpio-
Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141538. March 23, 2004]
Hermana R. Cerezo, petitioner, vs. David
Tuazon, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review
on certiorari[1] to annul the
Resolution[2] dated 21 October 1999 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53572, as well as its
Resolution dated 20 January 2000denying the
motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
denied the petition for annulment of the
Decision[3] dated 30 May 1995 rendered by
the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch
56 (trial court), in Civil Case No. 7415. The trial
court ordered petitioner Hermana R. Cerezo
(Mrs. Cerezo) to pay respondent David Tuazon
(Tuazon) actual damages, loss of earnings, moral
damages, and costs of suit.
Antecedent Facts
Around noontime of 26 June 1993, a
Country Bus Lines passenger bus with plate
number NYA 241 collided with a tricycle bearing
plate number TC RV 126 along Captain M. Palo
Street, Sta. Ines, Mabalacat, Pampanga. On 1
October 1993, tricycle driver Tuazon filed a
complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as
owner of the bus line, her husband Attorney Juan
Cerezo (Atty. Cerezo), and bus driver Danilo A.
Foronda (Foronda). The complaint alleged that:
7. At the time of the incident, plaintiff [Tuazon]
was in his proper lane when the second-named
defendant [Foronda], being then the driver and
person in charge of the Country Bus with plate
number NYA 241, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously operate the said
motor vehicle in a negligent, careless, and
imprudent manner without due regard to traffic
rules and regulations, there being a Slow Down
sign near the scene of the incident, and without
taking the necessary precaution to prevent loss
of lives or injuries, his negligence, carelessness
and imprudence resulted to severe damage to
the tricycle and serious physical injuries to
plaintiff thus making him unable to walk and
becoming disabled, with his thumb and middle
finger on the left hand being cut[.][4]
On 1 October 1993, Tuazon filed a motion
to litigate as a pauper. Subsequently, the trial
court issued summons against Atty. Cerezo and
Mrs. Cerezo (the Cerezo spouses) at
the Makatiaddress stated in the
complaint. However, the summons was returned
unserved on 10 November 1993 as the Cerezo
spouses no longer held office nor resided
in Makati. On 18 April 1994, the trial court
issued alias summons against the Cerezo spouses
at their address in Barangay Sta. Maria, Camiling,
Tarlac. The alias summons and a copy of the
complaint were finally served on 20 April
1994 at the office of Atty. Cerezo, who was then
working as Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor.Atty.
Cerezo reacted angrily on learning of the service
of summons upon his person. Atty. Cerezo
allegedly told Sheriff William Canlas: Punyeta,
ano ang gusto mong mangyari? Gusto mong hindi
ka makalabas ng buhay dito? Teritoryo ko
ito. Wala ka sa teritoryo mo.[5]
The records show that the Cerezo spouses
participated in the proceedings before the trial
court. The Cerezo spouses filed a comment with
motion for bill of particulars dated 29 April
1994and a reply to opposition to comment with
motion dated 13 June 1994.[6] On 1 August 1994,
the trial court issued an order directing the
Cerezo spouses to file a comment to the
opposition to the bill of particulars. Atty. Elpidio
B. Valera (Atty. Valera) of Valera and Valera Law
Offices appeared on behalf of the Cerezo spouses.
On 29 August 1994, Atty. Valera filed an urgent
ex-parte motion praying for the resolution of
Tuazons motion to litigate as a pauper and for
the issuance of new summons on the Cerezo
spouses to satisfy proper service in accordance
with the Rules of Court.[7]
On 30 August 1994, the trial court issued
an order resolving Tuazons motion to litigate as
a pauper and the Cerezo spouses urgent ex-parte
motion. The order reads:
At the hearing on August 30, 1994, the plaintiff
[Tuazon] testified that he is presently jobless;
that at the time of the filing of this case, his son
who is working in Malaysia helps him and sends
him once in a while P300.00 a month, and that he
does not have any real property. Attached to the
Motion to Litigate as Pauper are his Affidavit that
he is unemployed; a Certification by the
Barangay Captain of his poblacion that his
income is not enough for his familys subsistence;
and a Certification by the Office of the Municipal
Assessor that he has no landholding in
the Municipality of Mabalacat, Province of Pamp
anga.
The Court is satisfied from the unrebutted
testimony of the plaintiff that he is entitled to
prosecute his complaint in this case as a pauper
under existing rules.
On the other hand, the Court denies the prayer in
the Appearance and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
requiring new summons to be served to the
defendants. The Court is of the opinion that any
infirmity in the service of the summons to the
defendant before plaintiff was allowed to
prosecute his complaint in this case as a pauper
has been cured by this Order.
If within 15 days from receipt of this Order, the
defendants do not question on appeal this Order
of this Court, the Court shall proceed to resolve
the Motion for Bill of Particulars.[8]
On 27 September 1994, the Cerezo spouses
filed an urgent ex-parte motion for
reconsideration. The trial court denied the
motion for reconsideration.
On 14 November 1994, the trial court
issued an order directing the Cerezo spouses to
file their answer within fifteen days from receipt
of the order. The Cerezo spouses did not file an
answer. On 27 January 1995, Tuazon filed a
motion to declare the Cerezo spouses in
default. On6 February 1995, the trial court
issued an order declaring the Cerezo spouses in
default and authorizing Tuazon to present his
evidence. [9]
On 30 May 1995, after considering Tuazons
testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial
court ruled in Tuazons favor. The trial court
made no pronouncement on Forondas liability
because there was no service of summons on
him. The trial court did not hold Atty. Cerezo
liable as Tuazon failed to show that Mrs. Cerezos
business benefited the family, pursuant to Article
121(3) of the Family Code. The trial court held
Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the damages
sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence
of Mrs. Cerezos employee, pursuant to Article
2180 of the Civil Code. The dispositive portion of
the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the defendant Hermana Cerezo to pay
the plaintiff:
a) For Actual Damages
1) Expenses for operation and
medical
Treatment - P69,485.35
2) Cost of repair of the
tricycle - 39,921.00
b) For loss of earnings - 43,300.00
c) For moral damages - 20,000.00
d) And to pay the cost of the suit.
The docket fees and other expenses in the filing
of this suit shall be lien on whatever judgment
may be rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Mrs. Cerezo received a copy of the decision
on 25 June 1995. On 10 July 1995, Mrs. Cerezo
filed before the trial court a petition for relief
from judgment on the grounds of fraud, mistake
or excusable negligence. Testifying before the
trial court, both Mrs. Cerezo and Atty. Valera
denied receipt of notices of hearings and of
orders of the court. Atty. Valera added that he
received no notice before or during the 8 May
1995 elections, when he was a senatorial
candidate for the KBL Party, and very busy, using
his office and residence as Party National
Headquarters. Atty. Valera claimed that he was
able to read the decision of the trial court only
after Mrs. Cerezo sent him a copy.[11]
Tuazon did not testify but presented
documentary evidence to prove the participation
of the Cerezo spouses in the case. Tuazon
presented the following exhibits:
Exhibit 1 - Sheriffs return and
summons;
Exhibit 1-A - Alias summons
dated April 20, 1994;
Exhibit 2 - Comment with Motion;
Exhibit 3 - Minutes of the hearing
held on August 1, 1994;
Exhibit 3-A - Signature of defendants
counsel;
Exhibit 4 - Minutes of the hearing
held on August 30, 1994;
Exhibit 4-A - Signature of the
defendants counsel;
Exhibit 5 - Appearance and Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion;
Exhibit 6 - Order dated November 14,
1994;
Exhibit 6-A - Postal certification
dated January 13, 1995;
Exhibit 7 - Order dated February
[illegible];
Exhibit 7-A - Courts return slip
addressed to Atty. Elpidio
Valera;
Exhibit 7-B - Courts return slip
addressed to Spouses Juan
and Hermana Cerezo;
Exhibit 8 - Decision dated May [30],
1995
Exhibit 8-A - Courts return slip
addressed to defendant Hermana
Cerezo;
Exhibit 8-B - Courts return slip
addressed to defendants counsel,
Atty. Elpidio Valera;
Exhibit 9 - Order dated September 21,
1995;
Exhibit 9-A - Second Page of Exhibit
9;
Exhibit 9-B - Third page of Exhibit 9;
Exhibit 9-C - Fourth page of Exhibit 9;
Exhibit 9-D - Courts return slip
addressed to Atty. Elpidio Valera;
and
Exhibit 9-E - Courts return slip
addressed to plaintiffs counsel,
Atty. Norman Dick de Guzman.[12]
On 4 March 1998, the trial court issued an
order[13] denying the petition for relief from
judgment. The trial court stated that having
received the decision on 25 June 1995, the
Cerezo spouses should have filed a notice of
appeal instead of resorting to a petition for relief
from judgment. The trial court refused to grant
relief from judgment because the Cerezo spouses
could have availed of the remedy of appeal.
Moreover, the Cerezo spouses not only failed to
prove fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence by conclusive evidence, they also
failed to prove that they had a good and
substantial defense. The trial court noted that
the Cerezo spouses failed to appeal because they
relied on an expected settlement of the case.
The Cerezo spouses subsequently filed
before the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorariunder Section 1 of Rule 65. The
petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
48132.[14] The petition questioned whether the
trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case
considering there was no service of summons on
Foronda, whom the Cerezo spouses claimed was
an indispensable party. In a
resolution[15] dated 21 January 1999, the Court
of Appeals denied the petition for certiorariand
affirmed the trial courts order denying the
petition for relief from judgment. The Court of
Appeals declared that the Cerezo spouses failure
to file an answer was due to their own
negligence, considering that they continued to
participate in the proceedings without filing an
answer. There was also nothing in the records to
show that the Cerezo spouses actually offered a
reasonable settlement to Tuazon. The Court of
Appeals also denied Cerezo spouses motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Cerezo spouses filed before this Court
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45.Atty. Cerezo himself signed the petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 137593. On 13 April 1999,
this Court rendered a resolution denying the
petition for review on certiorari for failure to
attach an affidavit of service of copies of the
petition to the Court of Appeals and to the
adverse parties.Even if the petition complied
with this requirement, the Court would still have
denied the petition as the Cerezo spouses failed
to show that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error. The Courts resolution was
entered in the Book of Entries and Judgments
when it became final and executory on 28 June
1999.[16]
Undaunted, the Cerezo spouses filed before
the Court of Appeals on 6 July 1999 a petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 with
prayer for restraining order. Atty. Valera and
Atty. Dionisio S. Daga (Atty. Daga) represented
Mrs. Cerezo in the petition, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 53572.[17] The petition prayed for the
annulment of the 30 May 1995 decision of the
trial court and for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining execution of the
trial courts decision pending resolution of the
petition.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition
for annulment of judgment in a resolution
dated 21 October 1999. The resolution reads in
part:
In this case, records show that the petitioner
previously filed with the lower court a Petition
for Relief from Judgment on the ground that they
were wrongfully declared in default while
waiting for an amicable settlement of the
complaint for damages. The court a quo correctly
ruled that such petition is without merit. The
defendant spouses admit that during the initial
hearing they appeared before the court and even
mentioned the need for an amicable
settlement. Thus, the lower court acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant spouses.
Therefore, petitioner having availed of a petition
for relief, the remedy of an annulment of
judgment is no longer available. The proper
action for the petitioner is to appeal the order of
the lower court denying the petition for relief.
Wherefore, the instant petition could not be
given due course and should accordingly be
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[18]
On 20 January 2000, the Court of Appeals
denied the Cerezo spouses motion for
reconsideration.[19] The Court of Appeals stated:
A distinction should be made between a courts
jurisdiction over a person and its jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case. The former is
acquired by the proper service of summons or by
the parties voluntary appearance; while the
latter is conferred by law.
Resolving the matter of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, Section 19(1) of B[atas]
P[ambansa] 129 provides that Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Thus it was proper for the lower
court to decide the instant case for damages.
Unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case which is absolute and conferred by law; any
defects [sic] in the acquisition of jurisdiction
over a person (i.e., improper filing of civil
complaint or improper service of summons) may
be waived by the voluntary appearance of
parties.
The lower court admits the fact that no summons
was served on defendant Foronda. Thus,
jurisdiction over the person of defendant
Foronda was not acquired, for which reason he
was not held liable in this case. However, it has
been proven that jurisdiction over the other
defendants was validly acquired by the court a
quo.
The defendant spouses admit to having appeared
in the initial hearings and in the hearing for
plaintiffs motion to litigate as a pauper. They
even mentioned conferences where attempts
were made to reach an amicable settlement with
plaintiff. However, the possibility of amicable
settlement is not a good and substantial defense
which will warrant the granting of said petition.
xxx
Assuming arguendo that private respondent
failed to reserve his right to institute a separate
action for damages in the criminal action, the
petitioner cannot now raise such issue and
question the lower courts jurisdiction because
petitioner and her husband have waived such
right by voluntarily appearing in the civil case for
damages. Therefore, the findings and the
decision of the lower court may bind them.
Records show that the petitioner previously filed
with the lower court a Petition for Relief from
Judgment on the ground that they were
wrongfully declared in default while waiting for
an amicable settlement of the complaint for
damages. The court a quo correctly ruled that
such petition is without merit, jurisdiction
having been acquired by the voluntary
appearance of defendant spouses.
Once again, it bears stressing that having availed
of a petition for relief, the remedy of annulment
of judgment is no longer available.
Based on the foregoing, the motion for
reconsideration could not be given due course
and is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[20]
The Issues
On 7 February 2000, Mrs. Cerezo, this time
with Atty. Daga alone representing her, filed the
present petition for review on certiorari before
this Court. Mrs. Cerezo claims that:
1. In dismissing the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment, the Court
of Appeals assumes that the
issues raised in the petition for
annulment is based on extrinsic
fraud related to the denied
petition for relief notwithstanding
that the grounds relied upon
involves questions of lack of
jurisdiction.
2. In dismissing the Petition for
Annulment, the Court of Appeals
disregarded the allegation that
the lower court[s] findings of
negligence against defendant-
driver Danilo Foronda [whom]
the lower court did not summon
is null and void for want of due
process and consequently, such
findings of negligence which is
[sic] null and void cannot become
the basis of the lower court to
adjudge petitioner-employer
liable for civil damages.
3. In dismissing the Petition for
Annulment, the Court of Appeals
ignored the allegation that
defendant-driver Danilo A.
Foronda whose negligence is the
main issue is an indispensable
party whose presence is
compulsory but [whom] the
lower court did not summon.
4. In dismissing the Petition for
Annulment, the Court of Appeals
ruled that assuming arguendothat
private respondent failed to
reserve his right to institute a
separate action for damages in
the criminal action, the petitioner
cannot now raise such issue and
question the lower courts
jurisdiction because petitioner
[has] waived such right by
voluntarily appearing in the civil
case for damages notwithstanding
that lack of jurisdiction cannot be
waived.[21]
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit. As the issues are
interrelated, we shall discuss them jointly.
Remedies Available
to a Party Declared in Default
An examination of the records of the entire
proceedings shows that three lawyers filed and
signed pleadings on behalf of Mrs. Cerezo,
namely, Atty. Daga, Atty. Valera, and Atty.
Cerezo.Despite their number, Mrs. Cerezos
counsels failed to avail of the proper remedies. It
is either by sheer ignorance or by malicious
manipulation of legal technicalities that they
have managed to delay the disposition of the
present case, to the detriment of pauper litigant
Tuazon.
Mrs. Cerezo claims she did not receive any
copy of the order declaring the Cerezo spouses in
default. Mrs. Cerezo asserts that she only came to
know of the default order on 25 June 1995, when
she received a copy of the decision. On 10 July
1995, Mrs. Cerezo filed before the trial court a
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38,
alleging fraud, mistake, or excusable negligence
as grounds. On 4 March 1998, the trial court
denied Mrs. Cerezos petition for relief from
judgment.The trial court stated that Mrs. Cerezo
could have availed of appeal as a remedy and
that she failed to prove that the judgment was
entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence. Mrs. Cerezo then filed
before the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65 assailing
the denial of the petition for relief from
judgment. On 21 January 1999, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Mrs. Cerezos petition. On 24
February 1999, the appellate court denied Mrs.
Cerezos motion for reconsideration. On 11
March 1999, Mrs. Cerezo filed before this Court a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
questioning the denial of the petition for relief
from judgment. We denied the petition and our
resolution became final and executory on 28
June 1999.
On 6 July 1999, a mere eight days after our
resolution became final and executory, Mrs.
Cerezo filed before the Court of Appeals a
petition for annulment of the judgment of the
trial court under Rule 47. Meanwhile, on 25
August 1999, the trial court issued over the
objection of Mrs. Cerezo an order of execution of
the judgment in Civil Case No. 7415. On 21
October 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for annulment of judgment. On 20
January 2000, the Court of Appeals denied Mrs.
Cerezos motion for reconsideration. On 7
February 2000, Mrs. Cerezo filed the present
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
challenging the dismissal of her petition for
annulment of judgment.
Lina v. Court of Appeals[22] enumerates
the remedies available to a party declared in
default:
a) The defendant in default may, at
any time after discovery thereof
and before judgment, file
amotion under oath to set aside
the order of default on the
ground that his failure to answer
was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence,
and that he has a meritorious
defense (Sec. 3, Rule 18 [now Sec.
3(b), Rule 9]);
b) If the judgment has already been
rendered when the defendant
discovered the default, but before
the same has become final and
executory, he may file a motion
for new trial under Section 1 (a)
of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the
default after the judgment has
become final and executory, he
may file a petition for
relief under Section 2 [now
Section 1] of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the
judgment rendered against him as
contrary to the evidence or to the
law, even if no petition to set
aside the order of default has
been presented by him (Sec. 2,
Rule 41). (Emphasis added)
Moreover, a petition for certiorari to
declare the nullity of a judgment by default is
also available if the trial court improperly
declared a party in default, or even if the trial
court properly declared a party in default, if
grave abuse of discretion attended such
declaration.[23]
Mrs. Cerezo admitted that she received a
copy of the trial courts decision on 25 June
1995.Based on this admission, Mrs. Cerezo had
at least three remedies at her disposal: an
appeal, a motion for new trial, or a petition
for certiorari.
Mrs. Cerezo could have appealed under
Rule 41[24] from the default judgment within 15
days from notice of the judgment. She could have
availed of the power of the Court of Appeals to
try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence,
and perform all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases falling within its appellate
jurisdiction.[25]
Mrs. Cerezo also had the option to file
under Rule 37[26] a motion for new trial within
the period for taking an appeal. If the trial court
grants a new trial, the original judgment is
vacated, and the action will stand for trial de
novo. The recorded evidence taken in the former
trial, as far as the same is material and
competent to establish the issues, shall be used
at the new trial without retaking the same.[27]
Mrs. Cerezo also had the alternative of
filing under Rule 65[28] a petition
for certiorari assailing the order of default within
60 days from notice of the judgment. An order of
default is interlocutory, and an aggrieved party
may file an appropriate special civil action under
Rule 65.[29] In a petition for certiorari, the
appellate court may declare void both the order
of default and the judgment of default.
Clearly, Mrs. Cerezo had every opportunity
to avail of these remedies within the
reglementary periods provided under the Rules
of Court. However, Mrs. Cerezo opted to file a
petition for relief from judgment, which is
available only in exceptional cases. A petition
for relief from judgment should be filed within
the reglementary period of 60 days from
knowledge of judgment and six months from
entry of judgment, pursuant to
Rule 38 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.[30] Tuason v. Court of
Appeals[31] explained the nature of a petition for
relief from judgment:
When a party has another remedy available to
him, which may either be a motion for new trial
or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial
court, and he was not prevented by fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence from
filing such motion or taking such appeal, he
cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed,
relief will not be granted to a party who seeks
avoidance from the effects of the judgment when
the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can
be used to revive the right to appeal which has
been lost thru inexcusable negligence.
Evidently, there was no fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence that prevented
Mrs. Cerezo from filing an appeal, a motion for
new trial or a petition for certiorari. It was error
for her to avail of a petition for relief from
judgment.
After our resolution denying Mrs. Cerezos
petition for relief became final and executory,
Mrs. Cerezo, in her last ditch attempt to evade
liability, filed before the Court of Appeals a
petition for annulment of the judgment of the
trial court. Annulment is available only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, a party
must file the petition within four years from its
discovery, and if based on lack of jurisdiction,
before laches or estoppel bars the
petition. Extrinsic fraud is not a valid ground if
such fraud was used as a ground, or could have
been used as a ground, in a motion for new trial
or petition for relief from judgment.[32]
Mrs. Cerezo insists that lack of jurisdiction,
not extrinsic fraud, was her ground for filing the
petition for annulment of judgment. However, a
party may avail of the remedy of annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 only if the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
from judgment, or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of the
party.[33]Mrs. Cerezo could have availed of a new
trial or appeal but through her own fault she
erroneously availed of the remedy of a petition
for relief, which was denied with finality. Thus,
Mrs. Cerezo may no longer avail of the remedy of
annulment.
In any event, the trial court clearly
acquired jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezos
person. Mrs. Cerezo actively participated in the
proceedings before the trial court, submitting
herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. The
defense of lack of jurisdiction fails in light of her
active participation in the trial court
proceedings. Estoppel or laches may also bar
lack of jurisdiction as a ground for nullity
especially if raised for the first time on appeal by
a party who participated in the proceedings
before the trial court, as what happened in this
case.[34]
For these reasons, the present petition
should be dismissed for utter lack of merit. The
extraordinary action to annul a final judgment is
restricted to the grounds specified in the
rules.The reason for the restriction is to prevent
this extraordinary action from being used by a
losing party to make a complete farce of a duly
promulgated decision that has long become final
and executory. There would be no end to
litigation if parties who have unsuccessfully
availed of any of the appropriate remedies or
lost them through their fault could still bring an
action for annulment of
judgment.[35] Nevertheless, we shall discuss the
issues raised in the present petition to clear any
doubt about the correctness of the decision of
the trial court.
Mrs. Cerezos Liability and the
Trial Courts Acquisition of Jurisdiction
Mrs. Cerezo contends that the basis of the
present petition for annulment is lack of
jurisdiction. Mrs. Cerezo asserts that the trial
court could not validly render judgment since it
failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. Mrs.
Cerezo points out that there was no service of
summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed
to reserve his right to institute a separate civil
action for damages in the criminal action. Such
contention betrays a faulty foundation. Mrs.
Cerezos contention proceeds from the point of
view of criminal law and not of civil law, while
the basis of the present action of Tuazon is quasi-
delict under the Civil Code, not delict under the
Revised Penal Code.
The same negligent act may produce civil
liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an
action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. An aggrieved party may choose
between the two remedies. An action based on a
quasi-delict may proceed independently from
the criminal action.[36] There is, however, a
distinction between civil liability arising from a
delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-
delict.The choice of remedy, whether to sue for a
delict or a quasi-delict, affects the procedural
and jurisdictional issues of the action.[37]
Tuazon chose to file an action for damages
based on a quasi-delict. In his complaint, Tuazon
alleged that Mrs. Cerezo, without exercising due
care and diligence in the supervision and
management of her employees and buses, hired
Foronda as her driver. Tuazon became disabled
because of Forondas recklessness, gross
negligence and imprudence, aggravated by Mrs.
Cerezos lack of due care and diligence in the
selection and supervision of her employees,
particularly Foronda.[38]
The trial court thus found Mrs. Cerezo
liable under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. Article 2180 states in part:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos assertion,
Foronda is not an indispensable party to the
case. An indispensable party is one whose
interest is affected by the courts action in the
litigation, and without whom no final resolution
of the case is possible.[39] However, Mrs. Cerezos
liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-
delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and
direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party to
the final resolution of Tuazons action for
damages against Mrs. Cerezo.
The responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary.[40]Where there is a solidary obligation
on the part of debtors, as in this case, each
debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence,
each debtor is liable to pay for the entire
obligation in full. There is no merger or
renunciation of rights, but only mutual
representation.[41] Where the obligation of the
parties is solidary, either of the parties is
indispensable, and the other is not even a
necessary party because complete relief is
available from either.[42] Therefore, jurisdiction
over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon
may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
Moreover, an employers liability based on
a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the
employers liability based on a delict is merely
subsidiary.[43] The words primary and direct, as
contrasted with subsidiary, refer to the remedy
provided by law for enforcing the obligation
rather than to the character and limits of the
obligation.[44] Although liability under Article
2180 originates from the negligent act of the
employee, the aggrieved party may sue the
employer directly. When an employee causes
damage, the law presumes that the employer has
himself committed an act of negligence in not
preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the
fault that the law condemns.While the employer
is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the
employees criminal negligence, the employer is
also civilly liable directly and separately for his
own civil negligence in failing to exercise due
diligence in selecting and supervising his
employee. The idea that the employers liability is
solely subsidiary is wrong.[45]
The action can be brought directly against the
person responsible (for another), without
including the author of the act. The action
against the principal is accessory in the sense
that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act
committed by the employee, but it is not
subsidiary in the sense that it can not be
instituted till after the judgment against the
author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary
to the principal action; the action for
responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a
principal action.[46]
Thus, there is no need in this case for the
trial court to acquire jurisdiction over
Foronda. The trial courts acquisition of
jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to
dispose of the present case on the merits.
In contrast, an action based on a delict
seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the
employer for the criminal negligence of the
employee as provided in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. To hold the employer liable
in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the
aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action
where the employees delict and corresponding
primary liability are established.[47] If the
present action proceeds from a delict, then the
trial courts jurisdiction over Foronda is
necessary. However, the present action is clearly
for the quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the
delict of Foronda.
The Cerezo spouses contention that
summons be served anew on them is untenable
in light of their participation in the trial court
proceedings. To uphold the Cerezo spouses
contention would make a fetish of a
technicality.[48] Moreover, any irregularity in the
service of summons that might have vitiated the
trial courts jurisdiction over the persons of the
Cerezo spouses was deemed waived when the
Cerezo spouses filed a petition for relief from
judgment.[49]
We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction
and was competent to decide the case in favor of
Tuazon and against Mrs. Cerezo even in the
absence of Foronda. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos
contention, Foronda is not an indispensable
party to the present case. It is not even necessary
for Tuazon to reserve the filing of a separate civil
action because he opted to file a civil action for
damages against Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily
and directly liable for her own civil
negligence. The words of Justice Jorge Bocobo
in Barredo v. Garcia still hold true today as
much as it did in 1942:
x x x [T]o hold that there is only one way to make
defendants liability effective, and that is, to sue
the driver and exhaust his (the latters) property
first, would be tantamount to compelling the
plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome
method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a
remedy under our laws, but there is also a more
expeditious way, which is based on the primary
and direct responsibility of the defendant under
article [2180] of the Civil Code. Our view of the
law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil
wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the
defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it
being a matter of common knowledge that
professional drivers of taxis and other similar
public conveyances do not have sufficient means
with which to pay damages. Why, then, should
the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through
this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably
useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts
have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the
pathways of right and justice.[50]
Interest at the rate of 6% per annum is due
on the amount of damages adjudged by the trial
court.[51] The 6% per annum interest shall
commence from 30 May 1995, the date of the
decision of the trial court. Upon finality of this
decision, interest at 12% per annum, in lieu of
6% per annum, is due on the amount of damages
adjudged by the trial court until full payment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant
petition for review. The Resolution dated 21
October 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 53572, as well as its Resolution dated 20
January 2000 denying the motion for
reconsideration, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONthat the amount due shall
earn legal interest at 6% per annum computed
from 30 May 1995, the date of the trial courts
decision. Upon finality of this decision, the
amount due shall earn interest at 12% per
annum, in lieu of 6% per annum, until full
payment.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-
Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., on official leave.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112346. March 29, 1996]
EVELYN YONAHA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF HECTOR
CAETE, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
From the decision of the Court of Appeals
dismissing for lack of merit the petition
forcertiorari, with prayer for preliminary
injunction, filed by Evelyn Yonaha against an
order, dated 29 May 1992, of the Regional Trial
Court[1] which had granted private respondents
motion for the issuance of a writ of subsidiary
execution, the instant appeal was taken.
In Criminal Case No. 01 106-L, Elmer
Ouano was charged with the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting In Homicide in an
information which averred -
That on April 14, 1990, at or about 11:45 A.M., in
Basak, Lapulapu City, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
aforenamed accused, while driving a Toyota
Tamaraw sporting Plate No. GCX-237 duly
registered in the name of Raul Cabahug and
owned by EK SEA Products, did then and there
unlawfully and feloniously maneuver and
operate it in a negligent and reckless manner,
without taking the necessary precaution to avoid
injuries to person and damage to property, as a
result thereof the motor vehicle he was then
driving bumped and hit Hector Caete, which
caused the latters instantaneous death, due to
the multiple severe traumatic injuries at
different parts of his body.[2]
When arraigned, the accused pleaded
guilty and, on 09 March 1992, the trial court
pronounced its judgment
Finding therefore the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged
against him and taking into account the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender
and plea of guilty which the prosecuting fiscal
readily accepted, the Court hereby sentences the
accused to suffer and undergo an imprisonment
of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months and
to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of
P50,000.00 for the death of the victim;
P30,000.00 for actual damages incurred in
connection with the burial and the nightly prayer
of the deceased victim and P10,000.00 as
attorneys fees.[3]
On 27 April 1992, a writ of execution was
issued for the satisfaction of the monetary
award. In his Return of Service, dated 07 May
1992, the MTCC Deputy City Sheriff stated that
he had served the writ on accused Elmer Ouano
but that the latter had manifested his inability to
pay the money obligation.
Forthwith, private respondents presented
a motion for subsidiary execution with neither a
notice of hearing nor notice to petitioner. Acting
on the motion, nevertheless, the trial court
issued an order, dated 29 May 1992, directing
the issuance of a writ of subsidiary
execution. The sheriff went to petitioners
residence to enforce the writ, and it was then,
allegedly for the first time, that petitioner was
informed of Ouanos conviction. Petitioner filed a
motion to stay and to recall the subsidiary writ
of execution principally anchored on the lack of
prior notice to her and on the fact that the
employers liability had yet to be
established. Private respondents opposed the
motion.
On 24 August 1992, the trial court denied
petitioners motion. On 23 September 1992,
petitioners plea for reconsideration of the denial
was likewise rejected.
Petitioner promptly elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP No. 29116) for
review. The appellate court initially restrained
the implementation of the assailed orders and
issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the
filing of a P10,000.00 bond. Ultimately, however,
the appellate court, in its decision of 28
September 1993, dismissed the petition for lack
of merit and thereby lifted the writ of
preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals
ratiocinated:
We are not unmindful of the ruling in the
aforecited case of Lucia
Pajarito vs. Seneris, supra. - that enforcement of
the secondary or subsidiary liability of employer
may be done by motion in the same criminal
case, a recourse which presupposes a
hearing. But even assuming that issuance of writ
of subsidiary execution requires notice and
hearing, we believe a hearing in the present case
would be sheer rigmarole, an unnecessary
formality, because, as employer, petitioner
became subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of
her accused driver, Elmer Ouano, and proof of
the latters insolvency. And if she had any defense
to free herself from such subsidiary liability, she
could have ventilated and substantiated the
same in connection with her (petitioners)
motion to stay and recall the writ of subsidiary
execution in question. But from her said motion,
it can be gleaned that except for the protestation
of violation of due process, and absence of notice
to her of the motion for issuance of a writ of
subsidiary execution, petitioner intimated no
defense which could absolve her of subsidiary
liability under the premises. Then, too, after the
denial of her motion to stay and recall subject
writ, petitioner moved for reconsideration but in
her motion for reconsideration, she averred no
exculpatory facts which could save her from
subsidiary liability, as employer of the convicted
Elmer Ouano.[4]
In the instant appeal, petitioner
additionally reminds the Court that Ouanos
conviction was not the result of a finding of proof
beyond reasonable doubt but from his
spontaneous plea of guilt.
We find merit in the petition.
The statutory basis for an employers
subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code.[5] This Court has since
sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary
liability in the same criminal proceedings in
which the employee is adjudged guilty,[6] on the
thesis that it really is a part of, and merely an
incident in, the execution process of the
judgment. But, execution against the employer
must not issue as just a matter of course, and it
behooves the court, as a measure of due process
to the employer, to determine and resolve a
priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal
applicability and propriety of the employers
liability. The requirement is mandatory even
when it appears prima facie that execution
against the convicted employee cannot be
satisfied. The court must convince itself that the
convicted employee is in truth in the employ of
the employer; that the latter is engaged in an
industry of some kind; that the employee has
committed the crime to which civil liability
attaches while in the performance of his duties
as such; and that execution against the employee
is unsuccessful by reason of insolvency.[7]
The assumption that, since petitioner in
this case did not aver any exculpatory facts in
her motion to stay and recall, as well as in her
motion for reconsideration, which could save her
from liability, a hearing would be a futile and a
sheer rigmarole is unacceptable. The employer
must be given his full day in court.
To repeat, the subsidiary liability of an
employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code requires (a) the existence of an employer-
employee relationship; (b) that the employer is
engaged in some kind of industry; (c) that the
employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act
and found to have committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties (not necessarily any
offense he commits while in the discharge of
such duties); and (d) that said employee is
insolvent. The judgment of conviction of the
employee, of course, concludes the
employer[8] and the subsidiary liability may be
enforced in the same criminal case, but to afford
the employer due process, the court should hear
and decide that liability on the basis of the
conditions required therefor by law.[9]
WHEREFORE, finding the order, dated 29
May 1992, as well as the order of 24 August
1992to have been improvidently issued, said
orders are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner shall be
given the right to a hearing on the motion for the
issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution filed by
private respondents, and the case is REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings
conformably with our foregoing opinion. No
costs.
Padilla, Bellosillo,
Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
PALAFOX VS PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122191. October 8, 1998]
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P.
MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A.
ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set
aside the Resolution[1] dated September 27, 1995
and the Decision[2] dated April 10, 1996 of the
Court of Appeals[3] in CA-G.R. SP No.
36533,[4] and the Orders[5] dated August 29,
1994[6] and February 2, 1995[7] that were issued
by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-93-18394.[8]
The pertinent antecedent facts which gave
rise to the instant petition, as stated in the
questioned Decision[9], are as follows:
On January 21, 1988 defendant
SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight
Attendant for its airlines based in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. x x x
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over
in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to
a disco dance with fellow crew
members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and
Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi
nationals. Because it was almost
morning when they returned to their
hotels, they agreed to have breakfast
together at the room of
Thamer. When they were in te (sic)
room, Allah left on some
pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer
attempted to rape
plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and
several security personnel heard her
cries for help and rescued her. Later,
the Indonesian police came and
arrested Thamer and Allah Al-
Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a
few days later, several SAUDIA
officials interrogated her about the
Jakarta incident. They then requested
her to go back to Jakarta to help
arrange the release of Thamer and
Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer
Sirah Akkad and base manager
Baharini negotiated with the police
for the immediate release of the
detained crew members but did not
succeed because plaintiff refused to
cooperate. She was afraid that she
might be tricked into something she
did not want because of her inability
to understand the local dialect. She
also declined to sign a blank paper
and a document written in the local
dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed
plaintiff to return to Jeddah but
barred her from the Jakarta flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the
intercession of the Saudi Arabian
government, the Indonesian
authorities agreed to deport Thamer
and Allah after two weeks of
detention.Eventually, they were again
put in service by defendant SAUDI
(sic). In September 1990, defendant
SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to
Manila.
On January 14, 1992, just when
plaintiff thought that the Jakarta
incident was already behind her, her
superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali
Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of
SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia. When she saw him, he
brought her to the police station
where the police took her passport
and questioned her about the Jakarta
incident.Miniewy simply stood by as
the police put pressure on her to
make a statement dropping the case
against Thamer and Allah. Not until
she agreed to do so did the police
return her passport and allowed her
to catch the afternoon flight out of
Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on June
16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a
few minutes before the departure of
her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not
allowed to board the plane and
instead ordered to take a later flight
to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the
Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When
she did, a certain Khalid of the
SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi
court where she was asked to sign a
document written in Arabic. They told
her that this was necessary to close
the case against Thamer and Allah. As
it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice
to her to appear before the court on
June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned
to Manila.
Shortly afterwards, defendant
SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report
to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy
on June 27, 1993 for further
investigation. Plaintiff did so after
receiving assurance from SAUDIAs
Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that
the investigation was routinary and
that it posed no danger to her.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer
brought plaintiff to the same Saudi
court on June 27, 1993. Nothing
happened then but on June 28, 1993,
a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff
through an interpreter about the
Jakarta incident. After one hour of
interrogation, they let her go. At the
airport, however, just as her plane
was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer
told her that the airline had forbidden
her to take flight. At the Inflight
Service Office where she was told to
go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick
took away her passport and told her
to remain in Jeddah, at the crew
quarters, until further orders.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer
again escorted plaintiff to the same
court where the judge, to her
astonishment and shock, rendered a
decision, translated to her in English,
sentencing her to five months
imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only
then did she realize that the Saudi
court had tried her, together with
Thamer and Allah, for what happened
in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff
guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a
disco, dancing and listening to the
music in violation of Islamic laws; and
(3) socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition.[10]
Facing conviction, private respondent
sought the help of her employer, petitioner
SAUDIA.Unfortunately, she was denied any
assistance. She then asked the Philippine
Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is
on appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she
worked on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while
Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the
international flights.[11]
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the
Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her
and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly
before her return to Manila,[12] she was
terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without
her being informed of the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a
Complaint[13] for damages against SAUDIA, and
Khaled Al-Balawi (Al- Balawi), its country
manager.
On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an
Omnibus Motion To Dismiss[14] which raised the
following grounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint
states no cause of action against Saudia; (2) that
defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in
interest; (3) that the claim or demand set forth in
the Complaint has been waived, abandoned or
otherwise extinguished; and (4) that the trial
court has no jurisdiction to try the case.
 On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her
Opposition (To Motion to Dismiss)[15] Saudia
filed a reply[16] thereto on March 3, 1994.
On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an
Amended Complaint[17] wherein Al-Balawi was
dropped as party defendant. On August 11, 1994,
Saudia filed its Manifestation and Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint[18].
The trial court issued an Order[19] dated
August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint filed by Saudia.
From the Order of respondent
Judge[20] denying the Motion to Dismiss, SAUDIA
filed on September 20, 1994, its Motion for
Reconsideration[21] of the Order dated August 29,
1994. It alleged that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to hear and try the case on the basis
of Article 21 of the Civil Code, since the proper
law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. On October 14, 1994, Morada filed her
Opposition[22] (To Defendants Motion for
Reconsideration).
In the Reply[23] filed with the trial court on
October 24, 1994, SAUDIA alleged that since its
Motion for Reconsideration raised lack of
jurisdiction as its cause of action, the Omnibus
Motion Rule does not apply, even if that ground
is raised for the first time on
appeal. Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that the
Philippines does not have any substantial
interest in the prosecution of the instant case,
and hence, without jurisdiction to adjudicate the
same.
Respondent Judge subsequently issued
another Order[24] dated February 2, 1995,
denying SAUDIAs Motion for
Reconsideration. The pertinent portion of the
assailed Order reads as follows:
Acting on the Motion for
Reconsideration of defendant Saudi
Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel,
on September 20, 1994, and the
Opposition thereto of the plaintiff
filed, thru counsel, on October 14,
1994, as well as the Reply therewith
of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines
filed, thru counsel, on October 24,
1994, considering that a perusal of
the plaintiffs Amended Complaint,
which is one for the recovery of
actual, moral and exemplary
damages plus attorneys fees, upon
the basis of the applicable Philippine
law, Article 21 of the New Civil Code
of the Philippines, is, clearly, within
the jurisdiction of this Court as
regards the subject matter, and there
being nothing new of substance
which might cause the reversal or
modification of the order sought to
be reconsidered, the motion for
reconsideration of the defendant, is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Consequently, on February 20, 1995,
SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order[26]with the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated
a Resolution with Temporary Restraining
Order[27]dated February 23, 1995, prohibiting
the respondent Judge from further conducting
any proceeding, unless otherwise directed, in the
interim.
In another Resolution[28] promulgated on
September 27, 1995, now assailed, the appellate
court denied SAUDIAs Petition for the Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated
February 18, 1995, to wit:
The Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
hereby DENIED, after considering
the Answer, with Prayer to Deny
Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Rollo,
p. 135) the Reply and Rejoinder, it
appearing that herein petitioner is
not clearly entitled thereto (Unciano
Paramedical College, et. Al., v. Court
of Appeals, et. Al., 100335, April 7,
1993, Second Division).
SO ORDERED.
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with
this Honorable Court the instant Petition[29] for
Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order dated October 13, 1995.
However, during the pendency of the
instant Petition, respondent Court of Appeals
rendered the Decision[30] dated April 10, 1996,
now also assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is
an appropriate forum considering that the
Amended Complaints basis for recovery of
damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus,
clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent
Court. It further held that certiorari is not the
proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss,
inasmuch as the petitioner should have
proceeded to trial, and in case of an adverse
ruling, find recourse in an appeal.
On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its
Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order[31] dated April
30, 1996, given due course by this Court. After
both parties submitted their Memoranda,[32] the
instant case is now deemed submitted for
decision.
Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following
issues:
I HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL
The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try
Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 based on Article 21 of
the New Civil Code since the proper law
applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia inasmuch as this case involves what is
known in private international law as a conflicts
problem.Otherwise, the Republic of the
Philippines will sit in judgment of the acts done
by another sovereign state which is abhorred.
II.
Leave of court before filing a supplemental
pleading is not a jurisdictional
requirement. Besides, the matter as to absence of
leave of court is now moot and academic when
this Honorable Court required the respondents
to comment on petitioners April 30, 1996
Supplemental Petition For Review With Prayer
For A Temporary Restraining Order Within Ten
(10) Days From Notice Thereof. Further, the
Revised Rules of Court should be construed with
liberality pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1 thereof.
III.
Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the April
10, 1996 decision in CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533
entitled Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Hon. Rodolfo A.
Ortiz, et al. and filed its April 30, 1996
Supplemental Petition For Review With Prayer
For A Temporary Restraining Order on May 7,
1996 at 10:29 a.m. or within the 15-day
reglementary period as provided for under
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Therefore, the decision in CA-G.R. SP NO.
36533 has not yet become final and executory
and this Honorable Court can take cognizance of
this case.[33]
From the foregoing factual and procedural
antecedents, the following issues emerge for our
resolution:
I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT
APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS
JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY
CIVIL CASE NO. Q-93-18394
ENTITLED MILAGROS P. MORADA V.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES.
II.
WHETHER RESPONDENT
APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
RULING THAT IN THE CASE
PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD GOVERN.
Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is
a conflict of laws that must be settled at the
outset.It maintains that private respondents
claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the
existence of a foreign element qualifies the
instant case for the application of the law of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci
delicti commissirule.[34]
 On the other hand, private respondent
contends that since her Amended Complaint is
based on Articles 19[35] and 21[36] of the Civil
Code, then the instant case is properly a matter
of domestic law.[37]
Under the factual antecedents obtaining in
this case, there is no dispute that the interplay of
events occurred in two states, the Philippines
and Saudi Arabia.
As stated by private respondent in her
Amended Complaint[38] dated June 23, 1994:
2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN
AIRLINES or SAUDIA is a foreign
airlines corporation doing business
in the Philippines. It may be served
with summons and other court
processes at Travel Wide Associated
Sales (Phils.), Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar
Building, 114 Valero St., Salcedo
Village, Makati, Metro Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
6. Plaintiff learned that, through the
intercession of the Saudi Arabian
government, the Indonesian
authorities agreed to deport Thamer
and Allah after two weeks of
detention.Eventually, they were
again put in service by defendant
SAUDIA. In September 1990,
defendant SAUDIA transferred
plaintiff to Manila.
7. On January 14, 1992, just when
plaintiff thought that the Jakarta
incident was already behind her, her
superiors requested her to see MR.
Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of
SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia. When she saw him, he
brought her to the police station
where the police took her passport
and questioned her about the Jakarta
incident. Miniewy simply stood by as
the police put pressure on her to
make a statement dropping the case
against Thamer and Allah. Not until
she agreed to do so did the police
return her passport and allowed her
to catch the afternoon flight out of
Jeddah.
8. One year and a half later or on
June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, a few minutes before the
departure of her flight to Manila,
plaintiff was not allowed to board
the plane and instead ordered to
take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr.
Meniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of
SAUDIA. When she did, a certain
Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought
her to a Saudi court where she was
asked to sign a document written in
Arabic. They told her that this was
necessary to close the case against
Thamer and Allah. As it turned out,
plaintiff signed a notice to her to
appear before the court on June 27,
1993. Plaintiff then returned to
Manila.
9. Shortly afterwards, defendant
SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to
report to Jeddah once again and see
Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further
investigation. Plaintiff did so after
receiving assurance from SAUDIAs
Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that
the investigation was routinary and
that it posed no danger to her.
10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer
brought plaintiff to the same Saudi
court on June 27, 1993. Nothing
happened then but on June 28, 1993,
a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff
through an interpreter about the
Jakarta incident. After one hour of
interrogation, they let her go. At the
airport, however, just as her plane
was about to take off, a SAUDIA
officer told her that the airline had
forbidden her to take that flight. At
the Inflight Service Office where she
was told to go, the secretary of Mr.
Yahya Saddick took away her
passport and told her to remain in
Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until
further orders.
11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal
officer again escorted plaintiff to the
same court where the judge, to her
astonishment and shock, rendered a
decision, translated to her in English,
sentencing her to five months
imprisonment and to 286
lashes. Only then did she realize that
the Saudi court had tried her,
together with Thamer and Allah, for
what happened in Jakarta. The court
found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery;
(2) going to a disco, dancing, and
listening to the music in violation of
Islamic laws; (3) socializing with the
male crew, in contravention of
Islamic tradition.
12. Because SAUDIA refused to lend
her a hand in the case, plaintiff
sought the help of the Philippine
Embassy in Jeddah. The latter helped
her pursue an appeal from the
decision of the court. To pay for her
upkeep, she worked on the domestic
flights of defendant SAUDIA while,
ironically, Thamer and Allah freely
served the international flights.[39]
Where the factual antecedents
satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign
element, we agree with petitioner that the
problem herein could present a conflicts case.
A factual situation that cuts across
territorial lines and is affected by the diverse
laws of two or more states is said to contain a
foreign element. The presence of a foreign
element is inevitable since social and economic
affairs of individuals and associations are rarely
confined to the geographic limits of their birth or
conception.[40]
The forms in which this foreign element
may appear are many.[41] The foreign element
may simply consist in the fact that one of the
parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign
domicile, or that a contract between nationals of
one State involves properties situated in another
State. In other cases, the foreign element may
assume a complex form.[42]
In the instant case, the foreign element
consisted in the fact that private respondent
Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that
petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign
corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of
Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight
stewardess, events did transpire during her
many occasions of travel across national borders,
particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a
conflicts situation to arise.
We thus find private respondents assertion
that the case is purely domestic,
imprecise. Aconflicts problem presents itself
here, and the question of
jurisdiction[43] confronts the court a quo.
After a careful study of the private
respondents Amended Complaint,[44] and the
Comment thereon, we note that she aptly
predicated her cause of action on Articles 19 and
21 of the New Civil Code.
On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil
Code provides;
Art. 19. Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with
justice give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.
On the other hand, Article 21 of the New
Civil Code provides:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for damages.
Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs.
Court of Appeals,[45] this Court held that:
The aforecited provisions on human
relations were intended to expand
the concept of torts in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate
legal remedy for the untold number
of moral wrongs which is impossible
for human foresight to specifically
provide in the statutes.
 Although Article 19 merely declares a
principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its
provisions.Thus, we agree with private
respondents assertion that violations of Articles
19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially
enforceable remedies in the municipal forum.
Based on the allegations[46] in the Amended
Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of Court
on jurisdiction[47] we find that the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit.[48] Its authority to try and hear the case is
provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act No.
7691, to wit:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
xxxxxxxxx
(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of
the property in controversy exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in
such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items
exceeds Two hundred Thousand pesos
(P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)
xxxxxxxxx
And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Courtthe venue, Quezon City, is
appropriate:
SEC. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance.
[Now Regional Trial Court]
(a) x x x x x x x x x
(b) Personal actions. All other
actions may be commenced and tried
where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found,
or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiff resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.
Pragmatic considerations, including the
convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in
favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming
jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of
the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is
obtained is quite obvious. Relative advantages
and obstacles to a fair trial are equally
important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an
inconvenient forum, vex, harass, or oppress the
defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless
expense or disturbance. But unless the balance is
strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.[49]
Weighing the relative claims of the parties,
the court a quo found it best to hear the case in
the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance
of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private
respondent now) to seek remedial action
elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
where she no longer maintains substantial
connections. That would have caused a
fundamental unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the
Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and
inconvenience have been shown by either of the
parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now
private respondent) should be upheld.
Similarly, the trial court also possesses
jurisdiction over the persons of the parties
herein. By filing her Complaint and Amended
Complaint with the trial court, private
respondent has voluntary submitted herself to
the jurisdiction of the court.
The records show that petitioner SAUDIA
has filed several motions[50] praying for the
dismissal of Moradas Amended
Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex
Abundante Cautelam dated February 20,
1995. What is very patent and explicit from the
motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for other
reliefs under the premises. Undeniably,
petitioner SAUDIA has effectively submitted to
the trial courts jurisdiction by praying for the
dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds
other than lack of jurisdiction.
As held by this Court in Republic vs. Ker and
Company, Ltd.:[51]
We observe that the motion to
dismiss filed on April 14, 1962, aside
from disputing the lower courts
jurisdiction over defendants person,
prayed for dismissal of the complaint
on the ground that plaintiffs cause of
action has prescribed. By interposing
such second ground in its motion to
dismiss, Ker and Co., Ltd. availed of
an affirmative defense on the basis of
which it prayed the court to resolve
controversy in its favor. For the
court to validly decide the said plea
of defendant Ker & Co., Ltd., it
necessarily had to acquire
jurisdiction upon the latters person,
who, being the proponent of the
affirmative defense, should be
deemed to have abandoned its
special appearance and voluntarily
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of
the court.
Similarly, the case of De Midgely vs.
Ferandos, held that:
When the appearance is by motion
for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the
person, it must be for the sole and
separate purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court. If his motion
is for any other purpose than to
object to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, he thereby submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the
court. A special appearance by
motion made for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person will be held to
be a general appearance, if the party
in said motion should, for example,
ask for a dismissal of the action upon
the further ground that the court had
no jurisdiction over the subject
matter.[52]
Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City.Thus, we find that the trial court has
jurisdiction over the case and that its exercise
thereof, justified.
As to the choice of applicable law, we note
that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two
important questions: (1) What legal system
should control a given situation where some of
the significant facts occurred in two or more
states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen
legal system regulate the situation.[53]
Several theories have been propounded in
order to identify the legal system that should
ultimately control. Although ideally, all choice-of-
law theories should intrinsically advance both
notions of justice and predictability, they do not
always do so. The forum is then faced with the
problem of deciding which of these two
important values should be stressed.[54]
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary
for us to determine under what category a
certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is
known as characterization, or the doctrine of
qualification. It is the process of deciding
whether or not the facts relate to the kind of
question specified in a conflicts rule.[55] The
purpose of characterization is to enable the
forum to select the proper law.[56]
Our starting point of analysis here is not a
legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or
operative fact.[57] An essential element of conflict
rules is the indication of a test or connecting
factor or point of contact. Choice-of-law rules
invariably consist of a factual relationship (such
as property right, contract claim) and a
connecting factor or point of contact, such as
the situs of theres, the place of celebration, the
place of performance, or the place of
wrongdoing.[58]
Note that one or more circumstances may
be present to serve as the possible test for the
determination of the applicable law.[59] These
test factors or points of contact or connecting
factors could be any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his
domicile, his residence, his place of
sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical
person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the
place where a thing is, or is deemed
to be situated. In particular, the lex
situs is decisive when real rights are
involved;
(4) the place where an act has
been done, the locus actus, such as
the place where a contract has
been made, a marriage celebrated,
a will signed or a tort
committed. The lex loci actus is
particularly important in
contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is
intended to come into effect, e.g., the
place of performance of contractual
duties, or the place where a power of
attorney is to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting
parties as to the law that should
govern their agreement, the lex loci
intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or
administrative proceedings are
instituted or done. The lex forithe
law of the forumis particularly
important because, as we have seen
earlier, matters of procedure not
going to the substance of the claim
involved are governed by it; and
because the lex fori applies whenever
the content of the otherwise
applicable foreign law is excluded
from application in a given case for
the reason that it falls under one of
the exceptions to the applications of
foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many
cases is decisive of practically all
legal relationships of the ship and of
its master or owner as such. It also
covers contractual relationships
particularly contracts of
affreightment.[60] (Underscoring
ours.)
After a careful study of the pleadings on
record, including allegations in the Amended
Complaint deemed submitted for purposes of the
motion to dismiss, we are convinced that there is
reasonable basis for private respondents
assertion that although she was already working
in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on
the pretense that she would merely testify in an
investigation of the charges she made against the
two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her
person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned
out, she was the one made to face trial for very
serious charges, including adultery and violation
of Islamic laws and tradition.
There is likewise logical basis on record for
the claim that the handing over or turning over
of the person of private respondent to Jeddah
officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its
duties as employer. Petitioners purported act
contributed to and amplified or even
proximately caused additional humiliation,
misery and suffering of private
respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly
facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution
of private respondent under the guise of
petitioners authority as employer, taking
advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she
reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the
Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and
imprisonment of private respondent was
wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm
allegedly inflicted upon her person and
reputation, for which petitioner could be liable
as claimed, to provide compensation or redress
for the wrongs done, once duly proven.
Considering that the complaint in the
court a quo is one involving torts, the connecting
factor or point of contact could be the place or
places where the tortious conduct or lex loci
actusoccurred. And applying the torts principle
in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines
could be said as a situs of the tort (the place
where the alleged tortious conduct took
place). This is because it is in the Philippines
where petitioner allegedly deceived private
respondent, a Filipina residing and working
here. According to her, she had honestly believed
that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights
and in the performance of its duties, act with
justice, give her her due and observe honesty
and good faith. Instead, petitioner failed to
protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or
parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another
country is of no moment. For in our view what is
important here is the place where the over-all
harm or the fatality of the alleged injury to the
person, reputation, social standing and human
rights of complainant, had lodged, according to
the plaintiff below (herein private
respondent). All told, it is not without basis to
identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged
tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of
the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi,
modern theories and rules on tort
liability[61] have been advanced to offer fresh
judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In
keeping abreast with the modern theories on
tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply
the State of the most significant relationship rule,
which in our view should be appropriate to
apply now, given the factual context of this case.
In applying said principle to determine the
State which has the most significant relationship,
the following contacts are to be taken into
account and evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue:
(a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the
place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality,
place of incorporation and place of business of
the parties, and (d) the place where the
relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.[62]
As already discussed, there is basis for the
claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in
the Philippines. There is likewise no question
that private respondent is a resident Filipina
national, working with petitioner, a resident
foreign corporation engaged here in the business
of international air carriage. Thus, the
relationship between the parties was centered
here, although it should be stressed that this suit
is not based on mere labor law violations. From
the record, the claim that the Philippines has the
most significant contact with the matter in this
dispute,[63] raised by private respondent as
plaintiff below against defendant (herein
petitioner), in our view, has been properly
established.
Prescinding from this premise that the
Philippines is the situs of the tort complaint of
and the place having the most interest in the
problem, we find, by way of recapitulation, that
the Philippine law on tort liability should have
paramount application to and control in the
resolution of the legal issues arising out of this
case. Further, we hold that the respondent
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter of the complaint;
the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which
could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover,
we find untenable petitioners insistence that
[s]ince private respondent instituted this suit,
she has the burden of pleading and proving the
applicable Saudi law on the matter.[64] As aptly
said by private respondent, she has no obligation
to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based
on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and
subsequent pleadings she never alleged that
Saudi law should govern this case.[65] And as
correctly held by the respondent appellate court,
considering that it was the petitioner who was
invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi
Arabia, thus the burden was on it [petitioner] to
plead and to establish what the law of Saudi
Arabia is.[66]
Lastly, no error could be imputed to the
respondent appellate court in upholding the trial
courts denial of defendants (herein petitioners)
motion to dismiss the case. Not only was
jurisdiction in order and venue properly laid, but
appeal after trial was obviously available, and
the expeditious trial itself indicated by the
nature of the case at hand. Indubitably, the
Philippines is the state intimately concerned
with the ultimate outcome of the case below not
just for the benefit of all the litigants, but also for
the vindication of the countrys system of law and
justice in a transnational setting. With these
guidelines in mind, the trial court must proceed
to try and adjudge the case in the light of
relevant Philippine law, with due consideration
of the foreign element or elements
involved. Nothing said herein, of course, should
be construed as prejudging the results of the
case in any manner whatsoever.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Civil Case No. Q-
93-18394 entitled Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi
Arabia Airlines is hereby REMANDED to
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89
for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo,
Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 3070 February 11, 1907
THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. JUAN CABILING,Defendant-Appellant.
Jose Altavas Cortes for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for
appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
The defendant was charged in the court below
with the murder of Clarence T. Allen on the 22d
of November, 1905. He was convicted of that
crime and sentenced to life imprisonment. From
this judgment he
appealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The evidence in the court below was
contradictory. The substance of the testimony of
Levina F. Allen, widow of the deceased, and a
witness for the Government, as stated in the
Attorney-General's brief, is as follows:
The defendant, Juan Cabiling, was a student of
the Government school at Ormoc, and the
deceased was the principal of said school. On the
morning of November 22, 1905, a normal school
was opened at Ormoc for the training of teachers
from the various towns on the western coast of
Leyte. Mr. Allen was authorized to select from
the students those who were to be promoted to
said school. The defendant was one of those who
desired to attend said school, and on the
morning in question as soon as the class under
the direction of Mrs. Allen assembled the
defendant, who was one of the students of said
class, inquired of Mrs. Allen if he was not going
to be in said normal class, and upon being
answered 'no' he stated that he was not satisfied.
Mrs. Allen went on with the recitation with
which she was then engaged, and while she was
thus engaged the defendant kept talking in a very
rude manner, grumbled and refused to study,
wherefore she told him two or three times to
stop because she must hear the recitation; a little
later, as soon as the recitation in class four was
over, and Mrs. Allen, desired to turn back to part
second of the book for review, because they had
no other books, the defendant told her that
grammars must be available and that he was not
satisfied, as there arrived of supply of same, and
upon being answered that the grammars were
for the normal school teachers, the defendant got
up and said to Mrs. Allen that she had told a lie
by telling him that he could go into the normal
school and now he was held back in the lower
grade. In view of this behavior of the defendant,
Mrs. Allen said that she would go to talk with Mr.
Allen and have him settle the matter. Mrs. Allen
left the room in the direction of the library,
where Mr. Allen was, and told him that it would
be better to send the defendant home and tell
him to come back at 2 p. m. The deceased gave
his assent and followed Mrs. Allen into the room,
where the defendant was, and coming to the
place where the latter sat, Mr. Allen said to him:
"What is the matter with you this morning, Juan?
If you are not satisfied here you may go away."
The defendant upon hearing these words, rushed
upon the deceased and stabbed him in the
stomach; the deceased pushed him back a
distance of about 4 feet, and then the defendant
gave deceased a second blow in the same place,
whereupon the deceased caught the defendant
by the right hand wherein he had the knife, and
by the neck. At this stage of the struggle the
lieutenant of the municipal police arrived and
pointing his revolver at the defendant separated
them and took the knife away from the
defendant.
Her evidence is corroborated by that of Wilbur
Chamberlain, another eyewitness, and by that of
James F. Godward, who witnessed the
termination of the
struggle.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The fact which the evidence for the defense
tended to establish are stated in the brief of the
Attorney-General as follows:
. . . That on the morning in question, after Mrs.
Allen had distributed some paper for the lesson
in arithmetic, she left the room and shortly
afterwards the deceased came and, taking the
defendant by one ear, caused him to stand up
and then kicked him, took him by the arms with
both hands and shook him against a table, which
fell down, and again advancing to where the
defendant was standing took him by the neck
and tried to throw him upon the floor; then the
police arrived and took Cabiling to the municipal
building. All the witnesses for the defendant
admitted that when the deceased arrived the
defendant had a knife in his hands and was
sharpening a pencil with it, but they stated
positively that they had not seen him assail the
deceased nor strike him with said knife. The
defendant himself flatly denied this fact.
The substance of the evidence on both sides is
correctly stated in the quotations above made.
Allen died as a result of these
wounds.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
After a careful and somewhat lengthy analysis of
the testimony of the witnesses on both sides, the
Attorney General says:
We find in the records sufficient data to lead us
to the belief that the testimony of the witnesses
for the prosecution is more reliable than that of
the witnesses for the defense. . .
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Upon the apparent improbability of the
testimony of the witnesses for the defense, we
have stated that there was a marked sign of
conspiracy between them. We need only to add,
at this time, that the testimony of the defendant
lends strength to our belief in this matter. He
emphatically denied having inflicted, either
designedly or undesignedly any of the wounds
shown in the body of the deceased, and asserted
that he could not possibly have inflicted such
wounds, nor did he know how they were
inflicted. We can not believe the truth of this
testimony of the defendant, for to do so it would
be necessary to presume that he was
unconscious at the time in question. The
absolute denial made by the defendant clearly
shows his well-planned and decided purpose of
concealing everything that might be damaging to
him. . . . He and the deceased were the only
parties to the difficulty, the defendant alone
carried a knife and no one except the latter could
have inflicted the wounds on the deceased. If
said wounds were caused as he alleged while he
defended himself against assault, there was no
reason whatever for attempting to conceal such
fact, because the circumstance would be a
sufficient ground for finding him not guilty; but
behind an absurd and incredible denial, there
arises in the mind the conviction that he is in fact
guilty of the crime in question, and that he
perpetrated the same in the manner testified to
by the witnesses for the prosecution. As against
such a lack of veracity on the part of the
defendant and his witnesses, we have to admit as
legal truth the evidence of the witnesses for the
prosecution given with evident frankness and
sincerity to the effect that said defendant
assailed the deceased in the manner recited by
them, and inflicted the wounds that caused his
death.
Our examination of the evidence has lead us to
the same conclusion which the Attorney-General
has reached, and we are satisfied beyond any
doubt that the testimony of the Government's
witnesses is true; that there was no aggression
on the part of the deceased, and that the first
attack came from the defendant. He is
accordingly criminally liable for the death of
Allen.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The next question to be considered is whether
the crime committed was that of homicide or
murder. In order to raise the guilt of a person to
the grade of murder it is necessary that one of
the elements specified in article 403 of the Penal
Code be proven. The Attorney-General is of the
opinion that no one of these requisites was
proven, and that the crime committed was
homicide. With this conclusion we can not agree.
Among the circumstances which qualify the act,
there is mentioned in article 403 "treachery"
( alevosia). The killing was done with a
pocketknife. It is very apparent from the
evidence that Allen had no suspicion that the
defendant intended to make any attack upon
him, and there is nothing to show that Allen
knew that the defendant had this knife in his
possession; in fact, Mrs. Allen, who was standing
near her husband, testified that she did not see
the knife until the second blow was struck. It has
been held in the supreme court of Spain that a
sudden and unexpected attack upon another is
proof of treachery, and we have repeatedly made
the same ruling In the case of the United States,
vs. Babasa (2 Phil. Rep., 102) the following
statement is made in the syllabus:
One who kills another by suddenly and
unexpectedly inflicting a mortal wound with a
knife is guilty of murder, as the means used in
the commission of the crime constitutealevosia.
The punishment for the crime of murder consists
of three degrees. The minimum degree, which is
the maximum degree of the penalty known
as cadena temporal, is imprisonment from
seventeen years four months and one day to
twenty years, the medium degree is life
imprisonment, and the maximum degree is
death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
In the case at bar it was proven that the
defendant was born of the 12th day of
September, 1888, and was, therefore, at the time
of the offense was committed 17 years and 2
months old. The penalty above mentioned for the
crime of murder is, by the terms of the Penal
Code, inflicted only upon those persons who are
more than 18 years old. By the provisions of
article 85 of the said code, if the defendant is
more that 15 years and less than 18 years of age,
the penalty provided in article 403 can not be
inflicted, but in its place there must be inflicted
the penalty immediately inferior to the one
indicated by that article. The highest of the
common crimes known to our law are parricide
and robbery with homicide, but if the person
who commits either one of these crimes is under
18 years of age, the greatest punishment which
can be inflicted upon him is imprisonment for
twenty years. In this case the punishment to be
imposed upon the defendant is the penalty
immediately inferior to that provided in article
403. That penalty consists of two indivisible
penalties, namely, death and life imprisonment;
and the maximum degree of a divisible penalty,
namely, cadena temporal. By article 75,
paragraph 3, of the Penal Code it is provided,
that the penalty immediately inferior to such
penalty, as the one named in article 403 shall be
the medium and minimum degrees of the
divisible penalty and the maximum degree of the
penalty which follows the divisible penalty in the
general scale. Applying that article to the case at
bar, it results that the penalty applicable is the
maximum degree of presidio mayor to the
medium degree of cadena temporal; that is to
say, imprisonment from ten years and one day to
seventeen years and four
months.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
If none of the extenuating circumstances
mentioned in article 9 of the Penal Code, nor any
of the aggravating circumstances mentioned in
article 10 are proven, the penalty should be
inflicted in the medium degree, that is from
twelve years and one day to fourteen years and
eight
months.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The attorney-General is of the opinion that
article 11 of the Penal Code should be considered
as an extenuating circumstance. That article is as
follows:
The circumstance of the culprit being a native,
mestizo, or Chinese shall be taken into
consideration by the judges and courts for the
purpose of increasing or reducing the penalties
according to the degree of respective intention,
the nature of the act, and the conditions of the
person offended, which shall be left to the
judgment of the former.
We can not agree with this conclusion. The
evidence shows that the defendant, so far from
being an ignorant boy, was one of the most, if not
the most, intelligent in his class, and in such Arellano, C.J. Torres, Mapa, Carson and
cases we have never considered article 11 as an Tracey, JJ., concur.
extenuating
circumstance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
bles virtual law library
As to the aggravating circumstance, we agree
with the Attorney-General that of known
premeditation was not proven, and that
circumstance 20 of article 10 was proven. That
provision of article 10 is as follows:
When the act is committed with insult or in
disregard for the respect which may be due the
aggrieved party on account of his rank, age, or
sex, or when it is committed in his dwelling, if he
has not given provocation.
It is applicable to this case because the person
attacked was the teacher and the person
attacking was the
pupil.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
There being one aggravating circumstance and
no extenuating circumstance, the penalty must
according to the law, be imposed in the
maximum degree and we fix it at fourteen years
eight months and one day of imprisonment
( cadena
temporal).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble
s virtual law library
The judgment of the court below is modified by
imposing instead of life imprisonment the
penalty of fourteen years eight months and one
day of cadena temporal, and the payment of
1,000 pesos, Philippine currency, to the heirs of
the deceased as indemnity. In all other respects
the judgment of the court below is affirmed, with
the costs of this instance against the appellant.
After the expiration of ten days let judgment be
entered in accordance herewith, and ten days
thereafter the case remanded to the lower court
for proper procedure. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33345 November 20, 1978
MARCELA M. BAGAJO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE GERONIMO R. MARAVE,
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Misamis Occidental, Branch 11, and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Diosdado Bacolod for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General, for respondents.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review, under Republic
Act 5440, the decision of respondent Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental in
Criminal Case No. OZ-95 affirming the judgment
of conviction rendered against petitioner by the
Municipal Court of Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental
and imposing upon her the penalty to pay a fine
of P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and the costs, for the crime of
slight physical injuries.
The background facts as found by the trial court
as follows:
In the afternoon of April 1, 1970, at about 2
o'clock, petitioner who was a teacher, left her
classroom to go to the principal's office. While
the teacher was thus out of the room,
complainant Wilma Alcantara, one of her pupils,
left her desk and went to chat with Lilibeth
Purlas, a classmate, while leaning over the desk
of Ponciano Navarro, another classmate. At that
juncture, a fourth classmate, Benedicta Guirigay
passed near Wilma, who suddenly raised her leg
causing the former to stumble on it and fall
down, her head hitting the edge of the desk, her
stomach a sharp pointed umbrella and her knee
a nail of the desk. She fainted. At that precise
moment, petitioner was entering the room. She
asked Wilma what happened but the latter
denied having anything to do with what had just
taken place. Petitioner thereupon became angry
and, with a piece of "bamboo stick" which she
was using as a pointer whipped Wilma behind
her legs and her thigh, thereby causing the
following injuries, according to the medical
certificate presented in evidence:
1. Linear bruises at the middle
half of the dorsal surface of
both legs. it is about four
inches in length and 1/4
centimeter in width. There
are three on the right leg and
two on the left leg.
2. Two linear bruises of the
same width and length as
above at the lower third of the
dorsal surface of the right
thigh.
The above lessions, if without
complication, may heal in four
to six days. (Pages 26-27,
Record.)
Upon the foregoing facts, petitioner claims in her
appeal that respondent Judge erred in convicting
her of the crime of slight physical injuries. She
maintains that as the teacher, she was just trying
to discipline her pupil Wilma for tripping her
classmate and for denying that she did so. She
contends she was not actuated by any criminal
intent. And she is joined in this pose by the
Solicitor General, who recommends her
acquittal, coupled with the observation that
although "petitioner is not criminally liable for
her conduct, she may still be held accountable
for her conduct administratively.
We agree with the Solicitor General.
In the school premises and during school
activities and affairs, the teacher exercises
substitute parental authority over the students.
(Article 349, Civil Code.) More specifically,
according to Article 352, "The relations between
teacher and pupil, professor and student, are
fixed by government regulations and those of
each school or institution. In no case shall
corporal punishment be countenanced. The
teacher or professor shall cultivate the best
potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil
or student." And pursuant to this provision,
Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools
Service Manual enjoins:
The use of corporal
punishment by teachers
(slapping, jerking, or pushing
pupils about), imposing
manual work or degrading
tasks as penalty, meting out
cruel and unusual
punishments of any nature,
reducing scholarship rating
for bad conduct, holding up a
pupil to unnecessary ridicule,
the use of epithets and
expressions tending to
destroy the pupil's self-
respect, and the permanent
confiscation of personal
effects of pupils are forbidden.
In other words, under the foregoing Civil Code
and administrative injunctions, no teacher may
impose corporal punishment upon any student
in any case. But We are not concerned in this
appeal with the possible administrative liability
of petitioner. Neither are we called upon here to
pass on her civil liability other than what could
be ex-delicto, arising from her conviction, if that
should be the outcome hereof. The sole question
for Our resolution in this appeal relates
exclusively to her criminal responsibility for the
alleged crime of slight physical injuries as
defined in Article 266, paragraph 2, of the
Revised Penal Code, pursuant to which she was
prosecuted and convicted in the courts below.
In this respect, it is Our considered opinion, and
so We Hold that as a matter of law, petitioner did
not incur any criminal liability for her act of
whipping her pupil, Wilma, with the bamboo-
stick-pointer, in the circumstances proven in the
record. Independently of any civil or
administrative responsibility for such act she
might be found to have incurred by the proper
authorities, We are persuaded that she did not
do what she had done with criminal intent. That
she meant to punish Wilma and somehow make
her feel such punishment may be true, but We
are convinced that the means she actually used
was moderate and that she was not motivated by
ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent. The
nature of the injuries actually suffered by Wilma,
a few linear bruises (at most 4 inches long and ¼
cm. wide) and the fact that petitioner whipped
her only behind the legs and thigh, show, to Our
mind, that indeed she intended merely to
discipline her. And it cannot be said, that Wilma
did not deserve to be discipline. In other words,
it was farthest from the thought of petitioner to
commit any criminal offense.Actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea.
Nothing said above is intended to mean that this
Court sanctions generally the use of corporal
punishment by teachers on their pupils. All that
We hold here is that in the peculiar
circumstances of the instant case before Us,
there is no indication beyond reasonable doubt,
in the evidence before the trial court, that
petitioner was actuated by a criminal design to
inflict the injuries suffered by complainant as a
result of her being whipped by petitioner. What
appears is that petitioner acted as she did in the
belief as a teacher exercising authority over her
pupil in loco parentis, she was within her rights
to punish her moderately for purposes of
discipline. Whether or not she exceeded the
degree of moderation permitted by the laws and
rules governing the performance of her functions
is not for Us, at this moment and in this case, to
determine.
Absent any applicable precedent indicative of the
concept of the disciplinary measures that may be
employed by teachers under Section 150 of the
Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual quoted
above, We feel it is wiser to leave such
determination first to the administrative
authorities.
After several deliberations, the Court has
remained divided, such that the necessary eight
(8) votes necessary for conviction has not been
obtained. Accordingly, the petitioner -accused is
entitled to acquittal. ,
WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby acquitted,
with costs de oficio, without prejudice to her
being dealt with administratively or in a civil
case for damages not resulting exdelicto.
Castro, C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Santos, JJ., concurs in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Makasiar.
Separate Opinions
ANTONIO, J., concurring:
The effectiveness of a teacher to exercise
authority over her pupil in loco parentis depends
on her ability to enforce discipline. Petitioner
had authority to inflict corporal punishment on a
pupil, if the punishment is moderate, not
prompted by bad motive, and is of such a nature
that the parent of the child might expect the child
would receive if she did wrong.
AQUINO, J., concurring:
The teacher, who inflicted corporal punishment,
should be disciplined administratively. In People
vs. Javier, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 150, the Court of
Appeals, per Melencio, J., Briones, Montemayor
and Enage, JJ., concurring, held that a teacher,
who inflicted moderate corporal punishment,
was not criminally liable because he had no
criminal intent, citing Mansell vs. Griffin, I K. B.
160. (Justice Torres dissented.)
FERNANDO, J, dissenting:
I find myself in sympathy with the approach
taken in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Makasiar not only in view of the humanity that
should permeate the law but also in accordance
with the tendency much more manifest of late in
international law to accord greater and greater
protection to the welfare of the young, as an
aspect of human rights. Moreover, it is well-
settled that the doctrine parens patriae calls for
the state exercising the utmost vigilance to
assure that teachers and educators should
refrain from the infliction of corporal
punishment which for me at least is a relic of the
past. This is not to lose sight of the significance of
the view stressed in the opinion of Justice
Barredo that criminal intent must be shown to
justify a finding of guilt. Nonetheless, considering
the nature and extent of the physical injuries
sustained, as shown in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Muñoz Palma, the protestation of good
faith on the part of appellant had, for me, lost its
persuasiveness. 'The leading case of People v.
Cagoco, 1 where the accused approached the
victim from behind and suddenly struck him
with his fist on the back part of his head causing
him to fall backwards, his head striking the
asphalt pavement as a result of which he died a
few hours later comes to mind. It was the ruling
of this Court that murder was committed as
there was alevosia, although appellant was
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intention to commit so great a wrong as that
inflicted. 2
Thus I find myself unable to yield concurrence to
the acquittal of the accused.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the dissenting opinion of Justice
Muñoz Palma and vote for affirmance of the
judgment of conviction which liberally imposed a
mere fine of P50.00 notwithstanding the physical
injuries requiring four to six days' healing time
inflicted upon the victim.
I only wish to stress that Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code expressly penalizes the
offense of slight physical injuries and
maltreatment, while Article 352 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that "(T)he relations between
teacher and pupil, professor and student, are
fixed by government, regulations and those of
each school or institution. In no case shall
corporal punishment be countenanced. The
teacher or professor shall cultivate the best
potentialities of the Heart and mind of the pupil
or student," even as Article 349 recognizes
teachers and professors as among those who
exercise substitute parental authority. Section
150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service
Manual further categorically forbids "the use of
corporal punishment by teachers (slapping,
jerking, or pushing pupils about)."
It cannot be contended then that teachers in the
exercise of their authority in loco parentis may,
without incurring criminal liability inflict
moderate corporal punishment. The power to
inflict moderate punishment on children is
vested by Article 316 of the Civil
Code exclusively, in the parents.
The petitioner might be entitled to the
appreciation of mitigating circumstances in her
favor such as having acted with obfuscation, but
in the face of the express provisions of law she
may not be absolved of the proven charge.
The statement in the main opinion (at page 4)
that "wheather or not (petitioner) exceeded the
degree of moderation permitted by the laws and
rules governing the performance of her functions
is not for Us, at this moment and in this case, to
determine" (but that "We feel it wiser to leave
such determination first to the administrative
authorities") appears to be contrary to the laws
and rules which do not permit the infliction of
corporal punishment, moderate or otherwise, by
teachers on their pupils but provide for criminal,
civil and administrative sanctions, and contrary
to the proven facts, which as pointed out by
Justice Muñoz Palma, show that the physical
injuries inflicted by petitioner on her pupil could
by no means be described as "moderate" (even
assuming that teachers had the authority to
inflict moderate corporal punishment).
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
The facts in this case are as follows.
Inside a classroom while the teacher was away,
an eleven year old girl-pupil tripped a girl-
classmate, causing slight physical injuries to the
latter. Upon being questioned by the teacher in
charge who just then came back, the erring child
denied authorship of the misdeed. The teacher
became angry and, with a bamboo stick, whipped
the erring child on the buttocks, thighs, and legs
with such violence as to leave on the punished
limbs, not welts, but bruises requiring some four
to six days to heal. The medical certificate
described the injuries thus:
1. Linear bruises at the middle
of the dorsal surface of both
legs. It is about four inches in
length and 1/4 centimeters in
width. There are three on the
right leg and 2 on the left leg.
2. Two linear bruises of the
same width and length as
above at the lower third of the
dorsal surface of the right
thigh.
The above lesions, if without
complications, may heal in
four to six days (page 2. Brief
of Solicitor General).
Convicted by the municipal court for slight
physical injuries, the accused appealed to the
Court of First Instance, which affirmed the
conviction. Hence, this appeal direct to this
Court.
The Solicitor General recommends the reversal
of the decision of the court below. Accordingly,
the majority returns a judgment of acquittal.
WE dissent.
I expresses its findings thus —
Criminal intent is presumed in every criminal
act. But the Solicitor General practically argues
that a good motive negatives criminal intent.
Motive may mitigate, but does not totally
exculpate, criminal liability.
Motive, in criminal law, consists of the special or
personal reason which may prompt or induce a
person to perform the act constituting a crime
(Padilla, Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, 9th ed., 1964, p. 41). It is the moving
power which impels one to act for a definite
result, as distinguished from "intent" which is
the purpose to use a particular means to effect
such result (People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264,
297; 61 N.E. 286, 296; 62 L.R.A. 193). The
foregoing distinction has gained wide acceptance
among our criminal law commentators (see
Francisco, The Revised Penal Code, Annotated
and Commented, 2nd ed., 1954, Book One, p. 38;
Reyes, the Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, 6th
ed., 1965, Book One, p. 60; Gregorio,
Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 3rd ed.,
1971, p. 16). In relation to the "particular means"
employed — the overt acts committed by a
person — motive, unlike intent, is quite
materially removed. One motive can give rise to
one of several possible courses of action, lawful
or unlawful, as one act could have been actuated
by one of several possible motives, good or bad.
That is why in our law on evidence, no unlawful
motive is presumed from the proof of
commission of an unlawful act. Nor would such
presumption, if there was, be of any use, for
materially unrelated as motive is to the
prohibited overt act, it is not essential to the
determination of a crime.
Since acts are equivocal as to motive, it is often
impossible to ascertain the reasons which moved
a person to commit an act. This finds excellent
example in the case at bar. While the accused
stoutly asserts that her motive was to discipline
the child, The trial court and the lower appellate
court hold differently. Their unanimous finding
is that the accused committed the act in the heat
of anger — a state of mind which could hardly
harbor a good motive. The Court of First Instance
It appears that ... (a)t this
precise moment, the accused
entered the room and asked
Wilma what had happened.
Wilma answered that she had
nothing to do with the failing
down of Benedicta. Ponciano
reported to the accused that
Wilma purposely blocked
Benedicta with her legs and
she fell to the floor. The
accused became angry and
whipped Wilma with a
bamboo stick (at pages 1 and
2).
xxx xxx xxx
From the evidence it has been
duly proved that while
Benedicta Guirigay was
passing near Wilma Alcantara,
the latter suddenly raised her
leg and Benedicta stumbled
on it and fell to the floor. She
fainted and suffered some
injuries. The accused became
very angry got her piece of
bamboo stick which she was
using as a pointer stick and
with it whipped
Wilma several times, thereby
causing on Wilma the physical
injuries described by Dr.
Ozarraga in his medical
certificate (at page 4;
Emphasis supplied).
In the same manner, the municipal court finds
that —
... (I)n the instant case, it would appear that
the accused Marcela M. Bagajo, was carried away
by her passion or anger in whipping to such an
extreme Wilma Alcantara with a bamboo stick
not really apt for the purpose. The victim of
Wilma Alcantara's mischief or naughtiness was
Benedicta Guirigay a working pupil actually living
with her(the accused)for some years. ...
The motive of the accused was to avenge the
injury to the victim who, as found by the trial
court, has been living with (and working for) the
accused teacher. Will vengeance justify the act?
But assuming that the motive of the accused was
really good, does this mean that criminal intent
on her part is thus completely ruled out? WE do
not believe so. A good motive, as we have earlier
intimated, is not incompatible with an unlawful
intent. One may be convicted of a crime whether
his motive appears to be good or bad or even
though no motive is proven. A good motive does
not prevent an act from being a crime. (People ex
rel Hegeman v. Corrigan 87 N.E. 792, 796; 195
N.Y. 1, quoting People v. Molineux supra; Clark,
Cr. Law, sec. 14; People v. Weiss 300 N.Y.S. 249,
255; 252 App. Div. 463). A classic example
is euthanasia or mercy killing. It is condemned
by law although the motive may be to spare a
hopeless patient prolonged suffering. And if a
father drowns his child who is five years of age
to save it from starving, he is guilty of parricide
though he was actuated by a good motive — love
for the child (People v.Kirby 2 Parker Cr. R., N.Y.,
28. See also U.S. v. Marmon 45 Fed. 414. Both are
cited in The Revised Penal Code,
Francisco, supra). The father or brother of a rape
victim, who kills the rapist long after the
commission of the rape. to avenge the victim's
defloration, is not exempt from penal liability. A
son killing his sleeping father, who used to beat
up his hardworking mother, to relieve his good
mother from so much misery, does not justify the
parricide. So also, if a person cuts off the foot of a
mischievous child to prevent if from doing
further mischief with its foot, and thus save it
from possible criminal liability, that person
stands liable for physical injuries. True enough,
the act involved in the instant case, which is the
beating of a child, is less serious than those
involved in the above-cited cases, but the fact
that an act is less serious than another does not
mean that it is not criminal. Other examples can
be catalogued ad infinitum. Thus, our penal code
provides specific penalties for specific crimes,
depending, generally, on their seriousness.
II
The Solicitor General further maintains that the
act committed by the accused is not unlawful.
"Administering moderate corporal punishment,"
he says, "is not so defined as felony by the
Revised Penal Code."
But "administering corporal punishment" is a
felony, although the Code categorized it under
the more graphic term "slight physical injuries".
The pertinent provision is stated as follows:
Art. 266. Slight physical
injuries ... — The crime of
slight physical injuries shall
be punished:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By arresto menor or a fine
not exceeding 200 pesos and
censure when the offender has
caused physical injuries which
do not prevent the offended
party from engaging in his
habitual work nor require
medical attendance.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied).
In fact, even if no visible injury were caused by
the act of administering punishment, it would
still be punished as an illtreatment by deed
under paragraph 3 of the same Article 266.
From the facts found by the trial court, the
following material points appear: (1) the teacher
beat the child with a bamboo stick, and (2) the
beating caused physical injuries on the child,
consisting of linear bruises requiring some four to
six days to heal. The act of the accused, no doubt,
constitutes the very offense penalized by the
cited provision.
Commission of a prohibited act having been
indubitably shown, no proof of criminal intent is
necessary. For, "from the felonious acts (of the
accused), freely and deliberately executed, the
moral and injurious intent arises conclusively
and indisputably, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary" (People v. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52,
53. See also U.S. v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92; People v.
Abando, 2 CA Rep. 205; paragraph [b], section 5
of Rule 13, Rules of Court; 16 C.J. 81).
In claiming that she merely acted within the
limits of her authority in punishing the child as
the latter's teacher and substitute parent, the
accused in effect invokes the defense of having
acted in the lawful exercise of a right under
paragraph 5 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The "right" or authority claimed by the teacher is
that which supposedly flows from the civil law
concept of "substitute parental authority"
exercised by teachers over their pupils. The
argument is that since under Article 349 of the
Civil Code, teachers exercise substitute parental
authority, and under Article 316, parents have
the power to correct their children and punish
them moderately, it follows logically that
teachers can likewise punish the pupils under
their charge. And if parents, in the exercise of
their authority, can inflict corporal punishment
on their children, so can teachers on their pupils.
The right of parents to chastise their
troublesome, mischievous or disobedient
children must be conceded as it is necessary to
the government of families, and to the good
order of society. However, this right was not
meant to be a license for manhandling or
physically chastising a misbehaving child. At the
same time that the law has created and
preserved this right, in its regard for the safety of
the child, it has prescribed bounds beyond which
it shall not be carried (Johnson v. State, 2 Hump
Tenn 283; 36 Am. Dec. 332). Thus, Dean
Francisco, commenting on Article 316 of the Civil
Code, observes: "It is to be noted that the law
provides for 'moderate' punishment.Since
modern educational system forbids the use of
corporal or physical punishment, this would be a
good test in determining the limitation of the
power of parents to correct and punish their
children moderately. Parents should never
exceed the limits of prudence and human
sentiments in proceeding against their children"
(Francisco, Civil Code of the Philippines,
Annotated and Commented, 1953 ed., Book One,
pp. 846-857; citing 2 Manresa 22-23; 5 Sanchez
Roman 1140; Decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain, November 26, 1901).
This observation is shared by Professors Garcia
and Alba, who maintain that: "The power to
correct and to punish children moderately
should be understood as not including corporal
or physical punishment, for otherwise it will be
against modern trends in education and a
violation of the provision of the Revised Penal
Code. Prudence and moderation should be the
rule" (Civil Code of the Philippines, 1950 ed., Vol.
1, p. 535).
The abiding love which reigns over families, the
native respect which children bear towards their
parents, and the moral ascendancy which
parents have over their children, should give
parents enough force to maintain the prestige of
their parental authority. Even if these fail, the
law affords parents recourse to the courts under
Act 4002. Under said law, minor children guilty
of disrespect or disobedience may be held
criminally liable upon the complaint of parents.
This law is a strong suggestion that parents are
not to take the law in their hands. In our
republican set-up, even the government of
families is not beyond the pale of the rule of law.
Indeed sanctions are provided in Article 332 of
the Civil Code when parents, hiding behind the
cloak of the parental privilege, "treat their
children with excessive harshness" which is a
cause for deprivation or suspension of their
parental authority (see Perez v. Samson, CA, 48
O.G. No. 12, p. 5368). The procedure therefor is
laid down by Rule 99, section 7 of the Rules of
Court, which includes as grounds for such
deprivation or suspension when the parents
"unlawfully beat or otherwise habitually
maltreat" the child.
Moreover, abusive parents may be proceeded
against criminally. It must be observed that our
general law on physical injuries does not exempt
parents (much less teachers) from criminal
liability for bodily harm inflicted on children or
pupils as punishment for misconduct. The only
concession given to the parents by law, under
Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, is that, in
case of serious physical injuries inflicted in the
course of a filial correction, the circumstance of
relationship shall not be considered for the
purpose of imposing the greater penalty. This
means that parents shall suffer only the ordinary
penalty provided for assailants who are not
related to the offended party within the specified
degrees.
Needless to emphasize, the authority delegated
to teachers cannot be greater than that conferred
on parents. Truly, the power exercised by
teachers over pupils is more restrictively, if not
more clearly, defined in law. The very chapter
which gives teachers and professors substitute
parental authority explicitly denies them the
power to administer corporal punishment, The
pertinent provision of the Civil Code is of the
following tenor:
Art. 352. The relations
between teacher and pupil
professor and student, are
fixed by government
regulations and those of each
school or institution. In no
case shall corporal punishment
be countenanced. The teacher
or professor shall cultivate
the best potentialities of the
heart and mind of the pupil or
student (emphasis supplied).
Said admonition is felicitously incorporated in
the government regulations promulgated
pursuant to law, namely, the Bureau of Public
Schools Service Manual, the pertinent provision
of which reads as follows:
Sec. 150. The use of corporal
punishment by teachers
(slapping, jerking, or pushing
pupils about), imposing
manual work or degrading
tasks as penalty, meting out
cruel and unusual
punishments of any nature ...
are forbidden (Third Revision,
1959 ed.).
Under the aforecited rule, the teacher cannot
even require the erring pupil to clean the room
or mow the lawn in the campus to discipline him,
although these penalties do not involve physical
injury. Neither can the teacher order the child to
stand at the corner of the classroom as it would
degrade or humiliate the child. He cannot even
push the pupil about to remind him that his
conduct is reproachable. By what twist of
reasoning can we then uphold the power to
apply corporal punishment as a legitimate means
of correction?
In the case at bar, the teacher clearly overdid
herself. In whipping the child several times with
a bamboo stick, an instrument liable to cause, as
in fact it caused, physical injuries, the accused
could not have meant to give expression to a
feeling of nobility. More than inflicting bodily
injuries, the punishment humiliated the child in
front of her classmates. In its execution, it was
plainly and simply excessive and brutal. The
most that the teacher could have done under the
circumstances was to admonish the child, if she
was certain of her guilt. She could have reported
her to her parents and to the parents of the pupil
who was tripped, and in turn, the parents to the
injured child could have reported the tripping
incident to the police authorities for the
institution of the proper criminal charges or
could have sued the parents of the erring pupil
for civil liability. The teacher pursued none of
these available courses of action. Instead, she
chose to take the law in her hands and, in the
process, arrogated unto herself the prerogatives
of a prosecutor, judge and executioner.
From the facts of the case, we therefore cannot
find any justification for the acts of the teacher.
The acts committed are not only unauthorized
even under the concept of the substitute parental
authority behind which the accused seeks refuge,
but they are precisely the acts teachers are
expressly forbidden to do. The accused acted not
to discharge the function of a teacher, but rather,
acted forgetting that she was a teacher.
Parenthetically, the Solicitor General noted that
the beating was administered on "parts of the
body which are not vulnerable to any serious
injury." But precisely, the teacher stands
accused only of slight physical injuries.
The doctrine enunciated by a division of the
Court of Appeals in the 1940 case of People
versus Javier (citing the 1908 case of Mansell v.
Griffin 1 K.B. 160) that "a teacher in a public
elementary school has authority to inflict
corporal punishment on a pupil" (40 OG 18th
Supp. 150), has been expressly revoked by
Article 352 of the New Civil Code which took
effect on August 30, 1950 and Article 150 of the
Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of Public
Schools aforequoted. Moreover, in the Javier
case, the main reason of the Court of Appeals in
acquitting the appellant therein was because the
Court of Appeals
cannot positively conclude
that it was appellant's blow
that caused the serious injury.
An equally strong probability
is that it was caused by the
other boys during their
boxing game. As a matter of
fact, the physician who
treated Bravo, testifying for
the prosecution, stated that
the injuries suffered by Bravo
'must have been caused by a
hard and blunt
instrument.' We are
constrained, therefore, to
doubt appellant's guilt,
We are inclined to believe
appellant's theory that the
incident was magnified in
order to find cause for
removing him from the
teaching staff of Quinalabasa
for reasons appearing
uncontradicted in the record.
He was disliked by the
residents in the barrio
because he had been
requiring his pupils to do
plenty of extracurricular work
in school, ... . There was also
the desire of Alejandro
Payoyo, a sponsor in the
marriage of Hilaria Bagaoisan,
mother of Bravo, to put his
niece, Joaquina Payoyo, a
temporary teacher in another
place, in appellant's stead.
That the barrio People
desired to appellant
dismissed as a school teacher
was also testified to by Elpidio
Doloctero (Vol. 40 O.G., 18th
Supp. p. 152, Emphasis
supplied).
It is clear, therefore, that the main ground for
acquitting the appellant Javier was that guilt was
not demonstrated beyond moral certainty.
Consequently, the additional reason that the
teacher has the authority to inflict moderate
corporal punishment was purely obiter dictum,
as it was not necessary to a finding of acquittal.
Furthermore, in the Javier case, the appellate
court laid down limitations on the exercise of
such authority to inflict moderate corporal
punishment, namely, the teacher must not inflict
any bodily harm and that he is not dictated by
any bad motive (Vol. 40 O.G. 18th Supp. pp. 153-
154). In the case at bar, appellant caused bodily
harm (slight physical injuries) on the pupil to
give vent to her anger as a measure of revenge
for the injury caused by the erring pupil on
another pupil, appellant's ward and househelper.
The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals in
the Javier case is further weakened by the
dissenting opinion of Justice Torres, which
dissent proclaims most accurately the present
policy. "The age when corporal punishment was
the basic factor of discipline in the schools has
passed, and a teacher who has to resort to
violence to enforce discipline among his pupils,
not only forfeits his right to be their mentor, but
practically confesses his inability and utter
failure to act as such, in which case he should
choose another profession or activity" (40 O.G.
18th Supp. 159).
The Court of Appeals in the 1952 case of People
vs. Padua (Vol. 49, O.G. No. 1, pp. 156, 161, citing
the 1940case of People versus Javier, supra) in
further stating that the authority to inflict
moderate corporal punishment without causing
any bodily harm "seems to be inherent in the
position of a teacher, especially in the grade
schools, is a competent of that old adage —
'spare the rod and spoil the child', not only failed
to consider the prohibition against the infliction
of such corporal punishment of any degree
whatsoever by a teacher on his or her pupil,
correctly expressed in Article 352 of the New
Civil Code, and re-enforced by Article 150 of the
Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of Public
Schools but also is obiter dictum ;because the
said case involves assault by the appellant Padua
against the teacher for allegedly slapping the
head of her niece with a notebook, for which
reason appellant Padua was prosecuted for
assault upon a person in authority and was
accordingly convicted by the court of first
instance, which conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. It is worthy to note that in said
case, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals
found in the Padua case that the appellant was
infuriated by the act of the teacher in slapping
her niece, it did not consider said anger of the
appellant as a mitigating circumstance.
It should be stressed that the Javier and Padua
cases were decided by the Court of Appeals,
whose opinion on questions of law is not binding
on the Supreme Court.
The authority of the parent under paragraph 2 of
Article 316 of the Civil Code "to correct and
punish moderately" an erring child, does not
include the infliction of corporal punishment.
Neither does the power "to discipline the child as
may be necessary for the formation of his good
character" under Article 45 of the Presidential
Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Youth
Welfare Code. Moderate punishment must be
short of corporal punishment. If the law intended
to authorize the parent to inflict such moderate
corporal punishment it would have provided so
expressly as is done in the statutes of Michigan
and Virginia invoked by the Solicitor General,
quoting Time Magazine (July 12, 1972 issue) and
relied on by the majority opinion.
The substitute parental authority granted to the
teacher over the pupil, does not include all the
rights comprehended in the patria potestas of
the natural parent over the child. For one thing,
certainly the teacher cannot demand support
and inheritance from the pupil in the same
manner that the teacher is not under obligation
to support the pupil or to recognize the right of
the pupil to inherit from him or even to educate
the child at his own expense.
The third paragraph of paragraph 4 of Article
263 of the Revised Penal Code affirms the
liability of the parent for serious physical
injuries, and only exempts the parent from the
special aggravating circumstances mentioned in
the second paragraph of said paragraph 4 of
Article 263 of the Revise Penal Code. The parent
"who shall inflict physical injuries upon his child
by excessive chastisement," does not incur the
graver penalties imposed in the penultimate
paragraph of Article 263 by reason of the special
aggravating circumstances. But such parent
remains liable for the penalties imposed in
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of said Article 263 for
serious physical injuries.
No such leniency is provided for slight physical
injuries and maltreatment inflicted by the parent
on the child under Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The use of corporal punishment in the halls of
learning is condemned. Flogging, even of the
most hardened criminals, has long been
abandoned as a form of punishment in penal
institutions. So must it be in schools. Respect for
human personality cannot be instilled in the
minds of the children when teachers choose to
defile the human body by whipping it. Beating a
child to make him remember his lesson well is
reminiscent of the days when slavery was
fashionable and instruments of torture were
symbols of authority. The inhumane dictum of
eras past "Spare the rod and spoil the child" had
been deposed by the compassionate precept
expressed in Article 352 of the Civil Code and
Section 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the
Bureau of Public Schools.
Hence, the conviction should be affirmed.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J., dissenting:
Petitioner Marcela M. Bagajo seeks a review of a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental convicting her of slight physical
injuries and imposing upon her a fine of Fifty
(P50.00) Pesos.
It is not disputed that petitioner, a classroom
teacher in a public school, whipped with a piece
of bamboo stick a pupil by the name of Wilma
Alcantara inflicting upon her the following
injuries:
1. Linear bruises at the middle
half of the dorsal surface of
both legs. It is about four
inches in length and ¼
centimeter in width. There
are three on the right leg and
two on the left leg.
2. Two linear bruises of the
same width and length as
above at the lower third of the
dorsal surface of the right
thigh.
The above lesions, if without
complication, may heal in four
to six days. (page 2, Majority
Opinion)
Petitioner claims that she is not criminally liable
as her act was without any criminal intent
because she was simply trying to discipline her
pupil Wilma who tripped a classmate Benedicta
Guirigay causing the latter to stumble and fall
down.
The Majority Opinion following the
recommendations of the Solicitor General sets
aside the conviction and acquits petitioner,
holding, inter alia:
. . . All that We hold here is
that in the peculiar
circumstances of the instant
case before Us, there is no
indication beyond reasonable
doubt, in the evidence before
the trial court, that petitioner
was actuated by a criminal
design to inflict the injuries
suffered by complainant as a
result of her being whipped
by petitioner. What appears is
that petitioner acted as she
did in the belief that as a
teacher exercising authority
over her pupil in loco parentis,
she was within her rights to
punish her moderately for
purposes of discipline. ... (pp.
3-4, Majority Opinion)
I am constrained to dissent from the majority,
briefly for the following reasons:
The act of inflicting physical injuries upon
another is a felony, as it is punishable by
law. 1 Every felonious act is in turn presumed to
be voluntary with all three elements present, to
wit: freedom, intelligence, intent (dolus) or fault
(culpa). 2 Freedom is overcome by evidence of
force or threat; 3 intelligence, by insanity or
infancy; 4 intent, by proof of mistake of fact,
performance of duty, or the like.5
The issue now is: was there malice or criminal
intent in the infliction of the physical injuries on
Wilma?
The Majority Opinion discounts the presence of
criminal intent and justifies the act of petitioner
as one committed by a teacher exercising
authority in loco parentis under Art. 349 of the
Civil Code.
Admittedly, Art. 349 includes a teacher among
the persons exercising substitute parental
authority while Art. 350 states that the latter
shall exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of a child. However, by the very
provisions of Art. 352 of the same Code it is a
condition that as to the relations between
teacher and pupil, in no case shall corporal
punishment be countenanced
The act of petitioner contravenes not only Art.
352 of the Civil Code but also Section 150 of the
Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual quoted
in pages 2 and 3 of the Opinion under which the
use of corporal punishment by teachers
is forbidden.
It is contended in the Opinion that the above
provisions are applicable in so far as the civil and
administrative liabilities of petitioner are
concerned, thereby overlooking the fact that the
law on substitute parental authority under which
the infliction of the "moderate penalty" is
justified, expressly prohibits the use of corporal
punishment by teachers in their relations with
their pupils.
But a more basic reason for this dissent is that
the legal presumption of malice is not
overthrown by protestation of good faith and
honest belief of petitioner that she was merely
imposing discipline, for the findings of the trial
courts, viz: the Municipal Court and the Court of
First Instance, attest that petitioner herein
whipped Wilma with a bamboo stick in the "heat
of anger" 6 because Benedicta Guirigay the victim
of Wilma's naughtiness or mischief, was "a
working pupil living in the house of the accused
(petitioner now) for several years." 7
In truth, therefore, anger, a desire to avenge the
mischief done on her protege Benedicta,
motivated petitioner in striking Wilma with her
bamboo stick.
Moreover, I simply cannot agree with the
Majority that all that petitioner did was to
impose a "moderate penalty" on Wilma.
Petitioner did not whip or strike at Wilma once
or twice, but several times with such vehemence
and force as to produce not one or two but seven
linear bruises on different parts of both legs and
right thigh which according to the doctor would
heal barring complications from four to six days.
Inflicting physical injuries, to my mind, is not a
"moderately penalty". If an exercise of discipline
was necessary, petitioner could have employed
methods short of bodily punishment which
would leave injuries on the person of the
recalcitrant pupil.
Wherefore, I vote for the affirmance of the
decision of the trial court.
Separate Opinions
ANTONIO, J., concurring:
The effectiveness of a teacher to exercise
authority over her pupil in loco parentis depends
on her ability to enforce discipline. Petitioner
had authority to inflict corporal punishment on a
pupil, if the punishment is moderate, not
prompted by bad motive, and is of such a nature
that the parent of the child might expect the child
would receive if she did wrong.
AQUINO, J., concurring:
The teacher, who inflicted corporal punishment,
should be disciplined administratively. In People
vs. Javier, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 150, the Court of
Appeals, per Melencio, J., Briones, Montemayor
and Enage, JJ., concurring, held that a teacher,
who inflicted moderate corporal punishment,
was not criminally liable because he had no
criminal intent, citing Mansell vs. Griffin, I K. B.
160. (Justice Torres dissented.)
FERNANDO, J, dissenting:
I find myself in sympathy with the approach
taken in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Makasiar not only in view of the humanity that
should permeate the law but also in accordance
with the tendency much more manifest of late in
international law to accord greater and greater
protection to the welfare of the young, as an
aspect of human rights. Moreover, it is well-
settled that the doctrine parens patriae calls for
the state exercising the utmost vigilance to
assure that teachers and educators should
refrain from the infliction of corporal
punishment which for me at least is a relic of the
past. This is not to lose sight of the significance of
the view stressed in the opinion of Justice
Barredo that criminal intent must be shown to
justify a finding of guilt. Nonetheless, considering
the nature and extent of the physical injuries
sustained, as shown in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Muñoz Palma, the protestation of good
faith on the part of appellant had, for me, lost its
persuasiveness. 'The leading case of People v.
Cagoco, 1 where the accused approached the
victim from behind and suddenly struck him
with his fist on the back part of his head causing
him to fall backwards, his head striking the
asphalt pavement as a result of which he died a
few hours later comes to mind. It was the ruling
of this Court that murder was committed as
there was alevosia, although appellant was
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intention to commit so great a wrong as that
inflicted. 2
Thus I find myself unable to yield concurrence to
the acquittal of the accused.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the dissenting opinion of Justice
Muñoz Palma and vote for affirmance of the
judgment of conviction which liberally imposed a
mere fine of P50.00 notwithstanding the physical
injuries requiring four to six days' healing time
inflicted upon the victim.
I only wish to stress that Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code expressly penalizes the
offense of slight physical injuries and
maltreatment, while Article 352 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that "(T)he relations between
teacher and pupil, professor and student, are
fixed by government, regulations and those of
each school or institution. In no case shall
corporal punishment be countenanced. The
teacher or professor shall cultivate the best
potentialities of the Heart and mind of the pupil
or student," even as Article 349 recognizes
teachers and professors as among those who
exercise substitute parental authority. Section
150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service
Manual further categorically forbids "the use of
corporal punishment by teachers (slapping,
jerking, or pushing pupils about)."
It cannot be contended then that teachers in the
exercise of their authority in loco parentis may,
without incurring criminal liability inflict
moderate corporal punishment. The power to
inflict moderate punishment on children is
vested by Article 316 of the Civil
Code exclusively, in the parents.
The petitioner might be entitled to the
appreciation of mitigating circumstances in her
favor such as having acted with obfuscation, but
in the face of the express provisions of law she
may not be absolved of the proven charge.
The statement in the main opinion (at page 4)
that "wheather or not (petitioner) exceeded the
degree of moderation permitted by the laws and
rules governing the performance of her functions
is not for Us, at this moment and in this case, to
determine" (but that "We feel it wiser to leave
such determination first to the administrative
authorities") appears to be contrary to the laws
and rules which do not permit the infliction of
corporal punishment, moderate or otherwise, by
teachers on their pupils but provide for criminal,
civil and administrative sanctions, and contrary
to the proven facts, which as pointed out by
Justice Muñoz Palma, show that the physical
injuries inflicted by petitioner on her pupil could
by no means be described as "moderate" (even
assuming that teachers had the authority to
inflict moderate corporal punishment).
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
The facts in this case are as follows.
Inside a classroom while the teacher was away,
an eleven year old girl-pupil tripped a girl-
classmate, causing slight physical injuries to the
latter. Upon being questioned by the teacher in
charge who just then came back, the erring child
denied authorship of the misdeed. The teacher
became angry and, with a bamboo stick, whipped
the erring child on the buttocks, thighs, and legs
with such violence as to leave on the punished
limbs, not welts, but bruises requiring some four
to six days to heal. The medical certificate
described the injuries thus:
1. Linear bruises at the middle
of the dorsal surface of both
legs. It is about four inches in
length and 1/4 centimeters in
width. There are three on the
right leg and 2 on the left leg.
2. Two linear bruises of the
same width and length as
above at the lower third of the
dorsal surface of the right
thigh.
The above lesions, if without
complications, may heal in
four to six days (page 2. Brief
of Solicitor General).
Convicted by the municipal court for slight
physical injuries, the accused appealed to the
Court of First Instance, which affirmed the
conviction. Hence, this appeal direct to this
Court.
The Solicitor General recommends the reversal
of the decision of the court below. Accordingly,
the majority returns a judgment of acquittal.
WE dissent.
I
Criminal intent is presumed in every criminal
act. But the Solicitor General practically argues
that a good motive negatives criminal intent.
Motive may mitigate, but does not totally
exculpate, criminal liability.
Motive, in criminal law, consists of the special or
personal reason which may prompt or induce a
person to perform the act constituting a crime
(Padilla, Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, 9th ed., 1964, p. 41). It is the moving
power which impels one to act for a definite
result, as distinguished from "intent" which is
the purpose to use a particular means to effect
such result (People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264,
297; 61 N.E. 286, 296; 62 L.R.A. 193). The
foregoing distinction has gained wide acceptance
among our criminal law commentators (see
Francisco, The Revised Penal Code, Annotated
and Commented, 2nd ed., 1954, Book One, p. 38;
Reyes, the Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, 6th
ed., 1965, Book One, p. 60; Gregorio,
Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 3rd ed.,
1971, p. 16). In relation to the "particular means"
employed — the overt acts committed by a
person — motive, unlike intent, is quite
materially removed. One motive can give rise to
one of several possible courses of action, lawful
or unlawful, as one act could have been actuated
by one of several possible motives, good or bad.
That is why in our law on evidence, no unlawful
motive is presumed from the proof of
commission of an unlawful act. Nor would such
presumption, if there was, be of any use, for
materially unrelated as motive is to the
prohibited overt act, it is not essential to the
determination of a crime.
Since acts are equivocal as to motive, it is often
impossible to ascertain the reasons which moved
a person to commit an act. This finds excellent
example in the case at bar. While the accused
stoutly asserts that her motive was to discipline
the child, The trial court and the lower appellate
court hold differently. Their unanimous finding
is that the accused committed the act in the heat
of anger — a state of mind which could hardly
harbor a good motive. The Court of First Instance
expresses its findings thus —
It appears that ... (a)t this
precise moment, the accused
entered the room and asked
Wilma what had happened.
Wilma answered that she had
nothing to do with the failing
down of Benedicta. Ponciano
reported to the accused that
Wilma purposely blocked
Benedicta with her legs and
she fell to the floor. The
accused became angry and
whipped Wilma with a
bamboo stick (at pages 1 and
2).
xxx xxx xxx
From the evidence it has been
duly proved that while
Benedicta Guirigay was
passing near Wilma Alcantara,
the latter suddenly raised her
leg and Benedicta stumbled
on it and fell to the floor. She
fainted and suffered some
injuries. The accused became
very angry got her piece of
bamboo stick which she was
using as a pointer stick and
with it whipped
Wilma several times, thereby
causing on Wilma the physical
injuries described by Dr.
Ozarraga in his medical
certificate (at page 4;
Emphasis supplied).
In the same manner, the municipal court finds
that —
... (I)n the instant case, it would appear that
the accused Marcela M. Bagajo, was carried away
by her passion or anger in whipping to such an
extreme Wilma Alcantara with a bamboo stick
not really apt for the purpose. The victim of
Wilma Alcantara's mischief or naughtiness was
Benedicta Guirigay a working pupil actually living
with her(the accused)for some years. ...
The motive of the accused was to avenge the
injury to the victim who, as found by the trial
court, has been living with (and working for) the
accused teacher. Will vengeance justify the act?
But assuming that the motive of the accused was
really good, does this mean that criminal intent
on her part is thus completely ruled out? WE do
not believe so. A good motive, as we have earlier
intimated, is not incompatible with an unlawful
intent. One may be convicted of a crime whether
his motive appears to be good or bad or even
though no motive is proven. A good motive does
not prevent an act from being a crime. (People ex
rel Hegeman v. Corrigan 87 N.E. 792, 796; 195
N.Y. 1, quoting People v. Molineux supra; Clark,
Cr. Law, sec. 14; People v. Weiss 300 N.Y.S. 249,
255; 252 App. Div. 463). A classic example
is euthanasia or mercy killing. It is condemned
by law although the motive may be to spare a
hopeless patient prolonged suffering. And if a
father drowns his child who is five years of age
to save it from starving, he is guilty of parricide
though he was actuated by a good motive — love
for the child (People v.Kirby 2 Parker Cr. R., N.Y.,
28. See also U.S. v. Marmon 45 Fed. 414. Both are
cited in The Revised Penal Code,
Francisco, supra). The father or brother of a rape
victim, who kills the rapist long after the
commission of the rape. to avenge the victim's
defloration, is not exempt from penal liability. A
son killing his sleeping father, who used to beat
up his hardworking mother, to relieve his good
mother from so much misery, does not justify the
parricide. So also, if a person cuts off the foot of a
mischievous child to prevent if from doing
further mischief with its foot, and thus save it
from possible criminal liability, that person
stands liable for physical injuries. True enough,
the act involved in the instant case, which is the
beating of a child, is less serious than those
involved in the above-cited cases, but the fact
that an act is less serious than another does not
mean that it is not criminal. Other examples can
be catalogued ad infinitum. Thus, our penal code
provides specific penalties for specific crimes,
depending, generally, on their seriousness.
II
The Solicitor General further maintains that the
act committed by the accused is not unlawful.
"Administering moderate corporal punishment,"
he says, "is not so defined as felony by the
Revised Penal Code."
But "administering corporal punishment" is a
felony, although the Code categorized it under
the more graphic term "slight physical injuries".
The pertinent provision is stated as follows:
Art. 266. Slight physical
injuries ... — The crime of
slight physical injuries shall
be punished:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By arresto menor or a fine
not exceeding 200 pesos and
censure when the offender has
caused physical injuries which
do not prevent the offended
party from engaging in his
habitual work nor require
medical attendance.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied).
In fact, even if no visible injury were caused by
the act of administering punishment, it would
still be punished as an illtreatment by deed
under paragraph 3 of the same Article 266.
From the facts found by the trial court, the
following material points appear: (1) the teacher
beat the child with a bamboo stick, and (2) the
beating caused physical injuries on the child,
consisting of linear bruises requiring some four to
six days to heal. The act of the accused, no doubt,
constitutes the very offense penalized by the
cited provision.
Commission of a prohibited act having been
indubitably shown, no proof of criminal intent is
necessary. For, "from the felonious acts (of the
accused), freely and deliberately executed, the
moral and injurious intent arises conclusively
and indisputably, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary" (People v. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52,
53. See also U.S. v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92; People v.
Abando, 2 CA Rep. 205; paragraph [b], section 5
of Rule 13, Rules of Court; 16 C.J. 81).
In claiming that she merely acted within the
limits of her authority in punishing the child as
the latter's teacher and substitute parent, the
accused in effect invokes the defense of having
acted in the lawful exercise of a right under
paragraph 5 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The "right" or authority claimed by the teacher is
that which supposedly flows from the civil law
concept of "substitute parental authority"
exercised by teachers over their pupils. The
argument is that since under Article 349 of the
Civil Code, teachers exercise substitute parental
authority, and under Article 316, parents have
the power to correct their children and punish
them moderately, it follows logically that
teachers can likewise punish the pupils under
their charge. And if parents, in the exercise of
their authority, can inflict corporal punishment
on their children, so can teachers on their pupils.
The right of parents to chastise their
troublesome, mischievous or disobedient
children must be conceded as it is necessary to
the government of families, and to the good
order of society. However, this right was not
meant to be a license for manhandling or
physically chastising a misbehaving child. At the
same time that the law has created and
preserved this right, in its regard for the safety of
the child, it has prescribed bounds beyond which
it shall not be carried (Johnson v. State, 2 Hump
Tenn 283; 36 Am. Dec. 332). Thus, Dean
Francisco, commenting on Article 316 of the Civil
Code, observes: "It is to be noted that the law
provides for 'moderate' punishment.Since
modern educational system forbids the use of
corporal or physical punishment, this would be a
good test in determining the limitation of the
power of parents to correct and punish their
children moderately. Parents should never
exceed the limits of prudence and human
sentiments in proceeding against their children"
(Francisco, Civil Code of the Philippines,
Annotated and Commented, 1953 ed., Book One,
pp. 846-857; citing 2 Manresa 22-23; 5 Sanchez
Roman 1140; Decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain, November 26, 1901).
This observation is shared by Professors Garcia
and Alba, who maintain that: "The power to
correct and to punish children moderately
should be understood as not including corporal
or physical punishment, for otherwise it will be
against modern trends in education and a
violation of the provision of the Revised Penal
Code. Prudence and moderation should be the
rule" (Civil Code of the Philippines, 1950 ed., Vol.
1, p. 535).
The abiding love which reigns over families, the
native respect which children bear towards their
parents, and the moral ascendancy which
parents have over their children, should give
parents enough force to maintain the prestige of
their parental authority. Even if these fail, the
law affords parents recourse to the courts under
Act 4002. Under said law, minor children guilty
of disrespect or disobedience may be held
criminally liable upon the complaint of parents.
This law is a strong suggestion that parents are
not to take the law in their hands. In our
republican set-up, even the government of
families is not beyond the pale of the rule of law.
Indeed sanctions are provided in Article 332 of
the Civil Code when parents, hiding behind the
cloak of the parental privilege, "treat their
children with excessive harshness" which is a
cause for deprivation or suspension of their
parental authority (see Perez v. Samson, CA, 48
O.G. No. 12, p. 5368). The procedure therefor is
laid down by Rule 99, section 7 of the Rules of
Court, which includes as grounds for such
deprivation or suspension when the parents
"unlawfully beat or otherwise habitually
maltreat" the child.
Moreover, abusive parents may be proceeded
against criminally. It must be observed that our
general law on physical injuries does not exempt
parents (much less teachers) from criminal
liability for bodily harm inflicted on children or
pupils as punishment for misconduct. The only
concession given to the parents by law, under
Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, is that, in
case of serious physical injuries inflicted in the
course of a filial correction, the circumstance of
relationship shall not be considered for the
purpose of imposing the greater penalty. This
means that parents shall suffer only the ordinary
penalty provided for assailants who are not
related to the offended party within the specified
degrees.
Needless to emphasize, the authority delegated
to teachers cannot be greater than that conferred
on parents. Truly, the power exercised by
teachers over pupils is more restrictively, if not
more clearly, defined in law. The very chapter
which gives teachers and professors substitute
parental authority explicitly denies them the
power to administer corporal punishment, The
pertinent provision of the Civil Code is of the
following tenor:
Art. 352. The relations
between teacher and pupil
professor and student, are
fixed by government
regulations and those of each
school or institution. In no
case shall corporal punishment
be countenanced. The teacher
or professor shall cultivate
the best potentialities of the
heart and mind of the pupil or
student (emphasis supplied).
Said admonition is felicitously incorporated in
the government regulations promulgated
pursuant to law, namely, the Bureau of Public
Schools Service Manual, the pertinent provision
of which reads as follows:
Sec. 150. The use of corporal
punishment by teachers
(slapping, jerking, or pushing
pupils about), imposing
manual work or degrading
tasks as penalty, meting out
cruel and unusual
punishments of any nature ...
are forbidden (Third Revision,
1959 ed.).
Under the aforecited rule, the teacher cannot
even require the erring pupil to clean the room
or mow the lawn in the campus to discipline him,
although these penalties do not involve physical
injury. Neither can the teacher order the child to
stand at the corner of the classroom as it would
degrade or humiliate the child. He cannot even
push the pupil about to remind him that his
conduct is reproachable. By what twist of
reasoning can we then uphold the power to
apply corporal punishment as a legitimate means
of correction?
In the case at bar, the teacher clearly overdid
herself. In whipping the child several times with
a bamboo stick, an instrument liable to cause, as
in fact it caused, physical injuries, the accused
could not have meant to give expression to a
feeling of nobility. More than inflicting bodily
injuries, the punishment humiliated the child in
front of her classmates. In its execution, it was
plainly and simply excessive and brutal. The
most that the teacher could have done under the
circumstances was to admonish the child, if she
was certain of her guilt. She could have reported
her to her parents and to the parents of the pupil
who was tripped, and in turn, the parents to the
injured child could have reported the tripping
incident to the police authorities for the
institution of the proper criminal charges or
could have sued the parents of the erring pupil
for civil liability. The teacher pursued none of
these available courses of action. Instead, she
chose to take the law in her hands and, in the
process, arrogated unto herself the prerogatives
of a prosecutor, judge and executioner.
From the facts of the case, we therefore cannot
find any justification for the acts of the teacher.
The acts committed are not only unauthorized
even under the concept of the substitute parental
authority behind which the accused seeks refuge,
but they are precisely the acts teachers are
expressly forbidden to do. The accused acted not
to discharge the function of a teacher, but rather,
acted forgetting that she was a teacher.
Parenthetically, the Solicitor General noted that
the beating was administered on "parts of the
body which are not vulnerable to any serious
injury." But precisely, the teacher stands
accused only of slight physical injuries.
The doctrine enunciated by a division of the
Court of Appeals in the 1940 case of People
versus Javier (citing the 1908 case of Mansell v.
Griffin 1 K.B. 160) that "a teacher in a public
elementary school has authority to inflict
corporal punishment on a pupil" (40 OG 18th
Supp. 150), has been expressly revoked by
Article 352 of the New Civil Code which took
effect on August 30, 1950 and Article 150 of the
Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of Public
Schools aforequoted. Moreover, in the Javier
case, the main reason of the Court of Appeals in
acquitting the appellant therein was because the
Court of Appeals
cannot positively conclude
that it was appellant's blow
that caused the serious injury.
An equally strong probability
is that it was caused by the
 other boys during their
boxing game. As a matter of
fact, the physician who
treated Bravo, testifying for
the prosecution, stated that
the injuries suffered by Bravo
'must have been caused by a
hard and blunt
instrument.' We are
constrained, therefore, to
doubt appellant's guilt,
We are inclined to believe
appellant's theory that the
incident was magnified in
order to find cause for
removing him from the
teaching staff of Quinalabasa
for reasons appearing
uncontradicted in the record.
He was disliked by the
residents in the barrio
because he had been
requiring his pupils to do
plenty of extracurricular work
in school, ... . There was also
the desire of Alejandro
Payoyo, a sponsor in the
marriage of Hilaria Bagaoisan,
mother of Bravo, to put his
niece, Joaquina Payoyo, a
temporary teacher in another
place, in appellant's stead.
That the barrio People
desired to appellant
dismissed as a school teacher
was also testified to by Elpidio
Doloctero (Vol. 40 O.G., 18th
Supp. p. 152, Emphasis
supplied).
It is clear, therefore, that the main ground for
acquitting the appellant Javier was that guilt was
not demonstrated beyond moral certainty.
Consequently, the additional reason that the
teacher has the authority to inflict moderate
corporal punishment was purely obiter dictum,
as it was not necessary to a finding of acquittal.
Furthermore, in the Javier case, the appellate
court laid down limitations on the exercise of
such authority to inflict moderate corporal
punishment, namely, the teacher must not inflict
any bodily harm and that he is not dictated by
any bad motive (Vol. 40 O.G. 18th Supp. pp. 153-
154). In the case at bar, appellant caused bodily
harm (slight physical injuries) on the pupil to
give vent to her anger as a measure of revenge
for the injury caused by the erring pupil on
another pupil, appellant's ward and househelper.
The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals in
the Javier case is further weakened by the
dissenting opinion of Justice Torres, which
dissent proclaims most accurately the present
policy. "The age when corporal punishment was
the basic factor of discipline in the schools has
passed, and a teacher who has to resort to
violence to enforce discipline among his pupils,
not only forfeits his right to be their mentor, but
practically confesses his inability and utter
failure to act as such, in which case he should
choose another profession or activity" (40 O.G.
18th Supp. 159).
The Court of Appeals in the 1952 case of People
vs. Padua (Vol. 49, O.G. No. 1, pp. 156, 161, citing
the 1940case of People versus Javier, supra) in
further stating that the authority to inflict
moderate corporal punishment without causing
any bodily harm "seems to be inherent in the
position of a teacher, especially in the grade
schools, is a competent of that old adage —
'spare the rod and spoil the child', not only failed
to consider the prohibition against the infliction
of such corporal punishment of any degree
whatsoever by a teacher on his or her pupil,
correctly expressed in Article 352 of the New
Civil Code, and re-enforced by Article 150 of the
Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of Public
Schools but also is obiter dictum ;because the
said case involves assault by the appellant Padua
against the teacher for allegedly slapping the
head of her niece with a notebook, for which
reason appellant Padua was prosecuted for
assault upon a person in authority and was
accordingly convicted by the court of first
instance, which conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. It is worthy to note that in said
case, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals
found in the Padua case that the appellant was
infuriated by the act of the teacher in slapping
her niece, it did not consider said anger of the
appellant as a mitigating circumstance.
It should be stressed that the Javier and Padua
cases were decided by the Court of Appeals,
whose opinion on questions of law is not binding
on the Supreme Court.
The authority of the parent under paragraph 2 of
Article 316 of the Civil Code "to correct and
punish moderately" an erring child, does not
include the infliction of corporal punishment.
Neither does the power "to discipline the child as
may be necessary for the formation of his good
character" under Article 45 of the Presidential
Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Youth
Welfare Code. Moderate punishment must be
short of corporal punishment. If the law intended
to authorize the parent to inflict such moderate
corporal punishment it would have provided so
expressly as is done in the statutes of Michigan
and Virginia invoked by the Solicitor General,
quoting Time Magazine (July 12, 1972 issue) and
relied on by the majority opinion.
The substitute parental authority granted to the
teacher over the pupil, does not include all the
rights comprehended in the patria potestas of
the natural parent over the child. For one thing,
certainly the teacher cannot demand support
and inheritance from the pupil in the same
manner that the teacher is not under obligation
to support the pupil or to recognize the right of
the pupil to inherit from him or even to educate
the child at his own expense.
The third paragraph of paragraph 4 of Article
263 of the Revised Penal Code affirms the
liability of the parent for serious physical
injuries, and only exempts the parent from the
special aggravating circumstances mentioned in
the second paragraph of said paragraph 4 of
Article 263 of the Revise Penal Code. The parent
"who shall inflict physical injuries upon his child
by excessive chastisement," does not incur the
graver penalties imposed in the penultimate
paragraph of Article 263 by reason of the special
aggravating circumstances. But such parent
remains liable for the penalties imposed in
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of said Article 263 for
serious physical injuries.
No such leniency is provided for slight physical
injuries and maltreatment inflicted by the parent
on the child under Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The use of corporal punishment in the halls of
learning is condemned. Flogging, even of the
most hardened criminals, has long been
abandoned as a form of punishment in penal
institutions. So must it be in schools. Respect for
human personality cannot be instilled in the
minds of the children when teachers choose to
defile the human body by whipping it. Beating a
child to make him remember his lesson well is
reminiscent of the days when slavery was
fashionable and instruments of torture were
symbols of authority. The inhumane dictum of
eras past "Spare the rod and spoil the child" had
been deposed by the compassionate precept
expressed in Article 352 of the Civil Code and
Section 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the
Bureau of Public Schools.
Hence, the conviction should be affirmed.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J., dissenting:
Petitioner Marcela M. Bagajo seeks a review of a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental convicting her of slight physical
injuries and imposing upon her a fine of Fifty
(P50.00) Pesos.
It is not disputed that petitioner, a classroom
teacher in a public school, whipped with a piece
of bamboo stick a pupil by the name of Wilma
Alcantara inflicting upon her the following
injuries:
1. Linear bruises at the middle
half of the dorsal surface of
both legs. It is about four
 inches in length and ¼
centimeter in width. There
are three on the right leg and
two on the left leg.
2. Two linear bruises of the
same width and length as
above at the lower third of the
dorsal surface of the right
thigh.
The above lesions, if without
complication, may heal in four
to six days. (page 2, Majority
Opinion)
Petitioner claims that she is not criminally liable
as her act was without any criminal intent
because she was simply trying to discipline her
pupil Wilma who tripped a classmate Benedicta
Guirigay causing the latter to stumble and fall
down.
The Majority Opinion following the
recommendations of the Solicitor General sets
aside the conviction and acquits petitioner,
holding, inter alia:
. . . All that We hold here is
that in the peculiar
circumstances of the instant
case before Us, there is no
indication beyond reasonable
doubt, in the evidence before
the trial court, that petitioner
was actuated by a criminal
design to inflict the injuries
suffered by complainant as a
result of her being whipped
by petitioner. What appears is
that petitioner acted as she
did in the belief that as a
teacher exercising authority
over her pupil in loco parentis,
she was within her rights to
punish her moderately for
purposes of discipline. ... (pp.
3-4, Majority Opinion)
I am constrained to dissent from the majority,
briefly for the following reasons:
The act of inflicting physical injuries upon
another is a felony, as it is punishable by
law. 1 Every felonious act is in turn presumed to
be voluntary with all three elements present, to
wit: freedom, intelligence, intent (dolus) or fault
(culpa). 2 Freedom is overcome by evidence of
force or threat; 3 intelligence, by insanity or
infancy; 4 intent, by proof of mistake of fact,
performance of duty, or the like.5
The issue now is: was there malice or criminal
intent in the infliction of the physical injuries on
Wilma?
The Majority Opinion discounts the presence of
criminal intent and justifies the act of petitioner
as one committed by a teacher exercising
authority in loco parentis under Art. 349 of the
Civil Code.
Admittedly, Art. 349 includes a teacher among
the persons exercising substitute parental
authority while Art. 350 states that the latter
shall exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of a child. However, by the very
provisions of Art. 352 of the same Code it is a
condition that as to the relations between
teacher and pupil, in no case shall corporal
punishment be countenanced
The act of petitioner contravenes not only Art.
352 of the Civil Code but also Section 150 of the
Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual quoted
in pages 2 and 3 of the Opinion under which the
use of corporal punishment by teachers
is forbidden.
It is contended in the Opinion that the above
provisions are applicable in so far as the civil and
administrative liabilities of petitioner are
concerned, thereby overlooking the fact that the
law on substitute parental authority under which
the infliction of the "moderate penalty" is
justified, expressly prohibits the use of corporal
punishment by teachers in their relations with
their pupils.
But a more basic reason for this dissent is that
the legal presumption of malice is not
overthrown by protestation of good faith and
honest belief of petitioner that she was merely
imposing discipline, for the findings of the trial
courts, viz: the Municipal Court and the Court of
First Instance, attest that petitioner herein
whipped Wilma with a bamboo stick in the "heat
of anger" 6 because Benedicta Guirigay the victim
of Wilma's naughtiness or mischief, was "a
working pupil living in the house of the accused
(petitioner now) for several years." 7
In truth, therefore, anger, a desire to avenge the
mischief done on her protege Benedicta,
motivated petitioner in striking Wilma with her
bamboo stick.
Moreover, I simply cannot agree with the
Majority that all that petitioner did was to
impose a "moderate penalty" on Wilma.
Petitioner did not whip or strike at Wilma once
or twice, but several times with such vehemence
and force as to produce not one or two but seven
linear bruises on different parts of both legs and
right thigh which according to the doctor would
heal barring complications from four to six days.
Inflicting physical injuries, to my mind, is not a
"moderately penalty". If an exercise of discipline
was necessary, petitioner could have employed
methods short of bodily punishment which
would leave injuries on the person of the
recalcitrant pupil.
Wherefore, I vote for the affirmance of the
decision of the trial court.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 173988 October 8, 2014
FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioner, a public schoolteacher, was
charged with and found guilty of child abuse, a
violation of Republic Act No. 7610.1 The victim
was her own Grade 1 pupil whom she physically
maltreated for having accidentally bumped her
knee while she was drowsing off on a bamboo
sofa as he entered the classroom. Her
maltreatment left him with physical injuries, as
duly certified by a physician.
Whether or not the petitioner thereby
committed child abuse is the question that this
appeal must determine, in light of the Court's
pronouncement in Bongalon v. People of the
Philippines2 that:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a
child constitutes the crime of child abuse under
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only
when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused
to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the child as a human being
should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise,
it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Antecedents
The State, through the Office ofthe Solicitor
General, summed up the factual antecedents in
its comment,3 as follows:
On February 13, 1996, seven yearold Michael
Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan
Elementary School located in the Municipality of
Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his
classroom when he accidentally bumped the
knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina Rosaldes,
who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa (TSN,
March 14, 1997, pp. 5-6). Roused from sleep,
petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to
her. When Michael did not obey but instead
proceeded to his seat (TSN, March 14, 1997, p.
6), petitioner went to Michael and pinched him
on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his
armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell,
Michael Ryan’s body hit a desk. As a result, he
lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded topick
Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly
slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan
cried (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6; TSN, November
13, 1997, p. 7).
After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach
her class. During lunch break, Michael Ryan,
accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella
Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home crying
and told his mother about the incident (TSN,
March 14, 1997, p. 7). His mother and his Aunt
Evangeline Gonzales reported the incident to
their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza (TSN,
February 1, 1999, p. 4) who advised them to
have Michael Ryan examined by a doctor.
Michael Ryan’s aunt and Barangay Councilman
Ernesto Ligante brought him to the Dr. Ricardo Y.
Ladrido Hospital where he was examined by Dr.
Teresita Castigador. They, likewise, reported the
incident to the Police Station (TSN, July 27, 1997,
p. 6; TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4).
The medical certificate issued by Dr. Teresita
Castigador reads, in part:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both
external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area
of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and
1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking
especially at the area of femoral head.
The petitioner was criminally charged with child
abusein the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City
(RTC), and the case was assigned to Branch 27 of
that court. The information alleged as follows:
The Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo, upon
approval and Directive of the Deputy
OMBUDSMAN for the Visayas accuses FELINA
ROSALDES of the crime of VIOLATION OF CHILD
ABUSE LAW
(Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610), committed as
follows:
That on or about the 13th day of February 1996,
in the Municipality of Lambunao, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being a public school teacher in Grade 1 of
Pughanan Elementary School, with a Salary
Grade below 26, under the DECS, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
maltreat her pupil Michael Ryan Gonzales, a
seven year old child, by pinching him on
different parts of his body, and thereafter
slumping him to the ground, thereby causing
Michael Ryan Gonzales to lose his consciousness
and has suffered injuries on different parts of his
body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 26, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment
convicting the petitioner of child
abuse,5 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 10 (a),
Article VI of R.A. 7610, the Court sentences her to
an indeterminate prison term ranging from four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay the costs.
No pronouncement as to civil liability, the same
not having been proved.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the
petitioner through its assailed decision
promulgated on May 11, 2005,7 with a
modification of the penalty, viz: WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed in
this case and AFFIRMING the decision rendered
on June 26, 2003 by the court a quo in Criminal
Case No. 46893 with the MODIFICATION that the
accusedappellant is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional,
as the minimum of it, to ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as the maximum
thereof.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
In her petition for review on certiorari,9 the
petitioner submits that:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the
petitioner by holding that the acts of the
petitioner constitute child abuse penalized under
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610[,] and
notunder the Revised Penal Code.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the
petitioner by holding that petitioner’s
constitutional right to due process and her right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her was not violated when the
essential elements of the crime charged were not
properly recited in the information.10
Countering, the State, through the OSG, insists
that the issues the petitioner is raising are
mainly factual and, therefore, not reviewable
under the mode of appeal chosen; that the
affirmance of her conviction by the CA was in
accord with the pertinent law and jurisprudence,
and supported by the overwhelming evidence of
the trial; and that the information charging her
with child abuse was sufficient in form and
substance.11
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
First of all, the State correctly contends that the
petitioner could raise only questions of law in
her present recourse. Under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, the appeal is limited to questionsof law.
The immediate implication of the limitation is to
have the findings of fact by the CA, which
affirmed the findings of fact by the trial court,
conclude the Court by virtue of its not being a
trier of fact. As such, the Court cannot analyze or
weigh the evidence all over again.
It is true that the limitation of the review to
errors of law admits of exceptions. Under Section
4, Rule 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court, the following situations are the exceptions
in which the Court may review findings of fact by
the lower courts, to wit: (a) the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise and conjecture; (b) the inference made
is manifestly mistaken; (c) there is grave abuse
of discretion; (d) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) the findings of fact
are conflicting; (f) the collegial appellate courts
went beyond the issues of the case, and their
findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (g) the findings of fact of
the collegial appellate courts are contrary to
those of the trial court; (h) said findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (i) the facts
set forth in the petition aswell as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; (j) the findings of
fact of the collegial appellate courts are premised
on the supposed evidence, but are contradicted
by the evidence on record; and (k) all other
similar and exceptional cases warranting a
review of the lower courts’ findings of fact. A
further exception is recognized when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed bythe parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different
conclusion.12 Yet, none of the exceptions applies
herein.
Secondly, the petitioner contends that she did
not deliberately inflict the physical injuries
suffered by MichaelRyan to maltreat or malign
him in a manner that would debase, demean or
degrade his dignity. She characterizes her
maltreatment as anact of discipline that she as a
school teacher could reasonably do towards the
development of the child. She insists that her act
further came under the doctrine of in loco
parentis.
The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft
of merit.
Although the petitioner, as a school teacher,
could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil,
her infliction of the physical injuries on him was
unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even
fainted from the violence suffered at her
hands.13 She could not justifiably claim that she
acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her
physical maltreatment of him was precisely
prohibited by no less than the Family Code,
which has expressly banned the infliction of
corporal punishmentby a school administrator,
teacher or individual engaged in child care
exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco
parentis), viz:
Article 233. The person exercising substitute
parental authority shall have the same authority
over the person of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher
or individual engaged in child care exercising
special parental authority inflict corporal
punishment upon the child. (n)
Proof of the severe results of the petitioner’s
physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan was
provided by Dr. Teresita Castigador, the Medico-
Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido
Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who examined the
victim at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of
February 13, 1996, barely three hours from the
timethe boy had sustained his injuries. Her
Medical Report stated as follows:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both
external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area
of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and
1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking
especially at the area of femoral head.
Reflecting her impressions of the physical
injuries based on the testimonial explanations of
Dr. Castigador, the trial judge observed in the
decision of June 26, 2003:
A petechiae (wound no. 1), according to Dr.
Castigador is a discoloration of the skin caused
by the extravasation of blood beneath it. She
opined that the petechiae and tenderness of the
ears of the victim could have been caused by
pinching. As to the lumbar pain and tenderness
at the third and fourth level of the vertebrae
(wound no. 2), the doctor testified that during
her examination of the victim the latter felt pain
when she put pressure on the said area. She
stated that this could be caused by pressure or
contact with a hard object. Wound No. 3 is
located on the victim’sleft inner thigh. According
to her this could not have been caused by
ordinary pinching with pressure. Wound No. 4 is
located on the upper part of the left thigh. Dr.
Castigador testified that she noticed that the boy
was limping as he walked.14
Section 3 of RepublicAct No. 7610 defines child
abusethusly:
xxxx
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment,
whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse,
neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which
debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as
a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his
basic needs for survival, such as food
and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical
treatment to an injured child resulting
in serious impairment of his growth
and development or in his permanent
incapacity or death.
xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner,
therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act
by deedsor by wordsthat debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being. The act need not be
habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner
"went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a
helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she
pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and
when she held him in the armpits and threw him
on the floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body
hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness
[but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the
accused-appellant further held the boy up by his
ears and pushed him down on the floor."15 On
her part, the trial judge said that the physical
pain experienced by the victim had been
aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused
him to stop going to school altogether out of fear
of the petitioner, compelling his parents to
transfer him to another school where he had to
adjust again.16Such established circumstances
proved beyond reasonable doubt thatthe
petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds that
degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and
dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryan’s physical
maltreatment by the petitioner was neither her
first or only maltreatment of a child. Prosecution
witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross
examination that she had also experienced the
petitioner’s cruelty.17 The petitioner was also
convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City (Branch 39) in
Criminal Case No. 348921 for maltreatment of
another childnamed Dariel Legayada.18 Such
previous incidents manifested that the petitioner
had "a propensity for violence," as the trial judge
stated in her decision of June 26, 2003.19
Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the
information charging her with child abuse was
insufficient in form and substance, in that the
essential elements of the crime charged were not
properly alleged therein; and that her
constitutional and statutory right to due process
of law was consequently violated.
The petitioner’s submission deserves scant
consideration.
Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
the information is sufficient if it states the name
of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the proximate date
of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
The information explicitly averred the offense of
child abusecharged against the petitioner in the
context of the statutory definition of child abuse
found in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610,
supra, and thus complied with the requirements
of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain
the petitioner’s challenge against the sufficiency
of the information in form and substance. Her
last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the
time she pleaded to the information through a
motion to quash on the ground that the
information did not conform substantially to the
prescribed form, or did not charge an offense.
She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the
challenge.
Fourthly, the RTC did not grant civil damages as
civil liability ex delictobecause no evidence had
been adduced thereon.20 The CA saw nothing
wrong with the omission by the trial court. The
explanation tendered by the trial judge for the
omission was misplaced, however, because even
without proof of the actual expenses, or
testimony on the victim’s feelings, the lower
courts still had the authority to define and allow
civil liability arising from the offense and the
means to fix their extent. The child abuse surely
inflicted on Michael Ryan physical and emotional
trauma as well as moral injury. It cannot also be
denied that his parents necessarily spent for his
treatment. We hold that both lower courts
committed a plain error that demands correction
by the Court. Indeed, as the Court pointed out in
Bacolod v. People,21 it was "imperative that the
courts prescribe the proper penalties when
convicting the accused, and determine the civil
liability to be imposed on the accused, unless
there has been a reservation of the action to
recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery,"
explaining the reason for doing so in the
following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the
CA disregarded their express mandate under
Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto have
the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1)
the legal qualification of the offense constituted
by the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which
attended its commission; (2) the participation
ofthe accused in the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact;
(3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and
(4) the civil liability or damages caused by his
wrongful act or omission to be recovered from
the accused by the offended party, if there is any,
unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a
separate civil action has been reserved or
waived." Their disregard compels us to actas we
now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as
tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses
Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of
the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this
action because the Court, as the final reviewing
tribunal, has not only the authority but also the
duty to correct at any time a matter of law and
justice.1âwphi1
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate
courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties
are properly entitled to by law or in equity under
the established facts. Their judgments will not be
worthy of the name unless they thereby fully
determine the rights and obligations of the
litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full
determination of such rights and obligations
would they betrue to the judicial office of
administering justice and equity for all. Courts
should then be alert and cautious in their
rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal
cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties,
which is what the Constitution and the law
require and expect them to do. Their
prescription of the wrong penalties will be
invalid and ineffectual for being done without
jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They
should also determine and set the civil liability
ex delictoof the accused, in order to do justice to
the complaining victims who are always entitled
to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do
so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by
separate actions has been reserved or waived.22
Moral damages should be awarded to assuage
the moral and emotional sufferings of the victim,
and in that respect the Court believes and holds
that ₱20,000.00 is reasonable. The victim was
likewise entitled to exemplary damages,
considering that Article 2230 of the Civil Code
authorizes such damages if at least one
aggravating circumstance attended the
commission of the crime. The child abuse
committed by the petitioner was aggravated her
being a public school teacher, a factor in raising
the penalty to its maximum period pursuantto
Section 31(e) of Republic Act No. 7610. The
amount of ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages is
imposed on in order to set an example for the
public good and as a deterrent to other public
school teachers who violate the ban imposed by
Article 233 of the Family Code, supra, against the
infliction of corporal punishment on children
under their substitute parental authority. The
lack of proof of the actual expenses for the
victim’s treatmentshould not hinder the granting
of a measure of compensation in the formof
temperate damages, which, according to Article
2224 of the Civil Code, may be recovered when
some pecuniary loss has been suffered butits
amount cannot be proved with certainty. There
being no question aboutthe injuries sustained
requiring medical treatment, temperate damages
ofat least ₱20,000.00 are warranted, for it would
be inequitable not to recognize the need for the
treatment. Lastly, interest of 6% per annum shall
be charged on all the items of civil liability, to be
reckoned from the finality of this decision until
full payment.
The penalty for the child abusecommitted by the
petitioner is that prescribed in Section 10(a) of
Republic Act No. 7610, viz:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty
or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial
to the Child's Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts
of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to
the child's development including those covered
by Atiicle 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
The CA revised the penalty fixed by the R TC by
imposing the indeterminate penalty of four
years, two months and one day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one
day of prision mayor, as the maximum, on the
ground that the offense was aggravated by the
petitioner being a public schoolteacher.23 It cited
Section 3 l(e) of Republic Act No. 7610, which
commands that the penalty provided in the Act
"shall be imposed in its maximum period if the
offender is a public officer or employee." Her
being a public schoolteacher was alleged in the
information and established by evidence as well
as admitted by her. The revised penalty was
erroneous, however, because Section 10 (a) of
Republic Act No. 7610 punishes the crime
committed by the petitioner with prision mayor
in its minimum period, whose three periods are
six years and one day to six years and eight
months, for the minimum period; six years, eight
months and one day to seven years and four
months, for the medium period; and seven years,
four months and one day to eight years, for the
maximum period. The maximum of the
indeterminate sentence should come from the
maximum period, therefore, and the Court fixes
it at seven years, four months and one day of
prision mayor. The minimum of the
indeterminate sentence should come from
prision correccional in the maximum period, the
penalty next lower than prision mayor in its
minimum period, whose range is from four
years, two months and one day to six
years.1âwphi1 Accordingly, the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence is four years, nine
months and 11 days, and the maximum is seven
years, four months and one day of prision mayor.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision

promulgated on May 11, 2005, subject to the
MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the petitioner shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of
prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of pr is
ion mayor, as the maximum; (b) the petitioner
shall pay to Michael Ryan Gonzales ₱20,000.00
as moral damages, ₱20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and ₱20,000.00 as temperate damages,
plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum on
each item of the civil liability reckoned from the
finality of this decision until full payment; and (c)
the petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013
GEORGE BONGALON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a
child constitutes the crime of child abuse under
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.1 Only
when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused
to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the child as a human being
should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise,
it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
The Case
On June 22, 2005,2 the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the conviction of the petitioner for the
crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of
Republic Act No. 7610.
Antecedents
On June 26, 2000, the Prosecutor’s Office of
Legazpi City charged the petitioner in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Legazpi City with
child abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a) of
Republic Act No. 7610, alleging as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of May 2000, in
the City of Legazpi Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit on the person
of JAYSON DELA CRUZ, a twelve year-old,
Grade VI pupil of MABA Institute, Legazpi City,
acts of physical abuse and/or maltreatment by
striking said JAYSON DELA CRUZ with his palm
hitting the latter at his back and by slapping said
minor hitting his left cheek and uttering
derogatory remarks to the latter’s family to wit:
"Mga hayop kamo, para dayo kamo digdi, Iharap
mo dito ama mo" (You all animals, you are all
strangers here. Bring your father here), which
acts of the accused are prejudicial to the child’s
development and which demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the said child as a human
being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002,
Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older
brother, both minors, joined the evening
procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in
Legazpi City; that when the procession passed in
front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s
daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw
stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the
petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and
called them names like "strangers" and
"animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson at
the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on
the face;4 that the petitioner then went to the
brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela
Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not
come out of the house to take on the petitioner;
that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi
City Police Station and reported the incident;
that Jayson also underwent medical treatment at
the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching
Hospital;5 that the doctors who examined Jayson
issued two medical certificates attesting that
Jayson suffered the following contusions, to wit:
(1) contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and (2)
+1x1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area and
contusion .5 x 2.33 cm. scapular area, left.6
On his part, the petitioner denied having
physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He
explained that he only talked with Jayson and
Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his
minor daughters, had told him about Jayson and
Roldan’s throwing stones at them and about
Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied
shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando
to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to
restrain his sons from harming his daughters.7
To corroborate the petitioner’s testimony, Mary
Ann Rose testified that her father did not hit or
slap but only confronted Jayson, asking why
Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi" and why
he had burned Cherrlyn’s hair. Mary Ann Rose
denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling him
a "sissy." She insisted that it was instead Jayson
who had pelted her with stones during the
procession. She described the petitioner as a
loving and protective father.8
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC found and declared the
petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged, to
wit:9
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused GEORGE BONGALON @ "GI"
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Republic Act No. 7610, and is hereby ordered to
undergo imprisonment of six (6) years and one
(1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor in its
minimum period.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner assailed the credibility
of the Prosecution witnesses by citing their
inconsistencies. He contended that the RTC
overlooked or disregarded material facts and
circumstances in the records that would have led
to a favorable judgment for him. He attacked the
lack of credibility of the witnesses presented
against him, citing the failure of the complaining
brothers to react to the incident, which was
unnatural and contrary to human experience.
The CA affirmed the conviction, but modified the
penalty,10 viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision
dated October 20, 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 9 of Legazpi City is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-
appellant George Bongalon is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional,
as minimum term, to six (6) years, eight (8)
months and 1 day of prision mayor as the
maximum term.
Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the
victim, Jayson de la Cruz the additional amount
of ₱5,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.11
The petitioner asserts that he was not guilty of
the crime charged; and that even assuming that
he was guilty, his liability should be mitigated
because he had merely acted to protect her two
minor daughters.
Ruling of the Court
At the outset, we should observe that the
petitioner has adopted the wrong remedy in
assailing the CA’s affirmance of his conviction.
His proper recourse from the affirmance of his
conviction was an appeal taken in due course.
Hence, he should have filed a petition for review
on certiorari. Instead, he wrongly brought a
petition for certiorari. We explained why in
People v. Court of Appeals:12
The special civil action for certiorari is intended
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only
to keep the inferior court within the parameters
of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As
observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, et al. "the special civil action for
certiorari is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors
of judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is
when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprived it
of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error is committed. If it did, every error
committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment
would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the
administration of justice would not survive.
Hence, where the issue or question involved
affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision–not the jurisdiction of the court to
render said decision–the same is beyond the
province of a special civil action for certiorari.
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from
a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
It is of no consequence that the petitioner alleges
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in
his petition. The allegation of grave abuse of
discretion no more warrants the granting of due
course to the petition as one for certiorari if
appeal was available as a proper and adequate
remedy. At any rate, a reading of his
presentation of the issues in his petition
indicates that he thereby imputes to the CA
errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. He
mentions instances attendant during the
commission of the crime that he claims were
really constitutive of justifying and mitigating
circumstances; and specifies reasons why he
believes Republic Act No. 7610 favors his
innocence rather than his guilt for the crime
charged.13 The errors he thereby underscores in
the petition concerned only the CA’s
appreciation and assessment of the evidence on
record, which really are errors of judgment, not
of jurisdiction.
Even if we were to treat the petition as one
brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, it
would still be defective due to its being filed
beyond the period provided by law. Section 2 of
Rule 45 requires the filing of the petition within
15 days from the notice of judgment to be
appealed. However, the petitioner received a
copy of the CA’s decision on July 15, 2005,14 but
filed the petition only on September 12,
2005,15 or well beyond the period prescribed by
the Rules of Court.
The procedural transgressions of the petitioner
notwithstanding, we opt to forego quickly
dismissing the petition, and instead set ourselves
upon the task of resolving the issues posed by
the petition on their merits. We cannot fairly and
justly ignore his plea about the sentence
imposed on him not being commensurate to the
wrong he committed. His plea is worthy of
another long and hard look. If, on the other hand,
we were to outrightly dismiss his plea because of
the procedural lapses he has committed, the
Court may be seen as an unfeeling tribunal of last
resort willing to sacrifice justice in order to give
premium to the rigidity of its rules of procedure.
But the Rules of Court has not been intended to
be rigidly enforced at all times. Rather, it has
been instituted first and foremost to ensure
justice to every litigant. Indeed, its announced
objective has been to secure a "just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding."16 This objective will be beyond
realization here unless the Rules of Court be
given liberal construction and application as the
noble ends of justice demand. Thereby, we give
primacy to substance over form, which, to a
temple of justice and equity like the Court, now
becomes the ideal ingredient in the dispensation
of justice in the case now awaiting our
consideration.
The petitioner’s right to liberty is in jeopardy. He
may be entirely deprived of such birthright
without due process of law unless we shunt
aside the rigidity of the rules of procedure and
review his case. Hence, we treat this recourse as
an appeal timely brought to the Court. Consonant
with the basic rule in criminal procedure that an
appeal opens the whole case for review, we
should deem it our duty to correct errors in the
appealed judgment, whether assigned or not.17
The law under which the petitioner was charged,
tried and found guilty of violating is Section 10
(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610, which
relevantly states:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty
or Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial
to the Child’s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts
of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to
the child’s development including those covered
by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by
Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as
follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms. –
xxxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment,
whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse,
neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which
debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as
a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his
basic needs for survival, such as food
and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical
treatment to an injured child resulting
in serious impairment of his growth
and development or in his permanent
incapacity or death.
xxxx
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by
the RTC and the CA to the effect that the
petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his
hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree
with their holding that his acts constituted child
abuse within the purview of the above-quoted
provisions. The records did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on
Jayson had been intended to debase the
"intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a
human being, or that he had thereby intended to
humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records
showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have
been done at the spur of the moment and in
anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed
by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of
his own minor daughters who had just suffered
harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With
the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific
intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being
that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-
recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is
resolved in favor of the petitioner as the accused.
Thus, the Court should consider all possible
circumstances in his favor.18
What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?
Considering that Jayson’s physical injury
required five to seven days of medical
attention,19 the petitioner was liable for slight
physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and
maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has him to suffer the penalty of 10 days of arresto
inflicted physical injuries which shall menor; and (c) ordering him to pay Jayson Dela
incapacitate the offended party for labor from Cruz the amount of ₱5,000.00 as moral damages,
one to nine days, or shall require medical plus the costs of suit.
attendance during the same period.
SO ORDERED.
xxxx

The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto

menor, which ranges from one day to 30 days of
imprisonment.20 In imposing the correct penalty,
however, we have to consider the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation under
Article 13 (6) of the Revised Penal
Code,21 because the petitioner lost his reason
and self-control, thereby diminishing the
exercise of his will power.22 Passion or
obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes
existing only in the honest belief of the
accused.23 It is relevant to mention, too, that in
passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a
diminution of intelligence and intent. With his
having acted under the belief that Jayson and
Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor
daughters, and that Jayson had burned
Cherrlyn’s hair, the petitioner was entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of passion. Arresto
menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e.,
one day to 10 days) in the absence of any
aggravating circumstance that offset the
mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly,
with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being
inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not
exceeding one year,24 the petitioner shall suffer a
straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.

The award of moral damages to Jayson is

appropriate. Such damages are granted in
criminal cases resulting in physical
injuries.25 The amount of ₱5,000.00 fixed by the
lower courts as moral damages is consistent with
the current jurisprudence.26

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the

Court of Appeals; and ENTER a new judgment:
(a) finding petitioner George Bongalon GUlLTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article
266, of the Revised Penal Code; (b) sentencing
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179337 April 30, 2008
JOSEPH SALUDAGA, petitioner,
vs.
FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY and EDILBERTO C.
DE JESUS in his capacity as President of
FEU,respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the June 29,
2007 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 87050, nullifying and setting aside the
November 10, 2004 Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil Case No.
98-89483 and dismissing the complaint filed by
petitioner; as well as its August 23, 2007
Resolution4 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.5
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law
student of respondent Far Eastern University
(FEU) when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete
(Rosete), one of the security guards on duty at
the school premises on August 18, 1996.
Petitioner was rushed to FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes
Medical Foundation (FEU-NRMF) due to the
wound he sustained.6 Meanwhile, Rosete was
brought to the police station where he explained
that the shooting was accidental. He was
eventually released considering that no formal
complaint was filed against him.
Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for
damages against respondents on the ground that
they breached their obligation to provide
students with a safe and secure environment and
an atmosphere conducive to learning.
Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-Party
Complaint7 against Galaxy Development and
Management Corporation (Galaxy), the agency
contracted by respondent FEU to provide
security services within its premises and
Mariano D. Imperial (Imperial), Galaxy's
President, to indemnify them for whatever
would be adjudged in favor of petitioner, if any;
and to pay attorney's fees and cost of the suit. On
the other hand, Galaxy and Imperial filed a
Fourth-Party Complaint against AFP General
Insurance.8
On November 10, 2004, the trial court rendered
a decision in favor of petitioner, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering:
1. FEU and Edilberto de Jesus,
in his capacity as president of
FEU to pay jointly and
severally Joseph Saludaga the
amount of P35,298.25 for
actual damages with 12%
interest per annum from the
filing of the complaint until
fully paid; moral damages of
P300,000.00, exemplary
damages of P500,000.00,
attorney's fees of P100,000.00
and cost of the suit;
2. Galaxy Management and
Development Corp. and its
president, Col. Mariano
Imperial to indemnify jointly
and severally 3rd party
plaintiffs (FEU and Edilberto
de Jesus in his capacity as
President of FEU) for the
above-mentioned amounts;
3. And the 4th party
complaint is dismissed for
lack of cause of action. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.9
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals
which rendered the assailed Decision, the
decretal portion of which provides, viz:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 10, 2004 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint filed by Joseph Saludaga
against appellant Far Eastern
University and its President in Civil
Case No. 98-89483 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied; hence, the instant petition
based on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN MANNER CONTRARY TO
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN RULING
THAT:
5.1. THE SHOOTING INCIDENT IS A
FORTUITOUS EVENT;
5.2. RESPONDENTS ARE NOT LIABLE
FOR DAMAGES FOR THE INJURY
RESULTING FROM A GUNSHOT
WOUND SUFFERED BY THE
PETITIONER FROM THE HANDS OF NO
LESS THAN THEIR OWN SECURITY
GUARD IN VIOLATION OF THEIR
BUILT-IN CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
TO PETITIONER, BEING THEIR LAW
STUDENT AT THAT TIME, TO PROVIDE
HIM WITH A SAFE AND SECURE
EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT;
5.3. SECURITY GAURD, ALEJANDRO
ROSETE, WHO SHOT PETITIONER
WHILE HE WAS WALKING ON HIS WAY
TO THE LAW LIBRARY OF
RESPONDENT FEU IS NOT THEIR
EMPLOYEE BY VIRTUE OF THE
CONTRACT FOR SECURITY SERVICES
BETWEEN GALAXY AND FEU
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT
PETITIONER, NOT BEING A PARTY TO
IT, IS NOT BOUND BY THE SAME
UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF
RELATIVITY OF CONTRACTS; and
5.4. RESPONDENT EXERCISED DUE
DILIGENCE IN SELECTING GALAXY AS
THE AGENCY WHICH WOULD PROVIDE
SECURITY SERVICES WITHIN THE
PREMISES OF RESPONDENT FEU.11
Petitioner is suing respondents for damages
based on the alleged breach of student-school
contract for a safe learning environment. The
pertinent portions of petitioner's Complaint
read:
6.0. At the time of plaintiff's
confinement, the defendants or any of
their representative did not bother to
visit and inquire about his condition.
This abject indifference on the part of
the defendants continued even after
plaintiff was discharged from the
hospital when not even a word of
consolation was heard from them.
Plaintiff waited for more than one (1)
year for the defendants to perform
their moral obligation but the wait was
fruitless. This indifference and total
lack of concern of defendants served to
exacerbate plaintiff's miserable
condition.
xxxx
11.0. Defendants are responsible for
ensuring the safety of its students while
the latter are within the University
premises. And that should anything
untoward happens to any of its
students while they are within the
University's premises shall be the
responsibility of the defendants. In this
case, defendants, despite being legally
and morally bound, miserably failed to
 protect plaintiff from injury and
thereafter, to mitigate and compensate
plaintiff for said injury;
12.0. When plaintiff enrolled with
defendant FEU, a contract was entered
into between them. Under this contract,
defendants are supposed to ensure that
adequate steps are taken to provide an
atmosphere conducive to study and
ensure the safety of the plaintiff while
inside defendant FEU's premises. In the
instant case, the latter breached this
contract when defendant allowed harm
to befall upon the plaintiff when he was
shot at by, of all people, their security
guard who was tasked to maintain
peace inside the campus.12
In Philippine School of Business Administration v.
Court of Appeals,13 we held that:
When an academic institution accepts
students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them,
resulting in bilateral obligations which
both parties are bound to comply with.
For its part, the school undertakes to
provide the student with an education
that would presumably suffice to equip
him with the necessary tools and skills
to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the
school's academic requirements and
observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet
the implicit or "built-in" obligation of
providing their students with an
atmosphere that promotes or assists in
attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Certainly, no
student can absorb the intricacies of
physics or higher mathematics or
explore the realm of the arts and other
sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where
there looms around the school
premises a constant threat to life and
limb. Necessarily, the school must
ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the
campus premises and to prevent the
breakdown thereof.14
It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a
sophomore law student in respondent FEU. As
such, there was created a contractual obligation
between the two parties. On petitioner's part, he
was obliged to comply with the rules and
regulations of the school. On the other hand,
respondent FEU, as a learning institution is
mandated to impart knowledge and equip its
students with the necessary skills to pursue
higher education or a profession. At the same
time, it is obliged to ensure and take adequate
steps to maintain peace and order within the
campus.
It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere
proof of the existence of the contract and the
failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief.15 In the instant
case, we find that, when petitioner was shot
inside the campus by no less the security guard
who was hired to maintain peace and secure the
premises, there is a prima facie showing that
respondents failed to comply with its obligation
to provide a safe and secure environment to its
students.
In order to avoid liability, however, respondents
aver that the shooting incident was a fortuitous
event because they could not have reasonably
foreseen nor avoided the accident caused by
Rosete as he was not their employee;16 and that
they complied with their obligation to ensure a
safe learning environment for their students by
having exercised due diligence in selecting the
security services of Galaxy.
After a thorough review of the records, we find
that respondents failed to discharge the burden
of proving that they exercised due diligence in
providing a safe learning environment for their
students. They failed to prove that they ensured
that the guards assigned in the campus met the
requirements stipulated in the Security Service
Agreement. Indeed, certain documents about
Galaxy were presented during trial; however, no
evidence as to the qualifications of Rosete as a
security guard for the university was offered.
Respondents also failed to show that they
undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that
the security guards assigned to them actually
possess the qualifications required in the
Security Service Agreement. It was not proven
that they examined the clearances, psychiatric
test results, 201 files, and other vital documents
enumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total
reliance on the security agency about these
matters or failure to check the papers stating the
qualifications of the guards is negligence on the
part of respondents. A learning institution
should not be allowed to completely relinquish
or abdicate security matters in its premises to
the security agency it hired. To do so would
result to contracting away its inherent obligation
to ensure a safe learning environment for its
students.
Consequently, respondents' defense of force
majeure must fail. In order for force majeure to
be considered, respondents must show that no
negligence or misconduct was committed that
may have occasioned the loss. An act of God
cannot be invoked to protect a person who has
failed to take steps to forestall the possible
adverse consequences of such a loss. One's
negligence may have concurred with an act of
God in producing damage and injury to another;
nonetheless, showing that the immediate or
proximate cause of the damage or injury was a
fortuitous event would not exempt one from
liability. When the effect is found to be partly the
result of a person's participation - whether by
active intervention, neglect or failure to act - the
whole occurrence is humanized and removed
from the rules applicable to acts of God.17
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those
who are negligent in the performance of their
obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly,
for breach of contract due to negligence in
providing a safe learning environment,
respondent FEU is liable to petitioner for
damages. It is essential in the award of damages
that the claimant must have satisfactorily proven
during the trial the existence of the factual basis
of the damages and its causal connection to
defendant's acts.18
In the instant case, it was established that
petitioner spent P35,298.25 for his
hospitalization and other medical
expenses.19 While the trial court correctly
imposed interest on said amount, however, the
case at bar involves an obligation arising from a
contract and not a loan or forbearance of money.
As such, the proper rate of legal interest is six
percent (6%) per annum of the amount
demanded. Such interest shall continue to run
from the filing of the complaint until the finality
of this Decision.20 After this Decision becomes
final and executory, the applicable rate shall be
twelve percent (12%) per annum until its
satisfaction.
The other expenses being claimed by petitioner,
such as transportation expenses and those
incurred in hiring a personal assistant while
recuperating were however not duly supported
by receipts.21 In the absence thereof, no actual
damages may be awarded. Nonetheless,
temperate damages under Art. 2224 of the Civil
Code may be recovered where it has been shown
that the claimant suffered some pecuniary loss
but the amount thereof cannot be proved with
certainty. Hence, the amount of P20,000.00 as
temperate damages is awarded to petitioner.
As regards the award of moral damages, there is
no hard and fast rule in the determination of
what would be a fair amount of moral damages
since each case must be governed by its own
peculiar circumstances.22 The testimony of
petitioner about his physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, and moral shock
resulting from the shooting incident23 justify the
award of moral damages. However, moral
damages are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual
injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on
the wrongdoer. The award is not meant to enrich
the complainant at the expense of the defendant,
but to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversion, or amusements that will serve to
obviate the moral suffering he has undergone. It
is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of
the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and
should be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted. Trial courts must then guard against
the award of exorbitant damages; they should
exercise balanced restrained and measured
objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to
passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of
the trial court.24 We deem it just and reasonable
under the circumstances to award petitioner
moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00.
Likewise, attorney's fees and litigation expenses
in the amount of P50,000.00 as part of damages
is reasonable in view of Article 2208 of the Civil
Code.25 However, the award of exemplary
damages is deleted considering the absence of
proof that respondents acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner.
We note that the trial court held respondent De
Jesus solidarily liable with respondent FEU.
In Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol,26 we
held that:
[A] corporation is invested by law with
a personality separate and distinct
from those of the persons composing it,
such that, save for certain exceptions,
corporate officers who entered into
contracts in behalf of the corporation
cannot be held personally liable for the
liabilities of the latter. Personal liability
of a corporate director, trustee or
officer along (although not necessarily)
with the corporation may so validly
attach, as a rule, only when - (1) he
assents to a patently unlawful act of the
corporation, or when he is guilty of bad
faith or gross negligence in directing its
affairs, or when there is a conflict of
interest resulting in damages to the
corporation, its stockholders or other
persons; (2) he consents to the
issuance of watered down stocks or
who, having knowledge thereof, does
not forthwith file with the corporate
secretary his written objection thereto;
(3) he agrees to hold himself personally
and solidarily liable with the
corporation; or (4) he is made by a
specific provision of law personally
answerable for his corporate action.27
None of the foregoing exceptions was
established in the instant case; hence,
respondent De Jesus should not be held
solidarily liable with respondent FEU.
Incidentally, although the main cause of action in
the instant case is the breach of the school-
student contract, petitioner, in the alternative,
also holds respondents vicariously liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this
article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
We agree with the findings of the Court of
Appeals that respondents cannot be held liable
for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code
because respondents are not the employers of
Rosete. The latter was employed by Galaxy. The
instructions issued by respondents' Security
Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are
ordinarily no more than requests commonly
envisaged in the contract for services entered
into by a principal and a security agency. They
cannot be construed as the element of control as
to treat respondents as the employers of
Rosete.28
As held in Mercury Drug Corporation v.
Libunao:29
In Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon,30 we held that
where the security agency recruits,
hires and assigns the works of its
watchmen or security guards to a
client, the employer of such guards or
watchmen is such agency, and not the
client, since the latter has no hand in
selecting the security guards. Thus, the
duty to observe the diligence of a good
father of a family cannot be demanded
from the said client:
… [I]t is settled in our
jurisdiction that where the
security agency, as here,
recruits, hires and assigns the
work of its watchmen or
security guards, the agency is
the employer of such guards
or watchmen. Liability for
illegal or harmful acts
committed by the security
guards attaches to the
employer agency, and not to
the clients or customers of
such agency. As a general rule,
a client or customer of a
security agency has no hand
in selecting who among the
pool of security guards or
watchmen employed by the
agency shall be assigned to it;
the duty to observe the
diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection of the
guards cannot, in the ordinary
course of events, be
demanded from the client
whose premises or property
are protected by the security
guards.
xxxx
The fact that a client company may give
instructions or directions to the
security guards assigned to it, does not,
by itself, render the client responsible
as an employer of the security guards
concerned and liable for their wrongful
acts or omissions.31
We now come to respondents' Third Party Claim
against Galaxy. In Firestone Tire and Rubber
Company of the Philippines v. Tempengko,32 we
held that:
The third-party complaint is, therefore,
a procedural device whereby a 'third
party' who is neither a party nor privy
to the act or deed complained of by the
plaintiff, may be brought into the case
with leave of court, by the defendant,
who acts as third-party plaintiff to
enforce against such third-party
defendant a right for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other
relief, in respect of the plaintiff's claim.
The third-party complaint is actually
independent of and separate and
distinct from the plaintiff's complaint.
Were it not for this provision of the
Rules of Court, it would have to be filed
independently and separately from the
original complaint by the defendant
against the third-party. But the Rules
permit defendant to bring in a third-
party defendant or so to speak, to
litigate his separate cause of action in
respect of plaintiff's claim against a
third-party in the original and principal
case with the object of avoiding
circuitry of action and unnecessary
proliferation of law suits and of
disposing expeditiously in one
litigation the entire subject matter
arising from one particular set of
facts.33
Respondents and Galaxy were able to litigate
their respective claims and defenses in the
course of the trial of petitioner's complaint.
Evidence duly supports the findings of the trial
court that Galaxy is negligent not only in the
selection of its employees but also in their
supervision. Indeed, no administrative sanction
was imposed against Rosete despite the shooting
incident; moreover, he was even allowed to go
on leave of absence which led eventually to his
disappearance.34 Galaxy also failed to monitor
petitioner's condition or extend the necessary
assistance, other than the P5,000.00 initially
given to petitioner. Galaxy and Imperial failed to
make good their pledge to reimburse petitioner's
medical expenses.
For these acts of negligence and for having
supplied respondent FEU with an unqualified
security guard, which resulted to the latter's
breach of obligation to petitioner, it is proper to
hold Galaxy liable to respondent FEU for such
damages equivalent to the above-mentioned
amounts awarded to petitioner.
Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to
be solidarily liable with Galaxy for being grossly
negligent in directing the affairs of the security
agency. It was Imperial who assured petitioner
that his medical expenses will be shouldered by
Galaxy but said representations were not
fulfilled because they presumed that petitioner
and his family were no longer interested in filing
a formal complaint against them.35
a. respondent Far Eastern University (FEU)
is ORDERED to pay petitioner actual damages in
the amount of P35,298.25, plus 6% interest per
annum from the filing of the complaint until the
finality of this Decision. After this decision
becomes final and executory, the applicable rate
shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum until
its satisfaction;
b. respondent FEU is also ORDERED to pay
petitioner temperate damages in the amount of
P20,000.00; moral damages in the amount of
P100,000.00; and attorney's fees and litigation
expenses in the amount of P50,000.00;
c. the award of exemplary damages is DELETED.
The Complaint against respondent Edilberto C.
De Jesus is DISMISSED. The counterclaims of
respondents are likewise DISMISSED.
Galaxy Development and Management
Corporation (Galaxy) and its president, Mariano
D. Imperial areORDERED to jointly and severally
pay respondent FEU damages equivalent to the
above-mentioned amounts awarded to
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

June 29, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 87050 nullifying the Decision of
the trial court and dismissing the complaint as
well as the August 23, 2007 Resolution denying
the Motion for Reconsideration are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil Case No.
98-89483 finding respondent FEU liable for
damages for breach of its obligation to provide
students with a safe and secure learning
atmosphere, is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157906 November 2, 2006
JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI, Petitioner,
vs.
SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAÑA and ROSALITA
CARDAÑA, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review assailing the
Decision1 dated October 18, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 54412, declaring
petitioner liable for negligence that resulted in
the death of Jasmin Cardaña, a school child aged
12, enrolled in Grade 6, of San Roque Elementary
School, where petitioner is the principal.
Likewise assailed is the Resolution2 dated March
20, 2003 denying reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaña was
walking along the perimeter fence of the San
Roque Elementary School when a branch of
a caimito tree located within the school premises
fell on her, causing her instantaneous death.
Thus, her parents - Dominador and Rosalita
Cardaña - filed a case for damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte against
petitioner.
The Cardañas alleged in their complaint that
even as early as December 15, 1992, a resident of
the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on the
possible danger the tree posed to passersby.
Lerios even pointed to the petitioner the tree
that stood near the principal’s office. The
Cardañas averred that petitioner’s gross
negligence and lack of foresight caused the death
of their daughter.
Petitioner denied the accusation and said that at
that time Lerios had only offered to buy the tree.
She also denied knowing that the tree was dead
and rotting. To prove her point, she presented
witnesses who attested that she had brought up
the offer of Lerios to the other teachers during a
meeting on December 15, 1992 and assigned
Remedios Palaña to negotiate the sale.
In a Decision3 dated February 5, 1996, the trial
court dismissed the complaint for failure of the
respondents to establish negligence on the part
of the petitioner.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s decision. The appellate court found the
appellee (herein petitioner) liable for Jasmin’s
death, as follows:
Foregoing premises considered, the instant
appeal is GRANTED. Appellee Joaquinita Capili is
hereby declared liable for negligence resulting to
the death of Jasmin D. Cardaña. She is hereby
ordered to indemnify appellants, parents of
Jasmin, the following amounts:
1. For the life of Jasmin D. Cardaña
P50,000.00;
2. For burial expenses 15,010.00;
3. For moral damages 50,000.00;
4. For attorney’s fees and litigation
10,000.00.
expenses
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied. Petitioner now comes before us
submitting the following issues for our
resolution:
I would have done in the same situation.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS VIS-À-VIS THE SET OF FACTS
STATED IN THE CHALLENGED
DECISION, ERRED IN FINDING THE
PETITIONER NEGLIGENT AND
THEREFORE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES
UNDER ARTICLE 2206 OF THE CIVIL
CODE AND IN ORDERING THE
PETITIONER TO PAY DAMAGES TO
THE RESPONDENTS; AND
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.5
On the other hand, respondents posit the
following issue:
Whether or not the Decision of the Honorable
Court of Appeals, Twelfth Division, in CA G.R. CV.
No. 54412 promulgated on October 18, 2002 …
should be affirmed and respected, thus remain
undisturbed.6
Primarily, the issue is whether petitioner is
negligent and liable for the death of Jasmin
Cardaña.
Petitioner asserts that she was not negligent
about the disposal of the tree since she had
assigned her next-in-rank, Palaña, to see to its
disposal; that despite her physical inspection of
the school grounds, she did not observe any
indication that the tree was already rotten nor
did any of her 15 teachers inform her that the
tree was already rotten;7 and that moral
damages should not be granted against her since
there was no fraud nor bad faith on her part.
On the other hand, respondents insist that
petitioner knew that the tree was dead and
rotting, yet, she did not exercise reasonable care
and caution which an ordinary prudent person
To begin, we have to point out that whether
petitioner was negligent or not is a question of
fact which is generally not proper in a petition
for review, and when this determination is
supported by substantial evidence, it becomes
conclusive and binding on this Court.8 However,
there is an exception, that is, when the findings
of the Court of Appeals are incongruent with the
findings of the lower court.9 In our view, the
exception finds application in the present case.
The trial court gave credence to the claim of
petitioner that she had no knowledge that the
tree was already dead and rotting and that
Lerios merely informed her that he was going to
buy the tree for firewood. It ruled that petitioner
exercised the degree of care and vigilance which
the circumstances require and that there was an
absence of evidence that would require her to
use a higher standard of care more than that
required by the attendant circumstances.10 The
Court of Appeals, on the other hand, ruled that
petitioner should have known of the condition of
the tree by its mere sighting and that no matter
how hectic her schedule was, she should have
had the tree removed and not merely delegated
the task to Palaña. The appellate court ruled that
the deadcaimito tree was a nuisance that should
have been removed soon after petitioner had
chanced upon it.11
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be
merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary
prudence and may be one which creates a
situation involving an unreasonable risk to
another because of the expectable action of the
other, a third person, an animal, or a force of
nature. A negligent act is one from which an
ordinary prudent person in the actor’s position,
in the same or similar circumstances, would
foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to
others as to cause him not to do the act or to do
it in a more careful manner.12
The probability that the branches of a dead and
rotting tree could fall and harm someone is
clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As the school
principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the
maintenance of the school grounds and safety of
the children within the school and its premises.
That she was unaware of the rotten state of a
tree whose falling branch had caused the death
of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the
responsibility of her position.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other
person for whose act he must respond; and (3)
the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence and the damages incurred.13
The fact, however, that respondents’ daughter,
Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting
tree within the school’s premises shows that the
tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone
passing by and calls for application of the
principle of res ipsa loquitur.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where
(1) the accident was of such character as to
warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendant’s negligence;
(2) the accident must have been caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged
with the negligence complained of; and (3) the
accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the person injured.14
The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to
warrant a presumption or inference that the
mere falling of the branch of the dead and rotting
tree which caused the death of respondents’
daughter was a result of petitioner’s negligence,
being in charge of the school.
In the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,15 this Court held:
…As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence
may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence.
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been
explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or
presumed, and while the mere happening of an
accident or injury will not generally give rise to
an inference or presumption that it was due to
negligence on defendant’s part, under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means,
literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself,
or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or
instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or
circumstances accompanying an injury may be
such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit
an inference of negligence on the part of the
defendant, or some other person who is charged
with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or
instrumentality which caused the injury
complained of was under the control or
management of the defendant, and that the
occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in
the ordinary course of things would not happen
if those who had its control or management used
proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as
sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the
injury arose from or was caused by the
defendant’s want of care.
The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is that petitioner’s negligence is
presumed once respondents established the
requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once
respondents made out a prima facie case of all
requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to
explain. The presumption or inference may be
rebutted or overcome by other evidence and,
under appropriate circumstances a disputable
presumption, such as that of due care or
innocence, may outweigh the inference.16
Was petitioner’s explanation as to why she failed
to have the tree removed immediately sufficient
to exculpate her?
As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to
see to the maintenance of the school grounds
and safety of the children within the school and
its premises. That she was unaware of the rotten
state of the tree calls for an explanation on her evidence for the law always presumes good faith.
part as to why she failed to be vigilant. It is not enough that one merely suffered
sleepless nights, mental anguish, and serious
Petitioner contends she was unaware of the state anxiety as the result of the actuations of the
of the dead and rotting tree because Lerios other party. Invariably, such action must be
merely offered to buy the tree and did not inform shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or
her of its condition. Neither did any of her with ill motive.19 Under the circumstances, we
teachers inform her that the tree was an have to concede that petitioner was not
imminent danger to anyone. She argues that she motivated by bad faith or ill motive vis-à-vis
could not see the immediate danger posed by the respondents’ daughter’s death. The award of
tree by its mere sighting even as she and the moral damages is therefore not proper.
other teachers conducted ground inspections.
She further argues that, even if she should have In line with applicable jurisprudence, we sustain
been aware of the danger, she exercised her duty the award by the Court of Appeals of ₱50,000 as
by assigning the disposition of the tree to indemnity for the death of Jasmin,20 and ₱15,010
another teacher. as reimbursement of her burial expenses.21
We find petitioner’s explanation wanting. As WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
school principal, petitioner is expected to Decision dated October 18, 2002 and the
oversee the safety of the school’s Resolution dated March 20, 2003, of the Court of
premises.1âwphi1 The fact that she failed to see Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 54412 are AFFIRMED
the immediate danger posed by the dead and with MODIFICATION such that the award of
rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the moral damages is hereby deleted.
responsibility demanded by her position.
Costs against petitioner.
Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned
disposal of the tree to another teacher, she SO ORDERED.
exercises supervision over her assignee.17 The
record shows that more than a month had lapsed
from the time petitioner gave instruction to her
assistant Palaña on December 15, 1992, to the
time the incident occurred on February 1, 1993.
Clearly, she failed to check seasonably if the
danger posed by the rotting tree had been
removed. Thus, we cannot accept her defense of
lack of negligence.
Lastly, petitioner questions the award of moral
damages. Moral damages are awarded if the
following elements exist in the case: (1) an injury
clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable
act or omission factually established; (3) a
wrongful act or omission by the defendant as the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and (4) the award of damages
predicated on any of the cases stated in Article
2219 of the Civil Code.18 However, the person
claiming moral damages must prove the
existence of bad faith by clear and convincing
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14342 May 30, 1960
CIRIACO L. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANUEL
QUISUMBING, JR., ET AL., respondents.
Abad Santos and Pablo for petitioner.
Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for
respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is a petition to review a decision of the
Court of Appeals, which condemned petitioner to
pay P2,000 as moral damages and P50 for
medical expenses, for a physical injury caused by
the son of petitioner, Augusto Mercado, on a
classmate, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., both pupils of
the Lourdes Catholic School, Kanlaon, Quezon
City. The case had originated in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan,
presiding, which dismissed the complaint filed
by Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and his father against
petitioner, father of the above-mentioned
Mercado. The facts found by the Court of Appeals
are as follows:
Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing,
Jr. is the son of his co-plaintiff-
appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L.
Quisumbing, while Augusto Mercado is
the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L.
Mercado, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and
Augusto Mercado were classmates in
the Lourdes Catholic School on
Kanlaon, Quezon City. A "pitogo", which
figures prominently in this case, may be
described as an empty nutshell used by
children as a piggy bank. On February
22, 1956, Augusto Mercado and Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a
"pitogo". As a result, Augusto wounded
Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a
piece of razor.
xxx xxx xxx
The facts of record clearly show that it
was Augusto Mercado who started the
aggression. Undeniably, the "pitogo"
belonged to Augusto Mercado but he
lent it to Benedicto P. Lim and in turn
Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi.
Renato was not aware that the "pitogo"
belonged to Augusto, because right
after Benedicto gave it to him,
Benedicto ran away to get a basket ball
with which they could play. Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr. was likewise unaware
that the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto.
He thought it was the "pitogo" of
Benedicto P. Lim, so that when Augusto
attempted to get the "pitogo" from
Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so
because Renato was better at putting
the chain into the holes of the "pitogo".
However, Augusto resented Manuel,
Jr.'s remark and he aggresively pushed
the latter. The fight started then. After
Augusto gave successive blows to
Manuel, Jr., and the latter was clutching
his stomach which bore the brunt of
Augusto's anger, Augusto seeing that
Manuel, Jr. was in a helpless position,
cut him on the right check with a piece
of razor.
xxx xxx xxx
Although the doctor who treated
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., Antonio B.
Past, testified for plaintiffs-appellants,
he did not declare as to the amount of
fees he collected from plaintiff-
appellants for the treatment of Manuel,
Jr. the child was not even hospitalized
for the wound. We believe that the sum
of P50.00 is a fair approximation of the
medical expenses incurred by
plaintiffs-appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
The damages specified in paragraphs C
and D of the aforequoted portion of
plaintiffs-appellant's complaint come
under the class of moral damages. The
evidence of record shows that the child
suffered moral damages by reason of
the wound inflicted by Augusto
Mercado. Though such kind of damages
cannot be fully appreciated in terms of
money, we believe that the sum of
P2,000.00 would fully compensate the
child.
As second cause of action, plaintiffs-
appellants pray for P5,000.00 covering
the moral damages they allegedly
suffered due to their son's being
wounded; and the sum of P3,000.00 as
attorney's fees. The facts of record do
not warrant the granting of moral
damages to plaintiffs-appellants
Manuel Quisumbing and Ana Pineda.
"In law mental anguish is restricted, as
a rule, to such mental pain or suffering
as arises from an injury or wrong to the
person himself, as distinguished from
that form of mental suffering which is
the accompaniment of sympathy or
sorrow for another's suffering of which
arises from a contemplation of wrong
committed on the person of another.
Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband
or wife cannot recover for mental
suffering caused by his or her
sympathy for the other's suffering. Nor
can a parent recover for mental
distress and anxiety on account of
physical injury sustained by a child or
for anxiety for the safety of his child
placed in peril by the negligence of
another." (15 Am. Jur. 597). Plaintiffs-
appellants are not entitled to attorney's
fees, it not appearing that defendant-
appellee had wantonly disregarded
their claim for damages.
In the first, second and third assignments of
error, counsel for petitioner argues that since the
incident of the inflicting of the wound on
respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during
recess time), through no fault of the father,
petitioner herein, the teacher or head of the
school should be held responsible instead of the
latter. This precise question was brought before
this Court in Exconde vs. Capuno and Capuno, 101
Phil., 843, but we held, through Mr. Justice
Bautista:
We find merit in this claim. It is true
that under the law above-quoted,
"teachers or directors of arts and
trades are liable for any damage caused
by their pupils or apprentices while
they are under their custody", but this
provision only applies to an institution
of arts and trades and not to any
academic educational institution
(Padilla, Civil Law, 1953 Ed., Vol. IV, p.
841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557)
The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, upon which petitioner rests his claim that
the school where his son was studying should be
made liable, is as follows:
ART. 2180. . . .
Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody.
It would be seem that the clause "so long as they
remain in their custody," contemplates a
situation where the pupil lives and boards with
the teacher, such that the control, direction and
influence on the pupil supersedes those of the
parents. In these circumstances the control or
influence over the conduct and actions of the
pupil would pass from the father and mother to
the teacher; and so would the responsibility for
the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not
appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go
to school during school hours and go back to
their homes with their parents after school is
over. The situation contemplated in the last
paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor
does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes
father or mother responsible for the damages
caused by their minor children. The claim of
petitioner that responsibility should pass to the
school must, therefore, be held to be without
merit.
We next come to the claim of petitioner that the
moral damages fixed at P2,000 are excessive. We
note that the wound caused to respondent was
inflicted in the course of an ordinary or common
fight between boys in a grade school. The Court
of Appeals fixed the medical expenses incurred
in treating and curing the wound at P50. Said
court stated that the wound did not even require
hospitalization. Neither was Mercado found
guilty of any offense nor the scar in
Quisumbing's face pronounced to have caused a
deformity, unlike the case of Araneta, et al. vs.
Arreglado, et al., 104 Phil., 529; 55 Off. Gaz. (9)
1561. Petitioner's counsel argues that if death
call for P3,000 to P6,000, certainly the incised
wound could cause mental pain and suffering to
the tune of P2,000.
In the decision of the Court of Appeals, said court
pronounces that the child Quisumbing suffered
moral damages "by reason of the wound inflicted
by Augusto Mercado." While moral damages
included physical suffering, which must have
been caused to the wounded boy Quisumbing
(Art. 2217, Civil Code), the decision of the court
below does not declare that any of the cases
specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in
which moral damages may be recovered, has
attended or occasioned the physical injury. The
only possible circumstance in the case at bar in
which moral damages are recoverable would be
if a criminal offense or a quasi-delict has been
committed.
It does not appear that a criminal action for
physical injuries was ever presented. The
offender, Augusto Mercado, was nine years old
and it does not appear that he had acted with
discernment when he inflicted the physical
injuries on Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.
It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have
considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or
guilty, of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries,
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article
2219. Even if we assume that said court
considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when
it imposed the moral damages, yet the facts
found by said court indicate that Augusto's
resentment, which motivated the assault, was
occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried
to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of
Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato." This is,
according to the decision appealed from, the
reason why Mercado was incensed and pushed
Quisumbing who, in turn, also pushed Mercado.
It is, therefore, apparent that the proximate
cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was
Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having
interfered with Mercado while trying to get the
pitogo from another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.)
After considering all the facts as found by the
Court of Appeals, we find that none of the cases
mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code,
which authorizes the grant of moral damages,
was shown to have existed. Consequently, the
grant of moral damages is not justified.
For the foregoing considerations, the decision
appealed from is hereby reversed and the
petitioner is declared exempt or free from the
payment of moral damages. The award of P50 for
medical expenses, however, is hereby affirmed.
Without costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Barrera, and
Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo and Concepcion, JJ., concur in the
result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971
Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P.
PALISOC, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V.
VALENTON, owner and President,
respectively, of a school of arts and trades,
known under the name and style of "Manila
Technical Institute" (M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L.
DAFFON and SANTIAGO M.
QUIBULUE, defendants-appellees.
Leovillo C. Agustin for plaintiffs-appellants. .
Honorato S. Reyes for appellee Brillantes, et al. .
Villareal, Almacen Navarra & Amores for appellee
Daffon. .
TEEHANKEE, J.:
An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of
law from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila. .
Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-
year old son, Dominador Palisoc, and a student in
automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical
Institute, Quezon Boulevard, Manila, had filed on
May 19, 1966, the action below for damages
arising from the death on March 10, 1966 of
their son at the hands of a fellow student,
defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory
room of the said Institute. .
Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are: denying that he had inflicted any fist blows on remain in
"(T)he defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at the the deceased. . their
time when the incident which gave rise to his custody.
action occurred was a member of the Board of With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo
Directors of the institute;1 the defendant Singian of the Manila Police Department who In the opinion of the Court,
Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof; the performed the autopsy re "Cause of death: shock this article of the Code is not
defendant Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the due to traumatic fracture of theribs (6th and 7th, applicable to the case at bar,
class to which the deceased belonged; and the left, contusion of the pancreas and stomach with since this contemplates the
defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student of intra-gastric hemorrhage and slight situation where the control or
the deceased. At the beginning the Manila subarachnoid hemorrhage on the brain," and his influence of the teachers and
Technical Institute was a single proprietorship, testimony that these internal injuries of the heads of school
but lately on August 2, 1962, it was duly deceased were caused "probably by strong fist establishments over the
incorporated." blows," the trial court found defendant Daffon conduct and actions by the
liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of pupil supersedes those of the
The facts that led to the tragic death of plaintiffs' the Civil Code.3 It held that "(T)he act, therefore, parents.
son were thus narrated by the trial court: "(T)he of the accused Daffon in giving the deceased
deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant strong fistblows in the stomach which ruptured CIVIL LAW: DAMAGES ART
Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates, and on the his internal organs and caused his death falls 2180. NEW CIVIL CODE
afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and within the purview of this article of the Code."4 CONSTRUED: — The clause
three o'clock, they, together with another "so long as they remain in
classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory The trial court, however, absolved from liability their custody" contained in
room located on the ground floor. At that time the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Article 2180 of the new civil
the classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Technical Institute, in this wise: code contemplated a situation
Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine where the pupil lives and
while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on boards with the teacher, such
at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that ... Their liabilities are based on
the provisions of Article 2180 that the control or influence
Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this on the pupil supersedes those
remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the of the New Civil Code which
reads: of the parents. In those
face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong circumstances the control or
flat blow on the face, which was followed by influence over the conduct
other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc Art. 2180. and actions of the pupil as
retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but ... . well as the responsibilities for
Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows their sort would pass from the
until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which Lastly, father and mother to the
caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc teachers or teachers. (Ciriaco L. Mercado,
became pale and fainted. First aid was heads of Petitioner vs. the Court of
administered to him but he was not revived, so establishm Appeals, Manuel Quisumbing,
he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never ents of arts Jr., et al., respondents, G.R. No.
regained consciousness; finally he died. The and trades L-14862, May 30, 1960).5
foregoing is the substance of the testimony of shall be
Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness to the incident." liable for There is no evidence that the
damages accused Daffon lived and
The trial court expressly gave credence to this caused by boarded with his teacher or
version of the incident, as testified to by the lone their pupils the other defendant officials
eyewitness, Desiderio Cruz, a classmate of the and of the school. These
protagonists, as that of a disinterested witness students defendants cannot therefore
who "has no motive or reason to testify one way and be made responsible for the
or another in favor of any party" and rejected the apprentice tort of the defendant Daffon.
self-exculpatory version of defendant Daffon s, so long
as they
Judgment was therefore rendered by the trial
court as follows:
1. Sentencing the defendant
Virgilio L. Daffon to pay the
plaintiffs as heirs of the
deceased Dominador Palisoc
(a) P6,000.00 for the death of
Dominador Palisoc; (b)
P3,375.00 for actual and
compensatory expenses; (c)
P5,000.00 for moral damages;
(d) P10,000.00 for loss of
earning power, considering
that the deceased was only
between sixteen and
seventeen years, and in good
health when he died, and (e)
P2,000.00 for attorney's fee,
plus the costs of this action. .
2. Absolving the other
defendants. .
3. Dismissing the defendants'
counterclaim for lack of merit.
Plaintiffs' appeal raises the principal legal
question that under the factual findings of the
trial court, which are now beyond review, the
trial court erred in absolving the defendants-
school officials instead of holding them jointly
and severally liable as tortfeasors, with
defendant Daffon, for the damages awarded
them as a result of their son's death. The Court
finds the appeal, in the main, to be meritorious. .
1. The lower court absolved defendants-school
officials on the ground that the provisions of
Article 2180, Civil Code, which expressly hold
"teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades ... liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students and apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody," are not applicable
to to the case at bar, since "there is no evidence
that the accused Daffon [who inflicted the fatal
fistblows]6 lived and boarded with his teacher or
the other defendants-officials of the school.
These defendants cannot therefore be made
responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon."
The lower court based its legal conclusion
expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs.
Court of Appeals,7that "(I)t would seem that the
clause "so long as they remain in their custody,"
contemplates a situation where the pupil lives
and boards with the teacher, such that the
control, direction and influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents. In these
circumstances the control or influence over the
conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from
the father and mother to the teacher; and so
would the responsibility for the torts of the
pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the
case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school
during school hours and go back to their homes
with their parents after school is over." This
dictum had been made in rejecting therein
petitioner father's contention that his minor
son's school, Lourdes Catholic School at Kanlaon,
Quezon City [which was not a party to the case]
should be held responsible, rather than him as
father, for the moral damages of P2,000.00
adjudged against him for the physical injury
inflicted by his son on a classmate. [A cut on the
right cheek with a piece of razor which costs only
P50.00 by way of medical expenses to treat and
cure, since the wound left no scar.] The moral
damages award was after all set aside by the
Court on the ground that none of the specific
cases provided in Article 2219, Civil Code, for
awarding moral damages had been established,
petitioner's son being only nine years old and
not having been shown to have "acted with
discernment" in inflicting the injuries on his
classmate. .
The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on
another dictum in the earlier case of Exconde vs.
Capuno,8 where the only issue involved as
expressly stated in the decision, was whether the
therein defendant-father could be civilly liable
for damages resulting from a death caused in a
motor vehicle accident driven unauthorizedly
and negligently by his minor son, (which issue
was resolved adversely against the father).
Nevertheless, the dictum in such earlier case that
"It is true that under the law abovequoted,
teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable
for any damage caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody,
but this provision only applies to an institution
of arts and trades and not to any academic
educational institution" was expressly cited and
quoted in Mercado. .
2. The case at bar was instituted directly against
the school officials and squarely raises the issue
of liability of teachers and heads of schools
under Article 2180, Civil Code, for damages
caused by their pupils and students against
fellow students on the school premises. Here, the
parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon,
are not involved, since Daffon was already of age
at the time of the tragic incident. There is no
question, either, that the school involved is a
non-academic school,9 the Manila Technical
Institute being admittedly a technical vocational
and industrial school. .
The Court holds that under the cited codal
article, defendants head and teacher of the
Manila Technical Institute (defendants Valenton
and Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly and
severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for
the death of the latter's minor son at the hands of
defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory
room. No liability attaches to defendant
Brillantes as a mere member of the school's
board of directors. The school itself cannot be
held similarly liable, since it has not been
properly impleaded as party defendant. While
plaintiffs sought to so implead it, by impleading
improperly defendant Brillantes, its former
single proprietor, the lower court found that it
had been incorporated since August 2, 1962, and
therefore the school itself, as thus incorporated,
should have been brought in as party defendant.
Plaintiffs failed to do so, notwithstanding that
Brillantes and his co-defendants in their reply to
plaintiffs' request for admission had expressly
manifested and made of record that "defendant
Antonio C. Brillantes is not the registered
owner/head of the "Manila Technical Institute"
which is now a corporation and is not owned by
any individual person."10
3. The rationale of such liability of school heads
and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils
and students, so long as they remain in their
custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as
to their pupils and students, inloco parentis and
are called upon to "exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the child."11 This
is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and
352 of the Civil Code.12 In the law of torts, the
governing principle is that the protective
custody of the school heads and teachers is
mandatorily substituted for that of the parents,
and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as
that of the school itself to provide proper
supervision of the students' activities during the
whole time that they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time, as well as to take
the necessary precautions to protect the
students in their custody from dangers and
hazards that would reasonably be anticipated,
including injuries that some student themselves
may inflict willfully or through negligence on
their fellow students. .
4. As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in his dissenting opinion in Exconde, "the
basis of the presumption of negligence of Art.
1903 [now 2180] is some culpa in vigilando that
the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have
incurred in the exercise of their authority" 13 and
"where the parent places the child under the
effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and
not the parent, should be the one answerable for
the torts committed while under his custody, for
the very reason that the parent is not supposed
to interfere with the discipline of the school nor
with the authority and supervision of the teacher
while the child is under instruction." The school
itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or
negligence of its school head and teachers under
the same cited article.14
5. The lower court therefore erred in law in
absolving defendants-school officials on the
ground that they could be held liable under
Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student who
inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and
victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the
other defendants officials of the school." As
stated above, the phrase used in the cited article
— "so long as (the students) remain in their
custody" means the protective and supervisory
custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students
for as long as they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time. There is nothing in
the law that requires that for such liability to
attach the pupil or student who commits the
tortious act must live and board in the school, as
erroneously held by the lower court, and the
dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which
it relied, must now be deemed to have been set
aside by the present decision. .
6. Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as
president and teacher-in-charge of the school
must therefore be held jointly and severally
liable for the quasi-delict of their co-defendant
Daffon in the latter's having caused the death of
his classmate, the deceased Dominador Palisoc.
The unfortunate death resulting from the fight
between the protagonists-students could have
been avoided, had said defendants but complied
with their duty of providing adequate
supervision over the activities of the students in
the school premises to protect their students
from harm, whether at the hands of fellow
students or other parties. At any rate, the law
holds them liable unless they relieve themselves
of such liability, in compliance with the last
paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by
"(proving) that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage." In
the light of the factual findings of the lower
court's decision, said defendants failed to prove
such exemption from liability. .
7. Plaintiffs-appellees' contention that the award
of P6,000.00 as indemnity for the death of their
son should be increased to P12,000.00 as set by
the Court in People vs. Pantoja,15 and observed in
all death indemnity cases thereafter is well
taken. The Court, in Pantoja, after noting the
decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine
peso, had expressed its "considered opinion that
the amount of award of compensatory damages
for death caused by a crime or quasi-
delict should now be P12,000.00." The Court
thereby adjusted the minimum amount of
"compensatory damages for death caused by a
crime or quasi-delict" as per Article 2206, Civil
Code, from the old stated minimum of P3,000.00
to P12,000.00, which amount is to be awarded
"even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances" pursuant to the express
provisions of said codal article. .
8. Plaintiffs-appellees' other claims on appeal
that the lower court should have awarded
exemplary damages and imposed legal interest
on the total damages awarded, besides
increasing the award of attorney's fees all
concern matters that are left by law to the
discretion of the trial court and the Court has not
been shown any error or abuse in the exercise of
such discretion on the part of the trial
court.16 Decisive here is the touchstone provision
of Article 2231, Civil Code, that "In quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence." No gross
negligence on the part of defendants was found
by the trial court to warrant the imposition of
exemplary damages, as well as of interest and
increased attorney's fees, and the Court has not
been shown in this appeal any compelling reason
to disturb such finding. .
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is
modified so as to provide as follows: .
1. Sentencing the defendants Virgilio L.
Daffon, TeodosioV. Valenton and Santiago M.
Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as
heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a)
P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc;
(b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory
expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d)
P10,000.00 for loss of earning power and (e)
P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this
action in both instances; 2. absolving defendant
Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3.
dismissing defendants' counterclaims. .
Concepcion, C.J., Villamor and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur. .
Dizon, J., took no part. .
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring: .
I concur with the opinion of Mr. Justice
Teehankee but would like to clarify that the
argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect
that the responsibility of teachers and school
officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to
pupils who are minors (below the age of
majority) is not in accord with the plain text of
the law. Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines is to the following effect: .
The obligation imposed by
article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is
responsible. .
The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for
the damages caused by the
minor children who live in
their company. .
Guardians are liable for
damages caused by the
minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their
authority and live in their
company. .
The owners and managers of
an establishment or
enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages
caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed
or on the occasion of their
functions. .
Employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their
employees and household
helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are
not engaged in any business
or industry. .
The State is responsible in like
manner when it acts through
a special agent; but not when
the damage has been caused
by the official to whom the
task done properly pertains,
in which case what is
provided in article 2176 shall
be applicable. .
Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their
pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of
in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observe all
the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent
damages.
Examination of the article shows that where the
responsibility prescribed therein is limited to
illegal acts during minority, the article expressly
so provides, as in the case of the parents and of
the guardians. It is natural to expect that if the
law had intended to similarly restrict the civil
responsibility of the other categories of persons
enumerated in the article, it would have
expressly so stated. The fact that it has not done
so indicates an intent that the liability be not
restricted to the case of persons under age.
Further, it is not without significance that the
teachers and heads of scholarly establishments
are not grouped with parents and guardians but
ranged with owners and managers of
enterprises, employers and the state, as to whom
no reason is discernible to imply that they
should answer only for minors. .
Giorgi, in his well-known "Teoria de las
Obligaciones en el Derecho Moderno", Volume 5,
page 404, No. 272 (Sp. Ed.), after noting the split
among commentators on the point it issue,
observes with considerable cogency that —
272. Ante esta variedad de
opiniones, ninguna de las
cuales se funds en
argumentos merecedores de
seria ponderacion, no es facil
tomar un partido. Esto no
obstante, debiendo
manisfestar nuestra opinion,
nos acercamos a la de los que
no estiman necesaria la
menor edad del discipulo o
del aprendiz; porque si el
aforismo ubi voluit dixit, ubi
noluit tacuit, no es siempre
argumento seguro para
interpreter la ley, es infalible
cuanto se refiere a una misma
disposicion relative a varios
casos. Y tal es el art. 1.153. Lo
que haya establecido
important poco si,
elevandones a los principios
de razon, puede dudarse de la
oportunidad de semajante
diferencia; porque la voluntad
cierta del legislador
prevalece in iure condito a
cualquier otra consideracion.
Por otra parte, si bien se
considera, no puede parecer
extrano o absurdo el suponer
que un discipulo y un
aprendiz, aunque mayores de
edad, acepten
voluntariamente la entera
vigilancia de su preceptor
mientras dura la educacion. Ni
parece dudoso desde el
momento que los artesanos y
los preceptores deben, al par
de los padres, responder
civilmente de los daños
comitidos por sus discipulos,
aun cuando estos esten faltos
de discernimiento.
Similarly, Planiol-Ripert, in their "Droit Civil
Pratique," Volume VI, No. 635 (Spanish version),
say that —
635. Personas de quien
responde. — Si bien la
responsibilidad del maestro
es originalmente una
estension de la de los padres
(1), el art. 1384 no especifica
que los alumnos y aprendices
han de ser menores de edad,
por lo que la presuncion de
culpa funcionara aun cuando
sean mayores (2); pero, la
vigilancia no tendra que ser
ejercida en iguales terminos.
Aun respecto a los menores
variara segun la edad,
extremo que tendra que
ternese en ceunta a los fines
de apreciar si el maestro ha
podido impedir el acto nocivo
o no. .
I submit, finally, that while in the case of parents
and guardians, their authority and supervision
over the children and wards end by law upon the
latter reaching majority age, the authority and
custodial supervision over pupils exist
regardless of the age of the latter. A student over
twenty-one, by enrolling and attending a school,
places himself under the custodial supervision
and disciplinary authority of the school
authorities, which is the basis of the latter's
correlative responsibility for his torts,
committed while under such authority. Of
course, the teachers' control is not as plenary as
when the student is a minor; but that
circumstance can only affect the decree of the
responsibility but cannot negate the existence
thereof. It is only a factor to be appreciated in
determining whether or not the defendant has
exercised due diligence in endeavoring to
prevent the injury, as prescribed in the last
paragraph of Article 2180. .
Barredo, J., concurs.
Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:
I vote to affirm the decision appealed from. I see
no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down
by this Court inMercado v. Court of Appeals, 108
Phil. 414, where the clause "so long as they
remain in their custody" used in Article 2180 of
the Civil Code was construed as referring to a
"situation where the pupil lives and boards with
the teacher, such that the (latter's) control,
direction and influence on the pupil supersedes
those of the parents." I think it is highly
unrealistic and conducive to unjust results,
considering the size of the enrollment in many of
our educational institutions, academic and non-
academic, as well as the temper, attitudes and
often destructive activism of the students, to
hold their teachers and/or the administrative
heads of the schools directly liable for torts
committed by them. When even the school
authorities find themselves besieged,
beleaguered and attacked, and unable to impose
the traditional disciplinary measures formerly
recognized as available to them, such as
suspension or outright expulsion of the offending
students, it flies in the face of logic and reality to
consider such students, merely from the fact of
enrollment and class attendance, as "in the
custody" of the teachers or school heads within
the meaning of the statute, and to hold the latter
liable unless they can prove that they have
exercised "all the diligence of a good father of the
family to prevent damage." Article 2180, if
applied as appellants construe it, would be bad
law. It would demand responsibility without
commensurate authority, rendering teachers and
school heads open to damage suits for causes
beyond their power to control. Present
conditions being what they are, I believe the
restrictive interpretation of the aforesaid
provision enunciated in Mercado should be
maintained. .
With particular reference to the case at bar, one
other factor constrains me to dissent. The
opinion of the majority states: "Here, the parents
of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not
involved, since Daffon was already of age at the
time of the tragic incident." This statement is of
course in accordance with Article 2180, which
says that "the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live
in their company." Note that for parental
responsibility to arise the children must be
minors who live in their company. If, as stated
also in the opinion of the majority, "the rationale
of (the) liability of school heads and teachers for
the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so
long as they remain in their custody, is that they
stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and
students, in loco parentis and are called upon to
exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of the child," then it stands to reason
that (1) the clause "so long as they remain in
their custody" as used in reference to teachers
and school heads should be equated with the
phrase "who live in their company" as used in
reference to parents; and (2) that just as parents
are not responsible for damages caused by their
children who are no longer minors, so should
teachers and school heads be exempt from
liability for the tortious acts of their students in
the same age category. I find no justification,
either in the law itself or in justice and equity, to
make a substitute parent liable where the real
parent would be free from liability. .
Zaldivar, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:
I vote to affirm the decision appealed from. I see
no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down
by this Court inMercado v. Court of Appeals, 108
Phil. 414, where the clause "so long as they
remain in their custody" used in Article 2180 of
the Civil Code was construed as referring to a
"situation where the pupil lives and boards with
the teacher, such that the (latter's) control,
direction and influence on the pupil supersedes
those of the parents." I think it is highly
unrealistic and conducive to unjust results,
considering the size of the enrollment in many of
our educational institutions, academic and non-
academic, as well as the temper, attitudes and
often destructive activism of the students, to
hold their teachers and/or the administrative
heads of the schools directly liable for torts
committed by them. When even the school
authorities find themselves besieged,
beleaguered and attacked, and unable to impose
the traditional disciplinary measures formerly
recognized as available to them, such as
suspension or outright expulsion of the offending
students, it flies in the face of logic and reality to
consider such students, merely from the fact of
enrollment and class attendance, as "in the
custody" of the teachers or school heads within
the meaning of the statute, and to hold the latter
liable unless they can prove that they have
exercised "all the diligence of a good father of the
family to prevent damage." Article 2180, if
applied as appellants construe it, would be bad
law. It would demand responsibility without
commensurate authority, rendering teachers and
school heads open to damage suits for causes
beyond their power to control. Present
conditions being what they are, I believe the
restrictive interpretation of the aforesaid
provision enunciated in Mercado should be
maintained. .
says that "the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live
in their company." Note that for parental
responsibility to arise the children must be
minors who live in their company. If, as stated
also in the opinion of the majority, "the rationale
of (the) liability of school heads and teachers for
the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so
long as they remain in their custody, is that they
stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and
students, in loco parentis and are called upon to
exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of the child," then it stands to reason
that (1) the clause "so long as they remain in
their custody" as used in reference to teachers
and school heads should be equated with the
phrase "who live in their company" as used in
reference to parents; and (2) that just as parents
are not responsible for damages caused by their
children who are no longer minors, so should
teachers and school heads be exempt from
liability for the tortious acts of their students in
the same age category. I find no justification,
either in the law itself or in justice and equity, to
make a substitute parent liable where the real
parent would be free from liability. .
Zaldivar, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.

With particular reference to the case at bar, one

other factor constrains me to dissent. The
opinion of the majority states: "Here, the parents
of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not
involved, since Daffon was already of age at the
time of the tragic incident." This statement is of
course in accordance with Article 2180, which
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA,
JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA
PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA
III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A.
AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC
A. AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and
MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA,petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO
DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH
SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON,
ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru
his parents and natural guardians, MR. and
MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO
VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO
ALONSO, respondents.
Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora
was looking forward to the commencement
exercises where he would ascend the stage and
in the presence of his relatives and friends
receive his high school diploma. These
ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As
it turned out, though, fate would intervene and
deny him that awaited experience. On April 13,
1972, while they were in the auditorium of their
school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a
classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that
mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations
and his life as well. The victim was only
seventeen years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein
petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil
action for damages under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the
dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together
with Daffon and two other students, through
their respective parents. The complaint against
the students was later dropped. After trial, the
Court of First Instance of Cebu held the
remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in
the sum of P294,984.00, representing death
compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of
litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees .3 On
appeal to the respondent court, however, the
decision was reversed and all the defendants
were completely absolved .4
In its decision, which is now the subject of this
petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, the respondent court found that Article
2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and
trades but an academic institution of learning. It
also held that the students were not in the
custody of the school at the time of the incident
as the semester had already ended, that there
was no clear identification of the fatal gun and
that in any event the defendant, had exercised
the necessary diligence in preventing the
injury. 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo
Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April
13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was shot to
death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the
implications and consequences of these facts, the
parties sharply disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the
school to show his physics experiment as a
prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was
then under the custody of the private
respondents. The private respondents submit
that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school
only for the purpose of submitting his physics
report and that he was no longer in their custody
because the semester had already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the
gun used which the petitioners consider
important because of an earlier incident which
they claim underscores the negligence of the
school and at least one of the private
respondents. It is not denied by the respondents
that on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the
dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban an
unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him
without making a report to the principal or
taking any further action .6 As Gumban was one
of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired
the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners
contend that this was the same pistol that had
been confiscated from Gumban and that their
son would not have been killed if it had not been
returned by Damaso. The respondents say,
however, that there is no proof that the gun was
the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will
depend on the interpretation of Article 2180
which, as it happens, is invoked by both parties
in support of their conflicting positions. The
pertinent part of this article reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their
pupils and students or
apprentices so long as they
remain in their custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the
Court in connection with the above-quoted
provision, to wit: Exconde v. Capuno 7 Mercado v.
Court of Appeals, 8 and Palisoc v.
Brillantes. 9 These will be briefly reviewed in this
opinion for a better resolution of the case at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of
the Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy
Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on
instructions of the city school supervisor. After
the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took over its
wheel and drove it so recklessly that it turned
turtle, resulting in the death of two of its
passengers. Dante was found guilty of double
homicide with reckless imprudence. In the
separate civil action flied against them, his father
was held solidarily liable with him in damages
under Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the
Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year
old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice
Bautista Angelo on June 29,1957, exculpated the
school in anobiter dictum (as it was not a party to
the case) on the ground that it was riot a school
of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with
whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes
concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the
school authorities who should be held liable
Liability under this rule, he said, was imposed on
(1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools
of arts and trades in particular. The modifying
clause "of establishments of arts and trades"
should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and
with an elaboration. A student cut a classmate
with a razor blade during recess time at the
Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City, and the
parents of the victim sued the culprits parents
for damages. Through Justice Labrador, the
Court declared in another obiter (as the school
itself had also not been sued that the school was
not liable because it was not an establishment of
arts and trades. Moreover, the custody
requirement had not been proved as this
"contemplates a situation where the student
lives and boards with the teacher, such that the
control, direction and influences on the pupil
supersede those of the parents." Justice J.B.L.
Reyes did not take part but the other members of
the court concurred in this decision promulgated
on May 30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4,
1971, a 16-year old student was killed by a
classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of the
Manila Technical Institute. Although the
wrongdoer — who was already of age — was not
boarding in the school, the head thereof and the
teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with
him. The Court declared through Justice
Teehankee:
 The phrase used in the cited
article — "so long as (the
students) remain in their
custody" — means the
protective and supervisory
custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise
over the pupils and students
for as long as they are at
attendance in the school,
including recess time. There is
nothing in the law that
requires that for such liability
to attach, the pupil or student
who commits the tortious act
must live and board in the
school, as erroneously held by
the lower court, and
the dicta in Mercado (as well
as in Exconde) on which it
relied, must now be deemed
to have been set aside by the
present decision.
This decision was concurred in by five other
members, 10 including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who
stressed, in answer to the dissenting opinion,
that even students already of age were covered
by the provision since they were equally in the
custody of the school and subject to its discipline.
Dissenting with three others,11 Justice Makalintal
was for retaining the custody interpretation in
Mercado and submitted that the rule should
apply only to torts committed by students not
yet of age as the school would be acting only
in loco parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed
with Justice Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case
but added that "since the school involved at bar
is a non-academic school, the question as to the
applicability of the cited codal provision to
academic institutions will have to await another
case wherein it may properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos has been directly impleaded
and is sought to be held liable under Article
2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of
arts and trades but an academic institution of
learning. The parties herein have also directly
raised the question of whether or not Article
2180 covers even establishments which are
technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if
so, when the offending student is supposed to be
"in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem,
the Court has come to the conclusion that the
provision in question should apply to all schools,
academic as well as non-academic. Where the
school is academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the
first part of the provision. This is the general
rule. In the case of establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who
shall be held liable as an exception to the general
rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be
liable for the acts of their students except where
the school is technical in nature, in which case it
is the head thereof who shall be answerable.
Following the canon of reddendo singula
singulis "teachers" should apply to the words
"pupils and students" and "heads of
establishments of arts and trades" to the word
"apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting
opinion expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
Exconde where he said in part:
I can see no sound reason for
limiting Art. 1903 of the Old
Civil Code to teachers of arts
and trades and not to
academic ones. What
substantial difference is there
between them insofar as
concerns the proper
supervision and vice over
their pupils? It cannot be
seriously contended that an
academic teacher is exempt
from the duty of watching that
his pupils do not commit a
tort to the detriment of third
Persons, so long as they are in
a position to exercise
authority and Supervision
over the pupil. In my opinion,
in the phrase "teachers or
heads of establishments of
arts and trades" used in Art.
1903 of the old Civil Code, the
words "arts and trades" does
not qualify "teachers" but only
"heads of establishments."
The phrase is only an updated
version of the equivalent
terms "preceptores y The Court cannot see why different degrees of
artesanos" used in the Italian
and French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all
commentators, the basis of
the presumption of negligence
of Art. 1903 in some culpa in
vigilando that the parents,
teachers, etc. are supposed to
have incurred in the exercise
of their authority, it would
seem clear that where the
parent places the child under
the effective authority of the
teacher, the latter, and not the
parent, should be the one
answerable for the torts
committed while under his
custody, for the very
reason/that the parent is not
supposed to interfere with the
discipline of the school nor
with the authority and
supervision of the teacher
while the child is under
instruction. And if there is no
authority, there can be no
responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction
between the academic and the non-academic
schools insofar as torts committed by their
students are concerned. The same vigilance is
expected from the teacher over the students
under his control and supervision, whatever the
nature of the school where he is teaching. The
suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is
that the provision would make the teacher or
even the head of the school of arts and trades
liable for an injury caused by any student in its
custody but if that same tort were committed in
an academic school, no liability would attach to
the teacher or the school head. All other
circumstances being the same, the teacher or the
head of the academic school would be absolved
whereas the teacher and the head of the non-
academic school would be held liable, and simply
because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
vigilance should be exercised by the school
authorities on the basis only of the nature of
their respective schools. There does not seem to
be any plausible reason for relaxing that
vigilance simply because the school is academic
in nature and for increasing such vigilance where
the school is non-academic. Notably, the injury
subject of liability is caused by the student and
not by the school itself nor is it a result of the
operations of the school or its equipment. The
injury contemplated may be caused by any
student regardless of the school where he is
registered. The teacher certainly should not be
able to excuse himself by simply showing that he
is teaching in an academic school where, on the
other hand, the head would be held liable if the
school were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the
teacher of the academic school is to be held
answerable for the torts committed by his
students, why is it the head of the school only
who is held liable where the injury is caused in a
school of arts and trades? And in the case of the
academic or non- technical school, why not apply
the rule also to the head thereof instead of
imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the
fact that historically the head of the school of arts
and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his
pupils than the head of the academic school. The
old schools of arts and trades were engaged in
the training of artisans apprenticed to their
master who personally and directly instructed
them on the technique and secrets of their craft.
The head of the school of arts and trades was
such a master and so was personally involved in
the task of teaching his students, who usually
even boarded with him and so came under his
constant control, supervision and influence. By
contrast, the head of the academic school was
not as involved with his students and exercised
only administrative duties over the teachers who
were the persons directly dealing with the
students. The head of the academic school had
then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with
the students. Consequently, while he could not
be directly faulted for the acts of the students,
the head of the school of arts and trades, because
of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer
obtains at present in view of the expansion of the
schools of arts and trades, the consequent
increase in their enrollment, and the
corresponding diminution of the direct and
personal contract of their heads with the
students. Article 2180, however, remains
unchanged. In its present state, the provision
must be interpreted by the Court according to its
clear and original mandate until the legislature,
taking into account the charges in the situation
subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the
necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration
of the responsibility of the teacher or the head of
the school of arts and trades over the students. Is
such responsibility co-extensive with the period
when the student is actually undergoing studies
during the school term, as contended by the
respondents and impliedly admitted by the
petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under
examination, it is clear that while the custody
requirement, to repeatPalisoc v. Brillantes, does
not mean that the student must be boarding with
the school authorities, it does signify that the
student should be within the control and under
the influence of the school authorities at the time
of the occurrence of the injury. This does not
necessarily mean that such, custody be co-
terminous with the semester, beginning with the
start of classes and ending upon the close
thereof, and excluding the time before or after
such period, such as the period of registration,
and in the case of graduating students, the
period before the commencement exercises. In
the view of the Court, the student is in the
custody of the school authorities as long as he is
under the control and influence of the school and
within its premises, whether the semester has
not yet begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes
under the discipline of the school only upon the
start of classes notwithstanding that before that
day he has already registered and thus placed
himself under its rules. Neither should such
discipline be deemed ended upon the last day of
classes notwithstanding that there may still be
certain requisites to be satisfied for completion
of the course, such as submission of reports,
term papers, clearances and the like. During such
periods, the student is still subject to the
disciplinary authority of the school and cannot
consider himself released altogether from
observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in
the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate
student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues. Indeed, even if the student
should be doing nothing more than relaxing in
the campus in the company of his classmates and
friends and enjoying the ambience and
atmosphere of the school, he is still within the
custody and subject to the discipline of the
school authorities under the provisions of Article
2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the
teacher-in-charge who must answer for his
students' torts, in practically the same way that
the parents are responsible for the child when he
is in their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the
one designated by the dean, principal, or other
administrative superior to exercise supervision
over the pupils in the specific classes or sections
to which they are assigned. It is not necessary
that at the time of the injury, the teacher be
physically present and in a position to prevent it.
Custody does not connote immediate and actual
physical control but refers more to the influence
exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in
him as a result of such influence. Thus, for the
injuries caused by the student, the teacher and
not the parent shag be held responsible if the
tort was committed within the premises of the
school at any time when its authority could be
validly exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability
imposed by this article is supposed to fall
directly on the teacher or the head of the school
of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If
at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be
held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even
of the head thereof under the general principle
of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate
itself from liability by proof that it had exercised
the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades directly held to answer for the tort
committed by the student. As long as the
defendant can show that he had taken the
necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, he can exonerate himself from the
liability imposed by Article 2180, which also
states that:
The responsibility treated of
in this article shall cease when
the Persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent
damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the
teacher will be held liable not only when he is
acting in loco parentis for the law does not
require that the offending student be of minority
age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable only if
his child is still a minor, the teacher is held
answerable by the law for the act of the student
under him regardless of the student's age. Thus,
in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the
teacher and the head of the technical school
although the wrongdoer was already of age. In
this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more
favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions
expressed by Justice Makalintal in his dissenting
opinion in Palisoc that the school may be unduly
exposed to liability under this article in view of
the increasing activism among the students that
is likely to cause violence and resulting injuries
in the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be
sure. Nevertheless, it should be repeated that,
under the present ruling, it is not the school that
will be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense
of due diligence is available to it in case it is
sought to be held answerable as principal for the
acts or omission of its head or the teacher in its
employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper
measures in selecting the head or its teachers
and the appropriate supervision over them in
the custody and instruction of the pupils
pursuant to its rules and regulations for the
maintenance of discipline among them. In almost
all cases now, in fact, these measures are effected
through the assistance of an adequate security
force to help the teacher physically enforce those
rules upon the students. Ms should bolster the
claim of the school that it has taken adequate
steps to prevent any injury that may be
committed by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this
defense as it would otherwise be unfair to hold
him directly answerable for the damage caused
by his students as long as they are in the school
premises and presumably under his influence. In
this respect, the Court is disposed not to expect
from the teacher the same measure of
responsibility imposed on the parent for their
influence over the child is not equal in degree.
Obviously, the parent can expect more obedience
from the child because the latter's dependence
on him is greater than on the teacher. It need not
be stressed that such dependence includes the
child's support and sustenance whereas
submission to the teacher's influence, besides
being coterminous with the period of custody is
usually enforced only because of the students'
desire to pass the course. The parent can instill
more las discipline on the child than the teacher
and so should be held to a greater accountability
than the teacher for the tort committed by the
child.
And if it is also considered that under the article
in question, the teacher or the head of the school
of arts and trades is responsible for the damage
caused by the student or apprentice even if he is
already of age — and therefore less tractable
than the minor — then there should all the more
be justification to require from the school
authorities less accountability as long as they can
prove reasonable diligence in preventing the
injury. After all, if the parent himself is no longer
liable for the student's acts because he has
reached majority age and so is no longer under
the former's control, there is then all the more
reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's
responsibility for the acts of the student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court
has arrived at the following conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot,
he was still in the custody of the authorities of
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding
that the fourth year classes had formally ended.
It was immaterial if he was in the school
auditorium to finish his physics experiment or
merely to submit his physics report for what is
important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. As previously observed, even the mere
savoring of the company of his friends in the
premises of the school is a legitimate purpose
that would have also brought him in the custody
of the school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the
dean of boys cannot be held liable because none
of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously
defined. Each of them was exercising only a
general authority over the student body and not
the direct control and influence exerted by the
teacher placed in charge of particular classes or
sections and thus immediately involved in its
discipline. The evidence of the parties does not
disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the
offending student was. The mere fact that
Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in
connection with his physics report did not
necessarily make the physics teacher,
respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-
charge of Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-
in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was
negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or
that he had waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school or condoned their non-
observance. His absence when the tragedy
happened cannot be considered against him
because he was not supposed or required to
report to school on that day. And while it is true
that the offending student was still in the
custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the
latter was physically absent when the tort was
committed, it has not been established that it
was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline
upon the student. On the contrary, the private
respondents have proved that they had
exercised due diligence, through the
enforcement of the school regulations, in
maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is
probably the dean of boys who should be held
liable especially in view of the unrefuted
evidence that he had earlier confiscated an
unlicensed gun from one of the students and
returned the same later to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to
higher authorities. While this was clearly
negligence on his part, for which he deserves
sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily
link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not
been shown that he confiscated and returned
pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable
under the article because only the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades is made
responsible for the damage caused by the
student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to
answer for the tort committed by any of the
other private respondents for none of them has
been found to have been charged with the
custody of the offending student or has been
remiss in the discharge of his duties in
connection with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as
disclosed by the record and in the light of the
principles herein announced that none of the
respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by
Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted
in the latter's death at the auditorium of the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972.
While we deeply sympathize with the petitioners
over the loss of their son under the tragic
circumstances here related, we nevertheless are
unable to extend them the material relief they
seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law they
have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without
any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Yap, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernan, Padilla and Teehankee, C.J., JJ, took no
part.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and
dissenting:
I concur, except with respect to the restricted
meaning given the term "teacher" in Article 2180
of the Civil Code as "teacher-in-charge." This
would limit liability to occasions where there are
classes under the immediate charge of a teacher,
which does not seem to be the intendment of the
law.
As I understand it, the philosophy of the law is
that whoever stands in loco parentis will have
the same duties and obligations as parents
whenever in such a standing. Those persons are
mandatorily held liable for the tortious acts of
pupils and students so long as the latter remain
in their custody, meaning their protective and
supervisory custody.
Thus Article 349 of the Civil Code enumerates
the persons who stand in loco parentis and
thereby exercise substitute parental authority:
Art. 349 The following
persons shall exercise
substitute parental authority:
xxx xxx xxx
2) Teachers and professors
xxx xxx xxx
4) Directors of trade
establishments, with regard to
apprentices;'
Article 352 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 362. The relations
between teacher and pupil,
professor and student, are
fixed by government
regulations and those of each
school or institution....
But even such rules and regulations as may be
fixed can not contravene the concept of
substitute parental authority.
The rationale of liability of school heads and
teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils was
explained inPalisoc vs. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548),
thus:
The protective custody of
the school heads and
teachers is mandatorily
substituted for that of the
parents, and hence, it
becomes their obligation as
well as that of the school
itself to provide proper
supervision of the students'
activities during the whole
time that they are at
attendance in the
school, including recess time,
as well as to take the
necessary precautions to
protect the students in their
custody from dangers and
hazards that would
reasonably be anticipated,
including injuries that some
students themselves may
inflict wilfully or through
negligence on their fellow
students. (Emphasis supplied)
Of course, as provided for in the same Article
2180, the responsibility treated of shall cease
when the persons mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
And while a school is, admittedly, not directly
liable since Article 2180 speaks only of teachers
and schools heads, yet, by virtue of the same
provision, the school, as their employer, may be
held liable for the failure of its teachers or school
heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as
substitute parents (Sangco, Philippine Law on
Torts & Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201). Again, the
school may exculpate itself from liability by
proving that it had exercised the diligence of a
good father of the family.
Art. 2180. x x x
Employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their
employees and household
helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are
not engaged in any business
or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
Parenthetically, from the enumeration in Article
349 of the Civil Code, supra, it is apparent that
the Code Commission had already segregated the
classification of "teachers and professors" vis-a-
vis their pupils, from "directors of trade
establishments, with regard to their
apprentices."
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the Court's opinion so carefully
analyzed and crafted by Justice Isagani A. Cruz.
However, I would like to stress the need for a
major amendment to, if not a complete scrapping
of, Article 2180 of the Civil Code insofar as it
refers to teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades in relation to pupils and students
or apprentices. The seventh paragraph of Art.
2180 is a relic of the past and contemplates a
situation long gone and out of date. In a Palisoc v.
Brillantes (41 SCRA 548) situation, it is bound to
result in mischief and injustice.
First, we no longer have masters and apprentices
toiling in schools of arts and trades. Students in
"technological" colleges and universities are no
different from students in liberal arts or
professional schools. Apprentices now work in
regular shops and factories and their
relationship to the employer is covered by laws
governing the employment relationship and not
by laws governing the teacher—student
relationship.
Second, except for kindergarten, elementary, and
perhaps early high school students, teachers are
often no longer objects of veneration who are
given the respect due to substitute parents. Many
students in their late teens or early adult years pupils and students so long as the latter remain
view some teachers as part of a bourgeois or in their custody, meaning their protective and
reactionary group whose advice on behaviour, supervisory custody.
deportment, and other non-academic matters is
not only resented but actively rejected. It ,seems Thus Article 349 of the Civil Code enumerates
most unfair to hold teachers liable on a the persons who stand in loco parentis and
presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts thereby exercise substitute parental authority:
of students even under circumstances where
strictly speaking there could be no in loco
parentis relationship. Why do teachers have to Art. 349 The following
persons shall exercise
prove the contrary of negligence to be freed from
solidary liability for the acts f bomb-throwing or substitute parental authority:
pistol packing students who would just as soon
hurt them as they would other members of the xxx xxx xxx
so-called-establishment.
2) Teachers and professors
The ordinary rules on quasi-delicta should apply
to teachers and schools of whatever nature xxx xxx xxx
insofar as grown up students are concerned. The
provision of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code involved
in this case has outlived its purpose. The Court 4) Directors of trade
cannot make law. It can only apply the law with establishments, with regard to
its imperfections. However, the Court can apprentices;'
suggest that such a law should be amended or
repealed. Article 352 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 362. The relations
between teacher and pupil,
professor and student, are
fixed by government
regulations and those of each
Separate Opinions school or institution....
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and But even such rules and regulations as may be
dissenting: fixed can not contravene the concept of
substitute parental authority.
I concur, except with respect to the restricted
meaning given the term "teacher" in Article 2180
The rationale of liability of school heads and
of the Civil Code as "teacher-in-charge." This teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils was
would limit liability to occasions where there are
explained inPalisoc vs. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548),
classes under the immediate charge of a teacher, thus:
which does not seem to be the intendment of the
law.
The protective custody of
the school heads and
As I understand it, the philosophy of the law is teachers is mandatorily
that whoever stands in loco parentis will have substituted for that of the
the same duties and obligations as parents
parents, and hence, it
whenever in such a standing. Those persons are becomes their obligation as
mandatorily held liable for the tortious acts of
well as that of the school
 itself to provide proper
supervision of the students'
activities during the whole
time that they are at
attendance in the
school, including recess time,
as well as to take the
necessary precautions to
protect the students in their
custody from dangers and
hazards that would
reasonably be anticipated,
including injuries that some
students themselves may
inflict wilfully or through
negligence on their fellow
students. (Emphasis supplied)
Of course, as provided for in the same Article
2180, the responsibility treated of shall cease
when the persons mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
And while a school is, admittedly, not directly
liable since Article 2180 speaks only of teachers
and schools heads, yet, by virtue of the same
provision, the school, as their employer, may be
held liable for the failure of its teachers or school
heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as
substitute parents (Sangco, Philippine Law on
Torts & Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201). Again, the
school may exculpate itself from liability by
proving that it had exercised the diligence of a
good father of the family.
Art. 2180. x x x
Employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their
employees and household
helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are
not engaged in any business
or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
Parenthetically, from the enumeration in Article solidary liability for the acts f bomb-throwing or
349 of the Civil Code, supra, it is apparent that pistol packing students who would just as soon
the Code Commission had already segregated the hurt them as they would other members of the
classification of "teachers and professors" vis-a- so-called-establishment.
vis their pupils, from "directors of trade
establishments, with regard to their The ordinary rules on quasi-delicta should apply
apprentices." to teachers and schools of whatever nature
insofar as grown up students are concerned. The
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring: provision of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code involved
in this case has outlived its purpose. The Court
cannot make law. It can only apply the law with
I concur in the Court's opinion so carefully
analyzed and crafted by Justice Isagani A. Cruz. its imperfections. However, the Court can
suggest that such a law should be amended or
However, I would like to stress the need for a
major amendment to, if not a complete scrapping repealed.
of, Article 2180 of the Civil Code insofar as it
refers to teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades in relation to pupils and students
or apprentices. The seventh paragraph of Art.
2180 is a relic of the past and contemplates a
situation long gone and out of date. In a Palisoc v.
Brillantes (41 SCRA 548) situation, it is bound to
result in mischief and injustice.
First, we no longer have masters and apprentices
toiling in schools of arts and trades. Students in
"technological" colleges and universities are no
different from students in liberal arts or
professional schools. Apprentices now work in
regular shops and factories and their
relationship to the employer is covered by laws
governing the employment relationship and not
by laws governing the teacher—student
relationship.
Second, except for kindergarten, elementary, and
perhaps early high school students, teachers are
often no longer objects of veneration who are
given the respect due to substitute parents. Many
students in their late teens or early adult years
view some teachers as part of a bourgeois or
reactionary group whose advice on behaviour,
deportment, and other non-academic matters is
not only resented but actively rejected. It ,seems
most unfair to hold teachers liable on a
presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts
of students even under circumstances where
strictly speaking there could be no in loco
parentis relationship. Why do teachers have to
prove the contrary of negligence to be freed from
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54357 April 25, 1988
REYNALDO PASCO, assisted by his father
PEDRO PASCO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN,
BRANCH V, STA. MARIA and ARANETA
UNIVERSITY,respondents.
Ponciano G. Hernandez for petitioner.
Marcelo C. Aniana for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
The sole question of law raised by petitioner in
this case is whether the provision of the
penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code which states:
Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their
pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
is equally applicable to academic institutions.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, petitioner, together with two
companions, while walking inside the campus of
the private respondent Araneta University, after
attending classes in said university, was accosted
and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by
Abdul Karim Madidis alias "Teng." Said Muslim
group were also students of the Araneta
University. Petitioner was subsequently stabbed
by Abdul and as a consequence he was
hospitalized at the Manila Central University
(MCU) Hospital where he underwent surgery to
save his life.
On October 5, 1979, petitioner, assisted by his
father Pedro Pasco, filed a complaint for
damages against Abdul Karim Madidis and
herein private respondent Gregorio Araneta
University which was docketed as Civil Case No.
SM-1027. Said school was impleaded as a party
defendant based on the aforementioned
provision of the Civil Code.
On October 26, 1979, respondent school filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:
a. The penultimate paragraph
of Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code under which it was
sued applies only to
vocational schools and not to
academic institutions;
b. That every person
criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable under Article
100 of the Revised Penal
Code. Hence, the civil liability
in this case arises from a
criminal action which the
defendant university has not
committed;
c. Since this is a civil case, a
demand should have been
made by the plaintiff, hence, it
would be premature to bring
an action for damages against
defendant University. (Rollo,
p. 96)
On May 12, 1980, respondent court issued an
Order * granting said Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the Order of
Dismissal but the motion was likewise denied on
the ground that there is no sufficient justification
to disturb its ruling. Hence, this instant Petition
for certiorari under Republic Act No. 5440,
praying that judgment be rendered setting aside
the questioned order of May 12, 1980 dismissing
the complaint as against respondent school and
the order of July 17, 1980 denying the
reconsideration of the questioned order of
dismissal, with costs against respondent school.
We find no necessity of discussing the
applicability of the Article to educational
institutions (which are not schools of arts and
trades) for the issue in this petition is actually
whether or not, under the article, the school or
the university itself (as distinguished from
the teachers or heads) is liable. We find the
answer in the negative, for surely the provision
concerned speaks only of "teachers or heads."
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J. and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. Paragraph 5 of Art. 2180 may be
construed as the basis for the liability of the
school as the employer for the failure of its
teachers or school heads to perform their
mandatory legal duties as substitute parents.
Herrera, J. concurring (Amadora et al. vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-47745, citing Sangco,
Philippine Law on Torts & Damages, 1978 ed., p.
201).
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Sarmiento in his dissent.
As stated by him, my view is that while the
educational institution is not directly liable, yet
the school, as the employer, may be held liable
for the failure of its teachers or school heads to
perform their mandatory legal duties as
substitute parents (Article 2180, Civil Code). The
school, however, may exculpate itself from
liability by proving that it had exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family.
Melencio-Herrera, J., dissent.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. Paragraph 5 of Art. 2180 may be
construed as the basis for the liability of the
school as the employer for the failure of its
teachers or school heads to perform their
mandatory legal duties as substitute parents.
Herrera, J. concurring (Amadora et al. vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-47745, citing Sangco,
Philippine Law on Torts & Damages, 1978 ed., p.
201).
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Sarmiento in his dissent.
As stated by him, my view is that while the
educational institution is not directly liable, yet
the school, as the employer, may be held liable
for the failure of its teachers or school heads to
perform their mandatory legal duties as
substitute parents (Article 2180, Civil Code). The
school, however, may exculpate itself from
liability by proving that it had exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family.
Melencio-Herrera, J., dissent.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988
FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA
DORONIO petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO AQUINO, MAURO SORIANO and
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Buenaventura C. Evangelista for petitioners.
Modesto V. Cabanela for respondent Edgardo
Aquino.
Manuel P. Pastor for respondent Mauro Soriano.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari seeking
the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 36390-R entitled
"Federico Ylarde, et al. vs. Edgardo Aquino, et
al.," a case which originated from the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, We are again caned
upon determine the responsibility of the
principals and teachers towards their students
or pupils.
In 1963, private respondent Mariano Soriano
was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary
School, a public educational institution located in
Tayug, Pangasinan-Private respondent Edgardo
Aquino was a teacher therein. At that time, the
school was fittered with several concrete blocks
which were remnants of the old school shop that
was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the
huge stones were serious hazards to the
schoolchildren, another teacher by the name of
Sergio Banez started burying them one by one as
early as 1962. In fact, he was able to bury ten of
these blocks all by himself.
Deciding to help his colleague, private
respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen
of his male pupils, aged ten to eleven, after class
dismissal on October 7, 1963. Being their
teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig beside
a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole
wherein the stone can be buried. The work was
left unfinished. The following day, also after
classes, private respondent Aquino called four of
the original eighteen pupils to continue the
digging. These four pupils — Reynaldo Alonso,
Francisco Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito
Ylarde, dug until the excavation was one meter
and forty centimeters deep. At this point, private
respondent Aquino alone continued digging
while the pupils remained inside the pit
throwing out the loose soil that was brought
about by the digging.
When the depth was right enough to
accommodate the concrete block, private
respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of
the hole. Then, said private respondent left the
children to level the loose soil around the open
hole while he went to see Banez who was about
thirty meters away. Private respondent wanted
to borrow from Banez the key to the school
workroom where he could get some rope. Before
leaving. , private respondent Aquino allegedly
told the children "not to touch the stone."
A few minutes after private respondent Aquino
left, three of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and
Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then,
without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga
jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to
slide down towards the opening. Alonso and
Alcantara were able to scramble out of the
excavation on time but unfortunately fo Ylarde,
the concrete block caught him before he could
get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing
position. As a result thereof, Ylarde sustained the
following injuries:
1. Contusion with hematoma,
left inguinal region and
suprapubic region.
2. Contusion with ecchymosis
entire scrotal region.
3. Lacerated wound, left
lateral aspect of penile skin
with phimosis
4. Abrasion, gluteal region,
bilateral.
5. Intraperitoneal and
extrapertitoneal
extravasation of blood and
urine about 2 liters.
6. Fracture, simple, symphesis
pubis
7. Ruptured (macerated)
urinary bladder with body of
bladder almost entirely
separated from its neck.
REMARKS:
1. Above were incurred by
crushing injury.
2. Prognosis very poor.
Three days later, Novelito Ylarde died.
Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a
suit for damages against both private
respondents Aquino and Soriano. The lower
court dismissed the complaint on the following
grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils
is in line with their course called Work
Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person; and (3) that
the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless
imprudence. 2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision of the lower court.
Petitioners base their action against private
respondent Aquino on Article 2176 of the Civil
Code for his alleged negligence that caused their
son's death while the complaint against
respondent Soriano as the head of school is
founded on Article 2180 of the same Code.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is
no pre- existing contractual
relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
On the other hand, the applicable provision of
Article 2180 states:
Art. 2180. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their
pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody. 3
The issue to be resolved is whether or not under
the cited provisions, both private respondents
can be held liable for damages.
As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot
be made responsible for the death of the child
Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school
and not a school of arts and trades. This is in line
with Our ruling in Amadora vs. Court of
Appeals, 4 wherein this Court thoroughly
discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the
head of an academic school who should be
answerable for torts committed by their
students. This Court went on to say that in a
school of arts and trades, it is only the head of
the school who can be held liable. In the same
case, We explained:
After an exhaustive
examination of the problem,
the Court has come to the
conclusion that the provision
in question should apply
to all schools, academic as
well as non-academic. Where
the school is academic rather
than technical or vocational in
nature, responsibility for the
tort committed by the student
will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student,
following the first part of the
provision. This is the general
rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof,
and only he, who shall be held
liable as an exception to the
 general rule. In other words,
teachers in general shall be
liable for the acts of their
students except where the
school is technical in nature,
in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be
answerable. Following the
canon ofreddendo singula
sinquilis 'teachers' should
apply to the words "pupils
and students' and 'heads of
establishments of arts and
trades to the word
"apprentices."
Hence, applying the said doctrine to this case, We
rule that private respondent Soriano, as
principal, cannot be held liable for the reason
that the school he heads is an academic school
and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as
clearly admitted by private respondent Aquino,
private respondent Soriano did not give any
instruction regarding the digging.
From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that
private respondent Aquino can be held liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the
teacher-in-charge of the children for being
negligent in his supervision over them and his
failure to take the necessary precautions to
prevent any injury on their persons. However, as
earlier pointed out, petitioners base the alleged
liability of private respondent Aquino on Article
2176 which is separate and distinct from that
provided for in Article 2180.
With this in mind, the question We need to
answer is this: Were there acts and omissions on
the part of private respondent Aquino
amounting to fault or negligence which have
direct causal relation to the death of his pupil
Ylarde? Our answer is in the affirmative. He is
liable for damages.
From a review of the record of this case, it is very
clear that private respondent Aquino acted with
fault and gross negligence when he: (1) failed to
avail himself of services of adult manual laborers
and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven
to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete
stone which he knew to be a very hazardous
task; (2) required the children to remain inside
the pit even after they had finished digging,
knowing that the huge block was lying nearby
and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by
any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous
area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around
the excavation when it was so apparent that the
huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to
a place where he would not be able to check on
the children's safety; and (5) left the children
close to the excavation, an obviously attractive
nuisance.
The negligent act of private respondent Aquino
in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has
a direct causal connection to the death of the
child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but
natural for the children to play around. Tired
from the strenuous digging, they just had to
amuse themselves with whatever they found.
Driven by their playful and adventurous instincts
and not knowing the risk they were facing three
of them jumped into the hole while the other one
jumped on the stone. Since the stone was so
heavy and the soil was loose from the digging, it
was also a natural consequence that the stone
would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury
on the unfortunate child caught by its heavy
weight. Everything that occurred was the natural
and probable effect of the negligent acts of
private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the
child Ylarde would not have died were it not for
the unsafe situation created by private
respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all
the pupils concerned to real danger.
We cannot agree with the finding of the lower
court that the injuries which resulted in the
death of the child Ylarde were caused by his own
reckless imprudence, It should be remembered
that he was only ten years old at the time of the
incident, As such, he is expected to be playful and
daring. His actuations were natural to a boy his
age. Going back to the facts, it was not only him
but the three of them who jumped into the hole
while the remaining boy jumped on the block.
From this, it is clear that he only did what any
other ten-year old child would do in the same
situation.
In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it
is evident that the lower court did not consider
his age and maturity. This should not be the case.
The degree of care required to be exercised must
vary with the capacity of the person endangered
to care for himself. A minor should not be held to
the same degree of care as an adult, but his
conduct should be judged according to the
average conduct of persons of his age and
experience. 5 The standard of conduct to which a
child must conform for his own protection is that
degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of
the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge
and experience under the same or similar
circumstances. 6 Bearing this in mind, We cannot
charge the child Ylarde with reckless
imprudence.
The court is not persuaded that the digging done
by the pupils can pass as part of their Work
Education. A single glance at the picture showing
the excavation and the huge concrete
block 7 would reveal a dangerous site requiring
the attendance of strong, mature laborers and
not ten-year old grade-four pupils. We cannot
comprehend why the lower court saw it
otherwise when private respondent Aquino
himself admitted that there were no instructions
from the principal requiring what the pupils
were told to do. Nor was there any showing that
it was included in the lesson plan for their Work
Education. Even the Court of Appeals made
mention of the fact that respondent Aquino
decided all by himself to help his co-teacher
Banez bury the concrete remnants of the old
school shop. 8 Furthermore, the excavation
should not be placed in the category of school
gardening, planting trees, and the like as these
undertakings do not expose the children to any
risk that could result in death or physical
injuries.
The contention that private respondent Aquino
exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person is certainly without cogent basis. A
reasonably prudent person would have foreseen
that bringing children to an excavation site, and
more so, leaving them there all by themselves,
may result in an accident. An ordinarily careful
human being would not assume that a simple
warning "not to touch the stone" is sufficient to
cast away all the serious danger that a huge
concrete block adjacent to an excavation would
present to the children. Moreover, a teacher who
stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have
made sure that the children are protected from
all harm in his company.
We close by categorically stating that a truly
careful and cautious person would have acted in
all contrast to the way private respondent
Aquino did. Were it not for his gross negligence,
the unfortunate incident would not have
occurred and the child Ylarde would probably be
alive today, a grown- man of thirty-five. Due to
his failure to take the necessary precautions to
avoid the hazard, Ylarde's parents suffered great
anguish all these years.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is hereby GRANTED and the questioned
judgment of the respondent court is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby
rendered ordering private respondent Edagardo
Aquino to pay petitioners the following:
(1) Indemnity for the death of Child Ylarde
P30,000.00
(2) Exemplary damages 10,000.00
(3) Moral damages 20,000.00
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988
BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO COLLEGES
FOUNDATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
EDUARDO B. CASTRO, DIOMEDES B. CASTRO,
VIRGINIA B. CASTRO and RODOLFO B.
CASTRO., respondents.
Edilberto B. Tenefrancia for petitioners.
Leonardo L. Cocjin Jr. for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari,
petitioners seek the reversal of the
decision 1 of respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court, dated 7 December 1984, in AC-G.R. No. CV
69876, in so far as it affirmed the decision 2 of
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac (hereinafter
referred to as the Trial Court), which held,
among others, petitioners solidarily hable with
Jimmy B. Abon, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
The relevant facts, as found by the Trial Court
and adopted by reference by the respondent
Court, are:
... Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF, hereafter) is
an academic institution ... [However], it is also an
institution of arts and trade. It has so advertised
itself, as its own evidence shows. Its brochure
(Exh. 2) shows that BCF has a full-fledged
technical-vocational department offer
Communication, Broadcast and Teletype
Technician courses as well as Electronics
Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics courses...
these courses divest BCF of the nature or
character of being purely or exclusively an
academic institution. 3
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit,
the Baguio Colleges Foundation Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC) Unit, which is under the
fifth control of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. 4 The ROTC Unit, by way of
accommodation to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), pursuant to Department
Order No. 14, Series of 1975 of the Department
of Education and Culture, 5 is provided by the
BCF an office and an armory located at the
basement of its main building. 6
The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had
Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed
armorer. 7 As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy
B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP.
Not being an employee of the BCF, he also
received his salary from the AFP, 8 as well as
orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the
Commandant of the Baguio Colleges Foundation
ROTC Unit, concurrent Commandant of other
ROTC units in Baguio and an employee (officer)
of the AFP. 9 Jimmy B. Abon was also a commerce
student of the BCF. 10
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the
parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot
Napoleon Castro a student of the University of
Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the
former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of
the BCF. 11 As a result, Napoleon Castro died and
Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and
convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military
Commission No. 30, AFP. 12
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued
for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto
C. Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa
(President and Chairman of the Board of BCF),
Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF),
Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of
Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the
Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. as party
defendants. After hearing, the Trial Court
rendered a decision, (1) sentencing defendants
Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio
Colleges Foundation, Inc., jointly and severally,
to pay private respondents, as heirs of Napoleon
Castro: a) P12,000.00 for the death of Napoleon
Castro, (b) P316,000.00 as indemnity for the loss
of earning capacity of the deceased, (c)
P5,000.00 as moral damages, (d) P6,000.00 as
actual damages, and (e) P5,000.00 as attorney's
fees, plus costs; (2) absolving the other
defendants; and (3) dismissing the defendants'
counterclaim for lack of merit. 13 On appeal by
petitioners, the respondent Court affirmed with
modification the decision of the Trial Court. The
modification consisted in reducing the award for
loss of earning capacity of the deceased from
P316,000.00 to P30,000.00 by way of temperate
damages, and increasing the indemnity for the
death of Napoleon Castro from P12,000.00 to
P30,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
The central issue in this case is whether or not
petitioners can be held solidarity hable with
Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious
act of Jimmy B. Abon.
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades are hable for
"damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody." The rationale of such liability is that so
long as the student remains in the custody of a
teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in
loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called
upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of the [student]." 14 Likewise, "the
phrase used in [Art. 2180 — 'so long as (the
students) remain in their custody means the
protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over
the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess
time." 15
In the case at bar, in holding that Jimmy B. Abon
was stin in the protective and supervisory
custody of the Baguio Colleges Foundation when
he shot Napoleon Castro, the respondent Court
ruled that:
it is true that Abon was not
attending any class or school
function at the time of the
shooting incident, which was
at about 8 o'clock in the
evening; but considering that
Abon was employed as an
armorer and property
custodian of the BCF ROTC
unit, he must have been
attending night classes and
therefore that hour in the
evening was just about
dismissal time for him or soon
thereafter. The time interval is
safely within the "recess time"
that the trial court spoke of
and envisioned by the Palisoc
case, supra. 16 (Emphasis
supplied)
In line with the case of Palisoc, 17 a
student not "at attendance in the school" cannot
be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept
is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the
school," contemplates a situation of temporary
adjournment of school activities where the
student still remains within call of his mentor
and is not permitted to leave the school
premises, or the area within which the school
activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does
not include dismissal. 18 Likewise, the mere fact
of being enrolled or being in the premises of a
school without more does not constitute
"attending school" or being in the "protective
and supervisory custody' of the school, as
contemplated in the law.
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that
Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have
been "at attendance in the school," or in the
custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity
liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting
from his acts.
Besides, the record shows that before the
shooting incident, Roberto B. Ungos ROTC Unit
Commandant, AFP, had instructed Jimmy B.
Abon "not to leave the office and [to keep the
armory] well guarded." 19 Apart from negating a
finding that Jimmy B. Abon was under the
custody of the school when he committed the act
for which the petitioners are sought to be held
liable, this circumstance shows that Jimmy B.
Abon was supposed to be working in the
armory with definite instructions from his
superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot
Napoleon Castro.

Petitioners also raise the issue that, under Art.

2180 of the Civil Code, a school which offers both
academic and technical/vocational courses
cannot be held liable for a tort committed by a
student enrolled only in its academic program;
however, considering that Jimmy B. Abon was
not in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon
Castro, the Court deems it unnecessary to pass
upon such other issue. 20

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is

hereby REVERSED in so far as it holds
petitioners solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon
for his tortious act in the killing of Napoleon
Castro. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento

and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 82465 February 25, 1991
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by
SPS. FERNANDO NANTES AND ROSARIO
LACANDULA, BENJAMIN ILUMIN, TIRSO DE
CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS, CONNIE ARQUIO
AND PATRIA CADIZ,petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
ELEVENTH DIVISION and DR. ROMULO
CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ, respondents.
Jose C. Flores, Jr. for petitioners.
Jovito E. Talabong for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision * of
the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision under
appeal is hereby affirmed, with the
following modifications: (1) Exemplary
damages in the amount of P20,000.00
are hereby awarded to plaintiffs, in
addition to the actual damages of
P30,000.00, moral damages of
P20,000.00 and attorney's fees in the
amount of P15,000.00 awarded to
plaintiffs in the decision under appeal;
(2) St. Francis High School, represented
by the Spouses Fernando Nantes and
Rosario Lacandula, and Benjamin
Illumin, are hereby held jointly and
severally liable with defendants Connie
Arquio, Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas
and Patria Cadis for the payment to
plaintiffs of the abovementioned actual
damages, moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney's fees, and for
costs; and (3) Defendants Yoly Jaro and
Nida Aragones are hereby absolved
from liability, and the case against
them, together with their respective
counterclaims, is hereby ordered
dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (p. 60, Rollo)
The complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo,
then a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St.
Francis High School, wanted to join a school
picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at
Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's
parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo
Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short
notice, did not allow their son to join but merely
allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the
picnic, with the directive that he should go back
home after doing so. However, because of
persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on
with them to the beach.
During the picnic and while the students,
including Ferdinand, were in the water, one of
the female teachers was apparently drowning.
Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came
to her rescue, but in the process, it was
Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was
recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore
failed. He was brought to a certain Dr. Luna in
Sariaya, Quezon and later to the Mt. Cannel
General Hospital where he was pronounced dead
on arrival.
Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a
complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 8834, in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch LVIII of Lucena City,
against the St. Francis High School, represented
by the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario
Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and
the teachers: Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas,
Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and
Patria Cadiz, for Damages which respondents
allegedly incurred from the death of their 13-
year old son, Ferdinand Castillo. Contending that
the death of their son was due to the failure of
the petitioners to exercise the proper diligence
of a good father of the family in preventing their
son's drowning, respondents prayed of actual,
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees
and expenses for litigation.
The trial court found in favor of the respondents
and against petitioners-teachers Arquio, de
Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro and Cadiz, ordering
all of them jointly and severally to pay
respondents the sum of P30,000.00 as actual
damages, P20,000.00 as moral damages,
P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the
costs. The court a quo reasoned:
Taking into consideration the evidence
presented, this Court believes that the
defendant teachers namely: Connie
Arquio, Luisito Vinas, Tirso de Chaves,
Yoly Jaro, Nida Aragones and Patria
Cadiz had failed to exercise the
diligence required of them by law
under the circumstances to guard
against the harm they had foreseen.
(pp. 2930, Rollo)
xxx xxx xxx
While it is alleged that when
defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida
Aragones arrived at the picnic site, the
drowning incident had already
occurred, such fact does not and cannot
excuse them from their liability. In fact,
it could be said that by coming late,
they were remiss in their duty to
safeguard the students. (p. 30,Rollo)
The students, young as they were then
(12 to 13 years old), were easily
attracted to the sea without
aforethought of the dangers it offers.
Yet, the precautions and reminders
allegedly performed by the defendants-
teachers definitely fell short of the
standard required by law under the
circumstances. While the defendants-
teachers admitted that some parts of
the sea where the picnic was held are
deep, the supposed lifeguards of the
children did not even actually go to the
water to test the depth of the particular
area where the children would swim.
And indeed the fears of the plaintiffs
that the picnic area was dangerous was
confirmed by the fact that three
persons during the picnic got drowned
at the same time. Had the defendant
teachers made an actual and physical
observation of the water before they
allowed the students to swim, they
could have found out that the area
where the children were swimming
was indeed dangerous. And not only
that, the male teachers who according
to the female teachers were there to
supervise the children to ensure their
safety were not even at the area where
the children were swimming. They
were somewhere and as testified to by
plaintiffs' witness they were having a
drinking spree. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the
case against the St. Francis High School,
Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna. Said the
court a quo:
As shown and adverted to above, this
Court cannot find sufficient evidence
showing that the picnic was a school
sanctioned one. Similarly no evidence
has been shown to hold defendants
Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna
responsible for the death of Ferdinand
Castillo together with the other
defendant teachers. It has been
sufficiently shown that Benjamin
Illumin had himself not consented to
the picnic and in fact he did not join it.
On the other hand, defendant Aurora
Cadorna had then her own class to
supervise and in fact she was not
amongst those allegedly invited by
defendant Connie Arquio to supervise
class I-C to which Ferdinand Castillo
belongs. (p. 30, Rollo)
Both petitioners and respondents appealed to
the Court of Appeals. Respondents-spouses
assigned the following errors committed by the
trial court:
1. The lower court erred in not
declaring the defendant St. Francis High
School and its administrator/principal
Benjamin Illumin as equally liable not
only for its approved co-curricular
activities but also for those which they
unreasonably failed to exercise control
and supervision like the holding of
picnic in the dangerous water of Talaan
Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.
2. The lower court erred in not
declaring the St. Francis High School
and principal Benjamin Illumin as
jointly and solidarily liable with their
co-defendants-teachers Rosario
Lacandula, et als., for the tragic death of
Ferdinand Castillo in a picnic at Talaan
Beach, Sariaya, Quezon, last March 20,
1982.
3. The lower court erred in not
declaring higher amount for actual and
moral damages for the untimely and
tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo in
favor of plaintiffs-appellants against all
the defendants. (pp. 56-57,Rollo)
The Court of Appeals ruled:
We find plaintiffs-appellants'
submission well-taken.
Even were We to find that the picnic in
question was not a school-sponsored
activity, nonetheless it cannot be
gainsaid that the same was held under
the supervision of the teachers
employed by the said school,
particularly the teacher in charge of
Class I-C to whom the victim belonged,
and those whom she invited to help her
in supervising the class during the
picnic. Considering that the court a
quo found negligence on the part of the
six defendants-teachers who, as such,
were charged with the supervision of
the children during the picnic, the St.
Francis High School and the school
principal, Benjamin Illumin, are liable
under Article 2176 taken together with
the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. They
cannot escape liability on the mere
excuse that the picnic was not an
"extra-curricular activity of the St.
Francis High School." We find from the
evidence that, as claimed by plaintiffs-
appellants, the school principal had
knowledge of the picnic even from its
planning stage and had even been
invited to attend the affair; and yet he
did not express any prohibition against
undertaking the picnic, nor did he
prescribe any precautionary measures
to be adopted during the picnic. At the
least, We must find that the school and
the responsible school officials,
particularly the principal, Benjamin
Illumin, had acquiesced to the holding
of the picnic.
Under Article 2180, supra, the
defendant school and defendant school
principal must be found jointly and
severally liable with the defendants-
teachers for the damages incurred by
the plaintiffs as a result of the death of
their son. It is the rule that in cases
where the above-cited provisions find
application, the negligence of the
employees in causing the injury or
damage gives rise to a presumption of
negligence on the part of the owner
and/or manager of the establishment
(in the present case, St. Francis High
School and its principal); and while this
presumption is not conclusive, it may
be overthrown only by clear and
convincing proof that the owner and/or
manager exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and/or supervision of the
employee or employees causing the
injury or damage (in this case, the
defendants-teachers). The record does
not disclose such evidence as would
serve to overcome the aforesaid
presumption and absolve the St.
Francis High School and its principal
from liability under the above-cited
provisions.
As to the third assigned error
interposed by plaintiffs-appellants,
while We cannot but commiserate with
the plaintiffs for the tragedy that befell
them in the untimely death of their son
Ferdinand Castillo and understand
their suffering as parents, especially the
victim's mother who, according to
appellants, suffered a nervous
breakdown as a result of the tragedy,
We find that the amounts fixed by the
court a quo as actual damages and
moral damages (P30,000.00 and
P20,000.00, respectively) are
reasonable and are those which are
sustained by the evidence and the law.
However, We believe that exemplary or
corrective damages in the amount of
P20,000.00 may and should be, as it is
hereby, imposed in the present case by
way of example of correction for the
public good, pursuant to Article 2229 of
the Civil Code. (pp. 57-59, Rollo)
On the other hand, petitioners-teachers assigned
the following errors committed by the trial
court:
1. ". . . in finding the defendants Connie
Arquio, Tirso de Chavez, Luisito Vinas,
Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro and Patria
Cadiz guilty of negligence and jointly
and severally liable for damages such
finding not being supported by facts
and evidence.
2. ". . . in dismissing the counterclaim
interposed by the defendants. (p.
59, Rollo)
On this score, respondent Court ruled:
The main thrust of defendants-
appellants appeal is that plaintiffs, the
parents of the victim Ferdinand
Castillo, were not able to prove by their
evidence that they did not give their
son consent to join the picnic in
question. However, We agree with the
trial court in its finding that whether or
not the victim's parents had given such
permission to their son was immaterial
to the determination of the existence of
liability on the part of the defendants
for the damage incurred by the
plaintiffs-appellants as a result of the
death of their son. What is material to
such a determination is whether or not
there was negligence on the part of
defendants vis-a-vis the supervision of
the victim's group during the picnic;
and, as correctly found by the trial
court, an affirmative reply to this
question has been satisfactorily
established by the evidence, as already
pointed out.
However, We sustain defendants-
appellants insofar as two of the
defendants-teachers, Yoly Jaro and
Nida Aragones, are concerned. As to
them, the trial court found:
While it is alleged that when
defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida
Aragones arrived at the picnic
site, the drowning incident
had already occurred, such
fact does not and cannot
excuse them from their
liability. In fact, it could be
said that by coming late, they
were remiss in their duty to
safeguard the students.
The evidence shows that these two
defendants had satisfactorily explained
why they were late in going to the
picnic site, namely, that they had to
 attend to the entrance examination
being conducted by the school which is
part of their duty as teachers thereof.
Since they were not at the picnic site
during the occurrence in question, it
cannot be said that they had any
participation in the negligence
attributable to the other defendants-
teachers who failed to exercise
diligence in the supervision of the
children during the picnic and which
failure resulted in the drowning of
plaintiffs' son. Thus, We may not
attribute any act or omission to the two
teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones,
as to make them liable for the injury
caused to the plaintiffs because of the
death of their son resulting from his
drowning at the picnic. Accordingly,
they must be absolved from any
liability.
As to the second assigned error raised
by defendants-appellants, We agree
with the court a quo that the
counterclaim must be dismissed for
lack of merit. (pp. 59-60, Rollo)
Hence, this petition.
The issues presented by petitioners are:
A) Whether or not there was negligence
attributable to the defendants which
will warrant the award of damages to
the plaintiffs;
B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation
to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is
applicable to the case at bar;
C) Whether or not the award of
exemplary and moral damages is
proper under the circumstances
surrounding the case at bar. (pp. 81-
82, Rollo)
In the resolution of January 16, 1989, We gave
due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The petition is impressed with merit.
If at all petitioners are liable for negligence, this
is because of their own negligence or the
negligence of people under them. In the instant
case however, as will be shown hereunder,
petitioners are neither guilty of their own
negligence or guilty of the negligence of those
under them.
Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all
of any negligence. Consequently they cannot be
held liable for damages of any kind.
At the outset, it should be noted that respondent
spouses, parents of the victim
Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the
excursion.
Testimony of Dr. Castillo on cross exam.
by Atty. Flores
Q Now, when your son asked
you for money to buy food,
did you not ask him where he
will bring this?
A I asked him where he was
going, he answered, I am
going to the picnic, and when I
asked him where, he did not
answer, sir.
Q And after giving the money,
you did not tell him anything
more?
A No more, sir.
Q And after that you just
learned that your son join the
picnic?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you came to know of it
after the news that your son
was drowned in the picnic
came to you, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q From 8:00 o'clock in the
morning up to 12:00 o'clock
noon of March 20, 1982, you
did not know that your son
join the picnic?
A No, sir, I did not know.
Q Did you not look for your
son during that time?
A I am too busy with my
profession, that is why I was
not able, sir.
Q You did not ask your wife?
A I did not, sir.
Q And neither did your wife
tell you that your son join the
picnic?
A Later on after 12:00, sir.
Q And during that time you
were too busy that you did
not inquire whether your son
have joined that picnic?
A Yes, sir.
(TSN, pp. 16-17, hearing of
April 2, 1984 witness Romulo
Castillo)
The fact that he gave money to his son to buy
food for the picnic even without knowing where
it will be held, is a sign of consent for his son to
join the same. Furthermore.
Testimony of Dr. Lazaro on cross
examination:
Q How did you conduct this
mental and physical
examination?
A I have interviewed several
persons and the patient herself
She even felt guilty about the
death of her son because she
cooked adobo for him so he
could join the excursion where
her son died of drowning.
Q Why were you able to say
she was feeling guilty because
she was the one who
personally cooked the adobo
for her son?
A It was during the interview
that I had gathered it from the
patient herself. She was very
sorry had she not allowed her
son to join the excursion her
son would have not drowned.
I don't know if she actually
permitted her son although
she said she cooked adobo so
he could join. (Emphasis
Supplied) (TSN, p. 19, hearing
of April 30, 1984, Dr. Lazaro
— witness).
Respondent Court of Appeals committed an
error in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code in
rendering petitioner school liable for the death
of respondent's son.
Article 2180, par. 4 states that:
 The obligation imposed by article 2176 committed while they are not in the performance A No, sir. Q Will you please describe
is demandable not only for one's own of their duties. how you applied a single act
acts or omissions, but also for those of Q You mean you were in calm of back to back pressure?
persons for whom one is responsible. Finally, no negligence could be attributable to and peaceful condition?
the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of A This has been done by
xxx xxx xxx damages to the respondents-spouses. A Yes, sir. placing the boy lay first
downwards, then the face was
Employers shall be liable for the Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I- a little bit facing right and
Q Despite the fact that the boy doing it by massaging the
damages caused by their employees C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her was no longer responding to
and household helpers acting within best and exercised diligence of a good father of a back of the child, sir." (TSN,
your application of first aid? pp. 32-35, hearing of July 30,
the scope of their assigned tasks, even family to prevent any untoward incident or
though the former are not engaged in damages to all the students who joined the 1984)
any business or industry. picnic. A Yes, sir.
Testimony of Tirso de Chavez on direct
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Q You have never been examination
employer may be held liable for the negligence of Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. disturbed, "nababahala" in the
his employee, the act or omission which caused instructors and scout masters who have process of your application of ATTY. FLORES:
damage or prejudice must have occurred while knowledge in First Aid application and the first aid on the body of
an employee was in the performance of his swimming. Moreover, even respondents' Ferdinand Castillo?
Q Who actually applied the
assigned tasks. witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that "the first aid or artificial
defendants (petitioners herein) had life savers A No, sir, because we were respiration to the child?
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were especially brought by the defendants in case of attending to the application of
not in the actual performance of their assigned emergency." (p. 85, Rollo) The records also show first aid that we were doing,
that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all sir. A Myself, sir.
tasks. The incident happened not within the
school premises, not on a school day and most what is humanly possible to save the child.
importantly while the teachers and students Q After you have applied back Q How did you apply the first
were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is Testimony of Luisito Vinas on cross examination, to back pressure and which aid to the guy?
clear from the beginning that the incident you claimed the boy did not
happened while some members of the I-C class of Q And when you saw the boy, respond, were you not disturb A The first step that I took,
St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Ferdinand Castillo, you anyway? with the help of Mr. Luisito
Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the approached the boy and claim Vinas, was I applied back to
school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin also having applied first aid A I was disturbed during that back pressure and took notice
because this picnic is not a school sanctioned on him? time, sir. of the condition of the child.
activity neither is it considered as an extra- We placed the feet in a higher
curricular activity. position, that of the head of
A Yes, sir. Q For how many minutes have the child, sir.
you applied the back to back
As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere pressure?
knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the Q And while you were Q After you have placed the
planning of the picnic by the students and their applying the so called first aid, boy in that particular position,
teachers does not in any way or in any manner the children were covering A From 9 to 11 times, sir. where the feet were on a
show acquiescence or consent to the holding of you up or were surrounding higher level than that of the
the same. The application therefore of Article you? Q You mean 9 to 11 times of head, what did you do next?
2180 has no basis in law and neither is it having applied the pressure of
supported by any jurisprudence. If we were to A Yes, sir. your body on the body of A The first thing that we did,
affirm the findings of respondent Court on this Ferdinand Castillo? particularly myself, was that
score, employers wig forever be exposed to the Q You were rattled at that after putting the child in that
risk and danger of being hailed to Court to time, is it not? A Yes, sir. position, I applied the back to
answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the back pressure and started to
employees even if such act or omission he massage from the waistline
 up, but I noticed that the boy
was not responding, sir.
Q For how long did you apply
this back to back pressure on
the boy?
A About 10 seconds, sir.
Q What about Mr. Vinas?
A Almost the same a little
longer, for 15 seconds, sir.
Q After you noticed that the
boy was not responding, what
did you do?
A When we noticed that the
boy was not responding, we
changed the position of the
boy by placing the child facing
upwards laying on the sand
then we applied the mouth to
mouth resuscitation, sir. (pp.
92-93, Rollo)
With these facts in mind, no moral nor
exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of
respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not
fall under any of the grounds to grant moral
damages.
Art. 2217. Moral Damages include
physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant's wrongful act or
omission.
Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove,
petitioners are not guilty of any fault or
negligence, hence, no moral damages can be
assessed against them.
While it is true that respondents-spouses did
give their consent to their son to join the picnic,
this does not mean that the petitioners were
already relieved of their duty to observe the
required diligence of a good father of a family in
ensuring the safety of the children. But in the
case at bar, petitioners were able to prove that
they had exercised the required diligence. Hence,
the claim for moral or exemplary damages
becomes baseless.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned
decision dated November 19, 1987, finding
petitioners herein guilty of negligence and liable
for the death of Ferdinand Castillo and awarding
the respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE
insofar as the petitioners herein are concerned,
but the portion of the said decision dismissing
their counterclaim, there being no merit, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I regret that I can not concur with the majority. I
believe that the reversal of respondent appellate
court's decision gives rise to a situation which
was neither contemplated nor intended by the
applicable laws. I refer more particularly to the
fact that the ponencia has left private
respondents-spouses with no one to hold liable
for the untimely demise of their son. On the
other hand, they have, to my mind, been
wronged. and they should at least be
recompensed for their sufferings. For this and
other reasons stated hereunder. I dissent.
The issues, as adopted by the ponencia from the
record, are as follows:
A) Whether or not there was negligence
attributable to the defendants which
will warrant the award of damages to
the plaintiffs;
B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation
to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is
applicable to the case at bar;
C) Whether or not the award of
exemplary and moral damages is
proper under the circumstances
surrounding the case at bar.1
In my opinion, the record clearly shows
negligence on the part of the petitioners-
teachers, with the exception of Aragones and
Jaro. As to these two, respondent court absolved
them from liability for their having satisfactorily
demonstrated lack of participation in the
negligence of their colleagues. I am in agreement
with said conclusion. But I also agree with the
respondent court in its finding that Tirso de
Chavez, Luisito Viñas, Connie Arguio and Patria
Cadiz failed to exercise DILIGENT SUPERVISION
over the children during the ill-fated excursion.
I may concede, albeit with reservation, that the
afore-mentioned petitioners may not have been
negligent in finding ways and means to revive
the young Castillo AFTER the drowning incident.
Their application of first-aid measures may have
failed to revive him but the petitioners had fully
exhausted their efforts to save the deceased. This
concession, however, is given with hesitation, for
there is indication in the record that petitioner
petitioners may have tarried too long in securing
immediate medical attention for the deceased. I
refer to the trial court's finding that "it still took
the jeep which brought Ferdinand Castillo to the
poblacion six (6) minutes before it finally moved
to await the other teachers."2
All this aside, I am really disturbed about, and
would like to emphasize the demonstrated lack
of diligence on the part of the petitioners-
teachers BEFORE the unfortunate incident took
place. Despite awareness that the waters in the
area were deep, petitioners- teachers did not
take concrete steps to make sure their wards did
not stray too far and too deeply. Even if they
were not actually informed of the possible
dangers which the area posed, petitioners-
teachers should have first "tested the waters", so
to speak, to ensure which parts thereof were safe
for swimming purposes. However, this was not
the case for as testified to by petitioner de
Chavez, "they admitted that they did not even go
to the water to check its depth although they
were aware that some parts of it were deep."3
At best, it appears that only oral safety
instructions were imparted to the young
excursionists.
But, what I find most disturbing is the fact that at
the time the trouble arose, Viñas and de Chavez,
the male teachers who were supposed to ensure
the children's safety, being physical education
instructors, were nowhere within the immediate
vicinity but were, in fact, as admitted by the
latter, "at his house getting some foods (sic) and
thinks." The Court a quo even went as far as to
say that "they were somewhere and as testified
to by plaintiffs' witness they were having a
drinking spree!"4
It thus appears that the petitioners-teachers
failed to exercise the proper diligence or what I
may refer to as DILIGENCE BEFORE THE FACT.
As earlier mentioned, the steps taken to revive
the deceased may be considered adequate,
despite my reservations, but the over-all lack of
diligence on the part of petitioners-teachers
suffices to put them within the standards set by
this Court in determining the existence of
negligence. As held in Hedy Gan y Yu vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., the test in determining whether or
not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or
property of another is this: Would a prudent man
in the position of the person to whom negligence
is attributed foresee harm to the person injured
as a reasonable consequence of the course about
to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty on
the doer TO TAKE PRECAUTION against its
mischievous results and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence.5
The next issue to be addressed pertains to the
liability of the petitioner St. Francis High School
as represented by petitioners-spouses Fernando
Nantes and Rosario Lacandula. The majority
would like to emphasize the fact that the
unfortunate incident having occurred during a
purely private affair, the teachers involved
therein were not in the actual performance of
their assigned tasks. Consequently, any act or
omission caused by them cannot bind their
employer, petitioner St. Francis High School.
I take exception to this proposition. Although the
excursion may not have been attended by the
appropriate school authorities, the presence or
stamp of authority of the school nevertheless
pervaded by reason of the participation not of
one but of several teachers, the petitioners. As
found by the court a quo, the excursion was an
activity "organized by the teachers themselves,
for the students and to which the student,
NATURALLY, acceded."6
Moreover, the record indicates that petitioner
Benjamin Illumin, school principal, knew of the
excursion and had, in fact, been invited to attend.
As the majority see it, such knowledge does not
in any manner show acquiescence or consent to
the holding of the excursion, a view which I do
not accept. It seems to me that having known of
the forthcoming activity, petitioner Illumin, as
school principal, should have taken appropriate
measures to ensure the safety of his students.
Having preferred to remain silent, and even
indifferent, he now seeks excuse from such
omission by invoking his alleged lack of consent
to the excursion. But it is precisely his silence
and negligence in performing his role as
principal head of the school that must be
construed as an implied consent to such activity.
As administrative head (principal) of St. Francis
High School, petitioner Illumin acted as the agent
of his principal (the school) or its
representatives, the petitioners-spouses Nantes
and Lacandula. Consequently, and as found by
the respondent court.1âwphi1 Article 2176 in Anent the issue of damages, from the foregoing
conjunction with Article 2180, paragraphs (1) discussion the award thereof is clearly proper. I
and (5) are applicable to the situation. In the only wish to point out the basis for moral
application of these provisions, the negligence of damages which is found in Article 2219 of the
the employee in causing injury or damage gives Civil Code, to wit:
rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of
the owner and/or manager of the establishment. Moral damages may be recovered in
While this presumption is not conclusive, it may the following and analogous cases:
be overcome only by clear and convincing
evidence that the owner and/or manager
exercised the care and diligence of a good father 1. . . . .
of a family in the selection and/or supervision of
the employees causing the injury or damage. I 2. Quasi-delicts causing physical
agree with the respondent court that no proof injuries;
was presented to absolve the owner and/or
manager, herein petitioners-spouses Nantes and xxx xxx xxx
Lacandula, and Illumin. Thus, as correctly held
by the respondent court, they too must be
accountable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo. It should be noted that the term "physical
injuries" must not be construed in its penal sense
alone but rather in its generic sense, in the spirit
The majority view appears to be apprehensive of this Court's rulings in Carandang vs.
that employers will be continuously held Santiago (51 O.G. 2878) and Madeja vs. Caro, et
accountable for misdeeds of their employees al., (G.R. No. 51183, 21 December 1983, 126
committed even when the same are done not in SCRA 293). Thus, the death of private
the actual exercise of their duties. I fail to respondents' son as a result of petitioners'
appreciate such apprehensions, which need not negligence gives rise to an action for quasi-delict
arise on the part of employers, so long as the which, as provided, entitles the claimant to an
latter have no knowledge of, or give consent to,
award of moral damages.
such act or omission on the part of their
employee.
In the light of the foregoing, I vote to AFFIRM the
decision of the respondent court and thus hold
Educational institutions have responsibilities the petitioners jointly and severally liable for the
which cannot be equated with those of the death of Ferdinand Castillo.
ordinary employer or business establishment.
Such institutions, particularly the primary and
secondary schools, hold the tremendous Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
responsibility of exercising supervision over
young children. Too often, such schools avoid
liabilities, as in the instant cage, by invoking the
absence of approval on their part for activities
that may be held outside school premises or held
on a day not a school day. It is about time that
such schools realize that theirs is not a mere
moneymaking entity or one impersonally
established for the sole task of teaching the
rudimentary skills of "reading, writing and
'rithmetic." They must consider that their
students are children of tender years who are in
need of adequate care, continuing attention and
guidance.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P.
PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL.
PEDRO SACRO and LT. M.
SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-
BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge
of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila,
SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D.
BAUTISTA, respondents.
Balgos and Perez for petitioners.
Collantes, Ramirez & Associates for private
respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which
caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on
the second-floor premises of the Philippine
School of Business Administration (PSBA)
prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit
in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 47)
presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals
justice) Regina Ordoñez-Benitez, for damages
against the said PSBA and its corporate officers.
At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in
the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It
was established that his assailants were not
members of the school's academic community
but were elements from outside the school.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the
following school authorities: Juan D. Lim
(President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-
President), Antonio M. Magtalas
(Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of
Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of
Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now
private respondents) sought to adjudge them
liable for the victim's untimely demise due to
their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of
security precautions, means and methods before,
during and after the attack on the victim. During
the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated
his relationship with the other petitioners by
resigning from his position in the school.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to
have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they
are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of
action against them, as jurisprudence on the
subject is to the effect that academic institutions,
such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the
rule in the afore-stated article.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled
petitioners' contention and thru an order dated 8
December 1987, denied their motion to dismiss.
A subsequent motion for reconsideration was
similarly dealt with by an order dated 25 January
1988. Petitioners then assailed the trial court's
disposition before the respondent appellate
court which, in a decision * promulgated on 10
June 1988, affirmed the trial court's orders. On
22 August 1988, the respondent appellate court
resolved to deny the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
At the outset, it is to be observed that the
respondent appellate court primarily anchored
its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as
enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code. 1 Pertinent portions of the appellate
court's now assailed ruling state:
Article 2180 (formerly Article
1903) of the Civil Code is an
adoption from the old Spanish
Civil Code. The comments of
Manresa and learned
authorities on its meaning
should give way to present
day changes. The law is not
fixed and flexible (sic); it must
be dynamic. In fact, the
greatest value and
significance of law as a rule of
conduct in (sic) its flexibility
to adopt to changing social
conditions and its capacity to
meet the new challenges of
progress.
Construed in the light of
modern day educational
system, Article 2180 cannot
be construed in its narrow
concept as held in the old case
of Exconde
vs. Capuno 2 and Mercado
vs. Court of Appeals;3 hence,
the ruling in the Palisoc 4 case
that it should apply to all
kinds of educational
institutions, academic or
vocational.
At any rate, the law holds the
teachers and heads of the
school staff liable unless they
relieve themselves of such
liability pursuant to the last
paragraph of Article 2180 by
"proving that they observed
all the diligence to prevent
damage." This can only be
done at a trial on the merits of
the case. 5
While we agree with the respondent appellate
court that the motion to dismiss the complaint
was correctly denied and the complaint should
be tried on the merits, we do not however agree
with the premises of the appellate court's ruling.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco
parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in
the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza,
Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court
of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had been
stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly
provides that the damage should have been
caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he
educational institution sought to be held liable
for the acts of its pupils or students while in its
custody. However, this material situation does
not exist in the present case for, as earlier
indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not
students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school
could be made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to
consider such material facts mean the
exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It
does not necessarily follow.
When an academic institution accepts students
for enrollment, there is established
a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to
comply with. 7 For its part, the school undertakes
to provide the student with an education that
would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school's
academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the
implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their
students with an atmosphere that promotes or
assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can
absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and
other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there
looms around the school premises a constant
threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school
must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus
premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case
evince a contractual relation between the PSBA
and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do
not really govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176
shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts
or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. However, this impression has not
prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there obtains a
contract. In Air France vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil.
722), the private respondent was awarded
damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a
first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is
noted, however, that the Court referred to the
petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from
tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage.
In effect, Air Franceis authority for the view that
liability from tort may exist even if there is a
contract, for the act that breaks the contract may
be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs.
Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even
as early as 1918, this Court was already of a
similar mind. InCangco vs. Manila Railroad (38
Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual
obligation is much broader
than that of contractual
obligation, comprising, as it
does, the whole extent of
juridical human relations.
These two fields, figuratively
speaking, concentric; that is to
say, the mere fact that a
person is bound to another by
contract does not relieve him
from extra-contractual
liability to such person. When
such a contractual relation
exists the obligor may break
the contract under such
conditions that the same act
which constitutes a breach of
the contract would have
constituted the source of an
extra-contractual obligation
had no contract existed
between the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter
of the Civil Code on Human Relations,
particularly Article 21, which provides:
Any person
who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to
morals, good custom or public
policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
(emphasis supplied).
Air France penalized the racist policy of the
airline which emboldened the petitioner's
employee to forcibly oust the private respondent
to cater to the comfort of a white man who
allegedly "had a better right to the seat."
InAustro-American, supra, the public
embarrassment caused to the passenger was the
justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals,
(Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that
should the act which breaches a contract be done
in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then
there is a cause to view the act as constituting a
quasi-delict.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar,
however, there is, as yet, no finding that the
contract between the school and Bautista had
been breached thru the former's negligence in
providing proper security measures. This would
be for the trial court to determine. And, even if
there be a finding of negligence, the same could
give rise generally to a breach of contractual
obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra,
the negligence of the school would not be
relevant absent a contract. In fact, that
negligence becomes material only because of the
contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista.
In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to the school's liability.
The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set
out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant
difficulties posed by the obligation of schools,
above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like
a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its
students against all risks. This is specially true in
the populous student communities of the so-
called "university belt" in Manila where there
have been reported several incidents ranging
from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It
would not be equitable to expect of schools to
anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their
premises, for notwithstanding the security
measures installed, the same may still fail against
an individual or group determined to carry out a
nefarious deed inside school premises and
environs. Should this be the case, the school may
still avoid liability by proving that the breach of
its contractual obligation to the students was not
due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to
be the omission of that degree of diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of persons,
time and place. 9
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence
on the substance of the private respondents'
complaint, the record is bereft of all the material
facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court
can make such a determination from the
evidence still to unfold.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises
considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of
origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to
continue proceedings consistent with this ruling
of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Regalado and Nocon, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines of said school performing his Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice xxx xxx xxx
SUPREME COURT duties and obligations as a of the school.
Manila duly appointed security guard The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis
under the employment, In an order dated 29 November 1983, for holding the Colleges liable for the alleged
THIRD DIVISION supervision and control of his respondent Judge granted private respondent wrongful acts of security guard Jimmy B.
employer-defendant R.L. school's motion to dismiss, holding that security Solomon inflicted upon petitioner Soliman, Jr.
SECURITY AGENCY, INC., guard Jimmy Solomon was not an employee of Private respondent school was not the employer
headed by Mr. Benjamin the school which accordingly could not be held of Jimmy Solomon. The employer of Jimmy
Serrano, without any liable for his acts or omissions. Petitioner moved Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while
G.R. No. 66207 May 18, 1992 provocation, in a wanton, for reconsideration, without success. the school was the client or customer of the R.L.
fraudulent, reckless, Security Agency Inc. It is settled that where the
MAXIMINO SOLIMAN, JR., represented by his oppressive or malevolent security agency, as here, recruits, hires and
manner, with intent to kill, In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, it
judicial guardian VIRGINIA C. is contended that respondent trial judge assigns the work of its watchmen or security
SOLIMAN, petitioner, attack, assault, strike and guards, the agency is the employer of such
shoot the plaintiff on the committed a grave abuse of discretion when he
vs. refused to apply the provisions of Article 2180, guards or watchmen. 2 Liability for illegal or
HON. JUDGE RAMON TUAZON, Presiding abdomen with a .38 Caliber harmful acts committed by the security guards
Revolver, a deadly weapon, as well as those of Articles 349, 350 and 352, of
Judge of Branch LXI, Regional Trial Court of the Civil Code and granted the school's motion to attaches to the employer agency, and not to the
Region III, Angeles City, and the REPUBLIC which ordinarily such wound clients or customers of such agency. 3 As a
sustained would have caused dismiss.
CENTRAL COLLEGES, represented by its general rule, a client or customer of a security
President, respondents. plaintiff's death were it not agency has no hand in selecting who among the
for the timely medical Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the pool of security guards or watchmen employed
assistance given to him. The obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to
Mariano Y. Navarro for Republic Central Colleges. plaintiff was treated and against another by fault or negligence exists not observe the diligence of a good father of a family
confined at Angeles Medical only for one's own act or omission, but also for in the selection of the guards cannot, in the
RESOLUTION Center, Angeles City, and, as acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by ordinary course of events, be demanded from the
per doctor's opinion, the law responsible. Among the persons held client whose premises or property are protected
plaintiff may not be able to vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of by the security guards. The fact that a client
attend to his regular classes another person are the following: company may give instructions or directions to
and will be incapacitated in the security guards assigned to it, does not, by
FELICIANO, J.: the performance of his usual xxx xxx xxx itself, render the client responsible as an
work for a duration of from employer of the security guards concerned and
On 22 March 1983, petitioner Soliman, Jr. filed a three to four months before liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those
civil complaint for damages against private his wounds would be Employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their instructions or directions are ordinarily no more
respondent Republic Central Colleges completely healed. 1 than requests commonly envisaged in the
("Colleges"), the R.L. Security Agency Inc. and employees and household
helpers acting within the contract for services entered into with the
one Jimmy B. Solomon, a security guard, as Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to security agency. There being no employer-
defendants. The complaint alleged that: scope of their assigned tasks,
dismiss, contending that the complaint stated no even though the former are employee relationship between the Colleges and
cause of action against it. Private respondent not engaged in any business Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student cannot
. . . on 13 August 1982, in the argued that it is free from any liability for the or industry. impose vicarious liability upon the Colleges for
morning thereof, while the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the the acts of security guard Solomon.
plaintiff was in the campus reason that private respondent school was not
ground and premises of the the employer of the security guard charged, xxx xxx xxx
Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon
defendant, REPUBLIC Jimmy Solomon, and hence was not responsible was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of
CENTRAL COLLEGES, as he for any wrongful act of Solomon. Private Lastly, teachers or heads of the Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the
was and is still a regular respondent school further argued that Article establishments of arts and R.L. Security Agency Inc., the other above-quoted
enrolled student of said 2180, 7th paragraph, of the Civil Code did not trades shall be liable for paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
school taking his morning apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and damages caused by their similarly not available for imposing liability upon
classes, the defendant, JIMMY heads of establishment of arts and trades liable pupils, their students or the Republic Central Colleges for the acts or
B. SOLOMON, who was on said for damages caused by their pupils and students apprentices, so long as they omissions of Jimmy Solomon.
date and hour in the premises or apprentices, while security guard Jimmy remain in their custody.
The relevant portions of the other Articles of the
Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows:
Art. 349. The following
persons shall exercise
substitute parental authority:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Teachers and professors;
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Directors of trade
establishments with regard to
apprentices;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 350. The persons named
in the preceding article shall
exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct
of the child.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 352. The relations
between teacher and pupil,
professor and student are
fixed by government
regulations and those of each
school or institution. In no
case shall corporal
punishment be countenanced.
The teacher or professor shall
cultivate the best
potentialities of the heart and
mind of the pupil or student.
In Palisoc v. Brillantes, 4 invoked by petitioner,
the Court held the owner and president of a
school of arts and trades known as the "Manila
Technical Institute," Quezon Blvd., Manila,
responsible in damages for the death of
Dominador Palisoc, a student of Institute, which
resulted from fist blows delivered by Virgilio L.
Daffon, another student of the Institute. It will be established
seen that the facts of Palisoc v. Brillantes brought a contract between them,
it expressly within the 7th paragraph of Article resulting in bilateral
2180, quoted above; but those facts are entirely obligations which parties are
different from the facts existing in the instant bound to comply with. For its
case. part, the school undertakes to
provide the student with an
Persons exercising substitute parental authority education that would
presumably suffice to equip
are made responsible for damage inflicted upon
a third person by the child or person subject to him with the necessary tools
such substitute parental authority. In the instant and skills to pursue higher
case, as already noted, Jimmy Solomon who education or a profession. On
committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in the other hand, the student
injury to petitioner, was not a pupil, student or covenants to abide by the
apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the school's academic
requirements and observe its
school had no substitute parental authority over
Solomon. rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must
Clearly, within the confines of its limited
logic, i.e., treating the petitioner's claim as one also meet the implicit or
"built-in" obligation of
based wholly and exclusively on Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, the order of the respondent trial providing their students with
an atmosphere that promotes
judge was correct. Does it follow, however, that
respondent Colleges could not be held liable or assists in attaining its
primary undertaking of
upon any other basis in law, for or in respect of
the injury sustained by petitioner, so as to entitle imparting knowledge.
Certainly, no student can
respondent school to dismissal of petitioner's
complaint in respect of itself? absorb the intricacies of
physics or higher
mathematics or explore the
The very recent case of the Philippine School of realm of the arts and other
Business Administration (PSBA) v. Court of sciences when bullets are
Appeals, 5 requires us to give a negative answer flying or grenades exploding
to that question. in the air or where there
looms around the school
In PSBA, the Court held that Article 2180 of the premises a constant threat to
Civil Code was not applicable where a student life and limb. Necessarily, the
had been injured by one who was an outsider or school must ensure that
by one over whom the school did not exercise adequate steps are taken to
any custody or control or supervision. At the maintain peace and order
same time, however, the Court stressed that an within the campus premises
implied contract may be held to be established and to prevent the breakdown
between a school which accepts students for thereof. 6
enrollment, on the one hand, and the students
who are enrolled, on the other hand, which In that case, the Court was careful to point out
contract results in obligations for both parties: that:
When an academic institution
In the circumstances
accepts students for obtaining in the case at bar,
enrollment, there is
however, there is, as yet, no
finding that the contract
between the school and
Bautista had been breached
thru the former's negligence
in providing proper security
measures. This would be for
the trial court to determine.
And, even if there be a finding
of negligence, the same could
give rise generally to a breach
of contractual obligation only.
Using the test
of Cangco, supra, the
negligence of the school
would not be relevant absent
a contract. In fact, that
negligence becomes material
only because of the
contractual relation between
PSBA and Bautista. In other
words, a contractual relation
is a condition sine qua non to
the school's liability. The
negligence of the school
cannot exist independently of
the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Court is not unmindful of
the attendant difficulties
posed by the obligation of
schools, above-mentioned, for
conceptually a school, like a
common carrier, cannot be an
insurer of its students
against all risks. This is
specially true in the populous
student communities of the
so-called "university belt" in
Manila where there have been
reported several incidents
ranging from gang wars to
other forms of hooliganism. It
would not be equitable to
expect of schools to anticipate
all types of violent trespass
upon their premises, for
notwithstanding the security
 measures installed, the same ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT
may still fail against an DUE COURSE to the Petition, to TREAT the
individual or group comment of respondent Colleges as its answer,
determined to carry out a and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order dated
nefarious deed inside school 29 November 1983. This case is REMANDED to
premises and environs. the court a quo for further proceedings
Should this be the case, the consistent with this Resolution.
school may still avoid liability
by proving that the breach of Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ.,
its contractual obligation to concur.
the students was not due to
its negligence, here statutorily
defined to be the omission of
that degree of diligence which
is required by the nature of
obligation and corresponding
to the circumstances of
person, time and place. 7

In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the

school's motion to dismiss the complaint against
it, and both the Court of Appeals and this Court
affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at bar,
the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss
filed by respondent Colleges, upon the
assumption that petitioner's cause of action was
based, and could have been based, only on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. As PSBA, however,
states, acts which are tortious or allegedly
tortious in character may at the same time
constitute breach of a contractual, or other legal,
obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious
error when he supposed that petitioner could
have no cause of action other than one based on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial
judge should not have granted the motion to
dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of
justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts
constituting breach of an obligation ex
contractu or ex lege on the part of respondent
Colleges.

In line, therefore, with the most recent

jurisprudence of this Court, and in order to avoid
a possible substantial miscarriage of justice, and
putting aside technical considerations, we
consider that respondent trial judge committed
serious error correctible by this Court in the
instant case.
SECOND DIVISION The antecedent facts are as follows: On July 31, 2000, petitioners dismissed and/or Sister Crispina
respondent on the ground of gross negligence Tolentino[,] NLRC NCR Case
SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY and/or G.R. No. 165565 resulting to loss of trust and No. 00-07-03877-01[,] NLRC
SR.CRISPINA A. TOLENTINO, S.Sp.S., Respondent Corazon P. Taguiam was the Class confidence.[9] Meanwhile, Chiara Maes parents NCR CA No. 031627-02 is
Adviser of Grade 5-Esmeralda of the petitioner, filed a P7 Million damage suit against petitioners hereby REVERSED and SET
Petitioners, School of the Holy Spirit of Quezon
Present: and respondent, among others. They also filed ASIDE, and a new one is
City. On March 10, 2000, the class president, against respondent a criminal complaint for hereby ENTERED directing
wrote a letter[5] to the grade school principal reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. the private respondent the
requesting permission to hold a year-end School of the Holy Spirit to:
celebration at the J.,school
QUISUMBING, grounds. The principal
Chairperson,
authorized the activity and allowed the pupils to On July 25, 2001, respondent in turn filed a
(1) Pay the
use CARPIO
the swimming
MORALES,pool. In this connection, complaint[10] against the school and/or
petitioner full
respondent distributed the parents/guardians Sr.Crispina Tolentino for illegal dismissal, with a
backwages, plus
permit forms to the pupils.
TINGA, prayer for reinstatement with full backwages
all other
and other money claims, damages and attorneys
benefits,
- versus - VELASCO, JR., and fees.
Respondent admitted that Chiara Mae bonuses and
Federicos permit form[6] was general
BRION, JJ.
unsigned.Nevertheless, she concluded In dismissing the complaint, the Labor increases to
that Chiara Mae was allowed by her mother to Arbiter declared that respondent was validly which she
join the activity since her mother personally terminated for gross neglect of duty. He opined would have
brought her to the school with her packed lunch
Promulgated: that Chiara Mae drowned because respondent been normally
and swimsuit. had left the pupils without any adult entitled, had
CORAZON P. TAGUIAM, supervision. He also noted that the absence of she not been
adequate facilities should have alerted dismissed and
Respondent. Before
July the activity started, respondent warned
14, 2008 respondent before allowing the pupils to use the had she not
the pupils who did not know how to swim to swimming pool. The Labor Arbiter further been forced to
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - avoid the deeper area. However, while the pupils concluded that although respondents negligence stop working
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -x were swimming, two of them sneaked was not habitual, the same warranted her computed up to
out. Respondent went after them to verify where dismissal since death resulted therefrom. the finality of
they were going. this decision;
DECISION
Respondent appealed to the NLRC (2) Pay the
QUISUMBING, J.: Unfortunately, while respondent was which, however, affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner
away, Chiara Mae drowned. When respondent complaint. separation pay
returned, the maintenance man was already equivalent to
administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation one (1) month
This petition assails the Decision[1] dated June 7, on Chiara Mae. She was still alive when Aggrieved, respondent instituted a
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. for every year
respondent rushed her to petition for certiorari before the Court of of service in
81480, which reversed the the General MalvarHospital where she was Appeals, which ruled in her favor. The appellate
Resolution[2] dated September 20, 2002 of the addition to full
pronounced dead on arrival. court observed that there was insufficient proof backwages;
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in that respondents negligence was both gross and
NLRC NCR CA No. 031627-02. The NLRC had habitual. The Court of Appeals disposed, thus: (3) Pay the
affirmed the Decision[3] dated March 26, 2002 of On May 23, 2000, petitioners issued a Notice of
petitioner an
the Labor Arbiter dismissing respondents Administrative Charge[7] to respondent for
WHEREFORE, the amount
complaint for illegal dismissal. This petition alleged gross negligence and required her to
Court hereby GRANTS the equivalent to
likewise assails the submit her written explanation. Thereafter,
petition. The assailed 10% of the
Resolution[4] dated September 30, 2004 of the petitioners conducted a clarificatory hearing
September 20, 2002 judgment
Court of Appeals denying petitioners motion for which respondent attended. Respondent also
Resolution of the National award as
reconsideration. submitted her Affidavit of Explanation.[8] Labor Relations Commission attorneys fees;
entitled Corazon Taguiam vs.
School of the Holy Spirit
 (4) Pay the cost of
this suit.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In this petition, petitioners contend
that the Court of Appeals erred in:
REVERSING AND SETTING
ASIDE THE DECISION AND
RESOLUTION OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE LABOR ARBITER
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
FOR LACK OF MERIT.[12]
Simply stated, the sole issue presented
for our resolution is whether respondents
dismissal on the ground of gross negligence
resulting to loss of trust and confidence was
valid.
The issue of whether a party is
negligent is a question of fact. As a rule, the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and this
applies with greater force in labor
cases.[13]However, where the issue is shrouded
by a conflict of factual perception, we are
constrained to review the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals. In this case, the findings of
facts of the appellate court contradict those of
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.[14]
Under Article 282[15] of the Labor Code,
gross and habitual neglect of duties is a valid
ground for an employer to terminate an
employee. Gross negligence implies a want or
absence of or a failure to exercise slight care or
diligence, or the entire absence of care.It evinces
a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them.[16] Habitual
neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones
duties for a period of time, depending upon the
circumstances.[17]
Our perusal of the records leads us to
conclude that respondent had been grossly
negligent. First, it is undisputed that Chiara Maes
permit form was unsigned. Yet, respondent
allowed her to join the activity because she
assumed that Chiara Maes mother has allowed
her to join it by personally bringing her to the
school with her packed lunch and swimsuit.
The purpose of a permit form is
precisely to ensure that the parents have allowed
their child to join the school activity
involved. Respondent cannot simply ignore this
by resorting to assumptions. Respondent
admitted that she was around when Chiara Mae
and her mother arrived. She could have
requested the mother to sign the permit form
before she left the school or at least called her up
to obtain her conformity.
Second, it was respondents
responsibility as Class Adviser to supervise her
class in all activities sanctioned by the
school.[18] Thus, she should have coordinated
with the school to ensure that proper safeguards,
such as adequate first aid and sufficient adult
personnel, were present during their
activity. She should have been mindful of the fact
that with the number of pupils involved, it would
be impossible for her by herself alone to keep an
eye on each one of them.
As it turned out, since respondent was
the only adult present, majority of the pupils
were left unsupervised when she followed the
two pupils who sneaked out. In the light of the
odds involved, respondent should have
considered that those who sneaked out could not
have left the school premises since there were
guards manning the gates. The guards would not
have allowed them to go out in their swimsuits
and without any adult accompanying them. But
those who stayed at the pool were put at greater
risk, when she left them unattended by an adult.
Notably, respondents negligence,
although gross, was not habitual. In view of the
considerable resultant damage, however, we are
in agreement that the cause is sufficient to dismiss
respondent. This is not the first time that we have
departed from the requirements laid down by the
law that neglect of duties must be both gross and
habitual. In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC,[19] we
ruled that Philippine Airlines (PAL) cannot be
legally compelled to continue with the
employment of a person admittedly guilty of gross
negligence in the performance of his duties
although it was his first offense. In that case, we
noted that a mere delay on PALs flight schedule
due to aircraft damage entails problems like hotel
accommodations for its passengers, re-booking,
the possibility of law suits, and payment of special
landing fees not to mention the soaring costs of
replacing aircraft parts.[20] In another
case, Fuentes v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[21] we held that it would be unfair to
compel Philippine Banking Corporation to
continue employing its bank teller. In that case, we
observed that although the tellers infraction was
not habitual, a substantial amount of money was
lost. The deposit slip had already been validated
prior to its loss and the amount reflected thereon
is already considered as current liabilities in the
banks balance sheet.[22] Indeed, the sufficiency of
the evidence as well as the resultant damage to
the employer should be considered in the
dismissal of the employee. In this case, the
damage went as far as claiming the life of a child.
As a result of gross negligence in the
present case, petitioners lost its trust and
confidence in respondent. Loss of trust and
confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal
must be based on a willful breach of trust and
founded on clearly established facts. A breach is
willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and
purposely, without justifiable excuse, as
distinguished from an act done carelessly,
thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently.[23] Otherwise stated, it must rest
on substantial grounds and not on the employers
arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion;
otherwise, the employee would eternally remain
at the mercy of the employer. It should
be genuine and not simulated; nor should it
appear as a mere afterthought to justify earlier
action taken in bad faith or a subterfuge for
causes which are improper, illegal or
unjustified. It has never been intended to afford
an occasion for abuse because of its subjective
nature. There must, therefore, be an actual
breach of duty committed by the employee
which must be established by substantial
evidence.[24]
As a teacher who stands in
loco parentis to her pupils, respondent should
have made sure that the children were protected
from all harm while in her
company.[25]Respondent should have known that
leaving the pupils in the swimming pool area all
by themselves may result in an accident. A
simple reminder not to go to the deepest part of
the pool[26] was insufficient to cast away all the
serious dangers that the situation presented to
the children, especially when respondent knew
that Chiara Mae cannot swim.[27] Dismally,
respondent created an unsafe situation which
exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to
real danger. This is a clear violation not only of
the trust and confidence reposed on her by the
parents of the pupils but of the school itself.
Finally, we note that based on the
criminal complaint filed by Chiara Maes parents,
the Assistant City Prosecutor found probable
cause to indict respondent for the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The
Assistant City Prosecutor held that respondent
should have foreseen the danger lurking in the
waters. By leaving her pupils in the swimming
pool, respondent displayed an inexcusable lack of
foresight and precaution.[28] While this finding is
not controlling for purposes of the instant case,
this only supports our conclusion that respondent
has indeed been grossly negligent.
All told, there being a clear showing
that respondent was culpable for gross
negligence resulting to loss of trust and
confidence, her dismissal was valid and legal. It
was error for the Court of Appeals to reverse and
set aside the resolution of the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 7,
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
81480 is SET ASIDE. The Resolution
dated September 20, 2002 of the National Labor
Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No.
031627-02 is REINSTATED. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines his group mates who moved it well as other expenses
Supreme Court close and towards the eye of incidental thereto, which the
Manila This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set [Jayson]. At that instance, the latter failed to heed. Hence,
aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) compound in the test tube [Jayson] was constrained to
in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367, which affirmed in spurted out and several file the complaint for
SECOND DIVISION toto the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court particles of which hit damages. [Petitioners],
(RTC), Branch 221, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. [Jaysons] eye and the therefore, should likewise
Q-95-22889. different parts of the bodies of compensate [Jayson] for
some of his group mates. As a litigation expenses, including
ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and G.R. No. 182353 result thereof, [Jaysons] eyes attorneys fees.
ROSALINDA TABUGO, were chemically burned,
The facts, as found by the CA, follow: particularly his left eye, for
Petitioners, Present: which he had to undergo
surgery and had to spend for On the other hand,
his medication. Upon filing of [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini
this case [in] the lower court, Ambatali, SFIC, and Tabugo]
CARPIO, J., [Jaysons] wound had not alleged that [Jayson] was a
completely healed and still grade six pupil of SJC in the
Chairperson, had to undergo another school year 1994-1995. On
On November 17, 1994, at surgery. November 17, 1994, at about
- versus - NACHURA,
around 1:30 in the afternoon 1:30 in the afternoon, the
inside St. Joseph Colleges class to which [Jayson]
PERALTA,
[SJCs] premises, the class to belong[s] was conducting a
which [respondent Jayson Val Upon learning of the incident science experiment under the
ABAD, and belonged
Miranda] was and because of the need for guidance and supervision of
conducting a science finances, [Jaysons] mother, Tabugo, the class science
MENDOZA, JJ.
experiment about fusion of who was working abroad, had teacher, about fusion of
sulphur powder and iron to rush back home for which sulphur powder and iron
JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father, RODOLFO S. fillings under the tutelage of
she spent P36,070.00 for her fillings by combining these
MIRANDA, [petitioner] Rosalinda fares and had to forego her elements in a test tube and
Promulgated:
Tabugo, she being the subject salary from November 23, heating the same. Before the
Respondent. teacher and employee of 1994 to December 26, 1994, science experiment was
[petitioner] SJC. The adviser in the amount of at conducted, [Jayson] and his
of [Jaysons] class is x x x leastP40,000.00. classmates were given strict
June 29, Abdan.
Estefania 2010
instructions to follow the
written procedure for the
experiment and not to look
x------------------------------------------------------------------- Then, too, [Jayson] and his into the test tube until the
Tabugo left her class while it parents suffered sleepless heated compound had cooled
-----------------x was doing the experiment nights, mental anguish and off. [Jayson], however, a
without having adequately wounded feelings as a result person of sufficient age and
secured it from any untoward of his injury due to discretion and completely
incident or occurrence. In the [petitioners] fault and failure capable of understanding the
middle of the experiment, to exercise the degree of care English language and the
[Jayson], who was the and diligence incumbent upon instructions of his teacher,
DECISION
assistant leader of one of the each one of them. Thus, they without waiting for the heated
class groups, checked the should be held liable for compound to cool off, as
result of the experiment by moral damages. Also, [Jayson] required in the written
NACHURA, J.: looking into the test tube with sent a demand letter to procedure for the experiment
magnifying glass. The test [petitioners] for the payment and as repeatedly explained
tube was being held by one of of his medical expenses as by the teacher, violated such
instructions and took a arising from the accident [Jayson] is [Jayson]
magnifying glass and looked caused by the science ordered to the sum
at the compound, which at experiment. In a letter dated reimburse of P30,000.
that moment spurted out of December 14, 1994, the [petitioner] 00 as
the test tube, a small particle counsel for SJC, represented St. Joseph reasonable
hitting one of [Jaysons] eyes. by Sr. Josephini Ambatali, College the attorneys
SFIC, explained that the amount fees;
school cannot accede to the ofP26,176.
demand because the accident 36
Jayson was rushed by the occurred by reason of representi
school employees to the [Jaysons] failure to comply ng the 4. To pay the
school clinic and thereafter with the written procedure advances costs of suit.
transferred to St. for the experiment and his given to
Lukes Medical Center for teachers repeated warnings pay
treatment. At the hospital, and instruction that no [Jaysons]
when Tabago visited [Jayson], student must face, much less initial SO ORDERED.[4]
the latter cried and look into, the opening of the hospital
apologized to his teacher for test tube until the heated expenses
violating her instructions not compound has cooled.[3] or in the
to look into the test tube until alternative Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA.
the compound had cooled off. to deduct However, as previously adverted to, the CA
said affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, thus:
Since SJC did not accede to the demand, amount
Rodolfo, Jaysons father, on Jaysons behalf, sued of P26,176.
After the treatment, [Jayson] petitioners for damages. 36 from
was pronounced ready for theP77,338 WHEREFORE, in view of the
discharge and an eye test After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, to wit: .25 actual foregoing, the assailed
showed that his vision had damages decision of the RTC of Quezon
not been impaired or affected. herein City, Branch 221 dated
In order to avoid additional awarded September 6, 2000 is
hospital charges due to the WHEREFORE, premises by way of hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
delay in [Jaysons] discharge, considered, judgment is legal Costs against [petitioners].[5]
Rodolfo S. Miranda, [Jaysons] hereby rendered in favor of compensati
father, requested SJC to [Jayson] and against on;
advance the amount [petitioners]. This Court
of P26,176.35 representing orders and holds the
[Jaysons] hospital bill until his [petitioners] joint[ly] and
wife could arrive from abroad solidarily liable to pay Undaunted, petitioners appealed` by certiorari to
2. T
and pay back the money. SJC [Jayson] the following this Court, adamant that the CA grievously erred,
o pay
acceded to the request. amount: thus:
[Jayson]
the sum
of P50,000.
00 as I. THE COURT OF APPEALS
On December 6, 1994, 1. To pay mitigated
however, the parents of [Jayson] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
moral dam FINDING THAT THE
[Jayson], through counsel, the amount ages;
wrote SJC a letter demanding of P77,338. PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
that it should shoulder all the 25 as JAYSONS INJURY WAS HIS
medical expenses of [Jayson] actual OWN ACT OF LOOKING AT
that had been incurred and damages; THE HEATED TEST TUBE
3. T
will be incurred further However, BEFORE THE COMPOUND
o pay
HAD COOLED IN COMPLETE PETITIONERS We are not convinced. responsible
DISREGARD OF COUNTERCLAIM.[6] for
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN PRIOR exercising
TO THE EXPERIMENT. We find no reason to depart from the uniform the
rulings of the lower courts that petitioners were Contrary to petitioners assertions, the lower required
negligent since they all failed to exercise the courts conclusions are borne out by the records reasonable
required reasonable care, prudence, caution and of this case. Both courts correctly concluded that care,
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the the immediate and proximate cause of the prudence,
FAILED TO APPRECIATE students. accident which caused injury to Jayson was the caution
THAT, IN LIGHT OF THE sudden and unexpected explosion of the and
RULING IN THE CASE OF ST. chemicals, independent of any intervening cause. foresight to
MARYS COLLEGE V. WILLIAM The assailed Decision of the CA quotes with favor prevent or
CARPITANOS, x x x JAYSONS Jurisprudence dictates that factual the RTC decision, thus: avoid
CONTRIBUTORY findings of the trial court, especially when injuries to
NEGLIGENCE OF PEEKING affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the the
INTO THE TEST TUBE WAS IN highest degree of respect and are considered students.
FACT THE PROXIMATE conclusive between the parties.[7] A review of In this case, [petitioners] The
CAUSE OF HIS INJURY FOR such findings by this Court is not warranted failed to show that the individual
WHICH THE PETITIONERS except for highly meritorious circumstances negligence of [Jayson] was the [petitioner
SHOULD NOT BE HELD when: (1) the findings of a trial court are proximate cause of the latters s] are
LIABLE. grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or injury. We find that the persons
conjectures; (2) a lower courts inference from its immediate cause of the charged
factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or accident was not the with the
impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion negligence of [Jayson] when teaching
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS in the appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of he curiously looked into the and
GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN the appellate court go beyond the issues of the test tube when the chemicals vigilance
AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, suddenly exploded which over their
ACTUAL DAMAGES DESPITE if properly considered, will justify a different caused his injury, but the students as
THE ABSENCE OF PROOF TO conclusion; (5) there is a misappreciation of sudden and unexpected well as the
SUPPORT THE SAME. facts; (6) the findings of fact are conclusions explosion of the chemicals supervisio
without mention of the specific evidence on independent of any n and
which they are based, are premised on the intervening cause. ensuring of
absence of evidence, or are contradicted by [Petitioners] could have their well-
IV. THE LOWER evidence on record.[8] None of the foregoing prevented the mishap if they being.
COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED exceptions which would warrant a reversal of exercised a higher degree of Based on
IN AWARDING MORAL the assailed decision obtains in this instance. care, caution and foresight. the facts
DAMAGES TO [JAYSON]. The court a quo correctly presented
Yet, petitioners maintain that the proximate ruled that: before this
cause of Jaysons injury was his own negligence Court,
in disregarding the instructions given by Tabugo these
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS prior to the experiment and peeking into the test [petitioner
GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN tube. Petitioners invoke our ruling in St. Marys All of the s] were
AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF Academy v. Carpitanos[9] which absolved St. [petitioner remiss in
ATTORNEYS FEES TO Marys Academy from liability for the untimely s] are their
[JAYSON]. death of its student during a school sanctioned equally at responsibil
activity, declaring that the negligence of fault and ities and
petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote are liable lacking in
cause of the accident. for the degree
VI. THE LOWER negligence of vigilance
COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED because all expected of
IN DENYING THE of them are them.
[Petitioner] [petitioner] no longer Ambatali is
subject subject enrolled in likewise
teacher teacher said school culpable
Rosalinda Rosalinda and under the
Tabugo Tabugo but testifying doctrine of
was inside by for [Jayson] command
the somebody would responsibil
classroom else. The incur the ity because
when the Court is ire of the other
class inclined to school individual
undertook believe authorities. [petitioner
the science that Estefania s] were
experiment [petitioner] Abdan is under her
although subject equally at direct
[Jayson] teacher fault as the control and
insisted Tabugo subject supervisio
that said was not adviser or n. The
[petitioner] inside the teacher in negligent
left the classroom charge acts of the
classroom. at the time because other
No the she individual
evidence, accident exercised [petitioner
however, happened. control and s] were
was The Court supervisio done
presented is also n over within the
to establish perplexed [petitioner] scope of
that why none Tabugo their
[petitioner] of the other and the assigned
Tabugo students students tasks.
was inside (who were themselves
the eyewitness . It was her
classroom es to the obligation
for the incident) to insure x
whole testified in that xxx
duration of Court to nothing
the corroborat would go
experiment e the story wrong and
. It was of the that the The
unnatural [petitioner science defense of
in the s]. The experiment due
ordinary Court, would be diligence of
course of however, conducted a good
events that understand safely and father of a
[Jayson] s that these without family
was other any harm raised by
brought to students or injury to [petitioner]
the school cannot the St. Joseph
clinic for testify for students. College will
immediate [Jayson] [Petitioner] not
treatment because Sr. exculpate it
not by [Jayson] is Josephini from
liability steps to devices to recourse
because it avert shield against the
has been damage students negligent
shown that and injury from employee.[1
it was to students. expected 0]

guilty of The fact risks and

inexcusabl that there anticipated
e laxity in has never dangers.
the been any
supervisio accident in Ordinarily,
n of its the past the liability Under the foregoing circumstances, we are hard
teachers during the of teachers pressed to disturb the findings of the RTC, which
(despite an conduct of does not the CA affirmed.
apparent science extend to
rigid experiment the school
screening s is not a or
process for justificatio university Nonetheless, petitioners make much of the fact
hiring) and n to be itself, that Tabugo specifically instructed her students,
in the complacent although including Jayson, at the start of the experiment,
maintenan in just an not to look into the heated test tube before the
ce of what preserving educational compound had cooled off. Petitioners would
should the institution allocate all liability and place all blame for the
have been status quo may be accident on a twelve (12)-year-old student,
a safe and and do held liable herein respondent Jayson.
secured away with under the
environme creative principle of
nt for foresight to RESPONDE
conducting install NT We disagree.
dangerous safety SUPERIOR.
experiment measures It has also
s. to protect been held
that the As found by both lower courts, the proximate
[Petitioner] the
liability of cause of Jaysons injury was the concurrent
school is students.
the failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable
still liable Schools
employer mishap that occurred during the conduct of the
for the should not
for the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent
wrongful simply
[tortuous] by failing to exercise the higher degree of care,
acts of the install
acts or caution and foresight incumbent upon the
teachers safety
negligence school, its administrators and teachers.
and reminders
employees and of its
because it distribute employees
had full safety is primary
Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to
informatio instruction and
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, bestows special
n on the al manuals. solidary,
parental authority on the following persons with
nature of More direct and
the corresponding obligation, thus:
dangerous importantl immediate
science y, schools and not
experiment should conditione
s but did provide d upon the Art. 218. The school, its
not take protective insolvency administrators and teachers,
affirmative gears and of or prior
 or the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child
care shall have special
parental authority and
responsibility over the minor
child while under their
supervision, instruction or
custody.
Authority and responsibility
shall apply to all authorized
activities whether inside or
outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution.
Art. 2180. The obligation
imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for ones
own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their
pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
Petitioners negligence and failure to
exercise the requisite degree of care and caution
is demonstrated by the following:
1. Petitioner school did not take cause of the accident was the
affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to negligence of the school
its students although it had full information on authorities, or the reckless
the nature of dangerous science experiments driving of James Daniel II.x x
conducted by the students during class; x.
2. Petitioner school did not install Further, there was no
safety measures to protect the students who evidence that petitioner
conduct experiments in class; school allowed the minor
James Daniel II to drive the
jeep of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva. It was Ched
3. Petitioner school did not provide Villanueva, grandson of
protective gears and devices, specifically goggles, respondent Vivencio
to shield students from expected risks and Villanueva, who had
dangers; and possession and control of the
jeep. He was driving the
vehicle and he allowed James
Daniel II, a minor, to drive the
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the jeep at the time of the
classroom the whole time her class conducted accident.
the experiment, specifically, when the accident
involving Jayson occurred. In any event, the size
of the classfifty (50) students conducting the
experiment is difficult to monitor. Hence, liability for the
accident, whether caused by
the negligence of the minor
driver or mechanical
Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their detachment of the steering
negligence and liability by insisting that wheel guide of the jeep, must
petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to be pinned on the minors
her science class not to look directly into the parents primarily. The
heated compound. Neither does our ruling in St. negligence of petitioner St.
Marys preclude their liability in this case. Marys Academy was only a
remote cause of the accident.
Between the remote cause
and the injury, there
Unfortunately for petitioners, St. Marys is not in intervened the negligence of
point. In that case, respondents thereat admitted the minors parents or the
the documentary exhibits establishing that the detachment of the steering
cause of the accident was a mechanical defect wheel guide of the jeep.[11]
and not the recklessness of the minor, James
Daniel II, in driving the jeep. We held, thus:
Significantly, respondents did In marked contrast, both the lower courts
not present any evidence to similarly concluded that the mishap which
show that the proximate happened during the science experiment was
foreseeable by the school, its officials and
teachers. This neglect in preventing a
foreseeable injury and damage equates to
neglect in exercising the utmost degree of
diligence required of schools, its administrators
and teachers, and, ultimately, was the proximate
cause of the damage and injury to Jayson. As we
have held in St. Marys, for petitioner [St. Marys
Academy] to be liable, there must be a finding
that the act or omission considered as negligent
was the proximate cause of the injury caused
because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident.[12]
As regards the contributory negligence of Jayson,
we see no need to disturb the lower courts
identical rulings thereon:
As earlier discussed, the
proximate cause of [Jaysons]
injury was the explosion of
the heated compound
independent of any efficient
intervening cause. The
negligence on the part of
[petitioner] Tabugo in not
making sure that the science
experiment was correctly
conducted was the proximate
cause or reason why the
heated compound exploded
and injured not only [Jayson]
but his classmates as well.
However, [Jayson] is partly
responsible for his own
injury, hence, he should not
be entitled to recover
damages in full but must
likewise bear the
consequences of his own
negligence. [Petitioners],
therefore, should be held
liable only for the damages
actually caused by their
negligence.[13]
 Lastly, given our foregoing ruling, we
likewise affirm the lower courts award of actual
and moral damages, and grant of attorneys fees.
The denial of petitioners counterclaim is also in
order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 68367 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
This case is about the private schools
liability for the outside catechists act of shoving a
AQUINAS SCHOOL, G.R. No. 184202 student and kicking him on the legs when he
Petitioner, disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat
Present: and not move around the classroom.
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA, The Facts and the Case
P Jose Luis. The CA, however, declined to increase
E In 1998 respondent Jose Luis Inton
R (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at Aquinas
A School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita
L Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher who
T began teaching at that school only in June of that
A year, taught Jose Luis grade three religion class.
, The Issue Presented
A On July 14, 1998, while Yamyamin was
B writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his
A assigned seat and went over to a classmate to
D play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed
, this and sent Jose Luis back to his seat. After a
while, Jose Luis got up again and went over to
a the same classmate. This time, unable to tolerate
n the childs behavior, Yamyamin approached Jose
d Luis and kicked him on the legs several
times. She
M also pulled and shoved his head on the
E classmates seat. Finally, she told the child to stay
N where he was on that spot of the room and finish
D copying the notes on the blackboard while
O seated on the floor.
Z four-fold test to determine the existence of an
A As a result of the incident, respondents
, Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an
action for damages on behalf of their son Jose
J Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the
J Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil
. Case 67427. The Intons also filed a criminal
SPS. JOSE INTON and MA. VICTORIA action against Yamyamin for violation of
S. INTON, on their behalf and on Republic Act 7610 to which she pleaded guilty
behalf of their minor child, JOSE LUIS and was sentenced accordingly.
S. INTON, and SR. MARGARITA Promulgated:
YAMYAMIN, OP, With regard to the action for damages,
Respondents. Januar the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and
y 26, 2011 exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, for
x ------------------------------------------------------------- the hurt that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria
-------------------------- x suffered. The RTC dismissed Victorias personal
claims but ruled in Jose Luis favor, holding
DECISION Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages
of P25,000.00, exemplary damages
ABAD, J.: of P25,000.00, and attorneys fees of P10,000.00
plus the costs of suit.[1]
Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals (CA).[2] They asked
the CA to increase the award of damages and
hold Aquinas solidarily liable with
Yamyamin. Finding that an employer-employee
relation existed between Aquinas and
Yamyamin, the CA found them solidarily liable to
the award of damages.[3] Jose Luis moved for
partial reconsideration but this was
denied. Aquinas, for its part, appealed directly to
this Court from the CA decision through a
petition for review on certiorari.
The sole issue presented in this case is
whether or not the CA was correct in holding
Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the
damages awarded to Jose Luis.
The Courts Ruling
The CA found Aquinas liable to Jose
Luis based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code upon
the CAs belief that the school was Yamyamins
employer. Aquinas contests this.
The Court has consistently applied the
employer-employee relationship: the employer
(a) selects and engages the employee; (b) pays
his wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and (d)
has control over his work. Of these, the most
crucial is the element of control. Control refers to
the right of the employer, whether actually
exercised or reserved, to control the work of the
employee as well as the means and methods by
which he accomplishes the same.[4]
In this case, the school directress
testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a
congregation of sisters under which, in order to
fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send
religion teachers to Aquinas to provide
catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it
was not the school but Yamyamins religious
congregation that chose her for the task of
catechizing the schools grade three students,
much like the way bishops designate the
catechists who would teach religion in public
schools. Under the circumstances, it was quite
evident that Aquinas did not have control over
Yamyamins teaching methods. The Intons had
not refuted the school directress testimony in
this regard. Consequently, it was error for the CA
to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Of course, Aquinas still had the
responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only
qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach
its young students. In this regard, it cannot be
said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the
occurrence of improper conduct towards the
students by their religion teacher.
First, Yamyamins transcript of records,
certificates, and diplomas showed that she was
qualified to teach religion.
Second, there is no question that
Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from a
legitimate religious congregation of sisters and
that, given her Christian training, the school had
reason to assume that she would behave
properly towards the students.
Third, the school gave Yamyamin a
copy of the schools Administrative Faculty Staff
Manual that set the standards for handling
students. It also required her to attend a teaching
orientation before she was allowed to teach
beginning that June of 1998.[5]
Fourth, the school pre-approved the
content of the course she was to teach[6] to
ensure that she was really catechizing the
students.
And fifth, the school had a program for
subjecting Yamyamin to classroom
evaluation.[7] Unfortunately, since she was new
and it was just the start of the school year,
Aquinas did not have sufficient opportunity to
observe her methods. At any rate, it acted
promptly to relieve her of her assignment as
soon as the school learned of the incident. [8] It
cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of
outright neglect.
Regarding the Intons plea for an award
of greater amounts of damages, the Court finds
no justification for this since they did not appeal
from the decision of the CA. The Intons prayed
for the increase only in their comment to the
petition. They thus cannot obtain from this Court
any affirmative relief other than those that the
CA already granted them in its decision.[9]

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the

petition, SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 88106 dated August 4,
2008, and HOLDSpetitioner Aquinas School not
liable in damages to respondent Jose Luis Inton.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 211362 February 24, 2015
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of
the Philippine Military Academy, represented
by his father RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts
on his own behalf, and BERTENI CATALUNA
CAUSING,Petitioners,
vs.
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR
COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and
HC MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND
APPEALS BOARD (CRAB),Respondents.
x-----------------------x
FILIPINA P. CUDIA, in behalf of CADET FIRST
CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA, and on her own
behalf,Petitioner-Intervenor.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The true test of a cadet's character as a leader
rests on his personal commitment to uphold
what is morally and ethically righteous at the
most critical and trying times, and at the most
challenging circumstances. When a cadet must
face a dilemma between what is true and right as
against his security, well-being, pleasures and
comfort, or dignity, what is at stake is his honor
and those that [define] his values. A man of an
honorable character does not think twice and
chooses the fore. This is the essence of and. the
Spirit of the Honor Code - it is championing truth
and righteousness even if it may mean the
surrender of one's basic rights and privileges.1
The Procedural Antecedents
Six days prior to the March 16, 2014 graduation
ceremonies of the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA), petitioners Renato P. Cudia, acting for
himself and in behalf of his son, Cadet First Class
Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia (Cadet JCL Cudia), and
Berteni Catalufta Causing filed this petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with
application for extremely urgent temporary
restraining order (TRO).2
In a Resolution dated March 1 7, 2014, the Court
denied the prayer for TRO and instead, required
respondents to file their comment on the
petition.3
On March 25, 2014, Filipina P. Cudia, acting for
herself and in behalf of her son Cadet 1 CL Cudia,
filed a motion for leave to intervene, attaching
thereto the petition-in-intervention.4 Per
Resolution dated March 31, 2014, the Court
granted the motion and resolved to await
respondents' comment on the petition.5
A manifestation was then filed by petitioners on
April 3, 2014, recommending the admission of
the petition-in-intervention and adopting it as an
integral part of their petition.6 On May 20, 2014,
petitioner-intervenor filed a manifestation with
motion for leave to admit the Final Investigation
Report of the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) dated April 25, 2014.7 The Report8 was
relative to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029 filed by
the spouses Renato and Filipina Cudia (Spouses
Cudia), for themselves and in behalf of their son,
against the PMA Honor Committee (HC)
members and Major Vladimir P. Gracilla (Maj.
Gracilla)9 for violation of Cadet lCL Cudia's
rights to due process, education, and privacy of
communication. Subsequently, on June 3, 2014,
petitioners filed a motion for leave to adopt the
submission of the CHR Report.10 The
manifestation was granted and the motion was
noted by the Court in its Resolution dated July 7,
2014.
After filing three motions for extension of
time,11 respondents filed their Consolidated
Comment12 on June 19, 2014. In a motion,
petitioner-intervenor filed a Reply, which was
later adopted by petitioners.13 Submitted as
Annex "A" of the Reply was a copy of the CHR
Resolution dated May 22, 2014 regarding CHR-
CAR Case No. 2014-0029.14 We noted and
granted the same on August 11, 2014 and
October 13, 2014.
Petitioner-intervenor twice filed a manifestation
with motion to submit the case for early
resolution,15 which the Court noted in a
Resolution dated August 11, 2014 and October 3,
2014.16
The Facts
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa
Class of 2014 of the PMA, the country's premiere
military academy located at Fort Gregorio del
Pilar in Baguio City. He belonged to the "A"
Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class.
As claimed by petitioners and petitioner-
intervenor (hereinafter collectively called
"petitioners," unless otherwise indicated), he
was supposed to graduate with honors as the
class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy
Saber as the top Navy cadet graduate, and be
commissioned as an ensign of the Philippine
Navy.
On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of
the Navy and Air Force 1 CL cadets had a lesson
examination (LE) on Operations Research
(OR432) under Dr. Maria Monica C. Costales (Dr.
Costales) at the PMAFI Room. Per published
schedule from the Headquarters Academic
Group, the 4th period class in OR432 was from 1
:30-3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H), while the 5th
period class in ENG412 was from 3:05-4:05 p.m.
(1505H-1605H).
Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof.
Berong) of the 5th period class issued a
Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet 1 CL
Cudia because he was "[/]ate for two (2) minutes
in his Eng 412 class x x x. "17 Cadets 1 CL Narciso,
Arcangel, Miranda, Pontillas, Diaz, Otila, and Dela
Cruz were also reported late for five minutes.18
On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the
Department of Tactical Officers. They were
logged and transmitted to the Company Tactical
Officers ( CTO) for explanation of the concerned
cadets. Two days later, Cadet lCL Cudia received
his DR.
In his Explanation of Report dated December 8,
2013, Cadet lCL Cudia reasoned out that: "I came
directly from OR432 Class. We were dismissed a
bit late by our instructor Sir."19
On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel Dennis
Hindang (Maj. Hindang), the CTO of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia, meted out to him the penalty of 11
demerits and 13 touring hours. Immediately,
Cadet lCL Cudia clarified with Maj. Hindang his
alleged violation. The latter told him that the
basis of the punishment was the result of his
conversation with Dr. Costales, who responded
that she never dismissed her class late, and the
protocol to dismiss the class 10-15 minutes
earlier than scheduled. When he expressed his
intention to appeal and seek reconsideration of
the punishment, he was · advised to put the
request in writing. Hence, that same day, Cadet 1
CL Cudia addressed his Request for
Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj.
Benjamin L. Leander, Senior Tactical Officer
(STO), asserting:
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the
circumstances, our 4th period class ended
1500H and our 5th period class, which is
ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after
4t period class, I went to my next class without
any intention of being late Sir.20
A day after, Maj. Leander instructed Maj.
Hindang to give his comments on the request of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia and to indicate if there were
other cadets belonging to the same section who
were also late.
On December 28, 2013, Maj. Hindang submitted
his reply to Maj. Leander pointing out that, based
on his investigation, the 4th period class was not
dismissed late. As a result, Maj. Leander
sustained the penalty imposed. Petitioners
alleged that Cadet 1 CL Cudia came to know of
the denial of his request only on January 24,
2014 upon inquiry with Maj. Leander.
Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014,
Cadet lCL Cudia was informed that Maj. Hindang
reported him to the HC21 for violation of the
Honor Code. The Honor Report stated:
Lying that is giving statement that perverts the
truth in his written appeal, stating that his 4th
period class ended at l 500H that made him late
in the succeeding class.22
Upon asking the HC Chairman, Cadet 1 CL Mike
Anthony P. Mogol (Cadet 1 CL Mogol), as to what
Maj. Hindang meant in his Report, Cadet lCL
Cudia learned that it was based on Maj.
Hindang's conversations with their instructors
and classmates as well as his statement in the
request for reconsideration to Maj. Leander. He
then verbally applied for and was granted an
extension of time to answer the charge against
him because Dr. Costales, who could shed light
on the matter, was on emergency leave.
On January 13, 2014, Dr. Costales sent text
messages to Cadet lCL Cudia, conveying:
Gud pm cdt cudia. Mam belandres gave me
bkground na. She told me its a report dated
november. When maj hindang ask me, no time
referens. (04:25:11 P.M.)
All the while I thot he was refering to dismisal
during last day last december. Whc i told, i wud
presume they wil finish early bee its grp work.
(04:29:21 P.M.)23
The next day, Cadets lCL Cudia and Arcangel
approached Dr. Costales, who reaffirmed that
she and Maj. Hindang were not in the same time
reference when the latter asked her.
Later, Cadet 1 CL Cudia submitted his letter of
explanation on the Honor Report. He averred:
Sir, We had an LE that day (14 November 2013)
in OR432 class. When the first bell rang (1455), I
stood up, reviewed my paper and submitted it to
my instructor, Ms. Costales. After which, I and
Cadet lcl Arcangel asked for some query with
regards (sic) to the deductions of our previous
LE. Our instructor gladly answered our question.
She then told me that she will give the copy of
our section grade, so I waited at the hallway
outside the ACAD5 office, and then she came out
of the room and gave me a copy of the grades.
Cadet Arcangel, Cadet Narciso and I immediately
went to our 5ti period class which is ENG412.
With these statements, I would like to clarify the
following:
1. How could this be lying?
2. What is wrong with the side of Maj.
Hindang (why did he come up to that
honor report)?
3. What are his assumptions?
I appeal, in the name of clarity, fairness and
truth[,] that my case be reopened and carefully
reviewed for I did not violate the honor
code/system, I can answer NO to both questions
(Did I intend to deceive? Did I intend to take
undue advantage?) and for the following
reasons:
1. The honor report of Maj. Hindang
was already settled and finalized given
the fact that no face-to-face personal
conversation with Ms. Costales was
conducted to clarify what and when
exactly was the issue at hand.
2. Statements of the respondents
support my explanation.
3. My explanation to my appeal to my
DR (Request for reconsideration of
meted punishment) further supports
my explanation in my delinquency
report.
4. My understanding of the duration of
the "CLASS" covers not just a lecture in
a typical classroom instruction but
includes every transaction and
communication a teacher does with her
students, especially that in our case
some cadets asked for queries, and I am
given instruction by which (sic) were
directly related to our CLASS. Her
transaction and communication with
our other classmates may have already
ended but ours extended for a little bit.
I agree and consider that because Cadet
CUDIA is under my instruction to wait,
and the other cadets still have business
with me, it is reasonable enough for
him to say that "Our class was
dismissed a bit late" (dealing with
matter of seconds or a minute
particularly 45 seconds to 1 minute and
30 seconds)
And with concern to (sic) OR432 class, I
can say it ended on time (1500H).
(signed)
M COSTALES
w/ attached certification
5. I was transparent and honest in
explaining the 2-minute delay and did
not attempt to conceal anything that
happened or I did.
6. Furthermore, CPT DULA WAN PA,
the Tactical Officer of Hawk Company[,]
and I had a conversation with regards
(sic) to the same matter for which he
can give important points of my case.
7. Cadet lcl DIAZ "D" Co can also stand
as a witness that I waited for Ms.
Costales. 24
On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team
to conduct a preliminary investigation on the
reported honor violation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia.
The Foxtrot Company was designated as the
investigating team and was composed of Cadet 1
CL Hasigan as Presiding Officer, and Cadets 1 CL
Mogol, lCL Raguindin, 2CL Gumilab, 2CL Saldua,
3CL Espejo, and 3CL Poncardas as
members.25 Soon after, the team submitted its
Preliminary Investigation Report recommending
that the case be formalized.
The formal investigation against Cadet 1 CL Cu di
a then ensued. The Presiding Officer was Cadet 1
CL Rhona K. Salvacion, while the nine (9) voting
members were Cadets lCL Jairus 0. Fantin, lCL
Bryan Sonny S. Arlegui, 1 CL Kim Adrian R.
Martal, 1 CL J eanelyn P. Cabrido, 1 CL ShuAydan
G. Ayada, 1 CL Dalton John G. Lagura, 2CL Renato
A. Carifio, Jr., 2CL Arwi C. Martinez, and 2CL Niko
Angelo C. Tarayao.26 Acting as recorders tasked
to document the entire proceedings were 4CL
Jennifer A. Cuarteron and 3CL Leoncio Nico A. de
Jesus 11.27Those who observed the trial were
Cadets 1 CL Balmeo, Dag-uman, Hasigan,
Raguindin, Paulino, Arcangel, and Narciso;
Cadets 2CL Jocson and Saldua, Jr.; and Cadet 3CL
Umaguing.28
The first formal hearing started late evening of
January 20, 2014 and lasted until early morning
the next day. Cadet lCL Cudia was informed of
the charge against him, as to which he pleaded
"Not Guilty." Among those who testified were
Cadet 1 CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and Cadets 1 CL
Arcangel and Narciso. On the second night of the
hearing held on January 21, 2014, Cadet 1 CL
Cudia again appeared and was called to the
witness stand along with Cadets Brit and
Barrawed. Dr. Costales also testified under oath
via phone on a loudspeaker. Deliberation among
the HC voting members followed. After that, the
ballot sheets were distributed. The members cast
their votes through secret balloting and
submitted their accomplished ballot sheets
together with their written justification. The
result was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. Cadet
lCL Dalton John G. Lagura (Cadet lCL Lagura) was
the lone dissenter. Allegedly, upon the order
ofHC Chairman Cadet 1 CL Mogol, the Presiding
Officer and voting members went inside a
chamber adjoining the court room for further
deliberation. After several minutes, they went
out and the Presiding Officer announced the 9-0
guilty verdict. Cadet 1 CL Cudia, who already
served nine (9) touring hours, was then
informed of the unanimous votes finding him
guilty of violating the Honor Code. He was
immediately placed in the PMA Holding Center
until the resolution of his appeal.
On January 24, 2014, Cadet ICL Cudia filed a
written appeal addressed to the HC Chairman,
the full text of which stated:
WRITTEN APPEAL
14 NOVEMBER 2013
This is when I was reported for "Late for two (2)
minutes in Eng412 class", my explanation on this
delinquency report when I received it, is that
"Our class was dismissed a (little) bit late and I
came directly from 4th period class ... etc".
Knowing the fact that in my delinquency report,
it is stated that ENG412 classes started 1500H
and I am late for two minutes, it is logical enough
for I (sic) to interpret it as "I came 1502H during
that class". This is the explanation that came into
my mind that time. (I just cannot recall the exact
words I used in explaining that delinquency
report, but what I want to say is that I have no
intention to be late). In my statements, I convey
my message as "since I was not the only one left
in that class, and the instructor is with us, I used
the term "CLASS", I used the word "DISMISSED"
because I was under instruction (to wait for her
to give the section grade) by the instructor, Ms.
Costales. The other cadets (lCL MIRANDA, lCL
ARCANGEL) still have queries and business with
her that made me decide to use the word
"CLASS", while the others who don't have
queries and business with her (ex: lCL NARCISO
and 1 CL DIAZ) were also around.
Note:
The four named cadets were also reported late.
Reference: Para 171. 0. (Leaving the Classroom
Prior to Dismissal Time)(Sec XVII, CCAFPR
s2008)
It is stated in this reference that "Cadets shall not
linger in the place of instruction after the section
has been dismissed. EXCEPT when told or
allowed to do so by the instructor or by any
competent authority for official purposes. "
The instruction by Ms. Costales was given to me
before the two bells rang (indicating the end of
class hour, 1500H). I waited for her for about 45
seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds, that made
me to decide to write "a little bit late" in my
explanation. Truly, the class ENDED 1500H but
due to official purpose (instruction by Ms.
Costales to wait) and the conflict in academic
schedule (to which I am not in control of the
circumstances, 4th PD class 1330H-1500H and
5th PD class 1500H-1 600H), and since Ms.
Costales, my other classmates, and I were there, I
used the word "CLASS".
19 December 2013
I was informed that my delinquency report was
awarded, 11 Demerits and 13 Touring hours. Not
because I don't want to serve punishment, but
because I know I did nothing wrong, I obeyed
instruction, and believing that my reason is
justifiable and valid, that is why I approached
our tactical officer, MAJ HINDANG PAF, to clarify
and ask why it was awarded that day.
In our conversation, he said that he had a phone
call to my instructor and he even added that they
have a protocol to dismiss the class, 15 minutes
or 10 minutes before 1500H. I explained:
Sir, I strongly believe that I am not in control of
the circumstances, our 4th period class ended
1500H and our 5th period class, which is
ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after
4th period class, I went to my next class without
any intention of being late Sir.
These statements are supplementary to my
explanation in my delinquency report, in here, I
specified the conflict in the schedule and again, I
have no intention to be late. After explaining it
further with these statements, my tactical officer
said that since I was reported in a written form, I
should make an appeal in a written form.
Thinking that he already understood what I want
to say, I immediately made an appeal that day
stating the words that I used in having
conversation with him.29
Attached to the written appeal was a
Certification dated January 24, 2014, wherein Dr.
Costales attested:
1. That Cadet MIRANDA, ARCANGEL,
[and] NARCISO was (sic) with Cadet
CUDIA in making query about their
latest grades in OR432 and/or results
of UEl outside the ACADS office. The
following facts may explain their
queries on 14 November 2013:
a. That I held my class in the
PMAFI room instead of room
104.
b. That OR432 releases grades
every Wednesday and cadets
are informed during
Thursday, either in class or
posted grades in the bulletin
board (grades released was
[sic J based on the previous
LEs: latest LE before UE was
Decision Trees).
c. That UE papers were
already checked but not yet
recorded due to (sic) other
cadets have not taken the UE.
Cadets were allowed to verify
scores but not to look at the
papers.
d. Last 23 January 2014,
Captain Dulawan clarified if
indeed Cadet NARCISO and
ARCANGEL verified grades.
The two cadets said that they
verified something with me
after the OR432 class and they
were with Cadet CUD IA. That
the statements of the three
(3) cadets are all the same
and consistent, thus[,] I honor
that as true.
2. As to the aspect of dismissing late, I
could not really account for the specific
time that I dismissed the class. To this
date, I [cannot] really recall an account
that is more than two (2) months
earlier. According to my records, there
was a lecture followed by an LE during
(sic) on 14 November 2013. To
determine the time of my dismissal,
maybe it can be verified with the other
members of class I was handling on
that said date.30
Respondents contend that the HC denied the
appeal the same day, January · 24, as it found no
reason to conduct a re-trial based on the
arguments and evidence
presented.31 Petitioners, however, claim that the
written appeal was not acted upon until the filing
of the petition-in-intervention.32
From January 25 to February 7, 2014,
respondents allege that the Headquarters Tactics
Group (HTG) conducted an informal review to
check the findings of the HC. During the course of
the investigation, Prof. Berong was said to have
confirmed with the Officer-in-Charge of the HC
that classes started as scheduled (i.e., 3:05 p.m.
or 1505H), and that Cadet lCL Barrawed, the
acting class marcher of ENG412, verified before
the Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and
STO that the class started not earlier than
scheduled.
Meantime, on February 4, 2014, the OIC of the
HC forwarded the Formal Investigation Report to
the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for review. The
next day, the SJA found the report to be legally in
order.
On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D. Briguez
(Col. Briguez), the Commandant of Cadets,
affirmed the HC findings and recommended to
Vice Admiral Edgar Abogado, then PMA
Superintendent, the separation from the PMA of
Cadet lCL Cudia for violation of the First Tenet of
the Honor Code (Lying, pursuant to Sec. VII.12.b
of the CCAFPR S-2008). On the same date, Special
Orders No. 26 was issued by the PMA
Headquarters placing Cadet 1 CL Cudia on
indefinite leave of absence without pay and
allowances effective February 10, 2014 pending
approval of his separation by the AFPGHQ,
barring him from future appointment and/or
admission as cadet, and not permitting him to
qualify for any entrance requirements to the
PMA. 33
Two days later, Vice Admiral Abogado approved
the recommendation to dismiss Cadet 1 CL
Cudia.
On February 13, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia
submitted a letter to the Office of the
Commandant of Cadets requesting for
reinstatement by the PMA of his status as a
cadet.34
Four days passed, Annavee P. Cudia (Annavee ),
the sister of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, posted his plight in
her Face book account. The day after, the
Spouses Cudia gave a letter to Major General
Oscar Lopez (Maj. Gen. Lopez), the new PMA
Superintendent, asking to recognize the 8-1
voting of the HC.35 Copies of which were
furnished to the AFP Chief of Staff and other
concerned military officials. Subsequently, Maj.
Gen. Lopez was directed to review Cadet lCL
Cudia's case. The latter, in turn, referred the
matter to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board
(CRAB).
On February 19, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia made his
personal appeal letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez. On
even date, the AFP Chief of Staff ordered a
reinvestigation following the viral Facebook post
of Annavee demanding the intervention of the
military leadership.
Petitioners claim that, on February 21, 2014,
Special Order No. 1 was issued directing all PMA
cadets to ostracize Cadet 1 CL Cudia by not
talking to him and by separating him from all
activities/functions of the cadets. It is said that
any violation shall be a "Class 1" offense entailing
45 demerits, 90 hours touring, and 90 hours
confinement. Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not given a
copy of the order and learned about it only from
the media.36 According to an alleged news
report, PMA Spokesperson Major Agnes Lynette
Flores (Maj. Flores) confirmed the HC order to
ostracize Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Among his offenses
were: breach of confidentiality by putting
documents in the social media, violation of the
PMA Honor Code, lack of initiative to resign, and
smearing the name of the PMA.37
On February 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia
requested the CRAB for additional time, until
March 4, 2014, to file an appeal on the ground
that his intended witnesses are in on-the-job
training ( OJT).38 As additional evidence to
support his appeal, he also requested for copies
of the Minutes of the HC proceedings, relevant
documents pertaining to the case, and video
footages and recordings of the HC hearings.
The next day, Cadet 1 CL Cudia and his family
engaged the services of the Public Attorney's
Office (PAO) in Baguio City.
The CRAB conducted a review of the case based
on the following: (a) letter of appeal of the
Spouses Cudia dated February 18, 2014; (b)
directive from the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the
case; and ( c) guidance from Maj. Gen. Lopez.
On February 26, 2014, Brigadier General Andre
M. Costales, Jr. (Brig. Gen. Costales, Jr.), the CRAB
Chairman, informed Cadet lCL Cudia that,
pending approval of the latter's request for
extension, the CRAB would continue to review
the case and submit its recommendations based
on whatever evidence and testimonies received,
and that it could not favorably consider his
request for copies of the HC minutes, relevant
documents, and video footages and recordings of
the HC hearings since it was neither the
appropriate nor the authorized body to take
action thereon.39 Subsequently, upon verbal
advice, Cadet 1 CL Cudia wrote a letter to Maj.
Gen. Lopez reiterating his request.40
Two days after, the Spouses Cudia filed a letter-
complaint before the CHR-Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR) Office against the
HC members and Maj. Gracilla for alleged
violation of the human rights of Cadet lCL Cudia,
particularly his rights to due process, education,
and privacy of communication.41
On March 4, 2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia, through the
PAO, moved for additional time, until March 19,
2014, to file his appeal and submit evidence. PAO
also wrote a letter to AFP Chief of Staff General
Emmanuel T. Bautista (Gen. Bautista) seeking for
immediate directive to the PMA to expeditiously
and favorably act on Cadet 1CL Cudia's
requests.42
Exactly a week prior to the commencement
exercises of Siklab Diwa Class, the following
events transpired:
On March 10, 2014, Annavee sought the
assistance of PAO Chief Public Attorney Persida
V. Rueda-Acosta.43On the other hand, the CRAB
submitted a report to the AFP-GHQ upholding
the dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia.44
On March 11, 2014, PAO received a letter from
Maj. Gen. Lopez stating the denial of Cadet 1CL
Cudia's requests for extension of time to file an
Appeal Memorandum in view of the ample time
already given, and to be furnished with a copy of
relevant documents because of confidentiality
and presumption of regularity of the HC
proceedings.45 Cadet 1CL Cudia, through PAO,
then filed an Appeal Memorandum46 before the
CRAB.
On March 12, 2014, Spouses Cudia wrote a letter
to President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (Pres.
Aquino), who is the Commander-in-Chief of the
AFP, attaching thereto the Appeal
Memorandum.47 On the same day, Special Orders
No. 48 was issued by the PMA constituting a
Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body
composed of the CRAB members and PMA senior
officers to conduct a deliberate investigation
pertaining to Cadet 1CL Cudia's Appeal
Memorandum.48 The focus of the inquiry was not
just to find out whether the appeal has merit or
may be considered but also to investigate
possible involvement of other cadets and
members of the command related to the incident
and to establish specific violation of policy or
regulations that had been violated by other
cadets and members of the HC.49
On March 13, 2014, the Cudia family and the
Chief Public Attorney had a dialogue with Maj.
Gen. Lopez. On March 14, 2014, the CHR-CAR
came out with its preliminary findings, which
recommended the following:
a. For the PMA and the Honor
Committee to respect and uphold the 8
Guilty - 1 Not guilty vote;
b. For the PMA and the Honor
Committee to officially pronounce Cdt
Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge filed
against him before the Honor
Committee;
c. For the PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's
rights and entitlements as a full-fledge
graduating cadet and allow him to
graduate on Sunday, 16 March 2014;
d. For the PMA to fully cooperate with
the CHR in the investigation of Cudia's
Case.50
On March 15, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his
family had a meeting with Pres. Aquino and
Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary
Voltaire T. Gazmin. The President recommended
that they put in writing their appeal, requests,
and other concerns. According to respondents,
the parties agreed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia would
not join the graduation but it was without
prejudice to the result of the appeal, which was
elevated to the AFP Chief of Staff. The President
then tasked Gen. Bautista to handle the
reinvestigation of the case, with Maj. Gen. Oscar
Lopez supervising the group conducting the
review.
Four days after Siklab Diwa Class' graduation
day, petitioner Renato S. Cudia received a letter
dated March 11, 2014 from the Office of the AFP
Adjutant General and signed by Brig. Gen. Ronald
N. Albano for the AFP Chief of Staff, affirming the
CRAB' s denial of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s appeal. It
held:
After review, The Judge Advocate General, APP
finds that the action of the PMA CRAB in denying
the appeal for reinvestigation is legally in order.
There was enough evidence to sustain the
finding of guilt and the proprietary (sic) of the
punishment imposed. Also, your son was
afforded sufficient time to file his appeal from
the date he was informed of the final verdict on
January 21, 2014, when the decision of the
Honor Committee was read to him in person,
until the time the PMA CRAB conducted its
review on the case. Moreover, the continued stay
of your son at the Academy was voluntary. As
such, he remained subject to the Academy's
policy regarding visitation. Further, there was no
violation of his right to due process considering
that the procedure undertaken by the Honor
Committee and PMA CRAB was consistent with
existing policy. Thus, the previous finding and
recommendation of the Honor Committee
finding your son, subject Cadet guilty of "Lying"
and recommending his separation from the
Academy is sustained.
In view of the foregoing, this Headquarters
resolved to deny your appeal for lack of
merit.51Thereafter, the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body issued its Final
Investigation Report on March 23, 2014 denying
Cadet 1 CL Cudia's appeal.52 Subsequently, on
April 28, 2014, the special investigation board
tasked to probe the case submitted its final
report to the President.53 Pursuant to the
administrative appeals process, the DND issued a
Memorandum dated May 23, 2014, directing the
Office of AFP Chief of Staff to submit the
complete records of the case for purposes of
DND review and recommendation for disposition
by the President.54
Meanwhile, on May 22, 2014, the CHR-CAR
issued its Resolution with respect to CHR-CAR
Case No. 2014-0029, concluding and
recommending as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
Commission on Human Rights-CAR Office finds
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS against the officers and members of
the PMA Honor Committee and .. certain PMA
officials, specifically for violations of the rights of
CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA to dignity, due
process, education, privacy/privacy of
communication, and good life.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the CHR-CAR
Office RESOLVED to indorse to competent
authorities for their immediate appropriate
action on the following recommendations:
1. The Philippine Military Academy
must set aside the "9-Guilty, 0-Not
Guilty" verdict against Cadet Aldrin Jeff
P. Cudia, for being null and void; to
uphold and respect the "8-Guilty, 1-Not
Guilty" voting result and make an
official pronouncement of NOT GUILTY
in favor of Cadet Cudia;
2. The PMA, the AFP Chief of Staff, and
the President in whose hands rest the
ends of justice and fate of Cadet Cudia,
to:
2.1 officially proclaim Cadet
Cudia a graduate and alumnus
of the Philippine Military
Academy;
2.2 issue to Cadet Cudia the
corresponding Diploma for
the degree of Bachelors of
Science; and
2.3 Issue to Cadet Cudia the
corresponding official
transcript 'of his academic
records for his BS degree,
without conditions therein as
to his status as a PMA cadet.
3. The Public Attorneys' Office to
provide legal services to Cadet Cudia in
pursuing administrative, criminal and
civil suits against the officers and
members of the Honor Committee
named hereunder, for violation of the
Honor Code and System and the
Procedure in Formal Investigation,
dishonesty, violation of the secrecy of
the ballot, tampering the true result of
the voting, perjury, intentional
omission in the Minutes of substantive
part of the formal trial proceedings
which are prejudicial to the interest of
justice and Cadet Cudia's fundamental
rights to dignity, non-discrimination
and due process, which led to the
infringement of his right to education
and even transgressing his right to a
good life.
3.1 Cdt lCL MIKE ANTHONY
MOGUL, now 2nd Lt. of the
AFP
3.2 Cdt lCL RHONA K.
SALVACION, now 2nd Lt. of
the AFP
3.3 Cdt 2CL ARWI C.
MARTINEZ
3.4 Cdt 2CL RENATO A.
CARINO, JR.
3.5 Cdt 2CL NIKOANGELOC.
TARAYAO
3.6 Cdt lCL JEANEL YN P.
CABRIDO, now 2nd Lt. of the
AFP
3.7 Cdt lCL KIM ADRIAN R.
MARTAL, now 2nd Lt. of the
AFP
3.8 Cdt lCL JAIRUS 0. FANTIN,
now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.9 Cdt lCL BRYAN SONNY S.
ARLEGUI, now 2nd Lt. of the
AFP
3.10 Cdt lCL DALTON JOHN G.
LAGURA, now 2nd Lt. of the
AFP
3.11 Cdt 1 CL
BIANCHIHEIMER L. EDRA,
now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.12 Cdt 4CL JENNIFER A.
CUARTERON (recorder)
3.13 Cdt 3CL LEONCIO NICO
A. DE JESUS II (record)
4. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff
and the PMA competent authorities
should investigate and file appropriate
charges against Maj. VLADIMIR P.
GRACILLA, for violation of the right to
privacy of Cadet Cudia and/or failure,
as intelligence officer, to ensure the
protection of the right to privacy of
Cudia who was then billeted at the PMA
Holding Center;
5. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff
and PMA competent authorities should
investigate Maj. DENNIS ROMMEL
HINDANG for his failure and ineptness
to exercise his responsibility as a
competent Tactical Officer and a good
father of his cadets, in this case, to
Cadet Cudia; for failure to respect
exhaustion of administrative remedies;
6. The Secretary of National Defense,
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
 the Philppines, the PMA
Superintendent, to immediately cause
the comprehensive review of all rules
of procedures, regulations, policies,
including the so-called practices in the
implementation of the Honor Code;
and, thereafter, adopt new policies,
rules of procedures and relevant
regulations which are human-rights
based and consistent with the
Constitution and other applicable laws;
7. The Congress of the Philippines to
consider the enactment of a law
defining and penalizing ostracism and
discrimination, which is apparently
being practiced in the PMA, as a
criminal offense in this jurisdiction;
8. His Excellency The President of the
Philippines to certify as priority, the
passage of an anti-ostracism and/or
anti-discrimination law; and
9. Finally, for the AFP Chief of Staff and
the PMA authorities to ensure respect
and protection of the rights of those
who testified for the cause of justice
and truth as well as human rights of
Cadet Cudia.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to monitor the actions by
the competent authorities on the foregoing CHR
recommendations.
Let copy of this resolution be served by personal
service or by substituted service to the
complainants (the spouses Renato and Filipina
Cudia; and Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia), and all the
respondents. Also, to the PMA Superintendent,
the AFP Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National
Defense, His Excellency The President of the
Philippines, The Public Attorneys' Office.
SO RESOLVED.55
On June 11, 2014, the Office of the President
sustained the findings of the AFP Chief of Staff
and the CRAB. The letter, which was addressed
to the Spouses Cudia and signed by Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., stated in whole:
This refers to your letters to the President dated
12 March 2014 and 26 March 2014 appealing for
a reconsideration of the decision of the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Honor
Committee on the case of your son, Cadet 1 CL
Aldrin Jeff Cudia.
After carefully studying the records of the case of
Cadet Cudia, the decision of the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and
the Honor Code System of the AFP Cadet Corps,
this Office has found no substantial basis to
disturb the findings of the AFP and the PMA
Cadet Review Appeals Board (CRAB). There is no
competent evidence to support the claim that the
decision of the Honor Committee members was
initially at 8 "Guilty" votes and 1 "Not Guilty"
vote. The lone affidavit of an officer, based on his
purported conversation with one Honor
Committee member, lacks personal knowledge
on the deliberations of the said Committee and is
hearsay at best.
Similarly, the initial recommendations of the
Commission on Human Rights cannot be adopted
as basis that Cadet Cudia's due process rights
were violated. Apart from being explicitly
preliminary in nature, such recommendations
are anchored on a finding that there was an 8-1
vote which, as discussed above, is not supported
by competent evidence.
In the evaluation of Cadet Cudia's case, this
Office has been guided by the precept that
military law is regarded to be in a class of its
own, "applicable only to military personnel
because the military constitutes an armed
organization requiring a system of discipline
separate from that of civilians" (Gonzales v.
Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, 10 August 2005 citing
Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d 184 [1975] and
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 US 83 [1953]). Thus,
this Office regarded the findings of the AFP Chief,
particularly his conclusion that there was
nothing irregular in the proceedings that ensued,
as carrying great weight.
Accordingly, please be informed that the
President has sustained the findings of the AFP
Chief and the PMA CRAB.56
The Issues
To petitioners, the issues for resolution are:
I.
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY
ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE AND THE
CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DISMISSING CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF
P. CUDIA FROM THE ACADEMY IN UTTER
DISREGARD OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
CONSIDERING THAT:
A. Despite repeated requests for
relevant documents regarding his case,
Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was
deprived of his right to have access to
evidence which would have proven his
defense, would have totally belied the
charge against him, and more
importantly, would have shown the
irregularity in the Honor Committee's
hearing and rendition of decision
B. Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia
was vaguely informed of the decisions
arrived at by the Honor Committee, the
Cadet Review and Appeals Board and
the Philippine Military Academy
C. The Honor Committee, the Cadet
Review and Appeals Board and the
Philippine Military Academy have
afforded Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff
Cudia nothing but a sham trial
D. The Honor Committee, the Cadet
Review and Appeals Board and the
Philippine Military Academy violated
their own rules and principles as
embodied in the Honor Code
E. The Honor Committee, the Cadet
Review and Appeals Board and the
Philippine Military Academy, in
deciding Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff
Cudia's case, grossly and in bad faith,
misapplied the Honor Code so as to
defy the 1987 Constitution,
notwithstanding the unquestionable
fact that the former should yield to the
latter.
II
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY
ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE AND THE
CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THAT CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN
JEFF P. CUDIA LIED, THEREBY VIOLATING THE
HONOR CODE
III
WHETHER THE RESULT OF THE FACT-FINDING
INVESTIGATION INDEPENDENTLY CONDUCTED
BY THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IS OF
SUCH GREAT WEIGHT AND PERSUASIVE
NATURE THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY
HONOR, UPHOLD AND RESPECT57
On the other hand, in support of their prayer to
dismiss the petition, respondents presented the
issues below:
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
I.
THE MANDAMUS PETITION PRAYING THAT
CADET CUDIA BE INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF
GRADUATES OF SIKLAB DIWA CLASS OF 2014
AND BE ALLOWED TO TAKE PART IN THE
COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES HAS ALREADY
BEEN RENDERED MOOT.
II.
THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITIONS ARE
ACTUALLY FACTUAL WHICH ARE BEYOND THE
SCOPE OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI,
PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS.
III.
MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE TO COMPEL
RESPONDENTS TO GRANT THE RELIEFS
PRAYED FOR. IV. IT IS PREMATURE TO INVOKE
JUDICIAL REDRESS PENDING THE DECISION OF
THE PRESIDENT ON CADET CUDIA'S APPEAL.
V.
WITH UTMOST DUE RESPECT, THE
HONORABLE COURT MUST EXERCISE CAREFUL
RESTRAINT AND REFRAIN FROM UNDULY OR
PREMATURELY INTERFERING WITH
LEGITIMATE MILITARY MATTERS.
SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
VI.
CADET CUDIA HAS NECESSARILY AND
VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISHED CERTAIN CIVIL
LIBERTIES BY VIRTUE OF HIS ENTRY INTO THE
PMA.
VII.
THE PMA ENJOYS THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM
WHICH AUTHORIZES IT TO IMPOSE
DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AND PUNISHMENT
AS IT DEEMS FIT AND CONSISTENT WITH THE
PECULIAR NEEDS OF THE ACADEMY.
VIII.
CADET CUDIA WAS PROPERLY AFFORDED
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
The PMA has regulatory authority to
administratively terminate cadets despite the
absence of statutory authority.
Violation of the Honor Code warrants the
administrative dismissal of a guilty cadet.
Cadet Cudia violated the first tenet of the Honor
Code by providing untruthful statements in the
explanation for his tardiness.
The higher authorities of the PMA did not blindly
adopt the findings of the Honor Committee.
The procedural safeguards in a student
disciplinary case were properly accorded to
Cadet Cudia.
The subtle evolution in the voting process of the
Honor Committee, by incorporating executive
session/chambering, was adopted to further
strengthen the voting procedure of the Honor
Committee. Cadet Lagura voluntarily changed his
vote without any pressure from the other voting
members of the Honor Committee.
Ostracism is not a sanctioned practice of the
PMA.
The findings of the Commission on Human
Rights are not binding on the Honorable Court,
and are, at best, recommendatory.
Cadet Cudia was not effectively deprived of his
future when he was dismissed from the PMA.58
The Ruling of the Court
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
Propriety of a petition for mandamus
Respondents argue that the mandamus aspect of
the petition praying that Cadet 1 CL Cudia be
included in the list of graduating cadets and for
him to take part in the commencement exercises
was already rendered moot and academic when
the graduation ceremonies of the PMA Siklab
Diwa Class took place on March 16, 2014. Also, a
petition for mandamus is improper since it does
not lie to compel the performance of a
discretionary duty. Invoking Garcia v. The
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology,59 respondents assert that a mandamus
petition could not be availed of to compel an
academic institution to allow a student to
continue studying therein because it is merely a
privilege and not a right. In this case, there is a
clear failure on petitioners' part to establish that
the PMA has the, ministerial duty to include
Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list, much less award him
with academic honors and commission him to
the Philippine Navy. Similar to the case of
University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,60 it is submitted that the PMA may
rightfully exercise its discretionary power on
who may be admitted to study pursuant to its
academic freedom.
In response, petitioners contend that while the
plea to allow Cadet 1 CL Cudia to participate in
the PMA 2014 commencement exercises could
no longer be had, the Court may still grant the
other reliefs prayed for. They add that Garcia
enunciated that a respondent can be ordered to
act in a particular manner when there is a
violation of a constitutional right, and that the
certiorari aspect of the petition must still be
considered because it is within the province of
the Court to determine whether a branch of the
government or any of its officials has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
thereof.
We agree that a petition for mandamus is
improper.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It
may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be
enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act
is ministerial if the act should be performed
"[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of
[the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done." The tribunal, corporation, board, officer,
or person must have no choice but to perform
the act specifically enjoined by law. This is
opposed to a discretionary act whereby the
officer has the choice to decide how or when to
perform the duty.61
In this case, petitioners pray for, among others:
Also, after due notice and hearing, it is prayed of
the Court to issue a Writ of Mandamus to:
1. direct the PMA to include Cadet
Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab
Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA,
including inclusion in the yearbook;
2. direct the PMA to allow Cadet Cudia
to take part in the commencement
exercises if he completed all the
requirements for his baccalaureate
degree;
3. direct the PMA to award unto Cadet
Cudia the academic honors he deserves,
and the commission as a new
Philippine Navy ensign;
4. direct the Honor Committee to
submit to the CRAB of the PMA all its
records of the proceedings taken
against Cadet Cudia, including the video
footage and audio recordings of the
deliberations and voting, for the
purpose of allowing the CRAB to
conduct intelligent review of the case of
Cadet Cudia;
 5. direct the PMA's CRAB to conduct a
review de nova of all the records
without requiring Cadet Cudia to
submit new evidence if it was
physically impossible to do so;
6. direct the PMA's CRAB to take into
account the certification signed by Dr.
Costales, the new evidence consisting
of the affidavit of a military officer
declaring under oath that the cadet
who voted "not guilty" revealed to this
officer that this cadet was coerced into
changing his vote, and other new
evidence if there is any;
7. direct the PMA's CRAB to give Cadet
Cudia the right to a counsel who is
allowed to participate actively in the
proceedings as well as in the cross-
examinations during the exercise of the
right to confront witnesses against him;
and
8. direct the Honor Committee in case
of remand of the case by the CRAB to
allow Cadet Cudia a representation of a
counsel.62
Similarly, petitioner-intervenor seeks for the
following reliefs:
A. xxx
B. a Writ of Mandamus be issued
commanding:
a.) The PMA, Honor
Committee, and CRAB to
respect and uphold the 8
Guilty -1 Not Guilty vote;
b.) The PMA, Honor
Committee, and CRAB to
officially pronounce Cadet
Cudia as Not Guilty of the
charge filed against him
before the Honor Committee;
c.) The PMA to restore Cadet
Cudia's rights and
entitlements as a full-fledged
graduating cadet, including
his diploma and awards.63
Anent the plea to direct the PMA to include Cadet
1 CL Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab Diwa
Class of 2014 and to allow him to take part in the
commencement exercises, the same was
rendered moot and academic when the
graduation ceremonies pushed through on
March 16, 2014 without including Cadet 1 CL
Cudia in the roll of graduates.
With respect to the prayer directing the PMA to
restore Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights and
entitlements as a full-fledged graduating cadet,
including his diploma, awards, and commission
as a new Philippine Navy ensign, the same
cannot be granted in a petition for mandamus on
the basis of academic freedom, which We shall
discuss in more detail below. Suffice it to say at
this point that these matters are within the ambit
of or encompassed by the right of academic
freedom; therefore, beyond the province of the
Court to decide.64 The powers to confer degrees
at the PMA, grant awards, and commission
officers in the military service are discretionary
acts on the part of the President as the AFP
Commander-in-Chief. Borrowing the words of
Garcia:
There are standards that must be met. There are
policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to be
of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology,
what a student in the position of petitioner
possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She
[in this case, Cadet 1 CL Cudia] cannot therefore
satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a
mandamus proceeding.65
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful
cases. It cannot be availed against an official or
government agency whose duty requires the
exercise of discretion or judgment.66 For a writ
to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded, and there should be
an imperative duty on the part of respondents to
perform the act sought to be mandated.67
The same reasons can be said as regards the
other reliefs being sought by petitioners, which
pertain to the HC and the CRAB proceedings. In
the absence of a clear and unmistakable
provision of a law, a mandamus petition does not
lie to require anyone to a specific course of
conduct or to control or review the exercise of
discretion; it will not issue to compel an official
to do anything which is not his duty to do or
which is his duty not to do or give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by
law.68
The foregoing notwithstanding, the resolution of
the case must proceed since, as argued by
petitioners, the Court is empowered to settle via
petition for certiorari whether there is grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondents in
dismissing Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA.
Factual nature of the issues
According to respondents, the petition raises
issues that actually require the Court to make
findings of fact because it sets forth several
factual disputes which include, among others:
the tardiness of Cadet 1 CL Cudia in , his ENG412
class and his explanation thereto, the
circumstances that transpired in the
investigation of his Honor Code violation, the
proceedings before the HC, and the allegation
that Cadet 1 CL Lagura was forced to change his
vote during the executive session/"chambering."
In opposition, petitioners claim that the instant
controversy presents legal issues. Rather than
determining which between the two conflicting
versions of the parties is true, the case allegedly
centers on the application, appreciation, and
interpretation of a person's rights to due
process, to education, and to property; the
interpretation of the PMA Honor Code and
Honor System; and the conclusion on whether
Cadet 1 CL Cudia's explanation constitutes lying.
Even if the instant case involves questions of
fact, petitioners still hold that the Court is
empowered to settle mixed questions of fact and
law. Petitioners are correct.
There is a question of law when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value
of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of
facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on
the matter. On the other hand, there is a question
of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. When
there is no dispute as to fact, the question of
whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom
is correct is a question of law.69 The petition does
not exclusively present factual matters for the
Court to decide. As pointed out, the all-
encompassing issue of more importance is the
determination of whether a PMA cadet has rights
to due process, to education, and to property in
the context of the Honor Code and the Honor
System, and, if in the affirmative, the extent or
limit thereof. Notably, even respondents
themselves raise substantive grounds that We
have to resolve. In support of their contention
that the Court must exercise careful restraint and
should refrain from unduly or prematurely
interfering in legitimate military matters, they
argue that Cadet 1 CL Cudia has necessarily and
voluntarily relinquished certain civil liberties by
virtue of his entry into the PMA, and that the
Academy enjoys academic freedom authorizing
the imposition of disciplinary measures and
punishment as it deems fit and consistent with
the peculiar needs of the PMA. These issues,
aside from being purely legal being purely legal
questions, are of first impression; hence, the
Court must not hesitate to make a categorical
ruling.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Respondents assert that the Court must decline
jurisdiction over the petition pending President
Aquino’s resolution of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' appeal.
They say that there is an obvious non-exhaustion
of the full administrative process. While Cadet 1
CL Cudia underwent the review procedures of
his guilty verdict at the Academy level - the
determination by the SJA of whether the HC
acted according to the established procedures of
the Honor System, the assessment by the
Commandant of Cadets of the procedural and
legal correctness of the guilty verdict, the
evaluation of the PMA Superintendent to
warrant the administrative separation of the
guilty cadet, and the appellate review
proceedings before the CRAB - he still appealed
to the President, who has the utmost latitude in
making decisions affecting the military. It is
contended that the President's power over the
persons and actions of the members of the
armed forces is recognized in B/Gen. (Ret.)
Gudani v. Lt./Gen. Senga70 and in Section 3171 of
Commonwealth Act (CA.) No. 1 (also known as
"The National Defense Act''). As such, the
President could still overturn the decision of the
PMA. In respondents' view, the filing of this
petition while the case is pending resolution of
the President is an irresponsible defiance, if not a
personal affront. For them, comity dictates that
courts of justice should shy away from a dispute
until the system of administrative redress has
been completed.
From the unfolding of events, petitioners,
however, consider that President Aquino
effectively denied the appeal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia.
They claim that his family exerted
insurmountable efforts to seek reconsideration
of the HC recommendation from the APP officials
and the President, but was in vain. The
circumstances prior to, during, and after the
PMA 2014 graduation rites, which was attended
by President Aquino after he talked to Cadet lCL
Cudia's family the night before, foreclose the
possibility that the challenged findings would
still be overturned. In any case, petitioners insist
that the· rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not absolute based on the Corsiga v.
Defensor72 and Verceles v. BLR-DOLE73 rulings.
We rule for petitioners.
In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for
a supposed or threatened injury until the
prescribed administrative remedy has been
exhausted. The rationale behind the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is that
"courts, for reasons of law, comity, and
convenience, should not entertain suits unless
the available administrative remedies have first
been resorted to and the proper authorities, who
are competent to act upon the matter
complained of, have been given the appropriate
opportunity to act and correct their alleged
errors, if any, committed in the administrative
forum."74 In the U.S. case of Ringgold v. United
States,75 which was cited by respondents, it was
specifically held that in a typical case involving a
decision by military authorities, the plaintiff
must exhaust his remedies within the military
before appealing to the court, the doctrine being
designed both to preserve the balance between
military and civilian authorities and to conserve
judicial resources.
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In
this jurisdiction, a party may directly resort to
judicial remedies if any of the following is
present:
1. when there is a violation of due
process;
2. when the issue involved is purely a
legal question;
3. when the administrative action is
patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of
the administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts as an alter ego of
the President bear the implied and
assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be
unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private
land in land case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
and
11. when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.76
Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due
process in the dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia from
the PMA. Thus, it may be a ground to give due
course to the petition despite the non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies. Yet more significant
is the fact that during the pendency of this case,
particularly on June 11, 2014, the Office of the
President finally issued its ruling, which
sustained the findings of the AFP Chief and the
CRAB. Hence, the occurrence of this supervening
event bars any objection to the petition based on
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Court's interference within military affairs
Respondents cite the U.S. cases of Bois v.
Marsh77 and Schlesinger v. Councilman78 to
support their contention that judicial
intervention would pose substantial threat to
military discipline and that there should be a
deferential review of military statutes and
regulations since political branches have
particular expertise and competence in assessing
military needs. Likewise, in Orloff v.
Willoughby79 and Parker v. Levy,80 it was
allegedly opined by the U.S. Supreme Court that
the military constitutes a specialized community
governed by a separate discipline from that of
the civilian. According to respondents, the U.S.
courts' respect to the military recognizes that
constitutional rights may apply differently in the
military context than in civilian society as a
whole. Such military deference is exercised
either by refusing to apply due process and equal
protection doctrines in military cases or applying
them but with leniency.
In respondents' view, although Philippine courts
have the power of judicial review in cases
attended with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
policy considerations call for the widest latitude
of deference to military affairs. Such respect is
exercised by the court where the issues to be
resolved entail a substantial consideration of
legitimate governmental interest. They suppose
that allowing Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case to prosper
will set an institutionally dangerous precedent,
opening a Pandora's box of other challenges
against the specialized system of discipline of the
PMA. They state that with the PMA's mandate to
train cadets for permanent commission in the
AFP, its disciplinary rules and procedure
necessarily must impose h different standard of
conduct compared with civilian institutions.
Petitioners, on the other hand, consider that this
Court is part of the State's check-and-balance
machinery, specifically mandated by Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution to ensure that no
branch of the government or any of its officials
acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of, discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. They assert that judicial
non-interference in military affairs is not
deemed as absolute even in the U.S. They cite
Schlesinger and Parker, which were invoked by
respondents, as well as Burns v. Wilson81 and
Harmon v. Brucker,82 wherein the U.S. Supreme
Court reviewed the proceedings of military
tribunals on account of issues posed concerning
due process and violations of constitutional
rights. Also, in Magno v. De Villa83 decided by this
Court, petitioners note that We, in fact, exercised
the judicial power to determine whether the APP
and the members of the court martial acted with
grave abuse o.f discretion in their military
investigation.
Petitioners' contentions are tenable.
Admittedly, the Constitution entrusts the
political branches of the government, not the
courts, with superintendence and control over
the military because the courts generally lack the
competence and expertise necessary to evaluate
military decisions and they are ill-equipped to
determine the impact upon discipline that any
particular intrusion upon military authority
might have.84 Nevertheless, for the sake of
brevity, We rule that the facts as well as the legal
issues in the U.S. cases cited by respondents are
not on all fours with the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia.
Instead, what applies is the 1975 U.S. case of
Andrews v. Knowlton,85 which similarly involved
cadets who were separated from the United
States Military Academy due to Honor Code
violations. Following Wasson v.
Trowbridge86 and Hagopian v.
Knowlton,87 Andrews re-affirmed the power of
the district courts to review procedures used at
the service academies in the separation or
dismissal of cadets and midshipmen. While it
recognized the "constitutional permissibility of
the military to set and enforce uncommonly high
standards of conduct and ethics," it said that the
courts "have expanded at an accelerated pace the
scope of judicial access for review of military
determinations." Later, in Kolesa v. Lehman,88 it
was opined that it has been well settled that
federal courts have jurisdiction "where there is a
substantial claim that prescribed military
procedures violates one's constitutional rights."
By 1983, the U.S. Congress eventually made
major revisions to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) by expressly providing, among
others; for a direct review by the U.S. Supreme
Court of decisions by the military's highest
appellate authority.89
Even without referring to U.S. cases, the position
of petitioners is still formidable. In this
jurisdiction, Section 1 Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution expanded the scope of judicial
power by mandating that the duty of the courts
of justice includes not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable" but also "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government" even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions.90 Grave abuse of discretion
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction or where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, which must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.91
The proceedings of the Cadet Honor Committee
can, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, be
considered a governmental activity. As ruled in
Andrews:
The relationship between the Cadet Honor
Committee and the separation process at the
Academy has been sufficiently formalized, and is
sufficiently interdependent, so as to bring that
committee's activities within the definition of
governmental activity for the purposes of our
review. While the Academy has long had the
informal practice of referring all alleged
violations to the Cadet Honor Committee, the
relationship between that committee and the
separation process has to a degree been
formalized. x x x
Regardless of whether the relationship be
deemed formal or informal, the Honor
Committee under its own procedures provides
that a single "not guilty" vote by a member ends
the matter, while a "guilty" finding confronts a
cadet with the hard choice of either resigning or
electing to go before a Board of Officers. An
adverse finding there results not only in formal
separation from the Academy but also in a
damaging record that will follow the cadet
through life. Accordingly, we conclude that the
Cadet Honor Committee, acting not unlike a
grand jury, is clearly part of the process whereby
a cadet can ultimately be adjudged to have
violated the Cadet Honor Code and be separated
from the Academy. Therefore, the effect of the
committee's procedures and determinations on
the separation process is sufficiently intertwined
with the formal governmental activity which
may follow as to bring it properly under judicial
review92
No one is above the law, including the military.
In fact, the present Constitution declares it as a
matter of principle that civilian authority is, at all
times, supreme over the military.93 Consistent
with the republican system of checks and
balances, the Court has been entrusted, expressly
or by necessary implication, with both the duty
and the obligation of determining, in appropriate
cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or
executive action.94
SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
Cadet's relinquishment of certain civil liberties
Respondents assert that the standard of rights
applicable to a cadet is not the same as that of a
civilian because the former' s rights have already
been recalibrated to best serve the military
purpose and necessity. They claim that both
Gudani and Lt. Col. Kapunan, Jr. v. Gen. De
Villa95 recognized that, to a certain degree,
individual rights of persons in the military
service may be curtailed by the rules of military
discipline in order to ensure its effectiveness in
fulfilling the duties required to be discharged
under the law. Respondents remind that, as a
military student aspiring to a commissioned post
in the military service, Cadet 1 CL Cudia
voluntarily gave up certain civil and political
rights which the rest of the civilian population
enjoys. The deliberate surrender of certain
freedoms on his part is embodied in the cadets'
Honor Code Handbook. It is noted that at the
beginning of their academic life in the PMA,
Cadet 1 CL Cudia, along with the rest of Cadet
Corps, took an oath and undertaking to stand by
the Honor Code and the Honor System.
To say that a PMA cadet surrenders his
fundamental human rights, including the right to
due process, is, for petitioners, contrary to the
provisions of Section 3, Article II of the 1987
Constitution,96 Executive Order (E.O.) No.
17897 (as amended by E.O. No. 100598), AFP Code
of Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code
and the Honor System, military professionalism,
and, in general, military culture. They maintain
that the HC, the CRAB, and the PMA, grossly and
in bad faith misapplied the Honor Code and the
Honor System in deciding Cadet lCL Cudia's case
considering that these should not be
implemented at the expense of human rights,
due process, and fair play. Further, under the
doctrine of constitutional supremacy, they can
never overpower or defy the 1987 Constitution
since the former should yield to the latter.
Petitioners stress that the statement that "a
cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil
rights and liberties in order for the Code and
System to be implemented" simply pertains to
what cadets have to sacrifice in order to prove
that they are men or women of integrity and
honor, such as the right to entertain vices and
the right to freely choose what they want to say
or do. In the context of disciplinary investigation,
it does not contemplate a surrender of the right
to due process but, at most, refers to the cadets'
rights to privacy and to remain silent.
We concur with the stand of petitioners.
Of course, a student at a military academy must
be prepared to subordinate his private interests
for the proper functioning of the educational
institution he attends to, one that is with a
greater degree than a student at a civilian public
school.99 In fact, the Honor Code and Honor
System Handbook of the PMA expresses that,
"[as] a training environment, the Cadet Corps is a
society which has its own norms. Each member
binds himself to what is good for him, his
subordinates, and his peers. To be part of the
Cadet Corps requires the surrender of some
basic rights and liberties for the good of the
group."100
It is clear, however, from the teachings of
Wasson and Hagopian, which were adopted by
Andrews, that a cadet facing dismissal from the
military academy for misconduct has
constitutionally protected private interests (life,
liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary
proceedings conducted within the bounds of
procedural due process is a must.101 For that
reason, the PMA is not immune from the
strictures of due process. Where a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake
because of what the government is doing to him,
the minimal requirements of the due process
clause must be satisfied.102 Likewise, the cadet
faces far more severe sanctions of being expelled
from a course of college instruction which he or
she has pursued with a view to becoming a
career officer and of probably
being forever denied that career.103
The cases of Gudani and Kapunan, Jr. are
inapplicable as they do not specifically pertain to
dismissal proceedings of a cadet in a military
academy due to honor violation. In Gudani, the
Court denied the petition that sought to annul
the directive from then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, which' enjoined petitioners
from testifying before the Congress without her
consent. We ruled that petitioners may be
subjected to military discipline for their defiance
of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff. On the
other hand, in Kapunan, Jr., this Court upheld the
restriction imposed on petitioner since the
conditions for his "house arrest" (particularly,
that he may not issue any press statements or
give any press conference during the period of
his detention) are justified by the requirements
of military discipline. In these two cases, the
constitutional rights to information,
transparency in matters of public concern, and to
free speech - not to due process clause - were
restricted to better serve the greater military
purpose. Academic freedom of the PMA
Petitioners posit that there is no law providing
that a guilty finding by the HC may be used by
the PMA to dismiss or recommend the dismissal
of a cadet from the PMA. They argue that Honor
Code violation is not among those listed as
justifications for the attrition of cadets
considering that the Honor Code and the Honor
System do not state that a guilty cadet is
automatically terminated or dismissed from
service. To them, the Honor Code and Honor
System are "gentleman's agreement" that cannot
take precedence over public interest - in the
defense of the nation and in view of the
taxpayer's money spent for each cadet.
Petitioners contend that, based on the Civil Code,
all written or verbal agreements are null and
void if they violate the law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, and public safety.
In opposition, respondents claim that the PMA
may impose disciplinary measures and
punishment as it deems fit and consistent with
the peculiar needs of the Academy. Even without
express provision of a law, the PMA has
regulatory authority to administratively dismiss
erring cadets since it is deemed reasonably
written into C.A. No. 1. Moreover, although said
law grants to the President the authority of
terminating a cadet's appointment, such power
may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent,
who may exercise direct supervision and control
over the cadets.
Respondents likewise contend that, as an
academic institution, the PMA has the inherent
right to promulgate reasonable norms, rules and
regulations that it may deem necessary for the
maintenance of school discipline, which is
specifically mandated by Section 3 (2),104 Article
XIV of the 1987 Constitution. As the premiere
military educational institution of the AFP in
accordance with Section 30,105 Article III of C.A.
No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59,106 Chapter 9,
Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of E.O. No. 292
("Administrative Code of 1987"), the PMA is an
institution that enjoys academic freedom
guaranteed by Section 5 (2),107 Article XIV of the
1987 Constitution. In Miriam College
Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,108 it was
held that concomitant with such freedom is the
right and duty to instill and impose discipline
upon its students. Also, consistent with lsabelo,
Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc.109 and
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,110 the
PMA has the freedom on who to admit (and,
conversely, to expel) given the high degree of
discipline and honor expected from its students
who are to form part of the AFP.
For respondents, Cadet 1 CL Cudia cannot,
therefore, belatedly assail the Honor Code as
basis of the HC' s decision to recommend his
dismissal from the PMA. When he enlisted for
enrolment and studied in the PMA for four years,
he knew or should have been fully aware of the
standards of discipline imposed on all cadets and
the corresponding penalty for failing to abide by
these standards.
In their Reply, petitioners counter that, as shown
in lsabelo, Jr. and Ateneo, academic freedom is
not absolute and cannot be exercised in blatant
disregard of the right to due process and the
1987 Constitution. Although schools have the
prerogative to choose what to teach, how to
teach, and who to teach, the same does not go so
far as to deprive a student of the right to
graduate when there is clear evidence that he is
entitled to the same since, in such a case, the
right to graduate becomes a vested right which
takes precedence over the limited and restricted
right of the educational institution.
While both parties have valid points to consider,
the arguments of respondents are more in line
with the facts of this case. We have ruled that the
school-student relationship is contractual in
nature. Once admitted, a student's enrolment is
not only semestral in duration but for the entire
period he or she is expected to complete it.111 An
institution of learning has an obligation to afford
its students a fair opportunity to complete the
course they seek to pursue.112 Such contract is
imbued with public interest because of the high
priority given by the Constitution to education
and the grant to the State of supervisory and
regulatory powers over a educational
institutions.113
The school-student relationship has also been
held as reciprocal. "[It] has consequences
appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of
such kind -it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal
rights and obligations. The school undertakes to
provide students with education sufficient to
enable them to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the students agree
to abide by the academic requirements of the
school and to observe its rules and
regulations."114
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the
institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning,115 has been
enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935, 1973,
and 1987.116 In Garcia, this Court espoused the
concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Felix Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire,117 which enumerated "the four
essential freedoms" of a university: To
determine for itself on academic grounds (1)
who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how
it shall be taught, and (4) who may be admitted
to study.118 An educational institution has the
power to adopt and enforce such rules as may be
deemed expedient for its government, this being
incident to the very object of incorporation, and
indispensable to the successful management of
the college.119 It can decide for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them, free from
outside coercion or interference except when
there is an overriding public welfare which
would call for some restraint.120 Indeed,
"academic freedom has never been meant to be
an unabridged license. It is a privilege that
assumes a correlative duty to exercise it
responsibly. An equally telling precept is a long
recognized mandate, so well expressed in Article
19 of the Civil Code, that every 'person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith."'121
The schools' power to instill discipline in their
students is subsumed in their academic freedom
and that "the establishment of rules governing
university-student relations, particularly those
pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded
as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient
operation of the institution, but to its very
survival."122 As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A
school without discipline is like a mill without
water." Insofar as the water turns the mill, so
does the school's disciplinary power assure its
right to survive and continue operating.123 In this
regard, the Court has always recognized the right
of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions,
which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on
students who violate disciplinary rules.124 In
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,125 this Court elucidated:
The right of the school to discipline its students
is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e.,
"how it shall be taught." A school certainly
cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the
establishment of an educational institution
requires rules and regulations necessary for the
maintenance of an orderly educational program
and the creation of an educational environment
conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations
are equally necessary for the protection of the
students, faculty, and property.
Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching
the student discipline, a necessary, if not
indispensable, value in any field of learning. By
instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline.
Accordingly, the right to discipline the student
likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to
teach." Incidentally, the school not only has the
right but the duty to develop discipline in its
students. The Constitution no less imposes such
duty.
[All educational institutions] shall inculcate
patriotism and nationalism, foster love of
humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation
of the role of national heroes in the historical
development of the country, teach the rights and
duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and
spiritual values, develop moral character and
personal discipline, encourage critical and
creative thinking, broaden scientific and
technological knowledge, and promote
vocational efficiency.
In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline
was a means for the school to carry out its
responsibility to help its students "grow and
develop into mature, responsible, effective and
worthy citizens of the community."
Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the
right to discipline more evident than in "who
may be admitted to study." If a school has the
freedom to determine whom to admit, logic
dictates that it also has the right to determine
whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom
to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension
and the withholding of graduation privileges.126
The power of the school to impose disciplinary
measures extends even after graduation for any
act done by the student prior thereto. In
University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court
of Appeals,127 We upheld the university's
withdrawal of a doctorate degree already
conferred on a student who was found to have
committed intellectual dishonesty in her
dissertation. Thus:
Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that
"[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning." This is nothing
new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973
Constitution likewise provided for the academic
freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional
autonomy of universities and institutions of
higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in
Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to
"institutions of higher learning" which is thus
given "a wide sphere of authority certainly
extending to the choice of students." If such
institution of higher learning can decide who can
and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also
determine on whom it can confer the honor and
distinction of being its graduates.
Where it is shown that the conferment of an
honor or distinction was obtained through fraud,
a university has the right to revoke or withdraw
the honor or distinction it has thus conferred.
This freedom of a university does not terminate
upon the "graduation" of a student, .as the Court
of Appeals held. For it is precisely the
"graduation" of such a student that is in question.
It is noteworthy that the investigation of private
respondent's case began before her graduation.
If she was able to join the graduation ceremonies
on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many
investigations conducted before the Board of
Regents finally decided she should not have been
allowed to graduate.
Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted
to institutions of higher learning, for the
constitutional grant of academic freedom, to
quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology, "is not to
be construed in a niggardly manner or in a
grudging fashion."
Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is
the highest governing body of the University of
the Philippines. It has the power to confer
degrees upon the recommendation of the
University Council. It follows that if the
conferment of a degree is founded on error or
fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered,
subject to the observance of due process, to
withdraw what it has granted without violating a
student's rights. An institution of higher learning
cannot be powerless if it discovers that an
academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully
deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable
than bestowing a university's highest academic
degree upon an individual who has obtained the
same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of
academic excellence is the university's concern.
It should be empowered, as an act of self-
defense, to take measures to protect itself from
serious threats to its integrity.
While it is true that the students are entitled to
the right to pursue their education, the USC as an
educational institution is also entitled to pursue
its academic freedom and in the process has the
concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is
not jeopardized.128
It must be borne in mind that schools are
established, not merely to develop the intellect
and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty
values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the
development, or flowering if you will, of the total
man.129 Essentially, education must ultimately be
religious, i.e., one which inculcates duty and
reverence.130 Under the rubric of "right to
education," students have a concomitant duty to
learn under the rules laid down by the
school.131 Every citizen has a right to select a
profession or, course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirements.132 The PMA is not
different. As the primary training and
educational institution of the AFP, it certainly
has the right to invoke academic freedom in the
enforcement of its internal rules and regulations,
which are the Honor Code and the Honor System
in particular.
The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental
ethical and moral principle. It is the minimum
standard for cadet behavior and serves as the
guiding spirit behind each cadet's action. It is the
cadet's responsibility to maintain the highest
standard of honor. Throughout a cadet's stay in
the PMA, he or she is absolutely bound thereto. It
binds as well the members of the Cadet Corps
from its alumni or the member of the so-called
"Long Gray Line."
Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the
foundation for the cadets' character
development. It defines the desirable values they
must possess to remain part of the Corps; it
develops the atmosphere of trust so essential in
a military organization; and it makes them
professional military soldiers.133 As it is for
character building, it should not only be kept
within the society of cadets. It is best adopted by
the Cadet Corps with the end view of applying it
outside as an officer of the AFP and as a product
of the PMA.134
The Honor Code and System could be justified as
the primary means of achieving the cadets'
character development and as ways by which the
Academy has chosen to identify those who are
deficient in conduct.135Upon the Code rests the
ethical standards of the Cadet Corps and it is also
an institutional goal, ensuring that graduates
have strong character, unimpeachable integrity,
and moral standards of the highest order.136 To
emphasize, the Academy's disciplinary system as
a whole is characterized as "correctional and
educational in nature rather than being legalistic
and punitive." Its purpose is to teach the cadets
"to be prepared to accept full responsibility for
all that they do or fail to do and to place loyalty
to the service above self-interest or loyalty to
friends or associates. "137 Procedural safeguards
in a student disciplinary case
Respondents stress that Guzman v. National
University138 is more appropriate in determining
the minimum standards for the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions.
Similarly, with the guideposts set in Andrews,
they believe that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was accorded
due process.
On the other hand, petitioners argue that the HC,
the CRAB and the PMA fell short in observing the
important safeguards laid down in Ang Tibay v.
CIR139 and Non v. Judge Dames II,140 which set
the minimum standards to satisfy the demands
of procedural due process in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions. For them, Guzman did not
entirely do away with the due process
requirements outlined in Ang Tibay as the Court
merely stated that the minimum requirements in
the Guzman case are more apropos.
Respondents rightly argued.
Ateneo de Manila University v.
Capulong141 already settled the issue as it held
that although both Ang Tibay and Guzman
essentially deal with the requirements of due
process, the latter case is more apropos since it
specifically deals with the minimum standards to
be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions in academic institutions. That Guzman
is the authority on the procedural rights of
students in disciplinary cases was reaffirmed by
the Court in the fairly recent case of Go v. Colegio
De San Juan De Letran.142
In Guzman, the Court held that there are
minimum standards which must be met to
satisfy the demands of procedural due process,
to wit:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of
the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of
the evidence against them; ( 4) they shall have
the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.143
We have been consistent in reminding that due
process in disciplinary cases involving students
does not entail proceedings and hearings similar
to those prescribed for actions and proceedings
in courts of justice;144 that the proceedings may
be summary;145 that cross-examination is not an
essential part of the investigation or
hearing;146 and that the required proof in a
student disciplinary action, which is an
administrative case, is neither proof beyond
reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence
but only substantial evidence or "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion."147
What is crucial is that official action must meet
minimum standards of fairness to the individual,
which generally encompass the right of adequate
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard.148 As held in De La Salle University, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals:149
Notice and hearing is the bulwark of
administrative due process, the right to which is
among the primary rights that must be respected
even in administrative proceedings. The essence
of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side
or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. So long as the
party is given the opportunity to advocate her
cause or defend her interest in due course, it
cannot be said that there was denial of due
process.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and
in all instances, essential to due process - it is
enough that the parties are given a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy and to
present supporting evidence on which a fair
decision can be based. "To be heard" does not
only mean presentation of testimonial evidence
in court - one may also be heard through
pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial
of due process.150
The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that
an administrative proceeding conducted to
investigate a cadet's honor violation need not be
clothed with the attributes of a judicial
proceeding. It articulates that – The Spirit of the
Honor Code guides the Corps in identifying and
assessing misconduct. While cadets are
interested in legal precedents in cases involving
Honor violations, those who hold the Spirit of the
Honor Code dare not look into these precedents
for loopholes to justify questionable acts and
they are not to interpret the system to their own
advantage.
The Spirit of the Honor Code is a way for the
cadets to internalize Honor in a substantive way.
Technical and procedural misgivings of the legal
systems may avert the true essence of imparting
the Spirit of the Code for the reason that it can be
used to make unlawful attempt to get into the
truth of matters especially when a cadet can be
compelled to surrender some civil rights and
liberties in order for the Code and System to be
implemented. By virtue of being a cadet, a
member of the CCAFP becomes a subject of the
Honor Code and System. Cadet's actions are
bound by the existing norms that are logically
applied through the Code and System in order to
realize the Academy's mission to produce
leaders of character - men of integrity and
honor.151
One of the fundamental principles of the Honor
System also states:
2. The Honor System correlates with legal
procedures of the state's Justice System but it
does not demean its Spirit by reducing the Code
to a systematic list of externally observed rules.
Where misinterpretations and loopholes arise
through legalism and its technicalities, the
objective of building the character of the cadets
becomes futile. While, generally, Public Law
penalizes only the faulty acts, the Honor System
tries to examine both the action and the
intention.152
Like in other institutions of higher learning,
there is aversion towards undue judicialization
of an administrative hearing in the military
academy. It has been said that the mission of the
military is unique in the sense that its primary
business is to fight or be ready to fight wars
should the occasion arise, and that over-
proceduralizing military determinations
necessarily gives soldiers less time to accomplish
this task.153 Extensive cadet investigations and
complex due process hearing could sacrifice
simplicity, practicality, and timeliness.
Investigations that last for several days or weeks,
sessions that become increasingly involved with
legal and procedural' points, and legal motions
and evidentiary objections that are irrelevant
and inconsequential tend to disrupt, delay, and
confuse the dismissal proceedings and make
them unmanageable. Excessive delays cannot be
tolerated since it is unfair to the accused, to his
or her fellow cadets, to the Academy, and,
generally, to the Armed Forces. A good balance
should, therefore, be struck to achieve fairness,
thoroughness, and efficiency.154Considering that
the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia is one of first
impression in the sense that this Court has not
previously dealt with the particular issue of a
dismissed cadet's right to due process, it is
necessary for Us to refer to U.S. jurisprudence for
some guidance. Notably, our armed forces have
been patterned after the U.S. Army and the U.S.
military code produced a salutary effect in the
military justice system of the
Philippines.155Hence, pertinent case laws
interpreting the U.S. military code and practices
have persuasive, if not the same, effect in this
jurisdiction.
We begin by stating that U.S. courts have
uniformly viewed that "due process" is a flexible
concept, requiring consideration in each case of a
variety of circumstances and calling for such
procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.156 Hagopian opined:
In approaching the question of what process is
due before governmental action adversely
affecting private interests may properly be
taken, it must be recognized that due process is
not a rigid formula or simple rule of thumb to be
applied undeviatingly to any given set of facts.
On the contrary, it is a flexible concept which
depends upon the balancing of various factors,
including the nature of the private right or
interest that is threatened, the extent to which
the proceeding is adversarial in character, the
severity and consequences of any action that
might be taken, the burden that would be
imposed by requiring use of all or part of the full
panoply of trial-type procedures, and the
existence of other overriding interests, such as
the necessity for prompt action in the conduct of
crucial military operations. The full context must
therefore be considered in each
case.157(Emphasis supplied)
Wasson, which was cited by Hagopian, broadly
outlined the minimum standards of due process
required in the dismissal of a cadet. Thus:
[W]hen the government affects the private
interests of individuals, it may not proceed
arbitrarily but must observe due process of law.
x x x Nevertheless, the flexibility which is
inherent in the concept of due process of law
precludes the dogmatic application of specific
rules developed in one context to entirely
distinct forms of government action. "For,
though 'due process of law' generally implies and
includes actor, reus, judex, regular allegations,
opportunity to answer, and a trial according to
some settled course of judicial proceedings, * * *
yet, this is not universally true." x x x Thus, to
determine in any given case what procedures
due process requires, the court must carefully
determine and balance the nature of the private
interest affected and of the government interest
involved, taking account of history and the
precise circumstances surrounding the case at
hand.
While the government must always have a
legitimate concern with the subject matter
before it may validly affect private interests, in
particularly vital and sensitive areas of
government concern such as national security
and military affairs, the private interest must
yield to a greater degree to the governmental. x x
x Few decisions properly rest so exclusively
within the discretion of the appropriate
government officials than the selection, training,
discipline and dismissal of the future officers of
the military and Merchant Marine. Instilling and
maintaining discipline and morale in these young
men who will be required to bear weighty
responsibility in the face of adversity -- at times
extreme -- is a matter of substantial national
importance scarcely within the competence of
the judiciary. And it cannot be doubted that
because of these factors historically the military
has been permitted greater freedom to fashion
its disciplinary procedures than the civilian
authorities.
We conclude, therefore, that due process only
requires for the dismissal of a Cadet from the
Merchant Marine Academy that he be given a fair
hearing at which he is apprised of the charges
against him and permitted a defense. x x x For
the guidance of the parties x x x the rudiments of
a fair hearing in broad outline are plain. The
Cadet must be apprised of the specific charges
against him. He must be given an adequate
opportunity to present his defense both from the
point of view of time and the use of witnesses
and other evidence. We do not suggest, however,
that the Cadet must be given this opportunity
both when demerits are awarded and when
dismissal is considered. The hearing may be
procedurally informal and need not be
adversarial.158 (Emphasis supplied)
In Andrews, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that
Wasson and Hagopian are equally controlling in
cases where cadets were separated from the
military academy for violation of the Honor
Code. Following the two previous cases, it was
ruled that in order to be proper and immune
from constitutional infirmity, a cadet who is
sought to be dismissed or separated from the
academy must be afforded a hearing, be apprised
of the specific charges against him, and be given
an adequate opportunity to present his or her
defense both from the point of view of time and
the use of witnesses and other
evidence.159 Conspicuously, these vital
conditions are not too far from what We have
already set in Guzman and the subsequent
rulings in Alcuaz v. Philippine School of Business
Administration160 and De La Salle University, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals.161
In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia' s Honor Code violation followed the
prescribed procedure and existing practices in
the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report
from Maj. Hindang. He was then given the
opportunity to explain the report against him. He
was informed about his options and the entire
process that the case would undergo. The
preliminary investigation immediately followed
after he replied and submitted a written
explanation. Upon its completion, the
investigating team submitted a written report
together with its recommendation to the HC
Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the
findings and recommendations. When the honor
case was submitted for formal investigation, a
new team was assigned to conduct the hearing.
During the formal investigation/hearing, he was
informed of the charge against him and given the
right to enter his plea. He had the chance to
explain his side, confront the witnesses against
him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a
thorough discussion of the HC voting members,
he was found to have violated the ' Honor Code.
Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the
review process at the Academy level - from the
OIC of the HC, to the SJA, to the Commandant of
Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A
separate investigation was also conducted by the
HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to
reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted
by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB
members and the PMA senior officers was
constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation
of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to
appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had
issued unfavorable rulings.
It is well settled that by reason of their special
knowledge and expertise gained from the
handling of specific matters falling under their
respective jurisdictions, the factual findings of
administrative tribunals are ordinarily accorded
respect if not finality by the Court, unless such
findings are not supported by evidence or
vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where
the procedure which led to the findings is
irregular; when palpable errors are committed;
or when a grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.162 In
the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, We find no reason
to deviate from the general rule. The grounds
therefor are discussed below seriatim:
As to the right to be represented by a counsel –
For petitioners, respondents must be compelled
to give Cadet 1 CL Cudia the right to be
represented by a counsel who could actively
participate in the proceedings like in the cross-
examination of the witnesses against him before
the CRAB or HC, if remanded. This is because
while the CRAB allowed him to be represented
by a PAO lawyer, the counsel was only made an
observer without any right to intervene and
demand respect of Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
rights.163 According to them, he was not
sufficiently given the opportunity to seek a
counsel and was not even asked if he would like
to have one. He was only properly represented
when it was already nearing graduation day after
his family sought the assistance of the PAO.
Petitioners assert that Guzman is specific in
stating that the erring student has the right to
answer the charges against him or her with the
assistance of counsel, if desired.
On the other hand, respondents cited Lumiqued
v. Exevea164 and Nera v. The Auditor
General165 in asserting that the right to a counsel
is not imperative in administrative investigations
or non-criminal proceedings. Also, based on
Cadet lCL Cudia's academic standing, he is said to
be obviously not untutored to fully understand
his rights and express himself. Moreover, the
confidentiality of the HC proceedings worked
against his right to be represented by a counsel.
In any event, respondents claim that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia was not precluded from seeking a
counsel's advice in preparing his defense prior to
the HC hearing.
Essentially, petitioners claim .. that Cadet lCL
Cudia is guaranteed the right to have his counsel
not just in assisting him in the preparation for
the investigative hearing before the HC and the
CRAB but in participating fully in said hearings.
The Court disagrees.
Consistent with Lumiqued and Nera, there is
nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating that a
party in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to
be represented by counsel. The assistance of a
lawyer, while desirable, is not indispensable.
Further, in Remolona v. Civil Service
Commission,166 the Court held that "a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be
assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of
the charges and of the respondent's capacity to
represent himself, and no duty rests on such
body to furnish the person being investigated
with counsel." Hence, the administrative body is
under no duty to provide the person with
counsel because assistance of counsel is not an
absolute requirement.
More in point is the opinion in Wasson, which
We adopt. Thus:
The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of
fairness is a function of all of the other aspects of
the hearing. Where the proceeding is non-
criminal in nature, where the hearing is
investigative and not adversarial and the
government does not proceed through counsel,
where the individual concerned is mature and
educated, where his knowledge of the events x x
x should enable him to develop the facts
adequately through available sources, and where
the other aspects of the hearing taken as a whole
are fair, due process does not require
representation by counsel.167
To note, U.S. courts, in general, have declined to
recognize a right to representation by counsel, as
a function of due process, in military academy
disciplinary proceedings.168 This rule is
principally motivated by the policy of "treading
lightly on the military domain, with scrupulous
regard for the power and authority of the
military establishment to govern its own affairs
within the broad confines of constitutional due
process" and the courts' views that disciplinary
proceedings are not judicial in nature and should
be kept informal, and that literate and educated
cadets should be able to defend themselves.169 In
Hagopian, it was ruled that the importance of
informality in the proceeding militates against a
requirement that the cadet be accorded the right
to representation by counsel before the
Academic Board and that unlike the welfare
recipient who lacks the training and education
needed to understand his rights and express
himself, the cadet should be capable of doing
so.170In the subsequent case of Wimmer v.
Lehman,171 the issue was not access to counsel
but the opportunity to have counsel, instead of
oneself, examine and cross-examine witnesses,
make objections, and argue the case during the
hearing. Disposing of the case, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was not
persuaded by the argument that an individual of
a midshipman's presumed intelligence, selected
because he is expected to be able to care for
himself and others, often under difficult
circumstances, and who has full awareness of
what he is facing, with counsel's advice, was
deprived of due process by being required to
present his defense in person at an investigatory
hearing.
In the case before Us, while the records are
bereft of evidence that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was
given the option or was able to seek legal advice
prior to and/or during the HC hearing, it is
indubitable that he was assisted by a counsel, a
PAO lawyer to be exact, when the CRAB
reviewed and reinvestigated the case. The
requirement of due process is already satisfied
since, at the very least, the counsel aided him in
the drafting and filing of the Appeal
Memorandum and even acted as an observer
who had no right to actively participate in the
proceedings (such as conducting the cross-
examination). Moreover, not to be missed out are
the facts that the offense committed by Cadet 1
CL Cudia is not criminal in nature; that the
hearings before the HC and the CRAB were
investigative and not adversarial; and that Cadet
lCL Cudia's excellent-academic standing puts him
in the best position to look after his own vested
interest in the Academy.
As to the confidentiality of records of the
proceedings –
Petitioners allege that when Maj. Gen. Lopez
denied in his March 11, 2014 letter Cadet lCL
Cudia's request for documents, footages, and
recordings relevant to the HC hearings, the vital
evidence negating the regularity of the HC trial
and supporting his defense have been surely
overlooked by the CRAB in its case review.
Indeed, for them, the answers on whether Cadet
1 CL Cudia was deprived of due process and
whether he lied could easily be unearthed from
the video and other records of the HC
investigation. Respondents did not deny their
existence but they refused to present them for
the parties and the Court to peruse. In particular,
they note that the Minutes of the HC dated
January 21, 2014 and the HC Formal
Investigation Report dated January 20, 2014
were considered by the CRAB but were not
furnished to petitioners and the Court; hence,
there is no way to confirm the truth of the
alleged statements therein. In their view, failure
to furnish these documents could only mean that
it would be adverse if produced pursuant to
Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.172
For lack of legal basis on PMA' s claim of
confidentiality of records, petitioners contend
that it is the ministerial duty of the HC to submit
to the CRAB, for the conduct of intelligent review
of the case, all its records of the proceedings,
including video footages of the deliberations and
voting. They likewise argue that PMA' s refusal to
release relevant documents to Cadet 1 CL Cudia
under the guise of confidentiality reveals another
misapplication of the Honor Code, which merely
provides: "A cadet who becomes part of any
investigation is subject to the existing
regulations pertaining to rules of confidentiality
and, therefore, must abide to the creed of
secrecy. Nothing shall be disclosed without
proper guidance from those with authority" (IV.
The Honor System, Honor Committee, Cadet
Observer). This provision, they say, does not
deprive Cadet 1 CL Cudia of his right to obtain
copies and examine relevant documents
pertaining to his case.
Basically, petitioners want Us to assume that the
documents, footages, and recordings relevant to
the HC hearings are favorable to Cadet 1 CL
Cudia's cause, and, consequently, to rule that
respondents' refusal to produce and have them
examined is tantamount to the denial of his right
to procedural due process. They are mistaken.
In this case, petitioners have not particularly
identified any documents, witness testimony, or
oral or written presentation of facts submitted at
the hearing that would support Cadet 1 CL
Cudia's defense. The Court may require that an
administrative record be supplemented, but only
"where there is a 'strong showing or bad faith or
improper behavior' on the part of the
agency,"173 both of which are not present here.
Petitioners have not specifically indicated the
nature of the concealed evidence, if any, and the
reason for withholding it. What they did was
simply supposing that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's guilty
verdict would be overturned with the production
and examination of such documents, footages,
and recordings. As will be further shown in the
discussions below, the requested matters, even if
denied, would not relieve Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
predicament. If at all, such denial was a harmless
procedural error since he was not seriously
prejudiced thereby.
As to the ostracism in the PMA –
To petitioners, the CRAB considered only biased
testimonies and evidence because Special Order
No. 1 issued on February 21, 2014, which
directed the ostracism of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, left
him without any opportunity, to secure
statements of his own witnesses. He could not
have access to or approach the cadets who were
present during the trial and who saw the 8-1
voting result. It is argued that the Order directing
Cadet 1 CL Cudia's ostracism is of doubtful legal
validity because the Honor Code unequivocally
announced: "x x x But by wholeheartedly
dismissing the cruel method of ostracizing Honor
Code violators, PMA will not have to resort to
other humiliating means and shall only have the
option to make known among its alumni the
names of those who have not sincerely felt
remorse for violating the Honor Code."
On their part, respondents assert that neither the
petition nor the petition-in-intervention
attached a full text copy of the alleged Special
Order No. 1. In any case, attributing its issuance
to PMA is improper and misplaced because of
petitioners' admission that ostracism has been
absolutely dismissed as an Academy-sanctioned
activity consistent with the trend in
International Humanitarian Law that the PMA
has included in its curriculum. Assuming that
said Order was issued, respondents contend that
it purely originated from the cadets themselves,
the sole purpose of which was to give a strong
voice to the Cadet Corps by declaring that they
did not tolerate Cadet 1 CL Cudia's honor
violation and breach of confindentiality of the HC
proceedings.
More importantly, respondents add that it is
highly improbable and unlikely that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia was ostracized by his fellow cadets. They
manifest that as early as January 22, 2014, he
was already transferred to the Holding Center.
The practice of billeting an accused cadet at the
Holding Center is provided for in the Honor Code
Handbook. Although within the PMA compound,
the Holding Center is off-limits to cadets who do
not have any business to conduct therein. The
cadets could not also ostracize him during mess
times since Cadet 1 CL Cudia opted to take his
meals at the Holding Center. The circumstances
obtaining when Special Order No. 1 was issued
clearly foreclose the possibility that he was
ostracized in common areas accessible to other
cadets. He remained in the Holding Center until
March 16, 2014 when he voluntarily left the
PMA. Contrary to his claim, guests were also free
to visit him in the Holding Center.
However, petitioners swear that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia suffered from ostracism in the PMA. The
practice was somehow recognized by
respondents in their Consolidated Comment and
by PMA Spokesperson Maj. Flores in a news
report. The CHR likewise confirmed the same in
its Resolution dated May 22, 2014. For them, it
does not matter where the ostracism order
originated from because the PMA appeared to
sanction it even if it came from the cadets
themselves. There was a tacit approval of an
illegal act. If not, those cadets responsible for
ostracism would have been charged by the PMA
officials. Finally, it is claimed that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia did not choose to take his meals at the
Holding Center as he was not allowed to leave
the place. Petitioners opine that placing the
accused cadet in the Holding Center is
inconsistent with his or her presumed innocence
and certainly gives the implication of ostracism.
We agree with respondents. Neither the petition
nor the petition-inintervention attached a full
text copy or even a pertinent portion of the
alleged Special Order No. 1, which authorized the
ostracism of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Being hearsay, its
existence and contents are of doubtful veracity.
Hence, a definite ruling on the matter can never
be granted in this case.
The Court cannot close its eyes though on what
appears to be an admission of Cadet 1 CL Mogol
during the CHR hearing that, upon consultation
with the entire class, the baron, and the Cadet
Conduct Policy Board, they issued an ostracism
order against Cadet 1 CL Cudia.174 While not
something new in a military
academy,175ostracism's continued existence in
the modem times should no longer be
countenanced. There are those who argue that
the "silence" is a punishment resulting in the loss
of private interests, primarily that of reputation,
and that such penalty may render illusory the
possibility of vindication by the reviewing body
once found guilty by the HC.176 Furthermore, in
Our mind, ostracism practically denies the
accused cadet's protected rights to present
witnesses or evidence in his or her behalf and to
be presumed innocent until finally proven
otherwise in a proper proceeding.
As to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's stay in the Holding
Center, the Court upholds the same. The Honor
Code and Honor System Handbook provides that,
in case a cadet has been found guilty by the HC of
violating the Honor Code and has opted not to
resign, he or she may stay and wait for the
disposition of the case. In such event, the cadet is
not on full-duty status and shall be billeted at the
HTG Holding Center.177 Similarly, in the U.S., the
purpose of "Boarders Ward" is to quarter those
cadets who are undergoing separation actions.
Permitted to attend classes, the cadet is
sequestered , therein until final disposition of the
case. In Andrews, it was opined that the
segregation of cadets in the Ward was a proper
exercise of the discretionary authority of
Academy officials. It relied on the traditional
doctrine that "with respect to decisions made by
Army authorities, 'orderly government requires
us to tread lightly on the military domain, with
scrupulous regard for the power and authority of
the military establishment to govern its own
affairs within the broad confines of
constitutional due process.'" Also, in Birdwell v.
Schlesinger,178 the "administrative segregation"
was held to be a reasonable exercise of military
discipline and could not be considered an
invasion of the rights to freedom of speech and
freedom of association.
Late and vague decisions –
It is claimed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was kept in
the dark as to the charge against him and the
decisions arrived at by the HC, the CRAB, and the
PMA. No written decision was furnished to him,
and if any, the information was unjustly belated
and the justifications for the decisions were
vague. He had to constantly seek clarification
and queries just to be apprised of what he was
confronted with.
Petitioners relate that upon being informed of
the "guilty" verdict, Cadet 1 CL Cudia
immediately inquired as to the grounds therefor,
but Cadet 1 CL Mogol answered that it is
confidential since he would still appeal the same.
By March 11, 2014, Maj. Gen. Lopez informed
Cadet 1 CL Cudia that the CRAB already
forwarded their recommendation for his
dismissal to the General Headquarters sometime
in February-March 2014. Even then, he received
no decision/recommendation on his case,
verbally or in writing. The PMA commencement
exercises pushed through with no written
decision from the CRAB or the PMA on his
appeal. The letter from the Office of the Adjutant
General of the AFP was suspiciously delayed
when the Cudia family received the same only on
March 20, 2014. Moreover, it fell short in laying
down with specificity the factual and legal bases
used by the CRAB and even by the Office of the
Adjutant General. There remains no proof that
the CRAB and the PMA considered the evidence
presented by Cadet 1 CL Cudia, it being uncertain
as to what evidence was weighed by the CRAB,
whether the same is substantial, and whether the
new evidence submitted by him was ever taken
into account.
In refutation, respondents allege the existence of
PMA's· practice of orally declaring the HC
finding, not putting it in a written document so
as to protect the integrity of the erring cadet and
guard the confidentiality of the HC proceedings
pursuant to the Honor System. Further, they aver
that a copy of the report of the CRAB, dated
March 10, 2014, was not furnished to Cadet 1 CL
Cudia because it was his parents who filed the
appeal, hence, were the ones who were given a
copy thereof.
Petitioners' contentions have no leg to stand on.
While there is a constitutional mandate stating
that "[no] decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based,"179 such provision does not apply in Cadet
1 CL Cudia's case. Neither Guzman nor Andrews
require a specific form and content of a decision
issued in disciplinary proceedings. The Honor
Code and Honor System Handbook also has no
written rule on the matter. Even if the provision
applies, nowhere does it demand that a point-by-
point consideration and resolution of the issues
raised by the parties are necessary.180 What
counts is that, albeit furnished to him late, Cadet
1 CL Cudia was informed of how it was decided,
with an explanation of the factual and legal
reasons that led to the conclusions of the
reviewing body, assuring that it went through
the processes of legal reasoning. He was not left
in the dark as to how it was reached and he
knows exactly the reasons why he lost, and is
able to pinpoint the possible errors for review.
As to the blind adoption of the HC findings –
Petitioners assert that, conformably with
Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1, only President
Aquino as the Commander-in-Chief has the
power to appoint and remove a cadet for a
valid/legal cause. The law gives no authority to
the HC as the sole body to determine the guilt or
innocence of a cadet. It also does not empower
the PMA to adopt the guilty findings of the HC as
a basis for recommending the cadet's dismissal.
In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, it is claimed that
the PMA blindly followed the HC's finding of guilt
in terminating his military service.
Further, it is the ministerial duty of the CRAB to
conduct a review de nova of all records without
requiring Cadet 1 CL Cudia to submit new
evidence if it is physically impossible for him to
do so. In their minds, respondents cannot claim
that the CRAB and the PMA thoroughly reviewed
the HC recommendation and heard Cadet lCL
Cudia's side. As clearly stated in the letter from
the Office of the AFP Adjutant General, "[in] its
report dated March 10, 2014, PMA CRAB
sustained the findings and recommendations of
the Honor Committee x x x It also resolved the
appeal filed by the subject Cadet." However, the
Final Investigation Report of the CRAB was dated
March 23, 2014. While such report states that a
report was submitted to the AFP General
Headquarters on March 10, 2014 and that it was
only on March 12, 2014 that it was designated as
a Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, it is
unusual that the CRAB would do the same things
twice. This raised a valid and well-grounded
suspicion that the CRAB never undertook an in-
depth investigation/review the first time it came
out with its report, and the Final Investigation
Report was drafted merely as an afterthought
when the lack of written decision was pointed
out by petitioners so as to remedy the apparent
lack of due process during the CRAB
investigation and review.
Despite the arguments, respondents assure that
there was a proper assessment of the procedural
and legal correctness of the guilty verdict against
Cadet 1 CL Cudia. They assert that the higher
authorities of the PMA did not merely rely on the
findings of the HC, noting that there was also a
separate investigation conducted by the HTG
from January 25 to February 7, 2014. Likewise,
contrary to the contention of petitioners that the
CRAB continued with the review of the case
despite the absence of necessary documents, the
CRAB conducted its own review of the case and
even conducted another investigation by
constituting the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body. For respondents,
petitioners failed to discharge the burden of
proof in showing bad faith on the part of the
PMA. In the absence of evidence to the contrary
and considering further that petitioners'
allegations are merely self-serving and baseless,
good faith on the part of the PMA' s higher
authorities is presumed and should, therefore,
prevail.
We agree with respondents.
The Honor Committee, acting on behalf of the
Cadet Corps, has a limited role of investigating
and determining whether or not the alleged
offender has actually violated the Honor
Code.181 It is given the responsibility of
administering the Honor Code and, in case of
breach, its task is entirely investigative,
examining in the first instance a suspected
violation. As a means of encouraging self-
discipline, without ceding to it any authority to
make final adjudications, the Academy has
assigned it the function of identifying suspected
violators.182 Contrary to petitioners' assertion,
the HC does not have the authority to order the
separation of a cadet from the Academy. The
results of its proceedings are purely
recommendatory and have no binding effect. The
HC determination is somewhat like an
indictment, an allegation, which, in Cadet 1 CL
Cudia's case, the PMA-CRAB investigated de
novo.183 In the U.S., it was even opined that due
process safeguards do not actually apply at the
Honor Committee level because it is only a
"charging body whose decisions had no effect
other than to initiate de nova proceedings before
a Board of Officers."184
Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC is
covered by the due process clause and that
irregularities in its proceedings were in fact
committed, still, We cannot rule for petitioners.
It is not required that procedural due process be
afforded at every stage of developing
disciplinary action. What is required is that an
adequate hearing be held before the final act of
dismissing a cadet from the military
academy.185 In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the
OIC of HC, the SJA, the Commandant of Cadets,
and the PMA Superintendent reviewed the HC
findings. A separate investigation was also
conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive
of the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a
review was conducted by the CRAB. Finally, a
Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body
composed of the CRAB members and the PMA
senior officers was constituted to conduct a
deliberate investigation of the case. The
Board/Body actually held hearings on March 12,
13, 14 and 20, 2014. Instead of commendation,
petitioners find it "unusual" that the CRAB would
do the same things twice and suspect that it
never undertook an in-depth
investigation/review the first time it came out
with its report. Such assertion is mere conjecture
that deserves scant consideration.
As to the dismissal proceedings as sham trial –
According to petitioners, the proceedings before
the HC were a sham. The people behind Cadet
ICL Cudia's charge, investigation, and conviction
were actually the ones who had the intent to
deceive and who took advantage of the situation.
Cadet 1 CL Raguindin, who was a senior HC
member and was the second in rank to Cadet 1
CL Cudia in the Navy cadet 1 CL, was part of the
team which conducted the preliminary
investigation. Also, Cadet I CL Mogol, the HC
Chairman, previously charged Cadet 1 CL Cudia
with honor violation allegedly for cheating
(particularly, conniving with and tutoring his
fellow cadets on a difficult topic by giving
solutions to a retake exam) but the charge was
dismissed for lack of merit. Even if he was a non-
voting member, he was in a position of influence
and authority. Thus, it would be a futile exercise
for Cadet 1 CL Cudia to resort to the procedure
for the removal of HC members.186
Further, no sufficient prior notice of the
scheduled CRAB hearing was given to Cadet I CL
Cudia, his family, or his PAO counsel. During one
of her visits to him in the Holding Center,
petitioner-intervenor was advised to convince
his son to resign and immediately leave the PMA.
Brig. Gen. Costales, who later became the CRAB
Head, also categorically uttered to Annavee:
"Your brother, he lied!" The CRAB conferences
were merely used to formalize his dismissal and
the PMA never really intended to hear his side.
For petitioners, these are manifestations of
PMA's clear resolve to dismiss him no matter
what.
For their part, respondents contend that the
CllR's allegation that Maj. Hindang acted in
obvious bad faith and that he failed to discharge
his duty to be a good father of cadets when he
"paved the road to [Cadet 1 CL Cudia's] sham
trial by the Honor Committee" is an unfounded
accusation. They note that when Maj. Hindang
was given the DR of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, he revoked
the penalty awarded because of his explanation.
However, all revocations of awarded penalties
are subject to the review of the STO. Therefore, it
was at the instance of Maj. Leander and the
established procedure followed at the PMA that
Maj. Hindang was prompted to investigate the
circumstances surrounding Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
tardiness. Respondents add that bad faith cannot
likewise be imputed against Maj. Hindang by
referring to the actions taken by Maj. Jekyll
Dulawan, the CTO of Cadets 1 CL Narciso and
Arcangel who also arrived late for their next
class. Unlike the other cadets, Cadet 1 CL Cudia
did not admit his being late and effectively
evaded responsibility by ascribing his tardiness
to Dr. Costales.
As to the CHR' s finding that Cadet 1 CL Mogol
was likewise "in bad faith and determined to
destroy [Cadet 1 CL] Cudia, for reasons of his
own" because the former previously reported
the latter for an honor violation in November
2013, respondents argue that the bias ascribed
against him is groundless as there is failure to
note that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was a non-voting
member of the HC. Further, he cannot be faulted
for reporting a possible honor violation since he
is the HC Chairman and nothing less is expected
of him. Respondents emphasize that the
representatives of the HC are elected from each
company, while the HC Chairman is elected by
secret ballot from the incoming first class
representatives. Thus, if Cadet 1 CL Cu'dia
believed that there was bias against him, he
should have resorted to the procedure for the
removal of HC members provided for in the
Honor Code Handbook.
Finally, respondents declare that there is no
reason or ill-motive on the part of the PMA to
prevent Cadet 1 CL Cudia from graduating
because the Academy does not stand to gain
anything from his dismissal. On the contrary, in
view of his academic standing, the separation
militates against PMA' s mission to produce
outstanding, honorable, and exceptional cadets.
The Court differs with petitioners.
Partiality, like fraudulent intent, can never be
presumed. Absent some showing of actual bias,
petitioners' allegations do not hold water. The
mere imputation of ill-motive without proof is
speculative at best. Kolesa teaches us that to
sustain the challenge, specific evidence must be
presented to overcome
a presumption of honesty and integrity in those
serving as adjudicators; and it must convince
that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weaknesses, conferring
investigative and adjudicative powers on the
same individual poses such a risk of actual bias
or prejudgment that the practice must be
forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
implemented.187
Although a CTO like Maj. Hindang must decide
whether demerits are to be awarded, he is not an
adversary of the cadet but an educator who
shares an identity of interest with the cadet,
whom he counsels from time to time as a future
leader.188 When the occasion calls for it, cadets
may be questioned as to the accuracy or
completeness of a submitted work. A particular
point or issue may be clarified. In this case, the
question asked of Cadet 1 CL Cudia concerning
his being late in class is proper, since there is
evidence indicating that a breach of regulation
may have occurred and there is reasonable cause
to believe that he was involved in the breach of
regulations.189
For lack of actual proof of bad faith or ill-motive,
the Court shall rely on the non-toleration clause
of the Honor Code, i.e., "We do not tolerate those
who violate the Code." Cadets are reminded that
they are charged with a tremendous duty far
more superior to their personal feeling or
friendship.190 They must learn to help others by
guiding them to accept the truth and do what is
right, rather than tolerating actions against truth
and justice.191Likewise, cadets are presumed to
be characteristically honorable; they cannot
overlook or arbitrarily ignore the dishonorable
action of their peers, seniors, or
subordinates.192 These are what Cadet 1 CL
Mogol exactly did, although he was later proven
to have erred in his accusation. Note that even
the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook
recognizes that interpretation of one's honor is
generally subjective.193
Moreover, assuming, for the sake of argument,
that Cadets 1 CL' Raguindin and Mogol as well as
Brig. Gen. Costales have an axe to grind against
Cadet 1 CL Cudia and were bent on causing, no
matter what, the latter's downfall, their
nefarious conduct would still be insignificant.
This is so since the HC (both the preliminary and
formal investigation), the CRAB, and the Fact-
Finding Board/Investigating Body are collegial
bodies. Hence, the claim that the
proceedings/hearings conducted were merely a
farce because the three personalities
participated therein is tantamount to implying
the existence of a conspiracy, distrusting the
competence, independence, and integrity of the
other members who constituted the majority.
Again, in the absence of specifics and substantial
evidence, the Court cannot easily give credence
to this baseless insinuation.
As to the HC executive session/chambering –
Petitioners narrate that there was an irregular
administrative hearing in the case of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia because two voting rounds took place.
After the result of the secret balloting, Cadet 1 CL
Mogol ordered the voting members to go to a
room without the cadet recorders. Therein, the
lone dissenter, Cadet lCL Lagura, was asked to
explain his "not guilty" vote. Pressured to change
his vote, he was made to cast a new one finding
Cadet 1 CL Cudia guilty. The original ballot was
discarded and replaced. There was no record of
the change in vote from 8-1 to 9-0 that was
mentioned in the HC formal report.
The Affidavit of Commander Junjie B. Tabuada
executed on March 6, 2014 was submitted by
petitioners since he purportedly recalled Cadet 1
CL Lagura telling him that he was pressured to
change his "not guilty" vote after the voting
members were "chambered." In the sworn
statement, Commander Tabuada said:
1. That after CDT lCL CUDIA [was]
convicted for honor violation, I [cannot]
remember exactly the date but
sometime in the morning of 23rd or
24th of January 2014, I was in my office
filling up forms for the renewal of my
passport, CDT 1CL LAGURA entered
and had business with my staff;
2. When he was about to leave I called
him. "Lags, halika muna dito," and he
approached me and I let him sit down
on the chair in front of my table. I told
and asked him, "Talagang nadali si
Cudia ah ... ano ha ang nangyari? Mag-
Tagalog or mag-Bisaya ka." He replied,
"Talagang NOT GUILTY ang vote ko sa
kanya sir", and I asked him, "Oh, bakit
naging guilty di ha pag may isang nag
NOT GUILTY, abswelto na? He replied
"Chinamber ako sir, bale pinapa-justify
kung bakit NOT GUILTY vote ko, at na-
pressure din ako sir kaya binago ko,
sir." So, I told him, "Sayang sya,
matalino at mabait pa naman" and he
replied "oo nga sir". After that
conversation, I let him go.194
It is claimed that the HC gravely abused its
discretion when it committed voting
manipulation since, under the rules, it is
required to have a unanimous nine (9) votes
finding an accused cadet guilty. There is nothing
in the procedure that permits the HC Chairman
to order the "chambering" of a member who
voted contrary to the majority and subjects him
or her to reconsider in order to reflect a
unanimous vote. Neither is there an order from
the Chief of Staff or the President sanctioning the
HC procedure or approving any change therein
pursuant to Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1. The
HC, the CRAB, and the PMA violated their own
rules and principles as embodied in the Honor
Code. Being a clear deviation from the
established procedures, the second deliberation
should be considered null and void.
Petitioners further contend that the requirement
of unanimous vote involves a substantive right
which cannot be unceremoniously changed
without a corresponding amendment/revision in
the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook. In
their view, "chambering" totally defeats the
purpose of voting by secret ballot as it glaringly
destroys the very essence and philosophy behind
the provisions of the Honor System, which is to
ensure that the voting member is free to vote
what is in his or her heart and mind and that no
one can pressure or persuade another to change
his or her vote. They suggest that if one voting
member acquits an accused cadet who is
obviously guilty of the offense, the solution is to
remove him or her from the HC through the vote
of non-confidence as provided for in the Honor
Code.195 Anent the above arguments,
respondents contend that a distinction must be
made between the concepts of the Honor Code
and the Honor System. According to them, the
former sets the standard for a cadet's, minimum
ethical and moral behavior and does not change,
while the latter is a set of rules for the conduct of
the observance and implementation of the·
Honor Code and may undergo necessary
adjustments as may be warranted by the
incumbent members of the HC in order to be
more responsive to the moral training and
character development of the cadets. The HC
may provide guidelines when the Honor System
can be used to supplement regulations. This
being so, the voting process is continuously
subject to change.
Respondents note that, historically, a non-
unanimous guilty verdict automatically acquits a
cadet from the charge of Honor violation. The
voting members only write either "guilty" or "not
guilty" in the voting sheets without stating their
name or their justification. However, this
situation drew criticisms since there were
instances where a reported cadet already
admitted his honor violation but was acquitted
due to the lone vote of a sympathetic voting
member.
In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the HC adopted
an existing practice that should the voting result
in 7-2 or 8-1 the HC would automatically
sanction a jury type of discussion called
"executive session" or "chambering," which is
intended to elicit the explanation and insights of
the voting member/s. This prevents the tyranny
of the minority or lone dissenter from prevailing
over the manifest proof of guilt. The assailed
voting practice has been adopted and widely
accepted by the PMA Siklab Diwa Class of 2014
since their first year in the Academy. The
allegations of conspiracy and sham trial are,
therefore, negated by the fact that such practice
was in place and applied to all cases of honor
violations, not solely to the case of Cadet 1CL
Cudia.
It is emphasized by respondents that any
decision to change vote rests solely on the
personal conviction of the dissenter/s, without
any compulsion from the other voting members.
There can also be no pressuring to change one's
vote to speak of since a vote may only be
considered as final when the Presiding Officer
has affixed his signature.
To debunk Commander Tabuada's statements,
respondents raise the argument that the Fact-
Finding Board/Investigating Body summoned
Cadet 1 CL Lagura for inquiry. Aside from his
oral testimony made under oath, he submitted to
the Board/Body an affidavit explaining that:
11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I
went to the Department of Naval Warfare to ask
permission if it is possible not to attend the Navy
duty for the reason that I will be attending our
baseball game outside the Academy.
12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy
Duty and when I was about to exit out of the
Office, CDR JUNJIE B T ABU ADA PN, our Head
Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my
attention. I approached him and he said:
"Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang
nangyari?" At first, I was hesitant to answer
because of the confidentiality of the Honor
Committee proceedings. He again said: "Wag
kang mag-alala, atin, atin lang ito, alam ko naman
na bawal magsabi." Then I answered: "Ako yung
isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung] Presiding Officer
nagsabi na pumunta muna kami sa Chamber.
Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung] mga
nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung
bakit ang boto nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh
naliwanagan ako. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from
Not Guilty to Guilty Sir." He replied: "Sayang si
Cudia ano?" And I said: "Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si
Cudia, mabait pa naman at matalino."196
Cadet 1 CL Lagura restated the above in the
Counter-Affidavit executed on March 12, 2014,
which he submitted before the CHR wherein he
attested to the following:
3. I was chosen to be a voting member
of the Honor Committee for Honor
Code violation committed by Cadet
Cudia, for "lying". As a voting member,
we are the one who assess or
investigate the case whether the
reported Cadet is Guilty for his actions
or not.
4. I was the only one who INITIALLY
voted "NOT GUILTY" among the nine
(9) voting members of the Honor
Committee in the case of Cdt Cudia for
Lying.
5. I initially voted "NOT GUILTY" for the
reason that after the proceedings and
before the presiding Officer told the
members to vote, I was confused of the
case of Cadet Cudia. I have gathered
some facts from the investigation to
make my decision but for me it is not
yet enough to give my verdict of guilty
to Cdt Cudia so I decided to vote "NOT
GUILTY" with a reservation in my mind
that we will still be discussing our
verdicts if we will arrive at 8-1 or 7-2.
Thus, I can still change my vote if I may
be enlightened with the other's
justifications.
6. After the votes were collected, the
Presiding Officer told us that the vote is
8 for guilty and 1 for not guilty. By way
of practice and as I predicted, we were
told to go inside the anteroom for
executive meeting and to discuss our
respective justifications. I have been a
member for two (2) years and the
voting committee will always go for
executive meeting whenever it will
meet 8-1 or 7-2 votes.
7. I listened to them and they listened
to me, then I saw things that
enlightened my confusions that time. I
gave a thumbs-up sign and asked for
another sheet of voting paper. I then
changed my vote from "NOT GUILTY"
to "GUILTY" and the voting members of
the Honor Committee came up with the
final vote of nine (9) votes for guilty
and zero (0) votes for not guilty.
9. Cdt Cudia was called inside the
courtroom and told that the verdict
was GUILTY of LYING. After that, all
persons inside the courtroom went
back to barracks.
10. Right after I changed to sleeping
uniform, I was approached by Cdt
Jocson and Cdt Cudia, inquiring and
said: "Bakit ka naman nagpalit ng boto?
., I answered: "Nasa process yan, may
mali talaga sa rason mo." They also
asked who were inside the Chamber
and I mentioned only Cdt Arlegui and
Cdt Mogol. That was the last time that
Cdt Cudia and Cdt Jocson talked to me.
11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of
January 2014, I went to the Department
of Naval Warfare to asked (sic)
permission if it is possible not to attend
the Navy duty for the reason that I will
be attending our baseball game outside
the Academy.
12. After I was permitted not to attend
my Navy Duty and when I was about to
exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B
TABUADA PN, our Head Department
Naval Warfare Officer, called my
attention. I approached him and he
said: "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano
ba talaga ang nangyari?" At first, I was
hesitant to answer because of the
confidentiality of the Honor Committee
proceedings. He again said: "Wag kang
mag-alala, atin, atin lang ito, alam ko
naman na bawal magsabi. " Then I
answered: "Ako yung isang not guilty
Sir. Kaya [yung} Presiding Officer
nagsabi na pumunta muna kami sa
Chamher. Nung nasa chamber kami,
nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote ng Guilty
tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang
boto nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh
naliwanagan aka. Pinalitan ko yung
boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir. "
He replied: "Sayang si Cudia ano?" And
I said: "Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia,
mabait pa naman at matalino. "197
Still not to be outdone, petitioners argue that the
very fact that Cadet 1 CL Lagura, as the lone
dissenter, was made to explain in the presence of
other HC members, who were in disagreement
with him, gives a semblance of intimidation,
force, or pressure. For them, the records of the
HC proceedings, which were not presented
assuming they actually exist, could have been the
best way to ensure that he was free to express
his views, reject the opinion of the majority, and
stick to his decision. Also, it was pointed out that
Cadet 1 CL Lagura failed to clearly explain in his
affidavit why he initially found Cadet 1 CL Cudia
"not guilty" and what made him change his mind.
His use of general statements like he "was
confused of the case " and "saw things that
enlightened my confusions " could hardly suffice
to establish why he changed his vote. Finally,
petitioners note the admission of ·Cadet 1 CL
Lagura during the CHR investigation that he was
the only one who was given another ballot sheet
while in the chamber and that he accomplished it
in the barracks which he only submitted the
following day. However, as the CHR found, the
announcement of the 9-0 vote was done
immediately after the HC came out from the
chamber and before Cadet 1 CL Lagura
submitted his accomplished ballot sheet.
We rule for respondents.
As to the manner of voting by the HC members,
the Honor Code tersely provides:
After a thorough discussion and deliberation, the
presiding member of the Board will call for the
members to vote whether the accused is GUILTY
or NOT GUILTY. A unanimous vote (9 votes) of
GUILTY decides that a cadet is found guilty of
violating the Honor Code.198
From the above-quoted provision, it readily
appears that the HC practice of conducting
"executive session" or "chambering" is not at all
prohibited. The HC is given leeway on the voting
procedures in' actual cases taking into account
the exigency of the times. What is important is
that, in the end, there must be a unanimous nine
votes in order to hold a cadet guilty of violating
the Honor Code.
Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC
violated its written procedure,199 We still rule
that there is nothing inherently wrong with the
practice of "chambering" considering that the
presence of intimidation or force cannot
automatically be inferred therefrom. The essence
of secret balloting and the freedom to vote based
on what is in the heart and mind of the voting
member is not necessarily diluted by the fact
that a second/final voting was conducted. As
explained by Cadet 1CL Mogol before the CRAB:
13. x x x [The] dissenting voter would have to
explain his side and insights regarding the case
at hand. The other members, on the other hand,
would be given the chance to explain their votes
as well as their insights to the dissenting voter.
The decision to change the vote of the dissenting
voter rests solely on his personal conviction.
Thus, if he [or she] opted not to change his/her
vote despite the discussion, his [or her] vote is
accorded respect by the Honor Committee.200
It is elementary that intimidation or force is
never presumed. Mere allegation is definitely not
evidence.1âwphi1 It must be substantiated and
proved because a person is presumed to be
innocent of a crime or wrong and that official
duty has been regularly performed.201
The oral and written statements of Cadet 1 CL
Lagura should settle the issue. Before the Fact-
Finding Board/Investigating Body and the CHR,
he consistently denied that he was pressured by
the other voting members of the HC. His
representation must be accepted as it is
regardless of whether he has satisfactorily
elaborated his decision to change his vote. Being
the one who was "chambered," he is more
credible to clarify the issue. In case of doubt, We
have to rely on the faith that Cadet 1 CL Lagura
observed the Honor Code, which clearly states
that every cadet must be his or her own Final'
Authority in honor; that he or she should not let
other cadets dictate on him or her their sense of
honor.202 Moreover, the Code implies that any
person can have confidence that a cadet and any
graduate of the PMA will be fair and just in
dealing with him; that his actions, words and
ways are sincere and true.203
As to the other alleged "irregularities"
committed such as not putting on record the
initial/first voting and Cadet 1CL Lagura's
bringing of his ballot sheet to and accomplishing
it in the barracks, the Court shall no longer dwell
on the same for being harmless procedural
errors that do not materially affect the validity of
the HC proceedings.
Cadet 1 CL Cudia 's alleged untruthful statements
Petitioners insist that Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not
lie. According to them, there is no clear time
reference as to when was the actual dismissal or
what was the exact time of dismissal - whether it
should be the dismissal inside the room or the
dismissal after the section grade was given by
Dr. Costales -in the minds of Cadet 1 CL Cudia,
Maj. Hindang, and the HC investigators and
voting members. They claim that during long
examinations, the time of dismissal was usually
five minutes before the class was set to end and
the protocol of dismissing the class 15 minutes
earlier was not observed. When Maj. Hindang
stated in accusatory language that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia perverted the truth by stating that OR432
class ended at 1500H, he did not state what was
the true time of dismissal. He did not mention
whether the truth he was relying on was 5 or 15
minutes before the scheduled end of class.
It is also averred that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's only
business was to ask Dr. Costales a query such
that his business was already finished as soon as
she gave an answer. However, a new business
was initiated by Dr. Costales, which is, Cadet 1 CL
Cudia must stay and wait for the section grade.
At that point in time, he was no longer in control
of the circumstances. Petitioners claim that Dr.
Costales never categorically stated that Cadet lCL
Cudia was lying. She recognized the confusion.
Her text messages to him clarified his alleged
violation. Also, the CHR noted during its
investigation that she could not exactly recall
what happened in her class on November 14,
2013.
Furthermore, petitioners reasoned out that
when respondents stated that ENG412 class
started at 3:05 p.m., it proves that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia was obviously not late. If, as indicated in
his Delinquency Report, he was late two (2)
minutes in his 1500-1600H class in ENG 412, he
must have arrived 3:02 p.m. Respondents,
however, claim that the class started at 3:05 p.m.
Thus, Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not late.
Relative to his explanation to the delinquency
report, petitioners were of the view that what
appears to have caused confusion in the minds of
respondents is just a matter of semantics; that
the entire incident was a product of inaccuracy,
not lying. It is malicious for them to insinuate
that Cadet 1 CL Cudia purposely used incorrect
language to hide the truth. Citing Merriam
Webster's Dictionary, petitioners argue that
"dismiss" means to permit or cause to leave,
while "class" refers to a body of students meeting
regularly to study the same subject. According to
them, these two words do not have definite and
precise meanings but are generic terms. Other
than the words "class" and "dismiss" used by
Cadet 1 CL Cudia, which may actually be used in
their generic sense, there is nothing deceiving
about what he said. Thus, the answer he chose
might be wrong or not correct, but it is not false
or not true.
For petitioners, Cadet lCL Cudia's explanations
are evidently truthful and with no intent to
deceive or mislead. He did not manipulate any
fact and was truthful of his explanation. His ..
statements were clear and unambiguous but
were given a narrow-minded interpretation.
Even the Honor Code acknowledges that
"[e]xperience demonstrates that human
communication is imperfect at best, and some
actions are often misinterpreted."
Lastly, petitioners contend that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia's transcript of records reflects not only his
outstanding academic performance but proves
his good conduct during his four-year stay in the
Academy. He has above-average grades in
Conduct, with grades ranging from 96 to 100 in
Conduct I to XI. His propensity to lie is, therefore,
far from the truth.
On the other hand, respondents were equally
adamant to contend that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was
obviously quibbling, which, in the military
parlance, is tantamount to lying. He fell short in
telling a simple truth. He lied by making
untruthful statements in his written explanation.
Respondents want Us to consider the following:
First, their OR432 class was not dismissed late.
During the formal investigation, Dr. Costales
testified that a class is dismissed as long as the
instructor is not there and the bell has rung. In
cases of lesson examinations (LE), cadets are
dismissed from the time they have answered
their respective LEs. Here, as Cadet Cudia stated
in his Request for Reconsideration of Meted
Punishment, "We had an LE that day (14
November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first
bell rang (1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper
and submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales.
xxx" Clearly, at the time Cadet Cudia submitted
his papers, he was already considered dismissed.
Thus, he cannot claim that his [OR432] class
ended at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H) or "a bit
late."
Second, Cadet Cudia was in control of the
circumstances leading to his tardiness. After
submitting his paper, Cadet Cudia is free to leave
and attend his next class. However, he initiated a
conversation with Dr. Costales regarding their
grades. He was not under instruction by Dr.
Costales to stay beyond the period of her class.
Furthermore, during the investigation of the
Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, Dr.
Costales clarified her statements in her written
explanation. She explained that the "instruction
to wait" is a response to Cadet Cudia' s request
and that it was not her initiated instruction.
Clearly, there was no directive from Dr. Costales
for Cadet Cudia and the other cadets to stay. On
the contrary, it was them who wanted to meet
with the instructor. Third, contrary to Cadet
Cudia's explanation, his subsequent class,
ENG412, did not exactly start at 3:00 in the
afternoon (1500H). In the informal review
conducted by the HTG to check the findings of
the HC, Professor Berong confirmed that her
English class started as scheduled (3:05 in the
afternoon, or 1505H) and not earlier. Cadet 1 CL
Barrawed, the acting class marcher of ENG412
also testified that their class started as scheduled
(3 :05 in the afternoon, or 1505) and not
earlier.204
Respondents were unimpressed with the excuse
that Cadet 1 CL Cudia had no intention to
mislead or deceive but merely used wrong and
unfitting words in his explanations. For them,
considering his academic standing, it is highly
improbable that he used incorrect language to
justify his mistake. Respondents' arguments are
tenable.
The issue of whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia
committed lying is an issue of fact. Unfortunately
for petitioners, the Court, not being a trier of
facts, cannot pass upon factual matters as it is
not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the
evidence considered in the proceedings below.
Moreover, We reiterate the long standing rule
that factual findings of administrative tribunals
are ordinarily accorded respect if not finality by
the Court. In this case, as shown in the previous
discussions, there is no evidence that the
findings of the investigating and reviewing
bodies below are not supported by evidence or
vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; that
the procedure which led to the findings is
irregular; that palpable errors were committed;
or that a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness,
or capriciousness is manifest. With respect to the
core issue of whether lying is present in this
case, all investigating and reviewing bodies are
in consonance in holding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in
truth and in fact lied.
For purposes of emphasis though, We shall
supplement some points.
As succinctly worded, the Honor Code of the
Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines
(CCAFP) states: "We, the Cadets, do not lie, cheat,
steal, nor tolerate among us those who do. "
The First Tenet of the Honor-Code is "We do not
lie. " Cadets violate the Honor Code by lying if
they make an oral or written statement which is
contrary to what is true or use doubtful
information with the intent to deceive or
mislead.205 It is expected that every cadet's word
is accepted without challenge on its truthfulness;
that it is true without qualification; and that the
cadets must answer directly, completely and
truthfully even though the answer may result in
punitive action under the CCPB and CCAFPR.206
To refresh, in his Explanation of Report dated
December 8, 2013, Cadet 1 CL Cudia justified
that: "I came directly from OR432 Class. We were
dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir."
Subsequently, in his Request for Reconsideration
of Meted Punishment to Maj. Leander, he
reasoned out as follows:
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the
circumstances, our 4th period class ended
1500H and our 5th period class, which is
ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after
4t period class, I went to my next class without
any intention of being late Sir.207
In this case, the Court agrees with respondents
that Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed quibbling;
hence, he lied in violation of the Honor Code.
Following an Honor Reference Handbook, the
term "Quibbling" has been defined in one U.S.
case as follows:
A person can easily create a false impression in
the mind of his listener by cleverly wording what
he says, omitting relevant facts, or telling a
partial truth. When he knowingly does so with
the intent to deceive or mislead, he is quibbling.
Because it is an intentional deception, quibbling
is a form of lying.208
The above definition can be applied in the
instant case. Here, instead of directly and
completely telling the cause of his being late in
the ENG412 class of Prof. Berong, Cadet 1 CL
Cudia chose to omit relevant facts, thereby,
telling a half-truth.
The two elements that must be presented for a
cadet to have committed an honor violation are:
1. The act and/or omission, and
2. The intent pertinent to it.
Intent does not only refer to the intent to violate
the Honor Code, but intent to commit or omit the
act itself.209
The basic questions a cadet must always seek to
answer unequivocally are:
1. Do I intend to deceive?
2. Do I intend to take undue advantage?
If a cadet can answer NO to BOTH questions, he
or she is doing the honorable thing.210
Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible
of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred
from the facts, and therefore, can only be proved
by unguarded expressions, conduct and
circumstances generally.211 In this case, Cadet 1
CL Cudia's intent to deceive is manifested from
the very act of capitalizing on the use of the
words "dismiss" and "class." The truth of the
matter is that the ordinary usage of these two
terms, in the context of an educational
institution, does not correspond to what Cadet 1
CL Cudia is trying to make it appear. In that
sense, the words are not generic and have
definite and precise meaning.
By no stretch of the imagination can Cadets 1 CL
Cudia, Miranda, Arcangel, and Narciso already
constitute a "class." The Court cannot agree that
such term includes "every transaction and
communication a teacher does with her
students." Clearly, it does not take too much
intelligence to conclude that Cadet 1 CL Cudia
should have been accurate by pinpointing who
were with him when he was late in the next
class. His deceptive explanation is made more
obvious when compared with what Cadets 1 CL
Archangel and Narciso wrote in their DR
explanation, which was: "We approached our
instructor after our class."212
Further, it is unimportant whether the time of
dismissal on November 14, 2013 was five or
fifteen minutes ahead of the scheduled end of
class. Worth noting is that even Dr. Costales, who
stood as a witness for Cadet 1 CL Cudia,
consistently admitted before the HC, the Fact-
Finding Board/Investigating Body, and the CHR
that he was already dismissed when he passed
his LE paper.213 During the hearing of the
Board/Body, she also declared that she merely
responded to his request to see the results of the
UE 1 and that she had reservations on the
phrases "under my instruction" and "dismissed a
bit late" used in his letter of explanation to the
HC. In addition, Dr. Costales manifested her view
before the CHR that the act of Cadet 1 CL Cudia of
inquiring about his grade outside their
classroom after he submitted his LE paper is not
part of the class time because the consultation,
being cadet-initiated, is voluntary.214 Assuming,
for the sake of argument, that a new business
was initiated by Dr. Costales when Cadet 1 CL
Cudia was asked to stay and wait for the section
grade, still, this does not acquit him. Given such
situation, a responsible cadet who is fully aware
of the time constraint has the last say, that is, to
politely decline the invitation and immediately
go to the next class. This was not done by Cadet 1
CL Cudia. Thus, it cannot be said that he already
lost control over the circumstances.
It is apparent, therefore, that Cadet 1 CL Cudia
cunningly chose words which led to confusion in
the minds of respondents and eventually
commenced the HC inquiry. His case is not just a
matter of semantics and a product of plain and
simple inaccuracy. There is manipulation of facts
and presentation of untruthful explanation
constitutive of Honor Code violation.
Evidence of prior good conduct cannot clear
Cadet 1 CL Cudia .. While his Transcript of
Records (TOR) may reflect not only his
outstanding academic performance but his
excellent grade in subjects on Conduct during his
four-year stay in the PMA,215 it does not
necessarily follow that he is innocent of the
offense charged. It is enough to say that
"evidence that one did or did not do a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that
he did or did not do the same or similar thing at
another time."216 While the TOR may be received
to prove his identity or habit as an exceptional
PMA student, it does not show his specific intent,
plan, or scheme as cadet accused of committing a
specific Honor Code violation.
Dismissal from the PMA as unjust and cruel
punishment
Respondents insist that violation of the Honor
Code warrants separation of the guilty cadet
from the cadet corps. Under the Cadet Corps
Armed Forces of the Philippines Regulation
(CCAFPR), a violation of the Cadet Honor Code is
considered Grave (Class 1) delinquency which
merits a recommendation for a cadet's dismissal
from the PMA Superintendent. The same is
likewise clear from the Honor Code and Honor
System Handbook. Cadet 1 CL Cudia is, therefore,
presumed to know that the Honor Code does not
accommodate a gradation or degree of offenses.
There is no difference between a little lie and a
huge falsehood. Respondents emphasize that the
Honor Code has always been considered as an
absolute yardstick against which cadets have
measured themselves ever since the PMA began
and that the Honor Code and System seek to
assure that only those who are able to meet the
high standards of integrity and honor are
produced by the PMA. As held in Andrews, it is
constitutionally permissible for the military "to
set and enforce uncommonly high standards of
conduct and ethics. " Thus, in violating the Honor
Code, Cadet 1 CL Cudia forfeits his privilege to
graduate from the PMA.
On their part, petitioners concede that if it is
proven that a cadet breached the Honor Code,
the offense warrants his or her dismissal since
such a policy may be the only means to maintain
and uphold the spirit of integrity in the
military.217 They maintain though that in Cadet 1
CL Cudia's case there is no need to distinguish
between a "little lie" and a "huge falsehood"
since he did not lie at all. Absent any intent to
deceive and to take undue advantage, the penalty
imposed on him is considered as unjust and
cruel. Under the circumstances obtaining in this
case, the penalty of dismissal is not
commensurate to the fact that he is a graduating
cadet with honors and what he allegedly
committed does not amount to an academic
deficiency or an intentional and flagrant
violation of the PMA non-academic rules and
regulations. Citing Non, petitioners argue that
the penalty imposed must be proportionate to
the offense. Further, lsabelo, Jr. is squarely
applicable to the facts of the case. Cadet 1 CL
Cudia was deprived of his right to education, the
only means by which he may have a secure life
and future.
Considering Our finding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in
truth and in fact lied and his acceptance that
violation of the Honor Code warrants the
ultimate penalty of dismissal from the PMA,
there is actually no more dispute to resolve.
Indeed, the sanction is clearly set forth and Cadet
1 CL Cudia, by contract, risked this when he
entered the Academy.218 We adopt the ruling in
Andrews219 wherein it was held that, while the
penalty is severe, it is nevertheless reasonable
and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation
of due process. It quoted the disposition of the
district court, thus:
The fact that a cadet will be separated from the
Academy upon a finding that he has violated the
Honor Code is known to all cadets even prior to
the beginning of their careers there. The finding
of a Code violation by hypothesis includes a
finding of scienter on the part of the offender.
While separation is admittedly a drastic and
tragic consequence of a cadet's transgression, it
is not an unconstitutionally arbitrary one, but
rather a reasonable albeit severe method of
preventing men who have suffered ethical lapses
from becoming career officers. That a policy of
admonitions or lesser penalties for single
violations might be more compassionate --or
even more effective in achieving the intended
result --is quite immaterial to the question of
whether the harsher penalty violates due
process.220
Nature of the CHR Findings
Petitioners contend that the PMA turned a blind
eye on the CHR's recommendations. The CHR,
they note, is a constitutional body mandated by
the 1987 Constitution to investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and
political rights, and to conduct investigative
monitoring of economic, social, and cultural
rights, particularly of vulnerable sectors of
society. Further, it was contended that the
results of CHR's investigation and
recommendations are so persuasive that this
Court, on several occasions like in the cases of
Cruz v. Sec. of Environment & Natural
Resources221 and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v.
Commission on Elections,222 gave its findings
serious consideration. It is not, therefore, too late
for the Court to hear what an independent and
unbiased fact-finding body has to say on the case.
In opposition, respondents assert that Simon, Jr.
v. Commission on Human Rights223 ruled that the
CHR is merely a recommendatory body that is
not empowered to arrive at a conclusive
determination of any controversy.
We are in accord with respondents.
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of
the CHR are merely recommendatory and,
therefore, not binding to this Court. The reason is
that the CHR's constitutional mandate extends
only to the investigation of all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political
rights.224 As held in Cariño v. Commission on
Human Rights225 and a number of subsequent
cases,226 the CHR is only a fact-finding body, not
a court of justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is
not empowered to adjudicate claims on the
merits or settle actual case or controversies. The
power to investigate is not the same as
adjudication:
The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency
or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy
is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may
be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not
have.
xxxx
[i]t cannot try and decide cases (or hear and
determine causes) as courts of justice, or even
quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to
adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or
the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate, "commonly understood, means to
examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely:
inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire
into: x x x to subject to an official probe x x x: to
conduct an official inquiry;" The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find
out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere
included or intimated is the notion of settling,
deciding or resolving a controversy involved in
the facts inquired into by application of the law
to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially
the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to
search into; to examine and inquire into with
care and accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence;
a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn
described as "(a)n administrative function, the
exercise of which ordinarily does not require a
hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; xx x an
inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery
and collection of facts concerning a certain
matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly
understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,
decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The
dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally
(the rights and duties of the parties to a court
case) on the merits of issues raised: xx to pass
judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as judge."
And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as
a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers:
xx to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy x x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle
in the exercise of judicial authority.1âwphi1 To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in
its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To
pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or
to sentence or condemn. xx Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a
judgment. "226
All told, petitioners are not entitled to moral and
exemplary damages in accordance with Articles
19, 2217, 2219 and 2229 of the Civil Code. The
dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA did
not effectively deprive him of a future. Cliche
though it may sound, being a PMA graduate is
not the "be-all and end-all" of his existence. A
cadet separated from the PMA may still continue
to pursue military or civilian career elsewhere
without suffering the stigma attached to his or
her dismissal. For one, as suggested by
respondents, DND-AFP Circular No. 13, dated
July 15, 1991, on the enlistment and
reenlistment in the APP Regular Force, provides
under Section 14 (b) thereof that priority shall
be given to, among others, the ex-PMA or PAFFFS
cadets.227 If the positions open does not appeal
to his interest for being way below the rank he
could have achieved as a PMA graduate, Cadet 1
CL Cudia could still practice other equally noble
profession or calling that is best suited to his
credentials, competence, and potential.
Definitely, nobody can deprive him of that
choice.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The
dismissal of Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia
from the Philippine Military Academy is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 222740, September 28, 2016
ST. LUKE'S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE-WILLIAM
H. QUASHA MEMORIAL FOUNDATION, DR.
BRIGIDO L. CARANDANG, AND DR.
ALEJANDRO P.
ORTIGAS Petitioners, v. SPOUSES MANUEL AND
ESMERALDA PEREZ AND SPOUSES ERIC AND
JURISITA QUINTOS, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review
on certiorari is the Decision1 dated September
30, 2015 and the Resolution2 dated February 2,
2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 103529, which rulings reversed the Decision
dated July 7, 20143 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 84, Malolos City, Bulacan in Civil
Case No. 145-M-2012 and remanded the case to
the trial court for reception of evidence on the
amount of damages to be awarded.
As a backgrounder, in 2006, the Commission on
Higher Education issued Memorandum Order
No. 10, series of 2006 which required medical
students to undergo rotating clinical clerkship in
their fourth year. As such, petitioner St. Luke's
College of Medicine (St. Luke's) entered into a
Memorandum of Intent with the Municipality of
Cabiao, Nueva Ecija for the construction of a
community clinic. The said facility consisted of a
six-bed medical facility in the ground floor, and a
residential space for the medical staff in the
second floor.
The undisputed facts, as amply summarized by
the CA, are as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In February 2010, St. Luke's sent four (4) of its
4th year medical students to the clinic, namely:
plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Perez's daughter
Jessa, plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Quintos'
daughter Cecille, Jerillie Ann Murillo (Murillo)
and Miguel Rafael Ramos (Ramos). They were
tasked to complete a four-week clerkship
rotation at the clinic and like the previous
batches, they were housed in the second floor of
the clinic.
According to Ramos, he and his groupmates
reported for duty at the Cabiao clinic at
approximately 10 o'clock in the morning of
February 8, 2010. When their shift ended at 5
o'clock that afternoon, the group went for a jog
and returned to the clinic at around 7 o'clock in
the evening. They again went out at 9 o'clock in
the evening to buy beverages, cooking oil and
other items needed for their breakfast the next
day and went to sleep sometime after midnight.
Ramos admitted that one of the beverages they
bought was an alcoholic beverage called The Bar,
which consisted of either vodka or gin. He also
admitted that only he and Cecille drank the
alcoholic beverage which they mixed with the
soda and that they did not consume the whole
bottle.
Ramos was awakened sometime between 3
o'clock and 3:30 in the morning of February 9,
2010 when he heard Murillo shouting from the
other side of the room that there was a fire.
Ramos immediately ran to the door which led to
the living room and when he opened the same,
he saw thick smoke coming from the left portion
of the living room where there was a glow. He
also felt extreme heat, prompting him to run to
the bathroom to get a pail of water with which he
tried to extinguish the fire. The girls, who had
followed him to the bathroom, stayed behind.
When Ramos' attempt to put out the fire proved
to be futile, he went back to the bathroom and
poured water on the girls in an attempt to
alleviate the extreme heat coming from the fire.
According to Ramos, the smoke started to seep
through the bathroom door and the group had
started shouting for help. After a considerable
amount of time, he heard somebody outside
instructing him to get back from the window.
When he did so, somebody broke the window
and started to dismantle the iron grills barring
the same. By that time, Ramos had started losing
consciousness due to smoke inhalation and only
remembered that he was being pulled out of the
building through the window. by the victims which greatly disturbed plaintiffs-
appellants. In a subsequent meeting, they were
Unfortunately, the fire resulted in the deaths of informed that there was also evidence that the
the female medical students, including the victims were drinking alcoholic beverages on the
daughters of plaintiffs-appellants due to smoke night of the fire which plaintiffs-appellants
inhalation resulting" to asphyxia. refused to accept.
As a result of the deaths, defendant-appellee St. Convinced that there was a cover-up, plaintiffs-
Luke's compensated the parents of the three appellants continued to question individual
deceased students in the amount of defendants-appellees. Exasperated, defendant-
PhP300,000.00 each from insurance proceeds. appellee Dr. Carandang allegedly asked "Ano pa
(Citations omitted) bang gusto ninyo sa amin? Nakiramay na kami."
Offended and still unconvinced, respondent
The Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) conducted
Spouses Manuel and Esmeralda Perez, the
an investigation on the incident, and in a
parents of Jessa, and respondent Spouses Eric
Certification dated April 18, 2011, it certified
and Jurisita Quintos, the parents of Cecille,
that the fire was "purely accidental in nature due
sought the help of the National Bureau of
to unattended cooking," to wit:4
Investigation (NBI). In its Resolution dated
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT as appearing on The
August 3, 2010, the existence of which is
Blotter Book No. 0304-0287, pages 17 and 18,
expressly admitted by petitioners, having quoted
the two storey Institutional building owned by
the contents6 and having attached a copy thereof
Local Government Unit (LGU) Cabiao, Nueva
to the present petition,7 the NBI declared that
Ecija was partially razed by fire including all the
the construction of the Cabiao Community Clinic
contents of the second floor that transpired on or
building was in violation of the provisions of
about 090245H February 2010. The estimated
Republic Act No. 9514 (R.A. No. 9514) or
cost of damage is two Million pesos
the Revised Fire Code of the Philippines, that the
(P2,000,000.00) more or less.
cause of the fire was due to faulty electrical
wiring, and that St. Luke's negligence is criminal
Result of investigation conducted by the
in nature. The pertinent parts of the said
Investigator on Case of this station, Bureau of
Resolution reads:8
Fire Protection, Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, disclosed
xxxx
that the fire was purely ACCIDENTAL IN
NATURE due to UNATTENDED COOKING that
2. The building structure of Cabiao
occurred at the kitchen of said floor and no
Community Center
evidence were gathered to show that the fire was
intentionally, deliberately or maliciously set.
The Cabiao Community Clinic/Center is a two-
Respondents had their doubts. Thus:5
storey concrete building. The ground floor is
xxx. xxx, plaintiffs-appellants, requested for a
used as the municipality's lie-in clinic or hospital
meeting with defendant-appellee Dr. Alejandro
during day time. The students and in particular
Ortigas, Associate Dean for Faculty and Student
the victims use this facility together with the.
Affairs of St. Luke's. During the meeting,
medical complement of the municipality for their
plaintiffs-appellants were surprised by the
community medical service.
presence of defendants-appellees Dr. Brigido
Carandang, St. Luke's Dean of Medicine, the
On the 2nd floor was the office of Dr. LEON DE
Municipal Health Officer of Cabiao Dr. De Leon,
LEON, Cabiao Municipal Health Officer, adjacent
as well as Municipal Fire Marshall of Cabiao Baby
was a storage room for office and medical
Boy Esquivel, a Cabiao police officer and its
supplies and documents, the bedrooms for the
barangay captain.
medical students rendering community service, a
dining area, a kitchen, and the living-room. The
The officials informed plaintiffs-appellants that
second floor, it may be said, is virtually dedicated
the fire was caused by the gas burner left open
for the board and lodging of the students while
on mission. These rooms and areas are
separated from each other by wood panels made
of plywood including the wall in which the gas
stove was located. All the windows at the
second floor are also covered by permanent
iron grills. There are no fire exits, fire alarms,
fire extinguishers, sprinklers, emergency
lights.
The community center is a virtual fire/death
trap. During night time, medical students
were left alone inside the 2nd floor with the
main gate locked from the outside and with
no apparent signs of fire alarms, fire
sprinklers, fire exit plan, emergency lights,
provisions of confining the fire to its source,
among others, for the occupants fire safety
and protection system. They were on their own
at the second floor, without anyone (maid or
security guard) to attend to their needs while the
ground floors and the adjoining building were
uninhabited.
3. The electrical system of Cabiao Community
Clinic;
Engr. DAVID R. AOANAN, Chief Electrical Section
of the (sic) and member of the NBI investigating
team observed that the facility has a main circuit
breaker and the two distribution panels, located
at the ground floor, just above the comfort room
of the 2ndfloor. The main breaker has a 500 amp
capacity while the two distribution panels
serving the 1st floor and the 2nd floor has 200
amp capacity, each, as against the main electrical
service wire with the size 14 mm.
The ratio between the capacity of the circuit
breaker and the electrical service wire is out
of proportion and became electrically
insensitive to overload and wire short
circuits; thereby negating the very purpose
the circuit breaker was designed.
The size of service wire is Small, suitable only for
lighting purposes and not to supply two
buildings, dedicated for public use. Six years of
use in overload capacity would have worn out
the wire and its strength and vitality, hence it
will readily overheat, notwithstanding at the
time short circuits, only few bulbs were in
use.
The electrical meter used is appropriate only to
residential units and not to service the two
buildings intended for public which are
[equipped] with modern medical equipment; the
old NFA and the [Cabiao] Community Clinic.
Both live service wire and secondary electrical
wires were bundled together inside the same
tube. At the 2nd floor, visible signs of cut wires
were found inside a tube, including the
service wire as it pass through going down to
the main panel board and several cut wires of
the secondary breaker going to the second
floor for power distribution.
The main and secondary panel boards were
wrongly situated at the ground floor, above
which is the location of a comfort room,
where water could easily slip to the panel
boards.
The installation of the secondary panel board
at the ground floor distributing power to the
2nd floor defeats its purpose, considering that
if electrical trouble happens at the 2nd floor
one has to go to the 1st floor to shut off the
power.
4. The construction of the Cabiao Community
Center building was in violation of the provision
of Republic Act No. 9514 (Revised Fire Code of
the Philippines)
Owners, occupants or administrator of buildings
or structures are required to incorporate and
provide fire safety construction, protective and
warning systems. Investigation shows that a)
there were no fire protection features such as
sprinkler systems, hose boxes, hose reels or
standpipe systems and other firefighting
equipment; fire alarm systems; b) no fire exit,
fire exit plan for each floor of the building
showing the routes from each other [sic] room to
appropriate exits, displayed prominently on the
door of such room; c) no properly marked and
lighted exits with provision for emergency light
to adequately illuminate exit ways in case of
power failure, and d) no provisions for confining
the fire at its source such as fire resistive floors
and walls.
5. The Cabiao Bureau of Fire Protection failed
to perform its mandate pursuant to RA 9514.
Under the Fire Code, the Bureau of Fire
Protection is required to conduct fire safety
inspections as pre-requisite to the grant of
licenses and permits for the use and occupancy
of buildings, structures, facilities and their
premises including the installation of fire
protections and fire safety equipment and
electrical systems in any building structure or
facility; and the storage of explosives or
combustible, flammable, toxic and other
hazardous materials.
The BFP is likewise responsible for designating
fire inspectors who shall inspect every building
at least once a year, and every time the owner,
administrator or occupant [renews] its business
permit or permit to occupy; to issue a business
permit or permit to operate only after securing a
Fire Safety Inspection Certification (FSIC);
require the building owner occupant to submit
plans and specifications and other pertinent
documents of building/structure in order to
ensure compliance of applicable codes and
standards and issue a written notice to the
owner and/or contractor to stop work on
portion of any work due to absence or in
violation of approved plans and specifications; to
inspect at reasonable time, any building,
structure or premises and order the
owner/occupant to remove hazardous materials
and/or stop operation if the standards are not
met; to declare and summarily abate hazardous
conditions of the buildings or structures and/or
declare the same as fire hazards.
It is worthy to note that despite the long period
of time from the occurrence of the fire until the
termination of this investigation, the Cabiao BFP
headed by FO3 ESQUIVEL has yet to submit its
report and findings. However, inasmuch as FO3
ESQUIVEL has bungled the investigation of
the fire by removing items from the scene of
the fire and his failure to explain the
disappearance of other electrical debris, the
opening and enlargement of the iron grill
where the sole survivor passed, the back
door broken, and the non-recording of the
investigations, FO3 Esquivel's action and
behaviors are highly suspect of a massive
cover up of the real cause of the fire.
xxxx
7. St. Luke's negligence is criminal in nature.
St. Luke's College of Medicine - William H.
Quasha Memorial, Inc., being the owner and
operator of the Cabiao Community Clinic is not
without liability for the fate of the fire victims. As
a learning institution, which sends out its
students to rural areas to comply with its
curriculum requirement, St. Luke's has the
duty and responsibility to see to it that the
premises to where it sends its students are
safe. It is significant to stress that the Cabiao
Community Clinic was established by the
Municipality of Cabiao and the St. Luke's College
of Medicine in line with the latter's expansion of
its Community Medicine undertaking to the rural
areas in order to train its students in health
promotion and disease prevention as well as to
provide medical service to deserving population
and to undertake clinical research on various
health practices.
The victims were sent there as part of their
community medicine module in the curriculum
and their assignments were determined by the
officials of the College of Medicine.
8. The origin of fire.
The Cabiao BFP has manifested its prejudice
and bias and thus, cannot be an independent,
reliable and credible investigator of this fire
incident. They could not even entertain any
theory, other than the gas burner, because in
doing so would place themselves in
jeopardy. They even resorted to tampering of
premises by removing all electrical wire
debris, thinking that in its absence, fire
caused by short circuits cannot be proven.
It is highly probable that the origin of fire is
electrical based on the Electrical Report No. 04-
10-001 submitted by Engr. DAVID R. AOANAN,
Chief, Electrical Section, NBI because of the
following.
i. Presence of thick black smoke that
indicates heat caused by short-circuit
ii. Explosion or tripping off of the
transformer, then a black out - showing
therefore that the circuit breaker did
not trip off
iii. Inspection of the main circuit breaker
and the secondary breakers show that
these did not trip off
iv. Presence of short circuited wires
located at the 2nd floor, where buddle
wires were found
v. Presence of numerous spliced wires or
jumped wires in three different
convenient outlets
vi. Mainboard panel is mismatched with
the service wire
vii. Other defective wirings
It is a well done theory that the cause of the
fire was due to faulty electrical wiring with
two reasons to support it, first is the physical
manifestation as mentioned by Engr. DAVE
AOANAN who conducted
evaluation/investigation on what is left on
the building of the Cabiao Community Clinic;
second is the personal experience of MIGUEL
RAFAEL RAMOS y DAVID the lone survivor of
the incident [who] narrated what he
perceived during last hour before he was
rescued. MIGUEL['s] narration contradict the
theories laid down by Fire Marshall BABY BOY
ESQUIVEL that the fire was by the negligence of
the victims [whom] he suspect[s] to have left
[burning a] gas stove. MIGUEL'S narration
specifically pointed out that the fire was
primarily coming from the living room and not at
the kitchen which is directly in front of their
door way. (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents then filed a Complaint for damages
against petitioners St. Luke's College of
Medicine-William H. Quasha Memorial
Foundation, Dean of Medicine Brigido L.
Carandang, and Associate Dean for Faculty and
Student Affairs Alejandro P. Ortigas, claiming
that their negligence caused the deaths of
respondents' daughters. Respondents
maintained that, as a learning institution which
sends out its medical students to rural areas to
comply with its curriculum requirement, St.
Luke's has the contractual duty and legal
responsibility to see to it that the premises to
where it sends its students are safe and that, in
the case at bar, St. Luke's refused to recognize its
obligations/liabilities.9Respondents thus prayed
as follows:10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is
respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered
in favor of plaintiffs -
1. Finding the defendants negligent and liable
under their contractual and legal obligations to
Jessa and Cecille;
2. Directing defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly
and severally, actual, moral and exemplary
damages; and cralawlawlibrary
3. Ordering defendants to pay the cost of suits
and attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs as
the Honorable Court may deem just and
equitable under the premises.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit.11 It held that the Cabiao Community Clinic
was not a fire trap as there were two (2) fire
exits, and that respondents failed to present any
report or finding by a competent authority that
the said Clinic was not a safe and secure place for
the conduct of St. Luke's clerkship program. The
RTC did not take into consideration the NBI
Report as it was allegedly not
presented.12chanrobleslaw
The RTC further held that the Clinic is owned by
the Municipality of Cabiao, and that the latter
and/or its responsible officials should have been
impleaded as indispensable
parties.13chanrobleslaw
The RTC summarized its findings in this
manner:14
Albeit the Court is saddened by what happened
with the untimely death of Perez and Quintos
who are both very bright with promising future
in the field of medicine, it cannot however close
its eyes on the evidence submitted before it by
placing the blame on the cause of their death[s]
to the defendants just to put the fault on anybody
in order to appease their grieving love[d] ones.
For in the mind of the Court, the omission of the
defendants to secure a copy of the fire safety
license of the Clinic or verify if it has one prior to
its construction before allowing their senior
medical students to occupy and reside therein is
not per se a negligent act. Neither is the failure of
the defendants to orient their senior medical
students, who obviously are of legal ages already
such as the deceased, on how to take the
necessary measures for their safety and security
before retiring to sleep in the night considered
negligent. Likewise, the failure of the dialogue
between the parties is not a legitimate ground to
declare the defendants negligent. Put differently,
the Court is not persuaded that there is basis or
justification to adjudge the defendants negligent
for the accidental death of Perez and Quintos.
Upon appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision
and remanded the case to the RTC for reception
of evidence on the amount of damages to be
awarded.15 Addressing the .preliminary issues,
the CA held that the Municipality of Cabiao was
not an indispensable party as the Complaint was
one for damages based on the allegations in the
enrollment contract. It explained that:16
While there was indeed an allegation of St.
Luke's ownership of the clinic, bulk of the
arguments in the complaint were based on St.
Luke's duty to ensure its students' safety based
on its obligation as a school. Not being
contractually obligated to keep plaintiffs-
appellants' children safe from any risk as a result
of school-sanctioned activities, the Municipality
of Cabiao cannot be considered an indispensable
party to the action as it was not a participant in
the contract of enrollment.
Moreover, the CA held that although schools
cannot be insurers of its students against all
risks, in the case at bar, the safety of the victims
was within the reach of petitioners and the
hazard of a fire was not unforeseeable.17 Also,
while the fire was beyond the control of
petitioners, their decision to house their
students in a place where there are no means of
escape in case of such an emergency shows a
blatant disregard for the students'
welfare.18chanrobleslaw
The CA elucidated as follows:19
The testimonies of Dr. Ortigas, Dr. Carandang
and Dr. Macabulos all show a lack of effort on
their part to thoroughly inspect the conditions of
the building in relation to the safety of their
enrolled medical student-clerks.
According to Dr. Ortigas and Dr.
Macabulos,20 they considered the doors leading
out from the pantry and the bedrooms as fire
exits. However, as doctors who presumably have
a wider degree of foresight than most, they failed
to consider that a fire might break out in areas
which would block these doors that are merely
ordinary exits. Further, Dr. Ortigas himself
testified that permits are not part of their
consideration for safety and that they do not
specifically look for the same [xxx.]
xxxx
Dr. Ortigas admitted that, as a doctor, he was not
concerned with the permits issued regarding the
construction and safety of the building. However,
at the time he conducted the inspections of the
clinic, he was also the Associate Dean of St.
Luke's College of Medicine with the duty to
ensure that the building was safe for the security
of the enrolled students of St. Luke's College of
Medicine who would be assigned to the clinic
during their clerkship and he admittedly did not
consider the same.
As Associate Dean for Student Affairs, it would
be reasonable to expect Dr. Ortigas to show
concern for the safety and security of the
students enrolled in the institution thus, ensure
that the premises they were to reside in would
be properly equipped in case of fires and other
calamities. He himself stated that his position as
such put him "in charge of student and student
affairs, xxx and in general, the non-academic
matters involving students and the faculty."
Consequently, it is safe to conclude that his task
included the safety and welfare of the students
enrolled at St. Luke's College of Medicine, one
which he miserably failed to discharge.
Defendants-appellees also made a big deal out of
the procedure of asking feedback from students
which led to the assumption that the clinic was
safe and habitable. However, it must be
remembered that the students that gave the
feedback were more concerned with passing
their course and presumably trusted that the
school would not send them to a location which
it has independently determined to be unsafe.
xxxx
In relation, defendants-appellees defend their
judgment to send plaintiffs-appellants' daughters
to the community clinic by contending that there
has been no untoward incident since the
program began in 2004. xxx.
xxxx
The same argument also runs contrary to
defendants-appellees' acceptance of the
construction of iron grills on the second floor
windows of the clinic. According to Dr. Ortigas,
the same were constructed in order to prevent
people from using the same to enter the building
and not designed to prevent egress therefrom.
Dr. Ortigas was specificallly questioned if there
were prior incidents of intrusion into the clinic
to which he replied in the negative. If
defendants-appellees' logic of "no untoward
incident has happened" is to be applied then, the
presence of the grills was unnecessary in the
same way that they found the inspection of fire
safety permits to be unnecessary. It baffles the
Court, therefore, that defendants-appellees
would accept the precaution against an
admittedly unlikely intrusion but ignore any
safety measures against a fire which was a great
possibility given that the clinic had flammable
equipment such as a gas burner for cooking.
(Citations omitted)
Hence, the present petition for review
on certiorari alleging that the CA committed
reversible error when it: (a) held that the
Municipality of Cabiao was not an indispensable
party,21 (b) disregarded the findings of the BFP
that the fire was purely accidental and caused by
unattended cooking,22 and (c) ruled that
petitioners were negligent.23chanrobleslaw
We deny the petition.
A perusal of the Complaint readily shows that
respondents base their cause of action on
petitioners' breach of the contractual obligation,
as an educational institution, of ensuring that
their students, in the performance of a required
school activity, would be safe and secure. The
Municipality of Cabiao, not being a party to said
enrollment contract, is not an indispensable
party to the case.
An indispensable party is defined by the Rules of
Court as a party-in-interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action.24 In
the present case, respondents premise
petitioners' liability on their contractual
obligation to their students and, certainly,
complete relief and a final judgment can be
arrived at by weighing the claims and defenses of
petitioners and respondents, without need of
evaluating the claims and defenses of the
Municipality of Cabiao. If at all, the Municipality
of Cabiao is a necessary party25cralawred whose
non-inclusion in the case at bar shall not prevent
the court from proceeding with the action.
Indeed, the present case is one between a school
and its students, with their relationship being
based on the enrollment contracts. In the
illuminating case of PSBA, et al. v. CA, et al.,26 the
Court had the opportunity to lay down the
principle that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
When an academic institution accepts students
for enrollment, there is established
acontract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to
comply with. For its part, the school undertakes
to provide the student with an education that
would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school's
academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the
implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their
students with an atmosphere that promotes or
assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can
absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and
other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there
looms around the school premises a constant
threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school
must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus
premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Indubitably, institutions of learning have the
"built-in" obligation of providing a conducive
atmosphere for learning, an atmosphere where
there are no constant threats to life and limb,
and one where peace and order are maintained.
In the case at bar, the Cabiao Community Clinic is
to be considered as part of the campus premises
of St. Luke's. In the course description of the
clerkship program in preventive and community
medicine, it is stated that the Cabiao Community
Clinic serves as the base operation of the
clerkship program.27 As such, petitioner had the
same obligation to their students, even though
they were stationed in the Cabiao Community
Clinic, and it was incumbent upon petitioners to
ensure that said Clinic was conducive for
learning, that it had no constant threats to life
and limb, and that peace and order was
maintained thereat. After all, although away
from the main campus of St. Luke's, the students
were still under the same protective and
supervisory custody of petitioners as the ones
detailed in the main campus.
In the performance of its contractual and
inherent obligations, the Court is mindful of the
attendant difficulties on the part of institutions
of learning, and the Court recognizes that the
latter cannot be an insurer of its students against
all risks. Thus, as also laid out in the PSBA case,
"the school may still avoid liability by proving that
the breach of its contractual obligation to the
students was not due to its negligence, here
statutorily defined to be the 'omission of that
degree of diligence which is required by the nature
of the obligation and corresponding to the
circumstances of persons, time and
place."28chanrobleslaw
Our next query, then, is, in relation to the fire
incident, did petitioners commit a breach of
contract through negligence?
A review of the records compels the Court to
answer in the affirmative.
In Mendoza, et al. v. Sps. Gomez,29 we defined
negligence as "the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person,
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury."
In Gaid v. People,30 we enumerated the elements
of simple negligence as follows: (1) that there is
lack of precaution on the part of the offender,
and (2) that the damage impending to be caused
is not immediate or the danger is not clearly
manifest. We explained
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The standard test in determining whether a
person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or
property of another is this: could a prudent man,
in the position of the person to whom negligence
is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured
as a reasonable consequence of the course
actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty
on the actor to refrain from that course or to take
precautions to guard against its mischievous
results, and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the admonition born
of this provision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to
exist.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bar, it is well to remember that the
victims were in the Cabiao Community Clinic
because it was a requirement of petitioners. The
students were complying with an obligation
under the enrollment contract � they were
rendering medical services in a community
center as required by petitioners. It was thus
incumbent upon petitioners to comply with their
own obligations under the enrollment contract -
to ensure that the community center where they
would designate their students is safe and
secure, among others.
Petitioners failed to take the necessary
precautions to guard their students against
foreseeable harm. As correctly found by the CA,
petitioners were remiss in inspecting the
premises of the Cabiao Community Clinic and in
ensuring that the necessary permits were in
order. These precautions could have minimized
the risk to the safety of the victims. Indeed, the
CA had basis in making the following
pronouncement:32
In the instant case, as previously emphasized,
defendants-appellees were aware that its
medical students were residing at the second
floor of the clinic. At the very least, during
inspection, they should have thoroughly
inspected the building's physical appearance and
the documents pertinent to the premises to
make sure that the same minimized the risk to
the safety of the students. There is no record that
any inquiry on the condition of the premises was
even made by defendants-appellees prior to the
implementation of the program. In addition to
such failure, defendants-appellees would have
this Court believe that their participation in the
clinic was limited to providing the same with
medical personnel without considering that such
personnel also included its students which St.
Luke's was obliged to protect from unnecessary
danger.
The petitioners were obviously negligent in
detailing their students to a virtual fire trap. As
found by the NBI, the Clinic was unsafe and was
constructed in violation of numerous provisions
of the Revised Fire Code of the Philippines. It had
no emergency facilities, no fire exits, and had no
permits or clearances from the appropriate
government offices.
Petitioners additionally aver that the Clinic was
built under the direction, supervision,
management and control of the Municipality of
Cabiao,33 and that it ensured that there was an
agreement for the Municipality of Cabiao to
provide 24-hour security to the
Clinic.34chanrobleslaw
Petitioners, however, cannot escape liability
based on these arguments. As held in Saludaga v.
FEU, et al.,35 a learning institution should not be
allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate
matters of safety and security to a third party as
to do so would result to contracting away its
inherent obligation of ensuring a safe learning
environment for its students.
In Saludaga, the Court chastised therein
respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) for its
total reliance on a security agency as to the
qualifications of its security guards, viz:36
Respondents also failed to show that they
undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that
the security guards assigned to them actually
possess the qualifications required in the
Security Service Agreement. It was not proven
that they examined the clearances, psychiatric
test results, 201 files, and other vital documents
enumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total
reliance on the security agency about these
matters or failure to check the papers stating the
qualifications of the guards is negligence on the
part of respondents. A learning institution
should not be allowed to completely relinquish
or abdicate security matters in its premises to
the security agency it hired. To do so would
result to contracting away its inherent obligation
to ensure a safe learning environment for its
students.
Similarly, we cannot turn; a blind eye on
petitioners' total reliance on the Municipality of
Cabiao in ensuring the safety and security of
their students. The enrollment contract is
between petitioners and the victims, and
petitioners cannot abdicate' on their contractual
obligation to provide their students a safe
learning environment, nor can it pass or contract
away such obligation to a third party.
Moreover, as to the stipulation of 24-hour
security in the Clinic, petitioners failed to
present evidence that this stipulation was
actually enforced or that they took measures to
ensure that it was enforced. This, once more,
shows petitioners' propensity of relying on third
parties in carrying out its obligations to its
students.
It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere
proof of the existence of the contract and the
failure, of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief.37 In Gilat Satellite
Networks, Ltd. v. UCPB General Insurance Co., JJ., concur.
Inc.,38 the Court Reyes, J., on leave.
expounded:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxx. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of
contracts, will not permit a party to be set free
from liability for any kind of misperformance of
the contractual undertaking or a contravention
of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract
confers upon the injured party a valid cause for
recovering that which may have been lost or
suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the
interests of the promissee that may include his
"expectation interest," which is his interest in
having the benefit of his bargain by being put in
as good a position as he would have been in had
the contract been performed, or his "reliance
interest," which is his interest in being
reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the
contract by being put in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract not been
made; or his "restitution interest," which is his
interest in having restored to him any benefit
that he has conferred on the other party. Indeed,
agreements can accomplish little, either for their
makers or for society, unless they are made the
basis for action. The effect of every infraction is
to create a new duty, that is, to make
RECOMPENSE to the one who has been injured
by the failure of another to observe his
contractual obligation unless he can show
extenuating circumstances, like proof of his
exercise of due diligence x x x or of the
attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him
from his ensuing liability. xxx. (Emphasis
omitted)
In the case at bar, it was amply shown that
petitioners and the victims were bound by the
enrollment contracts, and that petitioners were
negligent in complying with their obligation
under the said contracts to ensure the safety and
security of their students. For this contractual
breach, petitioners should be held liable.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
resolves to DENY the petition for review
oncertiorari and AFFIRM the Court of Appeals'
Decision and Resolution.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta, and Jardeleza,
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 186732 June 13, 2013
ALPS TRANSPORTATION and/or ALFREDO E.
PEREZ, Petitioners,
vs.
ELPIDIO M. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before this Court is a Rule 45 Petition for
Review1 assailing the Decision2 and
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 100163.
THE FACTS
Respondent Elpidio Rodriguez (Rodriguez) was
previously employed as a bus conductor.4 He
entered into an employment contract with
Contract Tours Manpower5 (Contact Tours) and
was assigned to work with petitioner bus
company, ALPS Transportation.6
During the course of his employment, Rodriguez
was found to have committed irregularities on
26 April 2003,712 October 2003,8 and 26 January
2005.9 The latest irregularity report dated 26
January 2005 stated that he had collected bus
fares without issuing corresponding tickets to
passengers. The report was annotated with the
word "Terminate."10
Rodriguez alleged that he was dismissed from
his employment on 27 January 2005, or the day
after the issuance of the last irregularity report.
However, he did not receive any written notice
of termination.11 He went back to the bus
company a number of times, but it refused to
readmit him.12
On 11 August 2005, Rodriguez filed before the
labor arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal,
nonpayment of 13th month pay, and damages
against ALPS Transportation and Alfredo Perez,
the proprietor of petitioner bus company.13
In response to the complaint, petitioners stated
that they did not have any prerogative to dismiss
Rodriguez, as he was not their employee, but
that of Contact Tours.14 In fact, based on their
agreement with Contact Tours, it was
supposedly the latter that had the obligation to
inform respondent of the contents of the reports
and to decide on the appropriate
sanctions.15 Petitioners further explained that
due to the issuance of the three irregularity
reports against Rodriguez, they wrote to Contact
Tours and recommended the termination of
respondent’s assignment to them.16
During the pendency of the illegal dismissal case
before the labor arbiter, ALPS Transportation
charged Rodriguez with theft before the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Tanauan,
Batangas.17 However, petitioners eventually filed
an Affidavit of Desistance and withdrew the
criminal charges against respondent.18
On 12 January 2006, the labor arbiter dismissed
the illegal dismissal complaint for lack of
merit.19 He explained that no evidence had been
adduced to support the contention of Rodriguez
that the latter had been terminated on 27
January 2005.20 Moreover, during the mandatory
conference, the representative of Contact Tours
manifested that the company had not dismissed
Rodriguez, and that it was in fact willing to
reinstate him to his former position.21 Thus, the
labor arbiter concluded that Rodriguez had not
been illegally dismissed, and was actually an
employee of Contact Tours, and not of ALPS
Transportation.22
Rodriguez appealed the dismissal to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On 28
February 2007, the NLRC set aside the decision
of the labor arbiter and entered a new one, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated
January 12, 2006 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new
one is being entered, directing the respondents
to reinstate the complainant to his former
position without loss of seniority rights and
privileges but without backwages.
SO ORDERED.23
In so concluding, the NLRC ruled that Contact
Tours was a labor-only contractor.24 Thus,
Rodriguez should be considered as a regular
employee of ALPS Transportation.25
As regards the claim of illegal dismissal, the
NLRC found that Rodriguez failed to prove that
his services were illegally terminated by
petitioners, and that he was prevented from
returning to work.26 However, the bus company
likewise failed to prove that he had abandoned
his work.27 Thus, citing previous rulings of this
Court, the NLRC held that in case the parties fail
to prove either abandonment or termination, the
employer should order the employee to report
back for work, accept the latter, and reinstate the
employee to the latter’s former position.
However, an award for backwages is not
warranted, as the parties must bear the burden
of their own loss.28
Dissatisfied with the ruling of the NLRC,
Rodriguez filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari
with the CA.
After a review of the records, the CA concluded
that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in rendering the assailed decision. The
appellate court ruled that, in termination cases, it
is the employer who bears the burden of proving
that the employee was not illegally
dismissed.29 Here, the CA found that ALPS
Transportation failed to present convincing
evidence that Rodriguez had indeed collected
bus fares without issuing corresponding tickets
to passengers. The appellate court held that the
irregularity reports were mere allegations, the
truth of which had not been established by
evidence.30
Moreover, the CA gave no credence to ALPS
Transportation’s argument that Rodriguez had
not yet been terminated when he filed the illegal
dismissal complaint, as he had not yet received
any notice of termination.31The appellate court
explained that, before the illegal dismissal
complaint was filed, more than six months had
lapsed since respondent was last given a bus
assignment by ALPS Transportation.32 Thus, the
CA concluded that the argument of the bus
company was only an excuse to cover up the
latter’s mistake in terminating him without due
process of law.33
The CA then ordered ALPS Transportation to
reinstate Rodriguez and to pay him full
backwages, viz:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Alfredo
Perez is declared guilty of having committed
illegal dismissal. Accordingly, only the portions
of the assailed dispositions ordering the
reinstatement of Elpidio Rodriguez to his former
position without loss of seniority rights is
AFFIRMED and the phrase, "but without
backwages" is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. In lieu
thereof, Alfredo Perez is ORDERED to pay Elpidio
Rodriguez backwages computed from the time
he was illegally dismissed until his actual
reinstatement. No costs.
SO ORDERED.34
Aggrieved by the appellate court’s decision,
petitioners filed the instant Rule 45 Petition
before this Court.
THE ISSUES
As culled from the records and the submissions
of the parties, the issues in this case are as
follows:
1. Whether respondent Rodriguez was validly
dismissed; and
2. Assuming that respondent was illegally
dismissed, whether ALPS Transportation and/or
Alfredo E. Perez is liable for the dismissal.
THE COURT’S RULING
We uphold the assailed Decision and Resolution
and rule that respondent Rodriguez has been
illegally dismissed.
For a dismissal to be valid, the rule is that the
employer must comply with both substantive
and procedural due process
requirements.35 Substantive due process
requires that the dismissal must be pursuant to
either a just or an authorized cause under
Articles 282, 283 or 284 of the Labor
Code.36 Procedural due process, on the other
hand, mandates that the employer must observe
the twin requirements of notice and hearing
before a dismissal can be effected.37
Thus, to determine the validity of Rodriguez’s
dismissal, we first discuss whether his
employment was terminated for a just cause.
Petitioners argue that the dismissal of Rodriguez
was brought about by his act of collecting fare
from a passenger without issuing the
corresponding ticket.38 This was not the first
irregularity report issued against respondent, as
similar reports had been issued against him on
26 April 200339 and 12 October 2003.40 Thus, the
company had lost trust and confidence in him, as
he had committed serious misconduct by
stealing company revenue.41 Petitioners
therefore submit that the dismissal was valid
under Article 282 of the Labor Code.42
For his part, Rodriguez denies the contents of the
irregularity report.43 He states that the report
consists of a mere charge, but is bereft of the
necessary proof.44 Moreover, he submits that
while the bus company filed a criminal complaint
against him for the same act, the complaint was
dismissed pursuant to an Affidavit of Desistance,
in which the bus company stated that "the
incident arose out of a misunderstanding
between them."45 Finally, he contends that the
company’s invocation of the 2003 irregularity
reports to support his dismissal effected in 2005
was a mere afterthought.46 In any event, he
maintains that even those alleged infractions
were not duly supported by evidence.47
We find for respondent and rule that the
employer failed to prove that the dismissal was
due to a just cause.
The Labor Code provides that the burden of
proving that the termination of an employee was
for a just or authorized cause lies with the
employer.48 If the employer fails to meet this
burden, the conclusion would be that the
dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal.49
Here, we agree with Rodriguez’s position that
the 26 January 2005 irregularity report, which
served as the basis of his dismissal, may only be
considered as an uncorroborated allegation if
unsupported by substantial
evidence.1âwphi1 On this matter, we quote with
favor the ruling of the appellate court:
The nature of work of a bus conductor involves
inherent or normal occupational risks of
incurring money shortages and uncollected
fares. A conductor’s job is to collect exact fares
from the passengers and remit his collections to
the company. Evidence must, therefore, be
substantial and not based on mere surmises or
conjectures for to allow an employer to
terminate the employment of a worker based on
mere allegations places the latter in an uncertain
situation and at the sole mercy of the employer.
An accusation that is not substantiated will not
ripen into a holding that there is just cause for
dismissal. A mere accusation of wrongdoing or a
mere pronouncement of lack of confidence is not
sufficient cause for a valid dismissal of an
employee. Thus, the failure of the petitioners to
convincingly show that the respondent
misappropriated the bus fares renders the
dismissal to be without a valid cause. To add,
jurisprudence dictates that if doubt exists
between the evidence presented by the
employer and the employee, the scales of justice
must be tilted in favor of the latter.50 (Citations
omitted)
Thus, we rule that petitioners have failed to
prove that the termination of Rodriguez’s
employment was due to a just cause.
Turning to the issue of procedural due process,
both parties are in agreement that Rodriguez
was not given a written notice specifying the
grounds for his termination and giving him a
reasonable opportunity to explain his side; a
hearing which would have given him the
opportunity to respond to the charge and
present evidence in his favor; and a written
notice of termination indicating that after
considering all the circumstances, management
has concluded that his dismissal is warranted.
Clearly, therefore, the inescapable conclusion is
that procedural due process is wanting in the
case at bar.
Having found that Rodriguez was illegally
dismissed, we now rule on petitioners’ liabilities
and respondent’s entitlements under the law.
An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to the
twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of
full backwages. In Santos v. National Labor
Relations Commission,51 we explained:
The normal consequences of a finding that an
employee has been illegally dismissed are, firstly,
that the employee becomes entitled to
reinstatement to his former position without loss
of seniority rights and, secondly, the payment of
backwages corresponding to the period from his
illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement. The
statutory intent on this matter is clearly
discernible. Reinstatement restores the
employee who was unjustly dismissed to the
position from which he was removed, that is, to
his status quo ante dismissal, while the grant of
backwages allows the same employee to recover
from the employer that which he had lost by way
of wages as a result of his dismissal. These twin
remedies — reinstatement and payment of
backwages — make the dismissed employee
whole who can then look forward to continued
employment. Thus, do these two remedies give
meaning and substance to the constitutional
right of labor to security of tenure. (Citations
omitted)
Thus, the CA committed no reversible error in
upholding the NLRC’s order to reinstate
Rodriguez and in directing the payment of his
full backwages, from the time he was illegally
dismissed until his actual reinstatement.
As to who should bear the burden of satisfying
respondent’s lawful claims, petitioners submit
that since Rodriguez was an employee of Contact
Tours, the latter is liable for the settlement of his
claims.
We do not agree.
"The presumption is that a contractor is a labor-
only contractor unless he overcomes the burden
of proving that it has substantial capital,
investment, tools, and the like."52 While ALPS
Transportation is not the contractor itself, since
it is invoking Contact Tours status as a legitimate
job contractor in order to avoid liability, it bears
the burden of proving that Contact Tours is an
independent contractor.53
It is thus incumbent upon ALPS Transportation
to present sufficient proof that Contact Tours has
substantial capital, investment and tools in order
to successfully impute liability to the latter.
However, aside from making bare assertions and
offering the Kasunduan between Rodriguez and
Contact Tours in evidence,54 ALPS
Transportation has failed to present any proof to
substantiate the former's status as a legitimate
job contractor. Hence, the legal presumption that
Contact Tours is a labor-only contractor has not
been overcome.
As a labor-only contractor, therefore, Contact
Tours is deemed to be an agent of ALPS
Transportation.55 Thus, the latter is responsible
to Contact Tours' employees in the same manner
and to the same extent as if they were directly
employed by the bus company.56
Finally, the CA correctly ruled that since ALPS
Transportation is a sole proprietorship owned
by petitioner Alfredo Perez, it is he who must be
held liable for the payment of backwages to
Rodriguez.57 A sole proprietorship does not
possess a juridical personality separate and
distinct from that of the owner of the
enterprise.58 Thus, the owner has unlimited
personal liability for all the debts and obligations
of the business, and it is against him that a
decision for illegal dismissal is to be enforced.59

WHEREFORE, the instant Rule 45 Petition for

Review is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 100163 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. NO. 175773, June 17, 2013
MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES SALARIED
EMPLOYEES UNION
(MMPSEU), Petitioner, v.MITSUBISHI MOTORS
PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) of
the parties in this case provides that the
company shoulder the hospitalization expenses
of the dependents of covered employees subject
to certain limitations and restrictions.�
Accordingly, covered employees pay part of the
hospitalization insurance premium through
monthly salary deduction while the company,
upon hospitalization of the covered
employees� dependents, shall pay the
hospitalization expenses incurred for the
same.� The conflict arose when a portion of the
hospitalization expenses of the covered
employees� dependents were paid/shouldered
by the dependent� s own health insurance.�
While the company refused to pay the portion of
the hospital expenses already shouldered by the
dependents� own health insurance, the union
insists that the covered employees are entitled to
the whole and undiminished amount of said
hospital expenses.
By this Petition for Review
on Certiorari,1 petitioner Mitsubishi Motors
Philippines Salaried Employees Union
(MMPSEU) assails the March 31, 2006
Decision2 and December 5, 2006 Resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
75630, which reversed and set aside the
Voluntary Arbitrator� s December 3, 2002
Decision4 and declared respondent Mitsubishi
Motors Philippines Corporation (MMPC) to be
under no legal obligation to pay its covered
employees� dependents� hospitalization
expenses which were already shouldered by
other health insurance companies.
Factual Antecedents
The parties� CBA5 covering the period August
1, 1996 to July 31, 1999 provides for the
hospitalization insurance benefits for the
covered dependents,
thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SECTION 4. DEPENDENTS� GROUP
HOSPITALIZATION INSURANCE � The
COMPANY shall obtain group hospitalization
insurance coverage or assume under a self-
insurance basis hospitalization for the
dependents of regular employees up to a
maximum amount of forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00) per confinement subject to the
following:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
a. The room and board must not exceed
three hundred pesos (P300.00) per day
up to a maximum of thirty-one (31)
days.� Similarly, Doctor� s Call fees
must not exceed three hundred pesos
(P300.00) per day for a maximum of
thirty-one (31) days.� Any excess of
this amount shall be borne by the
employee.
b. Confinement must be in a hospital
designated by the COMPANY.� For
this purpose, the COMPANY shall
designate hospitals in different
convenient places to be availed of by
the dependents of employees.� In
cases of emergency where the
dependent is confined without the
recommendation of the company
doctor or in a hospital not designated
by the COMPANY, the COMPANY shall
look into the circumstances of such
confinement and arrange for the
payment of the amount to the extent of
the hospitalization benefit.
c. The limitations and restrictions listed
in Annex "B" must be observed.
d. Payment shall be direct to the hospital
and doctor and must be covered by
actual billings.
Each employee shall pay one hundred pesos
(P100.00) per month through salary deduction
as his share in the payment of the insurance
premium for the above coverage with the
balance of the premium to be paid by the
COMPANY.� If the COMPANY is self-insured the
one hundred pesos (P100.00) per employee
monthly contribution shall be given to the
COMPANY which shall shoulder the expenses
subject to the above level of benefits and subject
to the same limitations and restrictions provided
for in Annex "B" hereof.
The hospitalization expenses must be covered by
actual hospital and doctor� s bills and any
amount in excess of the above mentioned level of
benefits will be for the account of the employee.
For purposes of this provision, eligible
dependents are the covered employees�
natural parents, legal spouse and legitimate or
legally adopted or step children who are
unmarried, unemployed who have not attained
twenty-one (21) years of age and wholly
dependent upon the employee for support.
This provision applies only in cases of actual
confinement in the hospital for at least six (6)
hours.
Maternity cases are not covered by this section
but will be under the next succeeding section on
maternity benefits.6
When the CBA expired on July 31, 1999, the
parties executed another CBA7 effective August
1, 1999 to July 31, 2002 incorporating the same
provisions on dependents� hospitalization
insurance benefits but in the increased amount
of P50,000.00.� The room and board expenses,
as well as the doctor� s call fees, were also
increased to P375.00.
On separate occasions, three members of
MMPSEU, namely, Ernesto Calida (Calida),
Hermie Juan Oabel (Oabel) and Jocelyn Martin
(Martin), filed claims for reimbursement of
hospitalization expenses of their dependents.
MMPC paid only a portion of their
hospitalization insurance claims, not the full
amount.� In the case of Calida, his wife, Lanie,
was confined at Sto. Tomas University Hospital
from September 4 to 9, 1998 due to
Thyroidectomy.� The medical expenses
incurred totalled P29,967.10.� Of this amount,
P9,000.00 representing professional fees was
paid by MEDICard Philippines, Inc. (MEDICard)
which provides health maintenance to Lanie.8�
MMPC only paid P12,148.63.9� It did not pay
the P9,000.00 already paid by MEDICard and the
P6,278.47 not covered by official receipts.� It
refused to give to Calida the difference between
the amount of medical expenses of
P27,427.1010 which he claimed to be entitled to
under the CBA and the P12,148.63 which MMPC
directly paid to the hospital.
As regards Oabel� s claim, his wife Jovita Nemia
(Jovita) was confined at The Medical City from
March 8 to 11, 1999 due to Tonsillopharyngitis,
incurring medical expenses totalling
P8,489.35.11� Of this amount, P7,811.00 was
paid by Jovita� s personal health insurance,
Prosper Insurance Company (Prosper).12�
MMPC paid the hospital the amount of
P630.87,13 after deducting from the total medical
expenses the amount paid by Prosper and the
P47.48 discount given by the hospital.
In the case of Martin, his father, Jose, was
admitted at The Medical City from March 26 to
27, 2000 due to Acid Peptic Disease and incurred
medical expenses amounting to P9,101.30.14�
MEDICard paid P8,496.00.15� Consequently,
MMPC only paid P288.40,16 after deducting from
the total medical expenses the amount paid by
MEDICard and the P316.90 discount given by the
hospital.
Claiming that under the CBA, they are entitled to
hospital benefits amounting to P27,427.10,
P6,769.35 and P8,123.80, respectively, which
should not be reduced by the amounts paid by
MEDICard and by Prosper, Calida, Oabel and
Martin asked for reimbursement from MMPC.�
However, MMPC denied the claims contending
that double insurance would result if the said
employees would receive from the company the
full amount of hospitalization expenses despite
having already received payment of portions
thereof from other health insurance providers.
This prompted the MMPSEU President to write
the MMPC President17 demanding full payment
of the hospitalization benefits.� Alleging
discrimination against MMPSEU union members,
she pointed out that full reimbursement was
given in a similar claim filed by Luisito Cruz
(Cruz), a member of the Hourly Union.� In a
letter-reply,18 MMPC, through its Vice-President
for Industrial Relations Division, clarified that
the claims of the said MMPSEU members have
already been paid on the basis of official receipts
submitted.� It also denied the charge of
discrimination and explained that the case of
Cruz involved an entirely different matter since
it concerned the admissibility of certified true
copies of documents for reimbursement
purposes, which case had been settled through
voluntary arbitration.
On August 28, 2000, MMPSEU referred the
dispute to the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board and requested for preventive
mediation.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Proceedings before the Voluntary Arbitrator
On October 3, 2000, the case was referred to
Voluntary Arbitrator Rolando Capocyan for
resolution of the issue involving the
interpretation of the subject CBA
provision.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
MMPSEU alleged that there is nothing in the CBA
which prohibits an employee from obtaining
other insurance or declares that medical
expenses can be reimbursed only upon
presentation of original official receipts.� It
stressed that the hospitalization benefits should
be computed based on the formula indicated in
the CBA without deducting the benefits derived
from other insurance providers.� Besides, if
reduction is permitted, MMPC would be unjustly
benefitted from the monthly premium
contributed by the employees through salary
deduction.� MMPSEU added that its members
had legitimate claims under the CBA and that any
doubt as to any of its provisions should be
resolved in favor of its members.� Moreover,
any ambiguity should be resolved in favor of
labor.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the other hand, MMPC argued that the
reimbursement of the entire amounts being
claimed by the covered employees, including
those already paid by other insurance
companies, would constitute double indemnity
or double insurance, which is circumscribed
under the Insurance Code.� Moreover, a
contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity
and the employees cannot be allowed to profit
from their dependents�
loss.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Meanwhile, the parties separately sought for a
legal opinion from the Insurance Commission
relative to the issue at hand.� In its letter23 to
the Insurance Commission, MMPC requested for
confirmation of its position that the covered
employees cannot claim insurance benefits for a
loss that had already been covered or paid by
another insurance company.� However, the
Office of the Insurance Commission opted not to
render an opinion on the matter as the same may
become the subject of a formal complaint before
it.24� On the other hand, when queried by
MMPSEU,25 the Insurance Commission, through
Atty. Richard David C. Funk II (Atty. Funk) of the
Claims Adjudication Division, rendered an
opinion contained in a letter,26viz:
January 8, 2002
Ms. Cecilia L. Paras
President Mitsubishi Motors Phils.
[Salaried] Employees Union
Ortigas Avenue Extension,
Cainta, Rizal
Madam:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We acknowledge receipt of your letter which, to
our impression, basically poses the question of
whether or not recovery of medical expenses
from a Health Maintenance Organization bars
recovery of the same reimbursable amount of
medical expenses under a contract of health or
medical insurance.
We wish to opine that in cases of claims for
reimbursement of medical expenses where there
are two contracts providing benefits to that
effect, recovery may be had on both
simultaneously.� In the absence of an Other
Insurance provision in these coverages, the
courts have uniformly held that an insured is
entitled to receive the insurance benefits without
regard to the amount of total benefits provided
by other insurance. (INSURANCE LAW, A Guide
to Fundamental Principles, Legal Doctrines, and
Commercial Practices; Robert E. Keeton, Alau I.
Widiss, p. 261).� The result is consistent with
the public policy underlying the collateral source
rule � that is, x x x the courts have usually
concluded that the liability of a health or
accident insurer is not reduced by other possible
sources of indemnification or compensation.�
(ibid).
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
RICHARD DAVID C. FUNK II
Attorney IV
Officer-in-Charge
Claims Adjudication Division
On December 3, 2002, the Voluntary Arbitrator
rendered a Decision27 finding MMPC liable to pay
or reimburse the amount of hospitalization
expenses already paid by other health insurance
companies.� The Voluntary Arbitrator held that
the employees may demand simultaneous
payment from both the CBA and their
dependents� separate health insurance without
resulting to double insurance, since separate
premiums were paid for each contract.� He also
noted that the CBA does not prohibit
reimbursement in case there are other health
insurers.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
MMPC filed a Petition for Review with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction28 before
the CA.� It claimed that the Voluntary
Arbitrator committed grave abuse of discretion
in not finding that recovery under both
insurance policies constitutes double insurance
as both had the same subject matter, interest
insured and risk or peril insured against; in
relying solely on the unauthorized legal opinion
of Atty. Funk; and in not finding that the
employees will be benefitted twice for the same
loss.� In its Comment,29 MMPSEU countered
that MMPC will unjustly enrich itself and profit
from the monthly premiums paid if full
reimbursement is not made.
On March 31, 2006, the CA found merit in
MMPC� s Petition.� It ruled that despite the
lack of a provision which bars recovery in case of
payment by other insurers, the wordings of the
subject provision of the CBA showed that the
parties intended to make MMPC liable only for
expenses actually incurred by an employee� s
qualified dependent.� In particular, the
provision stipulates that payment should be
made directly to the hospital and that the claim
should be supported by actual hospital and
doctor� s bills.� These mean that the
employees shall only be paid amounts not
covered by other health insurance and is more in
keeping with the principle of indemnity in
insurance contracts.� Besides, a contrary
interpretation would "allow unscrupulous
employees to unduly profit from the x x x
benefits" and shall "open the floodgates to
questionable claims x x
x."30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision31 reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is GRANTED.� The decision of the voluntary
arbitrator dated December 3, 2002
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is
rendered declaring that under Art. XI, Sec. 4 of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between
petitioner and respondent effective August 1,
1999 to July 31, 2002, the former� s obligation
to reimburse the Union members for the
hospitalization expenses incurred by their
dependents is exclusive of those paid by the
Union members to the hospital.
SO ORDERED.32
In its Motion for Reconsideration,33 MMPSEU
pointed out that the alleged oppression that may
be committed by abusive employees is a mere
possibility whereas the resulting losses to the
employees are real.� MMPSEU cited Samsel v.
Allstate Insurance Co.,34 wherein the Arizona
Supreme Court explicitly ruled that an insured
may recover from separate health insurance
providers, regardless of whether one of them has
already paid the medical expenses incurred.�
On the other hand, MMPC argued in its
Comment35 that the cited foreign case involves a
different set of facts. The CA, in its
Resolution36 dated December 5, 2006, denied
MMPSEU� s motion.
Hence, this Petition.cralaw lawlibrary
Issues
MMPSEU presented the following grounds in
support of
Petition:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION DATED
03 [DECEMBER] 2002 OF THE VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATOR BELOW WHEN THE SAME WAS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE,
INCLUDING THE OPINION OF THE INSURANCE
COMMISSION THAT RECOVERY FROM BOTH
THE CBA AND SEPARATE HEALTH CARDS IS
NOT PROHIBITED IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY
SPECIFIC PROVISION IN THE CBA.cralaw
lawlibrary
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN OVERTURNING THE
DECISION OF THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
WITHOUT EVEN GIVING ANY LEGAL OR
JUSTIFIABLE BASIS FOR SUCH
REVERSAL.cralaw lawlibrary
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ERROR IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER OR EVEN
MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT THE AMERICAN
AUTHORITIES CITED IN THE RECORDS THAT
DO NOT PROHIBIT, BUT IN FACT ALLOW,
RECOVERY FROM TWO SEPARATE HEALTH
PLANS.cralaw lawlibrary
D.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING MORE IMPORTANCE TO A POSSIBLE,
HENCE MERELY SPECULATIVE, ABUSE BY
EMPLOYEES OF THE BENEFITS IF DOUBLE
RECOVERY WERE ALLOWED INSTEAD OF THE
REAL INJURY TO THE EMPLOYEES WHO ARE
PAYING FOR THE CBA HOSPITALIZATION
BENEFITS THROUGH MONTHLY SALARY
DEDUCTIONS BUT WHO MAY NOT BE ABLE
TO AVAIL OF THE SAME IF THEY OR THEIR
DEPENDENTS HAVE OTHER HEALTH
INSURANCE.37
its
MMPSEU avers that the Decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator deserves utmost respect
and finality because it is supported by
substantial evidence and is in accordance with
the opinion rendered by the Insurance
Commission, an agency equipped with vast
knowledge concerning insurance contracts.� It
maintains that under the CBA, member-
employees are entitled to full reimbursement of
medical expenses incurred by their dependents
regardless of any amounts paid by the latter� s
health insurance provider.� Otherwise, non-
recovery will constitute unjust enrichment on
the part of MMPC.� It avers that recovery from
both the CBA and other insurance companies is
allowed under their CBA and not prohibited by
law nor by jurisprudence.cralaw lawlibrary
Our Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Atty. Funk erred in applying the
collateral source rule.�
The Voluntary Arbitrator based his ruling on the
opinion of Atty. Funk that the employees may
recover benefits from different insurance
providers without regard to the amount of
benefits paid by each.� According to him, this
view is consistent with the theory of the
collateral source rule.
As part of American personal injury law, the
collateral source rule was originally applied to
tort cases wherein the defendant is prevented
from benefitting from the plaintiff� s receipt of
money from other sources.38� Under this rule, if
an injured person receives compensation for his
injuries from a source wholly independent of the
tortfeasor, the payment should not be deducted
from the damages which he would otherwise
collect from the tortfeasor.39� In a recent
Decision40 by the Illinois Supreme Court, the rule
has been described as "an established exception
to the general rule that damages in negligence
actions must be compensatory."� The Court
went on to explain that although the rule
appears to allow a double recovery, the collateral
source will have a lien or subrogation right to
prevent such a double recovery.41� In Mitchell
v. Haldar,42� the collateral source rule was
rationalized by the Supreme Court of
Delaware:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The collateral source rule is � predicated on the
theory that a tortfeasor has no interest in, and
therefore no right to benefit from monies
received by the injured person from sources
unconnected with the defendant� .� According
to the collateral source rule, � a tortfeasor has
no right to any mitigation of damages because of
payments� or compensation received by the
injured person from an independent source.�
The rationale for the collateral source rule is
based upon the quasi-punitive nature of tort law
liability. It has been explained as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The collateral source rule is designed to strike a
balance between two competing principles of
tort law: (1) a plaintiff is entitled to
compensation sufficient to make him whole, but
no more; and (2) a defendant is liable for all
damages that proximately result from his
wrong.� A plaintiff who receives a double
recovery for a single tort enjoys a windfall; a
defendant who escapes, in whole or in part,
liability for his wrong enjoys a windfall.�
Because the law must sanction one windfall and
deny the other, it favors the victim of the wrong
rather than the wrongdoer.
Thus, the tortfeasor is required to bear the cost
for the full value of his or her negligent conduct
even if it results in a windfall for the innocent
plaintiff.� (Citations omitted)

As seen, the collateral source rule applies in
order to place the responsibility for losses on the
party causing them.43� Its application is
justified so that "'the wrongdoer should not
benefit from the expenditures made by the
injured party or take advantage of contracts or
other relations that may exist between the
injured party and third persons."44� Thus, it
finds no application to cases involving no-fault
insurances under which the insured is
indemnified for losses by insurance companies,
regardless of who was at fault in the incident
generating the losses.45� Here, it is clear that
MMPC is a no-fault insurer.� Hence, it cannot be
obliged to pay the hospitalization expenses of
the dependents of its employees which had
already been paid by separate health insurance
providers of said dependents.
The Voluntary Arbitrator therefore erred in
adopting Atty. Funk� s view that the covered
employees are entitled to full payment of the
hospital expenses incurred by their dependents,
including the amounts already paid by other
health insurance companies based on the theory
of collateral source rule.
The conditions set forth in the CBA provision
indicate an intention to limit MMPC� s liability
only to actual expenses incurred by the
employees�
dependents, that is, excluding the amounts paid
by dependents� other health insurance
providers.
The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that the CBA has
no express provision barring claims for
hospitalization expenses already paid by other
insurers.� Hence, the covered employees can
recover from both.� The CA did not agree,
saying that the conditions set forth in the CBA
implied an intention of the parties to limit
MMPC� s liability only to the extent of the
expenses actually incurred by their dependents
which excludes the amounts shouldered by other
health insurance companies.
We agree with the CA.� The condition
that payment should be direct to the hospital and
doctor implies that MMPC is only liable to pay
medical expenses actually shouldered by the
employees� dependents.� It follows that
MMPC� s liability is limited, that is, it does not
include the amounts paid by other health
insurance providers.� This condition is
obviously intended to thwart not only fraudulent
claims but also double claims for the same loss of
the dependents of covered employees.
It is well to note at this point that the CBA
constitutes a contract between the parties and as
such, it should be strictly construed for the
purpose of limiting the amount of the
employer� s liability.46� The terms of the
subject provision are clear and provide no room
for any other interpretation.� As there is no
ambiguity, the terms must be taken in their
plain, ordinary and popular sense.47�
Consequently, MMPSEU cannot rely on the rule
that a contract of insurance is to be liberally
construed in favor of the insured.� Neither can
it rely on the theory that any doubt must be
resolved in favor of labor.
Samsel v. Allstate Insurance Co. is
on all fours with the case at bar.�
MMPSEU cannot rely on Samsel v. Allstate
Insurance Co. where the Supreme Court of
Arizona allowed the insured to enjoy medical
benefits under an automobile policy insurance
despite being able to also recover from a
separate health insurer.� In that case, the
Allstate automobile policy does not contain any
clause restricting medical payment coverage to
expenses actually paid by the insured nor does it
specifically provide for reduction of medical
payments benefits by a coordination of
benefits.48� However, in the case before us, the
dependents� group hospitalization insurance Moreover, since the subject CBA provision is an
insurance contract, the rights and obligations of
provision in the CBA specifically contains a
the parties must be determined in accordance
condition which limits MMPC� s liability only up
with the general principles of insurance law.52�
to the extent of the expenses that should be paid
Being in the nature of a non-life insurance
by the covered employee� s dependent to the contract and essentially a contract of indemnity,
hospital and doctor.� This is evident from the the CBA provision obligates MMPC to indemnify
the covered employees� medical expenses
portion which states that "payment [by MMPC]
incurred by their dependents but only up to the
shall be direct to the hospital anddoctor."49� In
contrast, the Allstate automobile policy expressly extent of the expenses actually incurred.53�
gives Allstate the authority to pay directly to the
This is consistent with the principle of indemnity
insured person or on the latter� s behalf all which proscribes the insured from recovering
greater than the loss.54� Indeed, to profit from a
reasonable expenses actually incurred.�
loss will lead to unjust enrichment and therefore
Therefore, reliance on [Samsel] is unavailing
because the facts therein are different and not should not be countenanced.� As aptly ruled by
decisive of the issues in the present case. the CA, to grant the claims of MMPSEU will
permit possible abuse by employees.
To allow reimbursement of amounts paid
under other insurance policies shall constitute WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.� The
double recovery which is not sanctioned by law.
Decision dated March 31, 2006 and Resolution
dated December 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
MMPSEU insists that MMPC is also liable for the
in CA-G.R. SP No. 75630, are AFFIRMED.
amounts covered under other insurance policies;
otherwise, MMPC will unjustly profit from the
SO ORDERED.
premiums the employees contribute through
monthly salary deductions.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, Perez,
and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
This contention is unmeritorious.
To constitute unjust enrichment, it must be
shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the
sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally
not
or unlawfully.50� A claim for unjust enrichment
fails when the person who will benefit has a valid
claim to such
benefit.51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The CBA has provided for MMPC� s limited
liability which extends only up to the amount to
be paid to the hospital and doctor by the
employees� dependents, excluding those paid
by other insurers.� Consequently, the covered
employees will not receive more than what is
due them; neither is MMPC under any obligation
to give more than what is due under the CBA.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 2436. November 22, 1905. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
GUILLERMO MAZA, Defendant-Appellant.
Mariano de Jesus, for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; LIABILITY OF JOINT TORT
FEASORS. — Where two or more persons act
together in the commission of a crime, whether
they act through the physical volition of one or of
all, proceeding severally or collectively, each is in
law responsible for the result the same as though
he had acted alone.
2. ID.; ID. — If two or more persons combine to
perform a criminal act jointly, the guilt of each is
the same as if he had acted alone, and the result
is the same if the act is divided into parts and
each person proceeded with his part unaided.
DECISION
JOHNSON, J. :
This defendant was charged with the crimes of
assassination, robbery, assault, and lesiones
menos graves, was tried by the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Batangas, found
guilty of the crimes charged in said complaint,
and sentenced to life imprisonment (cadena
perpetua) with the accessory penalties
mentioned in article 54 of the Penal Code and to
pay the costs. From this decision the defendant
appealed to this court.
No objection was made by the defendant in the
court below to the fact that the complaint filed in
said cause contained more than one offense. (See
sec. 11, General Orders, No. 58.) Therefore this
defect in the complaint will not be considered
here.
The evidence adduced during the trial shows the
following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First. That this defendant was sentenced by the
Court of First Instance of the Province of
Batangas on the 6th day of December, 1902, to
be imprisoned for the period of eight years and
one day of presidio mayor with the accessory
penalties mentioned in the decision in that
cause.
Second. From this decision the defendant
appealed to the Supreme Court on the 9th day of
December of the same year.
Third. That on the 18th day of April, 1903, the
Supreme Court affirmed the above sentence of
the inferior court. (See General Register of
Sentences, Cause No. 1150. 1)
Fourth. That during the time the said appeal was
pending in the Supreme Court the said accused
was detained as a prisoner in the provincial jail
in the Province of Batangas.
Fifth. That on the afternoon of the 15th of
December, 1902, while the defendant was thus
detained as a prisoner in the provincial jail, he,
together with other prisoners, attempted to
escape from said jail.
Sixth. That in the attempt of the defendant,
together with his companions, to escape from
said jail, he inflicted wounds upon one Baltazar
Ramirez, by means of a revolver which he then
and there took from the possession of one of the
guards in said jail, from which wounds the said
Ramirez died.
Seventh. That in the attempt of the defendant
with his companions to escape from said jail,
they did, by force and violence, take from the
guards in the said jail, with the intent of
appropriating the same to their own use, one
revolver, two shotguns, and one rifle, the
property of the Insular police.
Eighth. That the defendant, with his companions,
in their attempt to escape from said carcel,
inflicted wounds upon the alcalde of said carcel,
from the effects of which the said alcalde did not "The provisions of the foregoing article are not
recover until a period of seventeen days had applicable to a case in which a single act should
elapsed. constitute two or more crimes, or if one of them
should be a necessary means for committing the
The evidence adduced during the trial shows others.
beyond peradventure of doubt that the
defendant and his companions inflicted wounds "In such cases, only the penalty corresponding to
upon Baltazar Ramirez, from which the said the more serious crime shall be imposed in its
Ramirez died a few hours later. The evidence maximum degree."cralaw virtua1aw library
fails to disclose, however, any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in article 403 of the The punishment for homicide is reclusion
Penal Code. This act, therefore, can not be temporal, and the penalty in its maximum degree
qualified as assassination, but must be qualified is seventeen years four months and one day to
as the crime of homicide. It is argued on behalf of twenty years. It is the judgment of this court,
the defendant that there was no evidence to therefore, that the defendant be imprisoned for a
show that he personally inflicted the wounds period of seventeen years four months and one
upon the said Ramirez which caused the latter’s day of reclusion temporal, to suffer the
death a few moments later. The general doctrine, subsidiary penalties mentioned in article 59 of
both by the supreme court of Spain and the the Penal Code, to indemnify the heirs of the said
courts of the United States, is that "where two or Ramirez in the sum of P1,000, to pay the said
more persons act together in the commission of alcalde the sum of P17, and to pay the costs. So
a crime, whether they act through the physical ordered.
volition of one or of all, proceeding severally or
collectively, each individual whose will Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Carson and
contributes to the wrongdoing is in law Willard, JJ., concur.
responsible for the whole, the same as though
the act or crime done or committed was by
himself alone." (Decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain of September 29, 1883; United States v.
Snyder, 3 McCrary, 377; Hanna v. People, 86 Ill.,
243; Spies v. People, 122 Ill., 1 [3 American State
Reports, 320, 321]).
"If two or more persons combine in an intent to
perform a criminal act jointly, the guilt of each is
the same as if he had acted alone; and the result
is the same if the act is divided into parts and
each person proceeds with his part unaided."
(People v. Mather, 4 Wendell, 229, 259; 21
American Decisions, 122.)
While the evidence shows beyond peradventure
of doubt that the defendant and his companions
were also guilty of the crime of robbery, as well
as that of inflicting wounds yet, by virtue of the
provisions of article 89 of the Penal Code, it is the
duty of the court to impose the penalty
corresponding to the more serious crime which
in this case is that of homicide. Article 89 of the
Penal Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 130068. October 1, 1998]
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING
COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPELAS and PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY, respondents.
[G.R. No. 130150. October 1, 1998]
MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY
and FAR EASTERN SHIPPING
COMPANY, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
These consolidated petitions for review
on certiorari seek in unison to annul and set
aside the decision[1] of respondent Court of
Appeals of November 15, 1996 and its
resolution[2] dated July 31, 1997 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 24072, entitled Philippine Ports Authority,
Plaintiff-Appellee vs. Far Eastern Shipping
Company, Senen C. Gavino and Manila Pilots
Association. Defendants-Appellants, which
affirmed with modification the judgment of the
trial court holding the defendants-appellants
therein solidarily liable for damages in favor of
herein private respondent.
There is no dispute about the facts as found
by the appellate court, thus --
x x x On June 20, 1980, the M/V
PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the
USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern
Shipping Company (FESC for brevitys sake),
arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver,
British Columbia at about 7:00 oclock in the
morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the
Manila International Port, as its berthing
space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by
the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the
berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino
was assigned by the appellant Manila Pilots
Association (MPA for brevitys sake) to conduct
docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the
vessel to Berth No. 4.
Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine
anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge,
with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov,
beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by
Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its
cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the
quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the
Manila International Port. The sea was calm and
the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers.
When the vessel reached the landmark (the big
church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half
mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine
stopped. When the vessel was already about
2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the
anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to
the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left
anchor, with two (2) shackles were
dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold
as expected. The speed of the vessel did not
slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew
members. A brief conference ensued between
Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino
inquired what was all the commotion about,
Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing
of it.
After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take
hold, he ordered the engines half-
astern.Abellana, who was then on the pier apron,
noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier
fast.Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor
did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the full-
astern code. Before the right anchor and
additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of
the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier
causing considerable damage to the pier. The
vessel sustained damage too. (Exhibit 7-Far
Eastern Shipping). Kavankov filed his sea protest
(Exhibit 1-Vessel).Gavino submitted his report to
the Chief Pilot (Exhibit 1-Pilot) who referred the
report to the Philippine Ports Authority (Exhibit
2-Pilot) Abellana likewise submitted his report
of the incident (Exhibit B).
Per contract and supplemental contract of the
Philippine Ports Authority and the contractor for
the rehabilitation of the damaged pier, the same
cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount
ofP1,126,132.25 (Exhibits D and E).[3]
On January 10, 1983, the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA, for brevity), through the
Solicitor General, filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 39, a complaint for a
sum of money against Far Eastern Shipping Co.,
Capt. Senen C. Gavino and the Manila Pilots
Association, docketed as Civil Case No. 83-
14958,[4] praying that the defendants therein be
held jointly and severally liable to pay the
plaintiff actual and exemplary damages plus
costs of suit. In a decision dated August 1, 1985,
the trial court ordered the defendants therein
jointly and severally to pay the PPA the amount
of P1,053,300.00 representing actual damages
and the cost of suit.[5]
The defendants appealed to the Court of
Appeals and raised the following issues: (1) Is
the pilot of a commercial vessel, under
compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage
caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of
destination, for his negligence? And (2) Would
the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the
damage is caused by the concurrent negligence
of the master of vessel and the pilot under a
compulsory pilotage?
As stated at the outset, respondent
appellate court affirmed the findings of the
court a quoexcept that it found no employer-
employee relationship existing between herein
private respondents Manila Pilots Association
(MPA, for short) and Capt. Gavino.[6] This being
so, it ruled instead that the liability of MPA is
anchored, not on Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
but on the provisions of Customs Administrative
Order No. 15-65,[7] and accordingly modified said
decision of the trial court by holding MPA, along
with its co-defendants therein, still solidarily
liable to PPA but entitled MPA to reimbursement
from Capt. Gavino for such amount of the
adjudged pecuniary liability in excess of the
amount equivalent to seventy-five percent
(75%) of its prescribed reserve fund.[8]
Neither Far Eastern Shipping Co. (briefly,
FESC) nor MPA was happy with the decision of
the Court of Appeals and both of them elevated
their respective plaints to us via separate
petitions for review on certiorari.
In G.R. No. 130068, which was assigned to
the Second Division of this Court, FESC imputed
that the Court of Appeals seriously erred:
1. in not holding Senen C. Gavino and the Manila
Pilots Association as the parties solely
responsible for the resulting damages sustained
by the pier deliberately ignoring the established
jurisprudence on the matter.
2. in holding that the master had not exercised
the required diligence demanded from him by
the circumstances at the time the incident
happened;
3. in affirming the amount of damages sustained
by the respondent Philippine Ports Authority
despite a strong and convincing evidence that
the amount is clearly exorbitant and
unreasonable;
4. in not awarding any amount of counterclaim
prayed for by the petitioner in its answer; and
5. in not granting herein petitioner's claim
against pilot Senen C. Gavino and Manila Pilots'
Association in the event that it be held liable.[9]
Petitioner asserts that since the MV
PAVLODAR was under compulsory pilotage at
the time of the incident, it was a compulsory
pilot, Capt. Gavino, who was in command and
had complete control in the navigation and
docking of the vessel. It is the pilot who
supersedes the master for the time being in the
command and navigation of a ship and his orders
must be obeyed in all respects connected with
her navigation. Consequently, he was solely
responsible for the damage caused upon the pier
apron, and not the owners of the vessel. It claims
that the master of the boat did not commit any
act of negligence when he failed to countermand
or overrule the orders of the pilot because he
did not see any justifiable reason to do so. In
other words, the master cannot be faulted for
relying absolutely on the competence of the
compulsory pilot. If the master does not observe
that a compulsory pilot is incompetent or
physically incapacitated, the master is justified in
relying on the pilot.[10]
Respondent PPA, in its comment,
predictably in full agreement with the ruling of
respondent court on the solidary liability of
FESC, MPA and Capt. Gavino, stresses the
concurrent negligence of Capt. Gavino, the
harbor pilot, and Capt. Viktor
Kabankov,* shipmaster of MV Pavlodar, as the
basis of their solidary liability for damages
sustained by PPA. It posits that the vessel was
being piloted by Capt. Gavino with Capt.
Kabankov beside him all the while on the bridge
of the vessel, as the former took over the helm of
MV Pavlodar when it rammed and damaged the
apron of the pier of Berth No. 4 of the Manila
International Port. Their concurrent negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of the
collision between the vessel and the pier - Capt.
Gavino, for his negligence in the conduct of
docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the
vessel; and Capt. Kabankov, for failing to
countermand the orders of the harbor pilot and
to take over and steer the vessel himself in the
face of imminent danger, as well as for merely
relying on Capt. Gavino during the berthing
procedure.[11]
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 130150,
originally assigned to the Court's First Division
and later transferred to the Third Division, MPA,
now as petitioner in this case, avers the
respondent court's errors consisted in
disregarding and misinterpreting Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65 which limits the
liability of MPA. Said pilots' association
asseverates that it should not be held solidarily
liable with Capt. Gavino who, as held by
respondent court, is only a member, not an
employee, thereof. There being no employer-
employee relationship, neither can MPA be held
liable for any vicarious liability for the respective
exercise of profession by its members nor be
considered a joint tortfeasor as to be held jointly
and severally liable.[12] It further argues that
there was erroneous reliance on Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65 and the
constitution and by-laws of MPA, instead of the
provisions of the Civil Code on damages which,
being a substantive law, is higher in category
than the aforesaid constitution and by-laws of a
professional organization or an administrative
order which bears no provision classifying the
nature of the liability of MPA for the negligence
its member pilots.[13]
As for Capt. Gavino, counsel for MPA states
that the former had retired from active pilotage
services since July 28, 1994 and has ceased to be
a member of petitioner pilots' association. He is
not joined as a petitioner in this case since his
whereabouts are unknown.[14]
FESC's comment thereto relied on the
competence of the Court of Appeals in construing
provisions of law or administrative orders as
basis for ascertaining the liability of MPA, and
expressed full accord with the appellate court's
holding of solidary liability among itself, MPA
and Capt. Gavino. It further avers that the
disputed provisions of Customs Administrative
Order No. 15-65 clearly established MPA's
solidary liability.[15]
On the other hand, public respondent PPA,
likewise through representations by the Solicitor
General, assumes the same supportive stance it
took in G.R. No. 130068 in declaring its total
accord with the ruling of the Court of Appeals
that MPA is solidarily liable with Capt. Gavino
and FESC for damages, and in its application to
the fullest extent of the provisions of Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65 in relation to
MPA's constitution and by-laws which spell out
the conditions of and govern their respective
liabilities. These provisions are clear and
ambiguous as regards MPA's liability without
need for interpretation or construction. Although
Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 is a
mere regulation issued by an administrative
agency pursuant to delegated legislative
authority to fix details to implement the law, it is
legally binding and has the same statutory force
as any valid statute.[16]
Upon motion[17] by FESC dated April 24,
1998 in G.R. No. 130150, said case was
consolidated with G.R. No. 130068.[18]
Prefatorily, on matters of compliance with
procedural requirements, it must be mentioned
that the conduct of the respective counsel for
FESC and PPA leaves much to be desired, to the
displeasure and disappointment of this Court.
Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure[19] incorporates the former Circular
No. 28-91 which provided for what has come to
be known as the certification against forum
shopping as an additional requisite for petitions
filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals, aside from the other requirements
contained in pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court therefor, with the end in view of
preventing the filing of multiple complaints
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof or
any other tribunal or agency.
More particularly, the second paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 42 provides:
xxxxxxxxx
The petitioner shall also submit together with
the petition a certification under oath that he has
not therefore commenced any other action
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals or different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there
is such other action or proceeding, he must state
the status of the same; and if he should thereafter
learn that a similar action or proceeding has been
filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or
any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to
promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other
tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days
therefrom. (Italics supplied.)
For petitions for review filed before the Supreme
Court, Section 4(e), Rule 45 specifically requires
that such petition shall contain a sworn
certification against forum shopping as provided
in the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42.
The records show that the law firm of Del
Rosario and Del Rosario through its associate,
Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is the counsel of record for
FESC in both G.R. No. 130068 and G.R. No.
130150.
G.R. No. 130068, which is assigned to the
Court's Second Division, commenced with the
filing by FESC through counsel on August 22,
1997 of a verified motion for extension of time to
file its petition for thirty (30) days from August
28, 1997 or until September 27, 1997.[20] Said
motion contained the following certification
against forum shopping[21] signed by Atty.
Herbert A. Tria as affiant:
CERTIFICATION
AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
I/we hereby certify that I/we have not
commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency; that to the best of my own knowledge, no
such action or proceeding is pending in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency; that if I/we should
thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency, I/we undertake to
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
this Honorable Court.
This motion having been granted, FESC
subsequently filed its petition on September 26,
1997, this time bearing a "verification and
certification against forum-shopping" executed
by one Teodoro P. Lopez on September 24,
1997,[22] to wit:
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
in compliance with Section 4(e), Rule 45 in
relation to Section 2, Rule 42 of the Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure
I, Teodoro P. Lopez, of legal age, after being duly
sworn, depose and state:
1. That I am the Manager, Claims Department of
Filsov Shipping Company, the local agent of
petitioner in this case.
2. That I have caused the preparation of this
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
3. That I have read the same and the allegations
therein contained are true and correct based on
the records of this case.
4. That I certify that petitioner has not
commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court
or Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency, that to the best of my own knowledge, no
such action or proceeding is pending in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other
tribunal or agency, that I should thereafter learn
that a similar action or proceeding has been filed
or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I
undertake to report the fact within five (5) days
therefrom to this Honorable Court. (Italics
supplied for emphasis.)
Reviewing the records, we find that the
petition filed by MPA in G.R. No. 130150 then
pending with the Third Division was duly filed
on August 29, 1997 with a copy thereof
furnished on the same date by registered mail to
counsel for FESC.[23] Counsel of record for MPA,
Atty. Jesus P. Amparo, in his verification
accompanying said petition dutifully revealed to
the Court that--
xxxxxxxxx
3. Petitioner has not commenced any other
action or proceeding involving the same issues in
his Honorable Court, the Court of Appeals or
different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal
or agency, but to the best of his knowledge, there
is an action or proceeding pending in this
Honorable Court, entitled Far Eastern Shipping
Co., Petitioner, vs. Philippine Ports Authority and
Court of Appeals with a Motion for Extension of
time to file Petition for Review by Certiorari filed
sometime on August 18, 1997. If undersigned
counsel will come to know of any other pending
action or claim filed or pending he undertakes to
report such fact within five (5) days to this
Honorable Court.[24] (Italics supplied.)
Inasmuch as MPA's petition in G.R. No.
130150 was posted by registered mail on August
29, 1997 and taking judicial notice of the average
period of time it takes local mail to reach its
destination, by reasonable estimation it would
be fair to conclude that when FESC filed its
petition in G.R. No. 130068 on September 26,
1997, it would already have received a copy of
the former and would then have knowledge of
the pendency of the other petition initially filed
with the First Division. It was therefore
incumbent upon FESC to inform the Court of that
fact through its certification against forum
shopping. For failure to make such disclosure, it
would appear that the aforequoted certification
accompanying the petition in G.R. No. 130068 is
defective and could have been a ground for
dismissal thereof.
Even assuming that FESC has not yet
received its copy of MPA's petition at the time it
filed its own petition and executed said
certification, its signatory did state "that if I
should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any
other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report
the fact within five (5) days therefrom in this
Honorable Court."[25] Scouring the records page
by page in this case, we find that no
manifestation concordant with such undertaking
was then or at any other time thereafter ever
filed by FESC nor was there any attempt to bring
such matter to the attention of the
Court. Moreover, it cannot feign non-knowledge
of the existence of such other petition because
FESC itself filed the motion for consolidation in
G.R. No. 130150 of these two cases on April 24,
1998.
It is disturbing to note that counsel for
FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del
Rosario, displays an unprofessional tendency of
taking the Rules for granted, in this instance
exemplified by its pro forma compliance
therewith but apparently without full
comprehension of and with less than faithful
commitment to its undertakings to this Court in
the interest of just, speedy and orderly
administration of court proceedings.
As between the lawyer and the courts, a
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the court.[26] He is an officer of the court
exercising a privilege which is indispensable in
the administration of justice.[27] Candidness,
especially towards the courts, is essential for the
expeditious administration of justice. Courts are
entitled to expect only complete honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before
them.[28] Candor in all dealings is the very
essence of honorable membership in the legal
profession.[29] More specifically, a lawyer is
obliged to observe the rules of procedure and
not to misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.[30] It behooves a lawyer, therefore, to
exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration
of justice.[31] Being an officer of the court, a
lawyer has a responsibility in the proper
administration of justice. Like the court itself, he
is an instrument to advance its ends -- the
speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and
inexpensive adjudication of cases and the
prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer
should not only help attain these objectives but
should likewise avoid any unethical or improper
practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their
realization, charged as he is with the primary
task of assisting in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.[32]
Sad to say, the members of said law firm
sorely failed to observe their duties as
responsible members of the Bar. Their
actuations are indicative of their predisposition
to take lightly the avowed duties of officers of the
Court to promote respect for law and for legal
processes.[33] We cannot allow this state of things
to pass judicial muster.
In view of the fact that at around the time
these petitions were commenced, the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure had just taken effect, the Court
treated infractions of the new Rules then with
relative liberality in evaluating full compliance
therewith. Nevertheless, it would do well to
remind all concerned that the penal provisions of
Circular No. 28-91 which remain operative
provides, inter alia:
3. Penalties.-
xxxxxxxxx
(c) The submission of a false certification under
Par. 2 of the Circular shall likewise constitute
contempt of court, without prejudice to the filing
of criminal action against the guilty party. The
lawyer may also be subjected to disciplinary
proceedings.
It must be stressed that the certification
against forum shopping ordained under the
Rules is to be executed by the petitioner, and not
by counsel. Obviously it is the petitioner, and not
always the counsel whose professional services
have been retained for a particular case, who is
in the best position to know whether he or it
actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in
that case.Hence, a certification against forum
shopping by counsel is a defective certification. It
is clearly equivalent to non-compliance with the
requirement under Section 2, Rule 42 in relation
to Section 4, Rule 45, and constitutes a valid
cause for dismissal of the petition.
Hence, the initial certification appended to
the motion for extension of time to file petition n
G.R. No. 130068 executed in behalf of FESC by
Atty. Tria is procedurally deficient. But
considering that it was a superfluity at that stage
of the proceeding, it being unnecessary to file
such a certification with a mere motion for
extension, we shall disregard such error. Besides,
the certification subsequently executed by
Teodoro P. Lopez in behalf of FESC cures that
defect to a certain extent, despite the
inaccuracies earlier pointed out. In the same
vein, we shall consider the verification signed in
behalf of MPA by its counsel, Atty. Amparo, in
G.R. No. 130150 as substantial compliance
inasmuch as it served the purpose of the Rules of
informing the Court of the pendency of another
action or proceeding involving the same issues.
It bears stressing that procedural rules are
instruments in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. They should be used to
achieve such end and not to derail it.[34]
Counsel for PPA did not make matters any
better. Despite the fact that, save for the Solicitor
General at the time, the same legal team of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG, for short)
composed of Assistant Solicitor General Roman
G. Del Rosario and Solicitor Luis F. Simon, with
the addition of Assistant Solicitor General Pio C.
Guerrero very much later in the proceedings,
represented PPA throughout the appellate
proceedings in both G.R. No. 130068 and G.R. No.
130150 and was presumably fully acquainted
with the facts and issues of the case, it took the
OSG an inordinately and almost unreasonably
long period of time to file its comment, thus
unduly delaying the resolution of these cases. It
took several changes of leadership in the OSG --
from Silvestre H. Bello III to Romeo C. dela Cruz
and, finally, Ricardo P. Galvez -- before the
comment in behalf of PPA was finally filed.
In G.R. No. 130068, it took eight (8)
motions for extension of time totaling 210 days,
a warning that no further extensions shall be
granted, and personal service on the Solicitor
General himself of the resolution requiring the
filing of such comment before the OSG indulged
the Court with the long required comment on
July 10, 1998.[35] This, despite the fact that said
office was required to file its comment way back
on November 12, 1997.[36] A closer scrutiny of
the records likewise indicates that petitioner
FESC was not even furnished a copy of said
comment as required by Section 5, Rule
42. Instead, a copy thereof was inadvertently
furnished to MPA which, from the point of view
of G.R. No. 130068, was a non-party.[37] The OSG
fared slightly better in G.R. No. 130150 in that it
took only six (6) extensions, or a total of 180
days, before the comment was finally
filed.[38] And while it properly furnished
petitioner MPA with a copy of its comment, it
would have been more desirable and expedient
in this case to have furnished its therein co-
respondent FESC with a copy thereof, if only as a
matter of professional courtesy.[39]
This undeniably dilatory disinclination of
the OSG to seasonably file required pleadings
constitutes deplorable disservice to the tax-
paying public and can only be categorized as
censurable inefficiency on the part of the
government law office. This is most certainly
professionally unbecoming of the OSG.
Another thing that baffles the Court is why
the OSG did not take the initiative of filing a
motion for consolidation in either G.R. No.
130068 or G.R. No. 130150, considering its
familiarity with the background of the case and if
only to make its job easier by having to prepare
and file only one comment. It could not have
been unaware of the pendency of one or the
other petition because, being counsel for
respondent in both cases, petitioner is required
to furnish it with a copy of the petition under
pain of dismissal of the petition for failure
otherwise.[40]
Besides, in G.R. 130068, it prefaces its
discussions thus --
Incidentally, the Manila Pilots' Association
(MPA), one of the defendants-appellants in the
case before the respondent Court of Appeals, has
taken a separate appeal from the said decision to
this Honorable Court, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 130150 and entitled "Manila Pilots'
Association, Petitioner, versus Philippine Ports
Authority and Far Eastern Shipping Co.,
Respondents.[41]
Similarly, in G.R. No. 130150, it states -
Incidentally, respondent Far Eastern Shipping
Co. (FESC) had also taken an appeal from the
said decision to this Honorable Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 130068, entitled "Far Eastern
Shipping Co. vs. Court of Appeals and Philippine
Ports Authority."[42]
We find here a lackadaisical attitude and
complacency on the part of the OSG in the
handling of its cases and an almost reflexive
propensity to move for countless extensions, as if
to test the patience of the Court, before favoring
it with the timely submission of required
pleadings.
It must be emphasized that the Court can
resolve cases only as fast as the respective
parties in a case file the necessary pleadings. The
OSG, be needlessly extending the pendency of
these cases through its numerous motions for
extension, came very close to exhausting this
Court's forbearance and has regrettably fallen
short of its duties as the People's Tribune.
The OSG is reminded that just like other
members of the Bar, the canons under the Code
of Professional Responsibility apply with equal
force on lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks.[43] These ethical
duties are rendered even more exacting as to
them because, as government counsel, they have
the added duty to abide by the policy of the State
to promote a high standard of ethics in public
service.[44] Furthermore, it is incumbent upon
the OSG, as part of the government bureaucracy,
to perform and discharge its duties with the
highest degree of professionalism, intelligence
and skill[45] and to extend prompt, courteous and
adequate service to the public.[46]
Now, on the merits of the case. After a
judicious examination of the records of this case,
the pleadings filed, and the evidence presented
by the parties in the two petitions, we find no
cogent reason to reverse and set aside the
questioned decision. While not entirely a case of
first impression, we shall discuss the
issues seriatim and, correlatively by way of a
judicial once-over, inasmuch as the matters
raised in both petitions beg for validation and
updating of well worn maritime
jurisprudence. Thereby, we shall write finis to
the endless finger-pointing in this
shippingmishap which has been stretched
beyond the limits of judicial tolerance.
The Port of Manila is within the Manila
Pilotage District which is under compulsory
pilotage pursuant to Section 8, Article III of
Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order
No. 03-85,[47]which provides that:
SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service.- For entering
a harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing
through rivers or straits within a pilotage
district, as well as docking and undocking at any
pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or
another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and
foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage.
xxx
In case of compulsory pilotage, the
respective duties and responsibilities of the
compulsory pilot and the master have been
specified by the same regulation in this wise:
SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for
damage. - On compulsory pilotage grounds, the
Harbor Pilot, providing the service to a vessel
shall be responsible for the damage caused to a
vessel or to life and property at ports due to his
negligence or fault. He can only be absolved from
liability if the accident is caused by force majeure
or natural calamities provided he has exercised
prudence and extra diligence to prevent or
minimize damage.
The Master shall retain overall command of the
vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can
countermand or overrule the order or command
of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any
damage caused to a vessel or to life and property
at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of
the Master shall be the responsibility and
liability of the registered owner of the vessel
concerned without prejudice to recourse against
said Master.
Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel
or its pilots shall be determined by competent
authority in appropriate proceedings in the light
of the facts and circumstances of each particular
case.
SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or
Pilots' Association. - The duties and
responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as
follows:
xxxxxxxxx
f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the
direction of a vessel from the time he assumes
his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it
anchored or berthed safely; Provided, however,
that his responsibility shall cease at the moment
the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his
order.
Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65
issued twenty years earlier likewise provided in
Chapter I thereof for the responsibilities of
pilots:
Par. XXXIX. - A Pilot shall be held responsible for
the direction of a vessel from the time he
assumes control thereof until he leaves it
anchored free from shoal; Provided, That his
responsibility shall cease at the moment the
master neglects or refuses to carry out his
instructions.
xxxxxxxxx
Par. XLIV. - Pilots shall properly and safely
secure or anchor vessels under their control
when requested to do so by the master of such
vessels.
I. G.R. No. 130068
Petitioner FESC faults the respondent court
with serious error in not holding MPA and Capt.
Gavino solely responsible for the damages
caused to the pier. It avers that since the vessel
was under compulsory pilotage at the time with
Capt. Gavino in command and having exclusive
control of the vessel during the docking
maneuvers, then the latter should be responsible
for damages caused to the pier.[48] It likewise
holds the appellate court in error for holding that
the master of the ship, Capt. Kabankov, did not
exercise the required diligence demanded by the
circumstances.[49]
We start our discussion of the successive
issues bearing in mind the evidentiary rule in
American jurisprudence that there is a
presumption of fault against a moving vessel that
strikes a stationary object such as a dock or
navigational aid. In admiralty, this presumption
does more than merely require the ship to go
forward and produce some evidence on the
presumptive matter. The moving vessel must
show that it was without fault or that the
collision was occasioned by the fault of the
stationary object or was the result of inevitable
accident. It has been held that such vessel must
exhaust every reasonable possibility which the
circumstances admit and show that in each, they
did all that reasonable care required.[50] In the
absence of sufficient proof in rebuttal, the
presumption of fault attaches to a moving vessel
which collides with a fixed object and makes
a prima facie case of fault against the
vessel.[51] Logic and experience support this
presumption:
The common sense behind the rule makes the
burden a heavy one. Such accidents simply do
not occur in the ordinary course of things unless
the vessel has been mismanaged in some way. It
is not sufficient for the respondent to produce
witnesses who testify that as soon as the danger
became apparent everything possible was done
to avoid an accident. The question remains, How
then did the collision occur? The answer must be
either that, in spite of the testimony of the
witnesses, what was done was too little or too
late or, if not, then the vessel was at fault for
being in a position in which an unavoidable
collision would occur.[52]
The task, therefore, in these cases is to pinpoint
who was negligent - the master of the ship, the
harbor pilot or both.
A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly
qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into
or out of ports, or in certain waters. In a broad
sense, the term "pilot" includes both (1) those
whose duty it is to guide vessels into or out of
ports, or in particular waters and (2) those
entrusted with the navigation of vessels on the
high seas.[53] However, the term "pilot" is more
generally understood as a person taken on board
at a particular place for the purpose of
conducting a ship through a river, road or
channel, or from a port.[54]
Under English and American authorities,
generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the
master for the time being in the command and
navigation of the ship, and his orders must be
obeyed in all matters connected with her
navigation. He becomes the master pro hac
vice and should give all directions as to speed,
course, stopping and reversing, anchoring,
towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is
employed in a place where pilotage is
compulsory, it is his duty to insist on having
effective control of the vessel, or to decline to act
as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, the
pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel,
but is deemed merely the adviser of the master,
who retains command and control of the
navigation even on localities where pilotage is
compulsory.[55]
It is quite common for states and localities
to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety
laws have been enacted requiring vessels
approaching their ports, with certain exceptions,
to take on board pilots duly licensed under local
law. The purpose of these laws is to create a
body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with the
harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or
depart, and thus protect life and property from
the dangers of navigation.[56]
In line with such established doctrines,
Chapter II of Customs Administrative Order No.
15-65 prescribes the rules of compulsory
pilotage in the covered pilotage districts, among
which is the Manila Pilotage District, viz. --
PARAGRAPH I. - Pilotage for entering a
harbor and anchoring thereat, as well as docking
and undocking in any pier or shifting from one
berth to another shall be compulsory, except
Government vessels and vessels of foreign
governments entitled to courtesy, and other
vessels engaged solely in river or harbor work,
or in a daily ferry service between ports which
shall be exempt from compulsory pilotage
provisions of these regulations: provided,
however, that compulsory pilotage shall not
apply in pilotage districts whose optional
pilotage is allowed under these regulations.
Pursuant thereto, Capt. Gavino was
assigned to pilot MV Pavlodar into Berth 4 of the
Manila International Port. Upon assuming such
office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to
the universally accepted high standards of care
and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he
assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect
to navigation in the particular waters over which
his license extends superior to and more to be
trusted than that of the master.[57] A pilot should
have a thorough knowledge of general and local
regulations and physical conditions affecting the
vessel in his charge and the waters for which he
is licensed, such as a particular harbor or
river.He is not held to the highest possible
degree of skill and care, but must have and
exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by
the circumstances, and usually shown by an
expert in his profession. Under extraordinary
circumstances, a pilot must exercise
extraordinary care.[58]
In Atlee vs. The Northwestern Union Packet
Company,[59] Mr. Justice Miller spelled out in
great detail the duties of a pilot:
x x x (T)he pilot of a river steamer, like the
harbor pilot, is selected for his personal
knowledge of the topography through which he
steers his vessel. In the long course of a thousand
miles in one of these rivers, he must be familiar
with the appearance of the shore on each side of
the river as he goes along. Its banks, towns, its
landings, its houses and trees, are all landmarks
by which he steers his vessel. The compass is of
little use to him. He must know where the
navigable channel is, in its relation to all these
external objects, especially in the night. He must
also be familiar with all dangers that are
permanently located in the course of the river, as
sand-bars, snags, sunken rocks or trees or
abandoned vessels or barges. All this he must
know and remember and avoid.To do this, he
must be constantly informed of the changes in
the current of the river, of the sand-bars newly
made, of logs or snags, or other objects newly
presented, against which his vessel might be
injured.
xxxxxxxxx
It may be said that this is exacting a very
high order of ability in a pilot. But when we
consider the value of the lives and property
committed to their control, for in this they are
absolute masters, the high compensation they
receive, the care which Congress has taken to
secure by rigid and frequent examinations and
renewal of licenses, this very class of skill, we do
not think we fix the standard too high.
Tested thereby, we affirm respondent
court's finding that Capt. Gavino failed to
measure up to such strict standard of care and
diligence required of pilots in the performance of
their duties.Witness this testimony of Capt.
Gavino:
Court:
You have testified before that the
reason why the vessel bumped the pier
was because the anchor was not
released immediately or as soon as you
have given the order. Do you remember
having stated that?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And you gave this order to the captain of
the vessel?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q By that testimony, you are leading the
Court to understand that is that anchor
was released immediately at the time
you gave the order, the incident would
not have happened. Is that correct?
A Yes, sir, but actually it was only a
presumption on my part because there
was a commotion between the officers
who are in charge of the dropping of
the anchor and the captain. I could not
understand their language, it was in
Russian, so I presumed the anchor was
not dropped on time.
Q So, you are not sure whether it was really
dropped on time or not?
A I am not sure, your Honor.
xxxxxxxxx
Q You are not even sure what could have
caused the incident. What factor could
have caused the incident?
A Well, in this case now, because either the
anchor was not dropped on time or the
anchor did not hold, that was the cause
of the incident, your Honor.[60]
It is disconcertingly riddled with too much
incertitude and manifests a seeming indifference
for the possibly injurious consequences his
commands as pilot may have. Prudence required
that he, as pilot, should have made sure that his
directions were promptly and strictly
followed. As correctly noted by the trial court -
Moreover, assuming that he did indeed
give the command to drop the anchor on time, as
pilot he should have seen to it that the order was
carried out, and he could have done this in a
number of ways, one of which was to inspect the
bow of the vessel where the anchor mechanism
was installed. Of course, Captain Gavino makes
reference to a commotion among the crew
members which supposedly caused the delay in
the execution of the command. This account was
reflected in the pilot's report prepared four
hours later, but Capt. Kavankov, while not
admitting whether or not such a commotion
occurred, maintained that the command to drop
anchor was followed "immediately and
precisely." Hence, the Court cannot give much
weight or consideration to this portion of
Gavino's testimony."[61]
An act may be negligent if it is done
without the competence that a reasonable
person in the position of the actor would
recognize as necessary to prevent it from
creating an unreasonable risk of harm to
another.[62] Those who undertake any work
calling for special skills are required not only to
exercise reasonable care in what they do but also
possess a standard minimum of special
knowledge and ability.[63]
Every man who offers his services to
another, and is employed, assumes to exercise in
the employment such skills he possesses, with a
reasonable degree of diligence. In all these
employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if
one offers his services he is understood as
holding himself out to the public as possessing
the degree of skill commonly possessed by
others in the same employment, and if his
pretensions are unfounded he commits a species
of fraud on every man who employs him in
reliance on his public profession.[64]
Furthermore, there is an obligation on all
persons to take the care which, under ordinary
circumstances of the case, a reasonable and
prudent man would take, and the omission of
that care constitutes negligence.[65] Generally,
the degree of care required is graduated
according to the danger a person or property
attendant upon the activity which the actor
pursues or the instrumentality which he
uses. The greater the danger the greater the
degree of care required.What is ordinary under
extraordinary of conditions is dictated by those
conditions; extraordinary risk demands
extraordinary care. Similarly, the more imminent
the danger, the higher the degree of care.[66]
We give our imprimatur to the bases for
the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Capt.
Gavino was indeed negligent in the performance
of his duties:
xxxxxxxxx
x x x As can be gleaned from the logbook,
Gavino ordered the left anchor and two (2)
shackles dropped at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning. He ordered the engines of the vessel
stopped at 8:31 o'clock. By then, Gavino must
have realized that the anchor did not hit a hard
object and was not clawed so as to reduce the
momentum of the vessel. In point of fact, the
vessel continued travelling towards the pier at
the same speed. Gavino failed to react. At 8:32
o'clock, the two (2) tugboats began to push the
stern part of the vessel from the port side but the
momentum of the vessel was not contained. Still,
Gavino did not react. He did not even order the
other anchor and two (2) more shackles dropped
to arrest the momentum of the vessel. Neither
did he order full-astern. It was only at 8:34
o'clock, or four (4) minutes, after the anchor was
dropped that Gavino reacted. But his reaction
was even (haphazard) because instead of
arresting fully the momentum of the vessel with
the help of the tugboats, Gavino ordered merely
"half-astern". It took Gavino another minute to
order a "full-astern". By then, it was too late. The
vessel's momentum could no longer be arrested
and, barely a minute thereafter, the bow of the
vessel hit the apron of the pier.Patently, Gavino
miscalculated. He failed to react and undertake
adequate measures to arrest fully the
momentum of the vessel after the anchor failed
to claw to the seabed. When he reacted, the same
was even (haphazard). Gavino failed to reckon
the bulk of the vessel, its size and its cargo. He
erroneously believed that only one (1) anchor
would suffice and even when the anchor failed to
claw into the seabed or against a hard object in
the seabed, Gavino failed to order the other
anchor dropped immediately. His claim that the
anchor was dropped when the vessel was only
1,000 feet from the pier is but a belated attempt
to extricate himself from the quagmire of his
own insouciance and negligence. In sum, then,
Appellants' claim that the incident was caused by
"force majeure" is barren of factual basis.
xxxxxxxxx
The harbor pilots are especially trained for
this job. In the Philippines, one may not be a
harbor pilot unless he passed the required
examination and training conducted then by the
Bureau of Custom, under Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65, now under the
Philippine Ports Authority under PPA
Administrative Order 63-85. Paragraph XXXIX of
the Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65
provides that "the pilot shall be held responsible
for the direction of the vessel from the time he
assumes control thereof, until he leaves it
anchored free from shoal: Provided, that his
responsibility shall cease at the moment the
master neglects or refuse(s) to carry out his
instructions." The overall direction regarding the
procedure for docking and undocking the vessel
emanates from the harbor pilot. In the present
recourse, Gavino failed to live up to his
responsibilities and exercise reasonable care or
that degree of care required by the exigencies of
the occasion. Failure on his part to exercise the
degree of care demanded by the circumstances is
negligence (Reese versus Philadelphia & RR Co.
239 US 463, 60 L ed. 384, 57 Am Jur. 2d 12age
418).[67]
 This affirms the findings of the trial court
regarding Capt. Gavino's negligence:
This discussion should not however, divert
the court from the fact that negligence in
manuevering the vessel must be attributed to
Capt. Senen Gavino. He was an experienced pilot
and by this time should have long familiarized
himself with the depth of the port and the
distance he could keep between the vessel and
port in order to berth safely.[68]
The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino
is evident; but Capt. Kabankov is no less
responsible for the allision. His unconcerned
lethargy as master of the ship in the face of
troublous exigence constitutes negligence.
While it is indubitable that in exercising his
functions a pilot-is in sole command of the
ship[69]and supersedes the master for the time
being in the command and navigation of a ship
and that he becomes master pro hac vice of a
vessel piloted by him,[70] there is overwhelming
authority to the effect that the master does not
surrender his vessel to the pilot and the pilot is
not the master. The master is still in command of
the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a
pilot. There are occasions when the master may
and should interfere and even displace the pilot,
as when the pilot is obviously incompetent or
intoxicated and the circumstances may require
the master to displace a compulsory pilot
because of incompetency or physical
incapacity. If, however, the master does not
observe that a compulsory pilot is incompetent
or physically incapacitated, the master is
justified in relying on the pilot, but not blindly.[71]
The master is not wholly absolved from his
duties while a pilot is on board his vessel, and
may advise with or offer suggestions to him. He
is still in command of the vessel, except so far as
her navigation is concerned, and must cause the
ordinary work of the vessel to be properly
carried on and the usual precaution taken. Thus,
in particular, he is bound to see that there is
sufficient watch on deck, and that the men are
attentive to their duties, also that engines are
stopped, towlines cast off, and the anchors clear
and ready to go at the pilot's order.[72]
A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony
makes it apparent that he was remiss in the
discharge of his duties as master of the ship,
leaving the entire docking procedure up to the
pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance
over this risky maneuver:
Q Will you please tell us whether you have
the right to intervene in docking of
your ship in the harbor?
A No sir, I have no right to intervene in time
of docking, only in case there is
imminent danger to the vessel and to
the pier.
Q Did you ever intervene during the time that
your ship was being docked by
Capt. Gavino?
A No sir, I did not intervene at the time when
the pilot was docking my ship.
Q Up to the time it was actually docked at the
pier, is that correct'?
A No sir, I did not intervene up to the very
moment when the vessel was docked.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Del Rosario (to the witness)
Q Mr. Witness, what happened, if any, or was
there anything unusual that happened
during the docking?
A Yes sir, our ship touched the pier and the
pier was damaged.
Court (to the witness)
Q When you said touched the pier, are you
leading the court to understand that
your ship bumped the pier?
A I believe that my vessel only touched the
pier but the impact was very weak.
Q Do you know whether the pier was
damaged as a result of that slight or
weak impact?
A Yes sir, after the pier was damaged.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Being most concerned with the safety of
your vessel, in the maneuvering of your
vessel, to the port, did you observe
anything irregular in the maneuvering
by Capt. Gavino at the time he was
trying to cause the vessel to be docked
at the pier?
A You mean the action of Capt. Gavino or his
condition?
Court:
Q Not the actuation that conform to the
safety maneuver of the ship to the
harbor?
A No sir, it was a usual docking.
Q By that statement of yours, you are leading
the court to understand that there was
nothing irregular in the docking of the
ship?
A Yes sir, during the initial period, of the
docking, there was nothing unusual
that happened.
Q What about in the last portion of the
docking of the ship, was there anything
unusual or abnormal that happened?
A None Your Honor, I believe that
Capt. Gavino thought that the anchor
could keep or hold the vessel.
Q You want us to understand, Mr. Witness,
that the dropping of the anchor of the
vessel was not timely?
A I don't know the depth of this port but I
think, if the anchor was dropped earlier
and with more shackles, there could
not have been an incident.
Q So you could not precisely tell the court
that the dropping of the anchor was
timely because you are not well aware
of the seabed, is that correct?
A Yes sir, that, is right.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Alright, Capt. Kavankov, did you come to
know later whether the anchor held its
ground so much so that the vessel could
not travel?
A It is difficult for me to say definitely. I
believe that the anchor did not hold the
ship.
Q You mean you don't know whether the
anchor blades stuck to the ground to
stop the ship from further moving?
A Yes sir, it is possible.
Q What is possible?
A I think, the 2 shackles were not enough to
hold the vessel.
Q Did you know that the 2 shackles were
dropped?
A Yes sir, I knew that.
Q If you knew that the shackles were not
enough to hold the ship, did you not
make any protest to the pilot?
A No sir, after the incident, that was my
assumption.
Q Did you come to know later whether that
presumption is correct?
A I still don't know the ground in the harbor
or the depths.
Q So from the beginning, you were not
competent whether the 2 shackles were
also dropped to hold the ship?
A No sir, at the beginning, I did not doubt it
because I believe Capt. Gavino to be an
experienced pilot and he should be
more aware as to the depths of the
harbor and the ground and I was
confident in his actions.
xxxxxxxxx
Solicitor Abad (to the witness)
Q Now, you were standing with the pilot on
the bridge of the vessel before the
incident happened, were you not?
A Yes sir, all the time, I was standing with the
pilot.
Q And so whatever the pilot saw, you could
also see from that point of view?
A That is right.
Q Whatever the pilot can read from the panel
of the bridge, you also could read, is
that correct?
A What is the meaning of panel'?
Q All indications necessary for men on the
bridge to be informed of the
movements of the ship?
A That is right.
Q And whatever sound the captain...
Capt. Gavino would hear from the
bridge, you could also hear?
A That is right.
Q Now, you said that when the command to
lower the anchor was given, it was
obeyed, is that right?
A This command was executed by the third
mate and boatswain.
Court (to the witness)
Q Mr. Witness, earlier in today's hearing, you
said that you did not intervene with the
duties of the pilot and that, in your
opinion, you can only intervene if the
ship is placed in imminent danger, is
that correct?
A That is right, I did say that.
Q In your observation before the incident
actually happened, did you observe
whether or not the ship, before the
actual incident, the ship was placed in
imminent danger?.
A No sir, I did not observe.
Q By that answer, are you leading the court
to understand that because you did not
intervene and because you believed
that it was your duty to intervene when
the vessel is placed in imminent danger
to which you did not observe any
imminent danger thereof, you have not
intervened in any manner to the
command of the pilot?
A That is right, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Assuming that you disagreed with the pilot
regarding the step being taken by the
pilot in maneuvering the vessel. whose
command will prevail, in case of
imminent danger to the vessel?
A I did not consider the situation as having
an imminent danger. I believed that the
vessel will dock alongside the pier.
Q You want us to understand that you did not
see an imminent danger to your ship, is
that what you mean?
A Yes sir, up to the very last moment, I
believed that there was no imminent
danger.
Q Because of that, did you ever intervene in
the command of the pilot?
A Yes sir, I did not intervene because I
believed that the command of the pilot
to be correct.
Solicitor Abad (to the witness)
Q As a captain of M/V Pavlodar, you consider
docking maneuvers a serious matter, is
it not?
A Yes sir, that is right.
Q Since it affects not only the safety of the
port or pier, but also the safety of the
vessel and the cargo, is it not?
A That is right.
Q So that, I assume that you were watching
Capt. Gavino very closely at the time he
was making his commands?
A I was close to him, I was hearing his
command and being executed.
Q And that you were also alert for any
possible mistakes he might commit in
the maneuvering of the vessel?
A Yes sir, that is right.
Q But at no time during the maneuver did
you issue order contrary to the orders
Capt. Gavino made?
A No sir.
Q So that you were in full accord with all of
Capt. Gavino's orders?
A Yes sir.
Q Because, otherwise, you would have issued
order that would supersede his own
order?
A In that case, I should take him away from
his command or remove the command
from him.
Court (to the witness)
Q You were in full accord with the steps
being taken by Capt. Gavino because
you relied on his knowledge, on his
familiarity of the seabed and shoals and
other surroundings or conditions under
the sea, is that correct?
A Yes sir, that is right.
xxxxxxxxx
Solicitor Abad (to the witness)
Q And so after the anchors were ordered
dropped and they did not take hold of
the seabed, you were alerted that there
was danger already on hand?
xxxxxxxxx
A No sir, there was no imminent danger to
the vessel.
Q Do you mean to tell us that even if the
anchor was supposed to take hold of
the bottom and it did not, there was no
danger to the ship?
A Yes sir, because the anchor dragged on the
ground later.
Q And after a few moments when the anchor
should have taken hold the seabed but
not done (sic), as you expected, you
already were alerted that there was
danger to the ship, is that correct?
A Yes sir, I was alerted but there was no
danger.
Q And you were alerted that somebody was
wrong?
A Yes sir, I was alerted.
Q And this alert you assumed was the
ordinary alertness that you have for
normal docking?
A Yes sir, I mean that it was usual condition
of any man in time of docking to be
alert.
Q And that is the same alertness when the
anchor did not hold onto the ground, is
that correct?
A Yes sir, me and Capt. Gavino (thought) that
the anchor will hold the ground.
Q Since, as you said that you agreed all the
while with the orders of Capt. Gavino,
you also therefore agreed with him in
his failure to take necessary precaution
against the eventuality that the anchor
will not hold as expected?
Atty. Del Rosario:
May I ask that the question ...
Solicitor Abad:
Never mind, I will reform the question.
Solicitor Abad (to the witness)
Q Is it not a fact that the vessel bumped the
pier?
A That is right, it bumped the pier.
Q For the main reason that the anchor of the
vessel did not hold the ground as
expected?
 A Yes sir, that is my opinion.[73]
Further, on redirect examination,
Capt. Kabankov fortified his apathetic
assessment of the situation:
Q Now, after the anchor was dropped, was
there any point in time that you felt
that the vessel was in imminent danger.
A No, at that time, the vessel was not in
imminent danger, sir."[74]
This cavalier appraisal of the event by
Capt. Kabankov is disturbingly antipodal to
Capt.Gavino's anxious assessment of the
situation:
Q When a pilot is on board a vessel, it is the
pilot's command which should be
followed-at that moment until the
vessel is, or goes to port or reaches
port?
A Yes, your Honor, but it does not take away
from the Captain his prerogative to
countermand the pilot.
Q In what way?
A In any case, which he thinks the pilot is not
maneuvering correctly, the Captain
always has the prerogative to
countermand the pilot's order.
Q But insofar as competence, efficiency and
functional knowledge of the seabed
which are vital or decisive in the safety
(sic) bringing of a vessel to the port, he
is not competent?
A Yes, your Honor. That is why they hire a
pilot in an advisory capacity, but still,
the safety of the vessel rest(s) upon the
Captain, the Master of the vessel.
Q In this case, there was not a disagreement
between you and the Captain of the
vessel in the bringing of the vessel to
port?
A No, your Honor.
Court:
May proceed.
Atty. Catris:
In fact, the Master of the vessel testified
here that he was all along in conformity
with the orders you gave to him, and, as
matter of fact, as he said, he obeyed all
your orders. Can you tell, if in the
course of giving such normal orders for
the saf(e) docking of the MV Pavlodar,
do you remember of any instance that
the Master of the vessel did not obey
your command for the safety docking of
the MV Pavlodar?
Atty. del Rosario:
Already answered, he already said yes
sir.
Court:
Yes, he has just answered yes sir to the
Court that there was no disagreement
insofar as the bringing of the vessel
safely to the port.
Atty. Catris:
But in this instance of docking of the
MV Pavlodar, do you remember of a
time during the course of the docking
that the MV Pavlodar was in imminent
danger of bumping the pier?
A When we were about more than one
thousand meters from the pier. I think,
the anchor was not holding, so I
immediately ordered to push the bow
at a fourth quarter, at the back of the
vessel in order to swing the bow away
from the pier and at the same time, I
ordered for a full astern of the
engine."[75]
These conflicting reactions can only imply, at the
very least, unmindful disregard or, worse,
neglectful relinquishment of duty by the
shipmaster, tantamount to negligence.
The findings of the trial court on this
aspect is noteworthy:
For, while the pilot Gavino may indeed
have been charged with the task of docking the
vessel in the berthing space, it is undisputed that
the master of the vessel had the corresponding
duty to countermand any of the orders made by
the pilot, aid even maneuver the vessel himself,
in case of imminent danger to the vessel and the
port.
In fact, in his testimony, Capt. Kavankov
admitted that all throughout the man(eu)vering
procedures he did not notice anything was going
wrong, and even observed that the order given
to drop the anchor, was done at the proper
time. He even ventured the opinion that the
accident occurred because the anchor failed to
take hold but that this did not alarm him because
there was still time to drop a second anchor.
Under normal circumstances, the above-
mentioned facts would have caused the master
of a vessel to take charge of the situation and see
to the man(eu)vering of the vessel
himself. Instead, Capt. Kavankov chose to rely
blindly upon his pilot, who by this time was
proven ill-equipped to cope with the situation.
xxxxxxxxx
It is apparent that Gavino was negligent
but Far Eastern's employee Capt. Kavankov was
no less responsible for as master of the vessel he
stood by the pilot during the man(eu)vering
procedures and was privy to every move the
latter made, as well as the vessel's response to
each of the commands. His choice to rely blindly
upon the pilot's skills, to the point that despite
being appraised of a notice of alert he continued
to relinquish control of the vessel to Gavino,
shows indubitably that he was not performing
his duties with the diligence required of him and
therefore may be charged with negligence along
with defendant Gavino.[76]
As correctly affirmed by the Court of Appeals -
We are in full accord with the findings and
disquisitions of the Court a quo.
In the present recourse, Captain Viktor
Kavankov had been a mariner for thirty-two
years before the incident. When Gavino was (in)
the command of the vessel, Kavankov was beside
Gavino, relaying the commands or orders of
Gavino to the crewmembers-officers of the
vessel concerned. He was thus fully aware of the
docking maneuvers and procedure Gavino
undertook to dock the vessel. Irrefragably,
Kavankov was fully aware of the bulk and size of
the vessel and its cargo as well as the weight of
the vessel. Kavankov categorically admitted that,
when the anchor and two (2) shackles were
dropped to the sea floor, the claws of the anchor
did not hitch on to any hard object in the
seabed. The momentum of the vessel was not
arrested. The use of the two (2) tugboats was
insufficient. The momentum of the vessel,
although a little bit arrested, continued (sic) the
vessel going straightforward with its bow
towards the port (Exhibit "A-1"). There was thus
a need for the vessel to move "full-astern" and to
drop the other anchor with another shackle or
two '(2), for the vessel to avoid hitting the
pier. Kavankov refused to act even as Gavino
failed to act. Even as Gavino gave mere "half-
astern" order, Kavankov supinely stood by. The
vessel was already about twenty (20) meters
away from the pier when Gavino gave the 'full-
astern" order.Even then, Kavankov did nothing
to prevent the vessel from hitting the pier simply
because he relied on the competence and plan of
Gavino. While the "full-astern" maneuver
momentarily arrested the momentum of the
vessel, it was, by then, too late. All along,
Kavankov stood supinely beside Gavino, doing
nothing but relay the commands of
Gavino. Inscrutably, then, Kavankov was
negligent.
xxxxxxxxx
The stark incompetence of Kavankov is
competent evidence to prove the
unseaworthiness of the vessel. It has been held
that the incompetence of the navigator, the
master of the vessel or its crew makes the vessel
unseaworthy (Tug Ocean Prince versus United
States of America, 584 F. 2nd, page 1151). Hence,
the Appellant FESC is likewise liable for the
damage sustained by the Appellee."[77]
We find strong and well-reasoned support
in time-tested American maritime jurisprudence,
on which much of our laws and jurisprudence on
the matter are based, for the conclusions of the
Court of Appeals adjudging both Capt. Gavino
and Capt. Kabankov negligent.
As early as 1869, the U.S. Supreme Court
declared, through Mr. Justice Swayne, in The
Steamship China vs. Walsh,[78] that it is the duty
of the master to interfere in cases of the pilot's
intoxication or manifest incapacity, in cases of
danger which he does not foresee, and in all
cases of great necessity. The master has the same
power to displace the pilot that he has to remove
any subordinate officer of the vessel, at his
discretion.
In 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court, this time
through Mr. Justice Brown, emphatically ruled
that:
Nor are we satisfied with the conduct of the
master in leaving the pilot in sole charge of the
vessel. While the pilot doubtless supersedes the
master for the time being in the command and
navigation of the ship, and his orders must be
obeyed in all matters connected with her
navigation, the master is not wholly absolved
from his duties while the pilot is on board, and
may advise with him, and even displace him in
case he is intoxicated or manifestly
incompetent. He is still in command of the vessel,
except so far as her navigation is concerned, and
bound to see that there is a sufficient watch on
deck, and that the men are attentive to their
duties.
xxx (N)otwithstanding the pilot has charge,
it is the duty of the master to prevent accident,
and not to abandon the vessel entirely to the
pilot; but that there are certain duties he has to
discharge (notwithstanding there is a pilot on
board) for the benefit of the owners. x x x that in
well conducted ships the master does not regard
the presence of a duly licensed pilot in compulsory
pilot waters as freeing him from every obligation
to attend to the safety of the vessel; but that, while
the master sees that his officers and crew duly
attend to the pilot's orders, he himself is bound to
keep a vigilant eye on the navigation of the vessel,
and, when exceptional circumstances exist, not
only to urge upon the pilot to use every
precaution, but to insist upon, such being
taken."[79] (Italics for emphasis.)
In Jure vs. United Fruit Co.,[80] which, like
the present petitions, involved compulsory
pilotage, with a similar scenario where at and
prior to the time of injury, the vessel was in the
charge of a pilot with the master on the bridge of
the vessel beside said pilot, the court therein
ruled:
The authority of the master of a vessel is
not in complete abeyance while a pilot, who is
required by law to be accepted, is in discharge of
his functions. x x x It is the duty of the master to
interfere in cases of the pilot's intoxication or
manifest incapacity, in cases of danger which he
does not foresee, and in all cases of great
necessity . The master has the same power to
displace the pilot that he has to remove any
subordinate officer of the vessel. He may
exercise it, or not, according to his
discretion. There was evidence to support
findings that plaintiff's injury was due to the
negligent operation of the Atenas, and that the
master of that vessel was negligent in failing to
take action to avoid endangering a vessel
situated as the City of Canton was and persons or
property thereon.
A phase of the evidence furnished support
for the inferences x x x that he negligently failed
to suggest to the pilot the danger which was
disclosed, and means of avoiding such danger;
and that the master's negligence in failing to give
timely admonition to the pilot proximately
contributed to the injury complained of. We are
of opinion that the evidence mentioned tended
to prove conduct of the pilot, known to the
master, giving rise to a case of danger or great
necessity, calling for the intervention of the
master. A master of a vessel is not Without fault in
acquiescing in conduct of a pilot which involves
apparent and avoidable danger, whether such
danger is to the vessel upon which the pilot is, or
to another vessel, or persons or property
thereon or on shore. (Italics ours.)
Still in another case involving a nearly identical
setting, the captain of a vessel alongside the
compulsory pilot was deemed to be negligent,
since, in the words of the court, "he was in a
position to exercise his superior authority if he
had deemed the speed excessive on the occasion
in question. I think it was clearly negligent of him
not to have recognized the danger to any craft
moored at Gravell Dock and that he should have
directed the pilot to reduce his speed as required
by the local governmental regulations. His failure
amounted to negligence and renders the
respondent liable."[81] (Italics supplied.) Though a
compulsory pilot might be regarded as an
independent contractor, he is at all times subject
to the ultimate control of the ship's master.[82]
In sum, where a compulsory pilot is in
charge of a ship, the master being required to
permit him to navigate it, if the master observes
that the pilot is incompetent or physically
incapable, then it is the duty of the master to
refuse to permit the pilot to act. But if no such
reasons are present, then the master is justified
in relying upon the pilot, but not blindly. Under
the circumstances of this case, if a situation arose
where the master, exercising that reasonable
vigilance which the master of a ship should
exercise, observed, or should have observed, that
the pilot was so navigating the vessel that she
was going, or was likely to go, into danger, and
there was in the exercise of reasonable care and
vigilance an opportunity for the master to
intervene so as to save the ship from danger, the
master should have acted accordingly.[83] The
master of a vessel must exercise a degree of
vigilance commensurate with the
circumstances.[84]
Inasmuch as the matter of negligence is a
question of fact,[85] we defer to the findings of the
trial court, especially as this is affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.[86] But even beyond that, our
own evaluation is that Capt. Kabankov's shared
liability is due mainly to the fact that he failed to
act when the perilous situation should have
spurred him into quick and decisive action as
master of the ship. In the face of imminent or
actual danger, he did not have to wait for the
happenstance to occur before countermanding
or overruling the pilot. By his own admission,
Capt. Kabankov concurred with Capt. Gavino's
decisions, and this is precisely the reason why he
decided not to countermand any of the latter's
orders. Inasmuch as both lower courts found
Capt. Gavino negligent, by expressing full
agreement therewith Capt. Kabankov was just as
negligent as Capt.Gavino.
In general, a pilot is personally liable for
damages caused by his own negligence or default
to the owners of the vessel, and to third parties
for damages sustained in a collision. Such
negligence of the pilot in the performance of
duty constitutes a maritime tort.[87] At common
law, a shipowner is not liable for injuries
inflicted exclusively by the negligence of a pilot
accepted by a vessel compulsorily.[88] The
exemption from liability for such negligence shall
apply if the pilot is actually in charge and solely
in fault. Since, a pilot is responsible only for his
own personal negligence, he cannot be held
accountable for damages proximately caused by
the default of others,[89] or, if there be anything
which concurred with the fault of the pilot in
producing the accident, the vessel master and
owners are liable.
Since the colliding vessel is prima
facie responsible, the burden of proof is upon the
party claiming benefit of the exemption from
liability. It must be shown affirmatively that the
pilot was at fault, and that there was no fault on
the part of the officers or crew, which might have
been conducive to the damage. The fact that the
law compelled the master to take the pilot does
not exonerate the vessel from liability. The
parties who suffer are entitled to have their
remedy against the vessel that occasioned the
damage, and are not under necessity to look to
the pilot from whom redress is not always had
for compensation. The owners of the vessel are
responsible to the injured party for the acts of
the pilot, and they must be left to recover the
amount as well as they can against him. It cannot
be maintained that the circumstance of having a
pilot on board, and acting in conformity to his
directions operate as a discharge of
responsibility of the owners.[90]Except insofar as
their liability is limited or exempted by statute,
the vessel or her owner are liable for all damages
caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the
owners or those in charge of the vessel. Where
the pilot of a vessel is not a compulsory one in
the sense that the owner or master of the vessel
are bound to accept him, but is employed
voluntarily, the owners of the vessel are, all the
more, liable for his negligent act.[91]
In the United States, the owners of a vessel
are not personally liable for the negligent acts of
a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the
fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot is
imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable
therefor in rem. Where, however, by the
provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory
only in the sense that his fee must be paid, and is
not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is
no exemption from liability. Even though the
pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the
sole cause of the injury, but the negligence of the
master or crew contributed thereto, the owners
are liable.[92] But the liability of the ship in
rem does not release the pilot from the
consequences of his own negligence.[93] The
rationale for this rule is that the master is not
entirely absolved of responsibility with respect
to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in
charge.[94]
By way of validation and in light of the
aforecited guidepost rulings in American
maritime cases, we declare that our rulings
during the early years of this century in City of
Manila vs.Gambe, [95] China Navigation Co., Ltd.
vs. Vidal,[96] and Yap Tico & Co. vs. Anderson, et
al.[97]have withstood the proverbial test of time
and remain good and relevant case law to this
day.
City of Manila stands for the doctrine that
the pilot who was in command and complete
control of a vessel, and not the owners, must be
held responsible for an accident which was
solely the result of the mistake of the pilot in not
giving proper orders, and which did not result
from the failure of the owners to equip the vessel
with the most modern and improved
machinery. In China Navigation Co., the pilot
deviated from the ordinary and safe course,
without heeding the warnings of the ship
captain. It was this careless deviation that caused
the vessel to collide with a pinnacle rock which,
though uncharted, was known to pilots and local
navigators. Obviously, the captain was
blameless. It was the negligence of the pilot
alone which was the proximate cause of the
collision. The Court could not but then rule that -
The pilot in the case at bar having deviated
from the usual and ordinary course followed by
navigators in passing through the strait in
question, without a substantial reason, was
guilty of negligence, and that negligence having
been the proximate cause of the damages, he is
liable for such damages as usually and naturally
flow therefrom. x x x.
x x x (T)he defendant should have known
of the existence and location of the rock upon
which the vessel struck while under his control
and management. x x x.
Consistent with the pronouncements in
these two earlier cases, but on a slightly different
tack, the Court in Yap Tico & Co. exonerated the
pilot from liability for the accident where the
order's of the pilot in the handling of the ship
were disregarded by the officers and crew of the
ship.According to the Court, a pilot is "x x x
responsible for a full knowledge of the channel
and the navigation only so far as he can
accomplish it through the officers and crew of
the ship, and I don't see that he can be held
responsible for damage when the evidence
shows, as it does in this case, that the officers
and crew of the ship failed to obey his orders."
Nonetheless, it is possible for a compulsory pilot
and the master of the vessel to be concurrently
negligent and thus share the blame for the
resulting damage as Joint tortfeasors,[98] but only
under the circumstances obtaining in and
demonstrated by the instant petitions.
It may be said, as a general rule, that
negligence in order to render a person liable
need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is
sufficient that his negligence, concurring with
one or more efficient causes other than
plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the
injury. Accordingly, where several causes
combine to produce injuries, a person is not
relieved from liability because he is responsible
for only one of them, it being sufficient that the
negligence of the person charged with injury is
an efficient cause without which the injury
would not have resulted to as great an extent,
and that such cause is not attributable to the
person injured. It is no defense to one of the
concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not
have resulted from his negligence alone, without
the negligence or wrongful acts of the other
concurrent tortfeasor.[99] Where several causes
producing an injury are concurrent and each is
an efficient cause without which the injury
would not have happened, the injury may be
attributed to all or any of the causes and
recovery may be had against any or all of the
responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one
of them was more culpable, and that the duty
owed by them to the injured person was not the
same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a
proximate cause merely because it does not
exceed the negligence of other actors. Each
wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result
and is liable as though his acts were the sole
cause of the injury.[100]
There is no contribution between joint
tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both
of them are liable for the total damage. Where
the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omissions of two or more persons, although
acting independently, are in combination the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a
third person, it is impossible to determine in
what proportion each contributed to the injury
and either of them is responsible for the whole
injury. Where their concurring negligence
resulted in injury or damage to a third party,
they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarity
liable for the resulting damage under Article
2194[101] of the Civil Code.[102]
As for the amount of damages awarded by
the trial court, we find the same to be
reasonable.The testimony of Mr. Pascual Barral,
witness for PPA, on cross and redirect
examination, appears to be grounded on
practical considerations:
Q So that the cost of the two additional piles
as well as the (two) square meters is
already included in this -P1,300,999.77.
A Yes sir, everything. It is (the) final cost
already.
Q For the eight piles.
A Including the reduced areas and other
reductions.
Q (A)nd the two square meters.
A Yes sir.
Q In other words, this P1,300,999.77 does
not represent only for the six piles that
was damaged as well as the
corresponding two piles.
A The area was corresponding, was
increased by almost two in the actual
payment. That was why the contract
was decreased, the real amount
was P1,124,627.40 and the final one
isP1300,999.77.
Q Yes, but that P1,300,999.77 included the
additional two new posts.
A It was increased.
Q Why was it increased?
A The original was 48 and the actual was 46.
Q Now, the damage was somewhere in
1980. It took place in 1980 and you
started the repair and reconstruction in
1982, that took almost two years?
A Yes sir.
Q May it not happen that by natural factors,
the existing damage in 1980 was
aggravated for the 2 year period that
the damage portion was not repaired?
A I don't think so because that area was at
once marked and no vehicles can park,
it was closed.
Q Even if or even natural elements cannot
affect the damage?
 A Cannot, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said in the cross-examination that
there were six piles damaged by the
accident, but that in the reconstruction
of the pier, PPA drove and constructed
8 piles. Will you explain to us why there
was change in the number of piles from
the original number?
A In piers where the piles are withdrawn or
pulled out, you cannot re-drive or drive
piles at the same point. You have to
redesign the driving of the piles. We
cannot drive the piles at the same point
where the piles are broken or damaged
or pulled out. We have to redesign, and
you will note that in the reconstruction,
we redesigned such that it necessitated
8 piles.
Q Why not, why could you not drive the same
number of piles and on the same spot?
A The original location was already
disturbed. We cannot get required
bearing capacity. The area is already
disturbed.
Q Nonetheless, if you drove the original
number of piles, six, on different places,
would not that have sustained the same
load?
A It will not suffice, sir."[103]
We quote the findings of the lower court
with approval:
With regards to the amount of damages that is to
be awarded to plaintiff, the Court finds that the
amount of P1,053,300.00 is justified. Firstly, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur best expounded
upon in the landmark case of Republic vs. Luzon
Stevedoring Corp. (21 SCRA 279) establishes the
presumption that in the ordinary course of
events the ramming of the dock would not have
occurred if proper care was used.
Secondly, the various estimates and plans justify
the cost of the port construction price. The new
structure constructed not only replaced the
damaged one but was built of stronger materials
to forestall the possibility of any similar
accidents in the future.
The Court inevitably finds that the plaintiff is
entitled to an award of P1,053,300.00 which
represents actual damages caused by the
damage to Berth 4 of the Manila International
Port. Co-defendants Far Eastern Shipping,
Capt. Senen Gavino and Manila Pilots Association
are solidarity liable to pay this amount to
plaintiff.[104]
The Solicitor General rightly commented that the
adjudicated amount of damages represents the
proportional cost of repair and rehabilitation of
the damaged section of the pier.[105]
Except insofar as their liability is limited or
exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners
are liable for all damages caused by the
negligence or other wrongs of the owners or
those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule,
the owners or those in possession and control of
a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural
and proximate damages caused to persons or
property by reason of her negligent management
or navigation.[106]
FESC's imputation of PPA's failure to
provide a safe and reliable berthing place is
obtuse, not only because it appears to be a mere
afterthought, being tardily raised only in this
petition, but also because there is no allegation
or evidence on record about Berth No. 4 being
unsafe and unreliable, although perhaps it is a
modest pier by international standards. There
was, therefore, no error on the part of the Court
of Appeals in dismissing FESC's counterclaim.
II. G.R. No. 130150
This consolidated case treats on whether
the Court of Appeals erred in holding MPA jointly
and solidarity liable with its member
pilot, Capt. Gavino, in the absence of employer-
employee relationship and in applying Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65, as basis for the Correlatively, the relevant provisions of
adjudged solidary liability of MPA and PPA Administrative Order No. 03-85, which
Capt. Gavino. timely amended this applicable maritime
regulation, state:
The pertinent provisions in Chapter I of
Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 are:
Article IV
"PAR. XXVII.-- In all pilotage districts where
pilotage is compulsory, there shall be created
and maintained by the pilots or pilots'
association, in the manner hereinafter SEC. 17. Pilots' Association -- The Pilots in a
prescribed, a reserve fund equal to P1,000.00 for Pilotage District shall organize themselves into a
each pilot thereof for the purpose of paying Pilots' Association or firm, the members of which
claims for damages to vessels or property caused shall promulgate their own By-Laws not in
through acts or omissions of its members while conflict with the rules and regulations
rendered in compulsory pilotage service. In promulgated by the Authority. These By-Laws
Manila, the reserve fund shall be P2,000.00 for shall be submitted not later than one (1) month
each pilot. after the organization of the Pilots' Association
for approval by the General Manager of the
Authority. Subsequent amendments thereto shall
PAR. XXVIII.-- A pilots' association shall not be
likewise be submitted for approval.
liable under these regulations for damage to any
vessel, or other property, resulting from acts of a
member of an association in the actual SEC. 25. Indemnity Insurance and Reserve Fund-
-
performance of his duty for a greater amount
than seventy-five per centum (75%) of its
prescribed reserve fund; it being understood a) Each Pilots' Association shall
that if the association is held liable for an amount collectively insure
greater than the amount above-stated, the excess its membership at
shall be paid by the personal funds of the the rate
member concerned. ofP50,000.00 each
member to cover in
whole or in part any
PAR. XXXI.-- If a payment is made from the
liability arising from
reserve fund of an association on account of
damages caused by a member thereof, and he any accident
resulting in damage
shall have been found at fault, such member shall
reimburse the association in the amount so paid to vessel(s), port
facilities and other
as soon as practicable; and for this purpose, not
properties and/or
less than twenty-five per centum of his dividends
shall be retained each month until the full injury to persons or
death which any
amount has been returned to the reserve fund.
member may have
caused in the course
PAR. XXXIV. - Nothing in these regulations shall
of his performance
relieve any pilots' association or members
of pilotage duties. x x
thereof, individually or collectively, from civil
x.
responsibility for damages to life or property
resulting from the acts of members in the
performance of their duties. b) The Pilotage Association
shall likewise set up
and maintain a
reserve fund which
 shall answer for any caused by a and/or criminal There being no employer-employee
part of the liability member thereof responsibility for relationship, clearly Article 2180[108] of the Civil
referred to in the who is found at damages to life or Code is inapplicable since there is no vicarious
immediately fault, he shall property resulting liability of an employer to speak of. It is so stated
preceding paragraph reimburse the from the individual in American law, as follows:
which is left Association in the acts of its members
unsatisfied by the amount so paid as as well as those of The well-established rule is that pilot
insurance proceeds, soon as practicable; the Association's associations are immune to vicarious liability for
in the following and for this employees and the tort of their members. They are not the
manner: purpose, not less crew in the employer of their members and exercise no
than twenty-five performance of control over them once they take the helm of the
1) Each pilot in the percentum (25%) their duties. vessel. They are also not partnerships because
Association shall of his dividend the members do not function as agents for the
contribute from his shall be retained The Court of Appeals, while affirming the association or for each other. Pilots' associations
own account an each month until trial court's finding of solidary liability on the are also not liable for negligently assuring, the
amount of P4,000.00 the full amount has part of FESC, MPA and Capt. Gavino, correctly competence of their members because as
(P6,000.00 in the been returned to based MPA's liability not on the concept of professional associations they made no
Manila Pilotage the reserve fund. employer-employee relationship between guarantee of the professional conduct of their
District) to the Thereafter, the Capt. Gavino and itself, but on the provisions of members to the general public.[109]
reserve fund.This pilot involved shall Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65:
fund shall not be be entitled to his
full dividend. Where under local statutes and regulations,
considered part of The Appellant MPA avers that, contrary to the pilot associations lack the necessary legal
the capital of the findings and disquisitions of the Court a quo, the incidents of responsibility, they have been held
Association nor 6) When the Appellant Gavino was not and has never been an not liable for damages caused by the default of a
charged as an reimbursement has employee of the MPA but was only a member member pilot.[110] Whether or not the members
expense thereof. been completed as thereof. The Court a quo, it is noteworthy,, did of a pilots' association are in legal effect a
prescribed in the not state the factual basis on which it anchored copartnership depends wholly on the powers
2) Seventy-five percent preceding its finding that Gavino was the employee of and duties of the members in relation to one
(75%) of the reserve paragraph, the ten MPA. We are in accord with MPA's pose. Case another under the provisions of the governing
fund shall be set percentum (10%) law teaches Us that, for an employer-employee statutes and regulations. The relation of a pilot to
aside for use, in the and the interest relationship to exist the confluence of the his association is not that of a servant to the
payment of damages withheld from the following elements must be established: (1) master, but of an associate assisting and
referred to above shares of the other selection and engagement of employees; (2) the participating in a common purpose. Ultimately,
incurred in the pilots in payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; the rights and liabilities between a pilots'
actual performance accordance with (4) the employer's power to control the association and an individual member depend
of pilots' duties and paragraph (4) employees with respect to the means and largely upon the constitution, articles or by-laws
the excess shall be hereof shall be method by which the work is to be performed of the association, subject to appropriate
paid from the returned to them. (Ruga versus NLRC, 181SCRA266). government regulations.[111]
personal funds of
the member c) Liability of Pilots' No reliance can be placed by MPA on the
xxxxxxxxx cited American rulings as to immunity from
concerned. Association --
Nothing in these liability of a pilots' association in light of existing
regulations shall The liability of MPA for damages is not anchored positive regulation under Philippine law. The
xxxxxxxxx on Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as Court of Appeals properly applied the clear and
relieve any Pilots'
Association or erroneously found and declared by the Court a unequivocal provisions of Customs
5) If payment is made members thereof, quo but under the provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65. In doing so, it
from the reserve individually or Administrative Order No. 15-65, supra, in was just being consistent with its finding of the
fund of an collectively, from tandem with the by-laws of the MPA."[107] non-existence of employer-employee
Association on any civil, relationship between MPA and Capt. Gavino
account of damage administrative
precludes the application of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code.
True, Customs Administrative Order No.
15-65 does not categorically characterize or
label MPA's liability as solidary in
nature. Nevertheless, a careful reading and
proper analysis of the correlated provisions lead
to the conclusion that MPA is solidarity liable for
the negligence of its member pilots, without
prejudice to subsequent reimbursement from
the pilot at fault.
Article 1207 of the Civil Code provides that
there is solidary liability only when the
obligation expressly so states, or when the law or
the nature of the obligation requires
solidarity. Plainly, Customs Administrative Order
No. 15-65, which as an implementing rule has
the force and effect of law, can validly provide
for solidary liability. We note the Solicitor
General's comment hereon, to wit:
x x x Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65
may be a mere rule and regulation issued by an
administrative agency pursuant to a delegated
authority to fix "the details" in the execution or
enforcement of a policy set out in the law
itself. Nonetheless, said administrative order,
which adds to the procedural or enforcing
provisions of substantive law, is legally binding
and receives the same statutory force upon going
into effect. In that sense, it has equal, not lower,
statutory force and effect as a regular statute
passed by the legislature."[112]
MPA's prayer for modification of the
appellate court's decision under review by
exculpating petitioner MPA "from liability
beyond seventy-five percent (75%) of Reserve
Fund" is unnecessary because the liability of
MPA under Par. XXVIII of Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65 is in fact limited
to seventy-five percent (75%) of its prescribed
reserve fund, any amount of liability beyond that
being for the personal account of the erring pilot
and subject to reimbursement in case of a finding
of fault by the member concerned. This is
clarified by the Solicitor General:
Moreover, contrary to petitioners pretensions, Let copies of this decision be spread upon
the provisions of Customs Administrative Order the personal records of the lawyers named
No. 15-65 do not limit the liability of petitioner herein in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
as a pilots' association to an absurdly small
amount of seventy-five per centum (75%) of the SO ORDERED.
member pilots' contribution of P2,000.00 to the
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
reserve fund.The law speaks of the entire Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Martinez,
reserve fund required to be maintained by the
Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.
pilots' association to answer (for) whatever Narvasa, C.J., and Mendoza, J., on leave.
liability arising from the tortious act of its
members. And even if the association is held
liable for an amount greater than the reserve
fund, the association may not resist the liability
by claiming to be liable only up to seventy-five
per centum (75%) of the reserve fund because in
such instance it has the right to be reimbursed
by the offending member pilot for the
excess."[113]
WHEREFORE, in view of all of the
foregoing, the consolidated petitions for review
are DENIED and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del
Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically its
associate, Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is
REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar acts of heedless disregard
of its undertakings under the Rules shall be dealt
with more severely.
The original members of the legal team of
the Office of the Solicitor General assigned to this
case, namely, Assistant Solicitor General Roman
G. Del Rosario and Solicitor Luis F. Simon, are
ADMONISHED and WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar acts of unduly delaying
proceedings due to delayed filing of required
pleadings shall also be dealt with more
stringently.
The Solicitor General is DIRECTED to look
into the circumstances of this case and to adopt
provident measures to avoid a repetition of this
incident and which would ensure prompt
compliance with orders of this Court regarding
the timely filing of requisite pleadings, in the
interest of just, speedy and orderly
administration of justice.
Republic of the Philippines Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," of the insatiable voracity of "Ascending the mountains of
SUPREME COURT which newspaper during all the time the former. At times they have Benguet to classify and
Manila mentioned in this complaint was been fortunate, putting to measure the skulls of the
published and circulated daily in the flight the eaters and Igorots and study and civilize
EN BANC Spanish and Tagalog languages in the devourers, but in the majority them and to espy in his flight,
city of Manila, having a large circulation of cases they did not obtain with the eye of the bird of
throughout the Philippine Islands. but a change of name or prey, where are the large
G.R. No. L-5932 February 27, 1912 plumage. deposits of gold, the prey
III. concealed amidst the lonely
DEAN C. WORCESTER, plaintiff-appellee, "The situation is the same in mountains, to appropriate
vs. all the spheres of creation: the them to himself afterwards,
MARTIN OCAMPO, TEODORO M. KALAW, That for a long time the defendants thanks to legal facilities made
have been maliciously persecuting and relation between the ones and
LOPE K. SANTOS, FIDEL A. REYES, FAUSTINO the others is that dictated by and unmade at will, but
AGUILAR, ET AL., defendants-appellants. attacking the plaintiff in said always for his own benefit.
newspaper, until at last on the 30th of the appetite and the power to
October, 1908, with the malicious satisfy it at the fellow-
Felipe Agoncillo for appellants. intention of injuring the plaintiff, who creatures' expense. "Authorizing, despite laws
W. A. Kincaid and Thos. L. Hartigan for appellee. on said date was, and still is a member and ordinances, an illegal
of the Civil Commission of the "Among men it is very easy to slaughtering of diseased cattle
JOHNSON, J.: Philippines and Secretary of the observe the development of in order to derive benefit
Interior in the Government of the this daily phenomenon. And from the infected and putrid
Philippines, they attacked the honesty for some psychological reason meat which he himself was
On the 23rd day of January, 1909, the plaintiff obliged to condemn by virtue
commenced an action against the defendants in and reviled the fame of the plaintiff, not the nations who believe
only as a private person but also as an themselves powerful have of his official position.
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila,
for the purpose of recovering damages resulting official of the Government of the taken the fiercest and most
from an alleged libelous publication. The Philippine Islands, and with the object harmful creatures as "Presenting himself on all
complaint was in the following language: of exposing him to the odium, emblems; it is either the lion, occasions with the wrinkled
contempt, and ridicule of the public, or the eagle, or the serpent. brow of the scientist who
printed, wrote (redactaron), and Some have done so by a secret consumes his life in the
COMPLAINT. published in said newspaper in its impulse of affinity and others mysteries of the laboratory of
ordinary number of the 30th of in the nature of simulation, of science, when his whole
I. October, 1908, a malicious defamation infatuated vanity, making scientific labor is confined o
and false libel which was injurious themselves appear that which dissecting insects and
That the plaintiff as well as the (injurioso) to the plaintiff, said libel they are not nor ever can be. importing fish eggs, as if the
defendants are residents of the city of reading as follows: fish eggs of this country were
Manila, Philippine Islands. "The eagle, symbolizing less nourishing and less
"EDITORIAL. liberty and strength, is the savory, so as to make it worth
bird that has found the most the while replacing them with
II. species coming from other
"BIRDS OF PREY. adepts. And men, collectively
and individually, have desired climes.
That for a long time before the 30th of to copy and imitate the most
October, 1908, the defendants, Martin "On the surface of the globe rapacious bird in order to "Giving an admirable impulse
Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. some were born to eat and triumph in the plundering of to the discovery of wealthy
Santos, Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, devour, others to be eaten and their fellow-men. lodes in Mindoro, in
Leoncio G. Liquete , Manuel Palma, devoured. Mindanao, and in other virgin
Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo regions of the Archipelago,
Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio "There are men who, besides
"Now and then the latter have being eagles, have the with the money of the people,
M. Cansipit, were the owners, directors, bestirred themselves, and under the pretext of the
writers (redactores), editors (editores) characteristics of the vulture,
endeavoring to rebel against the owl and the vampire. public good, when, as a strict
and administrators of a certain daily an order of things which matter of truth, the object is
newspaper known as "El makes them the prey and food to possess all the data and the
key to the national wealth for
his essentially personal
benefit, as is shown by the
acquisition of immense
properties registered under
he names of others.
"Promoting, through secret
agents and partners, the sale
to the city of worthless land at
fabulous prices which the city
fathers dare not refuse, from
fear of displeasing the one
who is behind the motion, and
which they do not refuse for
their own good.
"Patronizing concessions for
hotels on filled-in-land, with
the prospects of enormous
profits, at the expense of the
blood of the people.
"Such are the characteristics
of the man who is at the same
time an eagle who surprises
and devours, a vulture who
gorges himself on the dead
and putrid meats, an owl who
affects a petulent omniscience
and a vampire who silently
sucks the blood of the victim
until he leaves it bloodless.
"It is these birds of prey who
triumph. Their flight and their
aim are never thwarted.
"Who will detain them?
"Some share in the booty and
the plunder. Others are too
weak to raise a voice of
protest. And others die in the
disconsolating destruction of
their own energies and
interests.
"And then there appears,
terrifying, the immortal
legend:
"MANE, TECEL, PHARES."
IV.
That the plaintiff was, on the date of
said publication, and still is, well known
to the officials of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, and to the
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands,
and to public in general, personally as
well as a member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and as
Secretary of the Interior, and the
defamation and libel, and the words,
terms and language used in said
defamation and libel were employed by
the said defendants with the intention
of indicating the said plaintiff, and that
should be understood, as in effect they
were understood, by the public officials
of the Government and the inhabitants
of the Philippine Islands in general, as
referring to the plaintiff, by reason of
the publicly known fact that said
plaintiff in compliance with his duties
in his position as such member of the
Civil Commission of the Philippines and
as such Secretary of the Interior of the
Philippine Islands, ascended on a
previous occasion the mountains of the
Province of Benguet to study the native
tribe known as Igorot, residing in said
region; by reason of the publicly known
fact that in the said mountains of
Benguet there exist large deposits of
gold, and for the reason that, as
member of the Civil Commission of the
Philippines, which is the legislative
body of the Philippine Islands, the
plaintiff takes part in the enactment
and repealing of laws in said Islands; by
reason furthermore of the fact, publicly
known, that the plaintiff, as such
Secretary of the Interior of the
Philippine Islands, has had under his
direction and control the enforcement
of the laws of the Philippine Islands and
the ordinances of the city of Manila
relating to the slaughtering of cattle; by
reason furthermore of the fact, publicly
known that said plaintiff, as such
Secretary of the Interior of the
Philippine Islands, had under his
direction and control the Bureau of
Science of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, and he is generally
known as a man devoted to the study of
science; by reason furthermore of the
publicly known fact that the said
plaintiff, as such Secretary of the
Interior of the Philippine Islands, at a
previous time, caused the importation
into the Philippine Islands of fish eggs
for the purpose of supplying the
mountain streams of the Philippine
Islands with fish-hatcheries; by reason
furthermore of the publicly known fact
that said plaintiff, as such Secretary of
the Interior of the Philippine Islands,
has journeyed to and explored the
Islands of Mindoro, Mindanao, and
other regions of the Philippine
Archipelago; by reason furthermore of
the publicly known fact that said
plaintiff, as such Secretary of the
Interior of the Philippine Islands, at one
time investigated and prepared a
report for the Civil Commission of the
Philippines in regard to a certain
proposition for the purchase of a parcel
of land for the city of Manila; by reason
furthermore of the publicly known fact
that said plaintiff, as member of said
Civil Commission of the Philippines
together with the other members of
said legislative body, once opened
negotiations with a certain firm
engaged in the hotel business in regard
to the location of a prospective hotel on
one of the filled-in lands of the city of
Manila.
That said defendants charged said
plaintiff with the prostitution of his
office as member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and as
Secretary of the Interior of said Islands,
for personal ends; with wasting public
funds for the purpose of promoting his
personal welfare; with the violation of
the laws of the Philippine Islands and
the ordinances of the city of Manila;
with taking part in illegal combinations
for the purpose of robbing the people;
with the object of gain for himself and
for others; and lastly with being "a bird
of prey;" and that said defamation
should be understood, as in effect it
was understood, by the public officials
of the Government and the people of
the Philippine Islands in general, as
charging the said plaintiff with the
conduct, actions and things above
specified; all of which allegations
relating to the character and conduct of
the said plaintiff, as above stated, were
and are false and without any
foundation whatsoever.
That said defamation and libel were
published by the defendants under a
heading in large and showy type, and
every effort made by said defendants to
see that said defamation and libel
should attract the attention of the
public and be read by all the
subscribers to said newspaper and the
readers of the same.
V.
Besides assailing the integrity and
reviling the reputation of the plaintiff,
said defendants, in publishing the said
libel, did so with the malicious
intention of inciting the Filipino people
to believe that the plaintiff was a vile
despot and a corrupt person, unworthy
of the position which he held, and for
this reason to oppose his
administration of the office in his
charge as Secretary of the Interior, and
in this way they endeavored to create
enormous difficulties for him in the
performance of his official duties, and
to make him so unpopular that he
 would have to resign his office as
member of the Civil Commission of the
Philippines and Secretary of the
Interior.
In fact said defendants, by means of
said libel and other false statements in
said mentioned newspaper, have been
deliberately trying to destroy the
confidence of the public in the plaintiff
and to incite the people to place
obstacles in his way in the performance
of his official duties, in consequence of
which the plaintiff has met with a great
many difficulties which have increased
to a great extent his labors as a public
official in every one of the
Departments.
VI.
And for all these reasons the plaintiff
alleges: That he has been damaged and
is entitled to an indemnity for the
additional work to which he has been
put, by the said defendants, in the
compliance of his duties, both in the
past and the future, as well as for the
injuries to his reputation and feelings,
in the sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000) Philippine currency, and
besides this said amount he is entitled
to collect from the defendants the
additional sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000) Philippine currency, in the
way of punitive damages, as a warning
to the defendants.
Wherefore the plaintiff files this
complaint, praying the court:
(1) That the defendants be summoned
according to law.
(2) That judgment be rendered
ordering the defendants to pay the
damages as above stated, and the costs
of the action.
On the 23d of February, 1909, the defendants
presented the following demurrer to the said
complaint:
DEMURRER.
Now come the defendants, through
their undersigned attorney, and demur
to the complaint filed herein, upon the
following grounds:
First, That the complaint is vague and
unintelligible.
Second. That the facts alleged in the
complaint do not constitute a cause or
right of action.
Third. That there is another action
pending between the plaintiff and
several of the defendants for the same
cause; and
Fourth. That some of the defendants
have been erroneously included
therein.
Therefore, they respectfully ask the
court to dismiss the complaint, with
costs against the plaintiff.
On the 27th of February, 1909, the Honorable
Charles S. Lobingier, judge, overruled said
demurrer in the following decision, to which the
defendants duly excepted:
ORDER.
The defendant demur upon several
grounds:
(1) The first ground is that the
complaint is vague and unintelligible
and this is directed principally to
paragraph 2, in which it is alleged that
the defendants were "dueños,
directores, redactores", etc., but it is not
alleged that they were such
simultaneously. If this were the sole
averment of the defendants' connection
with the alleged libel, the objection
might be well taken, but paragraph 3 of
the complaint alleges that the
defendants "imprimieron, redactaron y
publicaron", etc., the article complained
of. Under section 2 of Act 277 "every
person" who "publishes or procures to
be published any belief is made
responsible. (Cf. U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil.
Rep., 752.) We think, therefore, that the
connection of the defendants with the
publication complained of is
sufficiently charged.
(2) It is also claimed that the facts
alleged are not sufficient to state a
cause of action and it is urged in
support of this that the article
complained of and which is copied in
the complaint, fails to mention the
plaintiff or to show on its face that it
refers to him. It is, however, specifically
alleged in paragraph 4 that the article
was intended to refer to the plaintiff
and was so understood by the public,
and this allegation is admitted by the
demurrer. Under the rule announced
in Causin vs. Jakosalem (5 Phil. Rep.,
155), where the words complained of
do refer to the plaintiff "an action for
libel may be maintained even though
the defamatory publication does not
refer to the plaintiff by name."
(3) It is further argued that there is
another action pending between the
parties for the same cause. This, it is
true, is made a ground for demurrer by
the Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 91 (3),
but like all grounds therein mentioned,
it must "appear upon the face" of the
pleading objected to, and where it does
not so appear "the objection can only
be taken by answer." (Code C. P., sec.
92.) There is no averment in the
complaint which indicates that there is
no another action pending.
The fourth ground of the demurrer is
not one recognized by law (Code C. P.,
sec. 91) nor do we find anything
in Sanidad vs. Cabotaje (5 Phil. Rep.,
204) which would necessitate any
change in the views already expressed.
The demurrer is, therefore, overruled
and defendants are given the usual five
days to answer.
On the 15th day of November, 1909, the
defendants presented their amended answer,
which was as follows:
ANSWER.
The defendants in the above-entitled
cause, through their undersigned
attorney, by their answer to the
complaint, state:
That the defendants deny generally the
allegation of the complaint.
As a special defense, the defendants
allege:
First. That the plaintiff has no legal
capacity to institute this action, as it
clearly appears from the allegations of
the complaint and which the
defendants hereby deny.
Second. That the facts are set out as
constituting cause of action in the
complaint, are insufficient to constitute
such cause of action in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants.
Third. That the said complaint is
manifestly improper, for the reason
that there is now pending in the Court
of First Instance of this city a criminal
cause, No. 4295, for the crime of libel
against the defendants herein, Martin
Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and Fidel
A. Reyes, both actions, criminal and
 civil, being based upon the same facts
which the plaintiffs herein, who is also
a party to the said criminal action, now
alleges as the basis of his action.
Fourth. That the civil action in the
above-entitled cause has been
extinguished for the reason that
plaintiff did not expressly reserve the
right to enforce the same in the
aforesaid cause 4295, for the crime of
libel, after the said criminal cause had
been finally disposed of.
Fifth. That the defendants, Lope K.
Santos, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G.
Liquete, Manuel Palma, Arcadio
Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco,
Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M.
Cansipit, were erroneously included in
the complaint for the simple reason
that the first two were acquitted in said
criminal cause No. 4295, for libel, the
third was used as a witness for the
prosecution in the said criminal cause,
and the others have no interest, either
directly or indirectly, in the newspaper
"El Renacimiento" in which it is alleged
by the plaintiff the editorial, which is
the basis of the complaint, and which it
is claimed to be libelous, was published.
Wherefore the defendants pray that
they be acquitted of the complaint, with
the costs against the plaintiff.
After hearing the evidence adduced during the
trial of the cause, the arguments if the respective
attorneys, the Honorable James C. Jenkins, judge,
on the 14th of January, 1910, rendered the
following decision:
DECISION.
This is a civil action sounding in
damages to the amount of P100,000 for
an alleged libel of the plaintiff by the
defendants.
The plaintiff is the Honorable Dean C.
Worcester, a member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippine Islands,
and Secretary of the Interior of Insular
Government. The defendants are
twelve persons designated by name in
the complaint and alleged therein to be
the owners, directors, writers
(redactores), editors (editores), and
administrators of a certain daily
newspaper known as "El
Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang,"
which defendants, as well as the
plaintiff, are residents of the city of
Manila, Philippine Islands.
It is further alleged in the complaint
that for a long time prior to the 30th of
October, 1908, the defendants were the
owners, directors, writers, editors, and
administrators of said daily newspaper,
and that said newspaper, during all the
time mentioned in the complaint, was
published and circulated daily in the
Spanish and Tagalog languages in the
city of Manila, having a large circulation
throughout the Philippine Islands.
It is also alleged that for a long time the
defendants had been maliciously
persecuting and attacking the plaintiff
in said newspaper, until at last, on said
date, with the malicious intention of
injuring the plaintiff who then was still
is a member of the Civil Commission of
the Philippines and Secretary of the
Interior in the Government of the
Philippines, they attacked the integrity
and reviled the reputation of the
plaintiff, not only as a private citizen,
but also as an official of the
Government of the Philippine Islands;
and with the object of exposing him to
the odium, contempt, and ridicule of
the public, they wrote, printed, and
published in said newspaper in its
ordinary number of the said 30th of
October, 1908, a malicious defamation
and false libel, which was injurious to
the plaintiff, said libel, as translated
from the Spanish, reading as follows:
"EDITORIAL.
"BIRDS OF PREY.
"On the surface of the globe
some were born to eat and
devour, others to be eaten and
devoured.
"Now and then the latter have
bestirred themselves,
endeavoring to rebel against
an order of things which
makes them the prey and food
of the insatiable voracity of
the former. At times they have
been fortunate, putting to
flight the eaters and
devourers, but in a majority of
cases they do not obtain
anything but a change of
name or plumage.
"The situation is the same in
all spheres of creation; the
relation between the ones and
the others is that dictated by
the appetite and the power to
satisfy it at the fellow-
creature's expense.
"Among men it is easy to
observe the development of
this daily phenomenon. And
for some psychological reason
the nations who believe
themselves powerful have
taken the fiercest and most
harmful creatures as
emblems; it is either the lion,
or the eagle, or the serpent.
Some have done so by a secret
impulse of affinity and others
in the nature of simulation, of
infatuated vanity, making
themselves appear that which
they are not nor ever will be.
"The eagle, symbolizing
liberty and strength, is the
bird that has found the most
adepts. And men, collectively
and individually, have desired
to copy and imitate the most
rapacious bird in order to
triumph in the plundering if
their fellow-men.
"There are men who, besides
being eagles, have the
characteristics of the vulture,
the owl and the vampire.
"Ascending the mountains of
Benguet to classify and
measure the skulls of the
Igorots and study and civilize
them, and to espy in his flight
with the eye of the bird of
prey, where are the large
deposits of gold, the prey
concealed amongst the lonely
mountains, to appropriate
them to himself afterwards,
thanks to legal facilities made
and unmade at will, but
always for his own benefit.
"Authorizing, despite laws
and ordinances an illegal
slaughtering of diseased cattle
in order to derive benefit
from the infected and putrid
meat which he himself was
obliged to condemn by virtue
of his official position.
"Presenting himself on all
occasions with the wrinkled
brow of the scientist who
consumes his life in the
mysteries of the laboratory of
science, when his whole
scientific labor is confined to
dissecting insects and
importing fish eggs, as if the
fish eggs of this country were
less nourishing and savory, so
as to make it worth the while
replacing them with species
coming from other climes.
"Giving an admirable impulse
to the discovery of wealthy
lodes in Mindanao, in
Mindoro, and in other virgin
regions of the archipelago,
with the money of the people,
and under the pretext of the
public good, when, as a strict
matter of truth, the object is
to possess all the data and the
key to the national wealth for
his essentially personal
benefit, as is shown by the
acquisition of immense
properties registered under
"MANE, TECEL, PHARES."
the names of others.
"Promoting through secret
agents and partners, the sale
of the city worthless land at
fabulous prices which the city
fathers dare not refuse from
fear of displeasing the one
who is behind the motion, and
which they do not refuse to
their own good.
"Patronizing concessions for
hotels on filled-in lands, with
the prospects of enormous
profits, at the expense of the
blood of the people.
"Such are the characteristics
of the man who is at the same
time an eagle who surprises
and devours, a vulture who
gorges himself on the dead
and putrid meats, an owl who
affects a petulant omniscience
and a vampire who silently
sucks the blood of the victim
until he leaves it bloodless.
"It is these birds of prey who
triumph. Their flight and aim
are never thwarted.
"Who will detain them?
"Some share in the body and
plunder, Others are too weak
to raise a voice to protest. And
others die in the
disconsolating destruction of
their own energies and
interests.
"And then there appears,
terrifying, the immortal
legend:
It is alleged, among other things, in
paragraph four of the complaint, that
the plaintiff was on the date of said
publication, and still is, well known to
the officials of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, and to the
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands,
and to the public generally, personally
as well as a member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and as a
Secretary of the Interior; and the
defamation and libel, and the words,
terms, and language used in said
defamation and libel were employed by
the said defendants with the intention
of indicating the said plaintiff, and that
they should be understood, as in fact
they were understood, by the public
officials of the Government and the
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands in
general, as referring to the plaintiff.
(Here follow the reasons for saying the
editorial referred to plaintiff and why
the public understood it as referring to
him.)
The said defendants charged plaintiff
with the prostitution of his office as a
member of the Civil Commission of the
Philippines and as Secretary of the
Interior of said Islands, for personal
ends; with wasting public funds for the
purpose of promoting his personal
welfare; and with the violation of the
laws of the Philippine Islands and the
ordinances of the city of Manila; with
taking part in illegal combination of the
purpose of robbing the people, with the
object of gain for himself and for
others; and lastly, with being a bird of
prey, and that said defamation should
be understood, as in effect it was
understood by the public officials of the
Government and the people of the
Philippine Islands in general, as
charging the said plaintiff with the
conduct, actions and things above
specified; all of which allegations
relating to the character and conduct of
the said plaintiff, as above stated, were
and are false and without any
foundation whatever. That said
defamation and libel were published by
the defendants under a heading in large
and showy type, and every effort was
made by said defendant to see that said
defamation and libel should attract the
attention of the public and be read by
all the subscribers to said newspaper
and the readers of the same.
In paragraph five of the complaint it is
further alleged that, besides assailing
the integrity and reviling the reputation
of the plaintiff, said defendants, in
publishing said libel, did so with the
malicious intention of inciting the
Filipino to believe that the plaintiff was
a vile despot and a corrupt person,
unworthy of the position which he held,
and for this reason to oppose of his
administration of the office in his
charge as Secretary of the Interior, and
in this way they endeavored to create
enormous difficulties for him in the
performance of his official duties, and
to make him so unpopular that he
would have to resign his office as a
member of the Civil Commission of the
Philippines and Secretary of the
Interior. In fact, said defendants, by
means of said libel and other false
statements in said mentioned
newspaper, have been deliberately
trying to destroy the confidence of the
public in the plaintiff, and to in incite
the people to place obstacles in his way
in the performance of his official duties,
in consequence of which said plaintiff
has met with a great many difficulties
which have increased to a great extent
his labors as a public official in every
one of the Departments.
And the allegations end with paragraph
six, in which the plaintiff states that for
all these reasons has been damaged
and is entitled to an indemnity for the
additional work to which he has been
put by said defendants in compliance
with his duties, both in the past and in
the future, as well as for the injuries to
his reputation and feelings, in the sum,
of P50,000, and that besides this said
amount he is entitled to collect from
the defendants the additional sum of
fifty thousand pesos in the way of
punitive damages, as a warning to the
defendants.
The complaint concludes with a prayer,
among other things, that judgment be
rendered ordering the defendants to
pay the damages as above stated and
the costs of the action; and is dated and
signed, Manila, P.I., January 23, 1909,
Hartigan and Rohde, Kincaid and Hurd,
attorneys for plaintiff.
A demurrer to this complaint was filed
by the defendants, through their
attorney, Sr. Felipe Agoncillo, which
demurrer was heretofore heard and
overruled by the Court, and the
defendants required to answer.
Accordingly, the defendants within the
prescribed time, filed their answer; and
on November 16, 1909, through their
attorney, filed and amended answer,
which is as follows (after stating the
case):
The defendants in the above-
entitled action, through their
undersigned attorney,
answering the complaint,
state: That they make a
general denial of the
allegations in the complaint,
and as a special defense
allege:
"(1) That the plaintiff lacks the
necessary personality to institute the
complaint in question, as evidently
appears from the allegations in the
same, and which the defendants deny;
"(2) That the facts set forth as a cause
of action in the complaint are
insufficient to constitute a cause of
action in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants;
"(3) That the said complaint is in every
sense contrary to law, criminal case No.
4295, for libel, against the defendants
Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and
Fidel A. Reyes, in the Court of First
Instance of this city, being still pending,
inasmuch as both causes, criminal and
civil, are based upon the same facts
which the plaintiff, who is also
interested in said criminal cause,
considers a cause of action;
"(4) That the civil action in the above-
entitled cause has been destroyed as a
consequence of the fact that the
plaintiff did not expressly reserve his
right to the same in the said mentioned
cause No. 4295 for libel, in order to
exercise it after the termination of said
criminal cause:
"(5) That the defendants Lope K.
Santos, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G.
Liquete, Manuel Palma, Arcadio
Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco,
Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M.
Cansipit have been erroneously
included in the complaint, for the
simple reason that the first two were
acquitted in said cause No. 4295 for
libel, the third was used as a witness by
the prosecution in the same cause, and
the latter ones have no interest, directly
or indirectly, in the newspaper "El
Renacimiento," in which the plaintiff
presumes, was published the editorial
which forms the basis of the complaint,
and which is said to be libelous; and
concluding with a prayer to the court to
dismiss the case, with cost against the
plaintiff."
The second paragraph of this "special
defense" is nothing other than a general
demurrer to the complaint, which has
been overruled, as already stated.
The first paragraph is not clearly
stated, but the court construes it as
meaning a simple denial that the
plaintiff is the person referred to in the
alleged libelous article "Birds of Prey,"
which issue is sufficiently raised by the
general denial of the allegations in the
complaint.
The third paragraph is not a valid
defense in law, for the simple reason
that section 11 of Act 277 of the
Philippine Commission, under which
this suit is brought, especially provides
for a separate civil action for damages,
as well as for a criminal prosecution.
(See Mr. Justice Johnson's recent
decision.) This third paragraph is
therefore without merit; and the same
may be said of the fourth paragraph
thereof. As to paragraph five, it
contains no material averment which
could not have been set up and insisted
upon under the general issue.
One part if this so-called special
defense is therefore a demurrer already
and adjudicated, another part is
covered by the general issue, and the
residue is without merit as a legal
defense, and might have been stricken
out. The defense is therefore
tantamount to the general issue only,
there being no special plea that these
charges are true, nor any plea of
justification.
The trial of this case on its merits began
November 16, and ended December 10,
1909, and the proceedings and
evidence introduced are to be found in
the exhibits and stenographic notes
taken by the court's official reporter. At
the trial Judge Kincaid said Major
Hartigan appeared for the plaintiff and
Señores Agoncillo, Cruz Herrera, and
Ferrer for the defendants.
After hearing the testimony and
arguments of counsel and a due
consideration of the case, the court
finds the following facts established by
the admissions and a decided
preponderance of the evidence:
That the defendants Martin Ocampo,
Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel
Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto,
and Gregorio M. Cansipit, seven in
number, are the proprietors and
owners of the said daily newspaper
known as "El Renacimiento" and
"Muling Pagsilang," and that "El
Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang,"
are one and the same newspaper,
owned, managed, printed and
published by the same persons; that
Teodoro M. Kalaw and Lope K. Santos
were the editors in chief of directors of
this paper on the 30th of October, 1908,
and that said nine defendants named
were the owners, editors, proprietors,
managers and publishers of said
newspaper on said 30th of October,
1908, for a long time prior thereto, and
during all the time mentioned in the
complaint.
As to the defendants, Reyes, Aguilar,
and Liquete, they appear from the
evidence to have been editors of said
paper, but in subordinate position to
the chief editors or directors, Kalaw
and Santos, and to have acted under the
direction of their latter two defendants.
The court further finds that every
essential or material allegation of the
complaint is true substantially as
therein stated, with the exception
noted to Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino
Aguilar, and Leoncio G. Liquete, and as
may be hereinafter indicated. The case
is therefore dismissed as to these three
defendants.
The only serious contention of the
defense is (1) that the editorial "Birds
of Prey" does not refer to a determinate
person; and (2) that, conceding that it
does refer to the plaintiff, none of the
defendants, except Teodoro M. Kalaw,
is responsible for the writing, printing,
or publication of the alleged libelous
article of the damages to the plaintiff
resulting therefrom.
In the opinion of the court this article
so indubitably refers to the plaintiff,
and was so easily and well understood
by the readers of said paper as
indicating the plaintiff, that it would be
an act of superrogation to elaborately
discuss the evidence adduced in
support of or against the proposition. It
is as clear to the court from the
evidence adduced as the noonday sun,
that the plaintiff is the identical and
only person meant and referred to in
said article "Birds and Prey;" and it
requires no argument to prove that it
does mean and refer to him and was so
intended by the writer, and therefore
by said nine defendants, and could not
have been otherwise understood by
any intelligent reader or subscriber of
said paper, in view of the reasons
assigned in the complaint, which
reasons are clearly disclosed and fully
established by the evidence. And it may
be added that much valuable time was
needlessly consumed by the defense at
trial in an effort to establish the
contrary.
It seems to the court a reflection upon
the intelligence of the subscribers and
readers of "El Renacimiento" to
contend that this editorial was not well
understood by them as referring to the
plaintiff, and as fully as if his name had
been mentioned in every paragraph
thereof. And assuredly the omission of
his name from the editorial has made
the libel less hurtful and disastrous in
its results to the reputation and feelings
of the plaintiff.
Much time was consumed also in
adducing evidence to show that none of
the twelve defendants were the owners
of "El Renacimiento" and "Muling
Pagsilang," but that six of them had
originally contributed their money as a
partriotic donation to the Filipino
people, and that Martin Ocampo simply
held the money and property of the
paper as trustees for this people, and
that the paper was being devoted
exclusively to philanthropic and
patriotic ends, and that Galo and
Lichauco had agreed to contribute to
the same ends, but had not done so.
This proposition in the light of evidence
is so preposterous as to entitle it to
little, if any, serious consideration. To
ask the court to believe it is tantamount
to asking the court to stultify reason
and common sense. That those seven
defendants named contributed their
respective sums of money, as shown by
the evidence, to the foundation of said
newspaper in 1901 for their own
personal benefit and profit is fully and
unmistakably established. It is equally
well established that Martin Ocampo is
and was, not only a part owner, but that
he has been and is still the
administrator or business manager of
said newspaper, and that the other six
persons named are shareholders, part
owners and proprietors thereof, and
were such on said 30th of October,
1908.
Arcadio Arellano testified positively
that Galo Lichauco was one of the seven
founders, and that Lichauco
contributed P1,000. Martin Ocampo
testified that Galo Lichauco promised to
contribute an amount which he (the
witness) did not remember but that
Lichauco did not keep his promise. (See
pp. 107, 108, and 231 of the evidence.)
The other evidence and circumstances
strongly corroborate Arcadio Arellano,
and the court is constrained to believe
that Arellano told the truth and
Ocampo did not. See Exhibit B-J, a copy
of "El Renacimiento" containing the
article "Infamy Among Comrades," page
87 of the evidence, in which there was
published that these seven persons
named are the shareholders of the
paper.
Furthermore, Galo Lichauco failed to
appear and testify, so as to enlighten
the court as to which witness, Arellano
or Ocampo, told the truth, or whether
chief editor Kalaw had his authority to
publish in said paper, as he did in
November 22, 1907, that he, Galo
Lichauco, was one of the shareholders.
The presumptions are therefore against
Galo Lichauco. See S.S. Co. vs. Brancroft-
Whitney Co. (36 C. C. A., 136 and 153).
It also appears from the evidence that
Teodoro M. Kalaw was the chief editor
or director of the Spanish section of
said paper, and that Lope K. Santos was
the chief editor or director of the
Tagalog section on said 30th of
October, 1908, and that the Spanish
and Tagalog sections are, and then
were, one and the same newspaper, but
printed and published in different
languages.
It is alleged that said newspaper has a
large circulation throughout the
Philippine Islands, and was published
and circulated daily in the Spanish and
Tagalog languages in the city of Manila.
Not only are these allegations true, but
it is also true that said newspaper has a
daily circulation and subscribers in
other parts of the world, notably in the
United States and Spain; and it has
subscribers numbering in totonot less
than 5,200, and a daily issue of 6,000
copies.
It is also true as alleged, and the court
so finds that since the year 1906 to said
30th of October, 1908, these nine
defendants had been maliciously
persecuting and attacking the plaintiff
in their said newspapers, until at last,
on said 30th of October, 1908 with the
malicious intention of injuring the
plaintiff, who on said date was and still
is a member of the Civil Commission
and Secretary of the Interior in the
Government of the Philippine Islands;
and with the object of exposing him to
the odium, contempt, and ridicule of
the public, they wrote, printed, and
published in their said newspaper, in
its ordinary number of said 30th of
October, 1908, the malicious
defamation and false libel of and
concerning the plaintiff, entitled and
herein alluded to as the editorial "Birds
of Prey," which libel was and is highly
injurious to the plaintiff and from
which the plaintiff has sustained
serious damage.
This editorial, when properly
interpreted and read between the lines,
means, besides other things, and was
intended by the writer to mean and be
understood by the readers thereof as
meaning substantially the following:
That the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester,
was born on the surface of the globe to
eat and devour, like a bird of prey, and
that others, born to be eaten and
devoured, are the prey and the food of
the insatiable voracity of the plaintiff;
that the plaintiff had a desire to copy
and imitate the most rapacious bird,
the eagle, in order to triumph in
plundering his fellowman; that the
plaintiff besides being an eagle, has the
characteristics of the vulture, the owl,
and the vampire.
That the plaintiff ascended the
mountains of Benguet to classify and
measure the skulls of the Igorots, and
study and civilize them and to espy in
his flight with the eye of the bird of
prey the large deposits of gold-the prey
concealed amidst the mountains-and to
appropriate them to himself
afterwards, and that to this end the
plaintiff had the legal facilities, made
and unmade at his own will, and
that this is always done for his own
benefit.
That the plaintiff authorized, inspite of
laws and ordinances, the illegal
slaughtering is diseased cattle in order
to derive benefit from the infected and
putrid meant which he himself was
obliged to condemn by virtue of his
official position; that while the plaintiff
presents himself on all occasions with
the wrinkled brow of the scientist who
consumes his life in the mysteries of
the laboratory of science, his whole
scientific labor is confined to dissecting
insects and importing fish eggs.
That although the plaintiff gave an
admirable impulse to the discovery of
wealthy lodes in Mindanao and
Mindoro, and in other virgin regions of
the Archipelago, with the money of the
people, under the pretext of the public
good, as a strict matter of truth his
object was to possess all the data and
the key to the national wealth for his
essentially personal benefit, and that
this is shown by his acquisition of
immense properties registered under
the names of others.
That the plaintiff promoted, through
secret agents and partners, the sale to
the city of Manila of worthless land at
fabulous prices, which the city fathers
dared not refuse from fear of
displeasing the plaintiff, who was
behind the project, and which they did
not refuse for their own good; that the
plaintiff favored concessions for hotels
in Manila on filled-in land; with the
prospect of enormous profits, at the
expense of the blood of the people.
That such are the characteristics of the
plaintiff, who is at the same time an
eagle that surprises and devours, a
vulture that gorges his self on deed and
rotten meats, an owl that affects a
petulant omniscience, and a vampire
that sucks the blood of the victim until
he leaves it bloodless. And this libelous
article concludes with the asseveration
in substance that the plaintiff has been
"weighed in the balance and found
wanting" — "Mane, Tecel, Phares."
That this editorial is malicious and
injurious goes without saying. Almost
every line thereof teems with
malevolence, ill will, and wanton and
reckless disregard of the rights and
feelings of the plaintiff; and from the
very nature and the number of the
charges therein contained the editorial
is necessarily very damaging to the
plaintiff.
That this editorial, published as it was
by the nine defendants, tends to
impeach the honesty and reputation of
the plaintiff and publishes his alleged
defects, and thereby exposes him to
public hatred, contempt, and ridicule is
clearly seen by a bare reading of the
editorial.
It suffices to say that not a line is to be
found in all the evidence in support of
these malicious, defamatory and
injurious charges against the plaintiff;
and there was at the trial no pretense
whatever by the defendants that any of
them are true, nor the slightest
evidence introduced to show the truth
of a solitary charge; nor is there any
plea of justification or that the charges
are true, much less evidence to sustain
a plea.
In the opinion of the court "Birds of
Prey," when read and considered in its
relation to and connection with the
other articles libelous and defamatory
in nature, published of and concerning
the plaintiff by these nine defendants
anterior and subsequent to the
publication of this article, and having
reference to the same subject matter as
shown by the evidence, is one of the
worst libels of record. It is safe to say
that in all the court reports to the
Philippine Islands, or of Spain, or the
United States, there is not to be found a
libel case in which there is a more
striking exemplification of the spirit of
hatred, bad faith, evil motive,
mischievous intent, actual malice,
nefarious purpose, base malignity, or
gross malevolence.
It is proper to observe also that since
the beginning of this attack on the
plaintiff in the year 1906 down almost
to the present time, so far from there
being any apology, retraction, or effort
to repair the injury already done as far
as lay in the power of the defendants,
the persecution, wrong, and tortious
injury to the plaintiff had been steadily
kept up and persisted in, without the
slightest abatement of the malevolent
spirit.
There has been neither retraction,
apology, nor reparation; per contra, the
libel has been repeated, reiterated, and
accentuated, and widely and
extensively propagated by these nine
defendants through the columns of
their said paper and otherwise; and it
appears from the evidence that especial
effort has been made by these same
defendants to give as much publicity as
possible to the libelous and defamatory
words used of and concerning the
plaintiff in said editorial.
Through their instrumentality and
persistency in asserting and reasserting
its truth, this diabolical libel has been
spread broadcast over the Philippine
Islands and to other parts of the world.
In said criminal case No. 4295 some of
these nine defendants pleaded the
truth of the charges; and in Exhibit A-Q
is to be found this language: "The
defense will adduce its evidence
demonstrating the truth of every one of
the facts published."
In their said paper of the 11th of
January, 1909, there is published
statement:
"The brief period of time
allowed us by the court, at the
request of the counsel, to
gather evidence which we are
to adduce in our effort to
demonstrate the truth of the
accusation that we have
formulated in the article
which is the subject of the
agitation against us, having
expired, the trial of the case
against our director had been
resumed." (See pp. 63 and 67
of the evidence.)
And about the same time they also
declared in their said paper that "there
is more graft than fish in the rivers of
Benguet." And this in the year of our
Lord 1909! the persecution having
begun in 1905; thus indicating that
there is to be no "let-up" or cessation of
the hostile attitude toward the plaintiff
or the vilification of his name and
assaults upon his character, much less a
retraction or an apology, unless drastic
means and measures are made use of to
the end that there may be no further
propagation of the libel, or
asseveration, or reiteration of its truth.
This article "Birds of Prey" charges the
plaintiff with malfeasance in office and
criminal acts, and is therefore
libelous per se. It in substance charges
the plaintiff with the prostitution of his
office as a member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippine Islands
and Secretary of the Interior of said
Islands for personal ends. It is charged
also substantially that plaintiff in his
official capacity wasted the public
funds for the purpose of promoting his
own personal welfare, and that he
violated the laws of the Philippine
Islands and the ordinances of the city of
Manila.
In its essence he is charged with taking
part in illegal combinations for the
purpose of robbing the people with the
object of gain for himself and for
others; with being a bird of prey, a
vulture (buzzard), an owl, and a
vampire that sucks the blood of the
victim (meaning the people) until he
leaves it bloodless, that is to say, robs
the people, until he leaves them
wretched and poverty-stricken,
deprived of all worldly possessions;
and lastly, that he, the plaintiff, like
Belshazzar, has been weighed in the
balance and found wanting as a high
Government functionary; all of which
charges are false and malicious and
without and foundation whatever in
fact, as the evidence fully demonstrates.
It is also a matter of fact, and the court
so finds, that said defamation was
written and published that it might be
understood, and it was understood, by
the public officials of the Government
and the people of the Philippine Islands
in general, and wherever else said
newspaper may have circulated and
been read, as charging the plaintiff with
the tortious and criminal acts and
conduct charged in said editorial as
hereinbefore specified and interpreted.
The court finds it also true that, besides
assailing the integrity and reviling the
reputation of the plaintiff, said nine
defendants, in publishing said libel, did
so with the malicious intention of
inciting the Filipino people to believe
that the plaintiff was despotic and
corrupt and unworthy of the position
which he held, and for this reason to
oppose his administration of the office
in his charge as Secretary of the
Interior, and in this way they
endeavored to create enormous
difficulties for him in the performance
of his official duties, and to make him
so unpopular that he would have to
resign his office as a member of the
Civil Commission of the Philippines and
Secretary of the Interior.
It is also true that the said nine
defendants, by means of said libel, and
other like false statements in their said
newspaper, have been deliberately
trying to destroy the confidence of the
public in the plaintiff and to incite the
people to place obstacles in his way in
the performance of his official duties, in
consequence of which the plaintiff has
met with many difficulties which have
greatly increased his labors as a public
official.
It further appears from the evidence
that not only has an effort been made
by these nine defendants to give as
much publicity as possible to the
charges, but in order that said
defamation should attract the attention
of the public, they published the same
under a heading in large, bold and
showy type, so that it might be easily
seen and read by all the subscribers
and readers of said paper.
In full view of all the evidence,
therefore, it is clearly seen that every
essential allegation of the complaint is
true substantially as therein claimed,
and that the whole of the said editorial
relating to the misconduct and bad
character of the plaintiff is false and
without the slightest foundation in fact.
Not a scintilla of evidence was
introduced in support of any injurious
charge made therein against the
plaintiff, to say nothing of the plaintiff's
evidence that each and every charge of
malfeasance therein contained is false,
and without reference to whether a
failure to plead the truth admits the
falsity of the charge.
The evidence shows no "special" or
"actual pecuniary damage," and none is
alleged in the complaint. Two other
kinds of damages, however are claimed,
to wit, general damages for injuries to
the feelings and reputation of the
plaintiff and additional work to which
he has been put by the conduct of the
defendants, which are laid in the sum of
P50,000, and "punitive," exemplary, or
vindictive damages, "as a warning to
the defendants," or as expressed in Act
277 of the Philippine Commission, as a
just punishment to the libelers and an
example to others," which are laid in
the same sum of P50,000.
The nine defendants being liable to the
plaintiff for damages, the next question
to be decided is what amount of
damages should be awarded the
plaintiff for the injury to his reputation
and feelings and his being a proper case
for punitive damages, the further
question is, what sum shall be awarded
as a just punishment to these nine
libelers and as an example to others. In
neither of these cases is there any
precise measure of damages.
In determining the amount to be
awarded in the first instance it is
proper to consider the previous
character, influence, reputation,
standing, official position, hope of
advancement, prospect of promotion,
and social status of the plaintiff and his
family, and all the circumstances
connected with the case.
The plaintiff is a man in the prime of
life, holding, as he has held for the last
ten years an important, responsible,
lucrative, high and exalted position of
trust and honor in the service of the
Government of the United States, in the
Philippine Islands, without a blotch on
his family escutcheon, so far as the
evidence shows, and with an
untarnished reputation as a man, as a
citizen, and as a Government official.
He is a man of honesty, integrity, and
high social position; a man of learning,
famous as a scientist, and scientific
achievements and scholarly
attainments, a man of industrious
habits, genuine worth, and intellectual
force. He has read, studied, traveled
and learned much, and is an author of
merit and distinction. He was for a long
while a professor in one of the largest
and most renowned institutions of
learning in the world; he is a man of
vast experience, broad and liberal
views, and an extensive
acquaintanceship, not only in the
Philippine Islands, but in the United
States and other countries of the world.
He was well and favorably received by
the people wherever he journeyed
previous to this atrocious libel upon his
integrity and reputation.
He has discharged the duties of his lofty
official position in a manner that
reflects credit upon himself as well as
the Government which he represents,
and apparently with entire satisfaction
to all of his superiors in office and the
people generally; and but for this
pernicious, outrageous, and highly
reprehensible assault upon his good
name, fame and reputation, there were
prospects of promotion to higher
honors. And so far as his personal and
private record is concerned it was
without a blemish anterior to the time
when these unfounded and dastardly
aspersions were cast upon it by these
nine defendants.
Indeed, it is only necessary to advert to
the testimony of the defense itself to
ascertain that the plaintiff is an
honorable man, and without a stain
upon his character, officially or
otherwise. It would be interesting to
note here in parallel columns and
compare the charges made in "Birds of
Prey" and the testimony of one of the
witnesses for the defendants.
Felipe Buencamino, an intelligent
witness for the defense, in his
testimony (p. 240) when asked the
question, Do you know Mr. Worcester?"
he answers, "Yes, sir: I know him as
an honorable man. I also know him as
an honest, honorable public official." In
answer to another question he says, "As
I have said, I know Mr. Worcester as a
private citizen and as a public official,
and my opinion of him is that of
honorable man and an upright official."
And no other witness testified anything
to the contrary.
 "A good name is rather to be secured a possession more intentionally and without the contained in any part of such
chosen than great riches and useful, and more valuable semblance of justification or excuse, or book or number of each
loving favor rather than silver than lands, or houses, or proof that the libelous charges against newspaper or serial as fully as
of gold." silver, or gold . . . the plaintiff were "published and good if he were the author of the
motives and justifiable ends." same."
"Who "The law recognizes the value
steals my of such a reputation, and But the Legislature and the highest And section 11 provides as follows:
purse constantly strives to give judicial authority of these Islands have
steals redress for its injury. It spoken in no uncertain words with "In addition to such criminal
trash; imposes upon him who regard to the rights of the plaintiff in action, any person libeled as
attacks it by slanderous this case; and we need not necessarily hereinbefore set forth shall
xxx xxx xxx words, or libelous publication, turn to the law of libel elsewhere, or have a right to a civil action
a liability to make full the decision of the courts in other against the person libeling
compensation for the damage jurisdictions to ascertain or determine him for damages sustained by
But he that to the reputation, for the his rights.
filches reason of such libel, and the
shame and obloquy, and for person so libeled shall be
from me the injury to the feelings of
my good In sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 11 of the entitled to recover in such
the owner, which are caused Libel Law (Act 277, Philippine civil action not only the actual
name, by the publication of the
Robs me of Commission) is to be found the law of pecuniary damages sustained
slander or the libel. these Islands especially applicable to by him, but also damages for
that which
not this case. Section 1 thereof defines libel. injury to his feelings and
enriches "It goes further. If the words Section 2 provides that every person reputation, and in addition
him are spoken, or the publication who willfully and with a malicious such punitive damages as the
And makes is made, with the intent to intent to injure another publishes, or court may think will be a just
me poor injure the victim, or with the procures to be published, any libel shall punishment to the libeler and
indeed." criminal indifference to civil be punished as therein provided. an example to others. Suit
obligation, it imposes such Section 3 provides that an injurious may be brought in any Court
damages as a jury (in this case publication is presumed to have been of First Instance having
The enjoyment of a private reputation the judge), in view of all the malicious if no justifiable motive for jurisdiction of the parties. The
is as much a constitutional right as the circumstances of the making it is shown. Section 4 provides, presumptions, rules or
possession of life, liberty or property. It particular case adjudge that among other things, that in all criminal evidence and special defenses
is one of those rights necessary to the wrongdoer ought to pay prosecutions the truth may be given in provided for in this chapter
human society that underlie the whole as an example to the public, to evidence; but to establish this defense, for criminal prosecutions
scheme of human civilization. deter others from committing not only must the truth of the matter shall be equally applicable in
like offenses, and as a charged as libelous be proven, but also civil actions under this
"The respect and esteem of punishment for the infliction that it was published with good section."
his fellows are among the of the injury. motives and for justifiable ends; and
highest rewards of a well- the presumptions, rules of evidence, "The proprietor of a printing
spent life vouchsafed to man "In the ordinary acceptance of and special defenses are equally plant is responsible for
in this existence. The hope of the term, malice signifies ill applicable in civil and criminal actions, publishing a libel. According
it is the inspiration of youth, will, evil intent, or hatred, according to section 11 of said Act. to the legal doctrines and
and their possession the while it is legal signification is jurisprudence of the United
solace of later years. A man of defined to be "a wrongful act Section 6 is as follows: States, the printer of a
affairs, a business man, who done intentionally, without publication containing
has been seen and known of legal justification." (36 C. C. A., libelous matter is liable for
his fellowmen in the active "Every author, editor, or
475.) proprietor of any book, the same." (Mr. Justice Torres,
pursuits of life for many years, in U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil. Rep.,
and who has developed a newspaper, or serial
Surely in the case at bar there was a publication is chargeable with 757.) But said section 6
great character and an plainly fixes the liability of
unblemished reputation, has wrongful or tortious act done the publication of any words
editors and proprietors of
 newspapers, and is clear
enough for all the purposes of
this case.
Mr. Justice Carson (5 Phil. Rep. 1551),
speaking for our Supreme Court, says:
"When there is an averment in
the complaint that the
defamatory words used refer
to the plaintiff, and it is
proven that the words do in
fact refer to him and are
capable of bearing such
special application, an action
for libel may be maintained
even though the defamatory
publication does not refer to
the plaintiff by name."
And Mr. Justice Willard (12 Phil. Rep.,
4282), for the same high authority, says:
"In an action for libel damages
for injury to feelings and
reputation may be recovered
though no actual pecuniary
damages are proven.
"Punitive damages cannot be
recovered unless the tort is
aggravated by evil motive,
actual malice, deliberate
violence or oppression."
That is to say, if there is evil motive, or
actual malice or deliberate violence, or
oppression then punitive damages, or
"smart money," may be recovered.
And Justice Carson (U.S. vs. Sedano, 14
Phil., Rep., 338), also says:
"Actual or express malice of
an alleged libelous publication
may be inferred from
the style and toneof the
publication.
"The publication of falsehood
and calumny against public
officers and candidates for
public office is specially
reprehensible and is an
offense most dangerous to the
people and to the public
welfare.
"The interest of society
require that immunity should
be granted to the discussion
of public affairs, and that all
acts and matters of a public
nature may be freely
published with fitting
comments and strictures; but
they do not require that the
right to criticise public
officers shall embrace the
right to base such criticism
under false statements of fact,
or attack the private character
of the officer, or to falsely
impute to
him malfeasance or misconduc
t in office."
And there are almost numberless
English and American authorities in
perfect harmony with these decisions
of our Supreme Court too numerous
indeed to be cited here; and it is not
necessary.
Among the leading cases, however, in
the United States, is that of Scott vs.
Donald (165 U.S., 58) and cases therein
cited. In this case the court says:
"Damages have been defined to be the
compensation which law will allow for
an injury done, and are said to be
exemplary and allowable in excess of
the actual loss when the tort is
aggravated by evil motive, actual
malice, deliberate violence or
oppression," which is in entire
harmony with Justice Willard's decision
hereinbefore cited.
And quoting from the decision in Day
vs. Woodworth (13 Howard, 371) the
same high court says:
"In actions of trespass, where
the injury has been wanton
and malicious, or gross or
outrageous, courts permit
juries (here the court) to add
to the measured
compensation of the plaintiff
which he would have been
entitled to recover, had the
injury been inflicted without
design or intention,
something further by way of
punishment or example,
which has sometimes been
called "smart money." "
It thus clearly appears that the facts
established in the case at bar are more
than sufficient to bring it within the
rule of law here laid down by the
highest judicial authority.
Section 11 of the Libel Law expressly
allows general damages; and Mr. Justice
Willard, in Macleod vs. Philippine
Publishing Company,3 says:
"The general damages which
are allowed in actions of libel
are not for mental suffering
alone, but they are allowed for
injury to
the standing and reputation of
the person libeled, and the
common law of England and
America presumed that such
damages
existed without proof thereof
from the mere fact of
publication of the libel."
In Day vs. Woodworth, the Supreme
Court of the United States recognized
the power of a jury in certain actions in
tort to assess against the tort feasor
punitive damages. Where the injury has
been inflicted maliciously or wantonly,
and with circumstances of contumely,
or indignity, the judge or jury, as the
case may be, is not limited to the
ascertainment of a simple
compensation for the wrong committed
against the aggrieved person.
"The public position of the
plaintiff, as an officer of the
Government, and the evil
example of libels, are
considerations with the jury
(here the judge) for increasing
damages."
(Tillotson vs. Cheetham, 3
Johns, 56.)
"The character, condition and
influence of the plaintiff are
relevant on the matter of the
extent of damages."
(Littlejohn vs. Greely, 22 How.
Prac., 345; 13 Abb. Prac., 41,
311.)
"Where the publication is
libelous, the law presumes
that it was made with malice
— technical, legal malice, but
not malice in fact — and the
amount of damages depends
in a large degree upon the
motives which actuated the
defendants in its publication;
and in such cases the law
leaves it to the jury (here the
judge) to find a return such
damages as they think right
and just, by a sound,
temperate, deliberate, and
reasonable exercise of their
functions as jurymen."
(Erber vs. Dun. (C. C.) 12 Fed.,
526.)
"Actions of libel, so far as they
involve questions of
exemplary damages, and the
law of principal and agent, are
controlled by the same rules
as are other actions of tort.
The right of a plaintiff to
recover exemplary damages
exists wherever a tortious
injury has been inflicted
recklessly or wantonly, and it
is not limited to cases where
the injury resulted from
personal malice or
recklessness of the defendant.
It follows that the owner of a
newspaper is as responsible
for all the acts of omission and
commission of those he
employs to edit it and manage
its affairs, as he would be if
personally managing the
same.' (Malloy vs. Bennett, (C.
C.) 15 Fed., 371.)
"The fact that a publication,
libelous per se, was made
without any attempt to
ascertain its correctness is
sufficient to justify a finding
that defendant committed
libel client with a wanton
indifference, and with actual
malice sufficient to sustain
exemplary damages." (Van
Ingen vs. Star Co., 1 App. Div.,
429, 37 N.Y., 114.)
"The court is not authorized
to set aside a verdict for
$45,000 in an action for libel,
where it appears that plaintiff
was persistently persecuted
in the columns of defendant's
newspaper, and that he and
his family were held up to
public contempt and ridicule,
and defendants withdraw
from the case after failing to
establish a plea of
justification." (Smith vs. Times
Co., (Com. p. 1) 4 Pa. Dist.
Rep., 399.)
"In considering the amount
with the defendant shall pay,
on this account (exemplary
damages) the turpitude of his
conduct and his financial
ability are only considered;
and such consideration is not
in view of the injury or
distress of the plaintiff, but in
behalf of the public; the
wrongful act is regarded as an
indication of the actor's
vicious mind — an overt deed
of vindictive or wanton
wrong, offensive and
dangerous to the public good.
This is the view of those
damages which generally
prevails." (Sutherland on
Damages, vol. 2, p. 1092. title
Exemplary Damages.)
"Punitive damages are
recoverable not to
compensate the plaintiff, but
solely to punish the
defendant. This legal motive
would suffer defeat if punitive
damages could not be given
for a malicious attack on a
reputation too well
established to receive
substantial injury at the hands
of a libeler." (Judge Bond in
Ferguson vs. Pub. Co., 72 Mo.
App., 462.)
It may be suggested that the reputation
of the plaintiff in this case is too well
established to be seriously affected by
the defamatory words used of and
concerning him in "Birds of Prey," but it
would not be proper to gravely
consider this suggestion.
The conditions in these Islands are
peculiar. The minds, thoughts, and
opinions of the people are easily
molded, and the public is credulous and
perhaps frequently too ready to believe
anything that may be said in derogation
of an American official, especially when
it is published and vouched for by the
editorial and business management
and proprietors if a newspaper of the
prominence, pretensions, circulation
and influence if "El Renacimiento,"
which paper is everlastingly
proclaiming in its columns that it is
being conducted and published solely
in the interests of the Filipino people —
pro bono publico. There is stronger
disposition to give credence to what is
said in a newspaper here in the Islands
the elsewhere, and when abuse,
vilification, and defamation are
persistently practiced for a period of
several years, without modification or
retraction, but with renewed emphasis,
the people naturally come to believe in
its verity and authenticity.
It is apparent from the evidence that as
an effect of the persecution of the
plaintiff by "El Renacimiento" and the
libel published in its columns, the
minds of the major part of the Filipino
people have been poisoned and
prejudiced against the plaintiff to such
an extent that he is regarded by these
people as odious, dishonest,
unscrupulous and tyrannical.
It may be that his reputation has not
suffered so severely with those of his
own race, but when it is considered
that his vocation has tenfold more to do
with the Filipinos than with his own
people, that his official duties place him
in constant contact with them, and that
his success in his chosen career is
largely dependent upon their good will
and support, it is manifest that the
damage to his reputation has been very
great and that a large sum of money
should be awarded to indemnify him,
as far as money can indemnify, for the
loss of his good name with the Filipino
people.
The plaintiff came to the Philippine
Islands when a young man, full of hope
and ambition. Since his arrival he has
devoted himself incessantly and
indefatigably to the uplifting of the
inhabitants of the Archipelago and to
the faithful performance, as far as he
was able, of the pledges and promises
of the Government to the Filipino
people. The duties of his particular
office were such as brought him in
more immediate and constant contract
with the people than any other official
of the same category in these Islands.
It is clearly shown that the plaintiff
faithfully endeavored to perform, and
did efficiently perform, all of these
duties, doing everything that he could
in an unselfish and disinterested
manner of the welfare and
development of the country and its
people, knowing full well that his
career, as well as his advancement,
depended largely upon the good will of
these people, and that by incurring
their censure or displeasure he would
have little hope of success in his chosen
work.
Imagine, therefore, the chagrin,
disappointment, mortification, mental
suffering, and distress, and
perturbation of spirit that would
necessarily be occasioned him when he
discovered that through the nefarious,
studied, and practiced persecution of
the paper in question, these high hopes
were blasted, and that, instead of
having gained the respect and gratitude
of the people for the assiduous labors
devoted to their uplifting, they had
been made to believe that, instead of
being a benefactor, he was a vampire
that was sucking their life blood, a
corrupt politician who was
squandering the money wrung from
the people by means of taxation, in
schemes for his own personal
aggrandizement and enrichment.
That instead of developing the mineral
wealth of the Islands he was taking up
all the rich veins and appropriating
them in the names of subservient tools,
to his own personal use, benefit and
profit. That instead of protecting the
people from disease, he was, by means
of infected meat and for his own
personal gain, spreading contagion
among them.
That he united in his person all the bad
qualities of the vulture, the eagle, and
the vampire; that, in short, he was a
"bird of prey," with all that is implied in
that term in its worst acceptation; that
he was a corrupt tyrant, who never lost
an opportunity to do the people hurt;
that instead of wishing them well and
seeking their advancement, he was
their enemy, who never lost an
opportunity to degrade and humiliate
them; that instead of preferring them
for office and positions of official trust,
he treated them with all sorts of
contempt and indifference.
It is difficult to appreciate the feelings
of a refined soul in its contemplation of
a result so disastrous, so unjust, and so
unmerited.
It is furthermore shown that when the
plaintiff came to these Islands a young
scientist he had already won fame in
his own country; that he is a fellow of
the important scientific associations in
the world. His election as a fellow or
member of these scientific bodies
shows that his labors in the Philippines
were the object of solicitude by the
prominent scientific and learned men
not only of his own race, but in many
other civilized countries of the world.
Important results were evidently
expected of him by them, and it can not
be doubted that they expected of him of
life honestly devoted to the
conscientious discharge of his duties as
a trusted public functionary of the
American Government in the Philippine
Islands.
And yet he is falsely denounced in the
columns of said newspaper to his
fellows of these societies as a man who
is so absolutely corrupt, so inordinately
selfish and avaricious that he has not
considered for a moment the duties
incumbent upon him; that he has been
oblivious to every obligation of trust
and confidence, and that he is
unworthy of the respect of honest men.
One witness testified that he read this
libel in the public library of the city of
Boston. It is furthermore shown that
copies of this paper went to Spain,
England, and to different parts of the
United States; and inasmuch as the
plaintiff is a man of prominence in the
scientific world, it is to be inferred that
his fellows became more or less aware
of these heinous charges.
Thus we find that the plaintiff is here
confronted with disappointed ambition
and frustrated hopes, and placed in the
humiliating attitude of having to
explain to his fellows that the charges
are untrue, of adducing evidence to
clear himself, perhaps never with
complete success, of the stain that has
been cast upon his reputation by the
libelous and defamatory declarations
contained in "Birds of Prey."
In view of the foregoing findings of fact
and circumstances of the case and the
law applicable thereto,
It is the opinion of the court, and the
court so finds, that the plaintiff has
sustained damages on account of
wounded feelings and mental suffering
and injuries to his standing and
reputation in the sum of thirty-five
thousand (P35,000) pesos, and that he
is entitled to recover this sum of the
nine defendants named, as being
responsible for having written, printed,
and published said libel; and that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover of them
the further sum of twenty-five
thousand (P25,000) pesos, as punitive
damages, which the court thinks will be
a just punishment to these nine libelers
and an example to others.
Wherefore, it is so ordered and
adjudged that the plaintiff, Dean C.
Worcester, have and recover of the
defendants, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro
M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Manuel
Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose,
Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and
Gregorio M. Cansipit, jointly and
severally, the sum of sixty thousand
(P60,000) pesos, and the costs of suit,
for which execution may issue.
It is ordered. At Manila, P.I., this 14th
day of January , 1910.
From said decision the defendants appealed and
made the following assignments of error in this
court:
I.
The court erred in overruling our
motions for suspension of this case, in
its present state, until final judgment
should be rendered in criminal case No.
4295 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, pending appeal in the
Honorable Supreme Court, for libel
based also on the editorial, "Birds of
Prey."
II.
The court erred in admitting as
evidence mere opinion adduced by
counsel for the plaintiff with the
intention of demonstrating to whom
the editorial, alleged to the libelous,
refers.
III.
The court erred in giving greater
preponderance to the opinions of the
witnesses for the plaintiff than to the
expert testimony of the defense.
IV.
The court erred in declaring the
editorial on which the complaint is
based to be libelous per se and to refer
necessarily to the plaintiff, Dean C.
Worcester.
V.
The court erred in declaring the
defendants Martin Ocampo, Manuel
Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose,
Felipe Barretto, Gregorio M. Cansipit,
and Galo Lichauco to be owners of "El
Renacimiento."
VI.
The court erred in not admitting
Exhibits 1 and 3 presented by counsel
for the defendants.
VII.
The court erred in rendering judgment
against the defendants.
VIII.
 The court erred in sentencing the
defendants jointly "and severally" to
pay to the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester,
the sum of P60,000.
IX.
The court erred in not ordering that
execution of the judgment to be
confined to the business known as "El
Renacimiento" and to the defendant
Teodoro M. Kalaw, without extending
to property of the alleged owners of
said newspaper which was not invested
therein by them at its establishment.
X.
The court erred in granting damages to
the plaintiff by virtue of the judgment
rendered against the defendants.
XI.
The court, finally, erred in granting to
the plaintiff punitive damages against
the alleged owners of "El
Renacimiento," admitting the
hypothesis that said editorial is
libelous per se and refers to the
Honorable Dean C. Worcester.
The theory of the defendants, under the first
assignment of error, is that the civil action could
not proceed until the termination of the criminal
action, relying upon the provisions of the Penal
Code in support of such theory. This court,
however, has decided in the case of Ocampo et
al. vs. Jenkins (14 Phil. Rep., 681) that a judgment
in a criminal prosecution for libel, under the
provisions of Act 277 of the Civil commission,
constitutes no bar or estoppel in a civil action
based upon the same acts or transactions. The
reason most often given for this doctrine is that
the two proceedings are not between the same
parties. Different rule as to the competency of
witnesses and the weight of evidence necessary
to the findings in the two proceedings always
exist. As between civil and criminal actions
under said Act (No. 277) a judgment in one is no
bar or estoppel to the prosecution of the other. A
judgment in a criminal cause, under said Act, can
not be pleaded as res adjudicatain a civil action.
(Stone vs. U.S., 167 U.S., 178; Boyd vs. U.S., 616 U.
S., 616, 634; Lee vs. U.S., 150 U.S., 476, 480;
U.S. vs. Jaedicke, 73 Fed. Rep., 100;
U.S. vs. Schneider, 35 Fed. Rep., 107;
Chamberlain vs.Pierson, 87 Fed. Rep., 420;
Steel vs. Cazeaux, 8 Martin (La.), 318, 13
American Decisions, 288; Betts vs. New Hartford,
25 Conn., 185.)
In a criminal action for libel the State must prove
its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the
defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt, while in a
civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to
sustain his cause by a preponderance of evidence
only. (Ocampo vs. Jenkins (supra);
Reilly vs. Norton, 65 Iowa, 306; Sloane vs.Gilbert,
27 American decisions, 708; Cooley on Torts, sec.
208; Greenleaf on Evidence, 426; Wigmore on
Evidence, secs. 2497, 2498.)
With reference to the second assignment of error
above noted, we find that this court has already
decided the question raised thereby, in the case
of U. S. vs. Ocampo et al. (18 Phil. Rep., 1).
During the trial of the cause the plaintiff called
several witnesses for the purpose of showing
that the statements made in said alleged libelous
editorial were intended to apply to the
Honorable Dean C. Worcester, Secretary of the
Interior. The defendants duly objected to these
questions and excepted to the ruling of the court
admitting them.
In the case of Russell vs. Kelley (44 Cal., 641, 642)
the same question was raised and the court, in
its decision, said:
The rule laid down in 2 Stockey on
Slander (p. 51) is that the application of
the slanderous words to the plaintiff
and the extrinsic matters alleged in the
declaration may be shown by the
testimony of witnesses who knew the
parties and circumstances and who can
state their judgment and opinion upon
the application and meaning of the
terms used by the defendant. It is said
that where the words are ambiguous
on the face of the libel, to whom it was
intended to be applied, the judgment
and opinion of witnesses, who from
their knowledge of the parties and
circumstances are able to form a
conclusion as to the defendant's
intention and application of the libel is
evidence for the information of the jury.
Mr. Odgers, in his work on Libel and Slander (p.
567), says:
The plaintiff may also call at the trial
his friends or others acquainted with
the circumstances, to state that, in
reading the libel, they at once
concluded it was aimed at the plaintiff.
It is not necessary that all the world
should understand the libel. It is
sufficient if those who know the
plaintiff can make out that he is the
person meant. (See also Falkard's
Stockey on Libel and Slander, 4th
English edition, 589.)
The correctness of this rule is not only
established by the weight of authority but is
supported by every consideration of justice and
sound policy. The lower court committed no
error in admitting the opinion of witnesses
offered during the trial of the cause. One's
reputation is the sum or composite of the
impressions spontaneously made by him from
time to time, and in one way or another, upon his
neighbors and acquaintances. The effect of a
libelous publication upon the understanding of
such persons, involving necessarily the identity
of the person libeled is of the very essence of the
wrong. The issue in a libel case concerns not only
the sense of the publication, but, in a measure its
effect upon a reader acquainted with the person
referred to. The correctness of the opinion of the
witnesses as to the identity of the person meant
in the libelous publication may always be tested
by cross-examination. (Enquirer Co. vs. Johnston,
72 Fed. Rep., 443; 2nd Greenleaf on Evidence,
417; Nelson vs. Barchenius, 52 Ill., 236;
Smith vs. Miles, 15 Vt., 245; Miller vs. Butler, 6
Cushing (Mass.), 71.)
It is true that some of the courts have established
a different rule. We think, however, that a large
preponderance of the decisions of the supreme
courts of the different States is in favor of the
doctrine which we have announced here.
We are of the opinion that assignments of error
Nos. 3, 4, and 7 may fairly be considered
together, the question being whether or not the
evidence adduced during the trial of the cause in
the lower court shows, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the said editorial was libelous
in its character. Here again we find that this
question has been passed upon by this court in
the case of U. S. vs. Ocampo et al. (18 Phil. Rep.,
1), and we deem it unnecessary to discuss this
question again, for the reason that the evidence
adduced in the present cause was practically the
same, or at least to the same effect, as the
evidence adduced in the cause of U.S. vs.Ocampo
et al. It is sufficient here to say that the evidence
adduced during the trial of the present cause
shows, by a large preponderance of the evidence,
that said editorial was one of the most pernicious
and malicious libels upon a just, upright and
honorable official, which the courts have ever
been called upon to consider. There is not a
scintilla of evidence in the entire record,
notwithstanding the fact that the defendants from
time to time attempted to make a show of proving
the truthfulness of the statements made in said
editorial, which in any way reflects upon the
character and high ideals of Mr. Dean C.
Worcester, in the administration of his
department of the Government.
With reference to the fifth assignment of error,
to wit: That the court erred in holding that the
defendants, Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma,
Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Felipe Barretto,
Gregorio M. Cansipit, and Galo Lichauco, were
the proprietors of "El Renacimiento," the lower
court said:
 Much time was consumed also in
adducing evidence to show that none of
the twelve defendants were the owners
of "El Renacimiento" and "Muling
Pagsilang," but that six of them had
originally contributed their money as a
patriotic donation to the Filipino
people, and that Martin Ocampo simply
held the money and property of the
paper as trustee for this people, and
that the paper was being devoted
exclusively to philanthropic and
patriotic ends, and that Galo Lichauco
had agreed to contribute to the same
ends but had not done so.
"This proposition," said the lower court, "in the
light of the evidence, is so preposterous as to
entitle it to little, if any, serious consideration. To
ask the court to believe it is tantamount to asking
the court to stultify reason and common sense.
That those seven defendants named contributed
their respective sums of money, as shown by the
evidence, to the foundation of said newspaper in
1901, for their own personal benefit and profit,
is fully and unmistakably established. It is
equally well established that Martin Ocampo is
and was, not only a part owner, but that he has
been and is still the administrator or business
manager of said newspaper, and that the other
six persons named are shareholders, part
owners and proprietors thereof and were such
on the said 30th of October, 1908."
Examining the evidence adduced during the
cause in the lower court, we find, sometime
before the commencement of the present action
and before any question was raised with
reference to who were the owners of the said
newspaper, that the defendant, Arcadio Arellano,
in the case of United States vs. Jose Sedano (14
Phil. Rep., 338), testified upon that question as
follows:
Q. Who are the proprietors of "El
Renacimiento"?
A. I, Martin Ocampo, Gregorio
Mariano (Cansipit), Mr. Barretto, and
Galo Lichauco.
Q. Who else?
A. No one else.
Q. And Rafael Palma — is not so?
A. No, sir; Manuel Palma, the brother
of Rafael Palma.
During the trial of the present cause, Arcadio
Arellano testified that his declarations in other
cause were true.
It also appears from the record (Exhibit B-J) that
in the month of November, 1907, long before the
commencement of the present action, "El
Renacimiento," in reply to an article which was
published in "El Comercio," published the
following statement:
They (it) say (s) that this enterprise"
(evidently meaning the publication of
"El Renacimiento") "is sustained by
Federal money; that we are inspired by
Federal personages. We declare that
this, besides being false, is
calumnious. The shareholders of this
company are persons well known by
the public, and never at any moment of
their lives have they acted with masks
on--those masks for which "El
Comercio" seems to have so great an
affection. They are, as the public
knows: Señores Martin Ocampo, Manuel
Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose,
Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and
Gregorio Cansipit.
Arcadio Arellano also testified during the trial of
the present cause that he contributed P750 to
the establishment of "El Renacimiento;" that
Martin Ocampo contributed the sum of P500;
that Mariano Cansipit, Felipe Barretto and Angel
Jose contributed the sum of P250 or P500 each;
that Galo Lichauco contributed the sum of
P1,000 and that Manuel Palma contributed
P3,000.
During the trial of the present cause Arcadio
Arellano, Martin Ocampo, and Angel Jose
testified as witnesses, relating to the ownership
of the newspaper called "El Renacimiento." They
testified that whatever money they gave for the
purpose of establishing said newspaper, was
given as a donation, and that they were neither
the owners nor coowners of said periodical. The
defendants, Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco, Felipe
Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit, did not testify as
witnesses during the trial of the cause in the
lower court. No reason is given for their failure
to appear and give testimony in their own behalf.
The record does not disclose whether or not the
declarations of Arcadio Arellano, in the case of U.
S. vs. Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 338) at the time they
were made, were called to the attention of
Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto,
and Gregorio Cansipit, as well as the reply to "El
Comercio," above noted. Proof of said
declarations and publication was adduced during
the trial of the cause in the present case, and the
attorney of these particular defendants well
knew the purpose and effect of such evidence, if
not disputed; but, notwithstanding the fact that
said declarations and publication were
presented in evidence, and notwithstanding the
fact that the attorney for the defendants knew of
the purpose of such proof, the defendants, Palma,
Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit, were not called
as witnesses for the purpose of rebutting the
same. It is a well settled rule of evidence, that
when the circumstances in proof tend to fix the
liability on a party who has it in his power to offer
evidence of all the facts as they existed and rebut
the inferences which the circumstances in proof
tend to establish, and he fails to offer such proof,
the natural conclusion is that the proof, if
produced, instead of rebutting would support the
inferences against him, and the court is justified in
acting upon that conclusion. (Railway
Company vs. Ellis, C. C. A. Reports, vol. 4, p. 454;
Commonwealth vs. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.),
295; People vs. McWhorter 4 Barb. (N. Y.), 438.)
Lord Mansfield, in the case of Blatch vs.
Archer (Cowper, 63, 65) said:
It is certainly a maxim that all the
evidence is to be weighed according to
the proof which it was in the power of
one side to have produced, and in the
power of the other side to have
contradicted.
Mr. Starkey, in his valuable work on evidence
(vol. 1, p. 64), lays down the rule that:
The conduct of a party in omitting to
produce evidence in elucidation of the
subject matter in dispute, which is
within his power and which rests
peculiarly within his own knowledge,
frequently offers occasion for
presumptions against him, since it
raises the strong suspicion that such
evidence, if adduced, would operate to
his prejudice. (Pacific Coast et al.
Co. vs. Bancroft-Whitney Co., 36 C. C. A.
Reports, 136, 153.)
At the time of the said declarations of Arcadio
Arellano in the case of Sedano and at the time of
the said publication in reply to "El Comercio,"
there was no reason for stating anything except
the truth: neither does there seem to have been
any reason for publishing the fact that the
defendants were the owners of "El Renacimiento"
unless it was true.
At the time there seemed to be no reason to have
it appear that they were donors and public
benefactors only. They seemed to be proud of the
fact that they were the owners. The editors,
publishers, and managers of "El Renacimiento,"
at the time the reply to "El Comercio" was
published, seemed to be anxious to announce to
the public who its owners were. It ("El
Renacimiento") had not then realized that it
belonged to no one; that it had been born into
the community without percentage; that it had
been created a terrible machine for the purpose
of destroying the good character and reputation
of men without having any one to respond for its
malicious damage occasioned to honorable men;
that it was a cast-off, without a past or the hope
of a future; that it was liable to be kicked and
buffetted about the persecuted and destroyed
without any one to protect it; that its former
friends and creators had scattered hither and
thither and had disappeared like feathers before
a cyclone, declaring, under oath, that they did not
know their offspring and were not willing to
recognize it in public. It seems to have been a
Moses found in the bulrushes, destined by its
creators to be a great good among the Filipino
people, in teaching them to respect the rights of
persons and property; but, unlike its Biblical
prototype, it became, by reason of its lack of
parentage, an engine of destruction let loose in
the State, to enter the private abode of
lawabiding citizens and to take from them their
honor and reputation, which neither it nor the
State could restore. To rob a man of his wealth is
to rob him of trash, but to take from him his good
name and reputation is to rob him of that which
does not make the robber richer and leaves the
person robbed poor indeed.
The appellants tried to make it appear that the
money which they gave for the establishment of
"El Renacimiento" was a pure donation. They
claim that it was a donation to the Filipino
people. They do not state, however, or attempt to
show what particular persons were to manage,
control, and direct the enterprise for which the
donation was made. A donation must be made to
definite persons or associations. A donation to an
indefinite person or association is an anomaly in
law, and we do not believe, in view of all of the
facts, that it was in fact made. A donation must
be made to some definite person or association
and the donee must be some ascertained or
ascertainable person or association.
A donation may be made for the benefit of the
public, but it must be made, in the very nature of
things, to some definite person or association. A
donation made to no person or association could
not be regarded as a donation in law. It could not
be more than an abandonment of property. Of
course where a donation is in fact made, without
reservation to a particular person or association,
the donor is no longer the owner of the thing
donated nor responsible, in any way, for its use,
provided that the object, for which the donation
was made, was legal. A person does not become
an owner or part owner of a church, for example,
to the construction of which he has made a
donation; neither is he responsible for the use to
which said edifice may be applied. No one
disputes the fact that donations may be made for
the public use, but they must be made to definite
persons or associations, to be administered in
accordance with the purpose of the gift.
We can not believe, in the light of the whole
record, that the defendants and appellants, at the
time they presented the defense that they were
donors simply and not owners, had a reasonable
hope that their declarations as to said donation,
given in the manner alleged, would be believed by
the court.
After a careful examination of the evidence
brought to this court and taking into
consideration the failure of the other defendants
to testify, we are of the opinion that a
preponderance of such evidence shows that the
defendants, Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma,
Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco,
Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, were
the coowners of the newspaper known as "El
Renacimiento," at the time of the publication of
the said alleged libel.
With reference to the sixth assignment of error
above noted, to wit: That the lower court
committed an error in not admitting in evidence
the judgment of acquittal of the defendant, Lope
K. Santos, rendered in the criminal cause, we are
of the opinion that the refusal to admit said
evidence in the civil cause was not an error. The
fact that the evidence in the criminal cause was
insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos was
guilty of the crime charged, in no way barred the
right of the person injured by said alleged libel to
maintain the present civil action against him.
(Ocampo vs. Jenkins, 14 Phil. Rep., 681.) The
criminal action had to be sustained by evidence
showing the culpability of the defendant beyond
a reasonable doubt, while in the civil action it is
sufficient to show that the defendants injured
the plaintiff by the alleged libelous publication,
by a preponderance of the evidence only.
(Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 426; Cooley on
Torts, 208; Reilley vs. Norton, 65 Iowa, 306;
Sloanevs. Gilbert, 23 Am. Dec., 708.)
In the case of Steel vs. Cazeaux (8 Martin, La.,
318; 13 American Decisions, 288), the supreme
court of Louisiana said:
A judgment of conviction in a criminal
prosecution can not be given in
evidence in a civil action.
In the case of Betts et al. vs. New Hartford (25
Conn., 180) Mr. Justice Ellsworth said (in a case
where a judgment in a criminal case was offered
in evidence):
A conviction in a criminal case is not
evidence of facts upon which the
judgment was rendered, when those
facts come up in a civil case, for this
evidence would not be material; and so
the law is perfectly well settled. (1
Greenleaf on Evidence, secs. 536, 524; 1
Phillips on Evidence, 231;
Hutchinson vs. Bank of Wheeling, 41 Pa.
St., 42; Beausoleil vs. Brown, 12 La.
Ann., 543; McDonald vs. Stark, 176 Ill.,
456, 468.)
While we believe that the lower court committed
no error in refusing to admit the sentence
acquitting Lope K. Santos in the criminal case, we
are of the opinion, after a careful examination of
the record brought to this court, that it is
insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos was
responsible, in any way, for the publication of the
alleged libel, and without discussing the question
whether or not the so-called Tagalog edition of
"El Renacimiento" and "El Renacimiento"
constituted one and the same newspaper, we
find that the evidence is insufficient to show that
Lope K. Santos is responsible in damages, in any
way, for the publication of the said alleged libel.
The appellants discussed the eight and ninth
assignments of error together, and claim that the
lower court committed an error in rendering a
judgment jointly and severally against the
defendants and in allowing an execution against
the individual property of said owners, and cite
provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes in
support of their contention. The difficulty in the
contention of the appellants is that they fail to
recognize that the basis of the present action is a
tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine
that each joint tort feasor is not only individually
liable for the tort in which he participates, but is
also jointly liable with his tort feasors. The
defendants might have been sued separately for
the commission of the tort. They might have
been sued jointly and severally, as they were.
(Nicoll vs. Glennie, 1 M. & S. (English Common
Law Reports), 558.) If several persons jointly
commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has
his election to sue all or some of the parties
jointly, or one of them separately, because the
tort is in its nature a separate act of each
individual. (1 Chiddey, Common Law Pleadings,
86.) It is not necessary that the cooperation
should be a direct, corporeal act, for, to give an
example, in a case of assault and battery
committed by various persons, under the
common law all are principals. So also is the
person who counsels, aids or assists in any way
he commission of a wrong. Under the common
law, he who aided or assisted or counseled, in
any way, the commission of a crime, was as much
a principal as he who inflicted or committed the
actual tort. (Page vs. Freeman, 19 Mo., 421.)
It may be stated as a general rule, that the joint
tort feasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the
commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it
is done, if done for their benefit. They are each
liable as principals, to the same extent and in the
same manner as if they had performed the
wrongful act themselves. (Cooley on Torts, 133;
Moir vs. Hopkins, 16 Ill., 313 (63 Am. Dec., 312
and note); Berry vs. Fletch, 1st Dill., 67;
Smithwick vs. Ward, 7 Jones L. 64; Smith vs.Felt,
50 Barb. (N. Y.), 612; Shepard vs. McQuilkin, 2 W.
Va., 90; Lewis vs. Johns, 34 Cal., 269.)
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable
for the tort which they commit. The person
injured may sue all of them, or any number less
than all. Each is liable for the whole damage
caused by all, and all together are jointly liable
for the whole damage. It is no defense for one
sued alone, that the others who participated in
the wrongful act are not joined with him as
defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his
participation in the tort was insignificant as
compared with that of the others.
(Forebrother vs. Ansley, 1 Campbell (English
Reports), 343; Pitcher vs. Bailey, 8 East, 171;
Booth vs. Hodgson, 6 Term Reports, 405;
Vose vs. Grant, 15 Mass., 505; Acheson vs. Miller,
18 Ohio, 1; Wallace vs. Miller, 15 La. Ann., 449;
Murphy vs. Wilson, 44 Mo., 313; Bishopvs. Ealey,
9 Johnson (N. Y.), 294.)
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The
damages can not be apportioned among them,
except among themselves. They can no insist
upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each
paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and
severally liable for the full amount.
(Pardrige vs. Brady, 7 Ill. App., 639;
Carney vs. Read, 11 Ind., 417; Lee vs. Black, 27
Ark., 337; Bevins vs. McElroy, 52 Am. Dec., 258.)
A payment in full of the damage done, by one of
the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies any
claim which might exist against the others. There
can be but one satisfaction. The release of one of
the joint tort feasors by agreement, generally
operates to discharge all. (Wright vs. Lathrop, 2
Ohio, 33; Livingston vs. Bishop, 1 Johnson (N.Y.),
290; Brown vs. Marsh, 7 Vt., 327;
Ayer vs. Ashmead, 31 Conn., 447;
Eastman vs. Grant, 34 Vt., 387;
Turner vs. Hitchcock, 20 Iowa, 310;
Ellis vs. Esson, 50 Wis., 149.)
Of course the courts during the trial may find
that some of the alleged joint tort feasors are
liable and that others are not liable. The courts
may release some for lack of evidence while
condemning others of the alleged tort feasors.
And this is true even though they are charged
jointly and severally. (Lansing vs. Montgomery, 2
Johnson (N. Y.), 382; Drake vs. Barrymore, 14
Johnson, 166; Owens vs. Derby, 3 Ill., 126.)
This same principle is recognized by Act 277 of
the Philippine Commission. Section 6 provides
that:
Every author, editor or proprietor . . . is
chargeable with the publication of any
words in any part . . . or number of each
newspaper, as fully as if he were the
author of the same.
In our opinion the lower court committed no
error in rendering a joint and several judgment
against the defendants and allowing an
execution against their individual property. The
provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes
cited by the defendants and appellants have no
application whatever to the question presented
in the present case.
The tenth assignment of error above noted
relates solely to the amount of damages suffered
on account of wounded feelings, mental suffering
and injury to the good name and reputation of
Mr. Worcester, by reason of the alleged libelous
publication. The lower court found that the
damages thus suffered by Mr. Worcester
amounted to P35,000. This assignment of error
presents a most difficult question. The amount of
damages resulting from a libelous publication to
a man's good name and reputation is difficult of
ascertainment. It is nor difficult to realize that
the damage thus done is great and almost
immeasurable. The specific amount the damages
to be awarded must depend upon the facts in
each case and the sound discretion of the court.
No fixed or precise rules can be laid down
governing the amount of damages in cases of
libel. It is difficult to include all of the facts and
conditions which enter into the measure of such
damages. A man's good name and reputation are
worth more to him than all the wealth which he
can accumulate during a lifetime of industrious
labor. To have them destroyed may be eminently
of more damage to him personally than the
destruction of his physical wealth. The loss is
immeasurable. No amount of money can
compensate him for his loss. Notwithstanding
the great loss which he, from his standpoint,
sustains, the courts must have some tangible
basis upon which to estimate such damages.
In discussing the elements of damages in a case
of libel, the Honorable James C. Jenkins, who
tried the present case in the court below,
correctly said that, "The enjoyment of a private
reputation is as much a constitutional right as the
possession of life, liberty or property. It is one of
those rights necessary to human society, that
underlie the whole scheme of human civilization.
The respect and esteem of his fellows are among
the highest rewards of a wellspent life
vouchsafed to man in this existence. The hope of
it is the inspiration of youth and its possession is
a solace in later years. A man of affairs, a
business man, who has been seen known by his
fellowmen in the active pursuits of life for many
years, and who has developed a great character
and an unblemished reputation, has secured a
possession more useful and more valuable than
lands or houses or silver or gold. The law
recognizes the value of such a reputation and
constantly strives to give redress for its injury. It
imposes upon him who attacks it by slanderous
words or libelous publications, the liability to
make full compensation for the damage to the
reputation, for the shame, obloquy and for the
injury to the feelings of its owner, which are
caused by the publication of the slander or libel.
The law goes further. If the words are spoken or
the publication is made with the intent to injure
the victim or with criminal indifference to civil
obligation, it imposes such damages as the jury,
in view of all the circumstances of the particular
case, adjudge that the wrongdoer ought to pay as
an example to the public and to deter others
from doing likewise, and for punishment for the
infliction of the injury."
As was said above, the damages suffered by Mr.
Worcester to his good name and reputation are
most difficult of ascertainment. The attorney for
the appellants, in his brief, lends the court but
little assistance in reaching a conclusion upon
this question. The appellants leaves the whole
question to the discretion of the court, without
any argument whatever.
After a careful examination, we are of the
opinion that part of the judgment of the lower
court relating to the damages suffered by the
Honorable Dean C. Worcester, should be
modified, and that a judgment should be
rendered in favor of Mr. Dean C. Worcester and
against the defendants, jointly and severally, for
the sum of P15,000, with interest at 6 per cent
from the 23d of January, 1909.
With reference to the eleventh assignment of
error above noted, to wit: That the court erred in
imposing punitive damages upon the defendants,
we are of the opinion, after a careful examination
of the evidence, and in view of all of the facts and
circumstances and the malice connected with the
publication of said editorial and the subsequent
publications with relation to said editorial, that
the lower court, by virtue of the provisions of Act
No. 277 of the Philippine Commission, was
justified in imposing punitive damages upon the
defendants.
Section 11 of Act No. 277 allows the court, in an
action for libel, to render a judgment for punitive
damages, in an amount which the court may
think will be a just punishment to the libeler and
an example to others.
Exemplary damages in civil actions for libel may
always be recovered if the defendant or
defendants are actuated by malice. In the present
case there was not the slightest effort on the part
of the defendants to show the existence of
probable cause or foundation whatever for the
facts contained in said editorial. Malice, hatred,
and ill will against the plaintiff are seen
throughout the record. The said editorial not
only attempted to paint the plaintiff as a villain,
but upon every occasion, the defendants
resorted to ridicule of the severest kind.
Here again we find difficulty in arriving at a
conclusion relating to the damages which should
be imposed upon the defendants for the purpose
of punishment. Upon this question the courts
must be governed in each case by the evidence,
the circumstances and their sound discretion.
Taking into consideration the fact that some of
the defendants have been prosecuted criminally
and have been sentenced, and considering that
fact as a part of the punitive damages, we have
arrived at the conclusion that the judgment of
the lower court should be modified, and that a
judgment should be rendered against the
defendants, jointly and severally, and in favor of
the plaintiff, the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, in
the sum of P10,000, as punitive damages, with
interest at 6 per cent from the 23d day of
January, 1909.
Therefore, after a full consideration of all the
facts contained in the record and the errors
assigned by the appellants in this court, we are of
the opinion that the judgment of the lower court
should be modified and that a judgment should
be rendered in favor of Dean C. Worcester and
against the defendants Martin Ocampo, Teodoro
M. Kalaw, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel
Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and
Gregorio M. Cansipit, jointly and severally, for
the sum of P25,000 with interest at 6 per cent
from the 23d of January, 1909, with costs, and
that a judgment should be entered absolving
Lope K. Santos from any liability under said
complaint. So ordered.
Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ARELLANO, C.J. and MAPA, J., concurring:
We concur, except with reference to the liability
imposed upon Galo Lichauco based on the
testimony of one of the defendants, Arcadio
Arellano, and an article published in the
newspaper itself, "El Renacimiento." In a case
against Sedano, Arcadio Arellano said that Galo
Lichauco was one of the owners of that
newspaper and in the criminal case prosecuted
for libel against some of the defendants herein
that he was one of the founders. Also, it was
asserted in an article in "El Renacimiento" that
Galo Lichauco was one of its stockholders.
If these things could be taken as evidence of his
right as a partner, coowner or participant in a
business or company, it would follow that they
could be evidence of an obligation or liability
emanating from such business, but it quite
impossible that they be regarded as evidence of
such nature, that is, in his favor. Therefore, they
can not be held to be sufficient proof against him
to conclude that he has contracted an obligation
or established a basis for liability, such as that of
answering with all his property for the
consequences of the act of another. Such person
could not on this evidence claim a share of the
earnings or profits of the Renacimiento
company, because it is inconsistent with all the
provisions and prohibitions of law bearing upon
the validity and force of such pretended right of
participation. He could not be held to be in the
situation of the other so-called founders of "El
Renacimiento," under article 117 of the Code of
Commerce, according to which:
Articles of association, executed with
the essential requisites of law, shall be
valid and binding between the parties
thereto, no matter what form,
conditions, and combinations, legal and
honest, are embraced therein, provided
they are not expressly prohibited by
this code.
There operates in favor of these other so-called
founders of "El Renacimiento" the testimony of
the real founder and manager thereof, Martin
Ocampo, who at the trial admitted that they had
subscribed and paid sums of money to aid him in
the business he had projected.
But with reference to Galo Lichauco, Martin
Ocampo explicitly stated that he offered to
contribute, but did not carry out his offer and in
fact paid nothing. It is incomprehensible how
one could claim the right or title to share the
earnings or profits of a company when he had
put no capital into it, neither is it comprehensible
how one could share in the losses thereof, and
still less incur liability for damages on account of
some act of the said company — an unrestricted
liability to the extent of all his property, as
though he were a regular general partner when
he was not such.
If there could be one law for and another against,
or, in other words, one for rights and another for
obligations, emanating from the same source, as
in a contract of partnership, then it might well
happen that one could be a partner for assuming
obligations, losses and liabilities, and not a
partner in the sense of exercising rights and of
participation in the earnings and profits of
partnership. But the contrary is a legal axiom,
and it is impossible to set aside the principle of
reciprocity that pervades and regulates in equal
manner rights and obligations. Hence it is
impossible to reach as a conclusion derived from
the evidence set forth that Galo Lichauco is a
partner in the Renacimiento company and
coowner of the newspaper of that name.
Judgment so rendered would not clothe Galo
Lichauco, after he had been sentenced to pay
damages for acts of "El Renacimiento," with any
title, right, or reason for calling himself a
coowner of said business and entitle him to claim
a share of any earnings and profits which might
be realized in the meantime or in the future. He
would not be entitled to register in the
mercantile registry on such ground, nor would or
could any court oblige the Renacimiento
company or Martin Ocampo to regard Galo
Lichauco as a partner or coowner.
From the testimony of a single witness,
corroborated by a newspaper article, wherein it
is asserted that a certain person is a partner or
coowner of the Y. M. C. A., the
witness believing for a certain amount and the
newspaper merely saying that he was a
stockholder in that association, offset by the
assertion of its president that he was not such,
no court is capable of rendering judgment
declaring that such person is actually a partner
or coowner of the Y. M. C. A. and must pay
damages for a culpable action of said association
and must in exchange be recognized and
admitted as a partner and coowner of the Y. M. C.
A. and a sharer in the earnings, profits and
advantages thereof.
Neither could a person be recognized and held
out to be the owner of one or more parcels of
real estate on the testimony of one witness, the
evidence of a newspaper article and the strength
of a judgment based upon such testimony and
newspaper article, in order that he might be
required to pay the land tax and in exchange
collect the rents from such property; it is no
argument, either pro or con, to say that such
person has neither impugned that testimony nor
corrected or denied the article published. Should
a newspaper publish a list of millionaires and
include therein one who is not such, or if a
millionaire should figure in a list of paupers,
there is no law imposing upon the pauper or the
millionaire the duty of denying or correcting the
inaccurate report. Neither is there any law that
creates the presumption that failure to make
such correction implies the truth of what is so
asserted. It is not a rational and acceptable rule
to infer consequences from the failure to correct
(whether proper or not) newspaper statements,
and still less when in a judicial action such
assertion is not substantiated, as has resulted in
the case at bar.
Although Arcadio Arellano may say during a
trial, as he has said, once, twice or a hundred
times that Galo Lichauco is the proprietor or
founder of "El Renacimiento;" although "El
Renacimiento" may have asserted extrajudicially,
in an article in reply to another newspaper, that
Galo Lichauco is one of the stockholders of the
business it conducts; yet when its editor on trial
testifies that such report had been secured from
mere hearsay among his associates in the
newspaper office and not from the organizer,
manager or administrator of the newspaper,
Martin Ocampo, it can not in justice be concluded
that Galo Lichauco is a partner in the business or
coowner of the newspaper "El Renacimiento."
TORRES, J., dissenting:
I concur in the foregoing decision of the majority
in regard to the defendants Martin Ocampo and
Teodoro Kalaw, but dissent from it with
reference to the others — Manuel Palma, Arcadio
Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe
Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit — for they had
neither direct nor indirect participation in the
act that gave rise to the present suit for damages,
nor were they owners or proprietors of the
newspaper "El Renacimiento," its press or other
equipment. Consequently they are not liable for
the damages claimed and should be absolved
from the complaint.
With the exception of Galo Lichauco, who did not
pay up the sum he subscribed toward the
founding of said newspaper, it is undeniable and
clearly proven that the other five — Palma,
Arellano, Jose, Barretto, and Cansipit —
contributed different sums for the object stated.
Martin Ocampo was placed at the head of the
business and from the funds he took charge of
purchased the press and other necessary
equipment for printing and publishing said
newspaper.
It is not conclusively shown in the record that a
company was formed to found and publish "El
Renacimiento," and divide the earnings and
profits among the partners, through a contract
entered into among them, nor that there was
established a community of ownership over the
said newspaper, its press and the other
equipment indispensable for its publication.
From the fact that the said five individuals
contributed, each turning over to Ocampo a
certain sum for the purpose of founding, editing
and issuing the said newspaper, it is improper to
deduce that the contributors formed a company
of either a civil or commercial nature, just as it is
inadmissible to presume the existence of a
company unless it appears that the formation
thereof was agreed upon among the partners.
Aside from the fact of the contribution, it is not
shown in the record that said six contributors
had anything to do with acquiring the press, type
and other equipment indispensable for getting
out the newspaper; that any contract, either
verbal or written, as to how and in what manner
the publication with its receipts and
expenditures should be managed, and in what
manner profits should be divided or deficit made
up in case of loss; or that at any time meetings
were held for discussing the business and
dividing the profits, as though they were really in
partnership. Up to the time when said
newspaper ceased publication, its sole manager,
Martin Ocampo, acted freely, just as if he were
the absolute owner of the publication, nor does it
appear that he ever rendered any report of his
acts to those who contributed their money to the
founding of "El Renacimiento."
The six contributors mentioned believed in all
good faith that it was necessary, expedient and
useful for the rights and interests of the
inhabitants of the Philippines to found a
newspaper and that out of love and duty to their
country they ought to contribute from their
private fortunes toward the expenses
indispensable thereto, and in so doing
unconditionally and with liberality they made a
genuine gift, each one freely turning over to
Martin Ocampo the amount he could spare.
The case comes under article 618 of the Civil
Code, which says:
A gift is an act of liberality by which a
person disposes gratuitously of a thing
in favor of another, who accepts it.
It is true that Martin Ocampo is not the real
donee, but considering that such acts of liberality
were executed by said six contributors for the
common good of the Filipino people and that it
was Martin Ocampo who voluntarily undertook
to realize and carry out the perfectly legitimate
purpose of the contributors, his acceptance of
the sums donated, not having been actually
repudiated or disapproved by the community,
must be understood to have been made in their
name, and thus is fulfilled the requirement of
acceptance established by the article of the code
cited.
According to this theory the donors, after they
had freely and spontaneously parted with the
sums donated, could not retain any right over
the objects to which these sums were applied,
because the donor by his gift voluntarily conveys
to the donee his rights of ownership over the
thing donated. Therefore the said donors can not
in strict logic be regarded as the proprietors of
the newspaper "El Renacimiento," its press and
equipment, because after having turned over the
money to Martin Ocampo, who accepted the
commission of carrying out the wishes and
purposes of the contributors, they retained no
right over the newspaper or the press, fixtures
and equipment thereof.
Persons who contribute to the erection of a
church or a hospital, in spite of the fact that they
freely and liberally give money to parties
charged with collecting it, do not, therefore
retain any right, nor can they be called coowners
or coproprietors of the church or hospital
constructed, and the receipt or acknowledgment
of the sums paid to the parties at the head of the
enterprise fulfills the requirement of the law,
perfects and brings within the legal pale the
donation voluntarily made from the motives of
piety or benevolence.
Such is the case of the said six contributors, who
were animated by love of this country in which
they were born. Five gave different sums to
Martin Ocampo, and a sixth promised to give
something, for the founding of "El
Renacimiento," believing in good faith that by
their acts they, were rendering a meritorious
service to their country, but, notwithstanding the
internal moral satisfaction they got, as in the
case of the benefactors of a church or hospital,
they can never be called coowners or
coproprietors of said newspaper.
If, after the establishment of the newspaper, its
staff, editor or manager made bad use of the
publication and issued a libelous article, the
donors who contributed to the funds, necessary
for the founding of "El Renacimiento," from the
very fact that they are not proprietors of the
newspaper or of the press from which it is
issued, are not liable for the publication of said
article, because they did not participate therein
either directly or indirectly, just as in the
criminal case they were not indicted even on the
ground that they are members of the company
that is alleged to have been formed for the
establishment of the said newspaper, "El
Renacimiento." But this is a theory which, as we
have already said, we do not admit, because
proof is entirely lacking of the existence of that
company wherefrom it is attempted to derive the
character of owner attributed to the said donees
and the consequent obligation to indemnify the
plaintiff for the damages claimed.
After Martin Ocampo had accepted the various
amounts proffered by the said Palma, Jose,
Arellano, Barretto, and Cansipit, these letter
ceased to be the owners of and surrendered all
right to the money donated and to the objects
that were acquired therewith for the purpose of
establishing the newspaper "El Renacimiento,"
from which business said five individuals, as also
Galo Lichauco, are entirely separated. Therefore
they can not incur, jointly and severally with the
director and manager of "El Renacimiento," the
liability to indemnify the plaintiff for the
publication therein of an article constituting
libel.
Section 11 of Act No. 277, applicable to the case,
prescribes:
In addition to the criminal action
hereby prescribed, a right of civil action
is also hereby given to any person
libeled as hereinbefore set forth against
the person libeling him for damages
sustained by such libel, and the person
so libeled shall be entitled to recover in
such civil action not only the actual
pecuniary damages sustained by him
but also damages for injury to his
feelings and reputation, and in addition
to such punitive damages as the court
may think will be a just punishment to
the libeler and an example to others.
Suit may be brought in any Court of
First Instance having jurisdiction of the
parties. The presumptions, rules of
evidence, and special defenses herein
provided for criminal prosecutions
shall be equally applicable in civil
actions under this section.
It is certain that Lichauco, who merely promised
a certain sum, and each of the other five
mentioned, who gave the amounts they could of the majority with reference to the others —
spare, did not write, edit, or publish the libelous Kalaw, Ocampo, and the rest of the defendants.
article that gave rise to this action, neither did
they take part directly or indirectly in writing
and publishing said article for the purpose of
discrediting the plaintiff, and for this reason
there does not in our opinion exist any just or
legal ground for bringing against them the
corresponding civil action for damages, since the
mere fact of having contributed from their
respective fortunes to the establishment of the
newspaper "El Renacimiento," a contribution
made in the nature of a gift, and not for the
purpose of forming a company for the sake of
dividing among themselves earnings and profits,
can not in any way have given rise to or
produced the obligation to indemnify the
plaintiff and place them on a par with those who
have injured him by means of a defamatory
article, because in making the gifts of money
which they did the said six contributing
defendants did not acquire, nor do they retain,
any right of property or of participation in the
said newspaper, its press and equipment. As it
does not appear from the record to have been
ascertained or proven that they contributed with
bad faith and criminal intention to the founding
of a newspaper expressly intended to publish
libelous articles, or in so doing that they
executed acts prohibited by law or contrary to
public morality, those who gave money nine
years ago for its establishment are certainly not
responsible for the bad use that those wrote and
managed said newspaper made of it, especially
when the penal action from which the obligation
arises was committed many years later, unless it
appears that said original donors had knowledge
of or participation in the defamatory acts
performed.

For these reasons it follows in our opinion that

justice requires that the judgment appealed from
with regard to the defendants Galo Lichauco,
Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose,
Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit should be
reversed and that they should be absolved from
the complaint entered against them for damages,
with no special finding as to six-ninths of the
costs in both instances. I concur in the decision
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20145 November 15, 1923
VICENTE VERZOSA and RUIZ, REMENTERIA Y
CIA., S. en C., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
SILVINO LIM and SIY CONG BIENG and
COMPANY, INC., defendants-appellants.
Ramon Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Gabriel La O for defendants-appellants.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of first
Instance of the City of Manila by Vicente Versoza
and Ruiz, Rementeria y Compania, as owners of
the coastwise vessel Perla, against Silvino Lim
and Siy Cong Bieng & Company, Inc., as owner
and agent, respectively, of the vessel Ban Yek, for
the purpose of recovering a sum of money
alleged to be the damages resulting to the
plaintiffs from a collision which occurred on
March 9, 1921, between the two vessels
mentioned, it being alleged that said collision
was due to the experience, carelessness and lack
of skill on the part of the captain of the Ban
Yek and to his failure to observe the rules of
navigation appropriate to the case. The
defendants answered with a general denial, and
by way of special defense asserted, among other
things, that the collision was due exclusively to
the inexperience and carelessness of the captain
and officers of the steamship Perla; for which
reason the defendants in turn, by way of
counterclaim, prayed judgment for the damages
suffered by the Ban Yek from the same collision.
At the hearing the trial judge absolved the
defendants from the complaint and likewise
absolved the plaintiffs from the defendants'
counterclaim. From this judgment both parties
appealed.
It appears in evidence that at about five o'clock
in the afternoon of March 9, 1921, the coastwise
steamer Ban Yek left the port of Naga on the
Bicol River, in the Province of Camarines Sur,
with destination to the City of Manila. At the time
of her departure from said port the sea was
approaching to high tide but the current was still
running in through the Bicol River, with the
result that the Ban Yek had the current against
her. As the ship approached the Malbong bend of
the Bicol River, in the municipality of Gainza,
another vessel, the Perla, was sighted coming up
the river on the way to Naga. While the boats
were yet more than a kilometer apart, the Ban
Yek gave two blasts with her whistle, thus
indicating an intention to pass on the left, or to
her own port side. In reply to this signal
the Perla gave a single blast, thereby indicating
that she disagreed with the signal given by
the Ban Yek and would maintain her position on
the right, that is, would keep to the starboard.
The Ban Yekmade no reply to this signal. As
the Perla was navigating with the current, then
running in from the sea, this vessel, under
paragraph 163 of Customs Marine Circular No.
53, had the right of way over the Ban Yek, and
the officers of the Perla interpreted the action of
the Ban Yek in not replying to the Perla's signal
as an indication of acquiescene of the officers of
the Ban Yek in the determination of the Perla to
keep to the starboard.
The river at this point is about two hundred and
fifty feet wide, and the courses thus being
respectively pursued by the two vessels
necessarily tended to bring them into a head-on
collision. When the danger of such an occurrence
became imminent, Captain Garrido of the Perla,
seeing that he was shut off by the Ban Yek from
passing to the right, put his vessel to port,
intending to avoid collision or minimize its
impact by getting farther out into the stream. An
additional reason for this maneuver, as stated by
Captain Carrido, is that the captain of the Ban
Yek waived his hand to Garrido, indicating that
the latter should turn his vessel towards the
middle of the stream. At about the same time
that the Perla was thus deflected from her course
the engine on the Ban Yek was reversed and
three blasts were given by this vessel to indicate
that she was backing.
Now, it appears that when the engine is
reversed, a vessel swings to the right or left in
accordance with the direction in which the
blades of the propeller are set; and as the Ban
Yek began to back, her bow was thrown out into
the stream, a movement which was assisted by
the current of the river. By this means the Ban
Yek was brought to occupy an oblique position
across the stream at the moment the Perla was
passing; and the bow of the Ban Yek crashed into
the starboard bumpers of the Perla, carrying
away external parts of the ship and inflicting
material damage on the hull. To effect the repairs
thus made necessary to the Perla cost her
owners the sum of P17,827, including expenses
of survey.
The first legal point presented in the case has
reference to the sufficiency of the protest. In this
connection it appears that within twenty-four
hours after the arrival of the Perla at the port of
Naga, Captain Garrido appeared before Vicente
Rodi, the auxiliary justice of the peace of the
municipality of Naga, and made before that
officer the sworn protest which is in evidence as
Exhibit B. This protest is sufficient in our opinion
to answer all the requirements of article 835 of
the Code of Commerce. A regular justice of the
peace would without doubt be competent to take
a marine protest, and the same authority must
be conceded to the auxiliary justice in the
absence of any showing in the record to the
effect that the justice of the peace himself was
acting at the time in the municipality (Adm.
Code, sec. 211; sec. 334, Code of Civ. Proc.,
subsecs. 14, 15). We note that in his certificate to
this protest Vicente Rodi added to the
appellation of auxiliary justice of the peace,
following his name, the additional designation
"notary public ex-officio." However, under
subsection (c) of section 242 of the
Administrative Code, it is plain that an auxiliary
justice of the peace is not an ex-officio notary
public. It results that the taking of this protest
must be ascribed to the officer in his character as
auxiliary justice of the peace and not in the
character of notary public ex-officio. It is hardly
necessary to add that this court takes judicial
notice of the fact that Naga is not a port of entry
and that no customs official of rank is there
stationed who could have taken cognizance of
this protest.
Upon the point of responsibility for the collision
we have no hesitancy in finding that the fault is
to be attributed exclusively to the negligence and
inattention of the captain and pilot in charge of
the Ban Yek. The Perlaundoubtedly had the right
of way, since this vessel was navigating with the
current, and the officers in charge of
the Perla were correct in assuming, from the
failure of the Ban Yek to respond to the single
blast of the Perla, that the officers in charge of
the Ban Yek recognized that the Perla had a right
of way and acquiesced in her resolution to keep
to the right. The excuse urged for the Ban Yek is
that this vessel is somewhat larger than
thePerla and that it was desirable for the Ban
Yek to keep on the side of the long arc of the
curve of the river; and in this connection it is
suggested that the river is deeper on the outer
edge of the bend than on the inner edge. It is also
stated that on a certain previous occasion
the Ban Yek on coming out from this port had
gotten stuck in the mud in this bend by keeping
too far to the right. Moreover, it is said to be the
practice of ships in navigating this stream to
keep nearer the outside than to the inside of the
bend. These suggestions are by no means
convincing. It appears in evidence that the river
bottom here is composed of mud and silt, and as
the tide at the time of this incident was nearly at
its flood, there was ample depth of water to have
accommodated the Ban Yekif she had kept to that
part of the stream which it was proper for her to
occupy. We may further observe that the
disparity in the size of the vessels was not such
as to dominate the situation and deprive
the Perla of the right of way under the conditions
stated. Blame for the collision must therefore, as
already stated, be attributed to theBan Yek.
On the other hand no fault can be attributed to
the officers navigating the Perla either in
maintaining the course which had been
determined upon for that vessel in conformity
with the marine regulations applicable to the
case or in deflecting the vessel towards the
middle of the stream after the danger of collision
became imminent. The trial judge suggests in his
opinion that when Captain Garrido saw that
the Ban Yek was holding her course to the left, he
(Garrido) should have changed the course of
the Perla to port more promptly. The validity of
this criticism cannot be admitted. Among rules
applicable to navigation none is better founded
on reason and experience than that which
requires the navigating officers of any vessel to
assume that an approaching vessel will observe
the regulations prescribed for navigation (G.
Urrutia & Co. vs. Baco River Plantation Co., 26
Phil., 632, 637). Any other rule would introduce
guess work into the control of ships and produce
uncertainty in the operation of the regulations.
Our conclusion is that his Honor, the trial judge,
was in error in not awarding damages to
the Perla; but no error was committed in
absolving the plaintiffs from the defendants'
cross-complaint.
The sum of P17,827 in our opinion represents
the limit of the plaintiffs' right of recovery. In the
original complaint recovery is sought for an
additional amount of P18,000, most of which
consists of damages supposed to have been
incurred from the inability of the Perla to
maintain her regular schedule while laid up in
the dock undergoing repairs. The damages thus
claimed, in addition to being somewhat of a
speculative nature, are in our opinion not
sufficiently proved to warrant the court in
allowing the same. lawphil.net
Having determined the amount which the
plaintiffs are entitled to recover, it becomes
necessary to consider the person, or persons,
who must respond for these damages. Upon this
point we note that Silvino Lim is impleaded as
owner; and Siy Cong Bieng & Co. is impleaded as
the shipping agent (casa naviera), or person in
responsible control of the Ban Yek at the time of
the accident. We note further that in article 826
of the Code of Commerce it is declared that
the owner of any vessel shall be liable for the
indemnity due to any other vessel injured by the
fault, negligence, or lack of skill of the captain of
the first. We say "owner," which is the word used
in the current translation of this article in the
Spanish Code of Commerce. It is to be observed,
however, that the Spanish text itself uses the
word naviero; and there is some ambiguity in the
use of said word in this article, owing to the fact
that naviero in Spanish has several meanings.
The author of the article which appears under
the word naviero in the Enciclopedia Juridica
Española tells us that in Spanish it may mean
either owner, outfitter, charterer, or agent,
though he says that the fundamental and correct
meaning of the word is that of "owner."
That naviero, as used in the Spanish text of
article 826, means owner is further to be
inferred from article 837, which limits the civil
liability expressed in article 826 to the value of
the vessel with all her appurtenances and all the
freight earned during the voyage. There would
have been no propriety in limiting liability to the
value of the vessel unless the owner were
understood to be the person liable. It is therefore
clear that by special provision of the Code of
Commerce the owner is made responsible for the
damage caused by an accident of the kind under
consideration in this case; and in more than one
case this court has held the owner liable, when
sued alone (Philippine Shipping Co. vs. Garcia
Vergara, 6 Phil., 281; G. Urrutia & Co. vs. Baco
River Plantation Co., 26 Phil., 632).
But while it is thus demonstrated that Silvino
Lim is liable for these damages in the character
of owner, it does not necessarily follows that Siy
Cong Bieng & Co., as character or agent (casa
naviera), is exempt from liability; and we are of
the opinion that both the owner and agent can be
held responsible where both are impleaded
together. In Philippine Shipping Co., vs. Garcia
Vergara (6 Phil., 281), it seems to have been
accepted as a matter of course that both owner
and agent of the offending vessel are liable for
the damage done; and this must, we think, be
true. The liability of the naviero, in the sense of
charterer or agent, if not expressed in article 826
of the Code of Commerce, is clearly deducible
from the general doctrine of jurisprudence
stated in article 1902 of the Civil Code, and it is
also recognized, but more especially as regards Under the pleadings here, the owner of the
contractual obligations, in article 586 of the Code vessel only is liable.
of Commerce. Moreover, we are of the opinion
that both the owner and agent (naviero) should
be declared to be jointly and severally liable,
since the obligation which is the subject of this
action had its origin in a tortious act and did not
arise from contract. Article 1137 of the Civil
Code, declaring that joint obligations shall be
apportionable unless otherwise provided, has no
application to obligation arising from tort.
For the reasons stated the judgment appealed
from will be affirmed in so far as it absolves the
plaintiffs from the defendants' cross-complaint
but will be reversed in so far as it absolves the
defendants from the plaintiffs' complaint; and
judgment will be entered for the plaintiffs to
recover jointly and severally from the
defendants Silvino Lim and Siy Cong Bieng & Co.
the sum of seventeen thousand eight hundred
and twenty-seven pesos (P17,827), with interest
from the date of the institution of the action,
without special pronouncement as to costs of
either instance. So ordered.
Johnson, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor and
Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
JOHNS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in all of that portion of the majority
opinion which holds that the defendant Silvino
Lim, as owner, is liable for the damages in
question, and I dissent from all of that portion of
the opinion which holds that the defendant Siy
Cong Bieng & Company, Inc., as charterer, is
liable.
Republic of the Philippines matched with performance, and to the extent 8. From the early years of his to said
SUPREME COURT that the resolutions of the respondent court presidency, Defendant Defendants
Manila dated November 29, 1989 and March 9, 1990 Ferdinand E. Marcos took , under
accord fidelity to this constitutional precept, we undue advantage of his terms and
EN BANC affirm them. powers as President. All conditions
throughout the period from grossly and
Less the fat of legalesse, the facts are few and September 21, 1972 to manifestly
uncontroverted. Before 1986, the Landoil Group February 25, 1986, he gravely disadvanta
of Companies spearheaded by then Congressman abused his powers under geous to
G.R. No. 92594 March 4, 1994 Jose de Venecia, Jr., was able to obtain foreign martial law and ruled as the
loans syndicated by various banks aggregating Dictator under the 1973 governmen
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, approximately one hundred twenty million US Marcos promulgated t;
vs. dollars ($120 M). These foreign loans were Constitution. Defendant
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FERDINAND E. guaranteed by PHILGUARANTEE, whose Board Ferdinand E. Marcos, together (b)
MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, ROSENDO D. of Directors was then composed of private with other Defendants, acting misapprop
BONDOC, CESAR E. A. VIRATA, RUBEN respondents, Rosendo D. Bondoc, Cesar E. A. singly or collectively, and/or riated,
ANCHETA, JAIME C. LAYA, PLACIDO MAPA, JR., Virata, Ruben Ancheta, Jaime C. Laya, Placido in unlawful concert with one embezzled
ROBERTO ONGPIN and CESAR C. Mapa, Jr., Roberto Ongpin, and Cezar Zalamea. another, in flagrant breach of and/or
ZALAMEA, respondents. Congressman de Venecia's group of companies public trust and of their converted
was unable to seasonably service these foreign fiduciary obligations as public to their
loans and this compelled PHILGUARANTEE to officers, with gross and own use
The Solicitor General for petitioner. scandalous abuse of right and
assume its obligation as guarantor. funds of
power and in brazen violation Governmen
Belo, Abiera & Associates for respondent Laya. of the Constitution and laws t financial
The EDSA revolution in February 1986 swept the of the Philippines embarked
Marcoses out of power. One of the first official institutions
Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for respondent upon a systematic plan to ;
acts of then President Corazon C. Aquino was the accumulate ill-gotten wealth.
Laya. creation of the Presidential Commission on Good Among others, in furtherance
Government (PCGG) under E.O No. 1. It was of said plan and acting in (c) engaged
De Castro & Cagampang Law Offices for C.C. given the difficult task of recovering the illegal unlawful concert with one in other
Zalamea. wealth of the Marcoses, their family, another and with gross abuse illegal and
subordinates and close associates. In due time, of power and authority, improper
Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent Ongpin. the Marcoses and their cronies had to face a Defendant Ferdinand E. acts and
flurry of cases, both civil and criminal, all Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos: practices
designed to recover the Republic's wealth designed to
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for allegedly plundered by them while in power. defraud
respondents C.E.A. Virata and P. Mapa, Jr. Case No. 0020 for Reconveyance, Reversion, (a) Plaintiffs
Accounting, Restitution and Damages was one of awarded and the
Mario V. Andres and Vicente F. Ruaro for R. these cases. It was filed by the petitioner contracts Filipino
Ancheta. Republic against Jose de Venecia, Jr., Ferdinand with the people, or
E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Rosendo D. Bondoc, Governmen otherwise
Cesar E. A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta, Jaime C. Laya, t to their misapprop
Placido Mapa, Jr., Roberto Ongpin and Cesar C. relatives, riated and
Zalamea. We quote its relevant allegations: business converted
PUNO, J.: associates, to their
dummies, own use,
IV nominees,
An enduring touchstone of a republican form of benefit and
government is its guarantee of equal protection agents or enrichment
of law. To the powerless, it is the promise of GENERAL AVERMENTS persons the lawful
parity of treatment with the powerful when they OF who were patrimony
are similarly situated. This promise must be DEFENDANTS' ILLEGAL ACTS beholden and
 revenues of collaboration with the other
Plaintiff Defendants, embarked upon
and the devices, schemes and
Filipino strategems to unjustly enrich
people. themselves at the expense of
Plaintiff and the Filipino
9. Among the assets acquired people, among others:
by Defendants in the manner
above-described and (a) Organized and headed the
discovered by the Land Oil Group, a big business
Commission in the exercise of conglomerate engaged in a
its official responsibilities are wide range of economic
funds and other property activity, such as petroleum
listed in Annex "A" hereof and exploration and engineering,
made an integral part of this port management and
Complaint. operation, and other services.
The Land Oil Group, more
10. Defendants, acting singly particularly, the Land Oil
or collectively, and/or in Resources Corporation, its
unlawful concert with one parent company, and its
another, for the purpose of major subsidiaries, the
preventing disclosure and Philippine-Singapore Ports
avoiding discovery of their Corporation, the Greater
unmitigated plunder of the Manila Land Corporation,
National Treasury and of their Construction Consortium, Inc.
other illegal acts, and and the Philippine Hospitals
employing the services of and Health Services, had
prominent lawyers, operations in the Philippines
accountants, financial experts, and abroad, particularly, in
businessman [sic] and other the Middle East;
persons, deposited, kept and
invested funds, securities and (b) To finance his huge
other assets in various banks, domestic and overseas
financial institutions, trust or operations, Defendant Jose de
investment companies and Venecia, acting through the
with persons here and abroad. Land Oil Group, borrowed
enormous amounts in foreign
V currency denominated loans
from several syndicates of
international banks, such as,
SPECIFIC AVERMENTS OF but not limited to, Arab
DEFENDANTS' ILLEGAL ACTS
Banking Corporation, Ahli
Bank of Kuwait, Credit Suisse,
11. Defendant Jose de Venecia, First of Boston's, Saudi Cairo
Jr. taking undue advantage of Bank, Mellon Bank and the
his relationship, influence and Bank of Montreal. In view of
connection with Defendants the magnitude of the loans
Ferdinand E. Marcos and and the project risks involved,
Imelda R. Marcos, acting by the banks required that their
himself and/or in active loans be fully covered by the
absolute and unconditional the loan and guarantee
guarantee of the Government agreements;
of the Republic of the
Philippines; (e) Notwithstanding the
aforesaid repeated violations
(c) Accordingly, Defendant Philguarantee, with the active
Jose de Venecia applied for collaboration of Defendants
Philippine Government Rosendo D. Bondoc, Cesar E.
guarantee from the Philippine A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta,
Export and Foreign Loan Jaime C. Laya, Placido Mapa,
Guarantee Corporation Jr., Roberto Ongpin and Cesar
(Philguarantee), a C. Zalamea, continued to
government-owned and provide financial assistance to
controlled corporation the companies owned and
organized to provide controlled by Defendant Jose
Philippine Government de Venecia;
guarantees, and, with the
active collaboration of (f) As a result of gross
Defendants Rosendo D. mismanagement and wanton
Bondoc, who was then the diversion of the loans, the
President of Philguarantee major operations of the Land
and the members of its Board Oil Group collapsed, Land Oil
of Directors, Defendants Cesar defaulted in the payment of its
E. A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta, maturing principal and
Jaime C. Laya, Placido Mapa, interests amortization and,
Jr., Roberto Ongpin and Cesar like the man holding the
C. Zalamea was granted full proverbial empty bag,
Philippine Government Philguarantee had to advance
guarantee coverage; on its guarantee using for this
purpose multi-millions of
(d) Defendant Jose de Venecia pesos in scarce government
misused the proceeds of the and taxpayers' money,
loans by diverting them to resulting in grave and
other uses and/or irreparable damage to
appropriation, then for his Plaintiff and to the entire
own personal benefit using Filipino people.
for this purpose a string of
local and overseas banks, such 12. The acts of Defendants,
as, but not limited to, PNB singly or collectively, and/or
(New York), PNB (Buendia in unlawful concert with one
Branch), PCTB (Makati
another, constitute gross
Branch), Swiss Banking Corp. abuse of official position and
of Hongkong, and the authority, flagrant breach of
Hongkong and Shanghai public trust and fiduciary
Banking Corp. in Hongkong, obligations, brazen abuse of
and in an effort to hide his right and power, unjust
complicity in the diversion, enrichment, violation of the
refused to submit regular Constitution and laws of the
accounting and reports, all in Republic of the Philippines, to
violation of the provisions of the grave and irreparable
damage of Plaintiff and the
Filipino people.
VI
CAUSE OF ACTION
13. First Cause of Action:
ABUSE OF RIGHT AND
POWER — (a) Defendants, in
perpetrating the unlawful acts
described above, committed
abuse of right and power
which caused untold misery,
suffering and damage to
Plaintiff. Defendants violated,
among others, Articles 19, 20
and 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines;
(b) As a result of the foregoing
acts, Defendants acquired title
to and beneficial interests in
funds and other property and
concealed such title, funds
and interests through the use
of relatives, business
associates, nominees, agents
or dummies. Defendants are,
therefore, jointly and
severally, liable to Plaintiff to
return and reconvey all such
funds and other property
unlawfully acquired; or
alternatively, to pay Plaintiff,
jointly and severally, by way
of indemnity, the damage
cause to Plaintiff equivalent to
the amount of such funds and
the value of other property
not returned or restored to
Plaintiff, plus interest thereon
from the date of unlawful
acquisition until full payment.
14. Second Cause of Action:
UNJUST ENRICHMENT —
Defendants illegally
accumulated funds and other
property in violation of the
laws of the Philippines and in
breach of their official
functions and fiduciary
obligations. Defendants,
therefore, have unjustly
enriched themselves to the
grave and irreparable damage
and prejudice of Plaintiff.
Defendants have an obligation
at law, independently of
breach of trust and abuse of
right and power and; as an
alternative, to jointly and
severally return to Plaintiff
such funds and other property
with which Defendants, in
gross and evident bad faith,
have unjustly enriched
themselves or, in default
thereof, restore to Plaintiff the
amount of such funds and the
value of the other property
including those which may
have been wasted, and/or
lost, with interest thereon
from the date of unlawful
acquisition until full payment.
15. Third Cause of Action:
BREACH OF TRUST — A
public office is a public trust.
By committing all the acts
described above, Defendants
repeatedly breached public
trust and the law, making
them jointly and severally
liable to Plaintiff. The funds
and other property acquired
by Defendants as a result of
their breach of public trust
are deemed to have been
acquired for the Benefit of
Plaintiff and are, therefore,
impressed with constructive
trust in favor of Plaintiff and
the Filipino people.
16. Fourth Cause of Action:
ACCOUNTING — The
Commission, acting pursuant
to the provisions of applicable
law, respectfully maintains
that Defendants, acting singly
or collectively, and/or in
unlawful concert with one
another, acquired funds,
assets and property during
the incumbency of Defendant
public officers, or while acting
in unlawful concert with
public officers, manifestly out
of proportion to their salaries,
to their other lawful income
and income from legitimately
acquired property.
Consequently, they are
required to show to the
satisfaction of this Honorable
Court that they have lawfully
acquired all such funds, assets
and property which are in
excess of their legal net
income, and for this
Honorable Court to decree
that the Defendants are under
obligation to account to
Plaintiff with respect to all
legal or beneficial interests in
funds, properties and assets
of whatever kind and
wherever located in excess of
their lawful earnings.
17. Fifth Cause of Action:
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES —
(a) By reason of the unlawful
acts set forth above, Plaintiff
and the Filipino people have
suffered actual damages in an
amount representing the
pecuniary loss sustained by
the latter as a result of
Defendants' unlawful acts, the
approximate value and
interest on which, from the
time of their wrongful
acquisition, plus expenses
which Plaintiff has been
compelled to incur and shall
continue to incur in its effort
to recover Defendants' ill-
gotten wealth all over the
world. Defendants are,
therefore, jointly and
severally liable to Plaintiff for
actual damages and for
expenses incurred in the
recovery of Defendants' ill-
gotten wealth.
(b) As a result of Defendants'
unlawful, malicious, immoral
and wanton acts described
above, Plaintiff and the
Filipino people had painfully
endured and suffered for
more than twenty long years,
and still continue to endure
and suffer anguish, fright,
sleepless nights, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings
and moral shock, as well as
besmirched reputation and
social humiliation before the
international community, for
which Defendants are jointly
and severally liable to
Plaintiff and the Filipino
people for moral damages.
(c) In addition, Plaintiff and
the Filipino people are
entitled to temperate
damages for their suffering
which, by their very nature,
are incapable of pecuniary
estimation, but which this
Honorable Court may
determine in the exercise of
its sound discretion.
(d) Defendants, by reason of
the above described
unlawful acts, have violated
and invaded the inalienable
right of Plaintiff and the
Filipino people to a fair and
decent way of life befitting a
Nation with rich natural and
 human resources. This basic,
and fundamental right of
Plaintiff and the Filipino
people should be recognized
and vindicated by awarding
nominal damages in an
amount to be determined by
the Honorable Court in the
exercise of its sound
discretion.
(e) By way of example and
correction for the public good
and in order to ensure that
Defendants' unlawful,
malicious, immoral and
wanton acts are not repeated,
said Defendants are jointly
and severally liable to Plaintiff
for exemplary damages.
Needless to state, the de Venecia group of
companies and PHILGUARANTEE were
sequestered by the petitioner, through the PCGG.
The filing of Case No. 0020 notwithstanding, an
investigation was conducted to determine the
veracity of the above allegations. The
investigation culminated in the signing of a Deed
of Assignment between the petitioner and de
Venecia, Jr., representing seven (7) of the
eighteen (18) companies of the Land Oil Group.
The Deed was premised on the following facts
found by the petitioner after its investigation,
and recited in its whereas clauses,viz:
. . . . As a result of such
investigation Philguarantee
has satisfied itself (i) that such
guarantee facility was
obtained in the ordinary and
regular course of business,
and that no favor was
accorded to the Landoil
officers, in the grant of such
guarantee facility; and (ii) that
the business reversals
experienced by the Landoil
Group in connection with its
various construction and
other projects in the Middle
East and elsewhere were
due, firstly, to the inability of
the Landoil Group to collect
its contract receivables from
such projects due to the
reasons specified in the sixth
"whereas" clause,
and, secondly, due to the non-
payment of its insurance
claim under the insurance
policy referred to in the
succeeding (ninth), "whereas"
clause.
Certain obligations were then assumed by de
Venecia, Jr., and his group, viz:
1.1 Upon the request of the
Assignee (referring to
petitioner), the Assignors
(being the above-named
companies making up Landoil
Group) shall immediately
cause to be transferred to the
Assignee (or its nominee/s)
all the shares of the capital
stock of Landoil (up to 45% of
the total outstanding issued
and subscribed capital stock
of Landoil) which have or may
hereafter be identified as
belonging to Marcos (whether
standing in his name or the
name [of] any of his
nominee/s). . . .
1.2 Upon the effectiveness of
this Agreement, the Assignors
shall cause to be paid to the
Assignee, through PCGG, the
amount of P13 million, which
amount represents a portion
of Landoil's recovery from an
arbitration proceeding which
Landoil had caused to be
instituted in London against
the Lloyd's Syndicate of
Insurance Underwriters;
1.3 Effective immediately, the
Assignors hereby assign,
transfer and convey to the
PCGG: (a) the entire proceeds
of the Assignors' claims in the
New York case which Landoil
has instituted against the
insurance brokers, namely,
the firm of Alexander and
Alexander, and (b) the entire
proceeds of the Assignors'
contract receivables from all
the Assignors' construction
and other projects in the
Middle East and elsewhere,
net of any amount required
for the settlement of any
compulsory statutory liens for
unpaid wages or salaries and
ordinary administrative
overhead and costs, and
attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation.
xxx xxx xxx
1.5 The Assignors, and or
their respective officers,
hereby undertake to fully
cooperate with the Philippine
Government, acting through
the PCGG or any other
governmental agency, in the
prosecution of any case which
the Philippine Government
may cause to be filed against
former President Marcos and
his cronies, either by
furnishing testimony in any
such case, or by providing
information in any
investigation undertaken in
the Philippines or elsewhere,
as may be required or
directed by the PCGG, or by
other appropriate
governmental agency from
time to time.
In reciprocity, petitioner agreed to cause the
dismissal without prejudice of the complaint in
Civil Case No. 0020 against de Venecia and his
group of co-signors.
Pursuant to this Deed of Assignment, de Venecia,
Jr., with the express conformity of PCGG, moved
to dismiss Civil Case No. 0020 against him. On
September 8, 1989, the respondent court
granted the motion to dismiss. The dismissal
became final and executory. The other private
respondents followed suit with their respective
motions to dismiss. The motions were opposed
by the petitioner. Nonetheless, on December 4,
1989, the respondent court dismissed the
Expanded Complaint against herein private
respondents. The dismissal was based on two (2)
grounds: (1) removal of an indispensable party
in the person of de Venecia, Jr., from the
Expanded Complaint; and (2) lack of cause of
action in view of the facts established and
admitted by the petitioner in the Deed of
Assignment. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and its Supplement were denied
by the respondent court on March 9, 1990.
Petitioner then filed the petition at bar, where it
is contended:
16. The respondent Court
committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the case against
defendant de Venecia's co-
defendants, on the following
grounds:
a) The
Deed of
Assignmen
t executed
on July 19,
1989 by
Landoil in
favor of the
petitioner
should not
be made to
benefit de
Venecia's
co- Ferdinand Bondoc, et al. It cites two (2) reasons: (1) 11 of the Expanded Complaint which used the
defendant; E. Marcos Bondoc, et al. were not parties to the Deed, and phrase "among others," viz:
and Imelda (2) petitioner did not receive any consideration
b) R. Marcos or benefit from Bondoc, et al., when it executed 11. Defendant Jose de Venecia,
Defendant have the said Deed. Jr., taking undue advantage of
de Venecia nothing to his relationship, influence and
is not an do with the Petitioner's submission misses the rationale of connection with Defendants
indispensa Deed of the ruling of the respondent court. The Ferdinand E. Marcos and
ble party in Assignmen respondent court ordered the dismissal of the Imelda R. Marcos, acting by
the t executed Expanded Complaint because the Deed himself and/or in active
prosecutio by Landoil contained averments which nullified petitioner's collaboration with the other
n of the in favor of cause of action. More specifically, the Deed Defendants, embarked upon
case the averred ". . . as a result of such investigation devices, schemes and
against his petitioner; Philguarantee has satisfied itself (1) that such strategems to unjustly enrich
co- and guarantee facility was obtained in the ordinary themselves at the expense of
defendants and regular course of business, and that no favor plaintiff and the Filipino
; e) The was accorded to the Landoil officers, in the grant People, among others.
parties of such guarantee facility; . . ." If after (Emphasis supplied.)
c) The manifestly investigation, petitioner has satisfied itself that
liabilities of intended to the guaranty facility was obtained in the They also cite par. 8 which used the same phrase
de exclude ordinary and regular course of business, it "among others," viz:
Venecia's defendant follows that it can no longer insist it has a cause
co- de of action against Bondoc and company. This
Venecia's admission of lack of cause of action constitutes . . . Defendant Ferdinand E.
defendants Marcos, together with other
arose not co- an admission against interest. It binds the
defendants petitioner as it is not alleged that it was given Defendants, acting singly or
only from collectively, and/or in
their from the due to fraud, mistake or inadvertence. The
benefit of adverse effects of the admission bind petitioner unlawful concert with one
alleged another, in flagrant breach of
conspiracy the Deed of and it is not material that respondents Bondoc
Assignmen and company were not parties to the Deed or public trust and of their
with fiduciary obligations as public
defendant t in that in executing the said Deed, petitioner did
question. not receive any consideration from respondents officers, with gross and
de Venecia scandalous abuse of right and
but also by Bondoc and company. An admission against
interest is a voluntary act and its effects do not power and in brazen violation
virtue of We find partial merit in the petition. of the Constitution and laws
their depend on the concurrence of any other party or
consideration of any kind. of the Philippines, embarked
individual The threshold question is whether the subject upon a systematic plan to
or Deed of Assignment justifies the dismissal of accumulate ill-gotten
collective Civil Case No. 0020 against, first, private Petitioner next contends that the respondent wealth. Among others, in
actions respondents Bondoc, Virata, Ancheta, Laya, court erred in ruling that it has only one cause of furtherance of said plan and
done in Mapa, Jr., Ongpin, Zalamea, and second, against action against the respondents Bondoc and acting in unlawful concert
unlawful the private respondents, Ferdinand and Imelda company — i.e., that as members of the Board of with one another and with
concert R. Marcos. Directors of PHILGUARANTEE, they gross abuse of power and
with one continuously extended and maintained authority, . . . (Emphasis
another; unwarranted guarantees to cover the foreign supplied.)
We shall first determine the effect of the Deed of loans of de Venecia's Land Oil Group of
Assignment on the cause of action of petitioner Companies, cronies of the Marcoses. Petitioner's
d) The against the first group of private respondents — They also refer to par. 9 which also used the
causes of submission is shared by our brethren who
Bondoc, et al. Petitioner submits that the dissented from the majority. They are of the view word "among," viz:
action execution of the Deed need not result in the
against that petitioner pleaded several causes of action.
dismissal of Expanded Complaint against They then point to the introductory part of par.
defendants
 Among the assets acquired by
Defendants in the manner
above-described and
discovered by the
Commission in the exercise of
its official responsibilities are
funds and other property
listed in Annex "A" hereof and
made an integral part of this
Complaint. (Emphasis
supplied.)
They then cite paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and
of the Expanded Complaint which allegedly
enumerated five (5) causes of action.
This stand cannot be sustained. Par 8 of the
Expanded Complaint merely laid down the
"General Averments of Defendants' Illegal Acts."
The specific allegations of the acts and omissions
committed by respondents Bondoc and company
and constitutive of petitioner's cause of action
are recited in par. 11 of the Expanded Complaint.
It is for this reason that par. 11 bears the
descriptive title "Specific Averments of
Defendants' Illegal Acts." Needless to stress, the
cause of action of the petitioner against the said
respondents is spelled out in par. 11 (a) to (f). A
perusal of par. 11 will yield no other conclusion
than that there is but one cause of action against
these respondents -- that with conspiracy, they
allegedly extended unwarranted guarantees to
enable the de Venecia group of companies, all
cronies of the Marcoses, to obtain foreign loans.
The use of the phrase "among others" in the
Expanded Complaint does not in any manner
mean that petitioner has other concealed causes
of action against these respondents. Smart
pleaders resort to said artful phrase only to gain
more leeway in presenting their evidence. By no
stretch of the imagination, however, can it be
maintained that the opaque phrase "among
others" can confer a cause of action. Such a
ruling cannot be reconciled with substantive due
process which bars roaming generalities in any
kind of complaint, whether civil or criminal. It is
for this reason that section 1 of rule 8 of the
Rules of Court requires that "every pleading shall
contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain,
concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts
on which the party pleading relies for his claim
or defense, as the case may be . . ." A
transgression of this rule is fatal. Upon the other
hand, paragraphs 13 to 17 of the Expanded
Complaint contain mere general averments and
do not allege petitioner's specific cause of action
against these respondents. They speak for
themselves and they need not undergo the
scalpel of judicial scrutiny.
Petitioner and the dissent further forward the
thesis: The averments earlier mentioned and the
deed of assignment, juxtaposed with Annex "A",
show prima facie that (a) the petitioner did not
intend to enter into any amicable settlement with
the remaining eleven (11) corporations or
regarding the frozen assets listed in said Annex
"A", and (b) the assets of the defendants in the
said eleven (11) corporations were not
necessarilyobtained through or as a consequence
of the acts or transactions described in
subparagraphs (a) to (f), paragraph 11 of the
Expanded Complaint, but probably through "the
other devices, schemes or strategems."
Again, we find the thesis untenable. We need not
agonize in search for the subjective intent of the
petitioner in concluding the Deed of Assignment
only with the seven (7) corporations of the de
Venecia group of companies. Speculations on
intent can be endless for it is the nature of
unmanifested intent to be fugitive. But the effort
is superfluous for we need not engage in this
difficult intellectual jujitsu. For, whether or not it
was petitioner's furtive intent to settle amicably
with all the corporations of de Venecia and the
respondents Bondoc and company, is not
decisive of the case at bar. What is determinative
is that in the Deed of Assignment, petitioner
itself admitted that it has no cause of action
against these respondents in Civil Case No. 0020.
The admission was made when, after conducting
its own investigation, it found out that (1) de
Venecia, Jr., was not a crony but a victim of the
Marcoses; (2) the guarantees extended by the
private respondents as members of the Board of
Director of PHILGUARANTEE were given in "the
ordinary and regular course of business and that
no favor was accorded to the Landoil officers in
the grant of such guarantee facility," and (3) that
the business reversals experienced by the of the Board of PHILGUARANTEE but as public
Landoil Group in connection with its various officials is simply irreconcilable with the
construction and other projects in the Middle allegations in the Expanded Complaint of the
East and elsewhere were due, firstly, to the petitioner,viz:
inability of the Landoil Group to collect its
contract receivables from such projects due to xxx xxx xxx
the reasons specified in the sixth "whereas"
clause, and, secondly, due to the non-payment of
its insurance claim. In light of these specific 5. Defendants ROSENDO D.
admissions, there is no need to speculate why BONDOC was the President of
the other corporations of de Venecia were not the Philippine Export and
Foreign Loan Guarantee
made parties to the Deed of Assignment.
Corporation (Philguarantee)
while Defendants CESAR E. A.
The dissent likewise posits the highly stretched VIRATA, RUBEN ANCHETA,
submission that there is a prima facie showing JAIME C. LAYA, PLACIDO
that the "assets of the defendants in the said MAPA, JR., ROBERTO ONGPIN,
eleven (11) corporations were not and CESAR C. ZALAMEA were
necessarily obtained through or as a consequence the members of its Board of
of the acts or transactions described in Directors.
subparagraphs (a) to (f), par. 11 of the Expanded
Complaint but probably through "the other
devices, schemes or strategems." This xxx xxx xxx
submission of a prima facieshowing self-
destructs for the factual basis given for its V
support is a mere guesswork — i.e.,
that probably the aforementioned assets were SPECIFIC AVERMENTS
obtained through other devices, schemes or OF DEFENDANTS' ILLEGAL
strategems. Moreover, we are dealing with a ACTS
petition for certiorari, where it may not be
proper for this Court, concededly not a trier of
fact, to rule about the existence of a prima xxx xxx xxx
facie case. To be sure, the facts of the case were
not fully developed, for petitioner's Expanded (b) To finance his huge
Complaint was dismissed on the basis of private domestic and overseas
respondents' motion to dismiss. operations, Defendant Jose de
Venecia, acting through the
Additionally, the dissent urges that the Land Oil Group, borrowed
petitioner's admissions ". . . do not by themselves enormous amounts in foreign
clear the Board of Directors or the officers of the currency denominated loans
Philguarantee from any liability which could from several syndicates of
have arisen from the grant of the guaranty international banks, such as,
facility." The given reason is that "private but not limited to, Arab
respondents were not sued as directors or Banking Corporation, Ahli
officers of a private corporation, but as Bank of Kuwait, Credit Swisse
government officials who under the Constitution First of Boston, Saudi Cairo
were obliged to serve with the highest degree of Bank, Mellon Bank and the
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency Bank of Montreal. In view of
and to remain accountable to the people." With the magnitude of the loans
due deference this view that respondents and the project risks involved,
Bondoc and company were not sued as members the banks required that their
loans be fully covered by the violation of the provisions of respondent court that the complaint against demands whatsoever, in law,
absolute and unconditional the loan and guarantee private respondents as former directors of in admiralty, or in equity,
guarantee of the Government agreements; PHILGUARANTEE should be dismissed. It is true which against
of the Republic of the that in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, said . . ., its subsidiaries and
Philippines. (e) Notwithstanding the Inc., 401 US 321, 91 S. Ct. 795, the US Supreme their respective successors
aforesaid repeated violations, Court held that "a party releases only those other and assigns, said Zenith Radio
(c) Accordingly, Defendant Philguarantee, with the active parties whom he intends to release." Corporation and the Rauland
Jose de Venecia applied for collaboration of Defendants Nonetheless, the ruling should be interpreted in Corporation and each of them
Philippine Government Rosendo D. Bondoc, Cesar E. light of the text of the release document executed ever had, now has or which
guarantee from the Philippine A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta, by Zenith, viz: each of them and their
Export and Foreign Loan Jaime C. Laya, Placido Mapa, respective subsidiaries,
Guarantee Corporation Jr., Roberto Ongpin and Cesar To All To Whom These successors and assigns,
(Philguarantee), a C. Zalamea, continued to Presents Shall Come Or May hereafter can, shall or may
government-owned and provide financial assistance to Concern, Greeting: Know ye, have for, upon or by reason of
controlled corporation the companies and controlled That Zenith Radio any matter, cause or thing
organized to provide by Defendant Jose de Venecia. Corporation and The Rauland whatsoever from the
Philippine Government (Emphasis supplied). Corporation, each a beginning of the world to the
guarantees, and, with the corporation organized and day of the date of these
active collaboration of existing under and by virtue presents, not including
There cannot be any iota of doubt that said however, claims, if any, for
Defendants Rosendo D. respondents were sued as members of the Board of the laws of the State of
Bondoc, who was then the Illinois, for and in unpaid balances on any goods
of PHILGUARANTEE and not as public officials. sold and delivered.
President of the Philguarantee Indeed, if they were able to guaranty the foreign consideration of the sum of
and the members of its Board loans of petitioner it was because they were One Dollar ($1.00) lawful
of Directors, Defendants Cesar members of the Board of PHILGUARANTEE and money of the United States of "Insert
E. A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta, for no other reason. But even America and other good and
Jaime C. Laya, Placido Mapa, granting arguendo that these respondents were valuable consideration, to "Radio Corporation of
Jr., Roberto Ongpin and Cesar sued as public officials, we cannot perceive how them in hand paid by . . . the America", or
C. Zalamea was granted full they could be charged with betrayal of their trust receipt whereof is hereby
Philippine government considering again petitioner's admission that the acknowledged, have each
guarantee coverage; remised, released and forever "General Electric Company,"
guarantee facilities were extended in the or
"ordinary and regular course of business." discharged, and by these
(d) Defendant Jose de Venecia presents does each for itself
misused the proceeds of the and its respective "Western Electric Company."
Petitioner further contends that the emerging subsidiaries, successors and
loans by diverting them to rule in the United States is that the release of one
other uses and/or assigns remise, release and "This release may not be
tortfeasor does not automatically result in the forever discharge the said . . .
appropriation, then for his release of the other tortfeasors, hence, the case changed orally."1
own personal benefit using and its subsidiaries and their
against the private respondents should not be respective successors and
for this purpose a string of dismissed even if it had consented to the It is clear from the text of this release document
local and overseas banks, such assigns of and from all, and all
dismissal of the case against de Venecia, Jr. We manner of action and actions, in Zenith that the release was made in exchange
as, but not limited to, PNB fail to see how the principles of tort can apply to for a valuable consideration, thus, in satisfaction
(New York), PNB (Buendia cause and causes of action,
the case at bench. Civil Case No. 0020 can hardly suits, debts, dues, sums of of Zenith's claim. In the case at bench, petitioner
Branch), PCTB (Makati be classified as a tort case for, as petitioner itself released de Venecia, Jr. and some of his
Branch), Swiss Banking Corp. money, accounts, reckoning,
labels its complaint, it is one for reconveyance, bonds, bills, specialties, companies not because its claim has already
of Hongkong, and the reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. been satisfied by a sufficient consideration, but
Hongkong and Shanghai covenants, contracts,
Petitioner has never taken the stance that its controversies, agreements, because of the fact that it could not establish its
Banking Corp. in Hongkong, cause of action is predicated on tort. cause of action against them. Petitioner's
and in an effect to hide his promises, variances,
trespasses, damages, investigation showed that de Venecia, Jr., was not
complicity in the diversion, a crony of former President Marcos and that he
refused to submit regular But even if we apply the principles of tort to the judgments, extents,
case at bench, we still affirm the ruling of the executions, claims and obtained the guarantees to his foreign loans in
accounting and reports, all in the regular and ordinary course of business. In
plain language, petitioner was convinced that de
Venecia, Jr., and company did not commit any
actionable wrong, including any tortious act. It
ought to follow that the complaint against the
respondents Bondoc and company for extending
the said guarantees in favor of de Venecia, Jr.,
cannot also be pursued any further. The
complaint against de Venecia, Jr., and these
respondents are inseparable, especially because
petitioner relied on the theory of conspiracy. In
any event, the rule with respect to the effect of
release of one tortfeasor on other tortfeasors is
still in a state of fluctuation even in the United
States. Thus, the 2nd Restatement of the Law on
Torts states:
Statutes. About half of the
states have now passed
statutes covering the matter.
They change the early
common law with varying
positions, but a substantial
number provide that neither a
release nor a covenant not to
sue discharges the other
tortfeasor unless its terms so
provide. This is the provision
in both the 1955 Uniform
Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act and the
Uniform Comparative Fault
Act.
Present status. States may
now be classed as follows:
(1) A release amounts to a
complete discharge, no matter
what language is used.
(2) An instrument in the form
of a release discharges all
tortfeasors; a covenant not to
sue does not.
(3) The intent is controlling,
irrespective of the language
— sometimes with a stock of each of the other companies of the
rebuttable presumption
either for or against discharge
of the other tortfeasor.
(4) A release of one tortfeasor
does not discharge the other
unless it so provides. There is
frequent change in the
alignment of the states,
usually in the direction
toward classification.
Next, petitioner argues that the respondent court
gravely abused its discretion when it held that de
Venecia, Jr., was an indispensable party; hence,
his exclusion in the Expanded Complaint ought
to result in the dismissal of the same Complaint
against the private respondents. The argument
has merit considering that the case can be
decided without impleading de Venecia, Jr. Be
that as it may, this ruling is not enough reason to
completely reverse the respondent court. As
discussed above, the petitioner dropped its cause
of action in its Expanded Complaint by signing
the said Deed of Assignment. It has precluded
itself from further pursuing its complaint not
only against de Venecia, Jr., but also against
respondents Bondoc and company who served
as former directors of PHILGUARANTEE.
We now come to the submission of petitioner
that the dismissal of the complaint against the
respondents Marcoses ordered by the
respondent court is a grave abuse of discretion.
We agree that the Marcoses should be treated
differently from de Venecia, Jr., and the
respondents Bondoc and company. For in the
aforementioned Deed of Assignment, the
petitioner only recognized the lack of culpability
of de Venecia, Jr., and by necessary inference, the
respondents Bondoc and company. In contrast,
however, the said Deed did not exculpate the
Marcoses, but on the contrary, inculpated them.
More specifically, the Deed alleged that former
President Marcos "by himself and/or through his
designated nominees or cronies, owns
approximately 45% of the outstanding capital
stock of Landoil, and through Landoil, a
proportionate portion of the outstanding capital
Landoil Group". According to the same Deed, the
former President and his cronies "coveted the
Landoil groups and caused the same to betaken
over by his (referring the Marcos) agents and
business associates . . .". It was for this reason
that in the same Deed, de Venecia, Jr., agreed to
surrender to petitioner all the Marcoses' shares
in the Landoil group of companies and to
cooperate in the prosecution of any case to be
filed against the Marcoses. In fine, the Deed of
Assignment leaves it crystal clear that petitioner
has not surrendered its cause of action against
the Marcoses as it did with respect to the
respondents Bondoc and company.
One final point. The dismissal of the Complaint
against Bondoc and company is compelled by the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. De
Venecia, Jr., and the respondents Bondoc and
company are similarly situated. Respondent
Bondoc, et al. were included in the Complaint
only because they allegedly gave unwarranted
favors to de Venecia, Jr., in guaranteeing the
latter's foreign loans. When petitioner admitted
that no undue favor was granted to de Venecia,
Jr. in the grant of such guaranty facilities and
dismissed its complaint against him, petitioner
cannot avoid its duty of dismissing its complaint
against respondents Bondoc and company. To
give a more favored treatment to de Venecia, Jr.,
when the parties are equally situated is to
indulge in invidious discrimination.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolutions dated
November 29, 1989 and March 9, 1990 of the
respondent court are affirmed with the
modification that the Expanded Complaint
against the respondents Marcoses in Civil Case
No. 0020 is reinstated and ordered to be
remanded to the respondent court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo,
Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Romero and Quiason, JJ., took
no part.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I respectfully submit that the respondent
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in promulgating the challenged
resolutions. I am, therefore, unable to concur
with the majority opinion except insofar as it
orders the reinstatement of the Expanded
Complaint in Civil Case No. 0020 against the
Marcoses.
The principal issue in this case is whether the
dismissal by the Sandiganbayan of Civil Case No.
0020 as against defendant Jose De Venecia, by
virtue of a Deed of Assignment executed
between the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) and seven corporations
belonging to the Landoil Group, should likewise
inure to the benefit of De Venecia's co-
defendants. The Sandiganbayan thought that it
should and dismissed the case against the co-
defendants. The petitioner thinks otherwise and
submits that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in so doing.
The material operative facts and procedural
antecedents generative of this controversy are
not disputed.
The Petitioner, represented by the PCGG, filed on
27 July 1987 with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion,
Accounting, Restitution and Damages against
JOSE DE VENECIA, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
IMELDA R. MARCOS, ROSENDO D. BONDOC,
CESAR E. A. VIRATA, RUBEN ANCHETA, JAIME C.
LAYA, PLACIDO MAPA, JR., ROBERTO ONGPIN
and CESAR C. ZALAMEA.1 The complaint was contracts Filipino V
docketed as Civil Case No. 0020. Upon prior with the people, or
leave of the Sandiganbayan, the Petitioner filed Governmen otherwise SPECIFIC AVERMENTS OF
on 25 January 1988 an Expanded Complaint,2 the t to their misapprop DEFENDANTS' ILLEGAL ACTS
pertinent portions of which read as follows: relatives, riated and
business converted
associates, to their 11. Defendant Jose de Venecia,
IV Jr. taking undue advantage of
dummies, own use,
nominees, benefit and his relationship, influence and
GENERAL AVERMENTS agents or enrichment connection with Defendants
OF persons the lawful Ferdinand E. Marcos and
DEFENDANTS' ILLEGAL ACTS who were patrimony Imelda R. Marcos, acting by
beholden and himself and/or in active
8. From the early years of his to said revenues of collaboration with the other
presidency, Defendant Defendants Plaintiff Defendants, embarked upon
Ferdinand E. Marcos took , under and the devices, schemes and
undue advantage of his terms and Filipino strategems to unjustly enrich
powers as President. All conditions people. themselves at the expense of
throughout the period from grossly and Plaintiff and the Filipino
September 21, 1972 to manifestly people, among others:
9. Among the assets acquired
February 25, 1986, he gravely disadvanta by Defendants in the manner
abused his powers under geous to above-described and (a)
martial law and ruled as the discovered by the Organized
Dictator under the 1973 governmen Commission in the exercise of and headed
Marcos promulgated t; its official responsibilities are the Land
Constitution. Defendant funds and other property Oil Group, a
Ferdinand E. Marcos, together (b) listed in Annex "A" hereof and big
with other Defendants, acting misapprop made an integral part of this business
singly or collectively, and/or riated, Complaint. conglomer
in unlawful concert with one embezzled ate
another, in flagrant breach of and/or engaged in
public trust and of their 10. Defendants, acting singly a wide
converted or collectively, and/or in
fiduciary obligations as public to their range of
officers, with gross and unlawful concert with one economic
own use another, for the purpose of
scandalous abuse of right and funds of activity,
power and in brazen violation preventing disclosure and such as
Governmen avoiding discovery of their
of the Constitution and laws t financial petroleum
of the Philippines embarked unmitigated plunder of the exploration
institutions National Treasury and of their
upon a systematic plan to ; and
accumulate ill-gotten wealth. other illegal acts, and engineerin
Among others, in furtherance employing the services of g, port
of said plan and acting in (c) engaged prominent lawyers, manageme
unlawful concert with one in other accountants, financial experts, nt and
another and with gross abuse illegal and businessman [sic] and other operation,
of power and authority, improper persons, deposited, kept and and
Defendant Ferdinand E. acts and invested funds, securities and other servic
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos: practices other assets in various banks, es. The
designed to financial institutions, trust or Land Oil
defraud investment companies and Group,
(a) Plaintiffs with persons here and abroad.
awarded more
and the particularl
y, the Land acting unconditio who was
Oil through nal then the
Resources the Land guarantee President
Corporatio Oil Group, of the of
n, its borrowed Governmen Philguaran
parent enormous t of the tee and the
company, amounts in Republic of members
and its foreign the of its Board
major currency Philippines of
subsidiarie denominat ; Directors,
s, the ed loans Defendants
Philippine- from (c) Cesar E. A.
Singapore several Accordingl Virata,
Ports syndicates y, Ruben
Corporatio of Defendant Ancheta,
n, the internation Jose de Jaime C.
Greater al Venecia Laya,
Manila banks, such applied for Placido
Land as, but not Philippine Mapa, Jr.,
Corporatio limited to, Governmen Roberto
n,Construct Arab t guarantee Ongpin and
ion Banking from the Cesar C.
Consortium Corporatio Philippine Zalamea
, Inc. n, Ahli Bank Export and was
and the of Kuwait, Foreign granted full
Philippine Credit Loan Philippine
Hospitals Suisse, First Guarantee Governmen
and Health of Boston's, Corporatio t guarantee
Services, Saudi Cairo n coverage;
had Bank, (Philguara
operations Mellon ntee), a (d)
in the Bank and governmen Defendant
Philippines the Bank of t-owned Jose de
and Montreal. and Venecia
abroad, In view of controlled misused
particularl the corporatio the
y, in the magnitude n proceeds of
Middle of the loans organized the loans
East; and the to provide by
project Philippine diverting
(b) To risks Governmen them to
finance his involved, t other uses
huge the banks guarantees, and/or
domestic required and, with appropriati
and that their the active on, then for
overseas loans be collaborati his own
operations, fully on of personal
Defendant covered by Defendants benefit
Jose de the Rosendo D. using for
Venecia, absolute Bondoc, this
and
purpose a repeated defaulted Constitution and laws of the
string of violations in the Republic of the Philippines, to
local and Philguaran payment of the grave and irreparable
overseas tee, with its damage of Plaintiff and the
banks, such the active maturing Filipino people.
as, but not collaborati principal
limited to, on of and VI
PNB (New Defendants interests
York), PNB Rosendo D. amortizatio
(Buendia Bondoc, n and, like CAUSE OF ACTION
Branch), Cesar E. A. the man
PCTB Virata, holding the 13. First Cause of Action:
(Makati Ruben proverbial ABUSE OF RIGHT AND
Branch), Ancheta, empty bag, POWER — (a) Defendants, in
Swiss Jaime C. Philguaran perpetrating the unlawful acts
Banking Laya, tee had to described above, committed
Corp. of Placido advance on abuse of right and power
Hongkong, Mapa, Jr., its which caused untold misery,
and the Roberto guarantee suffering and damage to
Hongkong Ongpin and using for Plaintiff. Defendants violated,
and Cesar C. this among others, Articles 19, 20
Shanghai Zalamea, purpose and 21 of the Civil Code of the
Banking continued multi- Philippines;
Corp. in to provide millions of
Hongkong, financial pesos in (b) As a
and in an assistance scarce result of
effort to to the governmen the
hide his companies t and foregoing
complicity owned and taxpayers' acts,
in the controlled money, Defendants
diversion, by resulting in acquired
refused to Defendant grave and title to and
submit Jose de irreparable beneficial
regular Venecia; damage to interests in
accounting Plaintiff funds and
and (f) As a and to the other
reports, all result of entire property
in violation gross Filipino and
of the mismanage people. concealed
provisions ment and such title,
of the loan wanton 12. The acts of Defendants, funds and
and diversion singly or collectively, and/or interests
guarantee of the in unlawful concert with one through
agreement loans, the another, constitute gross the use of
s; major abuse of official position and relatives,
operations authority, flagrant breach of business
(e) of the Land public trust and fiduciary associates,
Notwithsta Oil Group obligations, brazen abuse of nominees,
nding the collapsed, right and power, unjust agents or
aforesaid Land Oil enrichment, violation of the dummies.
 Defendants Defendants illegally 16. Fourth Cause of Action: which Plaintiff has been
are, accumulated funds and other ACCOUNTING — The compelled to incur and shall
therefore, property in violation of the Commission, acting pursuant continue to incur in its effort
jointly and laws of the Philippines and in to the provisions of applicable to recover Defendants' ill-
severally, breach of their official law, respectfully maintains gotten wealth all over the
liable to functions and fiduciary that Defendants, acting singly world. Defendants are,
Plaintiff to obligations. Defendants, or collectively, and/or in therefore, jointly and
return and therefore, have unjustly unlawful concert with one severally liable to Plaintiff for
reconvey enriched themselves to the another, acquired funds, actual damages and for
all such grave and irreparable damage assets and property during expenses incurred in the
funds and and prejudice of Plaintiff. the incumbency of Defendant recovery of Defendants' ill-
other Defendants have an obligation public officers, or while acting gotten wealth.
property at law, independently of in unlawful concert with
unlawfully breach of trust and abuse of public officers, manifestly out (b) As a
acquired; right and power and; as an of proportion to their salaries, result of
or alternative, to jointly and to their other lawful income Defendants
alternativel severally return to Plaintiff and income from legitimately ' unlawful,
y, to pay such funds and other property acquired property. malicious,
Plaintiff, with which Defendants, in Consequently, they are immoral
jointly and gross and evident bad faith, required to show to the and
severally, have unjustly enriched satisfaction of this Honorable wanton
by way of themselves or, in default Court that they have lawfully acts
indemnity, thereof, restore to Plaintiff the acquired all such funds, assets described
the damage amount of such funds and the and property which are in above,
cause to value of the other property excess of their legal net Plaintiff
Plaintiff including those which may income, and for this and the
equivalent have been wasted, and/or Honorable Court to decree Filipino
to the lost, with interest thereon that the Defendants are under people had
amount of from the date of unlawful obligation to account to painfully
such funds acquisition until full payment. Plaintiff with respect to all endured
and the legal or beneficial interests in and
value of 15. Third Cause of Action: funds, properties and assets suffered for
other BREACH OF TRUST — A of whatever kind and more than
property public office is a public trust. wherever located in excess of twenty
not By committing all the acts their lawful earnings. long years,
returned or described above, Defendants and still
restored to repeatedly breached public 17. Fifth Cause of Action: continue to
Plaintiff, trust and the law, making LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES — endure and
plus them jointly and severally (a) By reason of the unlawful suffer
interest liable to Plaintiff. The funds acts set forth above, Plaintiff anguish,
thereon and other property acquired and the Filipino people have fright,
from the by Defendants as a result of suffered actual damages in an sleepless
date of their breach of public trust amount representing the nights,
unlawful are deemed to have been pecuniary loss sustained by serious
acquisition acquired for the Benefit of the latter as a result of anxiety,
until full Plaintiff and are, therefore, Defendants' unlawful acts, the wounded
payment. impressed with constructive approximate value and feelings
trust in favor of Plaintiff and interest on which, from the and moral
14. Second Cause of Action: the Filipino people. time of their wrongful shock, as
UNJUST ENRICHMENT — acquisition, plus expenses well as
besmirche (d) its sound n
d Defendants discretion. 3. Greater
reputation , by reason Manila
and social of the (e) By way Land
humiliation above of example Corporatio
before the described and n
internation unlawful correction 4.
al acts, have for the Constructio
community violated public good n
, for which and and in Consortiu
Defendants invaded order to m, Inc.
are jointly the ensure that 5. Asian
and inalienable Defendants Water and
severally right of ' unlawful, Sewer
liable to Plaintiff malicious, System,
Plaintiff and the immoral Inc.
and the Filipino and 6.
Filipino people to a wanton Internation
people for fair and acts are not al Medical
moral decent way repeated, Group, Inc.
damages. of life said 7.
befitting a Defendants Philippine
(c) In Nation are jointly Hospitals
addition, with rich and and Health
Plaintiff natural and severally Services,
and the human liable to Inc.
Filipino resources. Plaintiff for 8. Global
people are This basic, exemplary Electrificati
entitled to and damages.3 on
temperate fundament Systems,
damages al right of Inc.
Plaintiff The Annex "A" mentioned in paragraph 9 of the 9.
for their Expanded Complaint read as follows:
suffering and the Philippine-
which, by Filipino Singapore
their very people ASSETS AND OTHER Ports
nature, are should be PROPERTY OF Corporatio
incapable recognized JOSE DE VENECIA, JR. n
of and 10.
pecuniary vindicated PERSONAL PROPERTY Asiaphil
estimation, by Fisheries
but which awarding Corporatio
nominal A. SHARES OF STOCK IN: n
this
Honorable damages in 11.
Court may an amount 1. Landoil Transnatio
determine to be Resources nal
in the determined Corporatio Systems,
exercise of by the n Inc.
its sound Honorable 2. Pacific 12.
discretion. Court in Asia Internation
the Builders al
exercise of Corporatio Agribusine
 ss AND ALL OTHER ASSETS OF dismiss and dismissing Civil Case No. 0020 as the private respondents in the instant
Corporatio ALL DEFENDANTS against him. 11 As a consequence thereof, Ongpin case. 20 Petitioner's motion of 27 December
n SEQUESTERED AND/OR filed on 11 September 1989 a motion for a 1989 21 and supplemental motion of 25 January
13. IOMC FROZEN BY THE hearing on his affirmative defenses. 12 On 12 1990 22 to reconsider the said Resolution were
Philippines COMMISSION PURSUANT TO September 1989, Zalamea filed a motion to denied in the Sandiganbayan's Resolution of 9
, Inc. EXECUTIVE ORDER NOS. 1 dismiss on the ground that there is no more legal March 1990. 23 These Resolutions are now
14. AND 2.4 and factual basis to proceed against him in view challenged in this petition which was filed on 24
Internation of the dismissal of the case as against De April 1990. 24 Petitioner claims that these were
al Centers The five (5) volumes of the original records of Venecia. 13 He argued that the latter is an issued by the respondent Sandiganbayan with
for Civil Case No. 0020 readily disclose that the case indispensable party; hence, the dismissal of the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
Technology has undergone unnecessary delays through the case against De Venecia should result in the excess of jurisdiction. In support thereof, the
Transfer, filing of motions for extension of time to file dismissal of the case against the other co- Petitioner contends that:
Inc. answer or other responsive pleading, motions defendants pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3 of the
15. Landoil for bill of particulars and motions to dismiss, Rules of Court. Separate motions to dismiss on a) The Deed of Assignment
Trading which were followed by exchanges of related the same ground as that of Zalamea's were executed on July 19, 1989
Corporatio pleadings such as opposition, reply to opposition successively filed by Ongpin, Ancheta, Mapa, Jr. [should be 1988] by Landoil
n and others. These motions for bill of particulars and Laya. 14 Laya filed his motion on 28 in favor of the petitioner
16. or motions to dismiss were denied by the September 1989. should not be made to benefit
Multiland Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, separate answers De Venecia's co-defendants;
Insurance were successively filed by defendants (now In the meantime, the Petitioner filed on 28
Agency, private respondents) Ongpin, Laya, Ancheta, September 1989 a motion to reconsider the
Inc. b) Defendant De Venecia is
Bondoc, Mapa, Jr., Virata and Zalamea. These Resolution of 7 September 1989. 15 However, on not an indispensable party in
17. answers were filed between 21 January 1988 17 October 1989, counsel for De Venecia
Freeport the prosecution of the case
and 10 August 1989.5 submitted to the Sandiganbayan a letter of the against his co-defendants;
Security PCGG dated 16 October 1989 and addressed to
Agency, the Solicitor General requesting the latter to
Inc. Alias summons were served upon Ferdinand E. c) The liabilities of De
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos on 10 November withdraw the motion for reconsideration. 16
18. Venecia's co-defendants arose
Internation 1988 at 2338 Makiki Heights, Honolulu, not only from their alleged
al Hawaii.6 In its Resolution of 6 April 1989,7 the The Petitioner filed on 17 October 1989 a conspiracy with defendant De
Caterer's, Sandiganbayan declared them in default in Civil Consolidated Opposition 17 to the motions to Venecia but also by virtue of
Inc. Case No. 0020 and other cases. dismiss wherein it alleged the prematurity of the their individual or collective
filing of the motions to dismiss since it had filed a actions done in unlawful
On 30 June 1989, defendant De Venecia filed a motion to reconsider the 8 September 1989 concert with one another;
BANK ACCOUNTS: Resolution dismissing the case as against De
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 0020 insofar as
he is concerned in view of a Deed of Assignment Venecia.
1. Frozen d) The causes of action
executed on 19 July 1988 between Landoil against defendants Ferdinand
Bank Resources Corporation, including its On 28 September 1989, defendant Ferdinand E.
Accounts E. Marcos and Imelda R.
subsidiaries, and the Petitioner, through the Marcos died and on 10 November 1989, the Marcos have nothing to do
and other PCGG as represented by its Acting Chairman, Petitioner filed a motion for his substitution by
Assets of with the Deed of Assignment
Hon. Adolfo S. Azcuna.8 On 16 July 1989, De his heirs, viz., Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand executed by Landoil in favor
Placido Venecia filed an amended motion to Marcos, Jr., Irene Marcos-Araneta and Imee
Mapa, Jr. of the petitioner; and
dismiss9 which the Petitioner opposed on the Marcos-Manotoc. 18 This was granted by the
2. Frozen ground that De Venecia is not a party to the Deed Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of 16 November
Bank of Assignment and that the said deed is still 1989. 19 e) The parties manifestly
Accounts subject to the approval of the PCGG. 10 intended to exclude defendant
and other De Venecia's co-defendants
Assets of On 4 December 1989, the Sandiganbayan from the benefit of the Deed
Cesar C. On 8 September 1989, the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) promulgated a Resolution, of Assignment in question. 25
Zalamea promulgated a Resolution dated 7 September dated 29 November 1989, dismissing Civil Case
1989 granting De Venecia's amended motion to No. 0020 as against De Venecia's co-defendants,
I find merit in this petition.
The Deed of Assignment, 26 upon which the himself and/or through his
dismissal of Civil Case designated nominees or
No. 0020 as against De Venecia is based, was cronies, owns approximately
executed between the (1) Landoil Resources 45% of the outstanding
Corporation, (2) Philippine Singapore Ports capital stock of Landoil, and
Corporation, (3) Asian Water and Sewer System, through Landoil, a s satisfied itself (i) that such
Inc., (4) Construction Consortium, Inc., (5) Pacific proportionate portion of the
Asia Builders and Developers, Inc., (6) Philippine outstanding capital stock of
Hospitals and Health Service, Inc. and (7) Greater each of the other companies
Manila Land Corporation, as ASSIGNORS, and of the Landoil Group;
represented therein by Ambrosio C. Collado as
President of the Landoil Resources Corporation xxx xxx xxx
and attorney-in-fact for the others, and the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
PCGG through its then Acting Chairman, Hon. (7) To negate the imputation
that the Landoil Group are
Adolfo S. Azcuna, as the ASSIGNEE. As described
therein, the former "constitute a group of related Marcos "crony" companions,
companies" sometimes referred to as the and that Jose de Venecia and
"Landoil Group," with the Landoil Resources other officers of the Landoil
Corporation, "organized by or at the initiative of Group are Marcos "cronies,"
Jose de Venecia," as their "flagship." These the Landoil Group submitted
ASSIGNORS are but seven (7) of the eighteen proof tending to show that
(18) corporations enumerated in Annex "A" of they were in fact the victims
the Expanded Complaint in Civil Case No. rather than the "cronies" of
0020. 27 Not parties to the deed of assignment Marcos who, in 1977, coveted
are International Medical Group, Inc.; Global the Landoil Group and caused
Electrification Systems, Inc.; Asiaphil Fisheries the same to be taken over by
Corporation; Transnational Systems, Inc.; his (Marcos') agents and
International Agribusiness Corporation; IOMC business associates for his
Philippines, Inc.; International Centers for (Marcos') benefit after the
Technology Transfer, Inc.; Landoil Trading discovery of oil deposits off
Corporation; Multiland Insurance Agency, Inc.; Palawan by a consortium of
Freeport Security Agency, Inc.; and International oil exploration companies of
which Landoil was a Subject to certain conditions, the ASSIGNORS
Caterer's, Incorporated. Pertinent portions of the
recital part of the deed of assignment read as substantial member, and the
follows: acquisition of Landoil, also in
1977, of a prime port
operations contract in Saudi
xxx xxx xxx Arabia with a value of US$350
million;
(2) Immediately after the
organization of the (8) After the establishment of
Presidential Commission on the present Aquino
Good Government (PCGG) in Government, Philguarantee
February 1986, the Landoil
caused an investigation to be
Group, acting through Landoil undertaken as to (a) the
itself, asked the PCGG to place
background of the issuance of
the Landoil Group under the alleged "behest"
sequestration for the reason
guarantee facility in favor of
that former President the Landoil Group, and (b) the
Ferdinand E. Marcos, by
management and operations
of the Landoil Group, both in
the Philippines and in the
Middle East. As a result of
such
investigationPhilguarantee ha
guarantee facility was
obtained in the ordinary and
regular course of business,
and that no favor was
accorded to the Landoil
officers, in the grant of such
guarantee facility; and (ii) that
the business reversals
experienced by the Landoil
Group in connection with its
various construction and
other projects in the Middle
East and elsewhere were
due, firstly, to the inability of
the Landoil Group to collect
its contract receivables from
such projects due to the
reasons specified in the sixth
"whereas" clause,
and, secondly, due to the non-
payment of its insurance
claim under the insurance
policy referred to in the
succeeding (ninth) "whereas"
clause. 28
assumed the following obligations:
1.1. Upon the request of the
Assignee, the Assignors (being
the above-named companies
making up Landoil Group)
shall immediately cause to be
transferred to the Assignee
(or its nominee/s) all the
shares of the capital stock of
Landoil (up to 45% of the
total outstanding issued and
subscribed capital stock of
Landoil) which have or may
hereafter be identified as
belonging to Marcos (whether
standing in his name or the
name [of] any of his
nominee/s). . . .
1.2. Upon the effectiveness of
this Agreement, the Assignors
shall cause to be paid to the
Assignee, through PCGG, the
amount of P13 million, which
amount represents a portion
of Landoil's recovery from an
arbitration proceeding which
Landoil had caused to be
instituted in London against
the Lloyd's Syndicate of
Insurance Underwriters;
1.3. Effective immediately, the
Assignors hereby assign,
transfer and convey to the
PCGG: (a) the entire proceeds
of the Assignors' claims in the
New York case which Landoil
has instituted against the
insurance brokers, namely,
the firm of Alexander and
Alexander, and (b) the entire
proceeds of the Assignors'
contract receivables from all
the Assignors' construction
and other projects in the
Middle East and elsewhere,
net of any amount required
for the settlement of any
compulsory statutory liens for
unpaid wages or salaries and
ordinary administrative
overhead and costs, and
attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation.
xxx xxx xxx
1.5. The Assignors, and or
their respective officers,
hereby undertake to fully
cooperate with the Philippine
Government, acting through
the PCGG or any other
governmental agency, in the
 prosecution of any case which
the Philippine Government
may cause to be filed against
former President Marcos and
his cronies, either by
furnishing testimony in any
such case, or by providing
information in any
investigation undertaken in
contemplation of the filing of
such case, whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, as
may be required or directed
by the PCGG, or by other
appropriate governmental
agency from time to time. 29
In consideration of the ASSIGNORS'
undertakings, the ASSIGNEE, viz., the Republic of
the Philippines, agreed:
2.1. . . . to cause the
sequestration order issued
against Landoil to be lifted
upon the effectiveness of this
Agreement. In addition, the
Assignee shall cause the
dismissal, without prejudice,
of Civil Case No. 0020, entitled
"Republic of the Philippines
vs. Jose de Venecia, Jr., et al.,"
in so far as the Assignors and
Jose de Venecia are
concerned: provided, however,
that such case shall be
deemed automatically
reinstated in the event of non-
compliance by any of the
Assignors with any of its
obligations and undertakings
hereunder. 30
The dismissal by the Sandiganbayan of Civil Case
No. 0020 as against De Venecia's co-defendants
is anchored on the following grounds:
a) The dismissal of the case as
against de Venecia pursuant
to the Resolution of 8
September 1989, "which . . .
has now become final and
executory after the plaintiff
withdrew its 'Motion for
Reconsideration,'" "in effect,
removed an indispensable
party from this case." De
Venecia is an indispensable
party because his
involvement in the
transactions, together with
the Landoil Group, which are
described in paragraph 11 of
the Expanded Complaint,
"constitute and/or comprise
the very essence of the only
cause of action which is
specifically averred in said
Complaint, the other causes of
action alleged therein being
premised on mere general
averments." With the removal
of De Venecia from the case
with the express conformity
of the plaintiff, no judgment
can be rendered or liability
enforced against the other
defendants who are alleged to
have acted in conspiracy with
him. 31
(2) The motions to dismiss
filed by de Venecia's co-
defendants may be treated as
motions for summary
judgment because when an
indispensable party "has . . .
been dropped from the
complaint by reason of a
compromise or amicable
settlement which practically
negates the legal or factual
basis for the principal cause of
action, then a fortiori, . . . the
cause of action has become
not only insufficient but in
existent." The "issues having
been joined already . . ., there
is nothing which could
prevent defendants from
submitting the case for I cannot agree.
summary judgment." 32
In the first place, the Sandiganbayan got itself
(3) As to defendants entangled in a web of incorrect premises which,
Ferdinand E. Marcos and unfortunately, became the bases for its
Imelda R. Marcos, although conclusions. For one, it is not true that the
they were declared in default, Petitioner has only one (1) cause of action as
a "perusal of the General and described in paragraph 11 of the Expanded
Specific Averments of the Complaint. As could be gathered from the
Expanded complaint, in introductory portion of said paragraph 11 under
relation to the causes of subheading V on Specific Averments of
action described therein, will Defendants' Illegal Acts, the acts or transactions
indubitably show that above- enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (f) thereof
named defendants' alleged are merely "among others." It reads:
liabilities are intimately
intertwined and closely
11. Defendant Jose de Venecia,
related to the transactions Jr., taking undue advantage of
subject matter of the
his relationship, influence and
compromise agreement connection with Defendants
between the PCGG and
Ferdinand E. Marcos and
defendant De Venecia. Imelda R. Marcos, acting by
"Accordingly, the
himself and/or in active
"compromise, . . . inures to, collaboration with the other
and benefits, defendants
Defendants, embarked upon
spouses Marcoses and devices, schemes and
completely removes any legal
strategems to unjustly enrich
or factual bases for their themselves at the expense of
retention as defendants in this
Plaintiff and the Filipino
case." 33 People, among others:
In its Resolution of 9 March 1990 34 denying the xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner's motion to reconsider the said
dismissal, the Sandiganbayan stressed that:
Among simply means "mingled with or
in the same group or class" or "in or
. . . the one and only cause of through the midst of." 36Moreover,
action set out in the Expanded
paragraph 8 thereof on General
Complaint appears in Averments states that:
paragraph 11 thereof, and
outlined in detail under sub-
paragraphs (a) and (f), . . . Defendant Ferdinand E.
Marcos, together with other
inclusive. The Compromise
Agreement, as we had pointed Defendants, acting singly or
collectively, and/or in
out, not only removed De
Venecia as an indispensable unlawful concert with one
another, in flagrant breach of
party but also deprived the
Expanded Complaint of any public trust and of their
fiduciary obligations as public
and all factual or legal support
for the sole cause of action set officers, with gross and
scandalous abuse of right and
forth therein. 35
power and in brazen violation
 of the Constitution and laws
of the Philippines, embarked
upon a systematic plan to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth.
Among others, in furtherance
of said plan and acting in
unlawful concert with one
another and with gross abuse
of power and authority, . . . .
and paragraph 9 states:
(9) Among the assets acquired
by Defendants in the manner
above-described and
discovered by the
Commission in the exercise of
its official responsibilities are
funds and other property
listed in Annex "A" hereof and
made an integral part of this
complaint.
Finally, paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16 and
17 enumerate five (5) causes of action.
As earlier noted, of the eighteen (18)
corporations enumerated in Annex "A" of the
complaint, only SEVEN (7) are parties to the
Deed of Assignment as ASSIGNORS therein. Also
listed in said Annex "A" are (1) frozen bank
accounts and other assets of defendant Placido E.
Mapa, Jr., (2) frozen bank accounts and other
assets of defendant Cesar Zalamea, and (3) all
other assets of all defendants sequestered
and/or frozen by the Commission pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2. The averments
earlier mentioned and the deed of assignment,
juxtaposed with Annex "A," show prima
facie that (a) the Petitioner did not intend to
enter into any amicable settlement with the
remaining eleven (11) corporations or regarding
the frozen assets listed in said Annex "A," and
(b) the assets of the defendants in the said
eleven corporations were not necessarily
obtained through or as a consequence of the acts
or transactions described in subparagraphs (a)
to (f), paragraph 11 of the Expanded Complaint,
but probably through "the other devices,
schemes or strategems." Otherwise, these
remaining corporations should have been made
parties to the deed of assignment. Inclusio unius
est exclusio alterius.
For another, it is not true that De Venecia is
the principal party either in the specific acts
described in subparagraphs (a) to (f), paragraph
11 of the Expanded Complaint or in the other
"devices, schemes or strategems." If, at all, there
are principal party defendants in Civil Case No.
0020, then a reading of the Expanded Complaint
readily reveals that they are Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos. Of course, there are
allegations of conspiracy which, for purposes of
the nature of the action pursued, must be
understood to be civil conspiracy, 37 as
distinguished from conspiracy in criminal law. 38
Nor is it true that De Venecia is an indispensable
party with respect to the acts or transactions
subject of the causes of action. An indispensable
party is defined as one without whom the action
cannot be finally determined, whose interest in
the subject matter of the suit and in the relief
sought is so intertwined with that of the other
parties that his legal presence as a party to the
proceeding is an absolute necessity. 39 No valid
judgment can be rendered where an
indispensable party is not impleaded or brought
before the court; 40 his non-inclusion in a case is
a fatal defect and any judgment rendered therein
would be ineffective.41
In the instant case, it is clear that De Venecia is
not an indispensable party because a final
determination of the case can be had without his
legal presence. Since the defendants in Civil Case
No. 0020 are sued for (a)collective or
conspirational and (b) individual acts, it follows
that the nature of their corresponding
obligations to the Petitioner could be joint and
several as to the first and individual or personal
as to the second. And if they are solidarily liable,
it cannot be successfully maintained that De
Venecia is an indispensable party. Article 1216 of
the Civil code provides that:
The creditor may proceed
against any one of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. The demand
made against one of them
shall not be an obstacle to
those which may
subsequently be directed
against the others, so long as
the debt had not been fully
collected.
Hence, a solidary debtor is not an indispensable
party. We held so categorically in Republic
vs.Sandiganbayan, 42 a case which also involves
an action for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages filed with
the Sandiganbayan against Alfredo (Bejo)
Romualdez, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
Marcos, Jose P. Campos, Jr. and 45 other
defendants. In the said case, we set aside the
challenged resolution of the Sandiganbayan
denying a motion to drop defendant Campos, Jr.
We stated that since the Presidential
Commission on Good Government had granted
immunity to Jose Y. Campos and his family, such
immunity necessarily extended to movant Jose
Campos, Jr., who is the son of Jose Y.
Campos. Inter alia, we noted:
The fact that Campos, Jr. and
all the other defendants were
charged solidarily in the
complaint does not make him
an indispensable party. We
have ruled in the case
of Operators Incorporated
vs.American Biscuit Co., Inc.,
[154 SCRA 738 (1987)] that
"Solidarity does not make a
solidary obligor an
indispensable party in a suit
filed by the creditor." Article
1216 of the Civil Code says
that the creditor "may
proceed against anyone of the
solidary debtors or some or
all of them simultaneously."
Even assuming for the sake of argument that De
Venecia is indeed a principal party, still, based on
a principle of tort upon which the cause of action
is also predicated, his release did not operate to
release the other tortfeasors. Under American
jurisprudence three rules have developed which
deal with the question of whether the release of
one joint tortfeasor releases other tortfeasors
who are not parties to or named in the release.
The first is the ancient common-law rule that a
release of one joint tortfeasor releases all other
parties jointly liable, regardless of the intent of
the parties. The second, otherwise known as the
"First Restatement rule," states that a release of
one co-conspirator normally releases all others
unless the plaintiff expressly reserves his rights
against the others. The third provides that the
effect of the release upon co-conspirators shall
be determined in accordance with the intentions
of the parties. In Zenith Radio Corp. vs. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 43 the Supreme Court of the United
States adopted the third rule thus:
We recently adopted the final
rule giving effect to the
intentions of the parties in Aro
Mfg. Co. vs.Convertible Top
Co., supra, a patent
infringement case. . . . We
concluded that a release,
"which clearly intends to save
the releasor's rights against a
past contributory infringer,
does not automatically
surrender those rights."
xxx xxx xxx
The straightforward rule is
that a party releases only
those other parties whom he
intends to release.
The Court observed that "[t]o adopt the ancient
common-law rule would frustrate . . . partial
settlements, and thereby promote litigation,
while adoption of the First Restatement rule
would create a trap for unwary plaintiffs'
attorneys."
In the instant case, the release of De Venecia is
clearly intended to apply only to him. There was,
evidently, no intent to spread the benefit to the
other tortfeasors.
For still another reason, the "admissions" by the
Petitioner in paragraph 8 of the deed of
assignment that the guaranty facility in favor of
the Assignors "was obtained in the ordinary and
regular course of business," that " no favor was
accorded to the Landoil officers in the grant"
thereof and that the business reversals
experienced by the Landoil Group in connection
with its various construction and other projects
were due to the special reasons therein
enumerated are not equivalent to an admission
that De Venecia's
co-defendants incurred no liability whatsoever
with respect thereto. That the facility was
obtained in such manner with no favor to the
Landoil officers do not, by themselves, clear the
Board of Directors or the officers of the
Philguarantee from any liability which could
have arisen from the grant of the guaranty
facility. Private respondents were not sued as
directors or officers of a private corporation, but
as government officials who under the
Constitution were obliged to serve with the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency and to remain accountable
to the people. 44 Indeed, if it were the intention of
the parties in the deed of assignment to accord to
the private respondents the same benefit as that
granted to De Venecia, they could have easily
done so without loss of time or effort. Better yet,
the parties could have explicitly stipulated that,
in consideration of the assignment made by the
Assignors, the Petitioner shall (a) lift the
sequestration issued against Landoil and (b)
dismiss Civil Case No. 0020. It is evident from the
deed of assignment that the only non-signatory
thereto who is to be benefited thereby is
defendant De Venecia. That favor granted him is
known as a stipulation pour autrui under Article
1311 of the Civil Code as the Sandiganbayan
correctly stated in its Resolution of 8 September
1989 granting De Venecia's amended motion to
dismiss. 45 Under the said article, for such a
stipulation to be effective and binding it is
necessary that the contracting parties "must
have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor
upon a third person." 46 A "mere incidental
benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient."
The deed of assignment in question fails to even
remotely suggest such a grant in favor of the
private respondents, and for the Sandiganbayan
to read into the document that which the parties
themselves have not even thought of would be to
stipulate for the parties, which is beyond its
power to do so.
Moreover, these "admissions" are contained in
the "whereas" clauses or in the recital part of the
Deed of Assignment and are inconsistent with
the following provisions in the operative part
thereof, to wit: (1) the ASSIGNORS shall transfer
to the ASSIGNEE all the capital shares of Landoil
(up to 45% of the capital stock) identified as
belonging to Marcos; (2) the ASSIGNORS shall
fully cooperate with the PCGG or any
government agency in the prosecution of any
case to be filed against Marcos and his cronies;
and (3) the dismissal of Civil Case No. 0020
against the ASSIGNORS and De Venecia shall be
without prejudice, and the case shall be deemed
automatically reinstated in the event of the
ASSIGNORS' non-compliance with any of their
obligations. These obligations are, in fact,
consistent with the 14th to 16th causes of action
enumerated in the Expanded Complaint.
These "admissions" are merely embodied in the
recital part of the deed. It is a settled rule in the
construction of contracts that in case of a conflict
between the operative part of a contract and the
recitals thereof, the former will
prevail. 47 The recitals are but merely
introductory and prefatory statements of a deed
and are not an essential part of the operating
portions of the contract. They may be used as a
guide in interpreting ambiguous portions of the
operative part, but cannot supersede the latter.
Finally, the Sandiganbayan's grave abuse of
discretion became more pronounced insofar as
the challenged resolutions benefit defendant
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos. They
are the principal dramatis personae in Civil Case
No. 0020, and the allegations in the Expanded
Complaint do not limit the causes of action
against them to transactions involving
Philguarantee which, if proven, do not at all, by
any standard, make them the least culpable. As a
matter of fact, the ASSIGNORS in the deed of
assignment admit that approximately 45% of the
outstanding capital stock of the flagship
corporation, Landoil Resources Corporation, and
through the latter, "a proportionate portion of
the outstanding capital stock of the six other
corporations" are owned by defendant
Ferdinand E. Marcos. Since the remaining eleven
(11) corporations listed in Annex "A" of the
Expanded Complaint are not parties to the deed
of assignment, the allegations with respect
thereto as against the Marcoses stand. It must,
however, be stressed that, because of his death,
Ferdinand E. Marcos had been substituted in
Civil Case No. 0020 by his heirs pursuant to the
Sandiganbayan's Resolution of 16 November
1989. Accordingly, he ceased to be a party and
the challenged resolutions are, insofar as he is
concerned, ineffective. Be that as it may, the
error committed by the Sandiganbayan in
granting him such unusual benefit compounded
the arbitrariness of the resolutions. Finally, as an
additional indicium of such arbitrariness,
although under the deed of assignment the
dismissal of the case against the Assignors and
De Venecia was to be "without prejudice," the
challenged dismissal against the latter's co-
defendants was without qualification.
WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition and to
set aside the challenged resolutions, with costs
against the private respondents.
Padilla, J., concurs.
# Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I respectfully submit that the respondent
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in promulgating the challenged
resolutions. I am, therefore, unable to concur
with the majority opinion except insofar as it
orders the reinstatement of the Expanded
Complaint in Civil Case No. 0020 against the
Marcoses.
The principal issue in this case is whether the
dismissal by the Sandiganbayan of Civil Case No.
0020 as against defendant Jose De Venecia, by
virtue of a Deed of Assignment executed
between the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) and seven corporations
belonging to the Landoil Group, should likewise
inure to the benefit of De Venecia's co-
defendants. The Sandiganbayan thought that it
should and dismissed the case against the co-
defendants. The petitioner thinks otherwise and
submits that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in so doing.
The material operative facts and procedural
antecedents generative of this controversy are
not disputed.
The Petitioner, represented by the PCGG, filed on
27 July 1987 with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion,
Accounting, Restitution and Damages against
JOSE DE VENECIA, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
IMELDA R. MARCOS, ROSENDO D. BONDOC,
CESAR E. A. VIRATA, RUBEN ANCHETA, JAIME C.
LAYA, PLACIDO MAPA, JR., ROBERTO ONGPIN
and CESAR C. ZALAMEA.1 The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 0020. Upon prior
leave of the Sandiganbayan, the Petitioner filed
on 25 January 1988 an Expanded Complaint,2 the
pertinent portions of which read as follows:
IV
GENERAL AVERMENTS
OF
DEFENDANTS' ILLEGAL ACTS
8. From the early years of his
presidency, Defendant
Ferdinand E. Marcos took
undue advantage of his
powers as President. All
throughout the period from
September 21, 1972 to
February 25, 1986, he gravely disadvanta 9. Among the assets acquired Plaintiff and the Filipino
abused his powers under geous to by Defendants in the manner people, among others:
martial law and ruled as the above-described and
Dictator under the 1973 governmen discovered by the (a) Organized and headed the
Marcos promulgated t; Commission in the exercise of Land Oil Group, a big business
Constitution. Defendant its official responsibilities are conglomerate engaged in a
Ferdinand E. Marcos, together (b) funds and other property wide range of economic
with other Defendants, acting misapprop listed in Annex "A" hereof and activity, such as petroleum
singly or collectively, and/or riated, made an integral part of this exploration and engineering,
in unlawful concert with one embezzled Complaint. port management and
another, in flagrant breach of and/or operation, and other services.
public trust and of their converted 10. Defendants, acting singly The Land Oil Group, more
fiduciary obligations as public to their or collectively, and/or in particularly, the Land Oil
officers, with gross and own use unlawful concert with one Resources Corporation, its
scandalous abuse of right and funds of another, for the purpose of parent company, and its
power and in brazen violation Governmen preventing disclosure and major subsidiaries, the
of the Constitution and laws t financial avoiding discovery of their Philippine-Singapore Ports
of the Philippines embarked institutions unmitigated plunder of the Corporation, the Greater
upon a systematic plan to ; National Treasury and of their Manila Land
accumulate ill-gotten wealth. other illegal acts, and Corporation,Construction
Among others, in furtherance employing the services of Consortium, Inc. and the
of said plan and acting in (c) engaged
in other prominent lawyers, Philippine Hospitals and
unlawful concert with one accountants, financial experts, Health Services, had
another and with gross abuse illegal and
improper businessman [sic] and other operations in the Philippines
of power and authority, persons, deposited, kept and and abroad, particularly, in
Defendant Ferdinand E. acts and
practices invested funds, securities and the Middle East;
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos: other assets in various banks,
designed to
defraud financial institutions, trust or (b) To finance his huge
(a) Plaintiffs investment companies and domestic and overseas
awarded and the with persons here and abroad. operations, Defendant Jose de
contracts Filipino Venecia, acting through the
with the people, or V Land Oil Group, borrowed
Governmen otherwise enormous amounts in foreign
t to their misapprop currency denominated loans
relatives, SPECIFIC AVERMENTS OF
riated and DEFENDANTS' ILLEGAL ACTS from several syndicates of
business converted international banks, such as,
associates, to their but not limited to, Arab
dummies, own use, 11. Defendant Jose de Venecia, Banking Corporation, Ahli
nominees, benefit and Jr. taking undue advantage of Bank of Kuwait, Credit Suisse,
agents or enrichment his relationship, influence and First of Boston's, Saudi Cairo
persons the lawful connection with Defendants Bank, Mellon Bank and the
who were patrimony Ferdinand E. Marcos and Bank of Montreal. In view of
beholden and Imelda R. Marcos, acting by the magnitude of the loans
to said revenues of himself and/or in active and the project risks involved,
Defendants Plaintiff collaboration with the other the banks required that their
, under and the Defendants, embarked upon loans be fully covered by the
terms and Filipino devices, schemes and absolute and unconditional
conditions people. strategems to unjustly enrich guarantee of the Government
grossly and themselves at the expense of of the Republic of the
manifestly Philippines;
(c) Accordingly, Defendant Philguarantee, with the active
Jose de Venecia applied for collaboration of Defendants
Philippine Government Rosendo D. Bondoc, Cesar E.
guarantee from the Philippine A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta,
Export and Foreign Loan Jaime C. Laya, Placido Mapa,
Guarantee Corporation Jr., Roberto Ongpin and Cesar
(Philguarantee), a C. Zalamea, continued to
government-owned and provide financial assistance to
controlled corporation the companies owned and
organized to provide controlled by Defendant Jose
Philippine Government de Venecia;
guarantees, and, with the
active collaboration of (f) As a result of gross
Defendants Rosendo D. mismanagement and wanton
Bondoc, who was then the diversion of the loans, the
President of Philguarantee major operations of the Land
and the members of its Board
Oil Group collapsed, Land Oil
of Directors, Defendants Cesar defaulted in the payment of its
E. A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta,
maturing principal and
Jaime C. Laya, Placido Mapa, interests amortization and,
Jr., Roberto Ongpin and Cesar
like the man holding the
C. Zalamea was granted full proverbial empty bag,
Philippine Government
Philguarantee had to advance
guarantee coverage; on its guarantee using for this
purpose multi-millions of
(d) Defendant Jose de Venecia pesos in scarce government
misused the proceeds of the and taxpayers' money,
loans by diverting them to resulting in grave and
other uses and/or irreparable damage to
appropriation, then for his Plaintiff and to the entire
own personal benefit using Filipino people.
for this purpose a string of
local and overseas banks, such 12. The acts of Defendants,
as, but not limited to, PNB singly or collectively, and/or
(New York), PNB (Buendia in unlawful concert with one
Branch), PCTB (Makati another, constitute gross
Branch), Swiss Banking Corp. abuse of official position and
of Hongkong, and the authority, flagrant breach of
Hongkong and Shanghai public trust and fiduciary
Banking Corp. in Hongkong, obligations, brazen abuse of
and in an effort to hide his right and power, unjust
complicity in the diversion,
enrichment, violation of the
refused to submit regular Constitution and laws of the
accounting and reports, all in
Republic of the Philippines, to
violation of the provisions of the grave and irreparable
the loan and guarantee
damage of Plaintiff and the
agreements; Filipino people.
(e) Notwithstanding the VI
aforesaid repeated violations
CAUSE OF ACTION
13. First Cause of Action:
ABUSE OF RIGHT AND
POWER — (a) Defendants, in
perpetrating the unlawful acts
described above, committed
abuse of right and power
which caused untold misery,
suffering and damage to
Plaintiff. Defendants violated,
among others, Articles 19, 20
and 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines;
(b) As a result of the foregoing
acts, Defendants acquired title
to and beneficial interests in
funds and other property and
concealed such title, funds
and interests through the use
of relatives, business
associates, nominees, agents
or dummies. Defendants are,
therefore, jointly and
severally, liable to Plaintiff to
return and reconvey all such
funds and other property
unlawfully acquired; or
alternatively, to pay Plaintiff,
jointly and severally, by way
of indemnity, the damage
cause to Plaintiff equivalent to
the amount of such funds and
the value of other property
not returned or restored to
Plaintiff, plus interest thereon
from the date of unlawful
acquisition until full payment.
14. Second Cause of Action:
UNJUST ENRICHMENT —
Defendants illegally
accumulated funds and other
property in violation of the
laws of the Philippines and in
breach of their official
functions and fiduciary
obligations. Defendants,
therefore, have unjustly
enriched themselves to the
grave and irreparable damage
and prejudice of Plaintiff.
Defendants have an obligation
at law, independently of
breach of trust and abuse of
right and power and; as an
alternative, to jointly and
severally return to Plaintiff
such funds and other property
with which Defendants, in
gross and evident bad faith,
have unjustly enriched
themselves or, in default
thereof, restore to Plaintiff the
amount of such funds and the
value of the other property
including those which may
have been wasted, and/or
lost, with interest thereon
from the date of unlawful
acquisition until full payment.
15. Third Cause of Action:
BREACH OF TRUST — A
public office is a public trust.
By committing all the acts
described above, Defendants
repeatedly breached public
trust and the law, making
them jointly and severally
liable to Plaintiff. The funds
and other property acquired
by Defendants as a result of
their breach of public trust
are deemed to have been
acquired for the Benefit of
Plaintiff and are, therefore,
impressed with constructive
trust in favor of Plaintiff and
the Filipino people.
16. Fourth Cause of Action:
ACCOUNTING — The
Commission, acting pursuant
to the provisions of applicable
law, respectfully maintains
that Defendants, acting singly
or collectively, and/or in
unlawful concert with one
another, acquired funds, actual damages and for determined by the Honorable Inc.
assets and property during expenses incurred in the Court in the exercise of its 6.
the incumbency of Defendant recovery of Defendants' ill- sound discretion. Internation
public officers, or while acting gotten wealth. al Medical
in unlawful concert with ( Group, Inc.
public officers, manifestly out (b) As a result of Defendants' e) By way of example and 7.
of proportion to their salaries, unlawful, malicious, immoral correction for the public good Philippine
to their other lawful income and wanton acts described and in order to ensure that Hospitals
and income from legitimately above, Plaintiff and the Defendants' unlawful, and Health
acquired property. Filipino people had painfully malicious, immoral and Services,
Consequently, they are endured and suffered for wanton acts are not repeated, Inc.
required to show to the more than twenty long years, said Defendants are jointly 8. Global
satisfaction of this Honorable and still continue to endure and severally liable to Plaintiff Electrificati
Court that they have lawfully and suffer anguish, fright, for exemplary damages. on
acquired all such funds, assets sleepless nights, serious Systems,
and property which are in anxiety, wounded feelings and Inc.
excess of their legal net The Annex "A" mentioned in paragraph 9 of the 9.
moral shock, as well as Expanded Complaint read as follows:
income, and for this besmirched reputation and Philippine-
Honorable Court to decree social humiliation before the Singapore
that the Defendants are under international community, for ASSETS AND OTHER Ports
obligation to account to which Defendants are jointly PROPERTY OF Corporatio
Plaintiff with respect to all and severally liable to Plaintiff JOSE DE VENECIA, JR. n
legal or beneficial interests in and the Filipino people for 10.
funds, properties and assets moral damages. PERSONAL PROPERTY Asiaphil
of whatever kind and Fisheries
wherever located in excess of Corporatio
their lawful earnings. (c) In addition, Plaintiff and A. SHARES OF STOCK IN: n
the Filipino people are 11.
entitled to temperate 1. Landoil Transnatio
17. Fifth Cause of Action: damages for their suffering
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES — Resources nal
which, by their very nature, Corporatio Systems,
(a) By reason of the unlawful are incapable of pecuniary
acts set forth above, Plaintiff n Inc.
estimation, but which this 2. Pacific 12.
and the Filipino people have Honorable Court may
suffered actual damages in an Asia Internation
determine in the exercise of Builders al
amount representing the its sound discretion.
pecuniary loss sustained by Corporatio Agribusine
the latter as a result of n ss
Defendants' unlawful acts, the (d) Defendants, by reason of 3. Greater Corporatio
approximate value and the above described unlawful Manila n
interest on which, from the acts, have violated and Land 13. IOMC
time of their wrongful invaded the inalienable right Corporatio Philippines
acquisition, plus expenses of Plaintiff and the Filipino n , Inc.
which Plaintiff has been people to a fair and decent 4. 14.
compelled to incur and shall way of life befitting a Nation Constructio Internation
continue to incur in its effort with rich natural and human n al Centers
to recover Defendants' ill- resources. This basic, and Consortiu for
gotten wealth all over the fundamental right of Plaintiff m, Inc. Technology
world. Defendants are, and the Filipino people should 5. Asian Transfer,
therefore, jointly and be recognized and vindicated Water and Inc.
severally liable to Plaintiff for by awarding nominal Sewer 15. Landoil
damages in an amount to be System, Trading
 Corporatio which were followed by exchanges of related
n pleadings such as opposition, reply to opposition
16. and others. These motions for bill of particulars
Multiland or motions to dismiss were denied by the
Insurance Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, separate answers
Agency, were successively filed by defendants (now
Inc. private respondents) Ongpin, Laya, Ancheta,
17. Bondoc, Mapa, Jr., Virata and Zalamea. These
Freeport answers were filed between 21 January 1988
Security and 10 August 1989.5
Agency,
Inc.
Alias summons were served upon Ferdinand E.
18. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos on 10 November
Internation
1988 at 2338 Makiki Heights, Honolulu,
al Hawaii.6 In its Resolution of 6 April 1989,7 the
Caterer's,
Sandiganbayan declared them in default in Civil
Inc. Case No. 0020 and other cases.
BANK ACCOUNTS: On 30 June 1989, defendant De Venecia filed a
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 0020 insofar as
1. Frozen he is concerned in view of a Deed of Assignment
Bank executed on 19 July 1988 between Landoil
Accounts Resources Corporation, including its
and other subsidiaries, and the Petitioner, through the
Assets of PCGG as represented by its Acting Chairman,
Placido Hon. Adolfo S. Azcuna.8 On 16 July 1989, De
Mapa, Jr. Venecia filed an amended motion to
2. Frozen dismiss9 which the Petitioner opposed on the
Bank ground that De Venecia is not a party to the Deed
Accounts of Assignment and that the said deed is still
and other subject to the approval of the PCGG. 10
Assets of
Cesar C.
On 8 September 1989, the Sandiganbayan
Zalamea promulgated a Resolution dated 7 September
1989 granting De Venecia's amended motion to
AND ALL OTHER ASSETS OF dismiss and dismissing Civil Case No. 0020 as
ALL DEFENDANTS against him. 11 As a consequence thereof, Ongpin
SEQUESTERED AND/OR filed on 11 September 1989 a motion for a
FROZEN BY THE hearing on his affirmative defenses. 12 On 12
COMMISSION PURSUANT TO September 1989, Zalamea filed a motion to
EXECUTIVE ORDER NOS. 1 dismiss on the ground that there is no more legal
AND 2.4 and factual basis to proceed against him in view
of the dismissal of the case as against De
The five (5) volumes of the original records of Venecia. 13 He argued that the latter is an
Civil Case No. 0020 readily disclose that the case indispensable party; hence, the dismissal of the
has undergone unnecessary delays through the case against De Venecia should result in the
filing of motions for extension of time to file dismissal of the case against the other co-
answer or other responsive pleading, motions defendants pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court. Separate motions to dismiss on
for bill of particulars and motions to dismiss,
the same ground as that of Zalamea's were
successively filed by Ongpin, Ancheta, Mapa, Jr.
and Laya. 14 Laya filed his motion on 28
September 1989.
In the meantime, the Petitioner filed on 28
September 1989 a motion to reconsider the
Resolution of 7 September 1989. 15 However, on
17 October 1989, counsel for De Venecia
submitted to the Sandiganbayan a letter of the
PCGG dated 16 October 1989 and addressed to
the Solicitor General requesting the latter to
withdraw the motion for reconsideration. 16
The Petitioner filed on 17 October 1989 a
Consolidated Opposition 17 to the motions to
dismiss wherein it alleged the prematurity of the
filing of the motions to dismiss since it had filed a
motion to reconsider the 8 September 1989
Resolution dismissing the case as against De
Venecia.
On 28 September 1989, defendant Ferdinand E.
Marcos died and on 10 November 1989, the
Petitioner filed a motion for his substitution by
his heirs, viz., Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand
Marcos, Jr., Irene Marcos-Araneta and Imee
Marcos-Manotoc. 18 This was granted by the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of 16 November
1989. 19
On 4 December 1989, the Sandiganbayan
(Second Division) promulgated a Resolution,
dated 29 November 1989, dismissing Civil Case
No. 0020 as against De Venecia's co-defendants,
the private respondents in the instant
case. 20 Petitioner's motion of 27 December
1989 21 and supplemental motion of 25 January
1990 22 to reconsider the said Resolution were
denied in the Sandiganbayan's Resolution of 9
March 1990. 23 These Resolutions are now
challenged in this petition which was filed on 24
April 1990. 24 Petitioner claims that these were
issued by the respondent Sandiganbayan with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. In support thereof, the
Petitioner contends that:
a) The Deed of Assignment
executed on July 19, 1989
[should be 1988] by Landoil
in favor of the petitioner
should not be made to benefit
De Venecia's co-defendants;
b) Defendant De Venecia is
not an indispensable party in
the prosecution of the case
against his co-defendants;
c) The liabilities of De
Venecia's co-defendants arose
not only from their alleged
conspiracy with defendant De
Venecia but also by virtue of
their individual or collective
actions done in unlawful
concert with one another;
d) The causes of action
against defendants Ferdinand
E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos have nothing to do
with the Deed of Assignment
executed by Landoil in favor
of the petitioner; and
e) The parties manifestly
intended to exclude defendant
De Venecia's co-defendants
from the benefit of the Deed
of Assignment in question. 25
I find merit in this petition.
The Deed of Assignment, 26 upon which the
dismissal of Civil Case
No. 0020 as against De Venecia is based, was
executed between the (1) Landoil Resources
Corporation, (2) Philippine Singapore Ports
Corporation, (3) Asian Water and Sewer System,
Inc., (4) Construction Consortium, Inc., (5) Pacific
Asia Builders and Developers, Inc., (6) Philippine
Hospitals and Health Service, Inc. and (7) Greater
Manila Land Corporation, as ASSIGNORS, and
represented therein by Ambrosio C. Collado as
President of the Landoil Resources Corporation
and attorney-in-fact for the others, and the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
PCGG through its then Acting Chairman, Hon.
Adolfo S. Azcuna, as the ASSIGNEE. As described
therein, the former "constitute a group of related
companies" sometimes referred to as the
"Landoil Group," with the Landoil Resources
Corporation, "organized by or at the initiative of
Jose de Venecia," as their "flagship." These
ASSIGNORS are but seven (7) of the eighteen
(18) corporations enumerated in Annex "A" of
the Expanded Complaint in Civil Case No.
0020. 27 Not parties to the deed of assignment
are International Medical Group, Inc.; Global
Electrification Systems, Inc.; Asiaphil Fisheries
Corporation; Transnational Systems, Inc.;
International Agribusiness Corporation; IOMC
Philippines, Inc.; International Centers for
Technology Transfer, Inc.; Landoil Trading
Corporation; Multiland Insurance Agency, Inc.;
Freeport Security Agency, Inc.; and International
Caterer's, Incorporated. Pertinent portions of the
recital part of the deed of assignment read as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Immediately after the
organization of the
Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) in
February 1986, the Landoil
Group, acting through Landoil
itself, asked the PCGG to place
the Landoil Group under
sequestration for the reason
that former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, by
himself and/or through his
designated nominees or
cronies, owns approximately
45% of the outstanding
capital stock of Landoil, and
through Landoil, a investigationPhilguarantee ha
proportionate portion of the
outstanding capital stock of
each of the other companies
of the Landoil Group;
xxx xxx xxx
(7) To negate the imputation
that the Landoil Group are
Marcos "crony" companions,
and that Jose de Venecia and
other officers of the Landoil
Group are Marcos "cronies,"
the Landoil Group submitted
proof tending to show that
they were in fact the victims
rather than the "cronies" of
Marcos who, in 1977, coveted
the Landoil Group and caused
the same to be taken over by
his (Marcos') agents and
business associates for his
(Marcos') benefit after the
discovery of oil deposits off
Palawan by a consortium of
oil exploration companies of
which Landoil was a Subject to certain conditions, the ASSIGNORS
substantial member, and the
acquisition of Landoil, also in
1977, of a prime port
operations contract in Saudi
Arabia with a value of US$350
million;
(8) After the establishment of
the present Aquino
Government, Philguarantee
caused an investigation to be
undertaken as to (a) the
background of the issuance of
the alleged "behest"
guarantee facility in favor of
the Landoil Group, and (b) the
management and operations
of the Landoil Group, both in
the Philippines and in the
Middle East. As a result of
such
s satisfied itself (i) that such
guarantee facility was
obtained in the ordinary and
regular course of business,
and that no favor was
accorded to the Landoil
officers, in the grant of such
guarantee facility; and (ii) that
the business reversals
experienced by the Landoil
Group in connection with its
various construction and
other projects in the Middle
East and elsewhere were
due, firstly, to the inability of
the Landoil Group to collect
its contract receivables from
such projects due to the
reasons specified in the sixth
"whereas" clause,
and, secondly, due to the non-
payment of its insurance
claim under the insurance
policy referred to in the
succeeding (ninth) "whereas"
clause. 28
assumed the following obligations:
1.1. Upon the request of the
Assignee, the Assignors (being
the above-named companies
making up Landoil Group)
shall immediately cause to be
transferred to the Assignee
(or its nominee/s) all the
shares of the capital stock of
Landoil (up to 45% of the
total outstanding issued and
subscribed capital stock of
Landoil) which have or may
hereafter be identified as
belonging to Marcos (whether
standing in his name or the
name [of] any of his
nominee/s). . . .
1.2. Upon the effectiveness of
this Agreement, the Assignors
shall cause to be paid to the
Assignee, through PCGG, the
amount of P13 million, which
amount represents a portion
of Landoil's recovery from an
arbitration proceeding which
Landoil had caused to be
instituted in London against
the Lloyd's Syndicate of
Insurance Underwriters;
1.3. Effective immediately, the
Assignors hereby assign,
transfer and convey to the
PCGG: (a) the entire proceeds
of the Assignors' claims in the
New York case which Landoil
has instituted against the
insurance brokers, namely,
the firm of Alexander and
Alexander, and (b) the entire
proceeds of the Assignors'
contract receivables from all
the Assignors' construction
and other projects in the
Middle East and elsewhere,
net of any amount required
for the settlement of any
compulsory statutory liens for
unpaid wages or salaries and
ordinary administrative
overhead and costs, and
attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation.
xxx xxx xxx
1.5. The Assignors, and or
their respective officers,
hereby undertake to fully
cooperate with the Philippine
Government, acting through
the PCGG or any other
governmental agency, in the
prosecution of any case which
the Philippine Government
may cause to be filed against
former President Marcos and
his cronies, either by
furnishing testimony in any
such case, or by providing
information in any
investigation undertaken in
contemplation of the filing of
such case, whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, as
may be required or directed
by the PCGG, or by other
 appropriate governmental
agency from time to time. 29
In consideration of the ASSIGNORS'
undertakings, the ASSIGNEE, viz., the Republic of
the Philippines, agreed:
2.1. . . . to cause the
sequestration order issued
against Landoil to be lifted
upon the effectiveness of this
Agreement. In addition, the
Assignee shall cause the
dismissal, without prejudice,
of Civil Case No. 0020, entitled
"Republic of the Philippines
vs. Jose de Venecia, Jr., et al.,"
in so far as the Assignors and
Jose de Venecia are
concerned: provided, however,
that such case shall be
deemed automatically
reinstated in the event of non-
compliance by any of the
Assignors with any of its
obligations and undertakings
hereunder. 30
The dismissal by the Sandiganbayan of Civil Case
No. 0020 as against De Venecia's co-defendants
is anchored on the following grounds:
a) The dismissal of the case as
against de Venecia pursuant
to the Resolution of 8
September 1989, "which . . .
has now become final and
executory after the plaintiff
withdrew its 'Motion for
Reconsideration,'" "in effect,
removed an indispensable
party from this case." De
Venecia is an indispensable
party because his
involvement in the
transactions, together with
the Landoil Group, which are
described in paragraph 11 of
the Expanded Complaint,
"constitute and/or comprise
the very essence of the only
cause of action which is
specifically averred in said
Complaint, the other causes of
action alleged therein being
premised on mere general
averments." With the removal
of De Venecia from the case
with the express conformity
of the plaintiff, no judgment
can be rendered or liability
enforced against the other
defendants who are alleged to
have acted in conspiracy with
him. 31
(2) The motions to dismiss
filed by de Venecia's co-
defendants may be treated as
motions for summary
judgment because when an
indispensable party "has . . .
been dropped from the
complaint by reason of a
compromise or amicable
settlement which practically
negates the legal or factual
basis for the principal cause of
action, then a fortiori, . . . the
cause of action has become
not only insufficient but in
existent." The "issues having
been joined already . . ., there
is nothing which could
prevent defendants from
submitting the case for
summary judgment." 32
(3) As to defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos, although
they were declared in default,
a "perusal of the General and
Specific Averments of the
Expanded complaint, in
relation to the causes of
action described therein, will
indubitably show that above-
named defendants' alleged
liabilities are intimately
intertwined and closely
related to the transactions
subject matter of the
compromise agreement
between the PCGG and
defendant De Venecia.
"Accordingly, the
"compromise, . . . inures to,
and benefits, defendants
spouses Marcoses and
completely removes any legal
or factual bases for their
retention as defendants in this
case." 33
In its Resolution of 9 March 1990 34 denying the
Petitioner's motion to reconsider the said
dismissal, the Sandiganbayan stressed that:
. . . the one and only cause of
action set out in the Expanded
Complaint appears in
paragraph 11 thereof, and
outlined in detail under sub-
paragraphs (a) and (f),
inclusive. The Compromise
Agreement, as we had pointed
out, not only removed De
Venecia as an indispensable
party but also deprived the
Expanded Complaint of any
and all factual or legal support
for the sole cause of action set
forth therein. 35
I cannot agree.
In the first place, the Sandiganbayan got itself
entangled in a web of incorrect premises which,
unfortunately, became the bases for its
conclusions. For one, it is not true that the
Petitioner has only one (1) cause of action as
described in paragraph 11 of the Expanded
Complaint. As could be gathered from the
introductory portion of said paragraph 11 under
subheading V on Specific Averments of
Defendants' Illegal Acts, the acts or transactions
enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (f) thereof
are merely "among others." It reads:
11. Defendant Jose de Venecia,
Jr., taking undue advantage of
his relationship, influence and
connection with Defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos, acting by
himself and/or in active
collaboration with the other
Defendants, embarked upon
devices, schemes and
strategems to unjustly enrich
themselves at the expense of
Plaintiff and the Filipino
People, among others:
xxx xxx xxx
Among simply means "mingled with or
in the same group or class" or "in or
through the midst of." 36Moreover,
paragraph 8 thereof on General
Averments states that:
. . . Defendant Ferdinand E.
Marcos, together with other
Defendants, acting singly or
collectively, and/or in
unlawful concert with one
another, in flagrant breach of
public trust and of their
fiduciary obligations as public
officers, with gross and
scandalous abuse of right and
power and in brazen violation
of the Constitution and laws
of the Philippines, embarked
upon a systematic plan to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth.
Among others, in furtherance
of said plan and acting in
unlawful concert with one
another and with gross abuse
of power and authority, . . . .
and paragraph 9 states:
 (9) Among the assets acquired
by Defendants in the manner
above-described and
discovered by the
Commission in the exercise of
its official responsibilities are
funds and other property
listed in Annex "A" hereof and
made an integral part of this
complaint.
Finally, paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16 and
17 enumerate five (5) causes of action.
As earlier noted, of the eighteen (18)
corporations enumerated in Annex "A" of the
complaint, only SEVEN (7) are parties to the
Deed of Assignment as ASSIGNORS therein. Also
listed in said Annex "A" are (1) frozen bank
accounts and other assets of defendant Placido E.
Mapa, Jr., (2) frozen bank accounts and other
assets of defendant Cesar Zalamea, and (3) all
other assets of all defendants sequestered
and/or frozen by the Commission pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2. The averments
earlier mentioned and the deed of assignment,
juxtaposed with Annex "A," show prima
facie that (a) the Petitioner did not intend to
enter into any amicable settlement with the
remaining eleven (11) corporations or regarding
the frozen assets listed in said Annex "A," and
(b) the assets of the defendants in the said
eleven corporations were not necessarily
obtained through or as a consequence of the acts
or transactions described in subparagraphs (a)
to (f), paragraph 11 of the Expanded Complaint,
but probably through "the other devices,
schemes or strategems." Otherwise, these
remaining corporations should have been made
parties to the deed of assignment. Inclusio unius
est exclusio alterius.
For another, it is not true that De Venecia is
the principal party either in the specific acts
described in subparagraphs (a) to (f), paragraph
11 of the Expanded Complaint or in the other
"devices, schemes or strategems." If, at all, there
are principal party defendants in Civil Case No.
0020, then a reading of the Expanded Complaint
readily reveals that they are Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos. Of course, there are
allegations of conspiracy which, for purposes of
the nature of the action pursued, must be
understood to be civil conspiracy, 37 as
distinguished from conspiracy in criminal law. 38
Nor is it true that De Venecia is an indispensable
party with respect to the acts or transactions
subject of the causes of action. An indispensable
party is defined as one without whom the action
cannot be finally determined, whose interest in
the subject matter of the suit and in the relief
sought is so intertwined with that of the other
parties that his legal presence as a party to the
proceeding is an absolute necessity. 39 No valid
judgment can be rendered where an
indispensable party is not impleaded or brought
before the court; 40 his non-inclusion in a case is
a fatal defect and any judgment rendered therein
would be ineffective.41
In the instant case, it is clear that De Venecia is
not an indispensable party because a final
determination of the case can be had without his
legal presence. Since the defendants in Civil Case
No. 0020 are sued for (a)collective or
conspirational and (b) individual acts, it follows
that the nature of their corresponding
obligations to the Petitioner could be joint and
several as to the first and individual or personal
as to the second. And if they are solidarily liable,
it cannot be successfully maintained that De
Venecia is an indispensable party. Article 1216 of
the Civil code provides that:
The creditor may proceed
against any one of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. The demand
made against one of them
shall not be an obstacle to
those which may
subsequently be directed
against the others, so long as
the debt had not been fully
collected.
Hence, a solidary debtor is not an indispensable
party. We held so categorically in Republic
vs.Sandiganbayan, 42 a case which also involves
an action for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages filed with
the Sandiganbayan against Alfredo (Bejo)
Romualdez, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
Marcos, Jose P. Campos, Jr. and 45 other
defendants. In the said case, we set aside the
challenged resolution of the Sandiganbayan
denying a motion to drop defendant Campos, Jr.
We stated that since the Presidential
Commission on Good Government had granted
immunity to Jose Y. Campos and his family, such
immunity necessarily extended to movant Jose
Campos, Jr., who is the son of Jose Y.
Campos. Inter alia, we noted:
The fact that Campos, Jr. and
all the other defendants were
charged solidarily in the
complaint does not make him
an indispensable party. We
have ruled in the case
of Operators Incorporated
vs.American Biscuit Co., Inc.,
[154 SCRA 738 (1987)] that
"Solidarity does not make a
solidary obligor an
indispensable party in a suit
filed by the creditor." Article
1216 of the Civil Code says
that the creditor "may
proceed against anyone of the
solidary debtors or some or
all of them simultaneously."
Even assuming for the sake of argument that De
Venecia is indeed a principal party, still, based on
a principle of tort upon which the cause of action
is also predicated, his release did not operate to
release the other tortfeasors. Under American
jurisprudence three rules have developed which
deal with the question of whether the release of
one joint tortfeasor releases other tortfeasors
who are not parties to or named in the release.
The first is the ancient common-law rule that a
release of one joint tortfeasor releases all other
parties jointly liable, regardless of the intent of
the parties. The second, otherwise known as the
"First Restatement rule," states that a release of
one co-conspirator normally releases all others
unless the plaintiff expressly reserves his rights
against the others. The third provides that the
effect of the release upon co-conspirators shall
be determined in accordance with the intentions
of the parties. In Zenith Radio Corp. vs. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 43 the Supreme Court of the United
States adopted the third rule thus:
We recently adopted the final
rule giving effect to the
intentions of the parties in Aro
Mfg. Co. vs.Convertible Top
Co., supra, a patent
infringement case. . . . We
concluded that a release,
"which clearly intends to save
the releasor's rights against a
past contributory infringer,
does not automatically
surrender those rights."
xxx xxx xxx
The straightforward rule is
that a party releases only
those other parties whom he
intends to release.
The Court observed that "[t]o adopt the ancient
common-law rule would frustrate . . . partial
settlements, and thereby promote litigation,
while adoption of the First Restatement rule
would create a trap for unwary plaintiffs'
attorneys."
In the instant case, the release of De Venecia is
clearly intended to apply only to him. There was,
evidently, no intent to spread the benefit to the
other tortfeasors.
For still another reason, the "admissions" by the
Petitioner in paragraph 8 of the deed of
assignment that the guaranty facility in favor of
the Assignors "was obtained in the ordinary and
regular course of business," that " no favor was
accorded to the Landoil officers in the grant"
thereof and that the business reversals
experienced by the Landoil Group in connection
with its various construction and other projects
were due to the special reasons therein
enumerated are not equivalent to an admission
that De Venecia's
co-defendants incurred no liability whatsoever
with respect thereto. That the facility was
obtained in such manner with no favor to the
Landoil officers do not, by themselves, clear the
Board of Directors or the officers of the
Philguarantee from any liability which could
have arisen from the grant of the guaranty
facility. Private respondents were not sued as
directors or officers of a private corporation, but
as government officials who under the
Constitution were obliged to serve with the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency and to remain accountable
to the people. 44 Indeed, if it were the intention of
the parties in the deed of assignment to accord to
the private respondents the same benefit as that
granted to De Venecia, they could have easily
done so without loss of time or effort. Better yet,
the parties could have explicitly stipulated that,
in consideration of the assignment made by the
Assignors, the Petitioner shall (a) lift the
sequestration issued against Landoil and (b)
dismiss Civil Case No. 0020. It is evident from the
deed of assignment that the only non-signatory
thereto who is to be benefited thereby is
defendant De Venecia. That favor granted him is
known as a stipulation pour autrui under Article
1311 of the Civil Code as the Sandiganbayan
correctly stated in its Resolution of 8 September
1989 granting De Venecia's amended motion to
dismiss. 45 Under the said article, for such a
stipulation to be effective and binding it is
necessary that the contracting parties "must
have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor
upon a third person." 46 A "mere incidental
benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient."
The deed of assignment in question fails to even
remotely suggest such a grant in favor of the
private respondents, and for the Sandiganbayan
to read into the document that which the parties
themselves have not even thought of would be to
stipulate for the parties, which is beyond its
power to do so.
Moreover, these "admissions" are contained in
the "whereas" clauses or in the recital part of the
Deed of Assignment and are inconsistent with
the following provisions in the operative part thereto as against the Marcoses stand. It must,
thereof, to wit: (1) the ASSIGNORS shall transfer however, be stressed that, because of his death,
to the ASSIGNEE all the capital shares of Landoil Ferdinand E. Marcos had been substituted in
(up to 45% of the capital stock) identified as Civil Case No. 0020 by his heirs pursuant to the
belonging to Marcos; (2) the ASSIGNORS shall Sandiganbayan's Resolution of 16 November
fully cooperate with the PCGG or any 1989. Accordingly, he ceased to be a party and
government agency in the prosecution of any the challenged resolutions are, insofar as he is
case to be filed against Marcos and his cronies; concerned, ineffective. Be that as it may, the
and (3) the dismissal of Civil Case No. 0020 error committed by the Sandiganbayan in
against the ASSIGNORS and De Venecia shall be granting him such unusual benefit compounded
without prejudice, and the case shall be deemed the arbitrariness of the resolutions. Finally, as an
automatically reinstated in the event of the additional indicium of such arbitrariness,
ASSIGNORS' non-compliance with any of their although under the deed of assignment the
obligations. These obligations are, in fact, dismissal of the case against the Assignors and
consistent with the 14th to 16th causes of action De Venecia was to be "without prejudice," the
enumerated in the Expanded Complaint. challenged dismissal against the latter's co-
defendants was without qualification.
These "admissions" are merely embodied in the
recital part of the deed. It is a settled rule in the WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition and to
construction of contracts that in case of a conflict set aside the challenged resolutions, with costs
between the operative part of a contract and the against the private respondents.
recitals thereof, the former will
prevail. 47 The recitals are but merely
Padilla, J., concurs.
introductory and prefatory statements of a deed
and are not an essential part of the operating
portions of the contract. They may be used as a
guide in interpreting ambiguous portions of the
operative part, but cannot supersede the latter.
Finally, the Sandiganbayan's grave abuse of
discretion became more pronounced insofar as
the challenged resolutions benefit defendant
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos. They
are the principal dramatis personae in Civil Case
No. 0020, and the allegations in the Expanded
Complaint do not limit the causes of action
against them to transactions involving
Philguarantee which, if proven, do not at all, by
any standard, make them the least culpable. As a
matter of fact, the ASSIGNORS in the deed of
assignment admit that approximately 45% of the
outstanding capital stock of the flagship
corporation, Landoil Resources Corporation, and
through the latter, "a proportionate portion of
the outstanding capital stock of the six other
corporations" are owned by defendant
Ferdinand E. Marcos. Since the remaining eleven
(11) corporations listed in Annex "A" of the
Expanded Complaint are not parties to the deed
of assignment, the allegations with respect
Republic of the Philippines Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit against the
Supreme Court Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with
Manila NACHURA, J.: Damages.[7] The Tanjangcos filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[9] of the said RTC Decision
Eventually, the Cuasos filed a Third-Party which the RTC, however, denied in its
Before this Court is a Petition for Review Complaint[8] against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Order[10] dated June 28, 1993.
THIRD DIVISION on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Engr. De Dios. The Cuasos ascribed negligence to
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain the proper Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Tanjangcos,
Appeals (CA) Decision[2] datedJanuary 31, specifications of their house, and to Engr. De the Cuasos, and C.B. Paraz all appealed to the CA.
2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43217, which reversed Dios for his failure to undertake an accurate
and set aside the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, dated March 30, litigation. The Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for Decision. It held that the Cuasos acted in bad
CORINTHIAN GARDENS 1993. G.R. No. 160795 approving their relocation survey and building faith in land-grabbing the 87 square meter-
plans without verifying their accuracy and in portion of Lot 69 as of April 5, 1989.
ASSOCIATION, INC., making representations as to Engr. De Dios' Correlatively, the CA allowed the Tanjangcos to
The Antecedents: integrity and competence. The Cuasos alleged exercise the rights granted under Articles 449,
Petitioner, that had Corinthian exercised diligence in 450, 451 and 549 of the New Civil Code, which
performing its duty, they would not have been include the right to demand the demolition of the
Present: Reynaldo and Maria Luisa
Respondents-spouses involved in a boundary dispute with the offending perimeter wall after reimbursing the
Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos) own Lots 68 and 69 Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that Cuasos the necessary expenses for the
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Corinthian should also be held answerable for preservation of the encroached area. The Cuasos
No. 242245[4] and 282961[5]respectively, located any damages that they might incur as a result of were ordered to pay monthly rentals
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
at Corinthian J., Quezon City,
Gardens Subdivision, of P10,000.00 for the use, enjoyment and
such construction.
which is managed by petitioner Corinthian occupancy of the lot from 1989 up to the time
- versus - Chairperson, they vacate the property considering the location
Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On the
other hand, respondents-spouses Frank and On March 30, 1993, the RTC rendered a Decision and category of the same. They were, likewise,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, ordered to pay the Tanjangcos P100,000.00, as
Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is in favor of the Tanjangcos. It ruled that the
adjacent to the Tanjangcos lots. Cuasos perimeter wall encroached on the land of moral damages,P50,000.00 as exemplary
CHICO-NAZARIO,
the Tanjangos by 87 square meters.It, however, damages, and P150,000.00 as attorneys fees. The
Before theNACHURA,
Cuasos constructed their house ruled that the Cuasos were builders in good faith, CA also imposed six percent (6%) interest per
SPOUSES REYNALDO and and
on Lot 65, a relocation survey was necessary.As and gave the Tanjangcos the option to sell and annum on all the awards. The Cuasos appeal
against the Tanjangcos, on the other hand, was
MARIA LUISA TANJANGCO, and SPOUSES FRANK and Geodetic Engineer Democrito De Dios (Engr. De
REYES, JJ. the Cuasos the option to buy the encroaching
Dios), operating under the business name D.M. portion of the land, at a price to be agreed upon dismissed for lack of merit. On the third-party
TERESITA CUASO, De Dios Realty and Surveying, conducted all the by the parties within sixty (60) days from receipt complaints, Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De
previous surveys for the subdivision's developer, of the said Decision. In the event that the Cuasos Dios were all found negligent in performing their
Respondents. Corinthian Promulgated:
referred Engr. De Dios to the were unable and unwilling to purchase the said respective duties and so they were ordered to
Cuasos. Before, during and after the construction portion, the perimeter wall should be contribute five percent (5%) each, or a total of
of the said house, Corinthian conducted periodic demolished at the latters expense. The RTC also fifteen percent (15%) to all judgment sums and
ocular inspections in order to determine ordered the Cuasos to pay monthly rentals amounts that the Cuasos shall eventually pay
complianceJune
with27,
the approved plans pursuant to
2008 of P2,000.00 commencing from the time of the under the decision, also with interest of six
the Manual of Rules and Regulations of filing of the complaint. The RTC likewise held percent (6%) per annum.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Corinthian.[6] Unfortunately, after the Cuasos that C.B. Paraz was grossly negligent in not
--------------x constructed their house employing the services taking into account the correct boundaries of Only Corinthian filed a Motion for
of C.B. Paraz & Construction Co., Inc. (C.B. Paraz) Cuasos lot when it constructed the house.It, thus, Reconsideration[11] of the CA Decision within the
as builder, their perimeter fence encroached on ordered C.B. Paraz to pay moral and exemplary 15-day reglementary period. No motion for
the Tanjangcos Lot 69 by 87 square meters. damages as well as attorneys fees to the reconsideration was filed by the Cuasos, C.B.
Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. The third-party Paraz and/or Engr. De Dios.
No amicable settlement was reached between complaint against Corinthian and Engr. De Dios,
DECISION the parties. Thus, the Tanjangcos demanded that on the other hand, was dismissed for lack of
the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the cause of action.
latter failed and refused, prompting the
About six (6) months later, or on August 12, irreparable damage to them, because what is
2003, the Cuasos filed a sought to be demolished is part of their
Comment/Manifestation[12] praying that they be residence. They claimed that no amount of
allowed to adopt Corinthians Motion for money will compensate for the damage they
Reconsideration. stand to suffer should any demolition
subsequently prove to be wrongful. They argued
In its Resolution[13] dated November 14, 2003, that before any execution can be carried out, it is
the CA denied Corinthians Motion for necessary to first determine whether or not
Reconsideration. Corinthian was negligent in approving the
building plan and whether or not it acted in good
Hence, Corinthian filed the instant Petition for faith in doing so. Such determination, according
Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision to the Cuasos, will in turn determine whether or
and Resolution, and impleading the Cuasos as not they were in good faith in constructing the
one of the respondents being the third-party house.[24]
plaintiffs in the RTC.
This Court gave due course to Corinthians
petition and required the parties to submit their The Tanjangcos opposed the Cuasos' application
respective memorandum.[14] In compliance, the for TRO. They countered that the only pending
Cuasos submitted their Memorandum[15] and matter with this Court is the appeal by
Supplement to Memorandum,[16] which were Corinthian; hence, the implementation of the
both noted by this Court in its Resolutions dated January 31, 2003 Decision of the CA against the
January 10, 2005[17] and February 2, Cuasos will not preempt the outcome of the said
2005, [18]respectively. pending incidents. Also, any action taken by this
Court on Corinthians petition would not benefit
In the meantime, the Tanjangcos moved for the Cuasos for they did not appeal the adverse
partial entry of judgment of the CA Decision decision against them. Accordingly, they cannot
which was granted by the CA in its obtain affirmative relief from this Court by
Resolution[19] dated May 26, 2006, directing the reason or on account of the appeal taken by
issuance of an Entry of Judgment and a Corinthian. The appeal, they added, is personal
Certification that its Decision dated January 31 to Corinthian. Finally, they argued that the
2003 has become final and executory with Cuasos are now estopped from questioning the
respect to the Cuasos, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De enforcement of the CA Decision since they issued
Dios for their failure to file an appeal assailing a managers check to pay the money judgment.[25]
the said Decision before this Court.
The Tanjangcos then moved for the execution of In this Court's Resolution dated July 18, 2007, we
the judgment against the Cuasos, specifically the denied the Cuasos' application for TRO and/or
demolition of the perimeter fence,[20] which was writ of preliminary injunction for lack of merit.
also granted by the RTC in its The denial was based on sound legal
Order[21] dated December 18, 2006. principles. It is axiomatic that to be entitled to
the injunctive writ, one must show that there
exists a right to be protected which is directly
Other than the filing of an Opposition[22] and a threatened by the act sought to be enjoined.
Motion for Reconsideration[23] before the RTC, Furthermore, there must be a showing that the
the Cuasos prayed for the issuance of a invasion of the right is material and substantial,
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or that the right of complainant is clear and
preliminary injunction before this Court to unmistakable, and that there is an urgent and
enjoin the demolition of the perimeter fence. paramount necessity for the writ to issue in
They averred that the premature demolition of order to prevent serious damage.[26]
the alleged encroaching perimeter wall and
other improvements will cause grave and
In the Cuasos case, their right to injunctive relief affirmative relief unless he has also
had not been clearly and unmistakably appealed.[31] This applies to C.B. Paraz and Engr.
demonstrated. They failed to show proof that De Dios who likewise failed to assail the
there is material and substantial invasion of their aforementioned CA Decision.
right to warrant the issuance of an injunctive
writ. Indeed, the enforcement of the writ of With this matter put to rest, we now go to the
execution, which would demolish the Cuasos main issues raised by Corinthian, the sole
perimeter fence, is manifestly prejudicial to their petitioner in this case, to wit:
interest. However, they possess no clear and
unmistakable legal right that merits protection a) Whether or not there is
through the writ of preliminary legal basis for the Court of
injunction.[27] Their right to maintain the said Appeals to hold petitioner
fence had been declared inferior to the Corinthian Gardens
Tanjangcos right to the demolition of the fence, Association, Inc. liable to pay
after the CA judgment had become final and 5% of the judgment money to
executory as to the Cuasos. Sps. Tanjangco on account of
It bears stressing that the Cuasos failed to appeal the encroachment made by
the ruling of the CA. This failure to contest the CA Sps. Cuaso[; and]
decision before this Court was fatal to their
cause. It had the effect of an admission that they
indeed acted in bad faith, as they accepted the CA b) Whether or not the
ruling. The decision of the CA, therefore, became Court of Appeals has
binding and final as to them.[28] As a matter of legal basis to increase
fact, the CA already issued a partial entry of unilaterally and without
judgment against the Cuasos. proof the amount
prayed for in the
An injunction to stay a final and executory Complaint, i.e., P2,000.0
decision is unavailing except only after a 0, as reasonable
showing that facts and circumstances exist which compensation for the
would render execution unjust or inequitable, or use and enjoyment of
that a change in the situation of the parties the portion of the lot
occurred. Here, no such exception exists as encroached upon,
shown by the facts earlier narrated.[29] toP10,000.00.[32]
Corinthian claims that the approval of the
While it is true that this Court noted the building plan of the Cuasos was not tainted with
Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum negligence as it did not approve the survey
filed by the Cuasos, such notation was made only relocation plan but merely the architectural,
insofar as Corinthian made them respondents in structural and sanitary plans for Cuasos' house;
this petition. This Court cannot grant to the that the purpose of the said approval is not to
Cuasos any affirmative relief as they did not file a ensure that the house to be erected on a
petition questioning the CA ruling. Consequently, particular lot is constructed within its
the Decision of the CA holding that the Cuasos boundaries but only to ensure compliance with
acted in bad faith and that the perimeter fence the Manual of Rules and Regulations; that while
may now be demolished cannot be put in issue Corinthian conducts actual site inspections, the
by the Cuasos. It is a fundamental principle that a inspection and approval of the building plans are
party who does not appeal, or file a petition limited to table inspection only; that the survey
for certiorari, is not entitled to any affirmative relocation plan was never submitted for
relief.[30] An appellee who is not an appellant Corinthian's approval; that the acceptance of the
may assign errors in his brief where his purpose builder's bond did not make Corinthian
is to maintain the judgment, but he cannot seek automatically liable for the encroachment and
modification or reversal of the judgment or claim for damages; and that Corinthian approved the
building plan with the good faith and due
diligence required under the circumstances. It,
thus, concludes that it cannot be held liable
to pay five percent (5%) of the money judgment
to the Tanjangcos on account of the encroachme
nt made by the Cuasos. Likewise, it finds no legal
basis for the CA to unilaterally increase the
amount of the adjudged rent from P2,000.00
to P10,000.00 which was not prayed for by the
Tanjangcos in their complaint and in the absence
of evidence adduced by the parties.[33]
On the other hand, the Tanjangcos stand by the
ruling of the CA and opine that Corinthian was
negligent in approving the building plan of the
Cuasos. They submit that Corinthian's claim that
it merely conducts table inspections of buildings
further bolsters their argument that Corinthian
was negligent in conveniently and unilaterally
restricting and limiting the coverage of its
approval, contrary to its own Manual of Rules
and Regulations; that the acceptance of a
builder's bond does not automatically make
Corinthian liable but the same affirms the fact
that a homeowner can hold it liable for the
consequences of the approval of a building plan;
and that Corinthian, by regularly demanding and
accepting membership dues, must be wary of its
responsibility to protect the rights and interests
of its members. Lastly, the Tanjangcos contend
that a court can take judicial notice of the general
increase in the rentals of real estate, as in this
case, where the CA considered the value of their
lot in the posh-and-swank Corinthian Gardens
Subdivision and the fact that they were deprived
of it for almost two decades. The Tanjangcos
pray that this Court sustain the ruling of the
CA.[34]
The instant case is obviously one for tort, as
governed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is blameworthy, or negligent in a man of ordinary Association and the
governed by the provisions of intelligence and prudence, and determines appropriate Builders cash bond
this Chapter. liability according to that standard.[37] and pre-construction fees are
paid. The Association will not
In every tort case filed under this provision, By this test, we find Corinthian negligent. allow the entry of construction
plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of materials and process
evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the While the issue of Corinthian's alleged identification cards for
plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the negligence is factual in character,[38] a review by workers if the above conditions
defendant or some other person for whose act he this Court is proper because the CA's factual are not complied
must respond; and (3) the connection of cause findings differ from those of the RTC's.[39]Thus, with. Likewise, all renovations,
and effect between the fault or negligence and after a meticulous review of the evidence on repairs, additions and
the damages incurred.[35] record, we hold that the CA committed no improvements to a finished
reversible error when it deviated from the house except electrical wiring,
Undeniably, the perimeter fence of the Cuasos findings of fact of the RTC. The CA's findings and will have to be approved by the
encroached on Lot 69 owned by the Tanjangcos conclusions are substantiated by the evidence on Association. Water service
by 87 square meters as duly found by both the record and are more in accord with law and connection of a homeowner
RTC and the CA in accordance with the evidence reason. Indeed, it is clear that Corinthian failed to who undertakes construction
on record. As a result, the Tanjangcos suffered exercise the requisite diligence in insuring that work without prior approval of
damage in having been deprived of the use of the Cuasos abide by its Manual of Rules and the Association will be cut-off
that portion of their lot encroached upon. Thus, Regulations, thereby resulting in the in addition to the sanctions
the primordial issue to be resolved in this case is encroachment on the Tanjangcos property. previously mentioned.
whether Corinthian was negligent under the We agree with the CA when it aptly held:
circumstances and, if so, whether such It goes without saying that
negligence contributed to the injury suffered by Corinthian cannot and should this Manual of Rules and
the Tanjangcos. not be allowed to justify or Regulations applies to all - or
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be excuse its negligence by it does not apply at all. To
merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary claiming that its approval of borrow a popular expression,
prudence and may be one which creates a the Cuasos building plans was what is sauce for the gander is
situation involving an unreasonable risk to only limited to a so-called sauce for the goose - or ought
another because of the expectable action of the table inspection; and not to be. To put it matter-of-
other, a third person, an animal, or a force of actual site measurement. To factly and bluntly, thus, its so-
nature. A negligent act is one from which an accept some such postulate is called table inspection
ordinary prudent person in the actor's position, to put a premium on approval of the Cuasos
in the same or similar circumstances, would negligence.Corinthian was not building plans is no less of an
foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to organized solely for the approval, as approvals come
others as to cause him not to do the act or to do defendants Cuasos. It is also and go. And since it is an
it in a more careful manner.[36] the subdivision of the approval tainted with
plaintiffs-spouses Tanjangcos negligence, the necessary and
The test to determine the existence of negligence - and of all others who have inevitable consequences
in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did their dwelling units or abodes which law and justice attach
the defendant in committing the alleged therein.Pertinently, its Manual to such negligence must, as a
negligent act use that reasonable care and of Rules and Regulations matter of law and justice, also
caution which an ordinary person would have stipulates in Section 3 thereof necessarily attach to
used in the same situation? If not, then he is (under the heading Corinthian.
guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the Construction), thus:
standard supplied by the imaginary conduct of
the discreet paterfamilias in Roman law. The A. Rules and Regulations
existence of negligence in a given case is not And then again third party
determined by reference to the personal No new construction can be defendant-
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. started unless the building appellee Corinthian Garden re
The law considers what would be reckless, plans are approved by the quired the posting of a
 builders cash bond (Exh. 5-
Corinthian) from the
defendants-appellants Cuasos
and the third-party defendant
C.B. Paraz Construction to
secure the performance of
their undertaking.Surely,
Corinthian does not imply
that while it may take the
benefits from the Builders
cash bond, it may, Pilate-like,
wash its hands of any
responsibility or liability that
would or might arise from the
construction or building of the
structure for which the cash
bond was in the first place
posted. That is not only unjust
and immoral, but downright
unchristian and iniquitous.
Under the same parity of
reasoning, the payment by the
appellants-Cuasos to the
appellee Corinthian of pre-
construction and membership
fees in the Association must
necessarily entail the creation
of certain obligations on the
part of Corinthian. For duties
and responsibilities always go
hand in hand with rights and
privileges. That is the law of
life - and that is the law of
every civilized society. It is an
axiom of equity that he who
receives the benefits must
share the burdens.[40]
By its Manual of Rules and Regulations, it is
reasonable to assume that Corinthian, through
its representative, in the approval of building
plans, and in the conduct of periodic inspections
of on-going construction projects within the
subdivision, is responsible in insuring
compliance with the approved plans, inclusive of
the construction of perimeter walls, which in this
case is the subject of dispute between the
Tanjangcos and the Cuasos.[41] It is not just or
equitable to relieve Corinthian of any liability
when, by its very own rules, it imposes its
authority over all its members to the end that no
new construction can be started unless the plans
are approved by the Association and the
appropriate cash bond and pre-construction fees
are paid. Moreover, Corinthian can impose
sanctions for violating these rules. Thus, the
proposition that the inspection is merely a table
inspection and, therefore, should exempt
Corinthian from liability, is unacceptable. After
all, if the supposed inspection is merely a table
inspection and the approval granted to every
member is a mere formality, then the purpose of
the rules would be defeated. Compliance
therewith would not be mandatory, and
sanctions imposed for violations could be
disregarded. Corinthian's imprimatur on the
construction of the Cuasos' perimeter wall over
the property of the Tanjangcos assured the
Cuasos that everything was in order.
In sum, Corinthians failure to prevent the
encroachment of the Cuasos perimeter wall into
Tanjangcos property despite the inspection
conducted constitutes negligence and, at the very
least, contributed to the injury suffered by the
Tanjangcos.
On the second issue, our ruling in Spouses Badillo
v. Tayag[42] is instructive:
Citing Sia v. Court of
Appeals [272 SCRA 141, May
5, 1997], petitioners argue
that the MTC may take judicial
notice of the reasonable rental
or the general price increase
of land in order to determine
the amount of rent that may
be awarded to them. In that
case, however, this Court
relied on the CA's factual
findings, which were based on
the evidence
presented beforethe trial
court. In determining
reasonable rent,
the RTC therein took account
of the following factors: 1) the
realty assessment of the land,
2) the increase in realty taxes,
and 3) the prevailing rate of
rentals in the vicinity. Clearly,
the trial court relied, not on
mere judicial notice, but on
the evidence presented before
it.
Indeed, courts may fix the
reasonable amount of rent for
the use and occupation of a
disputed property. However,
petitioners herein erred in
assuming that courts, in
determining the amount of
rent, could simply rely on
their own appreciation of land
values without considering
any evidence. As we have said
earlier, a court may fix the
reasonable amount of rent,
but it must still base its action
on the evidence adduced by
the parties.
In Herrera v. Bollos [G.R. No.
138258, January 18, 2002],
the trial court awarded rent to
the defendants in a forcible
entry case. Reversing the RTC,
this Court declared that the
reasonable amount of rent
could be determined not by
mere judicial notice, but by
supporting evidence:
x x x A court cannot take judicial
notice of a factual matter in
controversy. The court may take
judicial notice of matters of
public knowledge, or which are
capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be
known to judges because of
their judicial functions. Before
taking such judicial notice, the
court must allow the parties to
be heard thereon. Hence, there
can be no judicial notice on the
rental value of the premises in
question without supporting
evidence.
Truly, mere judicial notice is
inadequate, because evidence
is required for a court to
determine the proper rental
value. But contrary to
Corinthian's arguments, both
the RTCand the CA found that
indeed rent was due the
Tanjangcos because they were
deprived of possession and
use of their property. This
uniform factual finding of the
RTC and the CA was based on
the evidence presented below.
Moreover, in Spouses Catungal
v. Hao,[43]we considered the
increase in the award of
rentals as reasonable given
the particular circumstances
of each case. We noted therein
that the respondent denied
the petitioners the benefits,
including rightful possession,
of their property for almost a
decade.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos
were deprived of possession and use of their
property for more than two decades through no
fault of their own. Thus, we find no cogent
reason to disturb the monthly rental fixed by the
CA.
All told, the CA committed no reversible error.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals
isAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of
the Third Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA
City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch
ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and
CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees.
Eriberto Seno for appellant.
Jose M. Mesina for appellees.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the
Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
rendered on November 5, 1970.
The background facts to the controversy may be
set forth as follows:
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a
Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of damages on
account of a vehicular accident involving his
automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot
and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos
Pepito, the last three being the private
respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a
criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo
Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the pre-
trial in the civil case, counsel for private
respondents moved to suspend the civil action
pending the final determination of the criminal
suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules
of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has 1. THE TRIAL COURT, no pre-existing contractual
been commenced. no civil RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO relation between the parties,
action arising from the same CANONOY, ERRED IN is caned a quasi-delict and is
offense can be prosecuted, HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL governed by the provisions of
and the same shall be OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 this Chapter. (1902a)
suspended, in whatever stage FILED IN THE CITY COURT OF
it may be found, until final MANDAUE SHOULD BE Art. 2180. The obligation
judgment in the criminal SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER A imposed by article 2176 is
proceeding has been FINAL JUDGMENT IS demandable not only for one's
rendered; RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL own acts or omissions but
CASE. also for those of persons for
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated whom one is responsible.
August 11, 1970, ordered the suspension of the 2. THAT THE COURT ERRED
civil case. Petitioner's Motion for IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER
xxx xxx xxx
Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on TO AVOID DELAY THE
August 25, 1970, 1 petitioner elevated the matter OFFENDED PARTY MAY
on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR Employers shall be liable for
Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on September DAMAGES IN THE CRIMINAL the damages cause by their
11, 1970, alleging that the City Judge had acted CASE. employees and household
with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the helpers acting within the
civil action for being contrary to law and scope of their assigned tasks,
3. THAT THE COURT ERRED even though the former are
jurisprudence. 2 IN HOLDING THAT THE not engaged in any business
PETITION FOR certiorari IS or industry.
On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge NOT PROPER, BECAUSE THE
dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IS
ground that there was no grave abuse of INTERLOCUTORY. xxx xxx xxx
discretion on the part of the City Court in
suspending the civil action inasmuch as damage 4. THAT THE COURT ERRED The responsibility treated of
to property is not one of the instances when an IN HOLDING THAT THE in this article shall cease when
independent civil action is proper; that PETITION IS DEFECTIVE. 4 the persons herein mentioned
petitioner has another plain, speedy, and prove that they observed all
adequate remedy under the law, which is to the diligence of a good father
submit his claim for damages in the criminal all of which can be synthesized into one decisive of a family to prevent damage.
issue: whether or not there can be an
case; that the resolution of the City Court is (1903a)
interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is independent civil action for damage to property
improper; and that the Petition is defective during the pendency of the criminal action.
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that
inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a it was the fault or negligence of the driver,
Writ of mandamus (Annex "R"). Petitioner's From the Complaint filed by petitioner before
Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is evident owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision
respondent Judge in an Order dated November that the nature and character of his action
between his automobile and said jeepney; that
14,1970 (Annex "S" and Annex "U"). was quasi-delictual predicated principally on damages were sustained by petitioner because of
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, which
the collision; that there was a direct causal
Hence, this Petition for Review before this provide: connection between the damages he suffered
Tribunal, to which we gave due course on and the fault and negligence of private
February 25, 1971. 3 Art. 2176. Whoever by act or respondents.
omission causes damage to
Petitioner makes these: another, there being fault or Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents
negligence is obliged to pay contended, among others, that defendant,
for the damage done. Such Valeriana Pepito, observed due diligence in the
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR fault or negligence, if there is
selection and supervision of her employees,
particularly of her co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a
defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-
delict. 5
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil
case may proceed as a separate and independent
civil action, as specifically provided for in Article
2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for
fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the
defendant. (n)
The crucial distinction
between criminal negligence
and quasi-delict, which is
readily discernible from the
foregoing codal provision, has
been expounded in Barredo
vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607,
620-621, 6 thus:
Firstly, the Revised Penal
Code in article 365 punishes
not only reckless but also
simple imprudence. if we
were to hold that articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code
refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by
law, according to the literal
import of article 1093 of the
Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana would have
very little scope and
application in actual life.
Death or injury to
persons and damage to
property through any degree
of negligence — even the
slightest would have to be
indemnified only through the
principle of civil hability
arising from crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere
would remain for quasidelito
or culpa aquiliana We are
loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to
bring about a situation so
absurd and anomalous. Nor
are we, in the interpretation
of the laws, disposed to
uphold the letter that killeth
rather than the spirit that
giveth life. We will not use the
literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost
lifeless a principle of such
ancient origin and such full-
grown development as culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delito,
which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to
11910 of the Spanish Civil
Code.
Secondly, to find the accused
guilty in a criminal case, proof
of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is required, while in a
civil case, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to make
the defendant pay in damages.
There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which
cannot be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be
made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code,
otherwise, there would be
many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi
jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is
only one way to make
defendants liability effective,
and that is, to sue the driver
and exhaust his (the latter's)
property first, would be
tantamount to compelling the
plaintiff to follow a devious
and cumbersome method of
obtaining a reliel True, there
is such a remedy under our
laws, but there is also a more
expeditious way, which is
based on the primary and
direct responsibility of the
defendant under article 1903
of the Civil Code. Our view of
the law is more likely to
facilitate remedy for civil
wrongs because the
procedure indicated by the
defendant is wasteful and
productive of delay, it being a
matter of common knowledge
that professional drivers of
taxis and similar public
conveyances usually do not
have sufficient means with
which to pay damages. Why,
then, should the plaintiff be
required in all cases to go
through this round-about,
unnecessary, and probably
useless procedure? In
construing the laws, courts
have endeavored to shorten
and facilitate the pathways of
right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be
said that the primary and
direct responsibility of
employers and their
presumed negligence are
principles calculated to
protect society. Workmen and
employees should be carefully
chosen and supervised in
order to avoid injury to the
public. It is the masters or
employers who principally
reap the profits resulting from
the services of these servants
and employees. It is but right
that they should guarantee
the latter's careful conduct for
the personnel and patrimonial
safety of others. As Theilhard
has said, "they should
reproach themselves, at least,
some for their weakness,
others for their poor selection
and all for their negligence."
And according to Manresa, "It
is much more equitable and
just that such responsibility
should fail upon the principal
or director who could have
chosen a careful and prudent
employee, and not upon the
such employee because of his
confidence in the principal or
director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd
Ed.) Many jurists also base
this primary responsibility of
the employer on the principle
of representation of the
principal by the agent. Thus,
Oyuelos says in the work
already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747)
that before third persons the
employer and employee
vienen a ser como una sola
personalidad, por refundicion
de la del dependiente en la de
quien la emplea y utihza
(become as one personality by
the merging of the person of
the employee in that of him
who employs and utilizes
him.) All these observations
acquire a peculiar force and
significance when it comes to
motor accidents, and there is
need of stressing and
accentuating the
responsibility of owners of
motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad
sweep of the provisions of
both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code on this subject,
which has given rise to
overlapping or concurrence of
spheres already discussed,
and for lack of understanding
of the character and efficacy
of the action for
culpaaquiliana there has
grown up a common practice
to seek damages only by
virtue of the Civil
responsibility arising from
crime, forgetting that there is
another remedy, which is by
invoking articles 1902-1910
of the Civil Code. Although
this habitual method is
allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered
practically useless and
nugatory the more
expeditious and effective
remedy based on culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra-
contractual. In the present
case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course.
But we believe it is high time
we pointed out to the harm
done by such practice and to
restore the principle of
responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles
1902 et seq. of the Civil Code
to its full rigor. It is high time
we cause the stream of quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana to
flow on its own natural
channel, so that its waters
may no longer be diverted
into that of a crime under the
Penal Code. This will, it is
believed, make for the bet ter
safeguarding of private rights
because it re-establishes an
ancient and additional
remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent
civil action, not depending on
the issues, stations and results
of a criminal prosecution, and
entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel is
more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious
redress. (Garcia vs. Florida 52
SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31,
1973). (Emphasis supplied)
The separate and independent civil action for
a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section
2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil
action. — In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32,
33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, Are
independent civil action
entirely separate and distinct
from the c action, may be
brought by the injured party
during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided the
right is reserved as required
in the preceding section. Such
civil action shag proceed
independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of
evidence.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing
section categorically lists cases provided for
in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as
allowing of an "independent civil action."
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it
has to be held that the City Court, in surrounding
the civil action, erred in placing reliance on
section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, supra which refers to "other civil actions
arising from cases not included in the section
just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above
quoted), in which case 6 once the criminal action
has being commenced, no civil action arising
from the same offense can be prosecuted and the
same shall be suspended in whatever stage it
may be found, until final judgment in the
criminal proceeding has been rendered." Stated
otherwise, the civil action referred to in Secs.
3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
which should be suspended after the criminal
action has been instituted is that arising from the
criminal offense not the civil action based
on quasi-delict
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes
relevance when it provides:
Art. 31. When the civil action
is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or
omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the
latter.
For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-
delict is that of an independent source of
obligation "not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the
Civil Code bolsters this conclusion when it
specifically recognizes that:
Art. 1157. Obligations arise
from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions
punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
(Emphasis supplied)
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of
action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of
quasidelica as enunciated in Article 2176 of the
Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not
only injuries to persons but also damage to
property. 7 It makes no distinction between
"damage to persons" on the one hand and
"damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the
word "damage" is used in two concepts: the
"harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done.
And with respect to harm it is plain that it
includes both injuries to person and property
since "harm" is not limited to personal but also
to property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-
delict in the law itself include damage to
property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the
Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible
for damages caused by excessive smoke which
may be harmful to persons or property."
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are
constrained to hold that respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in upholding the
Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu,
suspending the civil action based on a quasi-
delict until after the criminal case is finally
terminated. Having arrived at this conclusion, a
discussion of the other errors assigned becomes
unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari
prayed for, the Decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby
set aside, and the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, Branch 11, is hereby ordered to proceed
with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of that
Court.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez,
Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R.
ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First
Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF
OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus is whether a
corporation, which has built through its agents,
waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances
within its land, thereby causing inundation and
damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly
liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177
of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the
resulting civil case can proceed independently of
the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad
Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is
adjacent to that of private respondent,
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a
religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation,
waterpaths and contrivances, including an
artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly
inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a
young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops
and plants, washed away costly fences,
endangered the lives of petitioners and their
laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and
exposed plants and other improvements to
destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal
action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82,
before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch
4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando
Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and
directors of herein respondent corporation, for
destruction by means of inundation under
Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners
filed another action against respondent
corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as
Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction before the same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed
its answer to the complaint and opposition to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Hearings were conducted including ocular
inspections on the land. However, on April 26,
1984, the trial court, acting on respondent
corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the
civil action, issued an order suspending further
hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after
judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-
907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to
dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court
issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed
order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of
jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was
instituted ahead of the civil case was still
unresolved. Said order was anchored on the
provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of
Court which provides that "criminal and civil
actions arising from the same offense may be
instituted separately, but after the criminal
action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been rendered in the criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the defendant, thru the lower
Intermediate Appellate Court. 3 portion of its concrete hollow-
blocks fence situated on the
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate right side of its cemented gate
Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a fronting the provincial
decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the highway, and connected by
trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed defendant to a man height
inter-connected cement
by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court
in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6 culverts which were also
constructed and lain by
defendant cross-wise beneath
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal the tip of the said cemented
of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with
gate, the left-end of the said
Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. inter-connected culverts again
Petitioners contend that the trial court and the
connected by defendant to a
Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case big hole or opening thru the
No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasi- lower portion of the same
delict. Petitioners have raised a valid point. concrete hollowblocks fence
on the left side of the said
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in cemented gate, which hole or
court is determined by the facts alleged in the opening is likewise connected
complaint as constituting the cause of by defendant to the cemented
action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the mouth of a big canal, also
law to govern it, including the period of constructed by defendant,
prescription, is to be determined not by the which runs northward
claim of the party filing the action, made in his towards a big hole or opening
argument or brief, but rather by the complaint which was also built by
itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The defendant thru the lower
nature of an action is not necessarily determined portion of its concrete hollow-
or controlled by its title or heading but the body blocks fence which separates
of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid the land of plaintiffs from that
possible denial of substantial justice due to legal of defendant (and which
technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws serves as the exit-point of the
should be liberally construed so that the litigants floodwater coming from the
may have ample opportunity to prove their land of defendant, and at the
respective claims. 9 same time, the entrance-point
of the same floodwater to the
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of land of plaintiffs, year after
petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748: year, during rainy or stormy
seasons.
4) That within defendant's
land, likewise located at Biga 5) That moreover, on the
(Biluso), Silang, Cavite, middle-left portion of its land
adjacent on the right side of just beside the land of
the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, plaintiffs, defendant also
defendant constructed constructed an artificial lake,
waterpaths starting from the the base of which is soil,
middle-right portion thereof which utilizes the water being
leading to a big hole or channeled thereto from its
opening, also constructed by water system thru inter-
connected galvanized iron c) During without due authority constructs a bank or dike, or omission constituting fault or negligence,
pipes (No. 2) and rainy and stopping the flow or communication between a thus:
complimented by rain water stormy creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss
during rainy or stormy seasons the and damages to a third party who, like the rest of Article 2176. Whoever by act
seasons, so much so that the lives of the residents, is entitled to the use and or omission causes damage to
water below it seeps into, and plaintiffs enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to another, there being fault or
the excess water above it and their the payment of an indemnity for loss and negligence, is obliged to pay
inundates, portions of the laborers damages to the injured party. for the damage done. Such
adjoining land of plaintiffs. are always fault or negligence, if there is
in danger. While the property involved in the cited case no pre-existing contractual
6) That as a result of the belonged to the public domain and the property relation between the parties,
inundation brought about by d) Plants subject of the instant case is privately owned, the is called a quasi-delict and is
defendant's aforementioned and other fact remains that petitioners' complaint governed by the provisions of
water conductors, improveme sufficiently alleges that petitioners have this chapter.
contrivances and nts on sustained and will continue to sustain damage
manipulators, a young man other due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or
was drowned to death, while portions of respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable
herein plaintiffs suffered and the land of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to by law" but also acts criminal in character,
will continue to suffer, as plaintiffs the petitioners, the act or omission of whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
follows: are respondent corporation supposedly constituting Consequently, a separate civil action lies against
exposed to fault or negligence, and the causal connection the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he
a) Portions destruction between the act and the damage, with no pre- is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
of the land . ... 10 existing contractual obligation between the acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
of plaintiffs parties make a clear case of a quasi allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also
were A careful examination of the aforequoted delict or culpa aquiliana. criminally), to recover damages on both scores,
eroded and complaint shows that the civil action is one and would be entitled in such eventuality only to
converted under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code It must be stressed that the use of one's property the bigger award of the two, assuming the
to deep, on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi- is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil awards made in the two cases vary. 13
wide and delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot
long canals, by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the make use thereof in such a manner as to injure The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in
such that defendant, or some other person for whose acts the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
the same he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining
can no and effect between the fault or negligence of the landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties
longer be defendant and the damages incurred by the which require that each must use his own land in Article 2177. Responsibility
planted to plaintiff. 11 a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon for fault or negligence under
any crop or the rights and interests of others. Although we the preceding article is
plant. recognize the right of an owner to build entirely separate and distinct
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the from the civil liability arising
waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent structures on his land, such structures must be
so constructed and maintained using all from negligence under the
b) Costly corporation are alleged to have inundated the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
fences land of petitioners. There is therefore, an reasonable care so that they cannot be
dangerous to adjoining landowners and can cannot recover damages twice
constructe assertion of a causal connection between the act for the same act or omission
d by of building these waterpaths and the damage withstand the usual and expected forces of
nature. If the structures cause injury or damage of the defendant.
plaintiffs sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven
were, on constitutes fault or negligence which may be the to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the
several basis for the recovery of damages. latter can claim indemnification for the injury or According to the Report of the Code Commission
occasions, damage suffered. "the foregoing provision though at first sight
washed startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
away. applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil
liability on a person for damage caused by his act negligence. The former is a violation of the
Civil Code and held that "any person who criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, which is a "culpa (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby
aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is
having always had its own foundation and ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R.
Such distinction between criminal negligence Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La
and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of
has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme the case with dispatch. This decision is
Court of Spain ... 14 immediately executory. Costs against respondent
corporation.
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this
Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana SO ORDERED.
is a separate legal institution under the Civil
Code with a substantivity all its own, and Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from a delict or crime — a
distinction exists between the civil liability Feliciano, J., is on leave.
arising from a crime and the responsibility for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The
same negligence causing damages may produce
civil liability arising from a crime under the
Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts
or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.
Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the
criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil
case, unless, of course, in the event of an
acquittal where the court has declared that the
fact from which the civil action arose did not
exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal
liability would carry with it the extinction of the
civil liability.

In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared

that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely
independent of the criminal case according to
Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can
be no logical conclusion than this, for to
subordinate the civil action contemplated in the
said articles to the result of the criminal
prosecution — whether it be conviction or
acquittal — would render meaningless the
independent character of the civil action and the
clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may
proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter."

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated

February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal
of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18
Republic of the Philippines private respondent Notre
SUPREME COURT Dame of Greater Manila
Manila starting January 1973. Prior
to school year 1976-1977, she
SECOND DIVISION was compensated on a 12-
month basis, although she
worked only during the ten-
G.R. No. 75093 February 23, 1990 month period of classes. She
was not required to report for
DELIA R. SIBAL, petitioner, work for the entire Christmas
vs. and summer vacations.
NOTRE DAME OF GREATER MANILA, However, on March 10, 1976,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS respondent's director, Fr.
COMMISSION, respondents. Enrique Gonzales, requested
her to shorten her summer
Semproniano S. Ochoco for petitioner. vacation, from two weeks
after the last day of classes to
two weeks before the first day
Williard B. Riano for private respondent. of classes of the next school
year. Petitioner acceded to the
request (Rec. p. 246).
PARAS, J.: Sometime in April 1980, Fr.
Gonzales required petitioner
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Delia R. to report during that summer
Sibal prays for the reversal of the decision dated to help in the library. In a
April 11, 1986 of public respondent National letter dated April 11, 1980,
Labor Relations Commission which affirmed the petitioner contested the
decision of the Labor Arbiter dated October 8, order, stating that it will
1982 awarding to petitioner separation pay but necessitate a change in the
denied her claim (1) for compensation for terms and conditions of her
teaching Health subject to 19 sections; (2) for employment and that library
moral damages; and (3) negating the existence of work is alien to her profession
unfair labor practice. The within petition further as nurse (Rec. p. 45). Fr.
seeks the reinstatement of petitioner to her Gonzales relented.
former position as school nurse in respondent
school without loss of seniority rights with fun In November 1980, Fr.
backwages from the date of her illegal dismissal Gonzales was replaced by Fr.
up to the time of actual reinstatement; and Pablo Garcia, an American, as
finally, seeks the desistance of private new director. Fr. Garcia
respondent Notre Dame of Greater Manila from required petitioner to report
further committing unfair labor practice. for work during the summer
before the beginning of school
year 1981-1982. Petitioner
The prefatory facts and proceedings as aptly
summed up by the Solicitor General and which informed him that her
contract does not require her
stand undisputed are:
to report for work during the
summer vacation. Fr. Garcia
Petitioner Delia R. Sibal was promised to verify her
employed as school nurse by allegation. However, he failed
to inform petitioner of his
findings. Thus, in order that
her failure to report for work
may not be misinterpreted,
petitioner filed leaves of
absence extending from April
1, 1981 to June 14, 1981 (Rec.
pp. 223-225). Petitioner failed
to receive her vacation pay.
During school year 1981-
1982, petitioner was assigned
to teach health subjects to 900
students spread out in
nineteen (19) sections of the
entire high school
department. This situation
came about because the two
(2) teachers of the health
subjects had left the school.
Petitioner, however, was not
given compensation for
teaching, notwithstanding the
fact that other teachers were
duly compensated for extra
work done. During that school
year petitioner tried to
arrange for a meeting with Fr.
Garcia regarding her vacation
pay, but to no avail because
Fr. Garcia was always busy. In
October 1981, Fr. Garcia
suffered a heart attack which
necessitated his
hospitalization. In December
1981, petitioner received her
13th month pay which was
computed on the basis of a
10-month period only.
On April 5, 1982, Fr. Garcia
again required petitioner to
work during that summer to
update all the clinical records
of the students (Rec. p. 242).
In a letter dated April 7, 1982,
petitioner objected to the
order by reiterating that her
contract does not require her
to report for work during
summer. In addition, she
reminded Fr. Garcia that she
had not received any
compensation for teaching
health subjects the past
school year (Rec. p. 6). On the
same day, Fr. Garcia replied in
a letter to the effect that it was
imperative for her to report
for work during the summer
because it is the best time to
update the clinical records
when no students could
disturb her. Also, petitioner
was not entitled to extra
compensation for teaching
because teaching was
allegedly part of her regular
working program as a school
nurse (Rec. p. 221).
On April 14, 1982, petitioner,
apart from reiterating her
objection to the order, called
the attention of Fr. Garcia to
the school's failure to pay her
salary for the summer of 1981
and of the deficiency in her
13th month pay for that year
(Rec. p. 8). The following day,
Fr. Garcia adamantly refused
to consider petitioner's
demands and threatened to
take drastic measures against
her if she remains obstinate in
her refusal to follow his order
to report for work that
summer (Rec. p. 243). This
letter was followed the next
day by a memorandum to the
same effect (Rec. p. 244). In a
letter dated April 19, 1982,
petitioner, for the fourth time,
informed Fr. Garcia that her
contract does not require her
to report for work during
summer, and she does not
intend to do so that summer
of 1982 (Rec. p. 241).
Failing to receive the
compensation demanded, May
10, 1982, petitioner filed a
complaint for non-payment of
the following; (1) vacation
pay for four (4) summer
months; (2) compensation for
teaching health subjects; and
(3) deficiency in the 13th
month pay for 1981 (Annexes
A, B, petition). Summons was
served on respondent school
on the opening day of classes
on June 14, 1982 (Rec. p. 19).
That very day when petitioner
reported for work,
respondent school served
petitioner her letter of
termination effective
immediately and it also
submitted a copy of the
termination paper to the
Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE) (Rec. pp.
218- 219). The following day,
petitioner filed an amended
complaint, adding two more
charges: illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practice (Annex
C, D, petition). For the next
four to five weeks, more than
20 teachers and personnel,
backed up by the Faculty
Association of respondent
school, pressed for the ouster
of Fr. Garcia with the Ministry
of Education, Culture, and
Sports (MECS) by virtue of PD
176 and the following
charges: oppressive behavior,
arrogance, contempt for
Filipinos in general and
Filipino teachers in particular;
unfairness in dealing with
personnel; dictatorial
conduct; and use of abusive
language (See Annexes A to F
of Annex F, petition). Fr.
Garcia was eventually
replaced on September 8,
1983.
In the meantime, respondent
school filed its position paper
on June 29, 1982, while
petitioner filed hers on July 1,
1982 (Rec. pp. 22, 210). In the
hearing of July 13, 1982,
petitioner directed
clarificatory questions to Miss
Cristina Sison, corporate
secretary of respondent
school (Rec. pp. 57-141). On
July 27, 1982, respondent
filed its memorandum, while
petitioner filed hers on
August 2, 1982 (Rec. pp. 142,
162).
On October 8, 1982, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision.
Petitioner filed a 1. Respondent NLRC failed to
memorandum of partial
appeal on November 11, 1982
(Annex F, petition).
Respondent filed opposition
to the appeal on January 5,
1983. On January 18, 1983,
petitioner filed reply to the
opposition. In an urgent ex
parte manifestation dated
September 20, 1983,
petitioner informed the NLRC
that Fr. Pablo Garcia had been
replaced by Fr. Jose Arong, a
Filipino, as new director
effective September 8, 1983
(Annex G,petition). On April
11, 1986, public respondent
NLRC rendered the
questioned decision which
affirmed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter. (Rollo, pp. 131-
136).
Petitioner thus resorted to this petition which
she filed on July 15, 1986.
Petitioner and both the Solicitor General and
public respondent NLRC have narrowed down
the issues for resolution to the following:
1. Whether or not the award
of separation pay instead of
reinstatement is the proper
remedy under the
circumstances;
2. Whether or not petitioner is
entitled to compensation for
teaching health subjects; and
3. Whether or not unfair labor
practice existed which would
entitle petitioner to moral
damages.
For the affirmative resolution of the aforestated
issues, petitioner alleges the following:
give full respect to the
constitutional mandate on
security of tenure when the
majority decision affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter
separating and, in effect,
dismissing petitioner on the
basis of her perception that
petitioner and the director
could no longer work
harmoniously. The award of
separation pay would defeat
and render nugatory the
Constitutional guaranty of
security of tenure.
2. Petitioner is entitled to
compensation relative to her
teaching job which is distinct
and separate from her duties
as school nurse.
3. Petitioner was, from the
very start, subjected to
harassment and fabricated
charges. She had suffered and
continues to suffer from the
time of her dismissal on June
14, 1982 up to the present.
She must be entitled to an
award of moral damages.
Public respondent NLRC, however, submits the
following:
1. The relationship between
petitioner and respondent
school had come to the point
that reinstatement of
petitioner would cause undue
burden on both parties. It
would affect petitioner's
performance of her duties as
school nurse and private
respondent's business.
2. Teaching health subjects is
allied to petitioner's job as
school nurse, particularly so
when the same is done within
the official eight (8) working
hour schedule.
3. Petitioner failed to prove
her membership in a union.
There was no union among
the employees of the school in
which case the instances
where unfair labor practice
may be committed, with the
exception of one instance, and
predicated on the existence of
a union, would not apply.
Private respondent has not
been found guilty of unfair
labor practice and it,
therefore, follows that she is
not entitled to moral
damages.
This Court finds merit in the petition.
The Labor Arbiter herself had found that the
termination of petitioner was not supported by
any just cause or reason. Yet, she erroneously
ordered separation pay instead of reinstatement
with backwages based on the alleged reason that
petitioner's working relations with the former
director, Father Garcia, had become so strained therefore, when the assailed NLRC decision was
and deteriorated that it became impossible for rendered on April 11, 1986, the alleged "strained
them to work harmoniously again. And the NLRC relations" or "irritant factors" which the Labor
affirmed such finding which is untrue and Arbiter capitalized on had been totally
merely speculative. eliminated. Respondent NLRC obviously failed to
consider this and thus perpetuated the error
It should be noted that the alleged conflict committed by the Labor Arbiter in her prior
between the petitioner and the director was decision. The eventual replacement of Fr. Garcia
strictly official in nature, the cause of which was all the more confirmed the discriminatory and
the violation of the terms of employment by the oppressive treatment which he gave petitioner.
latter. Petitioner's assertion of her right to
unpaid salaries and bonus differential was not The dissenting NLRC Commissioner aptly
motivated by any personal consideration. Rather, observed thus:
she simply claimed benefits which, under the
law, she was entitled to and legally due her. In Moreover, it should be
her act of asserting these money claims, emphasized, that no strained
petitioner observed utmost tact, courtesy and relations should arise from a
civility so as not to unduly offend the valid and legal act of asserting
sensibilities of the director by waiting for his frill ones right, such as in the
recovery from his illness before sending her instant case, for otherwise, an
formal letter of demand; and only after the employee who shall assert
school refused to satisfy her money claims did his/ her right could be easily
she file the formal complaint with the proper separated from the service by
NLRC branch. Ironically, however, the director merely paying his/her
gave her a downright shabby treatment by separation pay on the pretext
terminating her services without prior notice that his/her relationship with
and without first filing a case against her his/her employer had already
wherein she could have defended herself . The become strained.
school did not even give credit to her more than
nine (9) years of continuous service. Petitioner's
termination was a blatant disregard of due To Our mind, strained
relations in order that it may
process and Constitutional guarantee of
protection to labor. justify the award of
separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement with
Thus, in the case of Callanta v. Carnation backwages, should be such,
Philippines, Inc. (145 SCRA 268), this Court held that they are so compelling
that one's employment, profession, trade or and so serious in character,
calling is a "property right", and the wrongful
that the continued
interference therewith is an actionable wrong. employment of an employee
The right is considered to be property within the is so obnoxious to the person
protection of a constitutional guaranty of due or business of the employer,
process of law. and that the continuation of
such employment has become
Significantly, about a month after petitioner's inconsistent with peace and
termination on June 14, 1982, more than twenty tranquility which is an Ideal
teachers and personnel of respondent school, atmosphere in every
backed by the Faculty Association, petitioned for workplace. (pp. 98-99, Rollo)
the ouster of Director Fr. Garcia for serious
charges under P.D. 176. Consequently, Fr. Garcia
was replaced on September 8, 1983. Clearly,
The respondent NLRC erred is sustaining the
Labor Arbiter's ruling that petitioner is not
entitled to compensation for teaching health
subjects allegedly because petitioner taught
during her regular working hours; the subject
Health is allied to her profession as nurse; and
she and respondent school had no clear
understanding regarding extra compensation.
The Solicitor General who normally and
expectedly speaks for the NLRC has ably refuted
the position taken by the latter. The Court thus
finds valid and decisive the following submission
of the Solicitor General:
It is submitted, however, that
petitioner is entitled to
compensation for teaching
health subjects. Although the
subject taught is Health and
allied to her profession, and is
taught during regular working
hours, petitioner's teaching
the subject in the classroom
and her administering to the
health needs of students in
the clinic involve two
different and distinct jobs.
They cannot be equated with
each other for they refer to
different functions. Teaching
requires preparation of lesson
plans, examinations and
grades, while clinical work
entails preparation of clinical
records and treating illnesses
of students in school. There
can be no doubt that teaching
health subjects is extra work
for petitioner, and therefore
necessitates extra
compensation. After all it has
been the practice of the school
to pay extra compensation to
teachers who were given
extra load even during regular
working hours (Annex G of
Annex F, Petition). The fact
that respondent school failed
to produce the records of
those teachers prove that they
were paid for extra work.
Hence, petitioner should
likewise be paid
compensation. (pp. 138-139,
Rollo)
It must be noted that petitioner has established
that in several precedents, non-teaching
personnel of respondent school who were made
to handle teaching jobs were actually paid actual
compensation. Besides, justice and equity
demand that since the principle of equal work
has long been observed in this jurisdiction, then
it should follow that an extra pay for extra work
should also be applied.
Significantly, this Court has enunciated in the
care of University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v.
University of Pangasinan (127 SCRA 691) that
semestral breaks may be considered as "hours
worked" under the Rules implementing the
Labor Code and that regular professors and
teachers are entitled to ECOLA during the
semestral breaks, their "absence" from work not
being of their own will.
The records show that when summons with
attached complaint of petitioner for money
claims was served on respondent school on June
14, 1982, said respondent, on the very day, gave
petitioner her walking papers. Respondent did
not waste any time in dismissing her in brazen
violation of these provisions of the Labor Code,
as amended:
Art. 118 of the Labor Code provides:
Retaliatory measures. — It
shall be unlawful for an
employer to refuse to pay or
reduce the wages and
benefits, discharges or in any
manner discriminate against
any employee who has filed
any complaint or instituted
any proceeding under this Title
or has testified or is about to
testify in such
 proceedings. (Emphasis Petitioner had been the
supplied) subject of discrimination for
over a year before she was
Thus, too, Art. 249 (f) provides: ultimately dismissed. When
she justifiably refused to obey
the order to report for work
Art. 249. Unfair tabor practice for two summers, she was not
of employers. — It shall be given her vacation pay for
unlawful for an employer to both occasions. Unlike her, the
commit any of the following doctor and dentist who
unfair labor practice. worked in the same clinic,
were not required to report
xxx xxx xxx during summer and were
given their respective
xxx xxx xxx vacation pay. Again,
petitioner, unlike the teachers
who accepted extra load, was
(f) to dismiss, discharge, or not given extra compensation
otherwise prejudice or
when she taught health
discriminate against an subjects to 900 students for
employee for having given or
one year. By withholding such
being about to give testimony compensation, respondent
under this Code,
school stood to gain at the
expense of petitioner, the
xxx xxx xxx amount of the salary which it
could have paid to two (2)
For the aforestated violations, respondent health teachers. Petitioner's
becomes liable under Arts. 289 and 290 of the 13th month pay was likewise
same Code. underpaid because the basis
for computation was only ten
months, and not one year as
This Court has, time and again, condemned in the case of other regular
illegal termination of services of employees. office personnel. Finally,
In Remerco Garments Manufacturing v. Minister petitioner's travails
of Labor and Employment (135 SCRA 167), it culminated in her
declared that while it is true that it is the sole unceremonious termination
prerogative of the management to dismiss or lay- without due process at the
off an employee, the exercise of such a beginning of the school year
prerogative, however, must be made without on June 14, 1982, by the
abuse of discretion, for what is at stake is not service of her termination
only private respondent's position (petitioner in paper antedated June 11,
this case) but also his means of livelihood. 1982. Termination without
due process is specifically
In arguing for petitioner's entitlement to moral prohibited by Rule XIV
damages, the Solicitor General has aptly summed Section 1 under Section 8 of
up her plight. The Solicitor General has the Rules Implementing BP
submitted this valid justification for the award of Blg. 130:
moral damages under Art. 1701 of the Labor
Code: Security of
tenure and
due
process. —
No worker
shall be
dismissed
except for a
just or
authorized
cause
provided
by law and
after due
process.
The series of discriminatory
and oppressive acts of
respondent school against
petitioner invariably makes
respondent liable for moral
damages under Art. 1701,
which prohibits acts of capital
or labor against each other,
and Art. 21 on human
relations in relation to Art.
2219 No. 10 and Art. 2220, all
of the Civil Code (Philippine
Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, 18
SCRA 107). (Rollo, pp. 140-
141)
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of
respondent NLRC is hereby SET ASIDE. Private
respondent is hereby ordered to REINSTATE
petitioner to her former position without loss of
seniority rights and with backwages for three (3)
years from the time of her illegal dismissal; to
pay her the regular extra compensation relative
to her teaching health subjects; and to pay her
moral damages, the amount of which shall be
determined by respondent NLRC. Let this case be
remanded to the NLRC for the proper
implementation of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Sarmiento and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines appellant brought plaintiff-
SUPREME COURT appellant to the house of his
Manila grandmother Juana de Leon in
Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro
SECOND DIVISION Manila, where they lived
together as husband and wife
for 21 days, or until
September 29, 1973. On
September 10, 1973,
G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992 defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.
and plaintiff-appellant filed
CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner, their respective applications
vs. for a marriage license with
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and the Office of the Local Civil
ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents. Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On
October 1, 1973, after leaving
plaintiff-appellant, defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an
affidavit withdrawing his
REGALADO, J.: application for a marriage
license.
Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the
decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals Plaintiff-appellant contends
promulgated on May 17, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. that on the afternoon of
07054, entitled "Zenaida B. Cirilo vs. Conrado September 8, 1973,
Bunag, Sr. and Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which defendant-appellant Bunag,
affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Jr., together with an
Court, Branch XI at Bacoor, Cavite, and, unidentified male companion,
implicitly, respondent court's resolution of abducted her in the vicinity of
September 3, 1991 2 denying petitioner's motion the San Juan de Dios Hospital
for reconsideration. in Pasay City and brought her
to a motel where she was
Respondent court having assiduously discussed raped. The court a quo, which
the salient antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the adopted her evidence,
factual findings of the court below, the evidence summarized the same which
of record and the contentions of the parties, it is we paraphrased as follows:
appropriate that its findings, which we approve
and adopt, be extensively reproduced Plaintiff was 26 years old on November
hereunder: 5, 1974 when she testified, single and
had finished a college course in
Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5, 1974). It
Based on the evidence on
record, the following facts are appears that on September 8, 1973, at
about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
considered indisputable: On
the afternoon of September 8, while she was walking along Figueras
Street, Pasay City on her way to the San
1973, defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff- Juan de Dios Canteen to take her snack,
defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr., came
appellant to a motel or hotel
where they had sexual riding in a car driven by a male
companion. Plaintiff and defendant
intercourse. Later that
evening, said defendant- Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, but two
weeks before September 8, 1973, they
had a quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to
talk matters over with plaintiff, so that
he invited her to take their merienda at
the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila
instead of at the San Juan de Dios
Canteen, to which plaintiff obliged, as
she believed in his sincerity (t.s.n., pp.
8-10, Nov. 5, 1974).
Plaintiff rode in the car and took the
front seat beside the driver while
Bunag, Jr. seated himself by her right
side. The car travelled north on its way
to the Aristocrat Restaurant but upon
reaching San Juan Street in Pasay City,
it turned abruptly to the right, to which
plaintiff protested, but which the duo
ignored and instead threatened her not
to make any noise as they were ready
to die and would bump the car against
the post if she persisted. Frightened
and silenced, the car travelled its
course thru F.B. Harrison Boulevard
until they reached a motel. Plaintiff was
then pulled and dragged from the car
against her will, and amidst her cries
and pleas. In spite of her struggle she
was no match to the joint strength of
the two male combatants because of
her natural weakness being a woman
and her small stature. Eventually, she
was brought inside the hotel where the
defendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered her
against her will and consent. She could
not fight back and repel the attack
because after Bunag, Jr. had forced her
to lie down and embraced her, his
companion held her two feet, removed
her panty, after which he left. Bunag, Jr.
threatened her that he would ask his
companion to come back and hold her
feet if she did not surrender her
womanhood to him, thus he succeeded
in feasting on her virginity. Plaintiff
described the pains she felt and how
blood came out of her private parts
after her vagina was penetrated by the
penis of the defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n.
pp. 17-24, Nov. 5, 1974).
After that outrage on her virginity,
plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once more to
allow her to go home but the latter
would not consent and stated that he
would only let her go after they were
married as he intended to marry her, so
much so that she promised not to make
any scandal and to marry him.
Thereafter, they took a taxi together
after the car that they used had already
gone, and proceeded to the house of
Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s
grandmother in Pamplona, Las Piñas,
Metro Manila where they arrived at
9:30 o'clock in the evening (t.s.n., p. 26,
Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10) o'clock
that same evening, defendant Conrado
Bunag, Sr., father of Bunag, Jr. arrived
and assured plaintiff that the following
day which was a Monday, she and
Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply
for a marriage license, which they did.
They filed their applications for
marriage license (Exhibits "A" and "C")
and after that plaintiff and defendant
Bunag, Jr. returned to the house of
Juana de Leon and lived there as
husband and wife from September 8,
1973 to September 29, 1973.
On September 29, 1973 defendant
Bunag, Jr. left and never returned,
humiliating plaintiff and compelled her
to go back to her parents on October 3,
1973. Plaintiff was ashamed when she
went home and could not sleep and eat
because of the deception done against
her by defendants-appellants (t.s.n., p.
35, Nov. 5, 1974).
The testimony of plaintiff was
corroborated in toto by her uncle,
Vivencio Bansagan who declared that
on September 8, 1973 when plaintiff
failed to arrive home at 9:00 o'clock in
the evening, his sister who is the
mother of plaintiff asked him to look
for her but his efforts proved futile, and
he told his sister that plaintiff might
have married (baka nag-asawa, t.s.n.,
pp. 5-6, March 18, 1976). However, in
the afternoon of the next day (Sunday),
his sister told him that Francisco
Cabrera, accompanied by barrio
captain Jacinto Manalili of Ligas,
Bacoor, Cavite, informed her that
plaintiff and Bunag, Jr. were in
Cabrera's house, so that her sister
requested him to go and see the
plaintiff, which he did, and at the house
of Mrs. Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las
Piñas, Metro Manila he met defendant
Conrado Bunag, Sr., who told him,
"Pare, the children are here already. Let
us settle the matter and have them
married."
He conferred with plaintiff
who told him that as she had
already lost her honor, she
would bear her sufferings as
Boy Bunag, Jr. and his father
promised they would be
married.
Defendants-appellants, on the
other hand, deny that
defendant-appellant Conrado
Bunag, Jr. abducted and raped
plaintiff-appellant on
September 8, 1973. On the
contrary, plaintiff-appellant
and defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr. eloped on that date
because of the opposition of
the latter's father to their
relationship.
Defendant-appellants claim
that defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-
appellant had earlier made
plans to elope and get
married, and this fact was
known to their friends, among
them, Architect Chito
Rodriguez. The couple made
good their plans to elope on
the afternoon of September 8,
1973, when defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr.,
accompanied by his friend
Guillermo Ramos, Jr., met
plaintiff-appellant and her
officemate named Lydia in the
vicinity of the San Juan de
Dios Hospital. The foursome
then proceeded to (the)
aforesaid hospital's canteen
where they had some snacks.
Later, Guillermo Ramos, Jr.
took Lydia to Quirino Avenue
where she could get a ride
home, thereby leaving the
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.
and plaintiff-appellant alone.
According to defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr., after
Guillermo Ramos, Jr. and
Lydia left, he and plaintiff-
appellant took a taxi to the
Golden Gate and Flamingo
Hotels where they tried to get
a room, but these were full.
They finally got a room at the
Holiday Hotel, where
defendant-appellant
registered using his real name
and residence certificate
number. Three hours later,
the couple check out of the
hotel and proceeded to the
house of Juana de Leon at
Pamplona, Las Piñas, where
they stayed until September
19, 1873. Defendant-appellant
claims that bitter
disagreements with the
plaintiff-appellant over
money and the threats made
to his life prompted him to
break off their plan to get
married.
During this period, defendant-
appellant Bunag, Sr. denied
having gone to the house of
Juan de Leon and telling
plaintiff-appellant that she
would be wed to defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he
phoned Atty. Conrado
Adreneda, member of the
board of directors of Mandala
Corporation, defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr.'s
employer, three times
between the evening of
September 8, 1973 and
September 9, 1973 inquiring
as to the whereabouts of his
son. He came to know about
his son's whereabouts when
he was told of the couple's
elopement late in the
afternoon of September 9,
1973 by his mother Candida
Gawaran. He likewise denied
having met relatives and
emissaries of plaintiff-
appellant and agreeing to her
marriage to his son. 3
A complaint for damages for alleged breach of
promise to marry was filed by herein private
respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner
Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado
Bunag, Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor,
Cavite. On August 20, 1983, on a finding, inter
alia, that petitioner had forcibly abducted and
raped private respondent, the trial court
rendered a decision 4 ordering petitioner Bunag,
Jr. to pay private respondent P80,000.00 as
moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P20,000.00 by way of temperate
damages, and P10,000.00 for and as attorney's
fees, as well as the costs of suit. Defendant
Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and
all liability.
Private respondent appealed that portion of the
lower court's decision disculpating Conrado
Bunag, Sr. from civil liability in this case. On the
other hand, the Bunags, as defendants-
appellants, assigned in their appeal several
errors allegedly committed by trial court, which
were summarized by respondent court as
follows: (1) in finding that defendant-appellant
Conrado Bunag, Jr. forcibly abducted and raped
plaintiff-appellant; (2) in finding that
defendants-appellants promised plaintiff-
appellant that she would be wed to defendant-
appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in
awarding plaintiff-appellant damages for the
breach of defendants-appellants' promise of
marriage. 5
As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991
respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment
dismissing both appeals and affirming in toto the
decision of the trial court. His motion for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
Bunag, Jr. is before us on a petition for review,
contending that (1) respondent court failed to
consider vital exhibits, testimonies and incidents
for petitioner's defense, resulting in the
misapprehensions of facts and violative of the
law on preparation of judgment; and (2) it erred
in the application of the proper law and
jurisprudence by holding that there was forcible
abduction with rape, not just a simple elopement
and an agreement to marry, and in the award of
excessive damages. 6
Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the
trial and appellate courts failed to take into
consideration the alleged fact that he and private
respondent had agreed to marry, and that there
was no case of forcible abduction with rape, but
one of simple elopement and agreement to
marry. It is averred that the agreement to marry
has been sufficiently proven by the testimonies
of the witnesses for both parties and the exhibits
presented in court.
This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the
credibility of the witnesses and evidence
presented by the parties and the weight
accorded thereto in the factual findings of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals. In effect,
what petitioner would want this Court to do is to
evaluate and analyze anew the evidence, both
testimonial and documentary, presented before
and calibrated by the trial court, and as further
meticulously reviewed and discussed by
respondent court.
The issue raised primarily and ineluctably
involves questions of fact. We are, therefore,
once again constrained to stress the well-
entrenched statutory and jurisprudential
mandate that findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon this Court.
Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject to clearly
settled exceptions in case law.
Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the
Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and
revising the errors of law imputed to the latter,
its findings of fact being conclusive. This Court
has emphatically declared that it is not its
function to analyze or weigh such evidence all
over again, its jurisdiction being limited to
reviewing errors of law that might have been
committed by the lower court. Barring,
therefore, a showing that the findings
complained of are totally devoid of support in
the record, or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion, such findings must stand, for this
Court is not expected or required to examine or
contrast the oral and documentary evidence
submitted by the parties. 7 Neither does the
instant case reveal any feature falling within, any
of the exceptions which under our decisional
rules may warrant a review of the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals. On the foregoing
considerations and our review of the records, we
sustain the holding of respondent court in favor
of private respondent.
Petitioner likewise asserts that since action
involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial
court erred in awarding damages.
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to
the time-honored rule that an action for breach
of promise to marry has no standing in the civil
law, apart from the right to recover money or
property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith
of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach
of promise to marry per se is not actionable,
except where the plaintiff has actually incurred
expenses for the wedding and the necessary
incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed
in cases specified in or analogous to those
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in
relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was
adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the
statutes which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, and is
intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for
that untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically
provide for in the statutes. 10
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at
bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting
private respondent and having carnal knowledge
with her against her will, and thereafter
promising to marry her in order to escape
criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on
such promise after cohabiting with her for
twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts
contrary to morals and good customs. These are
grossly insensate and reprehensible
transgressions which indisputably warrant and
abundantly justify the award of moral and
exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in
relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219,
and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that
said damages were awarded by the trial court on
the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible
abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal
of the complaint therefor filed by private
respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is
the fundamental postulate of our law that every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. In other words, criminal liability will give
rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same
felonious act or omission results in damage or
injury to another and is the direct and proximate
cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of
civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from
a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist. 12
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint
for forcible abduction with rape was by mere
resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary
investigation stage. There is no declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil
case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the
dismissal did not in any way affect the right of
herein private respondent to institute a civil
action arising from the offense because such
preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not
carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is
that the two proceedings involved are not
between the same parties. Furthermore, it has
long been emphasized, with continuing validity
up to now, that there are different rules as to the
competency of witnesses and the quantum of
evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. In a
criminal action, the State must prove its case by
evidence which shows the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action
it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause
by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus,
in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is
not now necessary that a criminal prosecution
for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to
final judgment before a civil action based on said
offense in favor of the offended woman can
likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final
judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit, and the assailed judgment and
resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. and Padilla, J., concur.
Nocon, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking to review and set
aside the Decision1of the respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which
affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of
Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503.
Presented is the issue of whether or not damages
may be recovered for a breach of promise to
marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent,
without the assistance of counsel, filed with the
aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages
against the petitioner for the alleged violation of
their agreement to get married. She alleges in
said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years
old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good
moral character and reputation duly respected in
her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is
an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an
exchange student taking a medical course at the
Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City;
before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and
proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on
the condition that they would get married; they
therefore agreed to get married after the end of
the school semester, which was in October of
that year; petitioner then visited the private
respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan to secure their approval to the
marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the
petitioner forced her to live with him in the
Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she
began living with him; a week before the filing of
the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her
started to change; he maltreated and threatened
to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she
sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a
representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a
day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner
repudiated their marriage agreement and asked
her not to live with him anymore and; the
petitioner is already married to someone living
in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed
for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her
damages in the amount of not less than
P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses
amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs,
and granting her such other relief and remedies
as may be just and equitable. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner
admitted only the personal circumstances of the
parties as averred in the complaint and denied
the rest of the allegations either for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth thereof or because the true
facts are those alleged as his Special and
Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he
never proposed marriage to or agreed to be
married with the private respondent; he neither
sought the consent and approval of her parents
nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did
not maltreat her, but only told her to stop
coming to his place because he discovered that
she had deceived him by stealing his money and
passport; and finally, no confrontation took place
with a representative of the barangay captain.
Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint
is baseless and unfounded and that as a result
thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court
and compelled to incur expenses, and has
suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched
reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00
for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as
moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988,
the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the
parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single
and resident (sic) of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, while
the defendant is single,
Iranian citizen and resident
(sic) of Lozano Apartment,
Guilig, Dagupan City since
September 1, 1987 up to the
present;
2. That the defendant is
presently studying at Lyceum
Northwestern, Dagupan City,
College of Medicine, second
year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an
employee at Mabuhay
Luncheonette , Fernandez
Avenue, Dagupan City since
July, 1986 up to the present
and a (sic) high school
graduate;
4. That the parties happened
to know each other when the
manager of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino
introduced the defendant to
the plaintiff on August 3,
1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court,
applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on
16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private
respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to
pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the
foregoing consideration,
judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the
defendant to pay the plaintiff
the sum of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos as moral
damages.
2. Condemning further the
defendant to play the plaintiff
the sum of three thousand
(P3,000.00) pesos as atty's
fees and two thousand
(P2,000.00) pesos at (sic)
litigation expenses and to pay
the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's
findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and
private respondent were lovers, (b) private
respondent is not a woman of loose morals or
questionable virtue who readily submits to
sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through
machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, d)
because of his persuasive promise to marry her,
she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e)
by reason of that deceitful promise, private
respondent and her parents — in accordance
with Filipino customs and traditions — made
some preparations for the wedding that was to
be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for
pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives
and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not
fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts
of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has
abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our
sense of morality, good customs, culture and
traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the
private respondent's testimony because, inter
alia, she would not have had the temerity and
courage to come to court and expose her honor
and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if
her claim was false.7
The above findings and conclusions were culled
from the detailed summary of the evidence for
the private respondent in the foregoing decision,
digested by the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who
claimed that she was a virgin
at the time and that she never
had a boyfriend before,
defendant started courting
her just a few days after they
first met. He later proposed
marriage to her several times
and she accepted his love as
well as his proposal of
marriage on August 20, 1987,
on which same day he went
with her to her hometown of
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan,
as he wanted to meet her
parents and inform them of
their relationship and their
intention to get married. The
photographs Exhs. "A" to "E"
(and their submarkings) of
defendant with members of
plaintiff's family or with
plaintiff, were taken that day.
Also on that occasion,
defendant told plaintiffs
parents and brothers and
sisters that he intended to
marry her during the
semestral break in October,
1987, and because plaintiff's
parents thought he was good
and trusted him, they agreed
to his proposal for him to
marry their daughter, and
they likewise allowed him to
stay in their house and sleep
with plaintiff during the few
days that they were in
Bugallon. When plaintiff and
defendant later returned to
Dagupan City, they continued
to live together in defendant's
apartment. However, in the
early days of October, 1987,
defendant would tie plaintiff's
hands and feet while he went
to school, and he even gave
her medicine at 4 o'clock in
the morning that made her
sleep the whole day and night
until the following day. As a
result of this live-in
relationship, plaintiff became
pregnant, but defendant gave
her some medicine to abort
the fetus. Still plaintiff
continued to live with
defendant and kept reminding
him of his promise to marry
her until he told her that he
could not do so because he
was already married to a girl
in Bacolod City. That was the
time plaintiff left defendant,
went home to her parents,
and thereafter consulted a
lawyer who accompanied her
to the barangay captain in
Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her
lawyer, her godmother, and a
barangay tanod sent by the
barangay captain went to talk
to defendant to still convince
him to marry plaintiff, but
defendant insisted that he
could not do so because he
was already married to a girl
in Bacolod City, although the
truth, as stipulated by the
parties at the pre-trial, is that
defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle
driver, also claimed that after
defendant had informed them
of his desire to marry Marilou,
he already looked for
sponsors for the wedding,
started preparing for the
reception by looking for pigs
and chickens, and even
already invited many relatives
and friends to the
forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to
the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed
the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he
contended that the trial court erred (a) in not
dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal
basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral
damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court
promulgated the challenged
decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's
ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial
court's findings of fact, respondent Court made
the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only
21 years old when she met
defendant who was already
29 years old at the time, does
not appear to be a girl of loose
morals. It is uncontradicted
that she was a virgin prior to
her unfortunate experience
with defendant and never had
boyfriend. She is, as described
by the lower court, a barrio
lass "not used and
accustomed to trend of
modern urban life", and
certainly would (sic) not have
allowed
"herself to be deflowered by
the defendant if there was no
persuasive promise made by
the defendant to marry her."
In fact, we agree with the
lower court that plaintiff and
defendant must have been
sweethearts or so the plaintiff
must have thought because of
the deception of defendant,
for otherwise, she would not
have allowed herself to be
photographed with defendant
in public in so (sic) loving and
tender poses as those
depicted in the pictures Exhs.
"D" and "E". We cannot
believe, therefore, defendant's
pretense that plaintiff was a
nobody to him except a
waitress at the restaurant
where he usually ate.
Defendant in fact admitted
that he went to plaintiff's
hometown of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least
thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta
on February 27, 1987 (p. 54,
tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a
beach party together with the
manager and employees of
the Mabuhay Luncheonette on
March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.),
and on April 1, 1987 when he
allegedly talked to plaintiff's
mother who told him to marry
her daughter (pp. 55-56,
tsn id.). Would defendant have
left Dagupan City where he
was involved in the serious
study of medicine to go to
plaintiff's hometown in
Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there
was (sic) some kind of special
relationship between them?
And this special relationship
must indeed have led to
defendant's insincere
proposal of marriage to
plaintiff, communicated not
only to her but also to her
parents, and (sic) Marites
Rabino, the owner of the
restaurant where plaintiff was
working and where defendant
first proposed marriage to
her, also knew of this love
affair and defendant's
proposal of marriage to
plaintiff, which she declared
was the reason why plaintiff
resigned from her job at the
restaurant after she had
 accepted defendant's
proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March
7, 1988).
Upon the other hand,
appellant does not appear to
be a man of good moral
character and must think so
low and have so little respect
and regard for Filipino
women that he openly
admitted that when he
studied in Bacolod City for
several years where he
finished his B.S. Biology
before he came to Dagupan
City to study medicine, he had
a common-law wife in
Bacolod City. In other words,
he also lived with another
woman in Bacolod City but
did not marry that woman,
just like what he did to
plaintiff. It is not surprising,
then, that he felt so little
compunction or remorse in
pretending to love and
promising to marry plaintiff, a
young, innocent, trustful
country girl, in order to satisfy
his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly
convinced and so hold that it
was defendant-appellant's
fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and
promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her
virtue and womanhood to him
and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that
he would keep said promise,
and it was likewise these (sic)
fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to
their daughter's living-in with
him preparatory to their
supposed marriage. And as
these acts of appellant are
palpably and undoubtedly
against morals, good customs,
and public policy, and are
even gravely and deeply
derogatory and insulting to
our women, coming as they
do from a foreigner who has
been enjoying the hospitality
of our people and taking
advantage of the opportunity
to study in one of our
institutions of learning,
defendant-appellant should
indeed be made, under Art. 21
of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, to compensate for
the moral damages and injury
that he had caused plaintiff, as
the lower court ordered him
to do in its decision in this
case.12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the
instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises
therein the single issue of whether or not Article
21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not
applicable because he had not committed any
moral wrong or injury or violated any good
custom or public policy; he has not professed
love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He
criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking
Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and
ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is
not conversant with such Filipino customs,
traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he
is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways.
He stresses that even if he had made a promise
to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the
same is excusable or tolerable because of his
Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the
Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim
to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the
basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that
he does not posses good moral character.
Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is however, recognized exceptions to this rule.
now his legal wife as their marriage had been Thus, inMedina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took
solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with
the private respondent, petitioner claims that xxx xxx xxx
even if responsibility could be pinned on him for
the live-in relationship, the private respondent
should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit (1) When the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on
arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that
even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he speculation, surmises or
conjectures (Joaquin v.
had professed his love to the private respondent
and had also promised to marry her, such acts Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]);
(2) When the inference made
would not be actionable in view of the special
circumstances of the case. The mere breach of is manifestly mistaken, absurb
or impossible (Luna v.
promise is not actionable. 14
Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]);
(3) Where there is a grave
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent
abuse of discretion (Buyco v.
had filed her Comment to the petition and the People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]);
petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court
(4) When the judgment is
gave due course to the petition and required the based on a misapprehension
parties to submit their respective Memoranda,
of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
which they subsequently complied with. L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5)
When the findings of fact are
As may be gleaned from the foregoing conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca,
summation of the petitioner's arguments in L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.)
support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of (6) When the Court of
fact, which boil down to the issue of the Appeals, in making its
credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the findings, went beyond the
rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will issues of the case and the
not disturb the trial court's findings as to the same is contrary to the
credibility of witnesses, the latter court having admissions of both appellate
heard the witnesses and having had the and appellee (Evangelista v.
opportunity to observe closely their deportment Alto Surety and Insurance Co.,
and manner of testifying, unless the trial court 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
had plainly overlooked facts of substance or (7) The findings of the Court
value which, if considered, might affect the result of Appeals are contrary to
of the case. 15 those of the trial court (Garcia
v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us 622 [1970]; Sacay v.
that both the appellate and trial courts had Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593
overlooked any fact of substance or values which [1986]); (8) When the
could alter the result of the case. findings of fact are
conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of they are based (Ibid.,); (9)
law may be raised in a petition for review
When the facts set forth in the
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. petition as well as in the
It is not the function of this Court to analyze or
petitioners main and reply
weigh all over again the evidence introduced by briefs are not disputed by the
the parties before the lower court. There are,
respondents (Ibid.,); and (10)
 The finding of fact of the Court
of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the
evidence on record (Salazar v.
Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242
[1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us
the existence of any of the above quoted
exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual
findings of the trial and appellate courts must be
respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to
marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from
the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions
that would have made it so. The reason therefor
is set forth in the report of the Senate
Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from
which We quote:
The elimination of this
chapter is proposed. That
breach of promise to marry is
not actionable has been
definitely decided in the case
of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The
history of breach of promise
suits in the United States and
in England has shown that no
other action lends itself more
readily to abuse by designing
women and unscrupulous
men. It is this experience
which has led to the abolition
of rights of action in the so-
called Heart Balm suits in
many of the American states. .
. . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a
provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy
for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically becomes pregnant. Under the common law concept. Torts is much
enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20 present laws, there is no broader than culpa aquiliana because it
crime, as the girl is above includes not only negligence, but
As the Code Commission itself stated in its nineteen years of age. Neither international criminal acts as well such
Report: can any civil action for breach as assault and battery, false
of promise of marriage be imprisonment and deceit. In the
filed. Therefore, though the general scheme of the Philippine legal
But the Code Commission had grievous moral wrong has system envisioned by the Commission
gone farther than the sphere been committed, and though responsible for drafting the New Civil
of wrongs defined or
the girl and family have Code, intentional and malicious acts,
determined by positive law. suffered incalculable moral with certain exceptions, are to be
Fully sensible that there are
damage, she and her parents governed by the Revised Penal Code
countless gaps in the statutes, cannot bring action for while negligent acts or omissions are to
which leave so many victims damages. But under the be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil
of moral wrongs helpless, proposed article, she and her Code. 22 In between these opposite
even though they have parents would have such a spectrums are injurious acts which, in
actually suffered material and right of action. the absence of Article 21, would have
moral injury, the Commission been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21
has deemed it necessary, in fills that vacuum. It is even postulated
the interest of justice, to Thus at one stroke, the
legislator, if the forgoing rule that together with Articles 19 and 20 of
incorporate in the proposed the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly
Civil Code the following rule: is approved, would vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for broadened the scope of the law on civil
that untold number of moral wrongs; it has become much more
Art. 23. wrongs which it is impossible supple and adaptable than the Anglo-
Any person for human foresight to American law on torts. 23
who provide for specifically in the
wilfully statutes. 21 In the light of the above laudable purpose of
causes loss Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold,
or injury to that where a man's promise to marry is in fact
another in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines
a quasi-delict thus: the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love
a manner by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
that is promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause
contrary to Whoever by act or omission of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
morals, causes damage to another, congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
good there being fault or intention of marrying her and that the promise
customs or negligence, is obliged to pay was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to
public for the damage done. Such entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain
policy shall fault or negligence, if there is her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
compensat no pre-existing contractual award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
e the latter relation between the parties, because of such promise to marry but because of
for the is called a quasi-delict and is the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful
damage. governed by the provisions of injury to her honor and reputation which
this Chapter. followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that
An example will illustrate the such injury should have been committed in a
purview of the foregoing is limited to negligent acts or omissions manner contrary to morals, good customs or
norm: "A" seduces the and excludes the notion of willfulness public policy.
nineteen-year old daughter of or intent. Quasi-delict, known in
"X". A promise of marriage Spanish legal treatises as culpa In the instant case, respondent Court found that
either has not been made, or aquiliana, is a civil law concept it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
can not be proved. The girl while torts is an Anglo-American or protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this merely On the
womanhood to him and to live with him on the Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if from carnal other hand,
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said there had been moral seduction, recovery was lust and in an action
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and eventually denied because We were not the by the
deception on appellant's part that made convinced that such seduction existed. The intercourse woman, the
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's following enlightening disquisition and is from enticement
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed conclusion were made in the said case: mutual ,
marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent desire, persuasion
surrendered her virginity, the cherished The Court of Appeals seem to there is no or
possession of every single Filipina, not because have overlooked that the seduction deception
of lust but because of moral seduction — the example set forth in the Code (43 Cent. is the
kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its Commission's memorandum Dig. tit. essence of
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could refers to a tort upon a minor Seduction, the injury;
not be held liable for criminal seduction who had been seduced. The par. 56) and a mere
punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 essential feature is seduction, She must proof of
of the Revised Penal Code because the private that in law is more than mere be induced intercourse
respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age sexual intercourse, or a to depart is
at the time of the seduction. breach of a promise of from the insufficient
marriage; it connotes path of to warrant
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that essentially the idea of deceit, virtue by a recovery.
Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise enticement, superior power the use of
to marry where the woman is a victim of moral or abuse of confidence on the some Accordingl
seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of part of the seducer to which species of y it is not
Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages the woman has yielded (U.S. arts, seduction
to the woman because: vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. persuasion where the
121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. s and wiles, willingness
595). which are arises out
. . . we find ourselves unable to calculated
say that petitioner of sexual
to have and desire of
is morally guilty of seduction, It has been ruled in do have
not only because he is the Buenaventura case (supra) curiosity of
that effect, the female,
approximately ten (10) years that — and which
younger than the complainant and the
result in defendant
— who was around thirty-six To her person
(36) years of age, and as merely
constitute to affords her
highly enlightened as a former seduction ultimately
high school teacher and a life the needed
there must submitting opportunit
insurance agent are supposed in all cases her person
to be — when she became y for the
be some to the commissio
intimate with petitioner, then sufficient sexual
a mere apprentice pilot, but, n of the act.
promise or embraces It has been
also, because the court of first inducemen of her
instance found that, emphasize
t and the seducer d that to
complainant "surrendered woman (27 Phil.
herself" to petitioner because, allow a
must yield 123). recovery in
"overwhelmed by her love" because of
for him, she "wanted to all such
the promise And in American cases
bind" him by having a fruit of or other
their engagement even before Jurisprudence we find: would tend
inducement to the
they had the benefit of clergy. . If she demoraliza
consents
 tion of the
female sex,
and would
be a In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate
reward for
unchastity
by which a
class of
adventures
ses would
be swift to
profit. (47
Am. Jur.
662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan
allegations, the fact stand out
that for one whole year, from
1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-
appellee, a woman of adult
age, maintain intimate sexual
relations with appellant, with
repeated acts of intercourse.
Such conduct is incompatible
with the idea of seduction.
Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual
passion; for had the appellant
been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively
because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the
defendant, she would not
have again yielded to his
embraces, much less for one
year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged
promises of marriage, and
would have cut short all
sexual relations upon finding
that defendant did not intend
to fulfill his defendant did not
intend to fulfill his promise.
Hence, we conclude that no
case is made under article 21
of the Civil Code, and no other
cause of action being alleged,
no error was committed by
the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the complaint. 27
Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired
from this Court, opined that in a breach of
promise to marry where there had been carnal
knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or
moral seduction, but not if the
intercourse was due to
mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs.
Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960;
Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-
14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra
vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic);
Beatriz Galang vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan.
29, 1962). (In other words, if
the CAUSE be the promise to
marry, and the EFFECT be the
carnal knowledge, there is a
chance that there
was criminal or moral
seduction, hence recovery of
moral damages will prosper.
If it be the other way around,
there can be no recovery of
moral damages, because here
mutual lust has intervened). . .
. criminal law and there should
together with "ACTUAL damages,
should there be any, such as the
expenses for the wedding
presentations (See Domalagon v.
Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same
persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule
in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still
subsists, notwithstanding the
incorporation of the present
article31 in the Code. The
example given by the Code
Commission is correct, if there
was seduction, not necessarily
in the legal sense, but in the
vulgar sense of deception. But
when the sexual act is
accomplished without any
deceit or qualifying
circumstance of abuse of
authority or influence, but the
woman, already of age, has
knowingly given herself to a
man, it cannot be said that
there is an injury which can
be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud,
which is characterized by
willfulness (sic), the action
lies. The court, however, must
weigh the degree of fraud, if it
is sufficient to deceive the
woman under the
circumstances, because an act
which would deceive a girl
sixteen years of age may not
constitute deceit as to an
experienced woman thirty
years of age. But so long as
there is a wrongful act and a
resulting injury, there should
be civil liability, even if the act
is not punishable under the
have been an acquittal or
dismissal of the criminal case
for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's
alternative proposition to the effect that
granting, for argument's sake, that he did
promise to marry the private respondent, the
latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to
him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence,
pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and
the doctrine laid down in Batarra
vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot
recover damages from the petitioner. The latter
even goes as far as stating that if the private
respondent had "sustained any injury or damage
in their relationship, it is primarily because of
her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the
petitioner as the latter will
become a doctor sooner or
later. Take notice that she is a
plain high school graduate
and a mere employee . . .
(Annex "C") or a waitress
(TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988)
in a luncheonette and without
doubt, is in need of a man who
can give her economic
security. Her family is in dire
need of financial assistance.
(TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18,
1988). And this predicament
prompted her to accept a
proposition that may have
been offered by the
petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and
motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he
harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard
for the private respondent on account of the
latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him,
dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from
the very beginning, he was not at all moved by
good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a
woman so circumstances could not have even
remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of
love and promise to marry were empty words
directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile
and deceive the poor woman into believing that
indeed, he loved her and would want her to be
his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust
which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who
honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of
love and proposal of marriage, she would be able
to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner
clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality
and brazenly defied the traditional respect
Filipinos have for their women. It can even be
said that the petitioner committed such
deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19
of the Civil Code which directs every person to
act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of is not. (c.f. Bough vs.
his rights and in the performance of his Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
obligations.
We should stress, however, that while We find
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery for the private respondent, let it not be said that
of our laws, customs and traditions. this Court condones the deplorable behavior of
her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case together in the same room in their house after
for while indeed, the private respondent may not giving approval to their marriage. It is the
have been impelled by the purest of intentions, solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of
she eventually submitted to the petitioner in their daughters and infuse upon them the higher
sexual congress not out of lust, but because of values of morality and dignity.
moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she
had qualms of conscience about the entire WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the
episode for as soon as she found out that the challenged decision, the instant petition is
petitioner was not going to marry her after all, hereby DENIED, with costs against the
she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari petitioner.
delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in
equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in SO ORDERED.
guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it could be
conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Equity often interferes for the
relief of the less guilty of the Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
parties, where his
transgression has been
brought about by the
imposition of undue influence
of the party on whom the
burden of the original wrong
principally rests, or where his
consent to the transaction
was itself procured by
fraud. 36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:

Appellants likewise stress

that both parties being at
fault, there should be no
action by one against the
other (Art. 1412, New Civil
Code). This rule, however, has
been interpreted as applicable
only where the fault on both
sides is, more or less,
equivalent. It does not apply
where one party is literate or
intelligent and the other one
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992
AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL
CONSTANTINO, the latter represented herein
by the former, his mother and natural
guardian, petitioners,
vs.
IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioners.
Bienvinido D. Cariaga for private respondent.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review
on certiorari questioning the decision1 dated
April 30, 1981 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 61552-R which dismissed petitioner's
complaint and set aside the resolution2 dated
October 21, 1976 of the then Court of First
Instance of Davao, 16th Judicial District,
amending the dispositive portion of its decision
dated June 21, 1976 and ordering private
respondent Ivan Mendez: (1) to acknowledge the
minor Michael Constantino as his illegitimate
child; (2) to give a monthly support of P300.00 to
the minor child; (3) to pay complainant Amelita
Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as actual and
moral damages; and (4) to pay attorney's fees in
the sum of P5,000 plus costs.
It appears on record that on June 5, 1975,
petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for
acknowledgment, support and damages against
private respondent Ivan Mendez. The case was
filed with the then CFI of Davao, 10th Judicial
District and docketed as Civil Case No. 8881. In
her complaint, Amelita Constantino alleges,
among others, that sometime in the month of
August, 1974, she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's
Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, where
she worked as a waitress; that the day following
their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine
with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted;
that while dining, Ivan professed his love and
courted Amelita; that Amelita asked for time to
think about Ivan's proposal; that at about 11:00
o'clock in the evening, Amelita asked Ivan to
bring her home to which the latter agreed, that
on the pretext of getting something, Ivan brought
Amelita inside his hotel room and through a
promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with the latter; that after the sexual
contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a
married man; that they repeated their sexual
contact in the months of September and
November, 1974, whenever Ivan is in Manila, as
a result of which Amelita got pregnant; that her
pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears; that
Amelita had no sexual relations with any other
man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet
to be born at the time of the filing of the
complaint; that because of her pregnancy,
Amelita was forced to leave her work as a
waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous businessman
of Davao City with a monthly income of P5,000
to P8,000. As relief, Amelita prayed for the
recognition of the unborn child, the payment of
actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees plus costs.
In his answer dated August 5, 1975, Ivan
admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's Cocktail
Lounge but denied having sexual knowledge or
illicit relations with her. He prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of
action. By way of counterclaim, he further
prayed for the payment of exemplary damages
and litigation expense including attorney's fees
for the filing of the malicious complaint.
On September 1, 1975, Amelita Constantino filed
a motion for leave to amend the complaint
impleading as co-plaintiff her son Michael
Constantino who was born on August 3, 1975. In
its order dated September 4, 1975, the trial court
admitted the amended complaint.
On September 11, 1975, Ivan Mendez filed his
answer to the amended complaint reiterating his
previous answer denying that Michael
Constantino is his illegitimate son.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision
dated June 21, 1976, the dispositive portion of
which reads, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff
Amelita Constantino and
against defendant Ivan
Mendez, ordering the latter to
pay Amelita Constantino the
sum of P8,000.00 by way of
actual and moral damages;
and, the sum of P3,000.00, as
and by way of attorney's fees.
The defendant shall pay the
costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
From the above decision, both parties filed their
separate motion for reconsideration. Ivan
Mendez anchored his motion on the ground that
the award of damages was not supported by
evidence. Amelita Constantino, on the other
hand, sought the recognition and support of her
son Michael Constantino as the illegitimate son
of Ivan Mendez.
In its resolution dated October 21, 1976, the trial
court granted Amelita Constantino's motion for
reconsideration, and amended the dispositive
portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976 to
read as follows, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff
Amelita Constantino and
plaintiff-minor Michael
Constantino, and against
defendant Ivan Mendez
ordering the latter to pay
Amelita Constantino the sum
of P8,000.00 by way of actual
and moral damages and the
sum of P200.00 as and by way
of payment of the hospital and
medical bills incurred during
the delivery of plaintiff-minor
Michael Constantino; to
recognize as his own
illegitimate child the plaintiff-
minor Michael Constantino
who shall be entitled to all the
rights, privileges and benefits
appertaining to a child of such
status; to give a permanent
monthly support in favor of
plaintiff Michael Constantino
the amount of P300.00; and
the sum of P5,000.00 as and
by way of attorney's fees. The
defendant shall pay the costs
of this suit.
Let this Order form part of the
decision dated June 21, 1976.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the above
amended decision was set aside and the
complaint was dismissed. Hence, this petition for
review.
Basically, the issue to be resolved in the case at
bar is whether or not the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in setting aside the
decision of the trial court and in dismissing the
complaint.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals
erred in reversing the factual findings of the trial
and in not affirming the decision of the trial
court. They also pointed out that the appellate
court committed a misapprehension of facts
when it concluded that Ivan did not have sexual
access with Amelita during the first or second
week of November, 1976 (should be 1974), the
time of the conception of the child.
It must be stressed at the outset that factual
findings of the trial court have only a persuasive
and not a conclusive effect on the Court of
Appeals. In the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Court of Appeals
to review the factual findings of the trial court
and rectify the errors it committed as may have
been properly assigned and as could be
established by a re-examination of the evidence
on record. It is the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals, not those of the trial court, that as a rule
are considered final and conclusive even on this
Court (Hermo v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 155
SCRA 24 [1987]). This being a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
this Court will review only errors of law
committed by the Court of Appeals. It is not the
function of this Court to re-examine all over
again the oral and documentary evidence
submitted by the parties unless the findings of
facts of the Court of Appeals is not supported by
the evidence on record or the judgment is based
on misapprehension of facts (Remalante v. Tibe,
et al., 158 SCRA 138 [1988]; Hernandez v. Court
of Appeals, et al., 149 SCRA 97 [1987]).
It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based
on the evidence on record, that Amelita
Constantino has not proved by clear and
convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez
is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Such
conclusion based on the evaluation of the
evidence on record is controlling on this Court as
the same is supported by the evidence on record.
Even the trial court initially entertained such
posture. It ordered the recognition of Michael as
the illegitimate son of Ivan only when acting on
the motions for reconsideration, it reconsidered,
on October 21, 1976, its earlier decision dated
June 21, 1976. Amelita's testimony on cross-
examination that she had sexual contact with
Ivan in Manila in the first or second week of
November, 1974 (TSN, December 8, 1975, p.
108) is inconsistent with her response that she
could not remember the date of their last sexual
intercourse in November, 1974 (Ibid, p. 106).
Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or
second week of November, 1974 is the crucial
point that was not even established on direct
examination as she merely testified that she had
sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of
September, October and November, 1974.
Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on
August 3, 1975 (Exhibit 6) so that as correctly
pointed out by private respondent's counsel,
citing medical science (Williams Obstetrics,
Tenth Ed., p. 198) to the effect that "the mean
duration of actual pregnancy, counting from the
day of conception must be close to 267 days", the
conception of the child (Michael) must have
taken place about 267 days before August 3,
1975 or sometime in the second week of
November, 1974. While Amelita testified that she
had sexual contact with Ivan in November, 1974,
nevertheless said testimony is contradicted by
her own evidence (Exh. F), the letter dated
February 11, 1975, addressed to Ivan Mendez
requesting for a conference, prepared by her
own counsel Atty. Roberto Sarenas to whom she
must have confided the attendant circumstances
of her pregnancy while still fresh in her memory,
informing Ivan that Amelita is four (4) months
pregnant so that applying the period of the
duration of actual pregnancy, the child was
conceived on or about October 11, 1974.
Petitioner's assertion that Ivan is her first and
only boyfriend (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 65) is
belied by Exhibit 2, her own letter addressed to
Mrs. Mendez where she revealed the reason for
her attachment to Ivan who possessed certain
traits not possessed by her boyfriend. She also
confided that she had a quarrel with her
boyfriend because of gossips so she left her
work. An order for recognition and support may
create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be
an irritant in the family or lives of the parties so
that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation
is established by clear and convincing evidence.
The burden of proof is on Amelita to establish
her affirmative allegations that Ivan is the father
of her son. Consequently, in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence establishing paternity
or filiation, the complaint must be dismissed.
As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is
based on Articles 193 & 214 of the Civil Code on
the theory that through Ivan's promise of
marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we
cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals that
more sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis
for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if
sexual intercourse is not a product of
voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she
met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was
already 28 years old and she admitted that she
was attracted to Ivan (TSN, December 3, 1975, p.
83). Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she
surrendered her womanhood. Had she been
induced or deceived because of a promise of
marriage, she could have immediately severed
her relation with Ivan when she was informed
after their first sexual contact sometime in
August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her
declaration that in the months of September,
October and November, 1974, they repeated
their sexual intercourse only indicates that
passion and not the alleged promise of marriage
was the moving force that made her submit
herself to Ivan.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ.,
concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 145436. October 10, 2002]
MICHAEL LONDON for and in behalf of his
minor son NICHOLAS FREDERICK
LONDON, petitioner, vs. BAGUIO
COUNTRY CLUB CORPORATION,
ANTHONY DE LEON and FRANCIS
BASTIANO SIMALONG, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On 14 December 1998, Nicholas Frederick
London, then 11 years old, assisted by his father,
Michael London, executed and filed before the
Office of the City Prosecutor in Baguio City a
complaint-affidavit for Sexual Harassment
and/or Child Abuse and/or Acts of
Lasciviousness and Unjust Vexation against
respondent Francis Bastiano Simalong, a bowling
mechanic at the Baguio Country Club. The
complaint contained asseverations about an
incident that was said to have occurred on 29
November 1998 at the Baguio Country
Club. Nicholas was playing video games at the
recreation center of the club, when Simalong,
then obviously drunk, placed his hand around
Nicholas and touched the latters
penis. Frightened, Nicholas immediately
informed by telephone his parents about
it. Forthwith, his parents fetched him, and the
three proceeded to the police station to report
the matter.
On 28 December 1998, the investigating
prosecutor, finding probable cause to prosecute
Simalong, filed an Information for unjust
vexation before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC). On 09 October 1999, the MTC issued an
order to the effect that, Nicholas being a minor,
the case should instead be handled by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City in
accordance with Circular No. 11-99 of the
Supreme Court and Republic Act No. 8369 (the
Family Courts Act of 1997). The criminal case
was transferred to the RTC and docketed
Criminal Case No. 17107-R. The private
complainant reserved his right to institute an
independent civil action.
On 17 December 1999, Nicholas,
represented by his father Michael, filed a
complaint for damages before the Baguio City
RTC, against the Baguio Country Club, the clubs
General Manager Anthony de Leon, and Francis
Simalong. The civil action, docketed Civil Case
No. 4587-R, was predicated on the civil liability
of defendants for culpa acquiliana under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
On 04 February 2000, the Baguio Country
Club and Anthony de Leon filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
Verification/Certification against forum
shopping attached to the complaint did not
disclose the existence and status of Criminal Case
No. 17107-R.
The Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 61
issued, on 18 April 2000, a resolution granting
the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff filed a motion
for the reconsideration of the order of
dismissal. In the meantime, plaintiff sought the
inhibition of Presiding Judge Antonio Reyes of
RTC Branch 61 from trying Civil Case No. 4587-R
on the ground that the judge was a close friend of
the clubs president and counsel. Judge Reyes
inhibited himself and the case was transferred to
Branch 59 of the Baguio City RTC presided over
by Judge Abraham B. Borreta. On 10 October
2000, Judge Borreta issued an order denying the
motion for the reconsideration of the 18th April
2000 order of dismissal of the civil case.
On 29 November 2000, the plaintiff filed
the instant petition for review assailing the
dismissal of his complaint in Civil Case No. 4587-
R.
The petition is meritorious.
Forum shopping is the institution of two
(2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on
the same cause upon the supposition that one or
the other court would make a favorable
disposition.[1] For forum shopping to exist, the
actions must involve the same transaction, SO ORDERED.
including the essential facts and circumstances
thereof, and must raise identical causes of Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), concur.
actions, subject matter and issues. The mere Ynares-Santiago and Carpio, JJ., abroad on
filing of two or more cases based on the same official business.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, (special member, per
incident does not necessarily constitute forum-
shopping.[2] In fine, there should be (a) identity special order no. 269), concur.
of parties or at least such parties who represent
the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, such relief
being founded on the same circumstances, and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars
is such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration, said requisites being
likewise constitutive of the elements of auter
action pendent or litis pendencia.[3]
While, in this instance, both the criminal
action and the civil complaint for quasi-delict
have arisen from an act of lasciviousness claimed
to have been committed by Simalong against the
person of Nicholas Frederick London, there are,
however, material differences between the two
actions. In the criminal case, the real party
plaintiff is the People of the Philippines and the
defendant is accused Simalong alone. In the civil
case, the parties are plaintiff Michael London, for
and in behalf of his minor son Nicholas Frederick
London, and the defendants include not only
Simalong but also the Baguio Country Club and
its general manager Anthony de Leon. Given the
circumstances, a judgment of conviction or
acquittal in the criminal case against Simalong
cannot at all be invoked as being one of res
judicata in the independent suit for damages.
It may not be amiss to reiterate that rules
of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice; thus, their strict and
rigid application that would tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice are well
to be avoided.[4] Indeed, the Rules of Civil
Procedure on forum shopping are not always
applied with inflexibility.[5]
WHEREFORE, the challenged resolutions,
dated 18 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 51,
are SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 4587-R is hereby
ordered REINSTATED. No costs.
SECOND DIVISION essentially alleged that defendant Riveras gross WHEREFORE, premises
B.F. METAL (CORPORATION), G.R. No. 170813 negligence and recklessness was the immediate considered, judgment is
and proximate cause of the vehicular accident hereby rendered ordering
Petitioner, and that petitioner failed to exercise the required defendants to pay jointly and
DECISION diligence in the selection and supervision of severally to herein plaintiffs
Present: Rivera. The complaint prayed for the award of the following sums:
actual, exemplary and moral damages and
TINGA, J.: attorneys fees in favor of respondents.
(a) Actual Damages --- i. P96,700.00 for cost of the
QUISUMBING, J., In the Answer, petitioner and Rivera
Before the Court is a petition for review on denied the allegations in the complaint and owner-type jeep
- versus - Chairperson, certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of averred that respondents were not the proper
Civil Procedure, assailing the award of damages parties-in-interest to prosecute the action, not ii. P15,000.00 medical expenses
CARPIO MORALES, against petitioner in the Decision[1] and being the registered owner of the jeep; that the
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. sole and proximate cause of the accident was the iii. P50,000.00 for loss of
CV No.T58655. The Court of Appeals affirmed fault and negligence of Umuyon; and that earnings
I with modification the Decision of the Regional petitioner exercised due diligence in the
N Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72,Antipolo, Rizal in selection and supervision of its employees. (b) Moral Damages ---
G Civil Case No. 1567-A, which found petitioner P100,000.00
A corporation and its driver, Onofre V. During the trial, respondents offered
, Rivera, solidarily liable to respondents for the testimonies of Umuyon, SPO1 RicoCanaria, (c) Exemplary Damages ---
damages. SPO4 Theodore Cadaweg and Nicanor Fajardo, P100,000.00
VEL the auto-repair shop owner who gave a cost
ASCO, JR.,
The following factual antecedents are not estimate for the repair of the wrecked jeep. (d) Attorneys Fees --- P25,000.00 plus P1,000.00
and disputed. Among the documentary evidence presented
were the 1989 cost estimate of Pagawaan Court appearance
In the Bmorning of 03 May 1989, respondent Motors, Inc.,[3] which pegged the repair cost of
R
Rico Umuyon (Umuyon) was driving the owner- the jeep at P96,000.00, and the cost estimate
I
type jeep owned by respondents, Spouses of Fajardo Motor Works[4]done in 1993, which
RolandoO Costs of Suit.
reflected an increased repair cost
N
and Linaflor Lomotan(Spouses Lomotan). The at P130,655.00. They also presented in evidence
jeep , was cruising along Felix a copy of the Decision of the RTC, Assisting
Avenue in Cainta, Rizal at a moderate speed of 20 Branch 74, Cainta,Rizal in Criminal Case No. SO ORDERED.[5]
to 30 Jkilometers per hour. Suddenly, at the 4742, entitled People of the Philippines
J lane, the speeding ten-wheeler truck
opposite v. Onofre V. Rivera, finding Rivera guilty of
driven . by Onofre Rivera overtook a car by reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
invading the lane being traversed by the jeep and property with physical injuries. The trial court declared Rivera
SPS. ROLANDO M. LOMOTAN rammed into the jeep. The jeep was a total wreck negligent when he failed to determine with
whileUmuyon suffered blunt thoracic injury with For its part, petitioner presented at the
and LINAFLOR LOMOTAN and certainty that the opposite lane was clear before
multiple rib fracture, fractured scapula (L), hearing Rivera himself and Habner Revarez, overtaking the vehicle in front of the truck he
with pneumohemothorax, which entailed his petitioners production control
RICO UMUYON, Promulgated: was driving. It also found petitioner negligent in
hospitalization for 19 days. Also in view of the superintendent. Included in its documentary the selection and supervision of its employees
injuries he sustained, Umuyon could no longer evidence were written guidelines in preventive
Respondents. when it failed to prove the proper dissemination
drive, reducing his daily income fromP150.00 maintenance of vehicles and safety driving rules of safety driving instructions to its drivers.
to P100.00. for drivers.
April 16, 2008
On 27 October 1989, respondents instituted a On 21 April 1997, the trial court
separate and independent civil action for rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of Petitioner and Rivera appealed the
x------------------------------------------------------------- damages against petitioner BF Metal Corporation which reads: decision to the Court of Appeals.
--------------x (petitioner) and Rivera before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint
 On 13 April 2005, the Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed Decision. It affirmed the
trial courts finding that Riveras negligence
was the proximate cause of the accident and that
petitioner was liable under Article 2180[6] of the
Civil Code for its negligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees. However, the
appellate court modified the amount of damages
awarded to respondents. The dispositive portion
of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to read
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering
defendants to pay jointly and severally to
herein plaintiffs the following sums:
(a) Actual Damages ---
i. P130,655.00, for cost of repairing
the owner-type jeep.
i. P10,167.99 in medical expenses.
(b) Moral Damages ---
P100,000.00
(c) Exemplary Damages ---
P100,000.00
(d) Attorneys Fees ---
P25,000.00
Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On 12 December 2005, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration of its
Decision. Only petitioner filed the instant
petition, expressly stating that it is assailing only
the damages awarded by the appellate court.
The instant petition raises the
following issues: (1) whether the amount of
actual damages based only on a job estimate
should be lowered; (2) whether
Spouses Lomotanare also entitled to moral
damages; and (3) whether the award of
exemplary damages and attorneys is warranted.
For their part, respondents contend that the
aforementioned issues are factual in nature and
therefore beyond the province of a petitioner for
review under Rule 45.
This is not the first instance where the
Court has given due course to a Rule 45 petition
seeking solely the review of the award of
damages.[8] A partys entitlement to damages is
ultimately a question of law because not only
must it be proved factually but also its legal
justification must be shown. In any case, the trial
court and the appellate court have different
findings as to the amount of damages to which
respondents are entitled. When the factual
findings of the trial and appellate courts are
conflicting, the Court is constrained to look into
the evidence presented before the trial court so
as to resolve the herein appeal.[9]
The trial court split the award of actual
damages into three items, namely, the cost of the
wrecked jeep, the medical expenses incurred by
respondent Umuyon and the monetary value of
his earning capacity. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reduced the amount of medical
expenses and loss of earning capacity to which
respondent Umuyon is entitled but increased
from P96,700.00 to P130,655.00 the award in
favor of SpousesLomotan for the cost of
repairing the wrecked jeep.
The instant petition assails only the
modified valuation of the wrecked jeep.
Petitioner points out that the alleged cost of
repairing the jeep pegged at P130,655.00 has not
been incurred but is only a job estimate or a sum
total of the expenses yet to be incurred for its
repair. It argues that the best evidence
obtainable to prove with a reasonable degree of
certainty the value of the jeep is the acquisition
cost or the purchase price of the jeep minus
depreciation for one year of use equivalent to
10% of the purchase price.
Petitioners argument is partly
meritorious.
Except as provided by law or by
stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.[10] Actual damages are
such compensation or damages for an injury that
will put the injured party in the position in which
he had been before he was injured. They pertain
to such injuries or losses that are actually
sustained and susceptible of measurement. To
justify an award of actual damages, there must
be competent proof of the actual amount of
loss. Credence can be given only to claims which
are duly supported by receipts.[11]
In People v. Gopio,[12] the Court allowed
the reimbursement of only the laboratory fee
that was duly receipted as the rest of the
documents, which the prosecution presented to
prove the actual expenses incurred by the victim,
were merely a doctors prescription and a
handwritten list of food
expenses.[13] In Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v.
Delos Santos,[14] the Court particularly disallowed
the award of actual damages, considering that
the actual damages suffered by private
respondents therein were based only on a job
estimate and a photo showing the damage to the
truck and no competent proof on the specific
amounts of actual damages suffered was
presented.
In the instant case, no evidence was
submitted to show the amount actually spent for
the repair or replacement of the wrecked jeep.
Spouses Lomotan presented two different cost
estimates to prove the alleged actual damage of
the wrecked jeep. Exhibit B, is a job estimate by
Pagawaan Motors, Inc., which pegged the repair
cost of the jeep atP96,000.00, while Exhibit M,
estimated the cost of repair at P130,655.00.
FollowingViron, neither estimate is competent to
prove actual damages. Courts cannot simply rely
on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in
determining the fact and amount of damages.[15]
As correctly pointed out by petitioner,
the best evidence to prove the value of the
wrecked jeep is reflected in Exhibit I, the Deed of
Sale showing the jeeps acquisition cost
at P72,000.00. However, the depreciation value
of equivalent to 10% of the acquisition cost
cannot be deducted from it in the absence of
proof in support thereof.
Petitioner also questions the award of
moral and exemplary damages in favor of
Spouses Lomotan. It argues that the award of
moral damages was premised on the resulting
physical injuries arising from the quasi-delict;
since only respondent Umuyonsuffered physical
injuries, the award should pertain solely to him.
Correspondingly, the award of exemplary
damages should pertain only to
respondent Umuyon since only the latter is
entitled to moral damages, petitioner adds.
In the case of moral damages, recovery
is more an exception rather than the rule.Moral
damages are not punitive in nature but are
designed to compensate and alleviate the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar harm unjustly caused to a person. In
order that an award of moral damages can be
aptly justified, the claimant must be able to
satisfactorily prove that he
has suffered such damages and that the injury
causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed
in Articles 2219[16] and 2220[17] of the Civil Code.
Then, too, the damages must be shown to be the
proximate result of a wrongful act or
omission.The claimant must establish the factual
basis of the damages and its causal tie with the
acts of the defendant. In fine, an award of moral
damages would require, firstly, evidence of
besmirched reputation or physical, mental or
psychological suffering sustained by the
claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission
factually established; thirdly, proof that the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the damagessustained by the
claimant; and fourthly, that the case is
predicated on any of the instances expressed or
envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of
the Civil Code.[18]
In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a)
when an act or omission causes physical injuries,
or (b) where the defendant is guilty of
intentional tort, moral damages may aptly be
recovered. This rule also applies, as aforestated,
to breaches of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith. In culpa
criminal, moral damages could be lawfully due
when the accused is found guilty of physical
injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage,
illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal
search, or defamation.[19]
 Undoubtedly, petitioner is liable for the
moral damages suffered by respondentUmuyon.
Its liability is based on a quasi-delict or on its
negligence in the supervision and selection of its
driver, causing the vehicular accident and
physical injuries to respondentUmuyon. Rivera is
also liable for moral damages to
respondent Umuyon based on eitherculpa
criminal or quasi-delict. Since the decision in the
criminal case, which found Rivera guilty of
criminal negligence, did not award moral
damages, the same may be awarded in the
instant civil action for damages.
Jurisprudence show that in criminal
offenses resulting to the death of the victim, an
award within the range of P50,000.00
to P100,000.00 as moral damages has become
the trend.[20] Under the circumstances, because
respondent Umuyon did not die but had become
permanently incapacitated to drive as a result of
the accident, the award ofP30,000.00 for moral
damages in his favor is justified.[21]
However, there is no legal basis in
awarding moral damages to
Spouses Lomotanwhether arising from the
criminal negligence committed by Rivera or
based on the negligence of petitioner under
Article 2180.[22] Article 2219[23] speaks of
recovery of moral damages in case of a criminal
offense resulting in physical injuries or quasi-
delictscausing physical injuries, the two
instances where Rivera and petitioner are liable
for moral damages to respondent Umuyon.
Article 2220[24] does speak of awarding moral
damages where there is injury to property, but
the injury must be willful and the circumstances
show that such damages are justly due. There
being no proof that the accident was willful,
Article 2220 does not apply.
Exemplary or corrective damages are
imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory
damages.[25] Exemplary damages cannot be
recovered as a matter of right; the court will
decidewhether or not they should be
adjudicated.[26] In quasi-delicts, exemplary
damages may be granted if the defendant acted
with gross negligence.[27]While the amount of the
exemplary damages need not be proved, the
plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages before the
court may consider the question of whether or
not exemplary damages should be awarded.[28]
As correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, Spouses Lomotan have shown that they
are entitled to compensatory damages while
respondent Umuyon can recover both
compensatory and moral damages. To serve as
an example for the public good, the Court affirms
the award of exemplary damages in the amount
of P100,000.00 to respondents. Because
exemplary damages are awarded, attorneys fees
may also be awarded in consonance with Article
2208 (1).[29] The Court affirms the appellate
courts award of attorneys fees in the amount
of P25,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58655
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of
actual damages for the cost of repairing the
owner-type jeep
is hereby REDUCED to P72,000.00 while the mor
al damages of P30,000.00 is awarded solely to
respondent Umuyon. All other awards of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Following
jurisprudence,[30] petitioner is ordered to PAY
legal interest of 6% per annum from the date of
promulgation of the Decision dated 21 April
1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
72, Antipolo, Rizal and 12% per annum from the
time the Decision of this Court attains finality, on
all sums awarded until their full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION checked in at the St. Lukes Medical Center and total amount of P9,939 and costs of suit. It found THE COURT A QUO
underwent pre-operative procedures including no adequate proof that Noel had been deprived ERRED IN FINDING
CONCEPCION ILAO-ORETA, the G.R.
administration
No. 172406of intravenous fluid and of any job contract while attending to his wife in PETITIONER TO HAVE ACTED
Petitioner, enema. the hospital. WITH GROSS NEGLIGENCE
Present: AND AWARDING MORAL
Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive at the On appeal by the spouses, the Court of DAMAGES TO
scheduled
QUISUMBING,
time for J.,the
Chairperson,
procedure, however, and Appeals, by Decision[6] of April 21, 2006, finding RESPONDENTS.[10]
no prior
CARPIO,
notice of its cancellation was received. It Dr. Ilao-Oreta grossly negligent,[7] modified the
- versus - turned
CARPIO
out that
MORALES,
the doctor was on a return flight trial courts decision as follows: THE COURT A QUO
fromTINGA,
Hawaiiand
to, and arrived at 10:00 p.m. of April ERRED IN AWARDING
5, 1999
VELASCO,
in, Manila.
JR., JJ. WHEREFORE, the EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO
trial Courts decision dated RESPONDENTS.[11]
Promulgated:
On May 18, 1999, the Ronquillo March 9, 2001 is affirmed,
SPOUSES EVA MARIE and BENEDICTO NOELspouses
October
filed 11,
a complaint
2007 [1] against Dr. Ilao-Oreta subject to the modification THE COURT A QUO
RONQUILLO, and the St. Lukes Medical Center for breach of that the amount of actual [ERRED] IN AWARDING
Respondents. professional and service contract and for damages, for which both ATTORNEYS FEES TO
damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) defendants-appellees are RESPONDENTS.[12]
of Batangas City. They prayed for the award of jointly and severally liable to
actual damages including alleged loss of income plaintiffs-appellants, THE COURT A QUO
of Noel while accompanying his wife to the is increased to ERRED IN INCREASING THE
hospital, moral damages, exemplary damages, P16,069.40. Furthermore, AWARD OF ACTUAL
the costs of litigation, attorneys fees, and other defendant-appellee Dr. Ilao- DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF
x-------------------------------------
available reliefs and remedies.[2] Oreta is also held liable to pay RESPONDENTS.[13]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
plaintiff-appellants the
In her Answer,[3] Dr. Ilao-Oreta gave following:
DECISION
her side of the case as follows: She went on a Gross negligence implies a want or
honeymoon to Hawaii and was scheduled to (a) P50,000.00 absence of or failure to exercise slight care or
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
leave Hawaii at 3:00 p.m. of April 4, as moral diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces
Respondents, spouses Eva Marie
1999 forManila. Aware that her trip damages; a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
Ronquillo (Eva Marie) and Noel Benedicto
from Hawaii to Manila would take about 12 exerting any effort to avoid them.[14] It is
(Noel)Ronquillo (the Ronquillo spouses or the
hours, inclusive of a stop-over at (b) P25,000.00 characterized by want of even slight care, acting
spouses), had not been blessed with a child
the Narita Airport in Japan, she estimated that as or omitting to act in a situation where there is a
despite several years of marriage. They thus
she would arrive in Manila in the early morning exemplary duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
consulted petitioner, Dr. Concepcion Ilao-Oreta
of April 5, 1999. She thus believed in utmost damages; intentionally with a conscious indifference to
(Dr. Ilao-Oreta), an obstetrician-gynecologist-
good faith that she would be back in Manila in and consequences in so far as other persons may be
consultant at the St. Lukes MedicalCenter where
time for the scheduled conduct of the affected.[15]
she was, at the time material to the case, the
laparoscopic procedure. She failed to consider (c) P20,000.00
chief of the Reproductive Endocrinology and
the time difference between Hawaii and as attorneys The records show that before leaving
Infertility Section.
the Philippines, however. fees. for Hawaii, Dr. Ilao-Oreta left an admitting order
with her secretary for one of the spouses to pick
Upon Dr. Ilao-Oretas advice, Eva Marie
In its Answer,[4] the St. SO up, apprised Eva Marie of the necessary
agreed to undergo a laparoscopic procedure
Lukes Medical Center contended that the ORDERED.[8] (Underscorin preparations for the procedure, and instructed
whereby a laparascope would be inserted
spouses have no cause of action against it since it g supplied) the hospital staff to perform pre-operative
through the patients abdominal wall to get a
performed the pre-operative procedures without treatments.[16] These acts of the doctor reflect an
direct view of her internal reproductive organ in
delay, and any cause of action they have would earnest intention to perform the procedure on
order to determine the real cause of her
be against Dr. Ilao-Oreta. the day and time scheduled.
infertility.
Hence, the present Petition for
The procedure was scheduled on April
By Decision[5] of March 9, 2001, Branch Review[9] of Dr. Ilao-Oreta raising the following The records also show that on realizing
5, 1999 at 2:00 p.m., to be performed by Dr. Ilao-
84 of the Batangas RTC, finding that the failure of arguments: that she missed the scheduled procedure,
Oreta. At around 7:00 a.m. of said date, Eva
the doctor to arrive on time was not intentional, Dr. Ilao-Oreta, upon arrival in Manila,
Marie, accompanied by her husband Noel,
awarded Eva Marie only actual damages in the immediately sought to rectify the same, thus:
 my office early scheduling of the exist, petitioner could not
[ATTY SINJAN] Q: So, can you at 8:00 and looked surgery . . . have been conscious of any
tell us the reason for her chart, foreseeable danger that may
why you missed that because her ATTY LONTOK: May we move, occur since she actually
operation? telephone number your Honor, for the believed that she would make
was written in the striking out of the it to the operation that was
[DR. ILAO-ORETA] A: When I chart. So, I called answer, this is elective in nature, the only
scheduled her for them right away. purely hearsay. purpose of which was to
the surgery, I looked determine the real cause of
at my ticket and so I Q: Were you able to contact COURT: Remain on the infertility and not to treat and
was to leave Hawaii them? record. cure a life threatening
on April 4 at around WITNESS [DR. ILAO-ORETA]: . disease. Thus, in merely fixing
4:00 oclock in the A: I was able to reach Mr. . . and then Mr. the date of her appointment
afternoon, so I was Ronquillo. Ronquillo told me Im with respondent Eva Marie
computing 12 hours sorry, Dra., we Ronquillo, petitioner was not
of travel including Q: In the course of your cannot re-schedule in the pursuit or performance
stop-over, then conversation, what the of conduct which any
probably I would be did you tell Mr. surgery.[17] (Undersc ordinary person may deem to
in Manila early Ronquillo? oring supplied) probably and naturally result
morning of April 5, in injury,[19] (Underscoring in
then I have so much A: I apologized to him, I said I original)
time and I can easily was sorry about the Noel admitted that indeed Dr. Ilao-Oreta called
do the case at 2:00 time that I missed him up after she arrived in Manila as related by
oclock, you know it the surgery, and I her.[18] thus persuades.
skipped my mind the told him that I can
change in time. do the case right that The evidence then shows that Dr. Ilao- It bears noting that when she was
same day without Oreta, who had traveled more than twice to scheduling the date of her performance of the
Q: So when you arrived Mrs. Ronquillo the United States where she obtained a procedure, Dr. Ilao-Oreta had just gotten married
at 10:00 [PM] having to undergo fellowship in Reproductive Endocrinology and and was preparing for her honeymoon,[20] and it
in Manila, what did another Infertility was indeed negligent when she is of common human knowledge that excitement
you do? [b]arium enema. scheduled to perform professional service attends its preparations. Her negligence could
at 2:00 p.m. on April 5, 1999 without considering then be partly attributed to human frailty which
A: I called immediately the Q: What else did you tell him, the time difference between rules out its characterization as gross.
hospital and I talked if any? the Philippines andHawaii.
with the nurses, I The doctors negligence not being gross,
asked about the A: I asked him whether I can The doctors act did not, however, the spouses are not entitled to recover moral
patient, Mrs. talk with Mrs. reflect gross negligence as defined above. Her damages.
Ronquillo, and they Ronquillo because I argument that
told me that she has wanted to apologize Neither are the spouses entitled to
already left at to her personally. Although petitioner recover exemplary damages in the absence of a
around 7:00. failed to take into showing that Dr. Ilao-Oreta acted in a wanton,
Q: And what did he say? consideration the time fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
Q: And after calling the difference between manner,[21] nor to award of attorneys fees as,
hospital, what A: I could hear on the thePhilippines and Hawaii, th contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals
happened? background that e situation then did not that the spouses were compelled to litigate and
Mrs. Ronquillo was present any clear and incur expenses to protect their interest,[22] the
A: I wanted to call the shouting angrily that apparent harm or injury that records show that they did not exert enough
plaintiffs, but I didnt she didnt want to even a careless person may efforts to settle the matter before going to
have their number at talk to me, and that perceive. Unlike in situations court. Eva Marie herself testified:
that time, so in the she didnt want re- where the Supreme Court had
morning I went to found gross negligence to ATTY. SINJIAN:
Q: Isnt it true that before Q: But you did not demand proven through the sole loss.[28] (Underscoring
instituting this anything or write to testimony supplied)
present case, you did Dr. Oreta? ofThemistocles Ruguero, the
not make any vice president for
demand on Dr. Ilao- A: No. administration of Panacor. In The list of expenses cannot replace receipts when
Oreta regarding the his testimony, the witness they should have been issued as a matter of
claims which you Q: Before instituting this case? affirmed course in business transactions[29] as in the case
have allegedly that Panacor incurred losses, of purchase of gasoline and of food.
incurred, because of A: No.[23] (Underscoring specifically, in terms of
the failed supplied) training and seminars, The documented claim for hospital and
laparoscopic surgery leasehold acquisition, medical expenses of the spouses is detailed in the
operation? procurement of vehicles and Statement of Account issued by the hospital, the
Finally, Dr. Ilao-Oretas prayer for the office equipment without, pertinent entries of which read:
A [EVA MARIE]: I will tell the reduction of actual damages is well-taken.Article however, adducing receipts to
truth. Dr. Augusto Re 2201 of the Civil Code provides: substantiate the same. The xxxx
yes of St. Lukes . . . documentary evidence
In contracts and marked as Exhibit W, which GROSS HOSPITAL CHARGES 2,
Q: But did you demand? quasi-contracts, the damages was an ordinary private 416.50
for which the obligor who writing allegedly itemizing 4/5/1999 1699460
A: No, I did not demand acted in good faith is liable the capital expenditures and DEPOSITOFFICIAL
because shall be those which are the losses from the failed RECEIPT (5,000.00)
natural and probable operation of Panacor, was not (5,000.00)
ATTY. SINJIAN: That will be consequences of the breach of testified to by any witness to ________
all, your Honor. the obligation, and which the ascertain the veracity of its 4/5/1999 SECOND 0284893
parties have foreseen or could content.Although the lower UNUSED MED 0439534
ATTY. LONTOK: The witness have reasonably foreseen at court fixed the sum of (65.55)
is still explaining. the time the obligation was P4,520,000.00 as the total FLOOR HINOX 500 MG CAP
constituted. expenditures incurred SECOND 0284894 UNUSED M
WITNESS: Im explaining byPanacor, it failed to show ED 0439893 (62.25)
first. Dr. Augusto how and in what manner the FLOOR PHENERGAN 2 ML
Reyes told me that In fixing the amount of actual damages, the Court same were substantiated by 50MG ______ (127.80)
he will hold the of Appeals and the trial court included expenses the claimant with reasonable BALANCE DUE (2,711.30)[30]
meeting for me and which the spouses incurred prior to April 5, certainty. Hence, the claim for =======
Dr. Oreta to settle 1999 when the breach of contract complained of actual damages should be
things and occurred.[24] The Court of Appeals also included received with extreme caution As extrapolated from the above-quoted entries in
reimburse all the the alleged P300 spent on fuel consumption from since it is only based on bare the Statement of Account, P2,288.70(the gross
money that I spent the spouses residence at San Pascual, Batangas to assertion without support hospital charges of P2,416.50 less the unused
from the hospital, the St. LukesMedical Center in Quezon City and from independent medicine in the amount ofP127.80) was debited
and he even the alleged P500 spent on food in the hospital evidence.Premieres failure to from the P5,000 deposit[31] to thus leave a balance
suggested Dr. Oreta canteen, both of which are unsubstantiated by prove actual expenditure of the deposit in the amount of P2,711.30, which
to personally talk to independent or competent proof.[25] The only consequently conduces to a the trial court erroneously denominated as
me. piece of documentary evidence supporting the failure of its claim. In confinement fee. The remaining balance
food and fuel expenses is an unsigned listing.[26]As determining actual damages, of P2,711.30 was the amount refundable to the
ATTY. SINJIAN: the fuel and food expenses are not adequately the court cannot rely on mere spouses.
Q: So it was to Dr. Augusto substantiated, they cannot be included in the assertions, speculations,
Reyes that you computation of the amount of actual damages. conjectures or guesswork but Following Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
talked? So Premiere Development Bank v. Court of must depend on competent Court of Appeals,[32] this Court awards interest on
A: Yes. Appeals[27] instructs: proof and on the best the actual damages to be paid by Dr. Ilao-Oreta at
evidence obtainable regarding the rate of 6% per annumfrom the time of the
In the instant case, the actual amount of filing of the complaint on May 18, 1999, and at
the actual damages were
12% per annum from the finality of this judgment
until its satisfaction.

WHEREFORE, the petition

is GRANTED. The decision appealed from
isMODIFIED in that

1) the award to respondents-spouses

Noel and Eva Marie Ronquillo of actual damages
is REDUCED to P2,288.70, to bear interest at a
rate of 6% per annum from the time of the filing of
the complaint on May 18, 1999 and, upon finality
of this judgment, at the rate of 12% per
annum until satisfaction; and

2. The award of moral and

exemplary damages and attorneys fees
is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121768. July 21, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. DOMINGO CASTILLO,
JR., accused-appellant.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
This is a case of parricide more tragic in
that it involves the cold- blooded murder of a
father by his only son.
On November 6, 1993 between the hours of
7:30 and 8:30 in the evening, the appellant
DOMINGO CASTILLO, JR., nicknamed Boyet, was
in the D & G Restaurant in Norzagaray, Bulacan
drinking beer with the victim, his father,
Domingo Castillo, Sr.[1] After some two hours of
drinking, a group of noisy customers arrived.
Wary of the trouble that these customers may
cause and aware of his sons propensity to get
into fights, the victim urged the former to go
home with him.[2] The appellant and the victim
then boarded a blue pick-up truck with plate
number CBE 591.[3] The appellant drove the
vehicle in the direction of their home in Angat,
Bulacan with the victim in the passengers
seat. During the trip home, an argument ensued
between the appellant and the victim who were
both a bit drunk already[4] because the former
kept insisting that he should or could go back to
the restaurant while the latter prevented him
from doing so.[5] Upon nearing their house, the
appellant abruptly stopped the pick-up and the
victim alighted therefrom.[6] Holding a bottle of
beer in his right hand, the victim raised both of
his hands, stood in front of the pick-up and said,
sige kung gusto mo sagasaan mo ako, hindi ka
makakaalis (go ahead, run over me if you want to
leave).[7] The appellant slowly drove the pick-up
forward threatening to run over the victim. At
this juncture, the victim exclaimed, papatayin mo
ba ako? (are you going to kill me?).[8] After the
victim uttered these words, the appellant
backed-up almost hitting an owner type jeep
parked at the side of the road and on board
which were four (4) people conversing with each
other, including prosecution eyewitness, Ma.
Cecilia Mariano. Then at high speed, the
appellant drove the pick-up forward hitting the
victim in the process. Not satisfied with what he
had done, the appellant put the vehicle in reverse
thereby running over the victim a second
time. The appellant then alighted from the
vehicle and walked towards their house.[9]
At the precise moment of the perpetration
of the crime, another witness, Arthur Agaran
who worked at the recapping shop of the victim
was in the latters residence.[10] He was changing
his clothes and preparing to work overtime in
the recapping shop located in the premises of the
victims residence.[11] Agaran saw the pick-up
truck being driven by the appellant and noticed
that it moved forward and backward four (4)
times[12] about twenty (20) to thirty (30) meters
from the house.[13] When he and another worker
went outside to find out what had happened,
they saw the victims body bloodied and
sprawled on the ground.[14] They rushed the
victim to the Dolorosa Hospital at Norzagaray,
Bulacan where the victim expired shortly
thereafter.[15]
The appellant was not immediately
prosecuted for the death of his father which he
was able to pass off as an accident. But when his
older sister, Leslie C. Padilla, arrived from the
United States to attend her fathers wake and
funeral, she made inquiries about the
circumstances surrounding his death and was
given different versions of the incident, some of
which insinuated that her father did not meet his
demise accidentally.[16] Later, a suspicion of foul
play moved her to engage the services of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for a
formal investigation into the matter.[17] The
results thereof confirmed Padillas suspicion and
led to the filing of an information for parricide
against appellant.[18] After trial, Branch 14 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan found the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of parricide and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the On direct examination, Mariano testified as
other heirs of the victim TWO HUNDRED FIFTY follows:
THOUSAND PESOS (P250,000.00) as actual
damages.[19] Q: While you were there infront (sic)
of your house, do you recall of
We affirm the judgment of conviction. any unusual incident that
happened?
The prosecution has successfully
established the elements of parricide: (1) the A: Yes, sir there was.
death of the deceased; (2) that he or she was
Q: Tell us about that unusual
killed by the accused; and (3) that the deceased
incident?
was a legitimate ascendant or descendant, or the
legitimate spouse of the accused.[20] The only A: While we were conversing at that
question left to be answered by this Court is time, all of a sudden there was a
whether or not the parricide was committed thru
colored blue pick up (sic) that
reckless imprudence as claimed by the was rushing towards our place
appellant. The appellant does not dispute the fact in very fast speed
that he had indeed ran over his father with the (humaharurot).
pick-up truck he was driving on that fateful night
in November, 1993. He claims, however, that Q: With whom were you conversing
there was no intention on his part to kill his at that time?
father, and that he had accidentally stepped on
A: My two (2) friends and one of my
the gas pedal forcefully, causing the vehicle to
sister (sic), sir.
travel at a fast speed.[21]
The appellants asseveration is not worthy Q: What is the name of your sister?
of credence. In convicting the appellant, the trial
A: Ma. Lucila G. Mariano, sir.
court relied heavily on the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, Mariano and Agaran. We Q: From where did that pick up van
find no reason to do otherwise, applying the come from (sic)?
fundamental rule in criminal cases that in the
matter of credibility of witnesses, the appellate A:It came from behind our back, sir.
court gives great weight and highest degree of
xxxxxxxxx
respect to the findings of the trial court as they
are in a better position to examine real evidence Q: What happened after you saw that
as well as to observe the demeanor of the pick up (sic) colored blue
witnesses.[22] The details of the incident as speeding in that street?
narrated by Mariano and Agaran bespeak of a
crime committed with full intent. And we have A: All of a sudden it stopped, sir.
held that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful
Q: In your sketch, will you please
act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
draw a square or a rectangular
reckless imprudence.[23] What qualifies an act as
figure to indicate the position of
one of reckless or simple negligence or
that van when it stopped?
imprudence is the lack of malice or criminal
intent in the execution thereof.[24] Otherwise AT THIS JUNCTURE, THE WITNESS IS
stated, in criminal negligence, the injury caused INDICATING THE SAME.
to another should be unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act done without Q: After that pick up (sic) stopped,
malice[25] but with lack of foresight, carelessness, what happened next?
or negligence, and which has harmed society or
A: It stopped there, sir.
an individual.[26]
Q: How about you, what did you do
when the pick up stopped?
A: We were looking at it. We did not
mind it.
Q: After that, did you notice anything
unusual that happened around
the premises.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Tell us about that unusual
incident?
A: An old man alighted, sir.
Q: From where did that old man
alight?
A: From the pick up (sic), sir.
COURT:
Q: The blue pick up (sic)?
A: Yes, your honor.
FISCAL:
Q: From what side of the pick up (sic)
did he alight, from the left or
from the right side?
A: From the right side, sir.
Q: After that old man had alighted,
what happened?
A: I noticed that the pick up (sic)
colored blue thru the headlight
seems to be moving trying to
intimidate the old man then I
heard the old man saying
papatayin mo ba ako and at that
time, he was holding a bottle of
beer, sir.
Q: In this sketch, will you please draw
the position of that old man?
AT THIS JUNCTURE, THE WITNESS IS
DOING THE SAME.
Q: After the old man uttered those
words, what happened?
A: I just saw that the pick up made a
back up (sic) almost hitting us,
sir.
Q: Then, what did the driver of that
pick up (sic) do afterwards after
backing up rather?
A: All of a sudden, the pick up (sic)
ran very fast and hit the old
man, sir.
Q: You said that, that vehicle backed
up and then it proceeded very
fast hitting the old man in the
process, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q:Did the old man change his position
after he uttered papatayin mo
ba ako? up to the time that he
was hit by that pick up van?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you please indicate where the
old man proceed (sic)?
AT THIS JUNCTURE, THE WITNESS IS
DOING THE SAME.
Q: When you saw the old man hit by
that pick up (sic), did you do
anything?
A: I was just shocked, sir.
Q: And what happened to the pick up
(sic) after it hit the old man?
A: After it hit the old man, I noticed
that it moved backwards again
and then the headlight was on
at that time and I saw the old
man lying sprawled on the road,
sir.
Q: And what did you do after you saw
the old man lying sprawled on
the street?
A: I just say (sic) to my companion,
Hoy, nasagasaan yong matanda
then all of us were shocked and
we noticed that the driver of
that pick up (sic) was (sic)
alighted, sir.
Q: Were you able to recognize the
driver of that pick up who
alighted from that vehicle?
A: I did not recognize, I just recall that
he was wearing white shorts,
sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: After that driver wearing white
shorts alighted from that pick
up (sic), where did he proceed?
A: He walked towards the town
proper walking, sir.
Q: When you said that he walk (sic),
are you saying that the driver
left his vehicle in the middle of
the street?
A: Yes, sir he left the pick up
(sic).[27] (Underscoring
supplied.)
The records are bereft of any evidence that
the appellant had tried to avoid hitting the victim
who positioned himself in front of the pick-
up. On the contrary, Marianos testimony is to the
effect that prior to actually hitting the victim, the
appellant was intimidating him by moving the
pick-up forward, thus prompting the victim to
exclaim, papatayin mo ba ako?. Worse, the
appellant backed-up to gain momentum, then
accelerated at a very fast speed knowing fully
well that the vehicle would definitely hit the
victim who was still standing in front of the
same.
The appellants actuations subsequent
thereto also serve to refute his allegation that he
did not intend to kill his father. Surely, the
appellant must have felt the impact upon hitting
the victim.The normal reaction of any person
who had accidentally ran over another would be
to immediately alight from the vehicle and
render aid to the victim. But as if to ensure the
victims death, the appellant instead backed-up,
thereby running over the victim again. This
explains why, as testified to by Agaran, he saw
the imprint of tiremarks on the victims
feet.[28] Even more indicative that this was a
cold-blooded killing and not an accident as
appellant would have us believe is his deliberate
failure to promptly summon help for his
father. Mariano categorically testified that after
the appellant had ran over the victim, he alighted
from the pick-up and walked in the direction of
the town. The appellants claim that he shouted
for help and called the workers in the recapping
shop to bring his father to the hospital is
obviously a fabrication.[29] Agaran recounted that
after the incident, the appellant walked towards
their house and while passing in front of the
recapping shop, merely looked at him and the
other workers thereat.[30] A man who had not
intended to harm his own father would not walk
but more likely run in search of help. Aware of
the fact that his fathers life is precariously
hanging in the balance, the normal reaction of a
child is to waste no time in trying to save his
life. The appellant, on the other hand, did not
even lift a finger to help his own father whose
life he had so brutally taken away. It was Agaran
and the other workers who, on their own accord,
brought the victim to the hospital. In the light of
the foregoing circumstances, we therefore find it
difficult to believe that the appellant did not act
with malice. Worth reiterating here is the rule
that evidence, to be believed, must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness,
but it must be credible in itself- such as the
common experience and observation of mankind
can approve as probable under the
circumstances.[31]
Ironically, it is the appellants testimony
that finally clinches his conviction. His testimony
reveals that a certain degree of enmity and
resentment characterized his relationship with
his parents. The appellant was the only son of
well to do parents. He had never held a days job
in his entire life, and although already a family
man himself, he continued to rely solely on his
parents support. That he was a little spoiled[32] is
beyond doubt. The appellant admitted that
during the previous years, he and his parents
had some differences.[33] As a matter of fact,
several days prior to the incident, his father who
wanted him to look for a job had a heart to heart
talk with him, and asked him, ganito ka na lang
ba? (will you never change?).[34] Finally, it was
the appellant himself who told the court that the
incident was preceded by an argument between
him and his father who was determined to
prevent him from returning to the
restaurant.[35] But what exactly motivated the
appellant to commit so heinous a crime
continues to be beyond the comprehension of
this court. There is, however, no need to delve
into the same as the facts proven during trial
speak eloquently of the commission of a crime
and the identity of the author thereof.[36]
Anent the award of actual damages, we
delete the same as none had been proven in
court. The appellant should, however, be made to
pay the other heirs of the victim the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) by way of
moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision finding
the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of parricide is hereby AFFIRMED with
the modification that he is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
other heirs of the victim the amount FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr.,
Melo, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179799 September 11, 2009
ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SANSIO PHILIPPINES,
INC., and EMMA J. DATUIN, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition1 for certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 31, 2007
and its Resolution3 dated September 12, 2007 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 63602, entitled "Sansio
Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Hon. Romulo SG.
Villanueva, et al."
The case arose from the filing of an Affidavit of
Complaint4 for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) by
respondent Emma J. Datuin (Datuin), as Officer-
in-Charge of the Accounts Receivables
Department, and upon authority of petitioner
Sansio Philippines, Inc. (Sansio), against
petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio) and
one Vito Belarmino, as proprietors of Alvi
Marketing, allegedly for delivering insufficiently
funded bank checks as payment for the
numerous appliances bought by Alvi Marketing
from Sansio.
As the address stated in the complaint was
incorrect, Gregorio was unable to controvert the
charges against her. Consequently, she was
indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 236544,
236545, and 236546, before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 3, Manila.
The MeTC issued a warrant5 for her arrest, and it
was served upon her by the armed operatives of
the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime
(PARAC) of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) on October 17, 1997, Friday,
at around 9:30 a.m. in Quezon City while she was
visiting her husband and their two (2) daughters
at their city residence. Gregorio was brought to
the PARAC-DILG Office where she was subjected
to fingerprinting and mug shots, and was
detained. She was released in the afternoon of
the same day when her husband posted a bond
for her temporary liberty.
On December 5, 1997, Gregorio filed before the
MeTC a Motion6 for Deferment of Arraignment
and Reinvestigation, alleging that she could not
have issued the bounced checks, since she did
not even have a checking account with the bank
on which the checks were drawn, as certified by
the branch manager of the Philippine National
Bank, Sorsogon Branch. She also alleged that her
signature was patently and radically different
from the signatures appearing on the bounced
checks.
The MeTC granted the Motion and a
reinvestigation was conducted. In the course of
the reinvestigation, Datuin submitted an
Affidavit of Desistance7 dated August 18, 1998,
stating, among others, that Gregorio was not one
of the signatories of the bounced checks subject
of prosecution.
Subsequently, the assistant city prosecutor filed
a Motion to Dismiss8 dated November 12, 1998
with respect to Criminal Case Nos. 236544-46.
The MeTC granted the motion and ordered the
B.P. Blg. 22 cases dismissed.9
On August 18, 2000, Gregorio filed a
complaint10 for damages against Sansio and
Datuin before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 12, Ligao, Albay. The complaint, in part,
reads —
4. That on or about December 15, 1995,
defendant Emma J. Datuin filed with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila
an "Affidavit of Complaint" wherein,
among others, she alleged under oath
that as an Officer In-charge of the
Accounts Receivables Department of
SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., she was
duly authorized and empowered by
said company to file cases against
debtors, customers and dealers of the
company;
xxxx
5. That while acting under authority of
her employer namely the defendant
SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., defendant
EMMA J. DATUIN falsely stated in the
"Affidavit of Complaint" (Annex "A"),
among others, that plaintiff Zenaida R.
Gregorio issued and delivered to their
office the following checks, to wit:
a. PNB Check No. C-347108
dated November 30, 1992 in
the amount of ₱9,564.00;
b. PNB Check No. C-347109
dated November 30, 1992 in
the amount of ₱19,194.48;
and
c. PNB Check No. C-347104
dated December 2, 1992 in
the amount of ₱10,000.00
and that the above-mentioned PNB
Checks bounced when deposited upon
maturity;
6. That as a result of the filing of the
"Affidavit of Complaint" (Annex "A")
wherein defendant Emma J. Datuin
falsely charged the plaintiff with
offenses of Estafa and/or violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 on three (3) counts, the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila
issued a Resolution dated April 1, 1996
finding the existence of a probable
cause against the plaintiff for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 on three
counts;
xxxx
7. That in the "MEMO OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION" attached hereto as
Annex "C," signed by defendant Emma
J. Datuin she falsely indicated the
address of plaintiff to be at No. 76
Peñaranda Street, Legaspi City when
the truth of the matter is that the
latter’s correct address is at Barangay
Rizal, Oas, Albay;
8. That as a consequence of the
aforegoing false and misleading
indication of address, plaintiff was
therefore not duly notified of the
charges filed against her by defendant
Emma J. Datuin; and more, she was not
able to controvert them before the
investigating prosecutor, finally
resulting in the filing in court of three
(3) informations accusing her of
violating B.P. 22;
xxxx
9. That as pernicious result of the
unwarranted and baseless accusation
by the defendants which culminated in
the filing of three (3) informations in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 3 indicting the plaintiff on three
counts of the offense of violating B.P.
22, the said court issued a Warrant of
Arrest on July 22, 1996 ordering the
arrest of the plaintiff;
xxxx
10. That taking extra effort to expedite
the apprehension of plaintiff,
defendants’ retained private
prosecutor managed to obtain the
Warrant for the Arrest of said plaintiff
from the Court as evidenced by the
copy of the letter of lawyer Alquin B.
Manguerra of Chua and Associates Law
Office (Annex "H") so much so that in
the morning of October 17, 1997, while
plaintiff was visiting her husband Jose
Gregorio and their two daughters at
their city residence at 78 K-2 Street,
Kamuning, Quezon City, and without
the slightest premonition that she was
wanted by the law, armed operatives of
the Public Assistance and Reaction
Against Crime (PARAC) of DILG
suddenly swooped down on their
residence, arrested the plaintiff and
brought her to the PARAC DILG Office
in Quezon City where she was
fingerprinted and detained like an
ordinary criminal;
xxxx
11. That feeling distraught, helpless and
hungry (not having eaten for a whole
day) the plaintiff languished in her
place of confinement until the late
afternoon of October 17, 1997 when
her husband was able to post a bond
for her temporary liberty and secure an
order of release (Annex "J") from the
court. It was providential that a city
judge was available in the late
afternoon of October 17, 1997 which
was a Friday, otherwise plaintiff would
have remained in confinement for the
entire weekend;
12. That because of her desire to prove
and establish her innocence of the
unjustified charges lodged against her
by the defendants, the plaintiff was
thus compelled to retain the services of
counsel resulting in the filing of a
Motion for Deferment of Arraignment
and Reinvestigation (Annex "K") which
was granted by the court; the filing of a
Request for Reinvestigation with the
prosecutor’s office (Annex "L"); and the
submission of a Counter-Affidavit to the
investigating prosecutor. All of these
culminated in the filing by the
investigating prosecutor of a Motion to
Dismiss (Annex "M") the three criminal
cases as a consequence of which the
Court issued an Order dated June 1,
1999 (Annex "N") dismissing Criminal
Cases No. 236544, No. 236545 and No.
236546, copy of which was received by
plaintiff only on July 7, 2000;
13. That previous to the filing of the
above-mentioned Motion to Dismiss by
the prosecutor and having been faced
with the truth and righteousness of
plaintiff’s avowal of innocence which
was irrefutable, defendants had no
recourse but to concede and recognize
the verity that they had wrongly
accused an innocent person, in itself a
brazen travesty of justice, so much so
that defendant Emma J. Datuin had to
execute an Affidavit of Desistance
(Annex "O") admitting that plaintiff is
not a signatory to the three bouncing
checks in question, rationalizing, albeit
lamely, that the filing of the cases
against the plaintiff was by virtue of an
honest mistake or inadvertence on her
(Datuin’s) part;
14. Be that as it may, incalculable
damage has been inflicted on the
plaintiff on account of the defendants’
wanton, callous and reckless disregard
of the fundamental legal precept that
"every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind
of his neighbors and other persons"
(Art. 26, Civil Code of the Philippines);
15. That the plaintiff, being completely
innocent of the charges against her as
adverted to in the preceding
paragraphs, was socially humiliated,
embarrassed, suffered physical
discomfort, mental anguish, fright, and
serious anxiety as a proximate result of
her unjustified indictment, arrest and
detention at the PARAC headquarters –
all of these ordeals having been
exacerbated by the fact that plaintiff is
a woman who comes from a respected not to mention the undue aspersion
family in Oas, Albay, being the wife of cast upon her social, professional and
an executive of the Philippine National business reputation because of
Construction Corporation, the mother defendants’ tortious act of accusing her
of two college students studying in of Estafa and/or issuing bouncing
Manila, a pharmacist by profession, a checks – even without a scintilla of
businesswoman by occupation, and an evidence;
incumbent Municipal Councilor
(Kagawad) of Oas, Albay, at the time of 16. That to compound the aforegoing
her arrest and detention; and that she travails and sufferings of the plaintiff
previously held the following positions: she had to devote and spend much of
her time, money and efforts trying to
(a). President, Philippine clear her tarnished name and
Pharmaceutical Association reputation, including traveling to and
(Albay Chapter); from Manila to confer with her lawyer,
attend the hearings at the prosecutor’s
office and at the Metropolitan Trial
(b). Chairman of the Board,
Albay Pharmaceutical Court;
Marketing Cooperative
(ALPHAMAC); 17. By and large, defendants’ fault or, at
the very least, their reckless
imprudence or negligence, in filing the
(c). Charter Secretary,
Kiwanis Club of Oas; three (3) criminal cases against the
plaintiff unequivocally caused damage
to the latter and because of defendants’
(d). Chairman, Polangui baseless and unjustified accusations,
Ladies Multi-Purpose plaintiff was constrained to retain the
Cooperative, Polangui, Albay; services of a lawyer to represent her at
the Metropolitan Trial Court and at the
(e). Vicarial Regent, Daughters Office of the City Prosecutor at Manila
of Mary Immaculate in order to establish her innocence and
International, District IX; cause the dismissal of the three (3)
criminal cases filed against her, reason
(f). Chapter President and for which she spent ₱20,000.00; and in
Municipal Coordinator, Albay order to institute this instant action for
Women Volunteers the redress of her grievances, plaintiff
Association, Inc., Legaspi City; have to pay the sum of ₱50,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and incur litigation
expenses in the amount of ₱35,000.00;
(g). Regent, Daughters of
Mary Immaculate
International Virgo Clemens 18. That by reason of all the aforegoing
Circle, Oas, Albay; and pursuant to the provision of law
that "whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being
(h). Secretary, Girl Scout of fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the Philippines District the damage done," (Article 2176, Civil
Association; and Code of the Philippines), the plaintiff is
entitled to and hereby claims the
(i). Director, Albay Electric following items of damages:
Cooperative (ALECO),
 a. ₱3,000,000.00 as moral denying their motions to dismiss and for
damages reconsideration.
b. ₱50,000.00 as actual Meanwhile, on March 20, 2003, the RTC
damages rendered its Decision in the civil case for
damages instituted by Gregorio, directing Sansio
c. ₱50,000.00 as nominal and Datuin, jointly and solidarily, to pay Gregorio
damages ₱200,000.00 as moral damages; ₱10,000.00 as
nominal damages; ₱35,000.00 as litigation
expenses; ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
d. ₱70,000.00 as attorney’s costs of the suit. The RTC expressly stated in its
fees
Decision that the complaint was one for damages
based on quasi-delict and not on malicious
e. ₱35,000.00 as litigation prosecution.
expenses
Aggrieved by the March 20, 2003 Decision,
19. That defendants herein are jointly Sansio and Datuin appealed to the CA, and the
and solidarily liable for the payment of same is now pending resolution.
the above items of damages being co-
tortfeasors. Moreover, defendant On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision
SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC. is on the certiorari case granting the petition and
vicariously liable as the employer of ordering the dismissal of the damage suit of
defendant Emma J. Datuin who patently Gregorio. The latter moved to reconsider the said
acted within the scope of her assigned Decision but the same was denied in the
tasks (Vide: Art. 2180, Civil Code of the appellate court’s Resolution dated September 12,
Philippines).11 2007.
Sansio and Datuin filed a Motion to Dismiss12 on
Hence, this petition.
the ground that the complaint, being one for
damages arising from malicious prosecution,
failed to state a cause of action, as the ultimate The core issue to be resolved, as culled from the
facts constituting the elements thereof were not factual circumstances of this case, is whether the
alleged in the complaint. Gregorio opposed13 the complaint, a civil suit filed by Gregorio, is based
Motion. Sansio and Datuin filed their Reply14to on quasi-delict or malicious prosecution.
the Opposition. Gregorio, in turn, filed her
Rejoinder.15 It is the position of Sansio and Datuin that the
complaint for damages filed by Gregorio before
the RTC was for malicious prosecution, but it
On October 10, 2000, the RTC issued an
Order16 denying the Motion to Dismiss. Sansio failed to allege the elements thereof, such that it
was aptly dismissed on appeal by the CA on the
and Datuin filed a Motion for
Reconsideration17 of the October 10, 2000 Order, ground of lack of cause of action. In their
comment, citing Albenson Enterprise
but the RTC denied the same in its Order18 dated
January 5, 2001. Corporation v. Court of Appeals,20 they posit that
Article 26 of the Civil Code, cited by Gregorio as
one of the bases for her complaint, and Articles
Sansio and Datuin went to the CA via a 19, 20, and 21 of the same Code, mentioned by
petition19 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
the RTC as bases for sustaining the complaint,
Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of discretion are the very same provisions upon which
on the part of the presiding judge of the RTC in
malicious prosecution is grounded. And in order
to further buttress their position that Gregorio’s
complaint was indeed one for malicious
prosecution, they even pointed out the fact that
Gregorio prayed for moral damages, which may
be awarded only in case of malicious prosecution
or, if the case is for quasi-delict, only if physical
injury results therefrom.
We disagree.
A perusal of the allegations of Gregorio’s
complaint for damages readily shows that she
filed a civil suit against Sansio and Datuin for
filing against her criminal charges for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22; that respondents did not exercise
diligent efforts to ascertain the true identity of
the person who delivered to them insufficiently
funded checks as payment for the various
appliances purchased; and that respondents
never gave her the opportunity to controvert the
charges against her, because they stated an
incorrect address in the criminal complaint.
Gregorio claimed damages for the
embarrassment and humiliation she suffered
when she was suddenly arrested at her city
residence in Quezon City while visiting her
family. She was, at the time of her arrest, a
respected Kagawad in Oas, Albay. Gregorio
anchored her civil complaint on Articles
26,21 2176,22 and 218023 of the Civil Code.
Noticeably, despite alleging either fault or
negligence on the part of Sansio and Datuin,
Gregorio never imputed to them any bad faith in
her complaint.
Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an
action is determined by the material averments
in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought.24 Undeniably, Gregorio’s civil complaint,
read in its entirety, is a complaint based on
quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to
Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than on
malicious prosecution.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, the plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages
suffered by him; (2) the fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person to whose act he
must respond; (3) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence and the
damages incurred; and (4) that there must be no
preexisting contractual relation between the
parties.25
On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code
grants a cause of action for damages, prevention,
and other relief in cases of breach, though not
necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the
following rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2)
right to personal security; (3) right to family
relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right
to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.26
A scrutiny of Gregorio’s civil complaint reveals
that the averments thereof, taken together, fulfill
the elements of Article 2176, in relation to
Article 26 of the Civil Code. It appears that
Gregorio’s rights to personal dignity, personal
security, privacy, and peace of mind were
infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed
to exercise the requisite diligence in determining
the identity of the person they should rightfully
accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks.
This fault was compounded when they failed to
ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus
depriving her of the opportunity to controvert
the charges, because she was not given proper
notice. Because she was not able to refute the
charges against her, petitioner was falsely
indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. Although she was never found at No. 76
Peñaranda St., Legaspi City, the office address of
Alvi Marketing as stated in the criminal
complaint, Gregorio was conveniently arrested
by armed operatives of the PARAC-DILG at her
city residence at 78 K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon
City, while visiting her family. She suffered
embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden
arrest and detention and she had to spend time,
effort, and money to clear her tarnished name
and reputation, considering that she had held
several honorable positions in different
organizations and offices in the public service,
particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at
the time of her arrest. There exists no
contractual relation between Gregorio and
Sansio. On the other hand, Gregorio is
prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, for its vicarious liability, as employer,
arising from the act or omission of its employee
Datuin.

These allegations, assuming them to be true,

sufficiently constituted a cause of action against
Sansio and Datuin. Thus, the RTC was correct
when it denied respondents’ motion to dismiss.

Sansio and Datuin are in error when they insist

that Gregorio’s complaint is based on malicious
prosecution. In an action to recover damages for
malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and
established that Sansio and Datuin were
impelled by legal malice or bad faith in
deliberately initiating an action against Gregorio,
knowing that the charges were false and
groundless, intending to vex and humiliate
her.27 As previously mentioned, Gregorio did not
allege this in her complaint. Moreover, the fact
that she prayed for moral damages did not
change the nature of her action based on quasi-
delict. She might have acted on the mistaken
notion that she was entitled to moral damages,
considering that she suffered physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, and social humiliation on account of her
indictment and her sudden arrest.

Verily, Gregorio was only acting within her right

when she instituted against Sansio and Datuin an
action she perceived to be proper, given the
factual antecedents of the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

Decision dated January 31, 2007 and the
Resolution dated September 12, 2007 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against
respondents.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112392. February 29, 2000]
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and BENJAMIN C. NAPIZA, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 37392 affirming in toto that of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 139,[2]which
dismissed the complaint filed by petitioner Bank
of the Philippine Islands against private
respondent Benjamin C. Napiza for sum of
money. Sdaad
On September 3, 1987, private respondent
deposited in Foreign Currency Deposit Unit
(FCDU) Savings Account No. 028-187[3] which he
maintained in petitioner banks Buendia Avenue
Extension Branch, Continental Bank Managers
Check No. 00014757[4] dated August 17, 1984,
payable to "cash" in the amount of Two
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) and
duly endorsed by private respondent on its
dorsal side.[5] It appears that the check belonged
to a certain Henry Chan who went to the office of
private respondent and requested him to deposit
the check in his dollar account by way of
accommodation and for the purpose of clearing
the same. Private respondent acceded, and
agreed to deliver to Chan a signed blank
withdrawal slip, with the understanding that as
soon as the check is cleared, both of them would
go to the bank to withdraw the amount of the
check upon private respondents presentation to
the bank of his passbook.
Using the blank withdrawal slip given by private
respondent to Chan, on October 23, 1984, one
Ruben Gayon, Jr. was able to withdraw the
amount of $2,541.67 from FCDU Savings Account
No. 028-187. Notably, the withdrawal slip shows
that the amount was payable to Ramon A. de
Guzman and Agnes C. de Guzman and was duly
initialed by the branch assistant manager,
Teresita Lindo.[6]
On November 20, 1984, petitioner received
communication from the Wells Fargo Bank
International of New York that the said check
deposited by private respondent was a
counterfeit check[7] because it was "not of the
type or style of checks issued by Continental
Bank International."[8] Consequently, Mr. Ariel
Reyes, the manager of petitioners Buendia
Avenue Extension Branch, instructed one of its
employees, Benjamin D. Napiza IV, who is private
respondents son, to inform his father that the
check bounced.[9] Reyes himself sent a telegram
to private respondent regarding the dishonor of
the check. In turn, private respondents son wrote
to Reyes stating that the check had been
assigned "for encashment" to Ramon A. de
Guzman and/or Agnes C. de Guzman after it shall
have been cleared upon instruction of Chan. He
also said that upon learning of the dishonor of
the check, his father immediately tried to contact
Chan but the latter was out of town.[10]
Private respondents son undertook to return the
amount of $2,500.00 to petitioner bank. On
December 18, 1984, Reyes reminded private
respondent of his sons promise and warned that
should he fail to return that amount within seven
(7) days, the matter would be referred to the
banks lawyers for appropriate action to protect
the banks interest.[11] This was followed by a
letter of the banks lawyer dated April 8, 1985
demanding the return of the $2,500.00.[12]
In reply, private respondent wrote petitioners
counsel on April 20, 1985[13] stating that he
deposited the check "for clearing purposes" only
to accommodate Chan. He added:
"Further, please take notice
that said check was deposited
on September 3, 1984 and
withdrawn on October 23,
1984, or a total period of fifty
(50) days had elapsed at the
time of withdrawal. Also, it
may not be amiss to mention
here that I merely signed an
authority to withdraw said
deposit subject to its clearing,
the reason why the
transaction is not reflected in
the passbook of the account.
Besides, I did not receive its
proceeds as may be gleaned
from the withdrawal slip
under the captioned signature
of recipient.
If at all, my obligation on the
transaction is moral in nature,
which (sic) I have been and is
(sic) still exerting utmost and
maximum efforts to collect
from Mr. Henry Chan who is
directly liable under the
circumstances. Scsdaad
xxx......xxx......xxx."
On August 12, 1986, petitioner filed a complaint
against private respondent, praying for the
return of the amount of $2,500.00 or the
prevailing peso equivalent plus legal interest
from date of demand to date of full payment, a
sum equivalent to 20% of the total amount due
as attorney's fees, and litigation and/or costs of
suit.
Private respondent filed his answer, admitting
that he indeed signed a "blank" withdrawal slip
with the understanding that the amount
deposited would be withdrawn only after the
check in question has been cleared. He likewise
alleged that he instructed the party to whom he
issued the signed blank withdrawal slip to return
it to him after the bank drafts clearance so that
he could lend that party his passbook for the
purpose of withdrawing the amount of
$2,500.00. However, without his knowledge, said
party was able to withdraw the amount of
$2,541.67 from his dollar savings account
through collusion with one of petitioners
employees. Private respondent added that he
had "given the Plaintiff fifty one (51) days with
which to clear the bank draft in question."
Petitioner should have disallowed the
withdrawal because his passbook was not
presented. He claimed that petitioner had no one
to blame except itself "for being grossly
negligent;" in fact, it had allegedly admitted
having paid the amount in the check "by
mistake" x x x "if not altogether due to collusion
and/or bad faith on the part of (its) employees."
Charging petitioner with "apparent ignorance of
routine bank procedures," by way of
counterclaim, private respondent prayed for
moral damages of P100,000.00, exemplary
damages of P50,000.00 and attorneys fees of
30% of whatever amount that would be awarded
to him plus an honorarium of P500.00 per
appearance in court.
Private respondent also filed a motion for
admission of a third party complaint against
Chan. He alleged that "thru strategem and/or
manipulation," Chan was able to withdraw the
amount of $2,500.00 even without private
respondents passbook. Thus, private respondent
prayed that third party defendant Chan be made
to refund to him the amount withdrawn and to
pay attorneys fees of P5,000.00 plus P300.00
honorarium per appearance.
Petitioner filed a comment on the motion for
leave of court to admit the third party complaint,
wherein it asserted that per paragraph 2 of the
Rules and Regulations governing BPI savings
accounts, private respondent alone was liable
"for the value of the credit given on account of
the draft or check deposited." It contended that
private respondent was estopped from
disclaiming liability because he himself
authorized the withdrawal of the amount by
signing the withdrawal slip. Petitioner prayed for
the denial of the said motion so as not to unduly
delay the disposition of the main case asserting
that private respondents claim could be
ventilated in another case.
Private respondent replied that for the parties to
obtain complete relief and to avoid multiplicity
of suits, the motion to admit third party
complaint should be granted. Meanwhile, the
trial court issued orders on August 25, 1987 and
October 28, 1987 directing private respondent to
actively participate in locating Chan. After
private respondent failed to comply, the trial
court, on May 18, 1988, dismissed the third party
complaint without prejudice.
On November 4, 1991, a decision was rendered
dismissing the complaint. The lower court held
that petitioner could not hold private respondent
liable based on the checks face value alone. To so
hold him liable "would render inutile the
requirement of clearance from the drawee bank
before the value of a particular foreign check or
draft can be credited to the account of a
depositor making such deposit." The lower court
further held that "it was incumbent upon the
petitioner to credit the value of the check in
question to the account of the private
respondent only upon receipt of the notice of
final payment and should not have authorized
the withdrawal from the latters account of the
value or proceeds of the check." Having admitted
that it committed a "mistake" in not waiting for
the clearance of the check before authorizing the
withdrawal of its value or proceeds, petitioner
should suffer the resultant loss. Supremax
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower courts decision. The appellate court held
that petitioner committed "clear gross
negligence" in allowing Ruben Gayon, Jr. to
withdraw the money without presenting private
respondents passbook and, before the check was
cleared and in crediting the amount indicated
therein in private respondents account. It
stressed that the mere deposit of a check in
private respondents account did not mean that
the check was already private respondents
property. The check still had to be cleared and its
proceeds can only be withdrawn upon
presentation of a passbook in accordance with
the banks rules and regulations. Furthermore,
petitioners contention that private respondent
warranted the checks genuineness by endorsing
it is untenable for it would render useless the
clearance requirement. Likewise, the
requirement of presentation of a passbook to
ascertain the propriety of the accounting
reflected would be a meaningless exercise. After
all, these requirements are designed to protect
the bank from deception or fraud.
The Court of Appeals cited the case of Roman
Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. v. IAC,[14] where
this Court stated that a personal check is not
legal tender or money, and held that the check
deposited in this case must be cleared before its
value could be properly transferred to private
respondent's account.
Without filing a motion for the reconsideration
of the Court of Appeals Decision, petitioner filed
this petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following issues:
1.......WHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENT NAPIZA IS
LIABLE UNDER HIS
WARRANTIES AS A GENERAL
INDORSER.
2.......WHETHER OR NOT A
CONTRACT OF AGENCY WAS
CREATED BETWEEN
RESPONDENT NAPIZA AND
RUBEN GAYON.
3.......WHETHER OR NOT
PETITIONER WAS GROSSLY
NEGLIGENT IN ALLOWING
THE WITHDRAWAL.
Petitioner claims that private respondent, having
affixed his signature at the dorsal side of the
check, should be liable for the amount stated
therein in accordance with the following
provision of the Negotiable Instruments Law
(Act No. 2031):
"SEC. 66. Liability of general
indorser. Every indorser who
indorses without
qualification, warrants to all
subsequent holders in due
course
(a)......The matters and things
mentioned in subdivisions (a),
(b), and (c) of the next
preceding section; and
(b)......That the instrument is
at the time of his
indorsement, valid and
subsisting.
And, in addition, he engages
that on due presentment, it
shall be accepted or paid, or
both, as the case may be,
according to its tenor, and
that if it be dishonored, and
the necessary proceedings on
dishonor be duly taken, he
will pay the amount thereof to
the holder, or to any
subsequent indorser who may
be compelled to pay it."
Section 65, on the other hand, provides for the
following warranties of a person negotiating an
instrument by delivery or by qualified
indorsement: (a) that the instrument is genuine
and in all respects what it purports to be; (b)
that he has a good title to it, and (c) that all prior
parties had capacity to contract.[15] In People v.
Maniego,[16] this Court described the liabilities of
an indorser as follows: Juris
"Appellants contention that as
mere indorser, she may not be
liable on account of the
dishonor of the checks
indorsed by her, is likewise
untenable. Under the law, the
holder or last indorsee of a
negotiable instrument has the
right to enforce payment of
the instrument for the full
amount thereof against all
parties liable thereon. Among
the parties liable thereon is an
indorser of the instrument,
i.e., a person placing his
signature upon an instrument
otherwise than as a maker,
drawer or acceptor * * unless
he clearly indicated by
appropriate words his
intention to be bound in some
other capacity. Such an
indorser who indorses
without qualification, inter
aliaengages that on due
presentment, * * (the
instrument) shall be accepted
or paid, or both, as the case
may be, according to its tenor,
and that if it be dishonored,
and the necessary
proceedings on dishonor be
duly taken, he will pay the
amount thereof to the holder,
or any subsequent indorser
who may be compelled to pay
it. Maniego may also be
deemed an accommodation
party in the light of the facts,
i.e., a person who has signed
the instrument as maker,
drawer, acceptor, or indorser,
without receiving value
therefor, and for the purpose
of lending his name to some
other person. As such, she is
under the law liable on the
instrument to a holder for
value, notwithstanding such
holder at the time of taking
the instrument knew * * (her)
to be only an accommodation
party, although she has the
right, after paying the holder,
to obtain reimbursement
from the party
accommodated, since the
relation between them is in
effect that of principal and
surety, the accommodation
party being the surety."
It is thus clear that ordinarily private respondent
may be held liable as an indorser of the check or
even as an accommodation party.[17] However, to
hold private respondent liable for the amount of
the check he deposited by the strict application
of the law and without considering the attending
circumstances in the case would result in an
injustice and in the erosion of the public trust in
the banking system. The interest of justice thus
demands looking into the events that led to the
encashment of the check.
Petitioner asserts that by signing the withdrawal
slip, private respondent "presented the
opportunity for the withdrawal of the amount in
question." Petitioner relied "on the genuine
signature on the withdrawal slip, the personality
of private respondents son and the lapse of more
than fifty (50) days from date of deposit of the
Continental Bank draft, without the same being
returned yet."[18] We hold, however, that the
propriety of the withdrawal should be gauged by
compliance with the rules thereon that both
petitioner bank and its depositors are duty-
bound to observe.
In the passbook that petitioner issued to private
respondent, the following rules on withdrawal of
deposits appear:
"4.......Withdrawals must be
made by the depositor
personally but in some
exceptional circumstances,
the Bank may allow
withdrawal by another upon
the depositors written
authority duly authenticated;
and neither a deposit nor a
withdrawal will be permitted
except upon the presentation
of the depositors savings
passbook, in which the
amount deposited withdrawn
shall be entered only by the
Bank.
5.......Withdrawals may be
made by draft, mail or
telegraphic transfer in
currency of the account at the
request of the depositor in
writing on the withdrawal slip
or by authenticated cable.
Such request must indicate
the name of the payee/s,
amount and the place where
the funds are to be paid. Any
stamp, transmission and other
charges related to such
withdrawals shall be for the
account of the depositor and
shall be paid by him/her upon
demand. Withdrawals may
also be made in the form of
travellers checks and in pesos.
Withdrawals in the form of
notes/bills are allowed
subject however, to their
(availability).
6.......Deposits shall not be
subject to withdrawal by
check, and may be withdrawn
only in the manner above
provided, upon presentation
of the depositors savings
passbook and with the
withdrawal form supplied by
the Bank at the
counter."[19] Scjuris
Under these rules, to be able to withdraw from
the savings account deposit under the Philippine
foreign currency deposit system, two requisites
must be presented to petitioner bank by the
person withdrawing an amount: (a) a duly filled-
up withdrawal slip, and (b) the depositors
passbook. Private respondent admits that he
signed a blank withdrawal slip ostensibly in
violation of Rule No. 6 requiring that the request
for withdrawal must name the payee, the
amount to be withdrawn and the place where
such withdrawal should be made. That the
withdrawal slip was in fact a blank one with only
private respondents two signatures affixed on
the proper spaces is buttressed by petitioners
allegation in the instant petition that had private
respondent indicated therein the person
authorized to receive the money, then Ruben
Gayon, Jr. could not have withdrawn any amount.
Petitioner contends that "(i)n failing to do so (i.e.,
naming his authorized agent), he practically
authorized any possessor thereof to write any
amount and to collect the same."[20]
Such contention would have been valid if not for
the fact that the withdrawal slip itself indicates a
special instruction that the amount is payable to
"Ramon A. de Guzman &/or Agnes C. de
Guzman." Such being the case, petitioners
personnel should have been duly warned that
Gayon, who was also employed in petitioners
Buendia Ave. Extension branch,[21] was not the
proper payee of the proceeds of the check.
Otherwise, either Ramon or Agnes de Guzman
should have issued another authority to Gayon
for such withdrawal. Of course, at the dorsal side
of the withdrawal slip is an "authority to
withdraw" naming Gayon the person who can
withdraw the amount indicated in the check.
Private respondent does not deny having signed
such authority. However, considering petitioners
clear admission that the withdrawal slip was a
blank one except for private respondents
signature, the unavoidable conclusion is that the
typewritten name of "Ruben C. Gayon, Jr." was
intercalated and thereafter it was signed by
Gayon or whoever was allowed by petitioner to
withdraw the amount. Under these facts, there
could not have been a principal-agent
relationship between private respondent and
Gayon so as to render the former liable for the
amount withdrawn.
Moreover, the withdrawal slip contains a boxed
warning that states: "This receipt must be signed
and presented with the corresponding foreign
currency savings passbook by the depositor in
person. For withdrawals thru a representative,
depositor should accomplish the authority at the
back." The requirement of presentation of the
passbook when withdrawing an amount cannot
be given mere lip service even though the person
making the withdrawal is authorized by the
depositor to do so. This is clear from Rule No. 6
set out by petitioner so that, for the protection of
the banks interest and as a reminder to the
depositor, the withdrawal shall be entered in the
depositors passbook. The fact that private
respondents passbook was not presented during
the withdrawal is evidenced by the entries
therein showing that the last transaction that he
made with the bank was on September 3, 1984,
the date he deposited the controversial check in
the amount of $2,500.00.[22]
In allowing the withdrawal, petitioner likewise
overlooked another rule that is printed in the
passbook. Thus:
"2.......All deposits will be
received as current funds and
will be repaid in the same
manner; provided, however,
that deposits
of drafts, checks, money orders,
etc. will be accepted as subject
to collection only and credited
to the account only upon
receipt of the notice of final
payment. Collection charges
by the Banks foreign
correspondent in effecting
such collection shall be for the
account of the depositor. If the
account has sufficient balance,
the collection shall be debited
by the Bank against the
account. If, for any reason, the
proceeds of the deposited
checks, drafts, money orders,
etc., cannot be collected or if
the Bank is required to return
such proceeds, the provisional
entry therefor made by the
Bank in the savings passbook
and its records shall be
deemed automatically
cancelled regardless of the
time that has elapsed, and
whether or not the defective
items can be returned to the
depositor; and the Bank is
hereby authorized to execute
immediately the necessary
corrections, amendments or
changes in its record, as well
as on the savings passbook at
the first opportunity to reflect
such cancellation." (Italics and
underlining supplied.) Jurissc
As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, in
depositing the check in his name, private
respondent did not become the outright owner
of the amount stated therein. Under the above
rule, by depositing the check with petitioner,
private respondent was, in a way, merely
designating petitioner as the collecting bank.
This is in consonance with the rule that a
negotiable instrument, such as a check, whether
a managers check or ordinary check, is not legal
tender.[23] As such, after receiving the deposit,
under its own rules, petitioner shall credit the
amount in private respondents account or infuse
value thereon only after the drawee bank shall
have paid the amount of the check or the check
has been cleared for deposit. Again, this is in
accordance with ordinary banking practices and
with this Courts pronouncement that "the
collecting bank or last endorser generally suffers
the loss because it has the duty to ascertain the
genuineness of all prior endorsements
considering that the act of presenting the check
for payment to the drawee is an assertion that
the party making the presentment has done its
duty to ascertain the genuineness of the
endorsements."[24] The rule finds more meaning
in this case where the check involved is drawn
on a foreign bank and therefore collection is
more difficult than when the drawee bank is a
local one even though the check in question is a
managers check.[25] Misjuris
In Banco Atlantico v. Auditor General,[26] Banco
Atlantico, a commercial bank in Madrid, Spain,
paid the amounts represented in three (3)
checks to Virginia Boncan, the finance officer of
the Philippine Embassy in Madrid. The bank did
so without previously clearing the checks with
the drawee bank, the Philippine National Bank in
New York, on account of the "special treatment"
that Boncan received from the personnel of
Banco Atlanticos foreign department. The Court
held that the encashment of the checks without
prior clearance is "contrary to normal or
ordinary banking practice specially so where the
drawee bank is a foreign bank and the amounts
involved were large." Accordingly, the Court
approved the Auditor Generals denial of Banco
Atlanticos claim for payment of the value of the
checks that was withdrawn by Boncan.
Said ruling brings to light the fact that the
banking business is affected with public interest.
By the nature of its functions, a bank is under
obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors
"with meticulous care, always having in mind the
fiduciary nature of their relationship."[27] As
such, in dealing with its depositors, a bank
should exercise its functions not only with the
diligence of a good father of a family but it
should do so with the highest degree of care.[28]
In the case at bar, petitioner, in allowing the
withdrawal of private respondents deposit,
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of
a family. In total disregard of its own rules,
petitioners personnel negligently handled
private respondents account to petitioners
detriment. As this Court once said on this matter:
"Negligence is the omission to
do something which a
reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent
and reasonable man would
do. The seventy-eight (78)-
year-old, yet still relevant,
case of Picart v. Smith,
provides the test by which to
determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case
which may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have
used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law here in
effect adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by
the imaginary conduct of the
discreet pater-familias of the
Roman law. The existence of
negligence in a given case is
not determined by reference
to the personal judgment of
the actor in the situation
before him. The law considers
what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in
the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by
that."[29]
Petitioner violated its own rules by allowing the
withdrawal of an amount that is definitely over
and above the aggregate amount of private
respondents dollar deposits that had yet to be
cleared. The banks ledger on private
respondents account shows that before he
deposited $2,500.00, private respondent had a
balance of only $750.00.[30] Upon private
respondents deposit of $2,500.00 on September
3, 1984, that amount was credited in his ledger
as a deposit resulting in the corresponding total
balance of $3,250.00.[31] On September 10, 1984,
the amount of $600.00 and the additional
charges of $10.00 were indicated therein as
withdrawn thereby leaving a balance of
$2,640.00. On September 30, 1984, an interest of
$11.59 was reflected in the ledger and on
October 23, 1984, the amount of $2,541.67 was
entered as withdrawn with a balance of
$109.92.[32] On November 19, 1984 the word
"hold" was written beside the balance of
$109.92.[33] That must have been the time when
Reyes, petitioners branch manager, was
informed unofficially of the fact that the check
deposited was a counterfeit, but petitioners
Buendia Ave. Extension Branch received a copy
of the communication thereon from Wells Fargo
Bank International in New York the following
day, November 20, 1984.[34] According to Reyes,
Wells Fargo Bank International handled the
clearing of checks drawn against U.S. banks that
were deposited with petitioner.[35] Jjlex
From these facts on record, it is at once apparent
that petitioners personnel allowed the
withdrawal of an amount bigger than the original
deposit of $750.00 and the value of the check
deposited in the amount of $2,500.00 although
they had not yet received notice from the
clearing bank in the United States on whether or
not the check was funded. Reyes contention that
after the lapse of the 35-day period the amount
of a deposited check could be withdrawn even in
the absence of a clearance thereon, otherwise it
could take a long time before a depositor could
make a withdrawal,[36] is untenable. Said practice
amounts to a disregard of the clearance
requirement of the banking system.
While it is true that private respondents having
signed a blank withdrawal slip set in motion the
events that resulted in the withdrawal and
encashment of the counterfeit check, the
negligence of petitioners personnel was the
proximate cause of the loss that petitioner
sustained. Proximate cause, which is determined
by a mixed consideration of logic, common sense,
policy and precedent, is "that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred."[37] The proximate cause of the
withdrawal and eventual loss of the amount of
$2,500.00 on petitioners part was its personnels
negligence in allowing such withdrawal in
disregard of its own rules and the clearing
requirement in the banking system. In so doing,
petitioner assumed the risk of incurring a loss on
account of a forged or counterfeit foreign check
and hence, it should suffer the resulting damage.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on
certiorari is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37392 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. Newmiso
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno,
Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION turned 180 degrees towards good father of a family in the
the direction where it came selection and supervision of
DECISION from. his driver, Rodel.
LAMBERT S. RAMOS, G.R. No. 184905
Petitioner, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Upon investigation, Weighing the
Present: the Office of the City respective evidence of the
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson), Prosecutor of Quezon City parties, the MeTC rendered
- versus - Chico-Nazario, The issue for resolution is whether found probable cause to indict the Decision dated 1 March
petitioner
V can be held solidarily liable with his Rodel, the driver of the Ford 2006 exculpating (Ramos)
e driver, Rodel Ilustrisimo, to pay respondent Expedition, for Reckless from liability, thus:
l C.O.L. Realty the amount of P51,994.80 as actual Imprudence Resulting in
a damages suffered in a vehicular collision. Damage to Property. In the WHEREFORE, the instant
s meantime, petitioner case is DISMISSED for lack of
c The facts, as found by the appellate demanded from respondent merit. The Counterclaims of
o court, are as follows: reimbursement for the the defendant are likewise
, expenses incurred in the DISMISSED for lack of
On or about 10:40 repair of its car and the sufficient factual and legal
J oclock in the morning of 8 hospitalization of Estela in the basis.
r March 2004, along Katipunan aggregate amount of
. (Avenue), corner Rajah P103,989.60. The demand fell SO ORDERED.
, Matanda (Street), Quezon on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L.
N City, a vehicular accident took Realty) to file a Complaint for The aforesaid
a place between a Toyota Altis Damages based on quasi- judgment did not sit well with
c Sedan bearing Plate Number delict before the Metropolitan (C.O.L. Realty) so that he (sic)
h XDN 210, owned by petitioner Trial Court of Metro Manila appealed the same before the
u C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and (MeTC), Quezon City, RTC of Quezon City, raffled to
r driven by Aquilino Larin docketed as Civil Case No. Branch 215, which rendered
a (Aquilino), and a Ford 33277, and subsequently the assailed Decision dated 5
, Expedition, owned by x x x raffled to Branch 42. September 2006, affirming
Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and the MeTCs Decision. (C.O.L.
a driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo As could well be Realtys) Motion for
n (Rodel), with Plate Number expected, (Ramos) denied Reconsideration met the same
d LSR 917. A passenger of the liability for damages insisting fate as it was denied by the
P sedan, one Estela Maliwat that it was the negligence of RTC in its Order dated 5 June
e (Estela) sustained injuries. Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realtys) 2007.[1]
r She was immediately rushed driver, which was the
a to the hospital for treatment. proximate cause of the C.O.L. Realty appealed to the Court of
l accident. (Ramos) maintained Appeals which affirmed the view that Aquilino
t (C.O.L. Realty) that the sedan car was negligent in crossing Katipunan
a averred that its driver, crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Streetsince, as per
, Aquilino, was slowly driving Avenue from Rajah Matanda Certification of the Metropolitan Manila
the Toyota Altis car at a speed Street despite the concrete Development Authority (MMDA) dated
J of five to ten kilometers per barriers placed thereon November 30, 2004, such act is specifically
J hour along Rajah Matanda prohibiting vehicles to pass prohibited. Thus:
. Street and has just crossed the through the intersection.
C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION, center lane of Katipunan This is to certify that
Respondent. Promulgated: Avenue when (Ramos) Ford (Ramos) further as per records found and
Espedition violently rammed claimed that he was not in the available in this office the
August 28, 2009 against the cars right rear vehicle when the mishap crossing of vehicles
x ------------------------------------------------------------- door and fender. With the occurred. He asserted that he at Katipunan
--------------------------- x force of the impact, the sedan exercised the diligence of a Avenue from Rajah
 Matanda Street to Blue
Ridge Subdivision,Quezon
City has (sic) not allowed
since January 2004 up to
the present in view of the
ongoing road construction
at the area.[2] (Emphasis
supplied)
Barricades were precisely placed along
the intersection of Katipunan Avenue and Rajah
Matanda Street in order to prevent motorists
from crossing Katipunan Avenue. Nonetheless,
Aquilino crossed Katipunan Avenue through
certain portions of the barricade which were
broken, thus violating the MMDA rule.[3]
However, the Court of Appeals likewise
noted that at the time of the collision, Ramos
vehicle was moving at high speed in a busy area
that was then the subject of an ongoing
construction (the Katipunan Avenue-Boni
Serrano Avenue underpass), then smashed into
the rear door and fender of the passengers side
of Aquilinos car, sending it spinning in a 180-
degree turn.[4] It therefore found the driver
Rodel guilty of contributory negligence for
driving the Ford Expedition at high speed along a
busy intersection.
Thus, on May 28, 2008, the appellate
court rendered the assailed Decision,[5] the
dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the
Decision dated 5 September
2006 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch
215 is hereby MODIFIED in
that respondent Lambert
Ramos is held solidarily liable
with Rodel Ilustrisimo to pay
petitioner C.O.L. Realty
Corporation the amount of
P51,994.80 as actual damages.
Petitioner C.O.L. Realty
Corporations claim for
exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and cost of suit
are DISMISSED for lack of Avenue from Rajah which resulted in the
merit. Matanda Street to Blue vehicular mishap.[7]
Ridge Subdivision, Quezon
SO ORDERED. City has (sic) not allowed However, it also declared Ramos liable
since January 2004 up to vicariously for Rodels contributory
Petitioner filed a Motion for the present in view of the negligence in driving the Ford Expedition at
Reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the ongoing road construction high speed along a busy intersection.On this
instant petition, which raises the following sole at the area. score, the appellate court made the following
issue: pronouncement:
This certification is
THE COURT OF issued upon request of the As a professional
APPEALS DECISION IS interested parties for driver, Rodel should have
CONTRARY TO LAW AND whatever legal purpose it known that driving his vehicle
JURISPRUDENCE, AND THE may serve. at a high speed in a major
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AND thoroughfare which was then
JUSTIFY THE SAME IS (C.O.L. Realty) subject of an on-going
INSUFFICIENT. admitted that there were construction was a perilous
barricades along the act. He had no regard to (sic)
We resolve to GRANT the petition. intersection of Katipunan the safety of other vehicles on
Avenue and Rajah Matanda the road. Because of the
There is no doubt in the appellate Street. The barricades were impact of the collision,
courts mind that Aquilinos violation of the placed thereon to caution (Aquilinos) sedan made a
MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan drivers not to pass through 180-degree turn as (Ramos)
Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the intersecting roads. This Ford Expedition careened and
the proximate cause of the accident. prohibition stands even if, as smashed into its rear door
Respondent does not dispute this; in its (C.O.L. Realty) claimed, the and fender. We cannot
Comment to the instant petition, it even barriers were broken at that exculpate Rodel from liability.
conceded that petitioner was guilty of mere point creating a small gap
contributory negligence.[6] through which any vehicle Having thus settled
could pass. What is clear to Us the contributory negligence of
Thus, the Court of Appeals is that Aquilino recklessly Rodel, this created a
acknowledged that: ignored these barricades and presumption of negligence on
drove through it. Without the part of his employer,
The Certification dat doubt, his negligence is (Ramos). For the employer to
ed 30 November 2004 of the established by the fact that he avoid the solidary liability for
Metropolitan Manila violated a traffic regulation. a tort committed by his
Development Authority This finds support in Article employee, an employer must
(MMDA) evidently disproved 2185 of the Civil Code rebut the presumption by
(C.O.L. Realtys) barefaced presenting adequate and
assertion that its driver, Unless there is proof to convincing proof that in the
Aquilino, was not to be the contrary, it is presumed selection and supervision of
blamed for the accident that a person driving a motor his employee, he or she
vehicle has been negligent if exercises the care and
TO WHOM IT MAY at the time of the mishap, he diligence of a good father of a
CONCERN: was violating any traffic family. Employers must
regulation. submit concrete proof,
This is to certify that as including documentary
per records found and Accordingly, there evidence, that they complied
available in this office the ought to be no question on with everything that was
crossing of vehicles (C.O.L. Realtys) negligence incumbent on them.
at Katipunan
 (Ramos) feebly
attempts to escape vicarious
liability by averring that
Rodel was highly
recommended when he
applied for the position of
family driver by the Social
Service Committee of his
parish. A certain Ramon
Gomez, a member of the
churchs livelihood program,
testified that a background
investigation would have to
be made before an applicant is
recommended to the
parishioners for employment.
(Ramos) supposedly tested
Rodels driving skills before
accepting him for the job.
Rodel has been his driver
since 2001, and except for the
mishap in 2004, he has not
been involved in any road
accident.
Regrettably,
(Ramos) evidence which
consisted mainly of
testimonial evidence
remained unsubstantiated
and are thus, barren of
significant weight. There is
nothing on the records which
would support (Ramos) bare
allegation of Rodels 10-year
unblemished driving record.
He failed to present
convincing proof that he went
to the extent of verifying
Rodels qualifications, safety
record, and driving history.
So too, (Ramos) did
not bother to refute (C.O.L.
Realtys) stance that his driver
was texting with his cellphone
while running at a high speed
and that the latter did not
slow down albeit he knew
that Katipunan Avenue was
then undergoing repairs and
that the road was barricaded accident was respondents
with barriers. The 22. As culled from own driver, respondent
presumption juris tantum that the foregoing, respondent was cannot claim damages from
there was negligence in the the sole proximate cause of petitioner.[9]
selection of driver remains the accident. Respondents
unrebutted. As the employer vehicle should not have been
of Rodel, (Ramos) is solidarily in that position since crossing On the other hand, respondent in its
liable for the quasi-delict the said intersection was Comment merely reiterated the appellate courts
committed by the former. prohibited. Were it not for the findings and pronouncements, conceding that
obvious negligence of petitioner is guilty of mere contributory
Certainly, in the respondents driver in negligence, and insisted on his vicarious liability
selection of prospective crossing the intersection that as Rodels employer under Article 2184 of the
employees, employers are was prohibited, the accident Civil Code.
required to examine them as would not have happened.
to their qualifications, The crossing of respondents Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil
experience and service vehicle in a prohibited Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz:
records. In the supervision of intersection unquestionably
employees, the employer produced the injury, and Article 2179. When
must formulate standard without which the accident the plaintiffs own negligence
operating procedures, would not have occurred. On was the immediate and
monitor their implementation the other hand, petitioners proximate cause of his injury,
and impose disciplinary driver had the right to be he cannot recover damages.
measures for the breach where he was at the time of But if his negligence was only
thereof. These, (Ramos) failed the mishap. As correctly contributory, the immediate
to do.[8] concluded by the RTC, the and proximate cause of the
petitioners driver could not injury being the defendants
Petitioner disagrees, arguing that since be expected to slacken his lack of due care, the plaintiff
Aquilinos willful disregard of the MMDA speed while travelling along may recover damages, but the
prohibition was the sole proximate cause of the said intersection since courts shall mitigate the
accident, then respondent alone should suffer nobody, in his right mind, damages to be awarded.
the consequences of the accident and the would do the same. Assuming,
damages it incurred. He argues: however, that petitioners Article 2185. Unless
driver was indeed guilty of there is proof to the contrary,
20. It becomes any contributory negligence, it is presumed that a person
apparent therefore that the such was not the proximate driving a motor vehicle has
only time a plaintiff, the cause of the accident been negligent if at the time of
respondent herein, can considering that again, if the mishap, he was violating
recover damages is if its respondents driver did not any traffic regulation.
negligence was only cross the prohibited
contributory, and such intersection, no accident If the master is injured by the
contributory negligence was would have happened. No negligence of a third person and by the
the proximate cause of the imputation of any lack of care concurring contributory negligence of his own
accident. It has been clearly on Ilustrisimos could thus be servant or agent, the latters negligence is
established in this case, concluded. It is obvious then imputed to his superior and will defeat the
however, that respondents that petitioners driver was superiors action against the third person,
negligence was not merely not guilty of any negligence assuming of course that the contributory
contributory, but the sole that would make petitioner negligence was the proximate cause of the
proximate cause of the vicariously liable for damages. injury of which complaint is made.[10]
accident.
23. As the sole Applying the foregoing principles of
xxxx proximate cause of the law to the instant case, Aquilinos act of
crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda
constitutes negligence because it was prohibited
by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of
the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for
any damages suffered by respondent from the
accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that
cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred. And more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinary prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that
an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.[11]
since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilinos
recklessness which is the immediate and
proximate cause of the accident. Rodels
contributory negligence has relevance only in
the event that Ramos seeks to recover from
respondent whatever damages or injuries he
may have suffered as a result; it will have the
effect of mitigating the award of damages in his
favor. In other words, an assertion of
contributory negligence in this case would
benefit only the petitioner; it could not eliminate
respondents liability for Aquilinos negligence
which is the proximate result of the accident.
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 28, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No.
99614 and its Resolution of October 13, 2008 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 215 dated September 5, 2006 dismissing
for lack of merit respondents complaint for
damages is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA

prohibition against crossing Katipunan
Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would
not have happened. This specific untoward event
is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was
intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent
person who resides within the vicinity where the
accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable
ground to expect that the accident would be a
natural and probable result if he crossed
Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is
considered dangerous on account of the busy
nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing
construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue
underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of
Appeals to have overlooked the principle
embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that
when the plaintiffs own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages.

Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve

into the issue of Rodels contributory negligence,
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and
the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA,
OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented
by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA
VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R.
Francisco for plaintiffs-appellants.
Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952
bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation,
operated by its owner defendant Mariano
Medina under a certificate of public convenience,
left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to
Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur,
Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen
passengers, including the driver and conductor.
Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan,
seated beside and to the right of the driver,
Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan,
another passenger apparently from the Visayan
Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya,
apparently not knowing his name, seated in the
left side of the driver, and a woman named
Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four
last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that same
morning, while the bus was running within the
jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires
burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell
into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road
and turned turtle. Some of the passengers
managed to leave the bus the best way they
could, others had to be helped or pulled out,
while the three passengers seated beside the
driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan
and the woman behind them named Natalia
Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned
bus. Some of the passengers, after they had
clambered up to the road, heard groans and
moans from inside the bus, particularly, shouts
for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said they
could not get out of the bus. There is nothing in
the evidence to show whether or not the
passengers already free from the wreck,
including the driver and the conductor, made
any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue
the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle,
but calls or shouts for help were made to the
houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour,
came about ten men, one of them carrying a
lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on
one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These
men presumably approach the overturned bus,
and almost immediately, a fierce fire started,
burning and all but consuming the bus, including
the four passengers trapped inside it. It would
appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline
began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank
on the side of the chassis, spreading over and
permeating the body of the bus and the ground
under and around it, and that the lighted torch
brought by one of the men who answered the
call for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four
deemed passengers inside the bus were removed
and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By
reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva,
in her name and in behalf of her five minor
children, brought the present suit to recover
from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the
total amount of P87,150. After trial, the Court of
First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the
plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100,
the value of the merchandise being carried by
Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was
lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals,
but the latter endorsed the appeal to us because
of the value involved in the claim in the
complaint.
Our new Civil Code amply provides for the
responsibility of common carrier to its
passengers and their goods. For purposes of
reference, we are reproducing the pertinent
codal provisions:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the
nature of their business and for reasons
of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of
each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and
1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra
ordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in
articles 1755 and 1756.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound
to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or
injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed
in articles 1733 and 1755
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable
for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or
willful acts of the former's employees,
although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their
authority or in violation of the order of
the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers
does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
ART. 1763. A common carrier
responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of the willful acts
or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers, if the common carrier's
employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family
could have prevented or stopped the
act or omission.
We agree with the trial court that the case
involves a breach of contract of transportation
for hire, the Medina Transportation having
undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his
destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the
trial court that there was negligence on the part
of the defendant, through his agent, the driver
Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the
time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as
testified to by one of the passengers, and as
shown by the fact that according to the
testimony of the witnesses, including that of the
defense, from the point where one of the front
tires burst up to the canal where the bus
overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance
of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the
blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order
to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at
which the bus must have been running, its
momentum carried it over a distance of 150
meters before it fell into the canal and turned
turtle.
There is no question that under the
circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable.
The only question is to what degree. The trial
court was of the opinion that the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan was not the
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that
burned the bus, including himself and his co-
passengers who were unable to leave it; that at
the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he
must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps
serious, was still alive, and so damages were
awarded, not for his death, but for the physical
injuries suffered by him. We disagree. A
satisfactory definition of proximate cause is
found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American
jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in
their brief. It is as follows:
 . . . 'that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinary prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus
overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely
causing him physical injuries, if through some
event, unexpected and extraordinary, the
overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or
if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle
sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to
death, one might still contend that the proximate
cause of his death was the fire and not the
overturning of the vehicle. But in the present
case under the circumstances obtaining in the
same, we do not hesitate to hold that the
proximate cause was the overturning of the bus,
this for the reason that when the vehicle turned
not only on its side but completely on its back,
the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the
men with a lighted torch was in response to the
call for help, made not only by the passengers,
but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was
dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers
had to carry a light with them, and coming as
they did from a rural area where lanterns and
flashlights were not available; and what was
more natural than that said rescuers should
innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid
and effect the rescue requested from them. In
other words, the coming of the men with a torch
was to be expected and was a natural sequence
of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of
some of its passengers and the call for outside
help. What is more, the burning of the bus can
also in part be attributed to the negligence of the
carrier, through is driver and its conductor.
According to the witness, the driver and the
conductor were on the road walking back and
forth. They, or at least, the driver should and
must have known that in the position in which
the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must
have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked
the area in and around the bus, this aside from
the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over
a large area, can be smelt and directed even from
a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or
taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the
lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on
the part of the agents of the carrier come under
the codal provisions above-reproduced,
particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are
entitled, considering the earning capacity of the
deceased, as well as the other elements entering
into a damage award, we are satisfied that the
amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS
would constitute satisfactory compensation, this
to include compensatory, moral, and other
damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are
entitled to attorney's fees, and assessing the legal
services rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not
only in the trial court, but also in the course of
the appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs
prepared by them, the attorney's fees may well
be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS for
the loss of merchandise carried by the deceased
in the bus, is adequate and will not be disturbed.
There is one phase of this case which disturbs if
it does not shock us. According to the evidence,
one of the passengers who, because of the
injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and
while in the hospital, she was visited by the
defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of
his visit, she overheard him speaking to one of
his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have
the tires of the bus changed immediately because
they were already old, and that as a matter of
fact, he had been telling the driver to change the
said tires, but that the driver did not follow his
instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that
the driver had not been diligent and had not
taken the necessary precautions to insure the
safety of his passengers. Had he changed the
tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as
he had been instructed to do, probably, despite
his speeding, as we have already stated, the blow
out would not have occurred. All in all, there is
reason to believe that the driver operated and
drove his vehicle negligently, resulting in the
death of four of his passengers, physical injuries
to others, and the complete loss and destruction
of their goods, and yet the criminal case against
him, on motion of the fiscal and with his consent,
was provisionally dismissed, because according
to the fiscal, the witnesses on whose testimony
he was banking to support the complaint, either
failed or appear or were reluctant to testify. But
the record of the case before us shows the
several witnesses, passengers, in that bus,
willingly and unhesitatingly testified in court to
the effect of the said driver was negligent. In the
public interest the prosecution of said erring
driver should be pursued, this, not only as a
matter of justice, but for the promotion of the
safety of passengers on public utility buses. Let a
copy of this decision be furnished the
Department of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal of
Cavite.
In view of the foregoing, with the modification
that the damages awarded by the trial court are
increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS
TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and from
SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED
(P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for
the attorney's fees, respectively, the decision
appealed is from hereby affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista
Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29745 June 4, 1973
MERCEDES M. TEAGUE, petitioner,
vs.
ELENA FERNANDEZ, et al., respondent.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.
Jose G. Gatchalian for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
The facts are stated in the decision of the Court
of Appeals as follows:
The Realistic Institute,
admittedly owned and
operated by defendant-
appellee Mercedes M. Teague
was a vocational school for
hair and beauty culture
situated on the second floor of
the Gil-Armi Building, a two-
storey, semi-concrete edifice
(Exhs. "C", "C-1" to "C-5" and
"4") located at the corner of
Quezon Boulevard and Soler
Street, Quiapo, Manila. The
said second floor was
unpartitioned, had a total area
of about 400 square meters,
and although it had only one
stairway, of about 1.50 meters
in width, it had eight
windows, each of which was
provided with two fire-escape
ladders (Exh. "4"), and the
presence of each of said fire-
exits was indicated on the
wall (Exh. "5").
At about four o'clock in the
afternoon of October 24,
1955, a fire broke out in a
store for surplus materials
located about ten meters
away from the institute. Soler
Street lay between that store
and the institute. Upon seeing
the fire, some of the students
in the Realistic Institute
shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and
thereafter, a panic ensued.
Four instructresses and six
assistant instructress of the
Institute were present and
they, together with the
registrar, tried to calm down
the students, who numbered
about 180 at the time, telling
them not to be afraid because
the Gil-Armi Building would
not get burned as it is made of
concrete, and that the fire was
anyway, across the street.
They told the students not to
rush out but just to go down
the stairway two by two, or to
use the fire-escapes. Mrs.
Justitia Prieto, one of the
instructresses, took to the
microphone so as to convey to
the students the above
admonitions more effectively,
and she even slapped three
students in order to quiet
them down. Miss Frino
Meliton, the registrar, whose
desk was near the stairway,
stood up and tried with
outstretched arms to stop the
students from rushing and
pushing their way to the
stairs. The panic, however,
could not be subdued and the
students, with the exception
of the few who made use of
fire-escapes kept on rushing
and pushing their way
through the stairs, thereby
causing stampede therein.
Indeed, no part of the Gil-
Armi Building caught fire. But,
after the panic was over, four
students, including Lourdes
Fernandez, a sister of
plaintiffs-appellants, were
found dead and several others
injured on account of the
stampede.
xxx xxx xxx
The injuries sustained by Lourdes Fernandez
consisted of lacerations in both eyes and on the
upper lip, contused abrasions in different parts
of the body, internal hemorrhage and fractures
in the second and third right ribs. The cause of
death, according to the autopsy report, was
"Shock due to traumatic fractures of the ribs
with perinephric hematoma and lacerations of
the conjunctiva of both eyes."
The deceased's five brothers and sisters filed an
action for damages against Mercedes M. Teague
as owner and operator of Realistic Institute. The
Court of First Instance of Manila found for the
defendant and dismissed the case. The plaintiffs
thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which by a divided vote of 3 to 2 (a special
division of five members having been
constituted) rendered a judgment of reversal
and sentenced the defendant to pay damages to
the plaintiffs in the sum of P11,000.00, plus
interest at the legal rate from the date the
complaint was filed.
The case came up to this Court on a petition for
review filed by the defendant below.
The decision of the appellate court declared that
the defendant, hereinafter to be referred to as
the petitioner, was negligent and that such
negligence was the proximate cause of the death
of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence
is based primarily on the fact that the provision
of Section 491 Of the Revised Ordinances of the
City of Manila had not been complied with in
connection with the construction and use of the
Gil-Armi building where the petitioner's
vocational school was housed. This provision
reads as follows:
Sec. 491. Firepro of partitions,
exits and stairways. — ... All
buildings and separate
sections of buildings or
buildings otherwise known as
accessorias having less than
three stories, having one or
more persons domiciled
therein either temporarily or
permanently, and all public or
quasi-public buildings having
less than three stories, such as
hospitals, sanitarium, schools,
reformatories, places of
human detention, assembly
halls, clubs, restaurants or
panciterias, and the like, shall
be provided with at least two
unobstructed stairways of not
less than one meter and
twenty centimeters in width
and an inclination of not less
than forty degrees from the
perpendicular, in case of large
buildings more than two
stairways shall likewise be
provided when required by
the chief of the fire
department, said stairways
shall be placed as far apart as
possible.
The alleged violation of the ordinance above-
quoted consisted in the fact that the second
storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one
stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at
least 1.2 meters each, although at the time of the
fire the owner of the building had a second
stairway under construction.
In ruling that such non-compliance with the City
Ordinances was an act of negligence and that
such negligence was the proximate cause of the
death of Lourdes Fernandez, reliance is based on
a number of authorities in the American
jurisdiction, thus: .
The mere fact of violation of a
statute is not sufficient basis
for an inference that such
violation was the proximate
cause of the injury
complained. However, if the
very injury has happened
which was intended to be
prevented by the statute, it has
been held that violation of the
statute will be deemed to be
proximate cause of the injury.
(65 C.J.S. 1156).
The generally accepted view
is that violation of a statutory
duty constitutes negligence,
negligence as a matter or law,
or, according to the decisions
on the question, negligence
per se for the reason that non-
observance of what the
legislature has prescribed as a
suitable precaution is failure
to observe that care which an
ordinarily prudent man would
observe, and, when the state
regards certain acts as so
liable to injure others as to
justify their absolute
prohibition, doing the
forbidden act is a breach of
duty with respect to those
who may be injured thereby;
or, as it has been otherwise
expressed, when the standard
of care is fixed by law, failure
to conform to such standard is
negligence, negligence per se
or negligence in and of itself,
in the absence of a legal
excuse.According to this view
it is immaterial, where a
statute has been violated,
whether the act or omission
constituting such violation
would have been regarded as
negligence in the absence of
any statute on the subject or
whether there was, as a matter
of fact, any reason to
anticipate that injury would
result from such violation. ....
(65 C.J.S. pp. 623-628).
But the existence of an
ordinance changes the
situation. If a driver causes an
accident by exceeding the
speed limit, for example, do
not inquire whether his
prohibited conduct was
unreasonably dangerous. It is
enough that it was prohibited.
Violation of an ordinance
intended to promote safety is
negligence. If by creating the
hazard which the ordinance
was intended to avoid it
brings about the harm which
the ordinance was intended to
prevent, it is a legal cause of
the harm. This comes only to
saying that in such
circumstances the law has no
reason to ignore the causal
relation which obviously
exists in fact. The law has
excellent reason to recognize
it, since it is the very relation
which the makers of the
ordinance anticipated. This
court has applied these
principles to speed limits and
other regulations of the
manner of driving. (Ross vs.
Hartman, 139 Fed. 2d 14 at
15).
... However, the fact that other
happenings causing or
contributing toward an injury
intervened between the
violation of a statute or
ordinance and the injury does
not necessarily make the
result so remote that no
action can be maintained. The
test is to be found not in the
number of intervening events
or agents, but in their
character and in the natural
and probable connection
between the wrong done and
the injurious consequence.
The general principle is that
the violation of a statute or
ordinance is not rendered
remote as the cause of an
injury by the intervention of
another agency if the
occurrence of the accident, in
the manner in which it
happened, was the very thing
which the statute or
ordinance was intended to
Prevent. (38 Am Jur 841).
The petitioner has raised a number of issues. The
first is that Section 491 of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila refers to public
buildings and hence did not apply to the Gil-Armi
building which was of private ownership. It will
be noted from the text of the ordinance,
however, that it is not ownership which
determines the character of buildings subject to
its requirements, but rather the use or the
purpose for which a particular building is
utilized. Thus the same may be privately owned,
but if it is devoted to any one of the purposes
mentioned in the ordinance — for instance as a
school, which the Realistic Institute precisely
was — then the building is within the coverage
of the ordinance. Indeed the requirement that
such a building should have two (2) separate
stairways instead of only one (1) has no
relevance or reasonable relation to the fact of
ownership, but does have such relation to the
use or purpose for which the building is devoted.
It is next contended that the obligation to comply
with the ordinance devolved upon the owners of
the building and therefore it is they and not the
petitioner herein, who is a mere lessee, who
should be liable for the violation. The contention
ignores the fact that it was the use of the building
for school purposes which brought the same
within the coverage of the ordinance; and it was
the petitioner and not the owners who was
responsible for such use.
The next issue, indeed the basic one, raised by
the petitioner is whether or not the failure to
comply with the requirement of the ordinance
was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes
Fernandez. The case ofVillanueva Vda. de
Bataclan, et al. vs. Medina, G. R. No. L-10126,
October 22, 1957, is cited in support of the
contention that such failure was not the
proximate cause. It is there stated by this Court:
The proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately
or by settling other events in
motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close
causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain
immediately affecting the
injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person
might probably result
therefrom.
Having in view the decision just quoted, the
petitioner relates the chain of events that
resulted in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as
follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a
neighboring place; (3) shouts of "Fire!, Fire!"; (4)
panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6)
injuries and death.
As thus projected the violation of the ordinance,
it is argued, was only a remote cause, if at all, and
cannot be the basis of liability since there
intervened a number of independent causes
which produced the injury complained of. A
statement of the doctrine relied upon is found
in Manila Electric Co. vs. Remoquillo, L-8328, May
18, 1956, wherein this Court, citing Corpus
Juris said:
A prior and remote cause
cannot be made the basis of
an action if such remote cause
did nothing more than furnish
the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if
there intervened between
such prior or remote cause
and the injury a distinct,
successive unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury
would not have happened but
for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed
in the condition except
because of the independent
cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into
operation the circumstances
which result in injury because
of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent
act or condition is the
proximate cause. (45 C.J. p.
931.)
According to the petitioner "the events of fire,
panic and stampede were independent causes
with no causal connection at all with the
violation of the ordinance." The weakness in the
argument springs from a faulty juxtaposition of
the events which formed a chain and resulted in
the injury. It is true that the petitioner's non-
compliance with the ordinance in question was
ahead of and prior to the other events in point of
time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its
occupancy of the building. But the violation was exercise due care and
a continuing one, since the ordinance was a diligence for the safety of its
measure of safety designed to prevent a specific students in not providing the
situation which would pose a danger to the building with adequate fire
occupants of the building. That situation was exits and in not practicing fire
undue overcrowding in case it should become drill exercises to avoid the
necessary to evacuate the building, which, it stampede, aside from the fact
could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to that the defendant did not
happen under emergency conditions if there was have a permit to use the
only one stairway available. It is true that in this building as a school-house.
particular case there would have been no
overcrowding in the single stairway if there had The decision appealed from is affirmed, with
not been a fire in the neighborhood which costs.
caused the students to panic and rush headlong
for the stairs in order to go down. But it was
precisely such contingencies or event that the Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
authors of the ordinance had in mind, for under
normal conditions one stairway would be
adequate for the occupants of the building. Thus, Castro and Barredo, JJ., reserve their votes.
as stated in 38 American Jurisprudence, page
841: "The general principle is that the violation
of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote
as the cause of an injury by the intervention of
another agency if the occurrence of the accident,
in the manner in which it happened, was the
very thing which the statute or ordinance was
intended to prevent." To consider the violation of
the ordinance as the proximate cause of the
injury does not portray the situation in its true
perspective; it would be more accurate to say
that the overcrowding at the stairway was the
proximate cause and that it was precisely what
the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring
that there be two stairways instead of only one.
Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the
respondents, the principle of proximate cause
applies to such violation.
A procedural point mentioned by the petitioner
is that the complaint did not specifically allege
that the ordinance in question had been violated.
The violation, however, as an act of negligence
which gave rise to liability, was sufficiently
comprehended within paragraph 7 of the
complaint, which reads: .
Par. 7. That the death of
Lourdes Fernandez was due
to the gross negligence of the
defendant who failed to
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30741 January 30, 1930
TOMAS BERNAL and FORTUNATA
ENVERSO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
J. V. HOUSE and TACLOBAN ELECTRIC and ICE
PLANT, LTD., defendants-appellee.
Kapunan and Kapunan for appellants.
Camus and Delgado for appellees.
MALCOLM, J.:
The parents of the five-year old child,
Purificacion Bernal, appeal from a judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Leyte, which denied
them P15,000 damages from J.V. House and the
Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., for the death
of the child as a consequence of burns alleged to
have been caused by the fault and negligence of
the defendants.
The salient facts as found by the trial judge are
the following:
On the evening of April 10, 1925, the procession
of Holy Friday was held in Tacloban, Leyte.
Fortunata Enverso with her daughter
Purificacion Bernal came from another
municipality to attend the religious celebration.
After the procession was over, the woman and
her daughter, accompanied by two other persons
by the names of Fausto and Elias, passed along a
public street named Gran Capitan. The little girl
was allowed to get a short distance in advance of
her mother and her friends. When in front of the
offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd.,
and automobile appeared from the opposite
direction which so frightened the child that she
turned to run, with the result that she fell into
the street gutter. At that time there was hot
water in this gutter or ditch coming from the
Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. When the mother
and her companions reached the child, they
found her face downward in the hot water. Her
clothes were immediately removed and, then
covered with a garment, the girl was taken to the
provincial hospital. There she was attended by
the resident physician, Dr. Victoriano A. Benitez.
Despite his efforts, the child died that same night
at 11:40 o'clock.
Dr. Benitez, who, of course, was in a better
position than any one to know the cause of the
death, and who had no reason to depart from the
true facts, certified that the cause of death was
"Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body", and that the
contributory causes were "Congestion of the
Brain and visceras of the chest & abdomen". The
same physician in his general record in the Leyte
Hospital for this patient, under diagnosis in full,
stated: "Burned 3rd Degree, whole body". The
treatment record of the attending nurse was
much to the same effect.
The defense was that the hot water was
permitted to flow down the side of the street
Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of
the authorities; that the cause of death was other
than the hot water; and that in the death the
plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and
negligence. The trial judge, however, after
examination of the evidence presented by the
defendants, failed to sustain their theory of the
case, except as to the last mentioned special
defense. We are shown no good reason for the
departing from the conclusion of the trial judge
to the effect that the sudden death of the child
Purification Bernal was due principally to the
nervous shock and organic calefaction produced
by the extensive burns from the hot water. "The
danger from burns is proportional rather to the
extent of surface involved than to the depth of
the burn". (Wharton & Stille's Medical
Jurisprudence, vol. 3, p. 263). The same authority
continues. "Burns of the first degree, covering
two-thirds of the body surface, are rarely
recovered from. . . . Children seem especially
susceptible to the effect of burns." (Pp. 263, 264).
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact
hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was led
to order the dismissal of the action because of
the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is
from this point that a majority of the court
depart from the stand taken by the trial judge.
The mother and her child had a perfect right to
be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on
the evening when the religious procession was
held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing
the child to run along a few paces in advance of
the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence
of an automobile appearing and of a frightened
child running and falling into a ditch filled with
hot water. The doctrines announced in the much
debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and
Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article
1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced.
The contributory negligence of the child and her
mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to
recovery, but in its strictest sense could only
result in reduction of the damages.
Having reached the conclusion that liability
exists, we next turn to discover who can recover
damages for the obligation, and against whom
the action will lie. The plaintiffs are Tomas
Bernal and Fortunata Enverso. The latter was the
mother of Purificacion Bernal and the former
was the natural father, who had never legally
recognized his child. The daughter lived with the
mother, and presumably was supported by her.
Under these facts, recovery should be permitted
the mother but not the father. As to the
defendants, they are J.V. House and the Tacloban
Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., J.V. House was granted a
franchise by Act No. 2700 of the Philippine
Legislature approved on March 9, 1917. He only
transferred this franchise formally to the
Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd. on March 30,
1926, that is, nearly a year after the death of the
child Purificacion Bernal. Under these facts, J.V.
House is solely responsible.
Counsel for appellees point out that there is no
satisfactory proof to establish the pecuniary loss.
That is true. But in cases of this character the law
presumes a loss because of the impossibility of
exact computation. There is not enough money
in the entire world to compensate a mother for
the death of her child. In criminal cases, the rule
has been to allow as a matter of course P1,000 as
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased. In the
case of Manzanares vs. Moreta ([1918], 38 Phil.,
821), which in many respects is on all fours with
the case at bar, the same amount of P1,000 was
allowed the mother of the dead boy eight or nine
years of age. The same criterion will have to be
followed in this instance.
The result will, therefore, be to accept the
findings of fact made by the trial judge; to set
aside the legal deductions flowing from those
facts; to hold that the death of the child
Purificacion Bernal was the result of fault and
negligence in permitting hot water to flow
through the public streets, there to endanger the
lives of passers-by who were unfortunately
enough to fall into it; to rule that the proper
plaintiff is the mother Fortunata Enverso and not
the natural father Tomas Bernal; to likewise rule
that the person responsible to the plaintiff is J.V.
House and not the entity the Tacloban Electric &
Ice Plant, Ltd.; and finally to adjudge that the
amount of recovery, without the tendering of
special proof, should be fixed, as in other cases,
at P1,000.
Concordant with the pronouncements just made,
the judgment appealed from shall in part be
reversed and in the court of origin another
judgment shall issue in favor of Fortunata
Enverso and against J.V. House for the amount of
P1,000, and for the costs of both instances.
Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ.,
concur.
Johnson, J., dissents.
Separate Opinions
ROMUALDEZ, J., dissenting:
Even taking the finding that the defendant by its
negligence helped to bring about the accident
which resulted in the death of the child
Purificacion Bernal, as not subject to question
now, not being a matter discussed in this
instance, I nevertheless deem the trial court's
other finding sufficiently proved in the record, to
the effect that the plaintiff, by negligence,
contributed to that most regrettable result.
With due respect to the majority opinion, I
believe the judgment appealed from should be
affirmed.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33380 December 17, 1930
TEODORA ASTUDILLO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, defendant-
appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph and Antonio T.
Carrascoso, Jr. for appellant.
Vicente Sotto and Adolfo Brillantes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
In August, 1928, a young man by the name of
Juan Diaz Astudillo met his death through
electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a
wire connected with an electric light pole
situated near Santa Lucia Gate, Intramuros, in
the City of Manila. Shortly thereafter, the mother
of the deceased instituted an action in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to secure from the
Manila Electric Company damages in the amount
of P30,000. The answer of the company set up as
special defenses that the death of Juan Diaz
Astudillo was due solely to his negligence and
lack of care, and that the company had employed
the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the injury. After trial, which included an
ocular inspection of the place where the fatality
occurred, judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of
P15,000, and costs.
As is well known, a wall surrounds the District of
Intramuros, in the City of Manila. At intervals,
gates for the ingress and egress of pedestrians
and vehicles penetrate the wall. One of these
openings toward Manila Bay is known as the
Santa Lucia Gate. Above this gate and between
the wall and a street of Intramuros is a
considerable space sodded with grass with the
portion directly over the gate paved with stone.
Adjoining this place in Intramuros are the
buildings of the Ateneo de Manila, the Agustinian
Convent, the Bureau of Public Works, and the
Santa Lucia Barracks. The proximity to these
structures and to the congested district in the
Walled City has made this a public place where
persons come to stroll, to rest, and to enjoy
themselves. An employee of the City of Manila, a
number of years ago, put up some wire to keep
persons from dirtying the premises, but this wire
has fallen down and is no obstacle to those
desiring to make use of the place. No prohibitory
signs have been posted.
Near this place in the street of Intramuros is an
electric light pole with the corresponding wires.
The pole presumably was located by the
municipal authorities and conforms in height to
the requirements of the franchise of the Manila
Electric Company. The feeder wires are of the
insulated type, known as triple braid weather
proof, required by the franchise. The pole, with
its wires, was erected in 1920. It was last
inspected by the City Electrician in 1923 or 1924.
The pole was located close enough to the public
place here described, so that a person, by
reaching his arm out the full length, would be
able to take hold of one of the wires. It would
appear, according to the City Electrician, that
even a wire of the triple braid weather proof
type, if touched by a person, would endanger the
life of that person by electrocution.
About 6 o'clock in the evening of August 14,
1928, a group of boys or young men came to this
public place. Two of them named Juan Diaz
Astudillo and Alejo Ponsoy sauntered over to
where the electric post was situated. They were
there looking out towards Intramuros. For
exactly what reason, no one will ever know, but
Juan Diaz Astudillo, placing one foot on a
projection, reached out and grasped a charged
electric wire. Death resulted almost instantly.
The matter principally discussed is the question
of the defendant company's liability under the
circumstances stated. It is well established that
the liability of electric light companies for
damages for personal injuries is governed by the
rules of negligence. Such companies are,
however, not insurers of the safety of the public.
But considering that electricity is an agency,
subtle and deadly, the measure of care required
of electric companies must be commensurate
with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of
exercising this high degree of diligence and care
extends to every place where persons have a
right to be. The poles must be so erected and the
wires and appliances must be so located the
persons rightfully near the place will not be
injured. Particularly must there be proper
insulation of the wires and appliances in places
where there is probable likelihood of human
contact therewith. (20 C. J., pp. 320 et seq.; San
Juan Light & Transit Co. vs. Requena [1912], 224
U. S., 89.)
We cannot agree with the defense of the Manila
Electric Company in the lower court to the effect
that the death of Juan Diaz Astudillo was due
exclusively to his negligence. He only did the
natural thing to be expected of one not familiar
with the danger arising from touching an electric
wire, and was wholly unconscious of his peril.
Had not the wire caused the death of this young
man, it would undoubtedly have been only a
question of time when someone else, like a
playful boy, would have been induced to take
hold of the wire, with fatal results. The cause of
the injury was one which could have been
foreseen and guarded against. The negligence
came from the act of the Manila Electric
Company in so placing its pole and wires as to be
within proximity to a place frequented by many
people, with the possibility ever present of one
of them losing his life by coming in contact with a
highly charged and defectively insulated wire.
As we understand the position of the Manila
Electric Company on appeal, its principal defense
now is that it has fully complied with the
provisions of its franchise and of the ordinances
of the City of Manila. It is undeniable that the
violation of franchise, an ordinance, or a statute
might constitute negligence. But the converse is
not necessarily true, and compliance with a
franchise, an ordinance, or a statute is not
conclusive proof that there was no negligence.
The franchise, ordinance, or statute merely
states the minimum conditions. The fulfillment
of these conditions does not render unnecessary
other precautions required by ordinary care.
(Moore vs. Hart [1916], 171 Ky., 725;
Oliver vs. Weaver [1923], 72 Colo., 540;
Caldwell vs. New Jersey Steamboat Co. [1872], 47
N. Y., 282; Consolidated Electric Light & Power
Co. vs. Healy [1902], 65 Kan., 798.)
The company further defends in this court on the
ground that it has not been proven that the
deceased is an acknowledged natural child of the
plaintiff mother. Technically this is correct. (Civil
Code, art. 944). At the same time, it should first
of all be mentioned that, so far as we know, this
point was not raised in the lower court. Further,
while the mother may thus be precluded from
succeeding to the estate of the son, yet we know
of no reason why she cannot be permitted to
secure damages from the company when the
negligence of this company resulted in the death
of her child.lawphi1>net
We, therefore, conclude that the plaintiff is
entitled to damages. But the evidence indicative
of the true measure of those damages is sadly
deficient. All that we know certainly is that the
deceased was less than 20 years of age, a
student, and working in the Ateneo de Manila,
but at what wages we are not told. We are also
shown that approximately P200 was needed to
defray the travel and funeral expenses. As would
happen in the case of a jury who have before
them one of the parents, her position to life, and
the age and sex of the child, varying opinions,
have been disclosed in the court regarding the
estimate of the damages with reference to the
next of kin. Various sums have been suggested,
beginning as low as P1,000 and extending as
high as P5,000. A majority of the court finally
arrived at the sum of P1,500 as appropriate
damages in this case. The basis of this award
would be the P1,000 which have been allowed in
other cases for the death of young children
without there having been tendered any special
proof of the amount of damages suffered, in
connection with which should be taken into
account the more mature age of the boy in the
case at bar, together with the particular expenses
caused by his death. (Manzanares vs Moreta
[1918], 38 Phil., 821; Bernal and
Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice
Plant [1930], 54 Phil., 327; Cuison vs. Norton &
Harrison Co. [1930], p. 18, ante.)

In the light of the foregoing, the various errors

assigned by the appellant will in the main be
overruled, but as above indicated, the judgment
will be modified by allowing the plaintiff to
recover from the defendant the sum of P1,500,
and the costs of both instances.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and

Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

JOHNSON, J., dissenting:

I dissent, I find nothing in the record which even

remotely justifies a judgment for damages
against the Manila Electric Company. There is
not a word in the testimony which shows in the
slightest degree any culpability or negligence on
the part of the appellant. The judgment appealed
from should therefore be revoked.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000]
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and
FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.
D E C I S I ON
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated March
31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City,
and awarding damages instead to private
respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in
an action for breach of contract of carriage.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are
as follows:
At 10 oclock in the morning of August 23, 1989,
private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then
a college freshman majoring in Physical
Education at the Siliman University, took a
passenger jeepney owned and operated by
petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was
filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga
was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a
wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear
end of the vehicle. Sclaw
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros
Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a
passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of
the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing
passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu
truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by
Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of
the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She
sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left
tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the
underlying skin." Closed reduction of the
fracture, long leg circular casting, and case
wedging were done under sedation. Her
confinement in the hospital lasted from August
23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending
physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic
surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for
a period of three months and would have to
ambulate in crutches during said period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for
damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the
contract of carriage by the former in failing to
exercise the diligence required of him as a
common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed
a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva,
the owner of the Isuzu truck. Korte
The lower court rendered judgment against
Salva as third-party defendant and absolved
Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver
of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the
accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil
Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and
Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of
the same court held Salva and his driver Verena
jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his
jeepney. Rtcspped
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of
the lower court was reversed on the ground that
Sungas cause of action was based on a contract
of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the
common carrier failed to exercise the diligence
required under the Civil Code. The appellate
court dismissed the third-party complaint
against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for
damages to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision
appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and another one is entered
ordering defendant-appellee
Vicente Calalas to pay
plaintiff-appellant:
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and
compensatory damages;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral
damages;
(3) P10,000.00 as attorneys
fees; and
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of
litigation; and
(5) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the
ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence
of Verena was the proximate cause of the
accident negates his liability and that to rule
otherwise would be to make the common carrier
an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He
contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the
truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito.
Petitioner further assails the award of moral
damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not
supported by evidence. Sdaadsc
The petition has no merit.
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling
in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the
owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores
the fact that she was never a party to that case
and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does
not apply. Missdaa
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in
the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case
No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver
Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the
damage caused to petitioners jeepney. On the
other hand, the issue in this case is whether
petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
The first, quasi-delict, also known asculpa
aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its
source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The
second, breach of contract or culpa contractual,
is premised upon the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or
fault should be clearly established because it is
the basis of the action, whereas in breach of
contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by
proving the existence of the contract and the fact
that the obligor, in this case the common carrier,
failed to transport his passenger safely to his
destination.[2] In case of death or injuries to
passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides
that common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently unless
they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of
the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
common carrier the burden of proof. Slxmis
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that
the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva
and his driver Verena liable for the damage to
petitioners jeepney, should be binding on Sunga.
It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the
collision between the jeepney and the truck was
the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine
of proximate cause is applicable only in actions
for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach
of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing
liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case,
the obligation is created by law itself. But, where
there is a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, it is the parties themselves
who create the obligation, and the function of the
law is merely to regulate the relation thus
created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are
concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil
Code are those respecting the diligence required
of common carriers with regard to the safety of
passengers as well as the presumption of
negligence in cases of death or injury to
passengers. It provides: Slxsc
Art. 1733. Common carriers,
from the nature of their
business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over
the goods and for the safety of
the passengers transported by
them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over the goods
is further expressed in articles
1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos.
 5,6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for
the safety of the passengers is
further set forth in articles
1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier
is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for
all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of
or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are
presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove
that they observed
extraordinary diligence as
prescribed by articles 1733
and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the
accident, the presumption of negligence at once
arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to
prove that he had to observe extraordinary
diligence in the care of his passengers. Scslx
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga
"safely as far as human care and foresight could
provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do
not think so. Several factors militate against
petitioners contention. Slx
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the
jeepney was not properly parked, its rear
portion being exposed about two meters from
the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing
the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle.
This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as
amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of
Traffic. - No person shall drive
his motor vehicle in such a
manner as to obstruct or
impede the passage of any
vehicle, nor, while discharging
or taking on passengers or
loading or unloading freight,
obstruct the free passage of
other vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver
took in more passengers than the allowed
seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of
32(a) of the same law. It provides: Mesm
Exceeding registered
capacity. - No person
operating any motor vehicle
shall allow more passengers
or more freight or cargo in his
vehicle than its registered
capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension
seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to
which the other passengers were exposed.
Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to
overcome the presumption of negligence
imposed on him for the injury sustained by
Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was
actually negligent in transporting
passengers. Calrky
We find it hard to give serious thought to
petitioners contention that Sungas taking an
"extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the
injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in
our seas should not be compensated merely
because those passengers assumed a greater risk
of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry.
This is also true of petitioners contention that
the jeepney being bumped while it was
improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito.
A caso fortuito is an event which could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was
inevitable.[3] This requires that the following
requirements be present: (a) the cause of the
breach is independent of the debtors will; (b) the
event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the
event is such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in
causing the injury to the creditor.[4] Petitioner
should have foreseen the danger of parking his
jeepney with its body protruding two meters
into the highway. Kycalr
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral
damages alleging that it is excessive and without
basis in law. We find this contention well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of
Appeals stated: Kyle
Plaintiff-appellant at the time
of the accident was a first-
year college student in that
school year 1989-1990 at the
Silliman University, majoring
in Physical Education.
Because of the injury, she was
not able to enroll in the
second semester of that
school year. She testified that
she had no more intention of
continuing with her schooling,
because she could not walk
and decided not to pursue her
degree, major in Physical
Education "because of my leg
which has a defect already."
Plaintiff-appellant likewise
testified that even while she
was under confinement, she
cried in pain because of her
injured left foot. As a result of
her injury, the Orthopedic
Surgeon also certified that she
has "residual bowing of the
fracture side." She likewise
decided not to further pursue
Physical Education as her
major subject, because "my
left leg x x x has a defect
already."
Those are her physical pains
and moral sufferings, the
inevitable bedfellows of the
injuries that she suffered.
Under Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, she is entitled to
recover moral damages in the
sum of P50,000.00, which is
fair, just and reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not
recoverable in actions for damages predicated
on a breach of contract for it is not one of the
items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code.[5] As an exception, such damages are
recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap
results in the death of a passenger, as provided
in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the
Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the
carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided
in Art. 2220.[6]
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding
moral damages since there was no factual
finding by the appellate court that petitioner
acted in bad faith in the performance of the
contract of carriage. Sungas contention that
petitioners admission in open court that the
driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going
to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an
admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the
driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the
hospital does not imply that petitioner was
utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured
passenger. If at all, it is merely implied
recognition by Verena that he was the one at
fault for the accident. Exsm
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its
resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
award of moral damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), and Buena, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15674 October 17, 1921
CONSOLACION GABETO, in her own right and
as guardian ad litem of her three
children, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGATON ARANETA, defendant-appellant.
Jose E. Locsin for appellant.
Block, Johnston and Greenbaum for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo by Consolacion Gabeto, in her
own right as widow of Proceso Gayetano, and as
guardian ad litem of the three children, Conchita
Gayetano, Rosita Gayetano, and Fermin
Gayetano, for the purpose of recovering damages
incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the death
of the said Proceso Gayetano, supposedly cause
by the wrongful act of the defendant Agaton
Araneta. Upon hearing the evidence, his Honor,
Judge L. M. Southworth, awarded damages to the
plaintiff in the amount of P3,000, from which
judgment the defendant appealed.
It appears in evidence that on August 4, 1918.
Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a
carromata near Plaza Gay, in the City of Iloilo,
with a view to going to a cockpit on Calle
Ledesma in the same City. When the driver of the
carromata had turned his horse and started in
the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton
Araneta, stepped out into the street, and laying
his hands on the reins, stopped the horse, at the
same time protesting to the driver that he
himself had called this carromata first. The
driver, one Julio Pagnaya, replied to the effect
that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta,
and that he had taken up the two passengers
then in the carromata as the first who had
offered employment. At or about the same time
Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free
the horse from the control of Agaton Araneta, in
order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing,
however, to the looseness of the bridle on the
horse's head or to the rottenness of the material
of which it was made, the bit came out of the
horse's mouth; and it became necessary for the
driver to get out, which he did, in order to find
the bridle. The horse was then pulled over to
near the curb, by one or the other — it makes no
difference which — and Pagnaya tried to fix the
bridle.
While he was thus engaged, the horse, being free
from the control of the bit, became disturbed and
moved forward, in doing which he pulled one of
the wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk
and pushed Julio Pagnaya over. After going a few
years further the side of the carromata struck a
police telephone box which was fixed to a post
on the sidewalk, upon which the box came down
with a crash and frightened the horse to such an
extent that he set out at full speed up the street.
Meanwhile one of the passengers, to wit. Basilio
Ilano, had alighted while the carromata was as
yet alongside the sidewalk; but the other,
Proceso Gayetano, had unfortunately retained
his seat, and after the runaway horse had
proceeded up the street to a point in front of the
Mission Hospital, the said Gayetano jumped or
fell from the rig, and in so doing received injuries
from which he soon died.
As to the facts above stated the evidence cannot
be said to be materially in conflict; but there is
decided conflict upon the point of the exact
relation of the defendant Agaton Araneta, to the
runaway. The evidence for the plaintiff on this
point consists chiefly of the testimony of Julio
Pagnaya and of Basilio Ilano. They both say that
while yet in the middle of the street, the
defendant jerked the bridle, which caused the bit
to come out of the horse's mouth, and Julio says
that at that juncture the throat latch of the bridle
was broken. Be this as it may, we are of the
opinion that the mere fact that the defendant out of the horse's mouth; and they say that Julio,
interfered with the carromata by stopping the after alighting, led the horse over to the curb,
horse in the manner stated would not make him and proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so
liable for the death of Proceso Gayetano; because doing the bridle was slipped entirely off, when
it is admitted by Julio Pagnaya that he afterwards the horse, feeling himself free from control,
got out of the carromata and went to the horse's started to go away as previously stated.
head to fix the bridle. The evidence is
furthermore convincing to the effect that, after Upon the whole we are constrained to hold that
Julio Pagnaya alighted, the horse was conducted the defendant is not legally responsible for the
to the curb and that an appreciable interval of death of Proceso Gayetano; and though reluctant
time elapsed — same witnesses say several to interfere with the findings of fact of a trial
minutes — before the horse started on his career court when there is a conflict of testimony, the
up the street. 1awph!l.net evidence in this case so clearly preponderates in
favor of the defendant, that we have no recourse
It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig but to reverse the judgment.
by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the street
was too remote from the accident that presently The judgment will therefore be reversed, and the
ensued to be considered the legal or proximate defendant will be absolved from the complaint;
cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and and it is so ordered, without express finding as to
taking his post at the head of the horse, the costs of either instance. So ordered.
driver was the person primarily responsible for
the control of the animal, and the defendant
cannot be charged with liability for the accident Johnson, Araullo, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ.,
resulting from the action of the horse thereafter. concur.
Julio Pagnaya testifies to one fact which, if it
were fully accredited, would possibly put a
different complexion on the case; for he says that
when the horse was pulled over to the curb, the
defendant, by way of emphasizing his verbal
denunciation of Pagnaya, gesticulated with one
of his arms and incidentally brought his hand
down on the horse's nose. This, according to
Pagnaya, is what made the horse run away.
There is no other witness who testifies to this;
and it is noteworthy that Basilio Ilano does not
mention it. A decided preponderance of the
evidence in our opinion is against it.
The evidence indicates that the bridle was old,
and the leather of which it was made was
probably so weak as to be easily broken. Julio
Pagnaya had a natural interest in refuting this
fact, as well as in exculpating himself in other
respects; and we are of the opinion that the
several witnesses who testified for the defendant
gave a more credible account of the affair than
the witnesses for the plaintiff. According to the
witnesses for the defendant, it was Julio who
jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit it come
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 7763 December 2, 1957
HONORIA DELGADO VDA. DE GREGORIO, ET
AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
GO CHONG BING, defendant-appellee.
Pedro P. Suarez and Sabina Agcaoili Suarez for
appellants.
Castillo, Cervantes, Occena, Lozano, Montana,
Cunanan and Sison for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Davao absolving defendant from
liability for the accidental death of Quirico
Gregorio. It came to this Court as the amount
demanded in the complaint is more than
P50,000.
On or before June 2, 1952, defendant was the
owner of a truck. He had a driver and a cargador
or driver's helper by the name of Francisco
Romera. In the afternoon of June 2, 1952,
defendant ordered Romera to drive his truck,
with instructions to follow another track driven
by his driver and help the latter in crossing
Sumlog river which was then flooded, should it
be unable to cross the river because of the flood.
Romera at that time was not a licensed driver. He
only had a student's permit, issued to him on
March 31, 1952 (Exhibit "1"). The truck started
from the town of Lupon at about 5:30 o'clock in
the afternoon, driven by Romera. Some persons
boarded the truck and among them was one
policeman by the name of Venancio Orfanel.
While the truck was on the way, it made a stop
and then Orfanel took the wheel from Romera,
while the latter stayed on the driver's left,
reclined on a spare tire inside of the truck. As to
the circumstances under which Orfanel was able
to take hold of and drive the truck, there is some
dispute and this matter will be taken up later in
the decision.
While the truck was being driven by Orfanel,
with another truck ahead of it driven by
defendant's driver it so happened that they came
to a truck that was trying to park on the left side
of the road. Romera suggested to Orfanel that he
shift to low gear and Orfanel did so. But as they
approached the parking truck, and in order to
avoid colliding with it, Orfanel swerved the truck
towards the right. It so happened that at that
time two pedestrians were on the right side of
the road, As the truck had swerved to the right
and was proceeding to hit the said pedestrians,
Romera told Orfanel to apply the brake, but
Orfanel instead of doing so put his foot on the
gasoline and the truck did not stop but went on
and hit and run over one of the pedestrians, by
the name of Quirico Gregorio. The plaintiffs
appellants' in this action are Gregorio's widow
and his children and of the accident, Orfanel was
prosecuted for homicide with reckless
imprudence. He pleaded guilty to the charge and
was sentenced accordingly.
As hinted above, an important issue in the case
has relation to the circumstances under which
Orfanel was able to take hold of the wheel and
drive the truck. To sustain the theory that
defendant's cargador Francisco Romera was
negligent, plaintiffs introduced one Javier A.
Dayo as a witness. According to this witness the
truck was speeding at the rate of 20 miles an
hour. According to him also, while the truck was
about pass by the house of one Lucio, running at
a speed per hour, he heard Romera shouting
"hand brake! hand brake!"; that both Orfanel and
Romera tried to turn the driver's wheel to the
left and direct the truck towards also the left to
avoid the collision. According to his witness also,
Romera gave the wheel to Orfanel voluntarily
upon the request of the latter.
Plaintiffs also sought to prove that Romera gave
the truck voluntarily to the policeman by
presenting the affidavit of Romera made on June
3, 1952 (Exhibit "1"). This affidavit, however, is
inadmissible as evidence against the defendant
because it is hearsay with respect, to him. It may
not be considered as part of the res gestae either,
because the affidavit was taken one day after the
incident.lawphi1.net
Against the above evidence, the defendant
testified that he gave positive instructions to
Romera not to allow anybody to drive the truck,
and Romera himself testified that he had warned
Orfanel that his master prohibited him from
allowing anybody to drive the truck, but that as
Orfanel was a uniformed policeman and insisted
that he drive the truck, and that as he believed
that the policeman knew how to drive, he let him
drive the truck.
We are of the belief that defendant's claim that
Romera gave the wheel to the policeman for fear
of, or out of respect for, the latter, has been
proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The
testimony of witness Dayo is not corroborated
by any other testimony. As he testified that he
was two meters behind Romera, he could not
have noticed with exactness the circumstances
under which the policeman was able to get hold
of the wheel and drive the truck and his
testimony in that respect cannot be believed. We
are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that the
defendant's cargador, or Francisco Romera gave
the wheel to Orfanel out of respect for the latter,
who was a uniformed policeman and because he
believed that the latter had both the ability and
the authority to drive the truck, especially as he
himself had only a student's permit and not a
driver's license.
The court a quo dismissed the action on the
ground that as the death or accident was caused
by an act or omission of a person who is not in
any way related to the defendant, and as such act
or omission was punishable by law, and as a
matter of fact he had already been punished
therefor, no civil liability should be imposed
upon the defendant. Against this decision the
plaintiffs have appealed to this Court, contending
that when defendant permitted his cargador,
who was not provided with a driver's license, to
drive the truck, he thereby violated the
provisions of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law
(section 28., Act No. 3992), and that this
constitutes negligence per se. (People vs. Santos,
et al., CA-G.R. No. 1088-1089R.) But admitting for
the sake of argument that the defendant had so
violated the law, or may be deemed negligent in
entrusting the truck to one who is not provided
with a driver's license, it is clear that he may not
be declared liable for the accident because his
negligence was not the direct and proximate
cause thereof. The leading case in this
jurisdiction on negligence is that of Taylor vs.
Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, 16
Phil. 8. Negligence as a source of obligation both
under the civil law and in American cases was
carefully considered and it was held:
We agree with counsel for appellant
that under the Civil Code, as under the
generally accepted doctrine in the
United States, the plaintiff in an action
such as that under consideration, in
order to establish his right to a
recovery, must establish by competent
evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of
which defendant personally, or some
person for whose acts it must respond,
was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect
between the negligence and the
damage. (Taylor vs. Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Co., supra. p.15)
In accordance with the decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain, in order that a person may be
held guilty for damage through negligence, it is
necessary that there be an act or omission on the
part of the person who is to be charged with the
liability and that damage is produced by the said
act or omission.
In accordance with the fundamental
principle of proof, that the burden
 thereof is upon the plaintiff, it is
apparent that it is the duty of him who
shall claim damages to establish their
existence. The decisions of April 9,
1896, and March 18, July 6, and
September 27, 1898, have especially
supported the principle, the first
setting forth in detail the necessary
points of the proof, which are two: An
Act or omission on the part of the
person who is to be charged with the
liability, and the production of the
damage by said act or omission.

This includes, by inference, the

establishment of a relation of cause or
effect between the act or the omission
and the damage; the latter must be the
direct result of one of the first two. As
the decision of March 22, 1881, said, it
is necessary that the damages result
immediately and directly from an act
performed culpably and wrongfully;
'necessarily presupposing, a legal
ground for imputability. (Taylor vs.
Manila Electric Railroad and Light
Co., supra, p. 28.).

It is evident that the proximate, immediate and

direct cause of the death of the plaintiffs'
intestate was the negligence of Orfanel, a
uniformed policeman, who took the wheel of the
truck from defendant's cargador, in spite of the
protest of the latter. The reason for absolving the
defendant therefor is not because the one
responsible for the accident had already received
indemnification for the accident, but because
there is no direct and proximate causal
connection between the negligence or violation
of the law by the defendant to the death of the
plaintiff's intestate.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment

appealed from is hereby affirmed, without costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes,

A., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and
Felix, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court which
affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal
Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner
Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the
case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October
23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to
his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the
tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the
place where he stored his palay flooded with
water coming from the irrigation canal nearby
which had overflowed. Urbano went to the
elevated portion of the canal to see what
happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and
Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who
was responsible for the opening of the irrigation
canal and Javier admitted that he was the one.
Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier
pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between
them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about
2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches
wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right
palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the
bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran
away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano
who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left
leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a
swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack
and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced
and prevented him from hacking Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio
Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house
about 50 meters away from where the incident
happened. Emilio then went to the house of
Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not
finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio
councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice
of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to
the police station of San Fabian to report the
incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier
was brought to a physician. The group went to
Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of
San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but
instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario
Meneses because Padilla had no available
medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and
his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla
who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr.
Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit
"C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have
examined the wound of
Marcelo Javier, 20 years of
age, married, residing at
Barangay Anonang, San
Fabian, Pangasinan on
October 23, 1980 and found
the following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in
length at the upper portion of
the lesser palmar prominence,
right.
As to my observation the
incapacitation is from (7-9)
days period. This wound was
presented to me only for
medico-legal examination, as
it was already treated by the
other doctor. (p. 88, Original
Records)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis,
Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their
differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for
the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on
October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis
appeared before the San Fabian Police to
formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman
Torio recorded the event in the police blotter
(Exhibit A), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct
'80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592
on page 257 both parties
appeared before this Station
accompanied by brgy.
councilman Felipe Solis and
settled their case amicably,
for they are neighbors and
close relatives to each other.
Marcelo Javier accepted and
granted forgiveness to
Filomeno Urbano who
shoulder (sic) all the expenses
in his medical treatment, and
promising to him and to this
Office that this will never be
repeated anymore and not to
harbour any grudge against
each other. (p. 87, Original
Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police
station. On November 3, 1980, the additional
P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in
the presence of barangay captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier
was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a
very serious condition. When admitted to the
hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having
convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who
personally attended to Javier found that the
latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus
toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing
wound in Javier's palm which could have been
infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m.,
Javier died in the hospital. The medical findings
of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to
trismus
adm. at DX TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent
muscle spasm. With diffi-
#35, 421 culty opening his
mouth. Restless at times.
Febrile
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin
1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno
Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide
before the then Circuit Criminal Court of
Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty."
After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as
charged. He was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12)
YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to
SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
together with the accessories of the law, to
indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier,
in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs. He was ordered confined at the New
Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality
of the decision, in view of the nature of his
penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed
the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised
the award of indemnity to the heirs of the
deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the
appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial. The motion for new trial was
based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain
Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:
That in 1980, I was the barrio
captain of Barrio Anonang,
San Fabian, Pangasinan, and
up to the present having been
re-elected to such position in
the last barangay elections on
May 17, 1982;
That sometime in the first
week of November, 1980,
there was a typhoon that
swept Pangasinan and other
places of Central Luzon
including San Fabian, a town
of said province;
That during the typhoon, the
sluice or control gates of the
Bued irrigation dam which
irrigates the ricefields of San
Fabian were closed and/or
controlled so much so that
water and its flow to the
canals and ditches were
regulated and reduced;
That due to the locking of the
sluice or control gates of the
dam leading to the canals and
ditches which will bring water
to the ricefields, the water in
said canals and ditches
became shallow which was
suitable for catching
mudfishes;
That after the storm, I
conducted a personal survey
in the area affected, with my
secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
That on November 5, 1980,
while I was conducting
survey, I saw the late Marcelo
Javier catching fish in the
shallow irrigation canals with
some companions;
That few days there after,or
on November l5, l980, I came
to know that said Marcelo
Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33,
Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due
course to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of
the Revised Penal Code which provides that
"Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any
person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an
accused is criminally responsible for acts
committed by him in violation of law and for all
the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was
hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a
result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised
wound on his right palm; that on November 14,
1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident,
Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very
serious condition and that on the following day,
November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts
ruled that Javier's death was the natural and
logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act.
Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's
death. Thus, the appellate court said:
The claim of appellant that
there was an efficient cause
which supervened from the
time the deceased was
wounded to the time of his
death, which covers a period
of 23 days does not deserve
serious consideration. True,
that the deceased did not die
right away from his wound,
but the cause of his death was
due to said wound which was
inflicted by the appellant. Said
wound which was in the
process of healing got infected
with tetanus which ultimately
caused his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the
Nazareth General Hospital
testified that the victim
suffered lockjaw because of
the infection of the wound
with tetanus. And there is no
other way by which he could
be infected with tetanus
except through the wound in
his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5,
1981). Consequently, the
proximate cause of the
victim's death was the wound
which got infected with
tetanus. And the settled rule
in this jurisdiction is that an
accused is liable for all the
consequences of his unlawful
act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C.
People v. Red, CA 43 O.G.
5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil.
418).
Appellant's allegation that the
proximate cause of the
victim's death was due to his
own negligence in going back
to work without his wound
being properly healed, and
lately, that he went to catch
fish in dirty irrigation canals
in the first week of November,
1980, is an afterthought, and a
desperate attempt by
appellant to wiggle out of the
predicament he found himself
in. If the wound had not yet
healed, it is impossible to
conceive that the deceased
would be reckless enough to
work with a disabled hand.
(pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the
proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier
was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario
Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that
Javier got infected with tetanus when after two
weeks he returned to his farm and tended his
tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the
wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show
that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected
with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the
wound. The evidence merely confirms that the
wound, which was already healing at the time
Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment,
somehow got infected with tetanus However, as
to when the wound was infected is not clear
from the record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil.
1181), we adopted the following definition of
proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
... A satisfactory definition of
proximate cause is found in
Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American Jurisprudence, cited
by plaintiffs-appellants in
their brief. It is as follows:
... "that cause, which, in
natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and
without which the result
 would not have occurred."And
more comprehensively, "the
proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or
by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close
causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain
immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person
might probably result
therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not
there was an efficient intervening cause from the
time Javier was wounded until his death which
would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
The incubation period of
tetanus, i.e., the time between
injury and the appearance of
unmistakable symptoms,
ranges from 2 to 56 days.
However, over 80 percent of
patients become symptomatic
within 14 days. A short
incubation period indicates
severe disease, and when
symptoms occur within 2 or 3
days of injury the mortality
rate approaches 100 percent.
Non-specific premonitory
symptoms such as
restlessness, irritability, and
headache are encountered
occasionally, but the
commonest presenting
complaints are pain and
stiffness in the jaw, abdomen,
or back and difficulty
swallowing. As the
progresses, stiffness gives
way to rigidity, and patients
often complain of difficulty
opening their mouths. In fact,
trismus in the commonest
manifestation of tetanus and
is responsible for the familiar
descriptive name of lockjaw.
As more muscles are involved,
rigidity becomes generalized,
and sustained contractions
called risus sardonicus. The
intensity and sequence of
muscle involvement is quite
variable. In a small proportion
of patients, only local signs
and symptoms develop in the
region of the injury. In the
vast majority, however, most
muscles are involved to some
degree, and the signs and
symptoms encountered
depend upon the major
muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur
within 24 to 72 hours of the
first symptom, an interval
referred to as the onset time.
As in the case of the
incubation period, a short
onset time is associated with a
poor prognosis. Spasms are
caused by sudden
intensification of afferent
stimuli arising in the
periphery, which increases
rigidity and causes
simultaneous and excessive
contraction of muscles and
their antagonists. Spasms may
be both painful and
dangerous. As the disease
progresses, minimal or
inapparent stimuli produce
more intense and longer
lasting spasms with
increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired
by laryngospasm or tonic
contraction of respiratory
muscles which prevent
adequate ventilation. Hypoxia
may then lead to irreversible
central nervous system
damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized
by an incubation period of at
least 14 days and an onset time
of more than 6 days. Trismus
is usually present, but
dysphagia is absent and
generalized spasms are brief
and mild. Moderately severe
tetanus has a somewhat
shorter incubation period and
onset time; trismus is marked,
dysphagia and generalized
rigidity are present, but
ventilation remains adequate
even during spasms. The
criteria for severe tetanus
include a short incubation
time, and an onset time of 72
hrs., or less, severe trismus,
dysphagia and rigidity and
frequent prolonged,
generalized convulsive
spasms. (Harrison's Principle
of Internal Medicine, 1983
Edition, pp. 1004-1005;
Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to
tetanus found inside a man's body depends on
the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised
wound on his right palm when he parried the
bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This
incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22
days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the
symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle
spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980,
he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the
appellant was already infected by tetanus germs
at the time, it is more medically probable that
Javier should have been infected with only a mild
cause of tetanus because the symptoms of
tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the
hacking incident or more than 14 days after the
infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time
should have been more than six days. Javier,
however, died on the second day from the onset
time. The more credible conclusion is that at the
time Javier's wound was inflicted by the
appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed
him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus
after the hacking incident. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or
3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be
the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People
v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing
with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victim's death must convince
a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The
medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later
or between the time Javier was wounded to the
time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v.
Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the
wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take
necessary precautions, with tetanus may have
been the proximate cause of Javier's death with
which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we
ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al.
(99 Phil. 118).
 "A prior and remote cause
cannot be made the be of an
action if such remote cause
did nothing more than furnish
the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if
there intervened between
such prior or remote cause
and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury
would not have happened but
for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed
in the condition except
because of the independent
cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into
operation the instances which
result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is
the proximate cause." (45 C.J.
pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear
aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At
the very least, the records show he is guilty of
inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the
petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was
wiped out by the victim's own act. After the
hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the
facilities of barangay mediators to effect a
compromise agreement where Javier forgave
Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical
expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor
offenses is allowed under the express provisions
of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section
2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of
proximate cause and remote cause is limited to
the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case.
It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner
is also free of civil liability. The well-settled
doctrine is that a person, while not criminally
liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the
recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al.
(G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
... While the guilt of the
accused in a criminal
prosecution must be
established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is
required in a civil action for
damages. (Article 29, Civil
Code). The judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the civil
liability of the accused only
when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the
civil liability might arise did
not exist. (Padilla v. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions
of article 29 of the Civil Code,
which provides that the
acquittal of the accused on the
ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond
reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from
civil liability for the same act
or omission, has been
explained by the Code
Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal
of the accused in a criminal
case also releases him from
civil liability is one of the most
serious flaws in the Philippine
legal system. It has given use
to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where
the acquittal was due to a
reasonable doubt in the mind
of the court as to the guilt of
the accused. The reasoning
followed is that inasmuch as
the civil responsibility is
derived from the criminal
offense, when the latter is not
proved, civil liability cannot
be demanded.
This is one of those causes
where confused thinking
leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences.
Such reasoning fails to draw a
clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and
civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of
the distinction. The two
liabilities are separate and
distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and
the other, private rights. One
is for the punishment or
correction of the offender
while the other is for
reparation of damages
suffered by the aggrieved
party. The two
responsibilities are so
different from each other that
article 1813 of the present
(Spanish) Civil Code reads
thus: "There may be a
compromise upon the civil
action arising from a crime;
but the public action for the
imposition of the legal penalty
shall not thereby be
extinguished." It is just and
proper that, for the purposes
of the imprisonment of or fine
upon the accused, the offense
should be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. But for the
purpose of indemnity the
complaining party, why
should the offense also be
proved beyond reasonable
doubt? Is not the invasion or
violation of every private
right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence?
Is the right of the aggrieved
person any less private
because the wrongful act is
also punishable by the
criminal law?
"For these reasons, the
Commission recommends the
adoption of the reform under
discussion. It will correct a
serious defect in our law. It
will close up an inexhaustible
source of injustice-a cause for
disillusionment on the part of
the innumerable persons
injured or wronged."
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00
indemnification imposed by the trial court to
P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification
was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil
liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly
examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller
development if the heirs of the victim are so
minded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of
homicide. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and,Cortes,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-47379 May 16, 1988
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION,
INC., respondents.
G.R. No. L-47481 May 16, 1988
ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
COUTRT OF APPEALS and NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, respondents.
Raymundo A. Armovit for private respondent in L-
47379.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
These consolidated petitions seek to set aside
the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
which adjudged the National Power Corporation
liable for damages against Engineering
Construction, Inc. The appellate court, however,
reduced the amount of damages awarded by the
trial court. Hence, both parties filed their
respective petitions: the National Power
Corporation (NPC) in G.R. No. 47379,
questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals
for holding it liable for damages and the
Engineering Construction, Inc. (ECI) in G.R. No.
47481, questioning the same decision for
reducing the consequential damages and
attorney's fees and for eliminating the exemplary
damages.
The facts are succinctly summarized by the
respondent Court of Appeals, as follows:
On August 4, 1964, plaintiff
Engineering Construction,
Inc., being a successful bidder,
executed a contract in Manila
with the National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority
(NAWASA), whereby the
former undertook to furnish
all tools, labor, equipment,
and materials (not furnished
by Owner), and to construct
the proposed 2nd lpo-Bicti
Tunnel, Intake and Outlet
Structures, and Appurtenant
Structures, and Appurtenant
Features, at Norzagaray,
Bulacan, and to complete said
works within eight hundred
(800) calendar days from the
date the Contractor receives
the formal notice to proceed
(Exh. A).
The project involved two (2)
major phases: the first phase
comprising, the tunnel work
covering a distance of seven
(7) kilometers, passing
through the mountain, from
the Ipo river, a part of
Norzagaray, Bulacan, where
the Ipo Dam of the defendant
National Power Corporation is
located, to Bicti; the other
phase consisting of the
outworks at both ends of the
tunnel.
By September 1967, the
plaintiff corporation already
had completed the first major
phase of the work, namely, the
tunnel excavation work. Some
portions of the outworks at
the Bicti site were still under
construction. As soon as the
plaintiff corporation had
finished the tunnel excavation
work at the Bicti site, all the
equipment no longer needed
there were transferred to the
Ipo site where some projects
were yet to be completed.
The record shows that on
November 4,1967, typhoon
'Welming' hit Central Luzon,
passing through defendant's
Angat Hydro-electric Project
and Dam at lpo, Norzagaray,
Bulacan. Strong winds struck
the project area, and heavy
rains intermittently fell. Due
to the heavy downpour, the
water in the reservoir of the
Angat Dam was rising
perilously at the rate of sixty
(60) centimeters per hour. To
prevent an overflow of water
from the dam, since the water
level had reached the danger
height of 212 meters above
sea level, the defendant
corporation caused the
opening of the spillway gates."
(pp. 45-46, L-47379, Rollo)
The appellate court sustained the findings of the
trial court that the evidence preponlderantly
established the fact that due to the negligent
manner with which the spillway gates of the
Angat Dam were opened, an extraordinary large
volume of water rushed out of the gates, and hit
the installations and construction works of ECI at
the lpo site with terrific impact, as a result of
which the latter's stockpile of materials and
supplies, camp facilities and permanent
structures and accessories either washed away,
lost or destroyed.
The appellate court further found that:
It cannot be pretended that
there was no negligence or
that the appellant exercised
extraordinary care in the
opening of the spillway gates
of the Angat Dam. Maintainers
of the dam knew very well
that it was far more safe to
open them gradually. But the
spillway gates were opened
only when typhoon Welming
was already at its height, in a
vain effort to race against
time and prevent the overflow
of water from the dam as it
'was rising dangerously at the
rate of sixty centimeters per
hour. 'Action could have been
taken as early as November 3,
1967, when the water in the
reservoir was still low. At that
time, the gates of the dam
could have been opened in a
regulated manner. Let it be
stressed that the appellant
knew of the coming of the
typhoon four days before it
actually hit the project area.
(p. 53, L-47379, Rollo)
As to the award of damages, the appellate court
held:
We come now to the award of
damages. The appellee
submitted a list of estimated
losses and damages to the
tunnel project (Ipo side)
caused by the instant flooding
of the Angat River (Exh. J-1).
The damages were itemized in
four categories, to wit: Camp
Facilities P55,700.00;
Equipment, Parts and Plant —
P375,659.51; Materials
P107,175.80; and Permanent
Structures and accessories —
P137,250.00, with an
aggregate total amount of
P675,785.31. The list is
supported by several
vouchers which were all
submitted as Exhibits K to M-
38 a, N to O, P to U-2 and V to
X- 60-a (Vide: Folders Nos. 1
to 4). The appellant did not
submit proofs to traverse the
aforementioned documentary
evidence. We hold that the
lower court did not commit
any error in awarding P
675,785.31 as actual or
compensatory damages.
However, We cannot sustain
the award of P333,200.00 as
consequential damages. This
amount is broken down as
follows: P213,200.00 as and
for the rentals of a crane to
temporarily replace the one
"destroyed beyond repair,"
and P120,000.00 as one
month bonus which the
appellee failed to realize in
accordance with the contract
which the appellee had with
NAWASA. Said rental of the
crane allegedly covered the
period of one year at the rate
of P40.00 an hour for 16
hours a day. The evidence,
however, shows that the
appellee bought a crane also a
crawler type, on November
10, 1967, six (6) days after the
incident in question (Exh N)
And according to the lower
court, which finding was
never assailed, the appellee
resumed its normal
construction work on the Ipo-
Bicti Project after a stoppage
of only one month. There is no
evidence when the appellee
received the crane from the
seller, Asian Enterprise
Limited. But there was an
agreement that the shipment
of the goods would be effected
within 60 days from the
opening of the letter of credit
(Exh. N).<äre||anº•1àw> It
appearing that the contract of
sale was consummated, We
must conclude or at least
assume that the crane was
delivered to the appellee
within 60 days as stipulated.
The appellee then could have
availed of the services of
another crane for a period of
only one month (after a work
stoppage of one month) at the
rate of P 40.00 an hour for 16
hours a day or a total of P
19,200.00 as rental.
But the value of the new crane
cannot be included as part of
actual damages because the
old was reactivated after it
was repaired. The cost of the
repair was P 77,000.00 as
shown in item No. 1 under the
Equipment, Parts and Plants
category (Exh. J-1), which
amount of repair was already
included in the actual or
compensatory damages. (pp.
54-56, L-47379, Rollo)
The appellate court likewise rejected the award
of unrealized bonus from NAWASA in the
amount of P120,000.00 (computed at P4,000.00
a day in case construction is finished before the
specified time, i.e., within 800 calendar days),
considering that the incident occurred after
more than three (3) years or one thousand one
hundred seventy (1,170) days. The court also
eliminated the award of exemplary damages as
there was no gross negligence on the part of NPC
and reduced the amount of attorney's fees from
P50,000.00 to P30,000.00.
In these consolidated petitions, NPC assails the
appellate court's decision as being erroneous on
the ground that the destruction and loss of the
ECI's equipment and facilities were due to force
majeure. It argues that the rapid rise of the water
level in the reservoir of its Angat Dam due to
heavy rains brought about by the typhoon was
an extraordinary occurrence that could not have
been foreseen, and thus, the subsequent release
of water through the spillway gates and its
resultant effect, if any, on ECI's equipment and
facilities may rightly be attributed to force
majeure.
On the other hand, ECI assails the reduction of
the consequential damages from P333,200.00 to
P19,000.00 on the grounds that the appellate
court had no basis in concluding that ECI
acquired a new Crawler-type crane and
therefore, it only can claim rentals for the
temporary use of the leased crane for a period of
one month; and that the award of P4,000.00 a
day or P120,000.00 a month bonus is justified
since the period limitation on ECI's contract with
NAWASA had dual effects, i.e., bonus for earlier
completion and liquidated damages for delayed
performance; and in either case at the rate of
P4,000.00 daily. Thus, since NPC's negligence
compelled work stoppage for a period of one
month, the said award of P120,000.00 is
justified. ECI further assailes the reduction of
attorney's fees and the total elimination of
exemplary damages.
Both petitions are without merit.
It is clear from the appellate court's decision that
based on its findings of fact and that of the trial
court's, petitioner NPC was undoubtedly
negligent because it opened the spillway gates of
the Angat Dam only at the height of typhoon
"Welming" when it knew very well that it was
safer to have opened the same gradually and
earlier, as it was also undeniable that NPC knew
of the coming typhoon at least four days before it
actually struck. And even though the typhoon
was an act of God or what we may call force
majeure, NPC cannot escape liability because its
negligence was the proximate cause of the loss
and damage. As we have ruled in Juan F. Nakpil &
Sons v. Court of Appeals, (144 SCRA 596, 606-
607):
Thus, if upon the happening of
a fortuitous event or an act of
God, there concurs a 4379; Limpangco & Sons v.
corresponding fraud,
negligence, delay or violation
or contravention in any
manner of the tenor of the
obligation as provided for in
Article 1170 of the Civil Code,
which results in loss or
damage, the obligor cannot
escape liability.
The principle embodied in the
act of God doctrine strictly
requires that the act must be
one occasioned exclusively by
the violence of nature and
human agencies are to be
excluded from creating or
entering into the cause of the
mischief. When the effect, the
cause of which is to be
considered, is found to be in
part the result of the
participation of man, whether
it be from active intervention
or neglect, or failure to act,
the whole occurrence is
thereby humanized, as it was,
and removed from the rules
applicable to the acts of God.
(1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-
1175).
Thus, it has been held that
when the negligence of a
person concurs with an act of
God in producing a loss, such
person is not exempt from
liability by showing that the
immediate cause of the
damage was the act of God. To
be exempt from liability for
loss because of an act of God,
he must be free from any
previous negligence or
misconduct by which the loss
or damage may have been
occasioned. (Fish & Elective
Co. v. Phil. Motors, 55 Phil.
129; Tucker v. Milan 49 O.G.
Yangco Steamship Co., 34 Phil.
 594, 604; Lasam v. Smith, 45
Phil. 657).
Furthermore, the question of whether or not
there was negligence on the part of NPC is a
question of fact which properly falls within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and will not
be disturbed by this Court unless the same is
clearly unfounded. Thus, in Tolentino v. Court of
appeals, (150 SCRA 26, 36) we ruled:
Moreover, the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are
generally final and conclusive
upon the Supreme Court
(Leonardo v. Court of Appeals,
120 SCRA 890 [1983]. In fact
it is settled that the Supreme
Court is not supposed to
weigh evidence but only to
determine its substantially
(Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 100
SCRA 433 [1982] and will
generally not disturb said
findings of fact when
supported by substantial
evidence (Aytona v. Court of
Appeals, 113 SCRA 575
[1985]; Collector of Customs
of Manila v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 137 SCRA 3
[1985]. On the other hand
substantial evidence is
defined as such relevant
evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as
adequate to support a
conclusion (Philippine Metal
Products, Inc. v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 90 SCRA
135 [1979]; Police
Commission v. Lood, 127
SCRA 757 [1984]; Canete v.
WCC, 136 SCRA 302 [1985])
Therefore, the respondent Court of Appeals did
not err in holding the NPC liable for damages.
Likewise, it did not err in reducing the
consequential damages from P333,200.00 to
P19,000.00. As shown by the records, while
there was no categorical statement or admission
on the part of ECI that it bought a new crane to
replace the damaged one, a sales contract was
presented to the effect that the new crane would
be delivered to it by Asian Enterprises within 60
days from the opening of the letter of credit at
the cost of P106,336.75. The offer was made by
Asian Enterprises a few days after the flood. As
compared to the amount of P106,336.75 for a
brand new crane and paying the alleged amount
of P4,000.00 a day as rental for the use of a
temporary crane, which use petitioner ECI
alleged to have lasted for a period of one year,
thus, totalling P120,000.00, plus the fact that
there was already a sales contract between it and
Asian Enterprises, there is no reason why ECI
should opt to rent a temporary crane for a period
of one year. The appellate court also found that
the damaged crane was subsequently repaired
and reactivated and the cost of repair was
P77,000.00. Therefore, it included the said
amount in the award of of compensatory
damages, but not the value of the new crane. We
do not find anything erroneous in the decision of
the appellate court that the consequential
damages should represent only the service of the
temporary crane for one month. A contrary
ruling would result in the unjust enrichment of
ECI.
The P120,000.00 bonus was also properly
eliminated as the same was granted by the trial
court on the premise that it represented ECI's
lost opportunity "to earn the one month bonus
from NAWASA ... ." As stated earlier, the loss or
damage to ECI's equipment and facilities
occurred long after the stipulated deadline to
finish the construction. No bonus, therefore,
could have been possibly earned by ECI at that
point in time. The supposed liquidated damages
for failure to finish the project within the
stipulated period or the opposite of the claim for
bonus is not clearly presented in the records of
these petitions. It is not shown that NAWASA
imposed them.
As to the question of exemplary damages, we
sustain the appellate court in eliminating the
same since it found that there was no bad faith
on the part of NPC and that neither can the
latter's negligence be considered gross. In Dee
Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corp. v. Reyes,
(145 SCRA 713, 719) we ruled:
Neither may private
respondent recover
exemplary damages since he
is not entitled to moral or
compensatory damages, and
again because the petitioner is
not shown to have acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless
or oppressive manner (Art.
2234, Civil Code; Yutuk v.
Manila Electric Co., 2 SCRA
377; Francisco v. Government
Service Insurance System, 7
SCRA 577; Gutierrez v.
Villegas, 8 SCRA 527; Air
France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA
155; Pan Pacific (Phil.) v. Phil.
Advertising Corp., 23 SCRA
977; Marchan v. Mendoza, 24
SCRA 888).
We also affirm the reduction of attorney's fees
from P50,000.00 to P30,000.00. There are no
compelling reasons why we should set aside the
appellate court's finding that the latter amount
suffices for the services rendered by ECI's
counsel.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 47379 and
G.R. No. 47481 are both DISMISSED for LACK OF
MERIT. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 1719 January 23, 1907
M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC
COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
A. D. Gibbs for appellant.
F. G. Waite, & Thimas Kepner for appellee.
TRACEY, J.:
This is an action for damages. The plaintiff, one
of a gang of eight negro laborers in the
employment of the defendant, was at work
transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor
to the company's yard near the malecon in
Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was
used in this work. The defendant has proved that
there were two immediately following one
another, upon which were piled lengthwise
seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that
the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or
sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces
or guards to prevent them from slipping off.
According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the
men were either in the rear of the car or at its
sides. According to that defendant, some of them
were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain
spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged,
the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the
rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his
leg, which was afterwards amputated at about
the knee.
This first point for the plaintiff to establish was
that the accident happened through the
negligence of the defendant. The detailed
description by the defendant's witnesses of the
construction and quality of the track proves that
if was up to the general stranded of tramways of
that character, the foundation consisting on land
of blocks or crosspieces of wood, by 8 inches
thick and from 8 to 10 feet long laid, on the
surface of the ground, upon which at a right
angle rested stringers of the same thickness, but
from 24 to 30 feet in length. On the across the
stringers the parallel with the blocks were the
ties to which the tracks were fastened. After the
road reached the water's edge, the blocks or
crosspieces were replaced with pilling, capped
by timbers extending from one side to the other.
The tracks were each about 2 feet wide and the
two inside rails of the parallel tracks about 18
inches apart. It was admitted that there were no
side pieces or guards on the car; that where no
ends of the rails of the track met each other and
also where the stringers joined, there were no
fish plates. the defendant has not effectually
overcome the plaintiff's proof that the joints
between the rails were immediately above the
joints between the underlying stringers.
The cause of the sagging of the tracks and the
breaking of the tie, which was the immediate
occasion of the accident, is not clear in the
evidence, but is found by the trial court and is
admitted in the briefs and in the argument to
have been the dislodging of the crosspiece or
piling under the stringer by the water of the bay
raised by a recent typhoon. The superintendent
of the company attributed it to the giving way of
the block laid in the sand. No effort was made to
repair the injury at the time of the occurrence.
According to plaintiffs witnesses, a depression of
the track, varying from one half inch to one inch
and a half, was therafter apparent to the eye, and
a fellow workman of the plaintiff swears that the
day before the accident he called the attention of
McKenna, the foreman, to it and asked by simply
straightening out the crosspiece, resetting the
block under the stringer and renewing the tie,
but otherwise leaving the very same timbers as
before. It has not proven that the company
inspected the track after the typhoon or had any
proper system of inspection.
In order to charge the defendant with negligence,
it was necessary to show a breach of duty on its
part in failing either to properly secure the load
on iron to vehicles transporting it, or to skillfully
build the tramway or to maintain it in proper
condition, or to vigilantly inspect and repair the
roadway as soon as the depression in it became
visible. It is upon the failure of the defendant to
repair the weakened track, after notice of its
condition, that the judge below based his
judgment.
This case presents many important matters for
our decision, and first among them is the
standard of duty which we shall establish in our
jurisprudence on the part of employees toward
employees.
The lack or the harshness of legal rules on this
subject has led many countries to enact designed
to put these relations on a fair basis in the form
of compensation or liability laws or the
institution of insurance. In the absence of special
legislation we find no difficulty in so applying the
general principles of our law as to work out a
just result.
Article 1092 of the Civil Code provides:
Civil obligations, arising from crimes or
misdemeanors, shall be governed by
the provisions of the Penal Code.
And article 568 of the latter code provides:
He who shall execute through reckless
negligence an act that if done with
malice would constitute a grave crime,
shall be punished.
And article 590 provides that the following shall
be punished:
4. Those who by simple imprudence or
negligence, without committing any
infraction of regulations, shall cause an
injury which, had malice intervened,
would have constituted a crime or
misdemeanor.
And finally by articles 19 and 20, the liability of
owners and employers for the faults of their
servants and representatives is declared to be
civil and subsidiary in its character.
It is contented by the defendant, as its first
defense to the action, that the necessary
conclusion from these collated laws is that the
remedy for injuries through negligence lies only
in a criminal action in which the official
criminally responsible must be made primarily
liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to
him. According to this theory the plaintiff should
have procured the arrest of the representative of
the company accountable for not repairing the
tract, and on his prosecution a suitable fine
should have been imposed, payable primarily by
him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the
Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of
the Civil Code makes obligations arising from
faults or negligence not punished by the law,
subject to the provisions of Chapter 11 of Title
XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
A person who by an act or omission
causes damage to another when there
is fault or negligence shall be obliged to
repair the damage so done.
SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by
the preceding article is demandable,
not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of the
persons for whom they should be
responsible.
The father, and on his death or
incapacity, the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who live
with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Owners or directors of an
establishment or enterprise are equally
liable for the damages caused by their
employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter may be
 employed or in the performance of
their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
The liability referred to in this article
shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damages.
As an answer to the argument urged in this
particular action it may be sufficient to point out
that nowhere in our general statutes is the
employer penalized for failure to provide or
maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His
obligation therefore is one "not punished by the
law " and falls under civil rather than criminal
jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader
one. We should be reluctant, under any
conditions, to adopt a forced construction of
these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the
defendant, that would rob some of these articles
of effect, would shut out litigants their will from
the civil courts, would make the assertion of
their rights dependent upon the selection for
prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and
render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict
rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even
if these articles had always stood alone, such a
construction would be unnecessary, but clear
light is thrown upon their meaning by the
provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of
Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which,
though n ever in actual force in these Islands,
was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory
effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes
of action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted
jointly or separately, but while the penal action
was pending the civil was suspended. According
to article 112, the penal action once started, the
civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless
it had been waived by the party injured or been
expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings
for the future. If the civil action alone was
prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be
enforced by only on private complaint, the penal
action thereunder should be extinguished. These
provisions are in harmony with those of articles
23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same
subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried
much further, but the citations of these articles
suffices to show that the civil liability was not
intended to be merged in the criminal nor even
to be suspended thereby, except as expressly
provided by law. Where an individual is civilly
liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not
required that the inured party should seek out a
third person criminally liable whose prosecution
must be a condition precedent to the
enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the
responsibility of an employer may be regarded
as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions
against his employees only while they are
process of prosecution, or in so far as they
determinate the existence of the criminal act
from which liability arises, and his obligation
under the civil law and its enforcement in the
civil courts is not barred thereby unless by
election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no
criminal in question, the provisions of the Penal
Code can not affect this action. This construction
renders it unnecessary to finally determine here
whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal
actions survived the laws that fully regulated it
or has been abrogated by the American civil and
criminal procedure now in force in the
Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the
code above cited in this case appears from the
briefs before us to have arisen from the
interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault
or negligence not punished by law," as applied to
the comprehensive definition of offenses in
articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has
been shown that the liability of an employer
arising out of his relation to his employee who is
the offender is not to be regarded as derived
from negligence punished by the law, within the
meaning of articles 1092 and 1093. More than
this, however, it can not be said to fall within the
class of acts unpunished by the law, the
consequences of which are regulated by articles
1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to
which these articles are applicable are
understood to be those and growing out of
preexisting duties of the parties to one another.
But were relations already formed give rise to
duties, whether springing from contract or quasi
contract, then breaches of those duties are
subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104, of the
same code. A typical application of the
distinction may be found in the consequences of
a railway accident due to defective machinery
supplied by the employer. His liability to his
employee would arise out of the contract of
employment, that to the passengers out of the
contract for passage. while that to that injured
bystander would originate in the negligent act
itself. This distinction is thus clearly set forth by
Manresa in his commentary on article 1093.
We are with reference to such
obligations, that culpa, or negligence,
may be understood in two difference
senses; either as culpa,
substantive and independent, which on
account of its origin arises in an
obligation between two persons not
formerly bound by any other
obligation; or as an incident in the
performance of an obligation; or as
already existed, which can not be
presumed to exist without the other,
and which increases the liability arising
from the already exiting obligation.
Of these two species of culpa the first
one mentioned, existing by itself, may
be also considered as a real source of
an independent obligation, and, as
chapter 2, title 16 of this book of the
code is devoted to it, it is logical to
presume that the reference contained
in article 1093 is limited thereto and
that it does not extend to those
provisions relating to the other species
of culpa (negligence), the nature of
which we will discuss later. (Vol. 8, p.
29.)
And in his commentary on articles 1102 and
1104 he says that these two species of
negligence may be somewhat inexactly described
as contractual and extra-contractual, the letter
being the culpa aquiliana of the Roman law and
not entailing so strict an obligation as the former.
This terminology is unreservedly accepted by
Sanchez-Roman (Derecho Civil, fourth section,
Chapter XI, Article II, No. 12), and the principle
stated is supported be decisions of the supreme
court of Spain, among them those of November
20, 1896 (80 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 151), and
June 27, 1894 (75 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 182).
The contract is one for hire and not one of
mandate. (March 10, 1897, 81 Jurisprudencia
Civil, No. 107.)
Spanish Jurisprudencia prior to the adoption of
the Working Men's Accident Law of January 30,
1900, throws uncertain light on the relation
between master and workman. Moved by the
quick industrial development of their people, the
courts of France early applied to the subject the
principles common to the law of both countries,
which are lucidly discussed by the leading
French commentators.
The original French theory, resting the
responsibility of owners of industrial enterprises
upon articles 1382, 1383, and 1384 of the Code
Napoleon, corresponding in scope to articles
1902 and 1903 of the Spanish Code, soon yielded
to the principle that the true basis is the
contractual obligation of the employer and
employee. (See 18 Dalloz, 196,
Title Travail, 331.)
Later the hardships resulting from special
exemptions inserted in contracts for
employment led to the discovery of a third basis
for liability in an article of he French Code
making the possessor of any object answerable
for damage done by it while in his charge. Our
law having no counterpart of this article,
applicable to every kind of object, we need
consider neither the theory growing out of it nor
that of "professional risk" more recently
imposed by express legislation, but rather
adopting the interpretation of our Civil Code
above given, find a rule for this case in the
contractual obligation. This contractual
obligation, implied from the relation and
perhaps so inherent in its nature to be invariable
by the parties, binds the employer to provide
safe appliances for the use of the employee, thus
closely corresponding to English and American
Law. On these principles it was the duty of the
defendant to build and to maintain its track in
reasonably sound condition, so as to protect its
workingmen from unnecessary danger. It is plain
that in one respect or the other it failed in its
duty, otherwise the accident could not have
occurred; consequently the negligence of the
defendant is established.
Another contention of the defense is that the
injury resulted to the plaintiff as a risk incident
to his employment and, as such, one assumed by
him. It is evident that this can not be the case if
the occurrence was due to the failure to repair
the track or to duly inspect, it for the employee is
not presumed to have stipulated that the
employer might neglect his legal duty. Nor may it
be excused upon the ground that the negligence
leading to the accident was that of a fellow-
servant of the injured man. It is not apparent to
us that the intervention of a third person can
relieve the defendant from the performance of
its duty nor impose upon the plaintiff the
consequences of an act or omission not his
own. Sua cuique culpa nocet. This doctrine,
known as "the fellow-servant, rule," we are not
disposed to introduce into our jurisprudence.
Adopted in England by Lord Abinger in the case
of Prescott vs. Fowler (3 Meeson & Welsby, 1) in
1837, it has since been effectually abrogated by
"the Employers' Liability Acts" and the
"Compensation Law." The American States which
applied it appear to be gradually getting rid of it;
for instance, the New York State legislature of
1906 did away with it in respect to railroad
companies, and had in hand a scheme for its total
abolition. It has never found place in the civil law
of continental Europe. (Dalloz, vol. 39, 1858,
Title Responsibilite, 630, and vol. 15, 1895, same
title, 804. Also more recent instances in Fuzier-
Herman, Title Responsibilite Civile, 710.)
The French Cour de Cassation clearly laid down
the contrary principle in its judgment of June 28,
1841, in the case of Reygasse, and has since
adhered to it.
The most controverted question in the case is
that of the negligence of the plaintiff,
contributing to the accident, to what extent it
existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given
it. In two particulars is he charged with
carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the
track he continued his work; and
Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at
the side of the car instead of along the boards,
either before or behind it.
As to the first point, the depression in the track
night indicate either a serious or a rival difficulty.
There is nothing in the evidence to show that the
plaintiff did or could see the displaced timber
underneath the sleeper. The claim that he must
have done so is a conclusion drawn from what is
assumed to have been a probable condition of
things not before us, rather than a fair inference
from the testimony. While the method of
construction may have been known to the men
who had helped build the road, it was otherwise
with the plaintiff who had worked at this job less
than two days. A man may easily walk along a
railway without perceiving a displacement of the
underlying timbers. The foreman testified that
he knew the state of the track on the day of the
accident and that it was then in good condition,
and one Danridge, a witness for the defendant,
working on the same job, swore that he never
noticed the depression in the track and never
saw any bad place in it. The sagging of the track
this plaintiff did perceive, but that was reported
in his hearing to the foreman who neither
promised nor refused to repair it. His lack of
caution in continuing at his work after noticing
the slight depression of the rail was not of so
gross a nature as to constitute negligence,
barring his recovery under the severe American
rule. On this point we accept the conclusion of
the trial judge who found as facts that "the
plaintiff did not know the cause of the one rail
being lower than then other" and "it does not
appear in this case that the plaintiff knew before
the accident occurred that the stringers and rails
joined in the same place."
Were we not disposed to agree with these
findings they would, nevertheless, be binding
upon us, because not "plainly and manifestly
against the weight of evidence," as those words
of section 497, paragraph 3 of the Code of Civil
Procedure were interpreted by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the De la Rama case
(201 U. S., 303).
In respect of the second charge of negligence
against the plaintiff, the judgment below is not so
specific. While the judge remarks that the
evidence does not justify the finding that the car
was pulled by means of a rope attached to the
front end or to the rails upon it, and further that
the circumstances in evidence make it clear that
the persons necessary to operate the car could
not walk upon the plank between the rails and
that, therefore, it was necessary for the
employees moving it to get hold upon it as best
they could, there is no specific finding upon the
instruction given by the defendant to its
employees to walk only upon the planks, nor
upon the necessity of the plaintiff putting himself
upon the ties at the side in order to get hold
upon the car. Therefore the findings of the judge
below leave the conduct of the plaintiff in
walking along the side of the loaded car, upon
the open ties, over the depressed track, free to
our inquiry.
While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that
not only were they not forbidden to proceed in
this way, but were expressly directed by the
foreman to do so, both the officers of the
company and three of the workmen testify that
there was a general prohibition frequently made
known to all the gang against walking by the side
of the car, and the foreman swears that he
repeated the prohibition before the starting of
this particular load. On this contradiction of
proof we think that the preponderance is in
favor of the defendant's contention to the extent
of the general order being made known to the
workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff
in placing himself in danger contributed in some
degree to the injury as a proximate, although not
as its primary cause. This conclusion presents
sharply the question, What effect is to be given
such an act of contributory negligence? Does it
defeat a recovery, according to the American
rule, or is it to be taken only in reduction of
damages?
While a few of the American States have adopted
to a greater or less extent the doctrine of
comparative negligence, allowing a recovery by a
plaintiff whose own act contributed to his injury,
provided his negligence was slight as compared
with that of the defendant, and some others have
accepted the theory of proportional damages,
reducing the award to a plaintiff in proportion to
his responsibility for the accident, yet the
overwhelming weight of adjudication establishes
the principle in American jurisprudence that any
negligence, however slight, on the part of the
person injured which is one of the causes
proximately contributing to his injury, bars his
recovery. (English and American Encyclopedia of
law, Titles "Comparative Negligence" and
Contributory Negligence.")
In Grant Trunk Railway Company vs. Ives (144 U.
S., 408, at page 429) the Supreme Court of the
United States thus authoritatively states the
present rule of law:
Although the defendant's' negligence
may have been the primary cause of the
injury complained of, yet an action for
such injury can not be maintained if the
proximate and immediate cause of the
injury can be traced to the want of
ordinary care and caution in the person
injured; subject to this qualification,
which has grown up in recent years
(having been first enunciated in
Davies vs. Mann, 10 M. & W., 546) that
the contributory negligence of the party
injured will not defeat the action if it be
shown that the defendant might, by the
exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the injured party's
negligence.
There are may cases in the supreme court of
Spain in which the defendant was exonerated,
but when analyzed they prove to have been
decided either upon the point that he was not
negligent or that the negligence of the plaintiff
was the immediate cause of the casualty or that
the accident was due to casus fortuitus. Of the
first class in the decision of January 26, 1887
(38 Jurisprudencia Criminal, No. 70), in which a
railway employee, standing on a car, was thrown
therefrom and killed by the shock following the
backing up of the engine. It was held that the
management of the train and engine being in
conformity with proper rules of the company,
showed no fault on its part.
Of the second class are the decision of the 15th of
January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of
March, 1902, stated in Alcubilla's Index of that
year; and of the third class the decision of the 4th
of June, 1888 (64Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 1), in
which the breaking down of plaintiff's dam by
the logs of the defendant impelled against it by
the Tajo River, was held due to a freshet as a
fortuitous cause.
The decision of the 7th of March, 1902, on which
stress has been laid, rested on two bases, one,
that the defendant was not negligent, because
expressly relieved by royal order from the
common obligation imposed by the police law of
maintaining a guard at the road crossing; the
other, because the act of the deceased in driving
over level ground with unobstructed view in
front of a train running at speed, with the engine
whistle blowing was the determining cause of
the accident. It is plain that the train was doing
nothing but what it had a right to do and that the
only fault lay with the injured man. His
negligence was not contributory, it was sole, and
was of such an efficient nature that without it no
catastrophe could have happened.
On the other hand, there are many cases
reported in which it seems plain that the plaintiff
sustaining damages was not free from
contributory negligence; for instance, the
decision of the 14th of December, 1894
(76Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 134), in which the
owner of a building was held liable for not
furnishing protection to workmen engaged in
hanging out flags, when the latter must have
perceived beforehand the danger attending the
work.
None of those cases define the effect to be given
the negligence of a plaintiff which contributed to
his injury as one of its causes, though not the
principal one, and we are left to seek the theory
of the civil law in the practice of other countries.
In France in the case of Marquant, August 20,
1879, the cour de cassation held that the
carelessness of the victim did not civilly relieve
the person without whose fault the accident
could not have happened, but that the
contributory negligence of the injured man had
the effect only of reducing the damages. The
same principle was applied in the case of
Recullet, November 10, 1888. and that of Laugier
of the 11th of November, 1896. (Fuzier-Herman,
Title Responsibilite Cirile, 411, 412.) Of like tenor
are citations in Dalloz (vol. 18, 1806, Title Trail,
363, 364, and vol. 15, 1895, Title Responsibilite,
193, 198).
In the Canadian Province of Quebee, which has
retained for the most part the French Civil Law,
now embodied in a code following the Code
Napoleon, a practice in accord with that of
France is laid down in many cases collected in
the annotations to article 1053 of the code edited
by Beauchamps, 1904. One of these is
Luttrell vs.Trottier, reported in La Revue de
Jurisprudence, volume 6, page 90, in which the
court of Kings bench, otherwise known as the
court of appeals, the highest authority in the
Dominion of Canada on points of French law,
held that contributory negligence did not
exonerate the defendants whose fault had been
the immediate cause of the accident, but entitled
him to a reduction of damages. Other similar
cases in the provincial courts have been
overruled by appellate tribunals made up of
common law judges drawn from other provinces,
who have preferred to impose uniformally
throughout the Dominion the English theory of
contributory negligence. Such decisions throw
no light upon the doctrines of the civil law.
Elsewhere we find this practice embodied in
legislation; for instance, section 2 of article 2398
of the Code of Portugal reads as follows:
If in the case of damage there was fault
or negligence on the part of the person
injured or in the part of some one else,
the indemnification shall be reduced in
the first case, and in the second case it
shall be appropriated in proportion to
such fault or negligence as provided in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of section 2372.
And in article 1304 of the Austrian Code
provides that the victim who is partly
changeable with the accident shall stand his
damages in proportion to his fault, but when that
proportion is incapable of ascertainment, he
shall share the liability equally with the person
principally responsible. The principle of
proportional damages appears to be also
adopted in article 51 of the Swiss Code. Even in
the United States in admirality jurisdictions,
whose principles are derived from the civil law,
common fault in cases of collision have been
disposed of not on the ground of contradictor
negligence, but on that of equal loss, the fault of
the one part being offset against that of the
other. (Ralli vs. Troop, 157 U. S. 386; 97.)
The damage of both being added together and
the sum equally divided, a decree is entered in
favor of the vessel sustaining the greater loss
against the other for the excess of her damages
over one-half of the aggregate sum. (The
Manitoba, 122 U. S., 97)
Exceptional practice appears to prevail in
maritime law in other jurisdictions. The Spanish
Code of Commerce, article 827, makes each
vessel for its own damage when both are the
fault; this provision restricted to a single class of
the maritime accidents, falls for short of a
recognition of the principle of contributory
negligence as understood in American Law, with
which, indeed, it has little in common. This is a
plain from other articles of the same code; for
instance, article 829, referring to articles 826,
827, and 828, which provides: "In the cases
above mentioned the civil action of the owner
against the person liable for the damage is
reserved, as well as the criminal liability which
may appear."
The rule of the common law, a hard and fast one,
not adjustable with respects of the faults of the
parties, appears to have grown out the original
method of trial by jury, which rendered difficult
a nice balancing of responsibilities and which
demanded an inflexible standard as a safeguard
against too ready symphaty for the injured. It
was assumed that an exact measure of several
concurring faults was unattainable.
The reason why, in cases of mutual
concurring negligence, neither party
can maintain an action against the
other, is, not the wrong of the one is set
off against the wrong of the other; it
that the law can not measure how
much of the damage suffered is
attributable to the plaintiff's own fault.
If he were allowed to recover, it might
be that he would obtain from the other
party compensation for hiss own
misconduct. (Heilvs. Glanding, 42 Penn.
St. Rep., 493, 499.)
The parties being mutually in fault,
there can be no appointment of
damages. The law has no scales to
determine in such cases whose
wrongdoing weighed most in the
compound that occasioned the
mischief. (Railroad vs. Norton, 24 Penn.
St. 565, 469.)
Experience with jury trials in negligence cases
has brought American courts to review to relax
the vigor of the rule by freely exercising the
power of setting aside verdicts deemed
excessive, through the device of granting new
trials, unless reduced damages are stipulated for,
amounting to a partial revision of damages by
the courts. It appears to us that the control by
the court of the subject matter may be secured
on a moral logical basis and its judgment
adjusted with greater nicety to the merits of the
litigants through the practice of offsetting their
respective responsibilities. In the civil law
system the desirable end is not deemed beyond
the capacity of its tribunals.
Whatever may prove to be the doctrine finally
adopted in Spain or in other countries under the
stress and counter stress of novel schemers of
legislation, we find the theory of damages laid
down in the judgment the most consistent with
the history and the principals of our law in these
Islands and with its logical development.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding
which acts of the injured party shall be
considered immediate causes of the accident.
The test is simple. Distinction must be between
the accident and the injury, between the event
itself, without which there could have been no
accident, and those acts of the victim not
entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing under review was the displacement
of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this
produced the event giving occasion for damages
— that is, the shinking of the track and the
sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of
the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did
not contribute, although it was an element of the
damage which came to himself. Had the
crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly
thorough his act of omission of duty, the last
would have been one of the determining causes
of the event or accident, for which he would have
been responsible. Where he contributes to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining
factors, he can not recover. Where, in
conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes
only to his own injury, he may recover the
amount that the defendant responsible for the
event should pay for such injury, less a sum
deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence.
Accepting, though with some hesitation, the
judgment of the trial court, fixing the damage
incurred by the plaintiff at 5,000 pesos, the
equivalent of 2,500 dollars, United States money,
we deduct therefrom 2,500 pesos, the amount
fairly attributable to his negligence, and direct
judgment to be entered in favor of the plaintiff
for the resulting sum of 2,500 pesos, with cost of
both instances, and ten days hereafter let the
case be remanded to the court below for proper
action. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J. Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur. from board to board on the cross-ties track, found that he was not informed of the
which extended out over the stringers? exact cause of the accident, namely, the washing
away of the large crosspiece laid upon the
A. Yes, sir. ground or placed upon the posts as the
foundation upon which the stripers rested. This
finding of fact to my mind is plainly and
Separate Opinions Q. And these were very of irregular manifestly against the weight of the evidence.
shape, were they not? Ellis, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that on
WILLARD, J., dissenting: the morning of the accident he called the
A. They were in pretty bad attention of McKenna, the foreman, to the
The knowledge which the plaintiff had in regard condition. defective condition of the track at his precise
to the condition of the track is indicated by his point where the accident happened. His
own evidence. He testified, among other things, xxx xxx xxx testimony in part is as follows:
as follows:
Q. And it was not safe to walk along A. I called Mr. McKenna. I showed
Q. Now, describe the best you can on the outside of these crosspieces? him the track and told him I didn't
the character of the track that ran from think it was safe working, and that if he
the place where you loaded the irons didn't fix it he was liable to have an
A. It was safe if the car stayed on the accident; I told him I thought if he put
from the barge up to the point where track. We didn't try to hold the load on.
you unloaded them on the ground. fish plates on it would it. He said, you
We tried to hold the car back, keep it keep on fishing around here for fish
from going too fast, because we knew plates and you will be fishing for
A. — Well, it was pretty bad the track was in bad condition just another job the first thing you know."
character. here, and going down too fast we could He says, "You see to much."
be liable to run off most any time.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
Q. You knew the track was in bad
Q. And you were familiar with the condition when you got hold?
Q. Who else was present at the time
track before that its construction? you had this conversation with Mr.
A. Sure, it was in bad condition.
McKenna?
A. Familiar with what?
xxx xxx xxx A. Well, at that conversation as far as
Q. Well, you have described it here I can remember, we were all walking
to the court. Q. And the accident took place at down the track and I know that McCoy
that point where you believed it to be and Mr. Blakes was along at the time. I
A. Oh, yes; I knew the condition of so dangerous? remember them two, but we were all
the track. walking down the track in a bunch, but
A. Yes, sir. I disremember them.
Q. You knew its conditions as you
have described it here at the time you Q. But you knew it was dangerous? xxx xxx xxx
were working around there?
Q. Was that the exact language that
A. Why certainly, anybody could see
A. Yes, sir. it; but a workingman had to work in you used, that you wanted some fish
plates put on?
those days or get arrested for a vag
xxx xxx xxx here in Manila.
A. No, sir: I told him to look at that
The court below, while it found that the plaintiff track. I says get some fish plates. I says
Q. And while operating it from the
side it was necessary for you to step knew in a general way of the bad condition of the
 if there was any fish plates we would
fix that.
Q. What did the fish plates have to
do with that?
A. It would have strengthened that
joint.
Q. Why didn't you put the 8 by 8
which was washed crossways in place?
A. That would have been taken the
raising of the track and digging out
along this upright piece and then
putting it up again.
The plaintiff himself testified that he was present
with Ellis at the time this conversation was had
with McKenna. It thus appears that on the
morning in question the plaintiff and McKenna
were standing directly over the place where the
accident happened later in the day. The accident
was caused, as the court below found, by the
washing away or displacement of the large 8 by
8 piece of timber. This track was constructed as
all other tracks are, all of it open work, with no
floor over the ties, and of course see the ground
and the entire construction of the road, including
these large 8 by 8 pieces, the long stringers
placed thereon, the ties placed on these
stringers, and the rails placed on the ties. The
plaintiff himself must have seen that the 8 by 8
piece of timber was out of place.
If the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses is to
be believed, the displacement was more
markedly apparent even than it would appear
from the testimony of the defendant's witnesses.
According to the plaintiff's witnesses, the water
at high tide reached the place in question and
these 8 by 8 pieces were therefore not laid upon
the ground but were placed upon posts driven
into the ground, the height of the posts at this
particular place being, according to the
testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, from a foot
to two feet and a half. As has been said, Ellis
testified that the reason why they did not put the
8 by 8 back in its place was because that would
have required the raising up of the track and
digging out along this upright piece and then
putting it up again.
It conclusively appears from the evidence that
the plaintiff, before the accident happened, knew
the exact condition of the track and was
informed and knew of the defect which caused
the accident. There was no promise on the part
of McKenna to repair the track.
Under the circumstances the plaintiff was
negligent in placing himself on the side of the car
where he knew that he would be injured by the
falling of the rails from the car when they
reached this point in the track where the two
stringers were without any support of their ends.
He either should have refused to work at all or
he should have placed himself behind the car, on
the other side of it, or in front of it, drawing it
with a rope. He was guilty of contributory
negligence and is not entitled to recover.
It is, said however, that contributory negligence
on the part of the plaintiff in a case like this is no
defense under the law in force in these Islands.
To this proposition I can not agree. The liability
of the defendant is based in the majority opinion
upon articles 1101 and 1103 of the Civil Code.
In order to impose such liability upon the
defendant, it must appear that its negligence
caused the accident. The reason why
contradictory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff is a defense in this class of cases is that
the negligence of the defendant did not alone
cause the accident. If nothing but that negligence
had existed, the accident would not have
happened and, as I understand it, in every case in
which contradictory negligence is a defense it is
made so because the negligence of the plaintiff is
the cause of the accident, to this extent, that if
the plaintiff had not been negligent the accident
would not have happened, although the
defendant was also negligent. In other words, the
negligence of the defendant is not alone
sufficient to cause the accident. It requires also
the negligence of the plaintiff.
There is, so far as I know, nothing in the Civil
Code relating to contributory negligence. The
rule of the Roman law was: "Quod quis ex culap
sua damnum sentit, no intelligitur damnum
sentire." (Digest, book, 50, tit. 17, rule 203.)
The partidas contain the following provisions:
The just thing is that a man should
suffer the damage which comes to him
through his own fault, and that he can
not demand reparation therefor from
another. (Law 25, tit. 5, partida 3.)
And they even said that when a man
received an injury through his own
acts, the grievance should be against
himself and not against another. (Law
2, tit. 7, partida 2.)
In several cases in the supreme court of Spain
the fact has been negligence that the plaintiff was
himself guilty of negligence, as in the civil
judgments of the 4th of June, 1888, and of the
20th of February, 1887, and in the criminal
judgments of the 20th of February 1888, the
90th of March, 1876, and the 6th of October,
1882. These cases do not throw much light upon
the subject. The judgment of the 7th of March,
1902 (93 Jurisprudencia Civil, 391), is, however,
directly in point. In that case the supreme court
of Spain said:
According to the doctrine expressed in
article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or
negligence is a source of obligation
when between such negligence and the
injury thereby caused there exists the
relation of cause and effect; but in the
injury caused should not be the result
of acts or omissions of a third party, the
latter has no obligation to repair the
same, even though such acts or
omissions were imprudent or unlawful,
and much less when it is shown that the
immediate cause of the injury was the
negligence of the injured person party
himself.
Found the reasons above stated, and
the court below having found that the
death of the deceased was due to his
own imprudence, and not therefore due
to the absence of a guard at the grade
crossing where the accident occurred,
it seems clear that court in acquitting
the railroad company of the complaint
filed by the widow did not violate the
provisions of the aforesaid article of the
Civil Code.
For the same reason, although the
authority granted to the railroad
company to open the grade crossing
without a special guard was nullified by
the subsequent promulgation of the
railroad police law and the regulations
for the execution of the same, the result
would be identical, leaving one of the
grounds upon which the judgment of
acquittal is based, to wit, that the
accident was caused by the imprudence
of the injured party himself, unaffected.
It appears that the accident in this case took
place at a grade crossing where, according to the
claim of the plaintiff, it was the duty of the
railroad company to maintain husband was
injured by a train at this crossing, his negligence
contributing to the injury according to the ruling
of the court below. This judgment, then, amounts
to a holding that a contributory negligence is a
defense according to the law of Spain. (See also
judgment of the 21st of October, 1903, vol. 96 p.
400, Jurisprudencia Civil.)
Although in the Civil Code there is no express
provision upon the subject, in the Code of
Commerce there is found a distinct declaration
upon it in reference to damages caused by
collission at sea. Article 827 of the Code of
Commerce is as follows:
If both vessels may be blamed for the
collission, each one shall for liable for
his own damages, and both shall jointly
responsible for the loss and damages
suffered to their cargoes.
That article is an express recognition of the fact
that in collision cases contributory negligence is
a defense,

I do not think that this court is justified in view

of the Roman law, of the provisions of
the Partidas, of the judgment of March 7, 1902, of
article 827 of the Code of Commerce, and in the
absence of any declaration upon the subject in
the Civil Code, in saying that it was the intention
rule announced in the majority opinion, a rule
dimetrically opposed to that put in force by the
Code of Commerce.

The chief, is not the only, reason stated in the

opinion for adopting the rule that contradictory
negligence is not a defense seems to be that such
is the holding of the later French decisions.

As to whether, if any liability existed in this case,

it would be necessary in accordance with the
provisions of the Penal Code, or primary, in
accordance with the provision of the Civil Code, I
express no opinion.

The judgment should, I think, be reversed and

the defendant acquitted of the complaint.

Carson, J., concurs.

Republic of the Philippines driven by Aser Lagunda and
SUPREME COURT owned by Prospero Sabido,
Manila going in opposite directions
met each other in a road
EN BANC curve. Agripino Custodia a
passenger of LTB bus, who
was hanging on the left side as
G.R. No. L-21512 August 31, 1966 truck was full of passengers
was sideswiped by the track
PROSPERO SABIDO and ASER driven by Aser Lagunda. As a
LAGUNDA, petitioners, result, Agripino Custodio was
vs. injured and died (Exhibit A).
CARLOS CUSTODIO, BELEN MAKABUHAY
CUSTODIO and THE HONORABLE COURT OF "It appears clear from the
APPEALS,respondents. evidence that Agripino
Custodio was hanging on the
Sabido, Sabido and Associates for petitioners. left side of the LTB bus.
Ernesto S. Tengco for respondents. Otherwise, were he sitting
inside the truck, he could not
have been struck by the six by
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
six truck driven by Aser
Lagunda. This fact alone, of
Prospero Sabido and Aser Lagunda seek the allowing Agripino Custodio to
review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of
hang on the side of the truck,
Appeals, affirming that of the Court of First makes the defendant Laguna
Instance of Laguna, sentencing the Laguna-
Tayabas Bus Company liable
Tayabas Bus Co., Nicasio Mudales, and herein for damages. For certainly its
petitioners. Prospero Sabido and Aser Lagunda, employees, who are the driver
to jointly and severally indemnify Belen and conductor were negligent.
Makabuhay Custodio and her son, Agripino They should not have allowed
Custodio Jr., in the sum of P6,000 and to pay the Agripino Custodio to ride
costs of the suit. their truck in that manner.
The facts are set forth in the decision of the Court
"To avoid any liability, Aser
of Appeals from which we quote: Lagunda and Prospero Sabido
throw all the blame on Nicasio
Upon a careful study and judicious Mudales. From the testimony,
examining of the evidence on record, however, of Belen
we are inclined to concur in the Makabuhay, Agripino
findings made by the trial court. Here is Custodio's widow, we can
how the Court a quo analyzed the facts deduce that Aser Lagunda was
of this case: equally negligent as Nicasio
Mudales. Belen testified that
"In Barrio Halang, the 6 x 6 truck was running
fast when it met the LTB Bus.
Municipality of Lumban,
Province of Laguna, two And Aser Lagunda had time
and opportunity to avoid the
trucks, one driven by Nicasio
Mudales and belonging to mishap if he had been
sufficiently careful and
Laguna-Tayabas Bus
Company, and the other cautious because the two
trucks never collided with
each other. By simply
swerving to the right side of
the road, the 6 x 6 truck could
have avoided hitting Agripino
Custodio. It is incredible that
the LTB was running on the
middle of the road when
passing a curve. He knows it is
dangerous to do so. We are
rather of the belief that both
trucks did not keep close to
the right side of the road so
they sideswiped each other
and thus Agripino Custodio
was injured and died. In other
words, both drivers must
have drive in their trucks not
in the proper lane and are,
therefore, both reckless and
negligent.
"We might state by way of additional
observations that the sideswiping of
the deceased and his two fellow
passengers took place on broad
daylight at about 9:30 in the morning of
June 9, 1955 when the LTB bus with
full load to passengers was negotiating
a sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding
downward a slope, whereas the six by
six truck was climbing up with no
cargoes or passengers on board but for
three helpers, owner Sabido and driver
Lagunda (tsn. 308-309, Mendoza).
Under the above-stated condition, there
exists strong persuasion to accept what
Belen Makabuhay and Sofia Mesina,
LTB passengers, had testified to the
effect that the 6 x 6 cargo truck was
running at a fast rate of speed (tsn. 15,
74, 175 Mendoza). From the lips of no
less than driver Lagunda himself come
the testimonial admission that the
presence of three hanging passengers
located at the left side of the bus was
noted when his vehicle was still at a
distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus,
and yet despite the existence of a
shallow canal on the right side of the
road which he could pass over with
ease, Lagunda did not care to exercise
prudence to avert the accident simply
because to use his own language the
canal "is not a passage of trucks."
Based upon these facts, the Court of First
Instance of Laguna and the Court of Appeals
concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. —
hereinafter referred to as the carrier — and its
driver Nicasio Mudales (none of whom has
appealed), had violated the contract of carriage
with Agripino Custodio, whereas petitioners
Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict,
by reason of which all of them were held
solidarity liable in the manner above indicated.
Petitioners now maintain: (1) that the death of
Agripino Custodio was due exclusively to the
negligence of the carrier and its driver; (2) that
petitioners were not guilty of negligence in
connection with the matter under consideration;
(3) that petitioners cannot be held solidarily
liable with the carrier and its driver; and (4) that
the complaint against petitioners herein should
be dismissed.
With respect to the first two (2) points, which
are interrelated, it is urged that the carrier and
its driver were clearly guilty of negligence for
having allowed Agripino Custodio to ride on the
running board of the bus, in violation of Section
42 of Act No. 3992, and that this negligence was
the proximate cause of Agripino's death. It
should be noted, however, that the lower court
had, likewise, found the petitioners guilty of
contributory negligence, which was as much a
proximate cause of the accident as the carrier's
negligence, for petitioners' truck was running at
a considerable speed, despite the fact that it was
negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being
close to its right side of the road, said truck was
driven on its middle portion and so near the
passenger bus coming from the opposite
direction as to sideswipe a passenger riding on
its running board.1äwphï1.ñët
The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed of
the truck and its location at the time of the
accident are in the nature of findings of fact, Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby
which we cannot disturb in a petition for review affirmed, with costs against the petitioners
by certiorari, such as the one at bar. At any rate, herein. It is so ordered.
the correctness of said findings is borne out by
the very testimony of petitioner Lagunda to the Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon,
effect that he saw the passengers riding on the J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
running board of the bus while the same was still Regala, J., is on leave.
five (5) or seven (7) meters away from the truck
driven by him. Indeed, the distance between the
two (2) vehicles was such that he could have
avoided sideswiping said passengers if his truck
were not running at a great speed.

Although the negligence of the carrier and its

driver is independent, in its execution, of the
negligence of the truck driver and its owner,
both acts of negligence are the proximate cause
of the death of Agripino Custodio. In fact, the
negligence of the first two (2) would not have
produced this result without the negligence of
petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners'
negligence was the last, in point of time, for
Custodio was on the running board of the
carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck
came from the opposite direction, so that, in this
sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear
chance.

Petitioners contend that they should not be held

solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver,
because the latter's liability arises from a breach
of contract, whereas that of the former springs
from a quasi delict. The rule is, however, that

According to the great weight of

authority, where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omission of
two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in
combination, the direct and proximate
cause of a single injury to a third
person, and it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury, either is
responsible for the whole injury, even
though his act alone might not have
caused the entire injury, or the same
damage might have resulted from the
acts of the other tort-feasor ... . (38 Am.
Jur. 946, 947.)
Republic of the Philippines PhP 1,152,597.35 for a term of 31 days to mature
SUPREME COURT on December 15, 1983,[3] as evidenced by
Manila Provisional Receipt No. 1356 dated November
14, 1983.[4]
SECOND DIVISION On December 5, 1983, a person claiming to be
Lim Sio Wan called up Cristina So, an officer of
Allied, and instructed the latter to pre-terminate
ALLIED BANKING G.R. No. 133179 Lim Sio Wans money market placement, to issue
CORPORATION, a managers check representing the proceeds of
Petitioner, Present: the placement, and to give the check to one
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, Deborah Dee Santos who would pick up the
- versus - CARPIO MORALES, check.[5] Lim Sio Wan described the appearance
TINGA, of Santos so that So could easily identify her.[6]
VELASCO, JR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ. Later, Santos arrived at the bank and signed the
LIM SIO WAN, METROPOLITAN application form for a managers check to be
BANK AND TRUST CO., and Promulgated: issued.[7] The bank issued Managers Check No.
PRODUCERS BANK, 035669 for PhP 1,158,648.49, representing the
Respondents. March 27, 2008 proceeds of Lim Sio Wans money market
x------------------------------------------------------------- placement in the name of Lim Sio Wan, as
----------------------------x payee.[8] The check was cross-checked For
Payees Account Only and given to Santos.[9]
DECISION
Thereafter, the managers check was deposited in
VELASCO, JR., J.: the account of Filipinas Cement Corporation
(FCC) at respondent Metropolitan Bank and
To ingratiate themselves to their Trust Co. (Metrobank),[10]with the forged
valued depositors, some banks at times bend signature of Lim Sio Wan as indorser.[11]
over backwards that they unwittingly expose
themselves to great risks. Earlier, on September 21, 1983, FCC had
The Case deposited a money market placement for PhP 2
million with respondent Producers
This Petition for Review on Certiorari Bank. Santos was the money market trader
under Rule 45 seeks to reverse the Court of assigned to handle FCCs account.[12] Such deposit
Appeals (CAs) Decision promulgated on March is evidenced by Official Receipt No.
18, 1998[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 46290 entitled Lim 317568[13] and a Letter dated September 21,
Sio Wan v. Allied Banking Corporation, et al. The 1983 of Santosaddressed to Angie Lazo of FCC,
CA Decision modified the Decision acknowledging receipt of the placement.[14] The
dated November 15, 1993[2] of the Regional Trial placement matured on October 25, 1983 and was
Court (RTC), Branch 63 in Makati City rendered rolled-over until December 5, 1983 as evidenced
in Civil Case No. 6757. by a Letter dated October 25, 1983.[15] When the
The Facts placement matured, FCC demanded the payment
of the proceeds of the
The facts as found by the RTC and affirmed by placement.[16] OnDecember 5, 1983, the same
the CA are as follows: date that So received the phone call instructing
her to pre-terminate Lim Sio Wans placement,
On November 14, 1983, respondent Lim Sio Wan the managers check in the name of Lim Sio Wan
deposited with petitioner Allied Banking was deposited in the account of FCC, purportedly
Corporation (Allied) at its Quintin Paredes representing the proceeds of FCCs money
Branch in Manila a money market placement of market placement with Producers Bank.[17] In
other words, the Allied check was deposited with
Metrobank in the account of FCC as Producers
Banks payment of its obligation to FCC.
To clear the check and in compliance with the
requirements of the Philippine Clearing House
Corporation (PCHC) Rules and Regulations,
Metrobank stamped a guaranty on the check,
which reads: All prior endorsements and/or lack
of endorsement guaranteed.[18]
The check was sent to Allied through the PCHC.
Upon the presentment of the check, Allied
funded the check even without checking the
authenticity of Lim Sio Wans purported
indorsement. Thus, the amount on the face of the
check was credited to the account of FCC.[19]
On December 9, 1983, Lim Sio Wan deposited
with Allied a second money market placement to
mature on January 9, 1984.[20]
On December 14, 1983, upon the maturity date
of the first money market placement, Lim Sio
Wan went to Allied to withdraw it.[21] She was
then informed that the placement had been pre-
terminated upon her instructions. She denied
giving any instructions and receiving the
proceeds thereof. She desisted from further
complaints when she was assured by the banks
manager that her money would be recovered.[22]
When Lim Sio Wans second placement matured
on January 9, 1984, So called Lim Sio Wan to ask
for the latters instructions on the second
placement. Lim Sio Wan instructed So to roll-
over the placement for another 30
days.[23] On January 24, 1984, Lim Sio Wan,
realizing that the promise that her money would
be recovered would not materialize, sent a
demand letter to Allied asking for the payment of
the first placement.[24] Allied refused to pay Lim
Sio Wan, claiming that the latter had authorized
the pre-termination of the placement and its
subsequent release to Santos.[25]
Consequently, Lim Sio Wan filed with the RTC a
Complaint dated February 13, 1984[26] docketed
as Civil Case No. 6757 against Allied to recover
the proceeds of her first money market
placement. Sometime in February 1984, she
withdrew her second placement from Allied.
Allied filed a third party complaint[27] against
Metrobank and Santos. In turn, Metrobank filed a
fourth party complaint[28] against FCC. FCC for its
part filed a fifth party complaint[29] against
Producers Bank. Summonses were duly served
upon all the parties except for Santos, who was
no longer connected with Producers Bank.[30]
On May 15, 1984, or more than six (6) months
after funding the check, Allied informed
Metrobank that the signature on the check was
forged.[31] Thus, Metrobank withheld the amount
represented by the check from FCC. Later on,
Metrobank agreed to release the amount to FCC
after the latter executed an Undertaking,
promising to indemnify Metrobank in case it was
made to reimburse the amount.[32]
Lim Sio Wan thereafter filed an
amended complaint to include Metrobank as a
party-defendant, along with Allied.[33] The RTC
admitted the amended complaint despite the
opposition of Metrobank.[34] Consequently,
Allieds third party complaint against Metrobank
was converted into a cross-claim and the latters
fourth party complaint against FCC was
converted into a third party complaint.[35]
After trial, the RTC issued its Decision, holding as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering defendant Allied
Banking Corporation to pay
plaintiff the amount of
P1,158,648.49 plus 12%
interest per annum
from March 16, 1984 until
fully paid;
2. Ordering defendant Allied
Bank to pay plaintiff the
amount of P100,000.00 by
way of moral damages;
3. Ordering defendant Allied
Bank to pay plaintiff the
 amount of P173,792.20 by and Trust Company in the a question of fact. When the CA affirms the N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) v.
way of attorneys fees; and, same proportion of 60-40. findings of fact of the RTC, the factual findings of Sabeniano, this Court ruled that a money market
4. Ordering defendant Allied Except as thus modified, the both courts are binding on this Court.[39] placement is a simple loan or
Bank to pay the costs of suit. decision appealed from is mutuum.[43] Further, we defined a money market
AFFIRMED. We also agree with the CA when it said that it in Cebu International Finance Corporation v.
Defendant Allied Banks cross- could not disturb the trial courts findings on the Court of Appeals, as follows:
claim against defendant SO ORDERED.[37] credibility of witness So inasmuch as it was the
Metrobank is DISMISSED. trial court that heard the witness and had the [A] money market is a market
opportunity to observe closely her deportment dealing in standardized short-
Likewise defendant Hence, Allied filed the instant petition. and manner of testifying. Unless the trial court term credit instruments
Metrobanks third-party had plainly overlooked facts of substance or (involving large amounts)
complaint as against Filipinas The Issues value, which, if considered, might affect the where lenders and borrowers
Cement Corporation is result of the case,[40] we find it best to defer to do not deal directly with each
DISMISSED. Allied raises the following issues for our the trial court on matters pertaining to other but through a middle
consideration: credibility of witnesses. man or dealer in open market.
Filipinas Cement Additionally, this Court has held that the matter In a money market
Corporations fourth-party of negligence is also a factual question.[41] Thus, transaction, the investor is a
complaint against Producers The Honorable Court the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the CA, that lender who loans his money
Bank is also DISMISSED. of Appeals erred in holding the respective parties were negligent in the to a borrower through a
that Lim Sio Wan did not exercise of their obligations is also conclusive middleman or dealer.
SO ORDERED.[36] authorize [Allied] to pre- upon this Court.
terminate the initial In the case at bar,
placement and to deliver the The Liability of the Parties the money market transaction
check to Deborah Santos. between the petitioner and
The Decision of the Court of Appeals As to the liability of the parties, we find that the private respondent is in
The Honorable Court Allied is liable to Lim Sio Wan. Fundamental and the nature of a loan.[44]
Allied appealed to the CA, which in turn issued of Appeals erred in absolving familiar is the doctrine that the relationship
the assailed Decision on March 18, 1998, Producers Bank of any between a bank and a client is one of debtor-
modifying the RTC Decision, as follows: liability for the creditor. Lim Sio Wan, as creditor of the bank for
reimbursement of amount her money market placement, is entitled to
WHEREFORE, premises adjudged demandable. Articles 1953 and 1980 of the Civil Code provide: payment upon her request, or upon maturity of
considered, the decision the placement, or until the bank is released from
appealed from is MODIFIED. The Honorable Court Art. 1953. A person who its obligation as debtor. Until any such event, the
Judgment is rendered of Appeals erred in holding receives a loan of money or obligation of Allied to Lim Sio Wan remains
ordering and sentencing [Allied] liable to the extent of any other fungible thing unextinguished.
defendant-appellant Allied 60% of amount adjudged acquires the ownership
Banking Corporation to pay demandable in clear disregard thereof, and is bound to pay to Art. 1231 of the Civil Code enumerates
sixty (60%) percent and to the ultimate liability of the creditor an equal amount the instances when obligations are considered
defendant-appellee Metrobank as guarantor of all of the same kind and quality. extinguished, thus:
Metropolitan Bank and Trust endorsement on the check, it
Company forty (40%) of the being the collecting bank.[38] Art. 1980. Fixed, savings, and
amount of P1,158,648.49 plus current deposits of money in Art. 1231. Obligations are
12% interest per annum from banks and similar institutions extinguished:
March 16, 1984 until fully The petition is partly meritorious. shall be governed by the
paid. The moral damages, provisions concerning simple (1) By
attorneys fees and costs of A Question of Fact loan. payment or performance;
suit adjudged shall likewise (2) By the
be paid by defendant- Allied questions the finding of both the trial and loss of the thing due;
appellant Allied Banking appellate courts that Allied was not authorized Thus, we have ruled in a line of cases (3) By the
Corporation and defendant- to release the proceeds of Lim Sio Wans money that a bank deposit is in the nature of a simple condonation or remission of
appellee Metropolitan Bank market placement toSantos. Allied clearly raises loan or mutuum.[42] More succinctly, in Citibank, the debt;
 (4) By the not suspended by or to any subsequent indorser
confusion or merger of the it.[45](Emphasis supplied.) who may be compelled to pay
rights of creditor and debtor; In the instant case, Allied avers that even if it had it.
(5) By Since there was no effective payment of Lim Sio not issued the check payment, the money
compensation; Wans money market placement, the bank still represented by the check would still be lost Section 65. Warranty
(6) By has an obligation to pay her at six percent (6%) because of Metrobanks negligence in indorsing where negotiation by delivery,
novation. interest from March 16, 1984 until the payment the check without verifying the genuineness of so forth.Every person
thereof. the indorsement thereon. negotiating an instrument by
Other causes of delivery or by a qualified
extinguishment of obligations, We cannot, however, say outright that Allied is Section 66 in relation to Sec. 65 of the indorsement, warrants:
such as annulment, rescission, solely liable to Lim Sio Wan. Negotiable Instruments Law provides:
fulfillment of a resolutory a) That the
condition, and prescription, Allied claims that Metrobank is the proximate Section 66. Liability of general instrumen
are governed elsewhere in cause of the loss of Lim Sio Wans money. It indorser.Every indorser who t is
this Code. (Emphasis points out that Metrobank guaranteed all prior indorses without genuine
supplied.) indorsements inscribed on the managers check, qualification, warrants to all and in all
and without Metrobanks guarantee, the present subsequent holders in due respects
controversy would never have course; what it
From the factual findings of the trial occurred. According to Allied: purports
and appellate courts that Lim Sio Wan did not a) The to be;
authorize the release of her money market Failure on the part of the matters b) That he
placement to Santos and the bank had been collecting bank to ensure that and things has a good
negligent in so doing, there is no question that the proceeds of the check is mentione title of it;
the obligation of Allied to pay Lim Sio Wan had paid to the proper party is, d in c) That all
not been extinguished. Art. 1240 of the Code aside from being an efficient subdivisio prior
states that payment shall be made to the person intervening cause, also the ns (a), (b) parties had
in whose favor the obligation has been last negligent act, x x x and (c) of capacity to
constituted, or his successor in interest, or any contributory to the injury the next contract;
person authorized to receive it. As commented caused in the present case, preceding d) That he
by Arturo Tolentino: which thereby leads to the section; has no
conclusion that it is the and knowledge
Payment made by collecting bank, Metrobank of any fact
the debtor to a wrong party that is the proximate cause of b) That the which
does not extinguish the the alleged loss of the plaintiff instrument would
obligation as to the creditor, if in the instant case.[46] is at the impair the
there is no fault or negligence time of his validity of
which can be imputed to the indorseme the
latter. Even when the debtor We are not persuaded. nt valid instrument
acted in utmost good faith and and or render it
by mistake as to the person of Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural subsisting; valueless.
his creditor, or through error and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
induced by the fraud of a third efficient intervening cause, produces the injury And in addition, he But when the
person, the payment to one and without which the result would not have engages that on due negotiation is by delivery
who is not in fact his creditor, occurred.[47] Thus, there is an efficient presentment, it shall be only, the warranty extends in
or authorized to receive such supervening event if the event breaks the accepted or paid, or both, as favor of no holder other than
payment, is void, except as sequence leading from the cause to the ultimate the case may be according to the immediate transferee.
provided in Article result. To determine the proximate cause of a its tenor, and that if it be
1241. Such payment does controversy, the question that needs to be asked dishonored, and the necessary The provisions of
not prejudice the creditor, is: If the event did not happen, would the injury proceedings on dishonor be subdivision (c) of this section
and accrual of interest is have resulted? If the answer is NO, then the duly taken, he will pay the do not apply to persons
event is the proximate cause. amount thereof to the holder, negotiating public or
 corporation securities, other
than bills and
notes. (Emphasis supplied.)
The warranty that the instrument is genuine and
in all respects what it purports to be covers all
the defects in the instrument affecting the
validity thereof, including a forged
indorsement. Thus, the last indorser will be
liable for the amount indicated in the negotiable
instrument even if a previous indorsement was
forged. We held in a line of cases that a collecting
bank which indorses a check bearing a forged
indorsement and presents it to the drawee bank
guarantees all prior indorsements, including the
forged indorsement itself, and ultimately should
be held liable therefor.[48]
However, this general rule is subject to
exceptions. One such exception is when the
issuance of the check itself was attended with
negligence. Thus, in the cases cited above where
the collecting bank is generally held liable, in two
of the cases where the checks were negligently
issued, this Court held the institution issuing the
check just as liable as or more liable than the
collecting bank.
In isolated cases where the checks were
deposited in an account other than that of the
payees on the strength of forged indorsements,
we held the collecting bank solely liable for the
whole amount of the checks involved for having
indorsed the same. In Republic Bank v.
Ebrada,[49] the check was properly issued by the
Bureau of Treasury. While in Banco de Oro
Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco de Oro) v.
Equitable Banking Corporation,[50] Banco de Oro
admittedly issued the checks in the name of the
correct payees. And in Traders Royal Bank v.
Radio Philippines Network, Inc.,[51] the checks
were issued at the request of Radio Philippines
Network, Inc. from Traders Royal Bank.
However, in Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Court of Appeals, we said that the drawee bank is
liable for 60% of the amount on the face of the
negotiable instrument and the collecting bank is
liable for 40%. We also noted the relative
negligence exhibited by two banks, to wit:
Both banks were
negligent in the selection and
supervision of their
employees resulting in the
encashment of the forged
checks by an impostor. Both
banks were not able to
overcome the presumption of
negligence in the selection
and supervision of their
employees. It was the gross
negligence of the employees
of both banks which resulted
in the fraud and the
subsequent loss. While it is
true that petitioner BPIs
negligence may have been the
proximate cause of the loss,
respondent CBCs
negligence contributed equall
y to the success of the
impostor in encashing the
proceeds of the forged checks.
Under these circumstances,
we apply Article 2179 of the
Civil Code to the effect that
while respondent CBC may
recover its losses, such losses
are subject to mitigation by
the courts. (See Phoenix
Construction Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate
Courts, 148 SCRA 353
[1987]).
Considering the
comparative negligence of the
two (2) banks, we rule that
the demands of substantial
justice are satisfied by
allocating the loss of
P2,413,215.16 and the costs
of the arbitration proceeding
in the amount of P7,250.00
and the cost of litigation on a
60-40 ratio.[52]
Similarly, we ruled in Associated Bank v. Court of
Appeals that the issuing institution and the
collecting bank should equally share the liability
for the loss of amount represented by the checks
concerned due to the negligence of both parties:
The Court finds as reasonable,
the proportionate sharing of
fifty percent-fifty percent
(50%-50%). Due to the
negligence of the Province of
Tarlac in releasing the checks
to an unauthorized person
(Fausto Pangilinan), in
allowing the retired hospital
cashier to receive the checks
for the payee hospital for a
period close to three years
and in not properly
ascertaining why the retired
hospital cashier was collecting
checks for the payee hospital
in addition to the hospitals
real cashier, respondent
Province contributed to the
loss amounting to
P203,300.00 and shall be
liable to the PNB for fifty
(50%) percent thereof. In
effect,
the Province of Tarlac can
only recover fifty percent
(50%) of P203,300.00 from
PNB.
The collecting bank,
Associated Bank, shall be
liable to PNB for fifty (50%)
percent of P203,300.00. It is
liable on its warranties as
indorser of the checks which
were deposited by Fausto
Pangilinan, having guaranteed
the genuineness of all prior
indorsements, including that
of the chief of the payee
hospital, Dr. Adena Canlas.
Associated Bank was also
remiss in its duty to ascertain
the genuineness of the payees
indorsement.[53]
A reading of the facts of the two immediately
preceding cases would reveal that the reason
why the bank or institution which issued the
check was held partially liable for the amount of
the check was because of the negligence of these
parties which resulted in the issuance of the
checks.
In the instant case, the trial court correctly found
Allied negligent in issuing the managers check
and in transmitting it to Santos without even a
written authorization.[54]In fact, Allied did not
even ask for the certificate evidencing the money
market placement or call up Lim Sio Wan at her
residence or office to confirm her instructions.
Both actions could have prevented the whole
fraudulent transaction from unfolding. Allieds
negligence must be considered as the proximate
cause of the resulting loss.
To reiterate, had Allied exercised the diligence
due from a financial institution, the check would
not have been issued and no loss of funds would
have resulted. In fact, there would have been no
issuance of indorsement had there been no check
in the first place.
The liability of Allied, however, is concurrent
with that of Metrobank as the last indorser of the
check. When Metrobank indorsed the check in
compliance with the PCHC Rules and
Regulations[55] without verifying the authenticity
of Lim Sio Wans indorsement and when it
accepted the check despite the fact that it was
cross-checked payable to payees account
only,[56] its negligent and cavalier indorsement
contributed to the easier release of Lim Sio Wans
money and perpetuation of the fraud. Given the
relative participation of Allied and Metrobank to
the instant case, both banks cannot be adjudged
as equally liable. Hence, the 60:40 ratio of the
liabilities of Allied and Metrobank, as ruled by
the CA, must be upheld.
FCC, having no participation in the negotiation of
the check and in the forgery of Lim Sio Wans
indorsement, can raise the real defense of
forgery as against both banks.[57]
As to Producers Bank, Allied Banks
argument that Producers Bank must be held
liable as employer of Santos under Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code is erroneous. Art. 2180 pertains to
the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-
delicts that an employee has committed. Such
provision of law does not apply to civil liability
arising from delict.
One also cannot apply the principle of
subsidiary liability in Art. 103 of the Revised
Penal Code in the instant case. Such liability on
the part of the employer for the civil aspect of
the criminal act of the employee is based on the
conviction of the employee for a crime. Here,
there has been no conviction for any crime.
As to the claim that there was unjust
enrichment on the part of Producers Bank, the
same is correct. Allied correctly claims in its
petition that Producers Bank should reimburse
Allied for whatever judgment that may be
rendered against it pursuant to Art. 22 of the
Civil Code, which provides: Every person who
through an act of performance by another, or any
other means, acquires or comes into possession
of something at the expense of the latter without
just cause or legal ground, shall return the same
to him.
The above provision of law was
clarified in Reyes v. Lim, where we ruled that
[t]here is unjust enrichment when a person
unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another,
or when a person retains money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience.[58]
In Tamio v. Ticson, we further clarified
the principle of unjust enrichment, thus: Under
Article 22 of the Civil Code, there is unjust
enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly
benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the
expense of or with damages to another.[59]
In the instant case, Lim Sio Wans
money market placement in Allied Bank was pre-
terminated and withdrawn without her consent.
Moreover, the proceeds of the placement were
deposited in Producers Banks account in
Metrobank without any justification. In other
words, there is no reason that the proceeds of
Lim Sio Wans placement should be deposited in
FCCs account purportedly as payment for FCCs WHEREFORE, premises
money market placement and interest in considered, the decision
Producers Bank. With such payment, Producers appealed from is MODIFIED.
Banks indebtedness to FCC was extinguished, Judgment is rendered
thereby benefitting the former. Clearly, ordering and sentencing
Producers Bank was unjustly enriched at the defendant-appellant Allied
expense of Lim Sio Wan. Based on the facts and Banking Corporation to pay
circumstances of the case, Producers Bank sixty (60%) percent and
should reimburse Allied and Metrobank for the defendant-appellee
amounts the two latter banks are ordered to pay Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Lim Sio Wan. Company forty (40%) of the
amount of P1,158,648.49 plus
It cannot be validly claimed that FCC, 12% interest per annum from
and not Producers Bank, should be considered as March 16, 1984 until fully
having been unjustly enriched. It must be paid. The moral damages,
remembered that FCCs money market placement attorneys fees and costs of
with Producers Bank was already due and suit adjudged shall likewise
demandable; thus, Producers Banks payment be paid by defendant-
thereof was justified. FCC was entitled to such appellant Allied Banking
payment. As earlier stated, the fact that the Corporation and defendant-
indorsement on the check was forged cannot be appellee Metropolitan Bank
raised against FCC which was not a part in any and Trust Company in the
stage of the negotiation of the check. FCC was not same proportion of 60-40.
unjustly enriched. Except as thus modified, the
decision appealed from is
From the facts of the instant case, we AFFIRMED.
see that Santos could be the architect of the
entire controversy. Unfortunately, since SO ORDERED.
summons had not been served onSantos, the
courts have not acquired jurisdiction over
her.[60] We, therefore, cannot ascribe to her Additionally and by way
liability in the instant case. of MODIFICATION, Producers Bank is hereby
ordered to pay Allied and Metrobank the
Clearly, Producers Bank must be held aforementioned amounts. The liabilities of the
liable to Allied and Metrobank for the amount of parties are concurrent and independent of each
the check plus 12% interest per annum, moral other.
damages, attorneys fees, and costs of suit which
Allied and Metrobank are adjudged to pay Lim SO ORDERED.
Sio Wan based on a proportion of 60:40.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The March 18, 1998 CA Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 46290 and the November 15,
1993 RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 6757
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Thus, the CA Decision is AFFIRMED,
the fallo of which is reproduced, as follows:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 144595. August 6, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs. DANTE ILAGAN, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For automatic review is the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch
21, in Criminal Case No. 1246-M-99, convicting
appellant Dante Ilagan of Qualified Rape and
sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of
death and to pay the offended party, Mylene
Ilagan, the sums of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P100,000.00 as moral damages.[1]
The information for Rape against appellant
reads:
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1998, in the
municipality of Norzagaray, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with lewd designs, by means of force
and intimidation, have carnal knowledge of his
daughter Mylene Ilagan, 16 years old, against her
will and consent.
Contrary to law.[2]
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded
not guilty to the charge.[3] Thereafter, the trial of
the case ensued.
The facts of the case as established by the
prosecution are as follows:
The offended party, Mylene Ilagan, lived
with her father, appellant Dante Ilagan, and her
siblings at Barangay Bulalo, Norzagaray, Bulacan.
Her mother, Marietta, had gone off to live with
another man.[4]
On May 18, 1998, Mylenes elder sister went
with her paternal grandmother, Nenita Ilagan, to
Meycauayan to attend the birthday celebration
of their eldest sister. Later that evening, while
Mylene was asleep beside her other siblings,
accused woke her up and told her that they
would sleep in her grandmother Nenitas house,
located some fifteen meters away,[5] leaving
behind her other siblings in their own house.
At 3:00 in the morning of the following day,
while Mylene was asleep, she was awakened by
someone taking off her shorts and panties. She
saw appellant, naked from the waist down, lying
on top of her. Appellant inserted his penis into
her vagina, causing her pain. She was unable to
cry for fear that appellant might kill her since he
had threatened to kill her before. Appellant
stopped the sexual intrusion when a substance,
which looked like phlegm, came out of his penis.
He then got up and went to the kitchen to boil
some water. He told Mylene to watch the pot and
left the house.[6]
On December 10, 1998, while appellant
was in Quezon Province, Mylene mustered the
courage to tell her friend, Jocelyn, about the
sexual assault by her father. They went to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), which brought Mylene to the
Norzagaray Police where she gave her sworn
statement. Thereafter, she was brought to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Provincial
Crime Laboratory in Malolos, Bulacan for
physical examination.[7]
Dr. Manuel Aves, the PNP Medico-Legal
Officer who examined Mylene, found multiple
healed deep lacerations on her hymen. He
concluded that Mylene was a non-virgin at the
time of the examination on December 15,
1998.[8]
On the same date, Mylene filed a complaint
for Rape against appellant before the Norzagaray
Municipal Trial Court.[9]
In his defense, appellant denied the charges
and claimed that he was in Alabang, Muntinlupa
City on the date that the alleged rape was
committed, working at a project for Nipponville Lastly, the accused is also ordered to indemnify
Home Gallery. Moreover, as a furniture worker, Mylene Ilagan the sum of P75,000.00 and further
he stayed in Manila for several days and went amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages.
home to Bulacan only on weekends.[10] He
alleged that Mylene had several boyfriends, and
With costs against the accused.
presented in court purported love letters sent by
Mylene to Larry and Rudy, as well as letters she
received from her male suitors, namely, Boy SO ORDERED.[13]
Bicol, Dondon Hernandez, Rab and Orly.[11] Her
grandmother, Nenita Ilagan, and sister, Judith, In his brief, appellant assigns the following
corroborated appellants testimony. They alleged errors:
that appellant frequently scolded Mylene for
coming home late, and surmised that this may be I
the reason why she filed charges against her THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY
father.[12]
ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
On June 9, 2000, the trial court rendered APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
the appealed judgment, the dispositive portion of
CRIME CHARGED AND
which reads:
SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER
THE DEATH PENALTY.
WHEREFORE, ALL PREMISES CONSIDERED, this
Court resolves that the prosecution has II
successfully undertaken his burden to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY
Accordingly, accused Dante Ilagan is hereby ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT
AND CREDENCE TO THE
found GUILTY of the crime of RAPE from having
violated the provisions of Article 266-B in TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE
relation to Article 266-A of the Revised Penal COMPLAINANT MYLENE
Code, as amended. Considering the presence of ILAGAN.[14]
aggravating circumstances that the victim is Well-entrenched is the rule that a
under eighteen (18) years of age and the conviction for rape may be made even on the
offender is a parent of the victim in this case, he testimony of the victim herself, as long as such
is hereby sentenced to suffer the Supreme testimony is credible.[15] It is likewise settled that
Penalty of DEATH by lethal injection. when a woman says that she had been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that
One final word. The Court treats the imposition she had been raped, and if her testimony meets
of the capital punishment upon the hereby the test of credibility, the accused may be
accused as an unpleasant, if not an unenviable convicted on the basis of the victims testimony. A
task. Nonetheless, the burden becomes lighter as rape victim would not publicly disclose that she
we ponder on what the Supreme Court stated had been raped and undergo the troubles and
with regard to a case of Rape of this nature. humiliation of a public trial if her motive was not
Thus: incestuous relations are abhorrent to the to bring to justice the person who abused her.[16]
nature of man, not only to civilized men, but also
Consequently, the issues in a rape case boil
to semi-civilized and barbarous people x x x and
when a man perpetrates his lascivious desires on down to the credibility of the victim. In assessing
his own direct relative, he descends to a level her credibility, courts are guided by the
lower than that of a beast. (People vs. Mandap, following principles:
244 SCRA 457)
(1) As accusation for rape can be made
with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent,
to disprove;
(2) In view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime of rape where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution,
and;
(3) The evidence of the prosecution stands
or falls on its own merits and can not be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.[17]
In the case at bar, complainant recounted
her harrowing experience in the hands of
appellant in this wise:
Q: My question is, where were you on
May 1998 at around 3 oclock
early in the morning?
A: I was in the house of my
grandmother, sir. My father
asked me to undress and
remove my panty.
Q: You said that you were then at the
house of your grandmother,
what is the name of your
grandmother?
A: Her name is Aida Ilagan , sir.
Q: Where is this house located?
A: Near our house in Norzagaray,
Bulacan, sir.
Q: What is the exact place in
Norzagay where
your lolas house is located?
A: Bulalo, Norzagaray, sir.
Q: Who were with you in the house of
your lola at that time?
A: My father, sir.
Q: What about your lola?
A: She was in Meycauayan, Bulacan,
sir together with my ate.
Q: How about your other siblings?
Where were they at that time?
A: They were in our house, sir.
Q: Why did you decide to sleep at the
house of your lola?
A: I was sleeping there in our house,
but my father asked me to go
with him and sleep at the house
of my lola because nobody was
there, sir.
Q: After your panty was removed by
your father, what happened
next?
A: I was molested (ginalaw), sir.
Q: Tell me exactly what do you mean
by ginalaw?
A: He placed his body on top of me
and inserted his private organ
on my private organ, sir.
Q: You said your clothes and panty
were removed by your father.
Are you saying that you were
totally naked when your father
placed on top of you?
Court:
By the way, did the witness say
that it was not only her panty
but also her clothes were
removed?
Q: Just to clarify this, your honor.
What was removed by your
father from your body?
A: My shorts and panty, sir.
Court:
Was it your father or yourself
who removed your shorts and
panty?
A: My father, your honor.
Court: Proceed.
Q: What were you wearing on your
upper apparel?
A: T-shirt, sir.
Q: What did you feel when your
father inserted his private
organ into yours?
A: It was painful, sir.
Q: How long did your father placed
himself on top of you?
A: Half an hour, sir.
Q: While your father was on top of
you, what was he doing?
A: He forcibly inserted his penis into
my private organ, sir.
Q: Did you feel anything from the
private organ of your father?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that, that you felt came
out from the private organ if
your father?
A: As if phlegm (sipon), sir.[18]
The aforequoted testimony of the victim is
marked by spontaneity, honesty, and sincerity.
When the testimony of the victim is simple and
straightforward, the same must be given full
faith and credit.[19] A young girls revelation that
she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary
submission to medical examination and her
willingness to undergo public trial where she
could be compelled to give out the details of an
assault on her dignity, cannot be easily dismissed
as mere concoction. It is highly inconceivable for
a daughter to publicly accuse her father of rape if
it were not true. Indeed, it is highly against
human nature to fabricate a story that would
expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime
of dishonor, especially when her charge could
mean the death of her own father.[20]
Appellant claims that the victims failure to
resist the assault and the delay in reporting the
case to the authorities are sufficient to impair
her credibility. We disagree. Physical resistance
need not be established in rape when
intimidation is exercised upon the victim herself.
As held in People v. Las Pinas, Jr.,[21] the test is
whether the intimidation produces a reasonable
fear in the mind of the victim that if she resists or
does not yield to the desires of the accused, the
threat would be carried out. When resistance
would be futile, offering none at all does not
amount to consent to sexual assault. The law
does not impose upon a rape victim the burden
of proving resistance.
Anent the delay in reporting the case to the
authorities, suffice it to state that delay and the
initial reluctance of a rape victim to make public
the assault on her virtue is neither unknown or
uncommon.[22] Rape is a traumatic experience,
and the shock concomitant with it may linger for
a while. Oftentimes, the victim would rather bear
the ignominy and the pain in private, rather than
reveal her shame to the world or risk the rapists
carrying out his threat to harm her.[23]
We find no sufficient basis for disregarding,
let alone overturning, the factual assessment
made by the court a quo. Once again, we must
reiterate the familiar rule that the task of taking
on the issue of credibility is a function properly
lodged with the trial court, whose findings are
entitled to great weight and accorded the highest
respect by the reviewing courts, unless certain
facts of substance and value were overlooked or
misappreciated such as would alter the
conviction of the appellant.[24] There is no such
fact of substance and value in this case.
Premised on the complainants testimony,
there is sufficient foundation to conclude that
appellant succeeded by force in having carnal
knowledge of her own daughter on May 19,
1998. Against this backdrop of evidence and in
stark contrast to complainants convincing recital
of facts is appellants defense of denial and alibi.
An intrinsically weak defense, denial must be
buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability
in order to merit credibility. It is a negative self-
serving assertion that has no weight in law if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.[25] Since denial and alibi are so easy to
concoct and fabricate, the same cannot prevail
over the positive and credible testimony of the
prosecution witness that the accused committed
the crime.[26]
The rule is settled that for the defense of
alibi to prosper, the requirement of time and
place must be strictly met.[27] It is, therefore,
incumbent upon appellant to prove with clear
and convincing evidence that at the time of the
commission of the offense charged, he was in a
place other than the situs criminis or immediate
vicinity thereof, such that it was physically
impossible for him to have committed the crime
charged.[28]
 Thus, appellants alibi and denial must
necessarily fail. The defense of denial and alibi
per se, if not substantiated by sufficient evidence,
can not in any way diminish the credibility of the
complainant or the weight of her testimony.
The pertinent provisions of Articles 266-A
and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise
known as The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, state:
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How
Committed. Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of
a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxx xxx xxx.
ART. 266-B. Penalties.
xxx xxx xxx.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years
of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
xxx xxx xxx.
The qualifying circumstances of minority
and relationship must concur. More importantly,
they must be both alleged and proved, in order
to qualify the crime of Rape and warrant the
imposition of the death penalty.[29]
Hence, in addition to the requirement that
the qualifying and aggravating circumstance
must be specifically alleged in the information, it
must be established with certainty that the
victim was below eighteen (18) years of age or
that she was a minor at the time of the
commission of the crime. It must be stressed that
the severity of the death penalty, especially its
irreversible and final nature once carried out,
makes the decision-making process in capital
offense aptly subject to the most exacting rules
of procedure and evidence.[30]
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to
present the birth certificate or similar authentic
document, such as the school records or
baptismal certificate of the victim to prove her
age. Thus, the age of the victim cannot be
determined with utmost certainty. In People v.
Pruna,[31] it was held:
In order to remove any confusion that may be
engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby
set the following guidelines in appreciating age,
either as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the
offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth,
similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the
date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic
document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims
mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as
the exact age or date of birth of the offended P50,000.00, consistently with controlling
party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the jurisprudence. Moral damages are awarded in
Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the rape cases without need of pleading or proof.[33]
following circumstances:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of Bulacan, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 1246-
age and what is sought to be proved is that she is M-99, finding appellant Dante Ilagan guilty
less than 7 years old; beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
age and what is sought to be proved is that she is perpetua and is ordered to pay the private
less than 12 years old; offended party, Mylene Ilagan, the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of moral damages.
age and what is sought to be proved is that she is Costs de oficio.
less than 18 years old.
SO ORDERED.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug,
authentic document, or the testimony of the Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
victims mother or relatives concerning the Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
victims age, the complainants testimony will
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
Callejo, Sr., on leave.
admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of
proving the age of the offended party. The failure
of the accused to object to the testimonial
evidence regarding age shall not be taken against
him.
The trial court should always make a categorical
finding as to the age of the victim.
Hence, for failure of the prosecution to
prove the age of the victim by any of the means
set forth above, appellant can only be found
guilty of Simple Rape and the death penalty
imposed on him by the trial court shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Consequently, the amount of civil
indemnity awarded by the trial court should
accordingly be reduced to P50,000.00. The
amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is
mandatory only in cases involving qualified rape
where the death penalty is imposed. In cases of
simple rape, the amount of civil indemnity shall
be P50,000.00.[32] As regards the award of moral
damages, the same should likewise be reduced to
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 195481 July 10, 2013
ORIENTAL PETROLEUM AND MINERALS
CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
vs.
TUSCAN REALTY, INC., RESPONDENT.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a broker’s claim for
commission for having referred a possible buyer
who later served as an intermediary to the
eventual sale of the property to a third party.
The Facts and the Case
On June 9, 1999 respondent Tuscan Realty, Inc.
(Tuscan Realty) filed a complaint for sum of
money with application for preliminary
attachment against petitioner Oriental
Petroleum and Minerals Corporation (Oriental
Petroleum) before the Makati Regional Trial
Court (RTC).
Oriental Petroleum owned two condominium
units at Corinthian Plaza in Makati City. On
August 13, 1996 it gave Tuscan Realty a "non-
exclusive authority to offer" these units for sale.
On August 14, 1996 Tuscan Realty submitted an
initial list of its prospective client-buyers that
included Gateway Holdings Corporation
(Gateway). Tuscan Realty updated this list on
September 18, 1996. Subsequently, Oriental
Petroleum advised Tuscan Realty that it would
undertake direct negotiation with a certain Gene
de los Reyes of Gateway for the sale of the units.
This resulted in a contract to sell between
Oriental Petroleum and Gateway on August 1,
1997.
Meantime, Gateway apparently turned around
nearly two months later on September 29, 1997
and assigned its rights as buyer of the units to
Alonzo Ancheta in whose favor Oriental
Petroleum executed a deed of absolute sale on
December 10, 1997 for the price of
₱69,595,400.00. Prompted by this development,
Tuscan Realty demanded payment of its broker’s
commission of ₱2,087,862.00 by Oriental
Petroleum. The latter refused to pay, however,
claiming that Tuscan Realty did nothing to close
its deal with Gateway and Ancheta.
On July 28, 1999 the RTC granted Tuscan
Realty’s application for preliminary attachment
but rendered a decision six years later or on
November 2, 2005, dismissing the complaint on
the ground of Tuscan Realty’s failure to
substantiate its allegation that it was responsible
for closing the sale of the subject condominium
units. Tuscan Realty appealed the RTC decision
to the Court of Appeals (CA).
On August 11, 2010 the CA granted the appeal
and set aside the RTC decision. The CA ordered
Oriental Petroleum to pay Tuscan Realty its
broker’s commission of ₱2,087,862.00, which is
3% of the final purchase price, plus 6% interest
from the finality of its decision until actual
payment. Hence, the present petition.
The Issue Presented
The issue in this case is whether or not Tuscan
Realty is entitled to a broker’s commission for
the sale of Oriental Petroleum’s condominium
units to Ancheta.
The Ruling of the Court
The CA invoked the principle of "procuring
cause" in ordering the payment of broker’s
commission to Tuscan Realty. The term
"procuring cause" refers to a cause which starts a
series of events and results, without break in
their continuity, in the accomplishment of a
broker’s prime objective of producing a
purchaser who is ready, willing, and able to buy
on the owner’s terms.1 This is similar to the
concept of proximate cause in Torts, without
which the injury would not have occurred. To be
regarded as the procuring cause of a sale, a
broker’s efforts must have been the foundation
of the negotiations which subsequently resulted
in a sale.2
Here, it was Tuscan Realty that introduced
Gateway to Oriental Petroleum as an interested
buyer of its condominium units. Oriental
Petroleum’s own Executive Vice-President
attested to this, saying that they learned of
Gateway’s interest in the properties from Mr.
Capotosto of Tuscan Realty. Thus:
Q:
So you are saying that it was Mr. Capotosto of
plaintiff who introduced or who manifested that
Gateway Holdings is interested in buying the
properties?
A:
Yes, Ma’am. I never denied that.3
The evidence shows that on August 14, 1996
Tuscan Realty submitted an initial list4 of
prospective buyers with contact details. It twice
updated this list5 with Gateway always on top of
the lists. Clearly then, it was on account of
Tuscan Realty’s effort that Oriental Petroleum
got connected to Gateway, the prospective buyer,
resulting in the latter two entering into a
contract to sell involving the two condominium
units. Although Gateway turned around and sold
the condominium units to Ancheta, the fact is
that such ultimate sale could not have happened
without Gateway’s indispensable intervention as
intermediate buyer. Applying the principle of
procuring cause, therefore, Tuscan Realty should
be given its broker’s commission.
Oriental Petroleum of course claims that
Gateway was not a ready, willing, and able
purchaser and that it in fact assigned its right to
Ancheta who became the ultimate buyer and
that, moreover, it was not Tuscan Realty that
introduced Ancheta to Oriental Petroleum. But
there is no question that the contract to sell that
Oriental Petroleum concluded with Gateway was
a valid and binding contract to sell, which
precluded Oriental Petroleum from peddling the
properties to others. Indeed, Oriental Petroleum
executed a deed of absolute sale in Ancheta’s
favor by virtue of Gateway’s assignment to him
of its rights under the contract to sell.
Consequently, it cannot be said that Oriental
Petroleum found a direct buyer in Ancheta
without the intermediate contract to sell in favor
of Gateway, Tuscan Realty’s proposed buyer.
Oriental Petroleum further points out that
Tuscan Realty took no part in its negotiation
with Gateway.1âwphi1 That may be the case but
the reason why Tuscan Realty refrained from
doing so was because of Oriental Petroleum’s
advice that it would henceforth directly
negotiate the sale with Gateway. Besides,
assuming that the advice amounted to a
revocation of Tuscan Realty’s authority to sell,
the Court has always recognized the broker’s
right to his commission, although the owner
revoked his authority and directly negotiated
with the buyer whom he met through the
broker’s efforts.6 It would be unfair not to give
the broker the reward he had earned for helping
the owner find a buyer who would pay the price.
Lastly, Oriental Petroleum is convinced that this
is just a simple case of non-fulfillment of a
suspensive condition. It claims that the
commission is only to be awarded if the
properties were sold at a minimum of
₱120,000.00 per square meter and that the
delivery must be made within the first week of
January 1997. But these are just lame excuses to
avoid liability. As the CA correctly noted, Oriental
Petroleum did not raise the issue regarding the
delivery deadline in its Answer. As for the fact
that the properties were eventually sold for less
than the original asking price, that action was
within Oriental Petroleum’s discretion. It
decided the matter unilaterally without
consulting its broker. Consequently, it should be
deemed to have waived its own minimum price
requirement.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and
AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV 86417 dated August 11, 2010.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Mendoza,
and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO.,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ANTONIO
ESTEBAN and GLORIA ESTEBAN, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
This case had its inception in an action for
damages instituted in the former Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental 1 by private
respondent spouses against petitioner Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT, for
brevity) for the injuries they sustained in the
evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over
a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the
installation of its underground conduit system.
The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio
Esteban failed to notice the open trench which
was left uncovered because of the creeping
darkness and the lack of any warning light or
signs. As a result of the accident, respondent
Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on
her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar
on her cheek, while the respondent husband
suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of
the jeep was shattered.2
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the
contention that the injuries sustained by
respondent spouses were the result of their own
negligence and that the entity which should be
held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and
Company (Barte, for short), an independent
contractor which undertook the construction of
the manhole and the conduit
system.3 Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party
complaint against Barte alleging that, under the
terms of their agreement, PLDT should in no
manner be answerable for any accident or
injuries arising from the negligence or
carelessness of Barte or any of its employees.4 In
answer thereto, Barte claimed that it was not
aware nor was it notified of the accident
involving respondent spouses and that it had
complied with the terms of its contract with
PLDT by installing the necessary and
appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the
work site, with barricades at both ends of the
excavation and with red lights at night along the
excavated area to warn the traveling public of
the presence of excavations.5
On October 1, 1974, the trial court rendered a
decision in favor of private respondents, the
decretal part of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
considerations the defendant
Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company is hereby
ordered (A) to pay the
plaintiff Gloria Esteban the
sum of P20,000.00 as moral
damages and P5,000.00
exemplary damages; to
plaintiff Antonio Esteban the
sum of P2,000.00 as moral
damages and P500.00 as
exemplary damages, with
legal rate of interest from the
date of the filing of the
complaint until fully paid. The
defendant is hereby ordered
to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P3,000.00 as attorney's fees.
(B) The third-party defendant
is hereby ordered to
reimburse whatever amount
the defendant-third party
plaintiff has paid to the
plaintiff. With costs against
the defendant. 6
From this decision both PLDT and private
respondents appealed, the latter appealing only
as to the amount of damages. Third-party
defendant Barte did not appeal.
On September 25, 1979, the Special Second
Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision in said appealed case, with Justice
Corazon Juliano Agrava as ponente, reversing the
decision of the lower court and dismissing the
complaint of respondent spouses. It held that
respondent Esteban spouses were negligent and
consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from the
claim for damages.7 A copy of this decision was
received by private respondents on October 10,
1979. 8 On October 25, 1979, said respondents
filed a motion for reconsideration dated October
24, 1979. 9 On January 24, 1980, the Special
Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals denied
said motion for reconsideration.10 This
resolution was received by respondent spouses
on February 22, 1980.11
On February 29, 1980, respondent Court of
Appeals received private respondents' motion
for leave of court to file a second motion for
reconsideration, dated February 27, 1980. 12 On
March 11, 1980, respondent court, in a
resolution likewise penned by Justice Agrava,
allowed respondents to file a second motion for
reconsideration, within ten (10) days from
notice thereof. 13 Said resolution was received by
private respondents on April 1, 1980 but prior
thereto, private respondents had already filed
their second motion for reconsideration on
March 7, 1980.14
On April 30,1980 petitioner PLDT filed an
opposition to and/or motion to dismiss said
second motion for reconsideration. 15 The Court
of Appeals, in view of the divergent opinions on
the resolution of the second motion for
reconsideration, designated two additional
justices to form a division of five.16 On
September 3, 1980, said division of five
promulgated its resolution, penned by Justice
Mariano A. Zosa, setting aside the decision dated
September 25, 1979, as well as the resolution
dated, January 24,1980, and affirming in toto the
decision of the lower court.17
On September 19, 1980, petitioner PLDT filed a
motion to set aside and/or for reconsideration of
the resolution of September 3, 1980, contending
that the second motion for reconsideration of
private respondent spouses was filed out of time
and that the decision of September 25, 1979
penned by Justice Agrava was already final. It
further submitted therein that the relationship of
Barte and petitioner PLDT should be viewed in
the light of the contract between them and,
under the independent contractor rule, PLDT is
not liable for the acts of an independent
contractor.18 On May 11, 1981, respondent Court
of Appeals promulgated its resolution denying
said motion to set aside and/or for
reconsideration and affirming in toto the
decision of the lower court dated October 1,
1974. 19
Coming to this Court on a petition for review
on certiorari, petitioner assigns the following
errors:
1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not
denying private respondents' second motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the decision
of the Special Second Division, dated September
25, 1979, and the resolution of the Special Ninth
Division, dated January 24, 1980, are already
final, and on the additional ground that said
second motion for reconsideration is pro forma.
2. Respondent court erred in reversing the
aforesaid decision and resolution and in
misapplying the independent contractor rule in
holding PLDT liable to respondent Esteban
spouses.
A convenient resume of the relevant proceedings
in the respondent court, as shown by the records
and admitted by both parties, may be graphically
presented as follows:
(a) September 25, 1979, a
decision was rendered by the
Court of Appeals with Justice
Agrava asponente;
(b) October 10, 1979, a copy
of said decision was received
by private respondents;
(c) October 25, 1979, a
motion for reconsideration
was filed by private
respondents;
 (d) January 24, 1980, a pending. 20 Private respondents having filed for reconsideration had already expired when diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and
resolution was issued denying their first motion for reconsideration on the last private respondents sought leave to file the was not imputable to negligent omission on the
said motion for day of the reglementary period of fifteen (15) same, and respondent court no longer had the part of petitioner PLDT. Such findings were
reconsideration; days within which to do so, they had only one (1) power to entertain or grant the said motion. The reached after an exhaustive assessment and
day from receipt of the order denying said aforesaid extension of ten (10) days for private evaluation of the evidence on record, as
(e) February 22, 1980, a copy motion to file, with leave of court, a second respondents to file their second motion for evidenced by the respondent court's resolution
of said denial resolution was motion for reconsideration. 21 In the present reconsideration was of no legal consequence of January 24, 1980 which we quote with
received by private case, after their receipt on February 22, 1980 of since it was given when there was no more approval:
respondents; the resolution denying their first motion for period to extend. It is an elementary rule that an
reconsideration, private respondents had two application for extension of time must be filed First. Plaintiff's jeep was
remedial options. On February 23, 1980, the prior to the expiration of the period sought to be running along the inside lane
(f) February 29, 1980, a remaining one (1) day of the aforesaid extended. 24 Necessarily, the discretion of
motion for leave to file a of Lacson Street. If it had
reglementary period, they could have filed a respondent court to grant said extension for remained on that inside lane,
second motion for motion for leave of court to file a second motion filing a second motion for reconsideration is
reconsideration was filed by it would not have hit the
for reconsideration, conceivably with a prayer conditioned upon the timeliness of the motion ACCIDENT MOUND.
private respondents for the extension of the period within which to seeking the same.
do so. On the other hand, they could have
(g) March 7, 1980, a second appealed through a petition for review on Exhibit B shows, through the
No appeal having been taken seasonably, the tiremarks, that the ACCIDENT
motion for reconsideration certiorari to this Court within fifteen (15) days respondent court's decision, dated September
was filed by private from February 23, 1980. 22 Instead, they filed a MOUND was hit by the jeep
25, 1979, became final and executory on March swerving from the left that is,
respondents; motion for leave to file a second motion 'for 9, 1980. The subsequent resolutions of
reconsideration on February 29, 1980, and said swerving from the inside lane.
respondent court, dated March 11, 1980 and What caused the swerving is
(h) March 11, 1980, a second motion for reconsideration on March 7, September 3, 1980, allowing private
1980, both of which motions were by then time- not disclosed; but, as the
resolution was issued respondents to file a second motion for cause of the accident,
allowing respondents to file a barred. reconsideration and reversing the original defendant cannot be made
second motion for decision are null and void and cannot disturb the liable for the damages
reconsideration within ten Consequently, after the expiration on February finality of the judgment nor restore jurisdiction suffered by plaintiffs. The
(10) days from receipt; and 24, 1980 of the original fifteen (15) day period, to respondent court. This is but in line with the accident was not due to the
the running of which was suspended during the accepted rule that once a decision has become absence of warning signs, but
(i) September 3, 1980, a pendency of the first motion for reconsideration, final and executory it is removed from the power to the unexplained abrupt
resolution was issued, penned the Court of Appeals could no longer validly take and jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to swerving of the jeep from the
by Justice Zosa, reversing the further proceedings on the merits of the case, further alter or amend, much less revoke inside lane. That may explain
original decision dated much less to alter, modify or reconsider its it.25 The decision rendered anew is null and plaintiff-husband's insistence
September 25, 1979 and aforesaid decision and/or resolution. The filing void.26 The court's inherent power to correct its that he did not see the
setting aside the resolution of the motion for leave to file a second motion for own errors should be exercised before the ACCIDENT MOUND for which
dated January 24, 1980. reconsideration by herein respondents on finality of the decision or order sought to be reason he ran into it.
February 29, 1980 and the subsequent filing of corrected, otherwise litigation will be endless
the motion itself on March 7, 1980, after the and no question could be considered finally
From the foregoing chronology, we are expiration of the reglementary period to file the settled. Although the granting or denial of a Second. That plaintiff's jeep
convinced that both the motion for leave to file a same, produced no legal effects. Only a motion motion for reconsideration involves the exercise was on the inside lane before
second motion for reconsideration and, for re-hearing or reconsideration filed in time of discretion,27 the same should not be exercised it swerved to hit the
consequently, said second motion for shall stay the final order or judgment sought to whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, but ACCIDENT MOUND could
reconsideration itself were filed out of time. be re-examined. 23 prudently in conformity with law, justice, reason have been corroborated by a
and equity.28 picture showing Lacson Street
Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, which to the south of the ACCIDENT
The consequential result is that the resolution of MOUND.
had procedural governance at the time, provided respondent court of March 11, 1980 granting Prescinding from the aforesaid procedural lapses
that a second motion for reconsideration may be private respondents' aforesaid motion for leave into the substantive merits of the case, we find
presented within fifteen (15) days from notice of and, giving them an extension of ten (10) days to no error in the findings of the respondent court It has been stated that the
the order or judgment deducting the time in file a second motion for reconsideration, is null in its original decision that the accident which ditches along Lacson Street
which the first motion has been and void. The period for filing a second motion befell private respondents was due to the lack of had already been covered
except the 3 or 4 meters
where the ACCIDENT MOUND
was located. Exhibit B-1
shows that the ditches on
Lacson Street north of the
ACCIDENT MOUND had
already been covered, but not
in such a way as to allow the
outer lane to be freely and
conveniently passable to
vehicles. The situation could
have been worse to the south
of the ACCIDENT MOUND for
which reason no picture of the
ACCIDENT MOUND facing
south was taken.
Third. Plaintiff's jeep was not
running at 25 kilometers an
hour as plaintiff-husband
claimed. At that speed, he
could have braked the vehicle
the moment it struck the
ACCIDENT MOUND. The jeep
would not have climbed the
ACCIDENT MOUND several
feet as indicated by the
tiremarks in Exhibit B. The
jeep must have been running
quite fast. If the jeep had been
braked at 25 kilometers an
hour, plaintiff's would not
have been thrown against the
windshield and they would
not have suffered their
injuries.
Fourth. If the accident did not
happen because the jeep was
running quite fast on the
inside lane and for some
reason or other it had to
swerve suddenly to the right
and had to climb over the
ACCIDENT MOUND, then
plaintiff-husband had not
exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family to
avoid the accident. With the
drizzle, he should not have
run on dim lights, but should
have put on his regular lights
which should have made him
see the ACCIDENT MOUND in
time. If he was running on the
outside lane at 25 kilometers
an hour, even on dim lights,
his failure to see the
ACCIDENT MOUND in time to
brake the car was negligence
on his part. The ACCIDENT
MOUND was relatively big and
visible, being 2 to 3 feet high
and 1-1/2 feet wide. If he did
not see the ACCIDENT
MOUND in time, he would not
have seen any warning sign
either. He knew of the
existence and location of the
ACCIDENT MOUND, having
seen it many previous times.
With ordinary precaution, he
should have driven his jeep on
the night of the accident so as
to avoid hitting the ACCIDENT
MOUND.29
The above findings clearly show that the
negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was
not only contributory to his injuries and those of
his wife but goes to the very cause of the
occurrence of the accident, as one of its
determining factors, and thereby precludes their
right to recover damages.30 The perils of the road
were known to, hence appreciated and assumed
by, private respondents. By exercising
reasonable care and prudence, respondent
Antonio Esteban could have avoided the
injurious consequences of his act, even
assuming arguendothat there was some alleged
negligence on the part of petitioner.
The presence of warning signs could not have
completely prevented the accident; the only
purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the
public of the presence of excavations on the site.
The private respondents already knew of the
presence of said excavations. It was not the lack
of knowledge of these excavations which caused
the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation
but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep charged, being given the
from the inside lane towards the accident benefit of any doubt.
mound. As opined in some quarters, the Definitely without ascribing
omission to perform a duty, such as the placing the same motivation to
of warning signs on the site of the excavation, plaintiffs, another person
constitutes the proximate cause only when the could have deliberately
doing of the said omitted act would have engineered a similar accident
prevented the injury.31 It is basic that private in the hope and expectation
respondents cannot charge PLDT for their that the Court can grant him
injuries where their own failure to exercise due substantial moral and
and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is exemplary damages from the
both a societal norm and necessity that one big corporation that
should exercise a reasonable degree of caution defendant is. The statement is
for his own protection. Furthermore, respondent made only to stress the
Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or disadvantageous position of
opportunity to avoid the accident, defendant which would have
notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to extreme difficulty in
petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, contesting such person's
he passed on that street almost everyday and claim. If there were no
had knowledge of the presence and location of witness or record available
the excavations there. It was his negligence that from the police department of
exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is Bacolod, defendant would not
solely responsible for the consequences of his be able to determine for itself
imprudence. which of the conflicting
testimonies of plaintiffs is
Moreover, we also sustain the findings of correct as to the report or
respondent Court of Appeals in its original non-report of the accident to
decision that there was insufficient evidence to the police department.32
prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. We
have for consideration only the self-serving A person claiming damages for the negligence of
testimony of respondent Antonio Esteban and another has the burden of proving the existence
the unverified photograph of merely a portion of of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The
the scene of the accident. The absence of a police facts constitutive of negligence must be
report of the incident and the non-submission of affirmatively established by competent
a medical report from the hospital where private evidence.33 Whosoever relies on negligence for
respondents were allegedly treated have not his cause of action has the burden in the first
even been satisfactorily explained. instance of proving the existence of the same if
contested, otherwise his action must fail.
As aptly observed by respondent court in its
aforecited extended resolution of January 24, WHEREFORE, the resolutions of respondent
1980 — Court of Appeals, dated March 11, 1980 and
(a) There was no third party September 3,1980, are hereby SET ASIDE. Its
eyewitness of the accident. As original decision, promulgated on September
to how the accident occurred, 25,1979, is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
the Court can only rely on the SO ORDERED.
testimonial evidence of Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla
plaintiffs themselves, and and Sarmiento JJ., concur.
such evidence should be very
carefully evaluated, with
defendant, as the party being
FIRST DIVISION a. FIFTY THOUSAND enrollment drive for the school year 1995- We reverse the decision of the Court of
[G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002] PESOS (P50,000.00) 1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was Appeals.
ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM indemnity for the the visitation of schools from where prospective
CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. loss of life of enrollees were studying. As a student of St. The Court of Appeals held petitioner St.
CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES Sherwin S. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of Marys Academy liable for the death of Sherwin
DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, Carpitanos; the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the Carpitanos under Articles 218[7] and 219[8] of the
SR., and VIVENCIO fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was
VILLANUEVA, respondents. b. FORTY THOUSAND school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not
DECISION PESOS (P40,000.00) owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their having a teacher accompany the minor students
PARDO, J.: actual damages way to Larayan Elementary School, in the jeep.
The Case incurred by plaintiffs Larayan, Dapitan City.The jeep was driven by
for burial and Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student following shall have special parental authority
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals as well as the related expenses; of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the over a minor child while under their supervision,
resolution denying reconsideration, holding c. TEN THOUSAND jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep instruction or custody: (1) the school, its
petitioner liable for damages arising from an PESOS (P10,000.00) turned turtle. administrators and teachers; or (2) the
accident that resulted in the death of a student for attorneys fees; individual, entity or institution engaged in child
who had joined a campaign to visit the public Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the care. This special parental authority and
schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment. d. FIVE HUNDRED injuries he sustained from the accident.[2] responsibility applies to all authorized activities,
THOUSAND PESOS whether inside or outside the premises of the
(P500,000.00) for school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority
moral damages; and In due time, petitioner St. Marys academy
The Facts appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.[3] and responsibility applies to field trips,
to pay costs. excursions and other affairs of the pupils and
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals students outside the school premises whenever
2. Their liability being only subsidiary, promulgated a decision reducing the actual authorized by the school or its teachers.[9]
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals,
defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming
are as follows: Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the
are hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the the decision a quo, in toto.[4]
amount of damages above-stated in the event of person under custody is a minor, those
Claiming damages for the death of their only son, insolvency of principal obligor St. Marys On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Marys exercising special parental authority are
Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos Academy of Dipolog City; Academy filed a motion for reconsideration of principally and solidarily liable for damages
and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case the decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the caused by the acts or omissions of the
against James Daniel II and his parents, James Court of Appeals denied the motion.[5] unemancipated minor while under their
Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, 3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the supervision, instruction, or custody.[10]
Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy time of the commission of the tort and who was Hence, this appeal.[6]
before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City. under special parental authority of defendant St. However, for petitioner to be liable, there
Marys Academy, is ABSOLVED from paying the must be a finding that the act or omission
above-stated damages, same being adjudged considered as negligent was the proximate cause
On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of against defendants St. Marys Academy, and The Issues of the injury caused because the negligence must
the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered subsidiarily, against his parents; have a causal connection to the accident.[11]
its decision the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows: 1) Whether the Court of Appeals
4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby In order that there may be a recovery for an
erred in holding the petitioner
ABSOLVED of any liability. His counterclaim not injury, however, it must be shown that the injury
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, liable for damages for the death of
being in order as earlier discussed in this for which recovery is sought must be the
judgment is hereby rendered in the following Sherwin Carpitanos.
decision, is hereby DISMISSED. legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
manner: 2) Whether the Court of Appeals connection between the negligence and the
IT IS SO ORDERED. (Decision, pp. 32-33; erred in affirming the award of injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
1. Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, Records, pp. 205-206). moral damages against the events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.
is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William petitioner. In other words, the negligence must be the
Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no
sums of money: From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 matter in what it consists, cannot create a right
February 1995, defendant-appellant St. Marys of action unless it is the proximate cause of the
Academy of Dipolog City conducted an The Courts Ruling injury complained of. And the proximate cause of
an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have
occurred.[12]
In this case, the respondents failed to show
that the negligence of petitioner was the
proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and
Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of
the accident was not the negligence of petitioner
or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.
In their comment to the petition,
respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva
admitted the documentary exhibits establishing
that the cause of the accident was the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the
recklessness of James Daniel II but the
mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio
Villanueva.Respondents, including the spouses
Carpitanos, parents of the deceased Sherwin
Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and
testimony of the traffic investigator who stated
that the cause of the accident was the
detachment of the steering wheel guide that
caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present
any evidence to show that the proximate cause
of the accident was the negligence of the school
authorities, or the reckless driving of James
Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on
Article 219 of the Family Code that those given
the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor was
unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that
petitioner school allowed the minor James
Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had
possession and control of the jeep. He was
driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel
II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the
accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether
caused by the negligence of the minor driver or
mechanical detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors
parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner
St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of
the accident. Between the remote cause and the
injury, there intervened the negligence of the
minors parents or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep.
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.[13]
Considering that the negligence of the
minor driver or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent
Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St.
Marys Academy had no control, and which was
the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner
may not be held liable for the death resulting
from such accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner
likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages
in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the
trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered
if they are the proximate result of the defendants
wrongful act or omission.[14] In this case, the
proximate cause of the accident was not
attributable to petitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not
directly liable for the accident, the decision of the
Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay
death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must
be deleted. Moreover, the grant of attorneys fees
as part of damages is the exception rather than
the rule.[15] The power of the court to award
attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil
Code demands factual, legal and equitable
justification.[16] Thus, the grant of attorneys fees
against the petitioner is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the
registered owner of the vehicle was respondent
Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted
this fact. We have held that the registered owner
of any vehicle, even if not used for public service,
would primarily be responsible to the public or
to third persons for injuries caused the latter
while the vehicle was being driven on the
highways or streets.[17] Hence, with the
overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner
and the respondent Daniel spouses that the
accident occurred because of the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the
school, but the registered owner of the vehicle
who shall be held responsible for damages for
the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and
SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals[18] and that of the trial court.[19] The
Court remands the case to the trial court for
determination of the liability of defendants,
excluding petitioner St. Marys
Academy, Dipolog City.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., in the result.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 152133 February 9, 2006
ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET
AL., Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner
Rollie Calimutan prays for the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 23306, dated 29 August 2001,1affirming the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 46, of Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal Case
No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998,2 finding
petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code.
The Information3 filed with the RTC charged
petitioner Calimutan with the crime of homicide,
allegedly committed as follows –
That on or about February 4, 1996, in the
morning thereof, at sitio Capsay, Barangay
Panique, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of
Masbate, Philippines within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
throw a stone at PHILIP CANTRE, hitting him at
the back left portion of his body, resulting in
laceration of spleen due to impact which caused
his death a day after.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Masbate, Masbate, September 11, 1996.
Accordingly, the RTC issued, on 02 December
1996, a warrant4 for the arrest of petitioner
Calimutan. On 09 January 1997, however, he was
provisionally released5 after posting sufficient
bailbond.6 During the arraignment on 21 May
1997, petitioner Calimutan pleaded not guilty to
the crime of homicide charged against him.7
In the course of the trial, the prosecution
presented three witnesses, namely: (1) Dr.
Ronaldo B. Mendez, a Senior Medico-Legal
Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI); (2) Belen B. Cantre, mother of the victim,
Philip Cantre; and (3) Rene L. Sañano,
companion of the victim Cantre when the alleged
crime took place. Their testimonies are
collectively summarized below.
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the
victim Cantre and witness Sañano, together with
two other companions, had a drinking spree at a
videoke bar in Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy,
Masbate. From the videoke bar, the victim Cantre
and witness Sañano proceeded to go home to
their respective houses, but along the way, they
crossed paths with petitioner Calimutan and a
certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was
harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting
the latter as the culprit responsible for throwing
stones at the Cantre’s house on a previous night.
Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre
suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ran
away, petitioner Calimutan dashed towards the
backs of victim Cantre and witness Sañano.
Petitioner Calimutan then picked up a stone, as
big as a man’s fist, which he threw at victim
Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his back.
When hit by the stone, victim Cantre stopped for
a moment and held his back. Witness Sañano put
himself between the victim Cantre and petitioner
Calimutan, and attempted to pacify the two, even
convincing petitioner Calimutan to put down
another stone he was already holding. He also
urged victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan to
just go home. Witness Sañano accompanied
victim Cantre to the latter’s house, and on the
way, victim Cantre complained of the pain in the
left side of his back hit by the stone. They arrived
at the Cantre’s house at around 12:00 noon, and
witness Sañano left victim Cantre to the care of
the latter’s mother, Belen.8
Victim Cantre immediately told his mother,
Belen, of the stoning incident involving
petitioner Calimutan. He again complained of
backache and also of stomachache, and was
unable to eat. By nighttime, victim Cantre was
alternately feeling cold and then warm. He was
sweating profusely and his entire body felt
numb. His family would have wanted to bring
him to a doctor but they had no vehicle. At
around 3:00 a.m. of the following day, 05
February 1996, Belen was wiping his son with a
piece of cloth, when victim Cantre asked for
some food. He was able to eat a little, but he also
later vomited whatever he ate. For the last time,
he complained of backache and stomachache,
and shortly thereafter, he died.9
Right after his death, victim Cantre was
examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the
Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate. The
Post-Mortem Examination Report10 and
Certification of Death,11 issued and signed by Dr.
Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim
Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to
suspected food poisoning. The body of victim
Cantre was subsequently embalmed and buried
on 13 February 1996.
Unsatisfied with the findings of Dr. Ulanday, the
Cantre family, with the help of the Lingkod
Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN
Foundation, requested for an exhumation and
autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre by the
NBI. The exhumation and autopsy of the body of
the victim Cantre was conducted by Dr. Ronaldo
B. Mendez on 15 April 1996,12 after which, he
reported the following findings –
Body; fairly well-preserved with sign of partial
autopsy; clad in white Barong Tagalog and blue
pants placed inside a wooden golden-brown
coffin and buried in a concrete niche.
Contused-abrasion, 2.3 x 1.0 cms., posterior
chest wall, left side.
Hematoma, 16.0 x 8.0 cms., abdomen, along mid-
line.
Hemoperitoneum, massive, clotte [sic].
Laceration, spleen.
Other visceral organ, pale and embalmed.
Stomach contains small amount of whitish fluid
and other partially digested food particles.
xxxx
CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY OF THE
ABDOMEN.
In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez
affirmed the contents of his exhumation and
autopsy report. He explained that the victim
Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage
and there was massive accumulation of blood in
his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen.
The laceration of the spleen can be caused by any
blunt instrument, such as a stone. Hence, Dr.
Mendez confirmed the possibility that the victim
Cantre was stoned to death by petitioner
Calimutan.13
To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the
defense presented the sole testimony of the
accused, herein petitioner, Calimutan.
According to petitioner Calimutan, at about 1:00
p.m. on 04 February 1996, he was walking with
his house helper, Michael Bulalacao, on their way
to Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate,
when they met with the victim Cantre and
witness Sañano. The victim Cantre took hold of
Bulalacao and punched him several times.
Petitioner Calimutan attempted to pacify the
victim Cantre but the latter refused to calm
down, pulling out from his waist an eight-inch
Batangas knife and uttering that he was looking
for trouble, either "to kill or be killed." At this
point, petitioner Calimutan was about ten meters
away from the victim Cantre and was too
frightened to move any closer for fear that the
enraged man would turn on him; he still had a
family to take care of. When he saw that the
victim Cantre was about to stab Bulalacao,
petitioner Calimutan picked up a stone, which he
described as approximately one-inch in
diameter, and threw it at the victim Cantre. He
was able to hit the victim Cantre on his right
buttock. Petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao then
started to run away, and victim Cantre chased
after them, but witness Sañano was able to pacify
the victim Cantre. Petitioner Calimutan allegedly
reported the incident to a kagawad of Barangay
Panique and to the police authorities and sought
their help in settling the dispute between
Bulalacao and the victim Cantre. Bulalacao,
meanwhile, refused to seek medical help despite
the advice of petitioner Calimutan and, instead,
chose to go back to his hometown.14
Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of
what had happened to the victim Cantre after the
stoning incident on 04 February 1996. Some of
his friends told him that they still saw the victim
Cantre drinking at a videoke bar on the night of
04 February 1996. As far as he knew, the victim
Cantre died the following day, on 05 February
1996, because of food poisoning. Petitioner
Calimutan maintained that he had no personal
grudge against the victim Cantre previous to the
stoning incident.15
On 19 November 1998, the RTC rendered its
Decision,16 essentially adopting the prosecution’s
account of the incident on 04 February 1996, and
pronouncing that –
It cannot be legally contended that the throwing
of the stone by the accused was in defense of his
companion, a stranger, because after the boxing
Michael was able to run. While it appears that
the victim was the unlawful aggressor at the
beginning, but the aggression already ceased
after Michael was able to run and there was no
more need for throwing a stone. The throwing of
the stone to the victim which was a retaliatory
act can be considered unlawful, hence the
accused can be held criminally liable under
paragraph 1 of Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
The act of throwing a stone from behind which
hit the victim at his back on the left side was a
treacherous one and the accused committed a
felony causing physical injuries to the victim. The
physical injury of hematoma as a result of the
impact of the stone resulted in the laceration of
the spleen causing the death of the victim. The
accused is criminally liable for all the direct and
natural consequences of this unlawful act even if
the ultimate result had not been intended. (Art.
4, Par. 1, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Narciso,
CA-G.R. No. 03532-CR, Jan. 13, 1964)
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the
natural consequences of one’s illegal acts merely
because one does not intend to produce such
consequences (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310).
The crime committed is Homicide as defined and
penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal
Code.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that
accused ROLLIE CALIMUTAN is GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the
Revised Penal Code with no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby imposes the
penalty of imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS
of Prision Mayor as minimum, to TWELVE (12)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal
as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Philip
Cantre the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00)
Pesos as compensatory damages and the sum of
Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as moral
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
Petitioner Calimutan appealed the Decision of
the RTC to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 August
2001,17 sustained the conviction of homicide
rendered by the RTC against petitioner
Calimutan, ratiocinating thus –
The prosecution has sufficiently established that
the serious internal injury sustained by the
victim was caused by the stone thrown at the
victim by the accused which, the accused-
appellant does not deny. It was likewise shown
that the internal injury sustained by the victim
was the result of the impact of the stone that hit
the victim. It resulted to a traumatic injury of the
abdomen causing the laceration of the victim’s
spleen.
This is clearly shown by the autopsy report
prepared by Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, a Senior
Medico Legal Officer of the NBI after the
exhumation of the victim’s cadaver…
The Court cannot give credence to the post
mortem report prepared by Municipal Health
Officer Dr. Conchita Ulanday stating that the
cause of the victim’s death was food poisoning.
Dr. Ulanday was not even presented to testify in
court hence she was not even able to identify
and/or affirm the contents of her report. She was
not made available for cross-examination on the
accuracy and correctness of her findings.
Dr. Conchita Ulanday’s post mortem report
cannot prevail over the autopsy report (Exh. "C")
of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI who
testified and was cross-examined by the defense.
Besides, if accused-appellant was convinced that
the victim indeed died of food poisoning, as
reported by Dr. Conchita Ulanday, why did they
not present her as their witness to belie the
report of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.
The trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of
Dr. Mendez is accorded the highest respect
because it had the opportunity to observe the
conduct and demeanor of said witness.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate,
Branch 46, finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated 15
January 2002,18 denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner Calimutan for
lack of merit since the issues raised therein had
already been passed and ruled upon in its
Decision, dated 29 August 2001.
Comes now petitioner Calimutan, by way of the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari,
seeking (1) the reversal of the Decisions of the
RTC, dated 19 November 1998, and of the Court
of Appeals, dated 29 August 2001, convicting
him of the crime of homicide; and, (2)
consequently, his acquittal of the said crime
based on reasonable doubt.
Petitioner Calimutan contended that the
existence of the two autopsy reports, with
dissimilar findings on the cause of death of the
victim Cantre, constituted reasonable doubt as to
the liability of petitioner Calimutan for the said
death, arguing that –
x x x [I]t was Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal
Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate was the first
physician of the government who conducted an
examination on the cadaver of the victim Philip
Cantre whose findings was that the cause of his
death was due to food poisoning while the
second government physician NBI Medico Legal
Officer Dr. Ronaldo Mendez whose findings was
that the cause of the death was due to a
traumatic injury of the abdomen caused by a
lacerated spleen and with these findings of two
(2) government physicians whose findings are at
variance with each other materially, it is humbly
contended that the same issue raised a
reasonable doubt on the culpability of the
petitioner.
As there are improbabilities and uncertainties of
the evidence for the prosecution in the case at
bar, it suffices to reaise [sic] reasonable doubt as
to the petitioner’s guilt and therefore, he is
entitled to acquittal (People vs. Delmendo, G.R.
No. 32146, November 23, 1981).19
In this jurisdiction, an accused in a criminal case
may only be convicted if his or her guilt is
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a
moral certainty or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it
does not demand absolute certainty and the
exclusion of all possibility of error.20
In the Petition at bar, this Court finds that there
is proof beyond reasonable doubt to hold
petitioner Calimutan liable for the death of the
victim Cantre.
Undoubtedly, the exhumation and autopsy
report and the personal testimony before the
RTC of prosecution witness, NBI Senior Medico-
Legal Officer Dr. Mendez, are vital pieces of
evidence against petitioner Calimutan. Dr.
Mendez determined that the victim Cantre died
of internal hemorrhage or bleeding due to the
laceration of his spleen. In his testimony, Dr.
Mendez clearly and consistently explained that
the spleen could be lacerated or ruptured when
the abdominal area was hit with a blunt object,
such as the stone thrown by petitioner
Calimutan at the victim Cantre.
It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was
presented by the prosecution as an expert
witness, whose "competency and academic
qualification and background" was admitted by
the defense itself.21 As a Senior Medico-Legal
Officer of the NBI, Dr. Mendez is presumed to
possess sufficient knowledge of pathology,
surgery, gynecology, toxicology, and such other
branches of medicine germane to the issues
involved in a case.22
Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is
evidence,23 and although it does not necessarily
bind the courts, both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals had properly accorded it great weight
and probative value. Having testified as to
matters undeniably within his area of expertise,
and having performed a thorough autopsy on the
body of the victim Cantre, his findings as to the
cause of death of the victim Cantre are more than
just the mere speculations of an ordinary person.
They may sufficiently establish the causal
relationship between the stone thrown by the
petitioner Calimutan and the lacerated spleen of
the victim Cantre which, subsequently, resulted
in the latter’s death. With no apparent mistake or
irregularity, whether in the manner by which Dr.
Mendez performed the autopsy on the body of
the victim Cantre or in his findings, then his
report and testimony must be seriously
considered by this Court.
Moreover, reference to other resource materials
on abdominal injuries would also support the
conclusion of Dr. Mendez that the stone thrown
by petitioner Calimutan caused the death of the
victim Cantre.
One source explains the nature of abdominal
injuries24 in the following manner –
The skin may remain unmarked inspite of
extensive internal injuries with bleeding and
disruption of the internal organs. The areas most
vulnerable are the point of attachment of
internal organs, especially at the source of its
blood supply and at the point where blood
vessels change direction.
The area in the middle superior half of the
abdomen, forming a triangle bounded by the ribs
on the two sides and a line drawn horizontally
through the umbilicus forming its base
is vulnerable to trauma applied from any
direction. In this triangle are found several
blood vessels changing direction, particularly the
celiac trunk, its branches (the hepatic, splenic
and gastric arteries) as well as the
accompanying veins. The loop of the duodenum,
the ligament of Treitz and the pancreas are in the
retroperitoneal space, and the stomach and
transverse colon are in the triangle, located in
the peritoneal cavity. Compression or blow on
the area may cause detachment, laceration,
stretch-stress, contusion of the organs (Legal
Medicine 1980, Cyril H. Wecht et., p. 41).
As to injuries to the spleen, in particular,25 the
same source expounds that –
The spleen usually suffers traumatic rupture
resulting from the impact of a fall or blow from
the crushing and grinding effects of wheels of
motor vehicles. Although the organ is protected
at its upper portion by the ribs and also by the
air-containing visceral organs, yet on account of
its superficiality and fragility, it is usually
affected by trauma. x x x.
Certainly, there are some terms in the above-
quoted paragraphs difficult to comprehend for
people without medical backgrounds.
Nevertheless, there are some points that can be
plainly derived therefrom: (1) Contrary to
common perception, the abdominal area is more
than just the waist area. The entire abdominal
area is divided into different triangles, and the
spleen is located in the upper triangle, bounded
by the rib cage; (2) The spleen and all internal
organs in the same triangle are vulnerable to
trauma from all directions. Therefore, the stone
need not hit the victim Cantre from the front.
Even impact from a stone hitting the back of the
victim Cantre, in the area of the afore-mentioned
triangle, could rupture the spleen; and (3)
Although the spleen had already been ruptured
or lacerated, there may not always be a
perceptible external injury to the victim. Injury
to the spleen cannot, at all times, be attributed to
an obvious, external injury such as a cut or
bruise. The laceration of the victim Cantre’s
spleen can be caused by a stone thrown hard
enough, which qualifies as a nonpenetrating
trauma26 –
Nonpenetrating Trauma. The spleen, alone or
in combination with other viscera, is the most
frequently injured organ following blunt
trauma to the abdomen or the lower thoracic
cage. Automobile accidents provide the
predominating cause, while falls, sledding and
bicycle injuries, and blows incurred during
contact sports are frequently implicated in
children. x x x
The sheer impact of the stone thrown by
petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim
Cantre could rupture or lacerate the spleen – an
organ described as vulnerable, superficial, and
fragile – even without causing any other external
physical injury. Accordingly, the findings of Dr.
Mendez that the victim Cantre died of internal
hemorrhage from his lacerated spleen, and the
cause of the laceration of the spleen was the
stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back
of the victim Cantre, does not necessarily
contradict his testimony before the RTC that
none of the external injuries of the victim Cantre
were fatal.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the
prosecution was able to establish that the
proximate cause of the death of the victim Cantre
was the stone thrown at him by petitioner
Calimutan. Proximate cause has been defined as
"that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred."27
The two other witnesses presented by the
prosecution, namely Sañano and Belen Cantre,
had adequately recounted the events that
transpired on 04 February 1996 to 05 February
1996. Between the two of them, the said
witnesses accounted for the whereabouts,
actions, and physical condition of the victim
Cantre during the said period. Before the
encounter with petitioner Calimutan and
Bulalacao, the victim Cantre seemed to be
physically fine. However, after being hit at the
back by the stone thrown at him by petitioner
Calimutan, the victim Cantre had continuously
complained of backache. Subsequently, his
physical condition rapidly deteriorated, until
finally, he died. Other than being stoned by
petitioner Calimutan, there was no other
instance when the victim Cantre may have been
hit by another blunt instrument which could
have caused the laceration of his spleen.
Hence, this Court is morally persuaded that the
victim Cantre died from a lacerated spleen, an
injury sustained after being hit by a stone
thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Not even
the post-mortem report of Dr. Ulanday, the
Municipal Health Officer who first examined the
body of the victim Cantre, can raise reasonable
doubt as to the cause of death of the victim
Cantre. Invoking Dr. Ulanday’s post-mortem
report, the defense insisted on the possibility
that the victim Cantre died of food poisoning.
The post-mortem report, though, cannot be
given much weight and probative value for the
following reasons –
First, a closer scrutiny of the words used by Dr.
Ulanday in her post-mortem report, as well as in
the death certificate of the victim Cantre, reveals
that although she suspected food poisoning as
the cause of death, she held back from making a
categorical statement that it was so. In the post-
mortem report, 28 she found that "x x x the
provable (sic) cause of death was due to cardio-
respiratory arrest. Food poisoning must be
confirm (sic) by laboratory e(x)am." In the death
certificate of the victim Cantre, 29 she wrote that
the immediate cause of death was "Cardio-
Respiratory Arrest" and the antecedent cause
was "Food Poisoning Suspect." There was no
showing that further laboratory tests were
indeed conducted to confirm Dr. Ulanday’s
suspicion that the victim Cantre suffered from
food poisoning, and without such confirmation,
her suspicion as to the cause of death remains
just that – a suspicion.
Second, Dr. Ulanday executed before the NBI a
sworn statement30 in which she had explained
her findings in the post-mortem report, to wit –
05. Q: Did you conduct an autopsy on his
cadaver?
A: I did sir, but not as exhaustive as that done by
the NBI Medico-legal.
06. Q: Now, what do you want to state regarding
your certification on the death of PHILIP B.
CANTRE?
A: I stated in the certification and even in the
Death Certificate about "Food Poisoning". What I
stated in the Death Certificate was that CANTRE
was a SUSPECTED victim of food poisoning. I
didn’t state that he was a case of food poisoning.
And in the Certification, I even recommended
that an examination be done to confirm that
suspicion.
07. Q: What gave you that suspicion of
poisoning?
A: As there were no external signs of fatal
injuries except that of the contusion or abrasion,
measuring as that size of a 25 centavo coin, I
based my suspicion from the history of the
victim and from the police investigation.
08. Q: You also mentioned in your Certification
that there was no internal hemorrhage in the
cadaver. Did you open the body of the cadaver?
A: As I have already stated sir, I did not conduct
an exhaustive autopsy. I made an incision on the
abdomen and I explored the internal organs of
the cadaver with my hand in search for any
clotting inside. But I found none. I did not open
the body of the cadaver.
09. Q: You mentioned about a contusion you
have observed on the cadaver. Where was it
located?
A: On the left portion of his back, sir.
10. Q: Now, is it possible that if somebody be hit
by a hard object on that part of his body, his
SPLEEN could be injured?
A: Yes, sir. But that would depend on how strong
or forceful the impact was.
In contrast, Dr. Mendez described in his
testimony before the RTC31 how he conducted
the autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre, as
follows –
Q What specific procedure did you do in
connection with the exhumation of the body of
the victim in this case?
A We opened the head, chest and the abdomen.
Q That was part of the autopsy you have
conducted?
A Yes, sir.
Q Aside from opening the head as well as the
body of the victim Philip Cantre, what other
matters did you do in connection therewith?
A We examined the internal organs.
Q What in particular internal organs you have
examined?
A The brain, the heart, the lungs, the liver, the
kidneys, the pancreas plus the intestines.
xxxx
Q The cause of death as you have listed here in
your findings is listed as traumatic injury of the
abdomen, will you kindly tell us Doctor what is
the significance of this medical term traumatic
injury of the abdomen?
A We, medico-legal officers of the NBI don’t do
what other doctors do as they make causes of
death as internal hemorrhage we particularly
point to the injury of the body like this particular
case the injury was at the abdomen of the victim.
Q Will you tell as Doctor what particular portion
of the abdomen of the victim this traumatic
injury is located?
A Along the midline but the damaged organ was
at the left.
Q What particular organ are you referring to?
A The spleen, sir.
The difference in the extent of the examinations
conducted by the two doctors of the body of the
victim Cantre provides an adequate explanation
for their apparent inconsistent findings as to the
cause of death. Comparing the limited autopsy
conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed
suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre,
as opposed to the exhaustive autopsy performed
by Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a
ruptured spleen as the cause of death of the
victim Cantre, then the latter, without doubt,
deserves to be given credence by the courts.
Third, that the prosecution no longer presented
Dr. Ulanday before the RTC despite being
included in its list of witnesses did not amount to
a willful suppression of evidence that would give
rise to the presumption that her testimony
would be adverse to the prosecution if
produced.32 As this Court already expounded in
the case ofPeople v. Jumamoy33 –
The prosecution's failure to present the other
witnesses listed in the information did not
constitute, contrary to the contention of the
accused, suppression of evidence. The
prosecutor has the exclusive prerogative to
determine the witnesses to be presented for the
prosecution. If the prosecution has several
eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, the
prosecutor need not present all of them but only
as many as may be needed to meet the quantum
of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
testimonies of the other witnesses may,
therefore, be dispensed with for being merely
corroborative in nature. This Court has ruled
that the non-presentation of corroborative
witnesses would not constitute suppression of
evidence and would not be fatal to the
prosecution's case. Besides, there is no showing
that the eyewitnesses who were not presented in
court as witnesses were not available to the
accused. We reiterate the rule that the adverse
presumption from a suppression of evidence is
not applicable when (1) the suppression is not
willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld
is merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the
evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and
(4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Moreover, if the accused believed that the failure
to present the other witnesses was because their
testimonies would be unfavorable to the
prosecution, he should have compelled their
appearance, by compulsory process, to testify as
his own witnesses or even as hostile witnesses.
It was a judgment call for the prosecution to no
longer present Dr. Ulanday before the RTC,
perhaps believing that it had already presented
sufficient evidence to merit the conviction of
petitioner Calimutan even without her
testimony. There was nothing, however,
preventing the defense from calling on, or even
compelling, with the appropriate court
processes, Dr. Ulanday to testify in court as its
witness if it truly believed that her testimony
would be adverse to the case presented by the
prosecution.
While this Court is in accord with the factual
findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals and
affirms that there is ample evidence proving that
the death of the victim Cantre was caused by his
lacerated spleen, an injury which resulted from
being hit by the stone thrown at him by
petitioner Calimutan, this Court, nonetheless, is
at variance with the RTC and the Court of
Appeals as to the determination of the
appropriate crime or offense for which the
petitioner should have been convicted for.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies
felonies according to the means by which they
are committed, in particular: (1) intentional
felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two
types of felonies are distinguished from each
other by the existence or absence of malicious
intent of the offender –
In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the
offender is malicious. In the language of Art. 3,
the act is performed with deliberate intent (with
malice). The offender, in performing the act or in
incurring the omission,has the intention to cause
an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act
or omission of the offender is notmalicious. The
injury caused by the offender to another person
is "unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice." (People
vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the
wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.34
In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good
conscience, attribute to petitioner Calimutan any
malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the
victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent,
this Court cannot sustain the conviction of
petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of
homicide, as rendered by the RTC and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court finds
petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the culpable felony of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly
provides for the definition of reckless
imprudence –
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
There are several circumstances, discussed in
the succeeding paragraphs, that demonstrate
petitioner Calimutan’s lack of intent to kill the
victim Cantre, and conversely, that substantiate
the view of this Court that the death of victim
Cantre was a result of petitioner Calimutan’s
reckless imprudence. The RTC and the Court of
Appeals may have failed to appreciate, or had
completely overlooked, the significance of such
circumstances.
It should be remembered that the meeting of the
victim Cantre and witness Sañano, on the one
hand, and petitioner Calimutan and his helper
Bulalacao, on the other, was a chance encounter
as the two parties were on their way to different
destinations. The victim Cantre and witness
Sañano were on their way home from a drinking
spree in Crossing Capsay, while petitioner
Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao were
walking from the market to Crossing Capsay.
While the evidence on record suggests that a
running grudge existed between the victim
Cantre and Bulalacao, it did not establish that
there was likewise an existing animosity
between the victim Cantre and petitioner
Calimutan.1avvphil.net
In both versions of the events of 04 February
1996 submitted by the prosecution and the
defense, it was the victim Cantre who was the
initial aggressor. He suddenly punched
Bulalacao, the helper and companion of
petitioner Calimutan, when they met on the road.
The attack of the victim Cantre was swift and
unprovoked, which spurred petitioner Calimutan
into responsive action. Given that this Court
dismisses the claim of petitioner Calimutan that
the victim Cantre was holding a knife, it does
take into account that the victim Cantre was
considerably older and bigger, at 26 years of age
and with a height of five feet and nine inches,
compared to Bulalacao, the boy he attacked, who
was only 15 years old and stood at about five
feet. Even with his bare hands, the victim Cantre
could have hurt Bulalacao. Petitioner Calimutan
sought only to protect Bulalacao and to stop the
assault of the victim Cantre against the latter
when he picked up a stone and threw it at the
victim Cantre. The stone was readily available as
a weapon to petitioner Calimutan since the
incident took place on a road. That he threw the
stone at the back of the victim Cantre does not
automatically imply treachery on the part of
petitioner Calimutan as it is highly probable that
in the midst of the fray, he threw the stone rashly
and impulsively, with no regard as to the
position of the victim Cantre. When the victim
Cantre stopped his aggression after being hit by
the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan, the
latter also desisted from any other act of violence
against the victim Cantre.
The above-described incident could not have
taken more than just a few minutes. It was a very
brief scuffle, in which the parties involved would
hardly have the time to ponder upon the most
appropriate course of action to take. With this in
mind, this Court cannot concur in the declaration
made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner
Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre
as a retaliatory act. It was evidently a swift and
spontaneous reaction to an unexpected and
unprovoked attack by the victim Cantre on
Bulalacao. That Bulalacao was already able to
run away from the victim Cantre may have
escaped the notice of the petitioner Calimutan
who, under the pressure of the circumstances,
was forced to act as quickly as possible.
The prosecution did not establish that petitioner
Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre
with the specific intent of killing, or at the very
least, of harming the victim Cantre. What is
obvious to this Court was petitioner Calimutan’s
intention to drive away the attacker who was, at
that point, the victim Cantre, and to protect his
helper Bulalacao who was, as earlier described,
much younger and smaller in built than the
victim Cantre.35
Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled
by a lawful objective when he threw the stone at
the victim Cantre, his act was committed with
inexcusable lack of precaution. He failed to
consider that a stone the size of a man’s fist
could inflict substantial injury on someone. He
also miscalculated his own strength, perhaps
unaware, or even completely disbelieving, that
he could throw a stone with such force as to
seriously injure, or worse, kill someone, at a
quite lengthy distance of ten meters.
Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrown by
petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre was the
proximate cause of the latter’s death, despite
being done with reckless imprudence rather
than with malicious intent, petitioner Calimutan
remains civilly liable for such death. This Court,
therefore, retains the reward made by the RTC
and the Court of Appeals to the heirs of the
victim Cantre of the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity for his death and another
₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29
August 2001, affirming the Decision of the RTC in
Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November
1998, is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner Calimutan
is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and
is accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a
minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to
a maximum period of two years and one day
of prision correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is
further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim
Cantre the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the latter’s death and ₱50,000.00
as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

AMADOR CORPUZ G.R. No. 137772 The pertinent facts are as follows: Respondent Lugue then filed an action The Isuzu KC-20 Edison
and ROMEO for damages arising from the vehicular incident Lugue was riding on the date
GONZALES, P e t i t i On 14 September 1984, at around 7:15 before the Balanga, Bataan RTC, Branch 2, in question was being driven
o n e r s, in the morning, while an Isuzu KC-20 passenger against herein petitioners Amador Corpuz and by third-party defendant
Present: jeep (KC-20), then being driven by Jimmy Basilio, Romeo Gonzales, owner and driver of the Jimmy Basilio on the center of
was traversing the right side of the Roman minibus, respectively, and Oscar Jaring and the right lane of the national
Highway in Barangay Pias, Orion, Bataan, it Gerardo Lim, owner and driver of the tanker highway headed toward
collided with a tanker truck driven by Gerardo truck, respectively. Therein defendants filed a Lamao, Limay, Bataan. When
- versus - PUNO, Lim, which was then moving from the right third-party complaint against Ricardo Santiago said KC-20 was about 25 to 30
Chairman, shoulder of the highway. As a result of the and Jimmy Basilio, owner/operator and driver of meters from the tanker truck
AUSTRIA- collision, the KC-20 was thrown towards the left the KC-20, respectively. owned by defendant Oscar
MARTINEZ, lane of the highway where it was bumped by a Jaring, which tanker truck was
Mazda minibus (minibus) being driven by herein After trial, the lower court then just beginning to make a
EDISON LUGUE and CALLEJO, SR., petitioner Gonzales who was then trying to rendered a decision holding jointly and headstart from its former
CATHERINE overtake the KC-20. At that point, the KC-20 severally liable Ricardo Santiago, Jimmy parked position on the right
BALUYOT, TINGA, and spun and bumped a Transcon service truck Basilio, Oscar Jaring, Gerardo Lim, Amador shoulder of said highway, the
parked on the left side of the highway. As a result Corpuz, and Romeo Gonzales. The portion on the left headlight
R e s p o n d e n t s. CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. of the impact, the KC-20 was thrown across the appurtenant portions of the decision read: of the tanker truck bumped
highway where it was again hit by the minibus the KC-20 on its middle
pushing the former towards a deep portion on There are two (2) versions of portion of the right side. As a
the left side of the road. As a consequence of the the accident in question result, the KC-20 was thrown
Promulgated: accident, passengers of the KC-20, including respectively espoused by the to the left side of the highway
respondent Lugue, suffered physical injuries. several parties in the instant facing Mariveles and,
case. One version is that put immediately thereafter, it was
forth by plaintiff Edison Lugue bumped by the Mazda
July 29, 2005 (including his witness minibus owned by defendant
To summarize, the parties involved in Remigio Gervacio) and also by Amador Corpuz and then
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - the vehicular accident are as follows: defendants and third-party driven by defendant Romeo
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
plaintiffs Amador Corpuz and Gonzales. As a result of such
VEHI OW DRI Romeo Gonzales. The other second bumping of the KC-20,
CLE NER VER version is that advanced by it spun and bumped a service
Isuzu Rica Jim defendants and third-party truck of the Transcon which
KC- rdo my plaintiffs Oscar Jaring and was parked on the left side of
DECISION 20 Sant Basil Gerardo Lim. the highway facing Mariveles.
iago io Finally, the KC-20 fell
Tank Osca Gera crumpled on the left concrete
er r rdo These two versions shall be lane of the road facing
truck Jarin Lim discussed and their respective Balanga.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: g merits analyzed. Whichever
version is found to be
Before Us is a Petition for Review Mazd Ama Rom plausible shall determine
on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals a dor eo the proximate cause earlier (2) The Jaring-Lim version:
Decision[1] affirming the Regional Trial Court mini Corp Gonz mentioned.
(RTC) decision[2] finding herein petitioners liable bus uz ales
for the injuries suffered by respondent Edison
Lugue as a result of an accident involving four While third-party plaintiff
(4) vehicles, one of which was then driven by (1) The Lugue-Corpuz Oscar Jarings tanker truck
petitioner Romeo Gonzales and owned by version: was parked on the asphalted
petitioner Amador Corpuz. shoulder on the right side of
the highway near the Caltex at
Barangay Pias, Townsite,
Limay, Bataan, on the date in
question, and he was having
some invoices recorded by
Caltex employees at the
guardhouse, which was some
ten and a half (10-1/2) meters
away from said tanker
truck, he was not looking at
said truck and the KC-20. But
just the same he testified that
the right fender of the KC-20
hit the left front portion of the
fender of the tanker truck. As
a result, the KC-20 went to the
other side of the road, where
it was bumped by the minibus
behind it. Then the KC-20 hit
the rear portion of the
Transcon service truck. The
minibus bumped the KC-20
again, after which the latter
continued on toward
Mariveles for about 100
meters until it finally fell into
a deep portion of the road.
...
It will be noted that the
Lugue-Corpuz version was
testified to by at least four (4)
witnesses Edison Lugue,
Remigio Gervacio, Patrocinio
Carillo and Romeo Gonzales,
whereas the Jaring-Lim
version was testified to by
only one (1) witness Ricardo
Puno. Oscar Jaring himself did
not testify to having
witnessed the incident. On the
other hand, the driver of the
tanker truck defendant
Gerardo Lim, admitted
expressly in his oral
testimony that he was at the
guardhouse at the time the
accident happened, because
he was having some invoices
recorded by the Caltex
employees. Clearly, therefore,
he did not witness the
accident involving the KC-20
and the tanker truck
because he was not looking at
said two vehicles. Whatever
version he testified to of the
subject accident could not
have been otherwise
than pure hearsay.
From the foregoing discussion
of the respective two versions
of the subject accident and the
evidence adduced, it would
appear that
(1) The tanker truck owned
by defendant Oscar Jaring,
whose authorized driver at
the time of the accident was
defendant Gerardo Lim, was
not actually parked
completely(if it was parked at
all) on the right shoulder of
the national highway where
the accident took place,
witness Ricardo Puno testified
or as defendant Jarings
photographed marked as
Exhibits 1, 1-A and 1-B would
tend to show. If it was parked
at all, the plausible likelihood
was that it was so parked that
while its right front and rear
wheels were touching the
right asphalted shoulder of
that highway, however its left
front and rear wheels were
actually on the concrete right
lane of said highway, with its
left front fender and bumper
protruding well into said right
lane, thus constituting a
stumbling block to vehicles
traveling on such right lane
facing the direction where
plaintiff Edison Lugue was
going then.
This conclusion is bolstered
by the obvious fact that from
said photograph Exhibit 1 it
can be seen that the right
bumper of the tanker truck
appears to have detached
from its former connection to
the left front portion of the
tanker truck and such left end
now appears to have been
bent forward. The fender of
the same truck also appears to
have been damaged on the
same left side, with a vertical
long portion cut from said
fender.
If said tanker truck was thus
parked as posted in the two
foregoing paragraphs, then it
had been parked in a
negligent manner by its
driver, who thereby did not
exercise ordinary or simple
human prudence or foresight
to avoid any portion of said
truck from obstructing the
way of any oncoming motor
vehicle being driven on said
right or proper lane of the
highway. Any normal or
average human being,
especially a motor vehicle
driver, ought to know that the
concrete lanes of highways
are intended to be traversed
by motor vehicles and are not
intended to be used as
parking areas. Even in case of
emergency, only the
shoulders of such highways
may be used for parking
purposes.
(3) There was also the
possibility testified to by
plaintiff Edison Lugue, his
witness Remigio Gervacio and
defendant Romeo Gonzales to
the effect that the tanker
truck was not actually parked
but was actually already
moving or being driven from
its former parked position
and its left front wheel (and
perhaps even the left rear
wheels) had occupied a
portion of the concrete right
lane of the highway which
was also being traversed then
by the KC-20.
This possibility is silently
corroborated by the condition
of the front bumper and
fender of the tanker truck
depicted in the photograph
marked as Exhibit 1, as
already described
hereinbefore, having in mind
the fact that not a single
witness testified to having
seen the Isuzu KC-20 leave
the concrete right lane and
occupy the asphalted
shoulder.
On the plane of logic, this
version is also supported by
the undisputed fact testified
by practically all the
witnesses who testified that
after the physical contact
between the tanker truck and
the KC-20, the latter vehicle
was shoved from its proper
right lane to the left lane as a
result of the impact. Such
resulting shoving effect could
have been the consequence of
the push it got from the
tanker truck which was
already moving then toward
the concrete right lane.
(4) On the other hand, neither
may the Lugue-Corpuz
version on the physical
contact between the KC-20
and the tanker truck be
swallowed or considered as
entirely correct. This version
attempts to show that the
tanker truck, while being
initially driven away from the
right asphalted shoulder of
the highway into the concrete
right lane of said highway,
bumped with its left side the
right middle portion of the
body of said KC-20, thus
causing the latter to be
shoved to the left concrete
lane of said highway, where it
was bumped by the passing or
overtaking Mazda minibus.
Plaintiff Edison Lugue himself
testified on direct
examination that the first time
he saw the tanker truck was
when the KC-20 was about 25
to 30 meters from said truck.
At that time, he said, the truck
was just beginning to make a
headstart and was still on the
asphalted shoulder of the
highway. On cross-
examination, he modified that
distance between the two
vehicles the first time he saw
them to from 20 to 35 meters.
He also stated that at that
distance from the truck, the
KC-20 did not slow down until
it was bumped by the truck;
and that all of the four wheels
of the truck were originally
occupying the shoulder of the
highway.
If all of the wheels of the
tanker truck had originally
been occupying the asphalted
shoulder of the highway and
said vehicle was just
beginning to make a headstart
toward the right concrete lane
of the highway, then the most
probable course or direction
of said truck could have been
forward but slightly oblique
toward its left. Very likely, the
truck was still running on first steadily forward, hoping to R
gear, which means it was still safely pass the tanker truck at eckless
going very slowly. Even the fast rate of speed he was imprudenc
plaintiff Edison Lugue and then driving. Plaintiff Lugue e consists
driver Romeo Gonzales of the testified that the KC-20 he in the
Mazda minibus following the was riding in did not change doing or
KC-20 did not say that the course or position on the right failing to
tanker truck was being driven lane of the highway just do an act,
squarely across the right lane before the bumping occurred. voluntarily,
of the highway. In other words, the KC-20 did but
not change course nor relax without
If defendant driver Jimmy its speed before the actual malice,
Basilio of the KC-20 had seen physical contact between the from which
the tanker truck while at a tanker truck and the KC-20. material
distance of 20 to 35 meters damage
away from it, if he had been results by
prudent and careful he could reason of
still avoid having his vehicle In such a situation, wherein inexcusabl
get in physical contact with there was a truck starting to e lack of
said truck. That distance was crawl on the right lane precaution
still adequate for him to traversed by the KC-20 and on the part
swerve the steering wheel there was a minibus trailing it, of the
slightly to the left so as to and in the process of passing person
avoid such truck getting in or overtaking the KC-20, the performing
contact with his KC-20. But driver of the minibus (sic) or failing to
there is no showing was expected to exercise perform
whatsoever that he did that. A caution and prudence to avoid such act,
number of possibilities hitting or being hit by either taking into
present themselves. or both other motor vehicles considerati
before it or trailing it, the fact on his
(a) Because Jimmy Basilio was that the driver of the KC-20 employme
driving the KC-20 fast, as did not either slacken his nt or
Lugue stated, he must have speed or even swerve his occupation,
calculated that it could steering wheel, however degree of
already safely pass the truck slightly, to avoid hitting or intelligence
without the need of swerving being hit by the tanker truck , physical
the steering wheel even bespeaks reckless condition
slightly to the left. imprudence on the part of and other
third-party defendant Jimmy circumstan
(b) Basilio might have had in Basilio as driver of said KC-20. ces
mind the Mazda minibus Had he even only slackened regarding
which was trailing the KC-20 the speed of the KC-20, he persons,
and which was going through could have avoided any time and
the motions of passing or contact between it and the place. (Art.
overtaking such KC-20. He tanker truck, given that 365,
may have calculated that if he distance of 25 to 35 meters Revised
would swerve the KC-20 even from said truck when the Penal
slightly to the left, it might go latter was first seen. He chose Code)
directly on the path of the not to do so.
minibus. So he avoided (3) Defendant Gerardo Lim, as
swerving the KC-20 and went driver of the subject tanker
truck with Plate No. CVC-563
Phil. 84 on the date in
question, has been shown to
have been grossly negligent in
either (a) improperly parking
his said truck on the right lane
of the national highway
instead of totally on the
asphalted shoulder of said
highway, or (b) driving said
tanker truck from said
shoulder of the highway into
the right lane of said highway
without previously carefully
observing and making sure
that no other vehicle was
coming from the rear of his
vehicle so as to avoid any
possible accident from such
direction, which gross
negligence constituted the
proximate cause of the
accident in question.
Otherwise stated, had he not
parked his truck improperly,
or had he made sure that
there was no oncoming
vehicle from the direction of
the rear of his truck, the initial
bumping between the said
tanker truck and the Isuzu KC-
20 would not have taken place
and the subsequent bumpings
by and among the other
vehicles involved in the
subject accident would not
have occurred.
He is also liable due to culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delict,
under the provisions of
Articles 2176 to 2194,
inclusive, of the same Code.
(4) As far as defendant
Amador Corpuz is concerned,
who is the owner-operator of
the Mazda minibus with Plate
No. CVC-563-Phil. 84 being
driven by defendant Romeo
Gonzales on the date in
question, he failed to prove
that he had observed all the
diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage
sustained by plaintiff Lugue as
a consequence of the proven
negligence of his said driver
Romeo Gonzales.
He is liable for quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana under the
provisions of Articles 1733 or
1766, inclusive of the same
code.
(5) With respect to defendant
and third-party plaintiff Oscar
Jaring, as owner-operator of
the subject tanker truck
driven by defendant and
third-party plaintiff Gerardo
Lim, he failed to prove that he
had observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage sustained
by plaintiff Lugue as a
consequence of the proven
negligence of his said driver
Gerardo Lim.
He is liable for culpa
aquiliana or quasi-
delict under the provisions of
Articles 1733 to 1766,
inclusive, of the same Civil
Code.
(6) Concerning defendant
Romeo Gonzales, driver of the
subject Mazda minibus with
Plate No. CVC-563-Phil. 84 on
the date of the accident in
question, he has been shown
to have been grossly negligent
in the manner he drove or
operated the said motor
vehicle, which gross
negligence constituted an
intervening cause for the
accident which occurred and
which resulted in the injuries
sustained by plaintiff Edison
Lugue.
He is liable for quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana,
provided for under Articles
1733 to 1766, inclusive, of the
same Code.
WHEREFORE, the Court
hereby renders judgment in
favor of plaintiffs and against
all the defendants and third-
party defendants
(a) Declaring third-party
defendants Ricardo Santiago
and Jimmy Basilio liable
for culpa contractual and
for culpa aquiliana and to
plaintiff Edison Lugue in
respect to the accident subject
of the instant action and
ordering them to pay jointly
to said plaintiff (1) Nineteen
Thousand Nine Hundred
Forty-Eight Pesos and Ninety
Centavos (P19,948.90),
Philippine Currency, as actual
or compensatory damages;
(2) Actual or compensatory
damages in the sum of Two
Thousand Eleven Pesos
(P2,011.00) every month
from 14 September 1985,
representing the diminution
in the monthly salary of
plaintiff Edison Lugue as a
result of the physical injuries
sustained by him arising from
the subject accident, or
Twenty-Four Thousand One
Hundred Thirty-Two Pesos
(P24,132.00) every calendar
year from the aforementioned
year, until he shall have been
fully paid; and (3) Moral
damages in the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00);
(b) Declaring defendants
Amador Corpuz, Romeo
Gonzales, Oscar Jaring and
Gerardo Lim solidarily liable
for culpa aquiliana or quasi-
delict to Edison Lugue in
connection with the same
accident and ordering them to
pay jointly and severally to
said plaintiff the various
damages enumerated in Nos.
(1) to (3), inclusive, in the
foregoing subparagraph (a).
In no case shall said plaintiff
be allowed to recover twice
from the aforementioned
defendants the aforestated
damages.
Plaintiffs having instituted the
present action as paupers-
litigants, the docket and other
fees that they were exempted
from paying shall constitute a
lien on any amount that they
may collect under this
decision.[3]
Aggrieved by said decision of the trial
court, Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim, owner and
driver of the tanker truck respectively, and
Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales, owner and
driver of the minibus respectively, filed an
appeal before the appellate court. Third-party
defendants Santiago and Basilio, owner and
driver of the KC-20 respectively, did not
interpose an appeal.
On 09 March 1999, the Court of
Appeals granted the appeal of Oscar Jaring and
Gerardo Lim, while it dismissed that of plaintiffs
Santiago and Basilio in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the
appealed judgment is
MODIFIED as follows:
 We find merit in the petition. overtake the KC-20 moment, the front of
because the way was the minibus was
1.) Defendants A careful perusal of the lower courts clear. When the about eight (8)
Ricardo decision will show that the following were minibus was about meters behind the
Santiago and established during trial through the testimonies ten (10) meters from rear portion of the
Jimmy Basilio of petitioners witnesses: the KC-20, about to KC-20, the latter was
are declared overtake the latter, suddenly thrown to
jointly and I. Accor all of a sudden a the left and thus it
severally ding to the gasoline tanker blocked the path of
liable with testimony of witness entered the road. the Mazda minibus.
defendants- Remigio Gervacio While doing so, the As a result, the
appellants during the direct tanker bumped the minibus bumped the
Amador examination, who KC-20, as a result of left rear portion of
Corpuz and was then seated on which the latter the KC-20. This
Romeo the middle right moved to a position bumping happened
Gonzales; and portion of the blocking the way of when both vehicles
minibus, the minibus the minibus, the left were already on the
he was riding was lane facing left lane of the
following a KC-20 Mariveles. He did highway facing
2.) Defendants- which was being everything to avoid Mariveles.[7]
appellants driven on the right the KC-20. He
Oscar Jaring lane of the highway pressed the brake From the foregoing testimonies, as well
and Gerardo facing Mariveles, fully. But the tanker as the discussion of the trial court earlier quoted,
Lim are while the minibus was already too it is clear that the proximate cause of the injuries
absolved was occupying the close to the minibus, suffered by respondent Lugue was the collision
from liability left portion of the that was why the between the KC-20 and the tanker truck. As
and the road facing the same latter hit the KC- correctly pointed out by the lower
Complaint as direction, a little 20.[6] court, proximate legal cause is that acting first
against them beyond the center and producing the injury either immediately
is line. Then a tanker III. Witnes or by setting other events in motion, all
DISMISSED. truck bumped the s Patrocinio Carillo, constituting a natural and continuous chain
KC-20, which was a passenger of the of events, each having a close causal
In all other respects, thrown to the left minibus seated connection with its immediate predecessor,
the appealed portion of the road beside his wife who the final event in the chain immediately
Decision is facing Mariveles. was seated on the effecting the injury as a natural and probable
AFFIRMED.[4] Because the minibus front seat beside the result of the cause which first acted, under
was then already driver, maintained such circumstances that the person responsible
Hence, the instant petition by Amador near to the KC-20, it that the minibus had for the first event should, as an ordinarily
Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales. bumped the KC- been running on the prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
20.[5] superhighway ground to expect at the moment of his act or
Petitioners arguments can be trailing an Isuzu KC- default that an injury to some person might
summarized in one issue: whether or not the II. Petitio 20. When the probably result therefrom.[8]
appellate court erred in holding them liable for ner Gonzales, on minibus was right in
damages based on the findings of facts adduced direct examination, front of the Caltex Having stated such, it now becomes the
by the trial court. Petitioners emphasize that stated that the place, it attempted trial courts responsibility to adjudge who
nowhere in the trial courts 43-page decision was minibus he was to pass or overtake between the drivers of the two colliding vehicles
there any finding that would remotely support driving on the the KC-20 it had was negligent and thus liable for damages
the court a quosconclusion that petitioners are concrete highway been following by brought about by the injuries suffered by Edison
liable for the injuries suffered by respondent was following a KC- swerving to the left Lugue. This issue was settled by the court a
Lugue. 20 vehicle. Then he lane facing quo in this wise:
made a signal to Mariveles. At that
 In such a situation,
wherein there was a truck
starting to crawl on the right
lane traversed by the KC-20
and there was a minibus
trailing it, and in the process
of passing or overtaking the
KC-20, the driver of the
minibus (sic) was expected to
exercise caution and
prudence to avoid hitting or
being hit by either or both
other motor vehicles before it
or trailing it, the fact that the
driver of the KC-20 did not
either slacken his speed or
even swerve his steering
wheel, however slightly, to
avoid hitting or being hit by
the tanker truck bespeaks
reckless imprudence on the
part of third-party
defendant Jimmy Basilio as
driver of said KC-20. Had he
even only slackened the speed
of the KC-20, he could have
avoided any contact between
it and the tanker truck, given
that distance of 25 to 35
meters from said truck when
the latter was first seen. He
chose not to do
so.[9] [Emphasis ours]
Therefore, it is clear that it was the
reckless imprudence of the driver of the KC-20,
Jimmy Basilio, that set the other events in motion
which eventually led to the passengers of the KC-
20 sustaining physical injuries.
Nonetheless, in a single paragraph of its
ten-page Decision, the Court of Appeals
discussed the alleged negligence of Romeo
Gonzales, and thus attributed liability to the
latter, the driver of the minibus, to wit:
We however find no
merit in the appeal of Amador
Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales.
Faced with the situation
where the truck parked on the
side was at a headstart in clear chance doctrine can
crawling towards the never apply where the party
cemented portion of the charged is required to act
highway, still the Mazda mini instantaneously, and if the
bus recklessly proceeded in injury cannot be avoided by
attempting to overtake the the application of all means at
Isuzu passenger jeep hand after the peril is or
unmindful of the spatial should have been
limitations of the road. discovered.[17]
Defendant-driver Romeo
Gonzales was clearly
negligent.[10] WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the
This conclusion of the appellate court Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37085, finding
of recklessness on the part of petitioner Gonzales petitioners Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales
is, however, unwarranted. Based on the liable, is
unchallenged testimony of petitioner Gonzales,
he signaled to overtake the KC-20 because the hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In all other
way was clear.[11] That despite his best effort to respects, the Court of Appeals Decision is hereby
do everything to avoid hitting the KC-20, AFFIRMED. No costs.
petitioner failed to do so because the KC-20 had
moved to a position blocking the way of the SO ORDERED.
minibus as a result of the tanker bumping the
KC-20.[12] Furthermore, based on the unrebutted
testimony of both Remigio Gervacio[13] and
Patrocinio Carillo,[14] at the time when the
minibus hit the KC-20, the former was already
moving towards the middle portion of the
highway, occupying the left portion of the road, a
little beyond the center line. Certainly, even
assuming that petitioner Gonzales had a few
seconds before actual collision, he no longer had
any opportunity to avoid it.[15] Petitioner
Gonzales cannot be deemed negligent for failing
to prevent the collision even after applying all
means available to him within the few instants
when he had discovered the impending peril.[16]
In a similar case where a jeepney
bound for Isabela collided with a bus on its
regular route to Manila when the latter
encroached upon the jeepneys lane while it was
negotiating a curve, the Court declared that:
[E]ven assuming
that the jeepney driver
perceived the danger a few
seconds before the actual
collision, he had no
opportunity to avoid it. This
Court has held that the last
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156168. December 14, 2004]
EQUITABLE BANKING
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE T.
CALDERON, respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Thru this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Equitable Banking Corporation
(EBC), seeks the reversal and setting aside of the
decision dated November 25, 2002[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60016,
which partially affirmed an earlier decision of
the Regional Trial Court at Makati City, Branch
61, insofar as it grants moral damages and costs
of suit to herein respondent, Jose T. Calderon.
The decision under review recites the
factual background of the case, as follows:
Plaintiff-appellee [now respondent] Jose T.
Calderon (Calderon for brevity), is a businessman
engaged in several business activities here and
abroad, either in his capacity as President or
Chairman of the Board thereon. In addition
thereto, he is a stockholder of PLDT and a member
of the Manila Polo Club, among others. He is a
seasoned traveler, who travels at least seven times
a year in the U.S., Europe and Asia. On the other
hand, the defendant-appellant [now petitioner]
Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC for brevity),
is one of the leading commercial banking
institutions in the Philippines, engaged in
commercial banking, such as acceptance of
deposits, extension of loans and credit card
facilities, among others.
xxx xxx xxx
Sometime in September 1984, Calderon applied
and was issued an Equitable International Visa
card (Visa card for brevity). The said Visa card can
be used for both peso and dollar transactions
within and outside the Philippines. The credit limit
for the peso transaction is TWENTY THOUSAND
(P20,000.00) PESOS; while in the dollar
transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a
dollar account with a minimum deposit of
$3,000.00, the balance of dollar account shall
serve as the credit limit.
In April 1986, Calderon together with some
reputable business friends and associates, went to
Hongkong for business and pleasure trips.
Specifically on 30 April 1986, Calderon
accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon went to
Gucci Department Store located at the basement
of the Peninsula Hotel (Hongkong). There and
then, Calderon purchased several Gucci items (t-
shirts, jackets, a pair of shoes, etc.). The cost of his
total purchase amounted to HK$4,030.00 or
equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of paying the
said items in cash, he used his Visa card (No. 4921
6400 0001 9373) to effect payment thereof on
credit. He then presented and gave his credit card
to the saleslady who promptly referred it to the
store cashier for verification. Shortly thereafter,
the saleslady, in the presence of his friend, Ed De
Leon and other shoppers of different nationalities,
informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted.
Calderon sought the reconfirmation of the status
of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter
simply did not honor it and even threatened to cut
it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors.
Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order
to avoid further indignities, Calderon paid cash for
the Gucci goods and items that he bought.
Upon his return to the Philippines, and
claiming that he suffered much torment and
embarrassment on account of EBCs wrongful act
of blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit card
while at the Gucci store in Hongkong, Calderon
filed with the Regional Trial Court at Makati City
a complaint for damages[2] against EBC.
In its Answer,[3] EBC denied any liability to
Calderon, alleging that the latters credit card
privileges for dollar transactions were earlier
placed under suspension on account of
Calderons prior use of the same card in excess of
his credit limit, adding that Calderon failed to
settle said prior credit purchase on due date,
thereby causing his obligation to become past
due. Corollarily, EBC asserts that Calderon also
failed to maintain the required minimum deposit
of $3,000.00.
To expedite the direct examination of
witnesses, the trial court required the parties to
submit affidavits, in question-and-answer form,
of their respective witnesses, to be sworn to in
court, with cross examination to be made in open
court.
Eventually, in a decision dated October 10,
1997,[4] the trial court, concluding that defendant
bank was negligent if not in bad faith, in
suspending, or blacklisting plaintiffs credit card
without notice or basis, rendered judgment in
favor of Calderon, thus:
WHEREFORE PREMISES ABOVE CONSIDERED,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
as against defendant EQUITABLE BANKING
CORPORATION, which is hereby ORDERED to pay
plaintiff as follows:
1. the sum of US$150.00 as actual damages;
2. the sum of P200,000.00 as and by way of moral
damages;
3. the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
4. the sum of P100,000.00 as attorneys
fees plus P500.00 per court
hearing and
5. costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, EBC went to the Court of
Appeals (CA), whereat its recourse was docketed
as CA G.R. CV No. 60016.
After due proceedings, the CA, in
a decision dated November 25,
2002,[5] affirmed that of the trial court but only
insofar as the awards of moral damages, the
amount of which was even reduced, and the
costs of suits are concerned. More specifically,
the CA decision dispositively reads:[6]
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing
disquisitions, the decision of the court a quo dated
10 October 1997 is AFFIRMED insofar as the
awards of moral damages and costs of suit are
concerned. However, anent the award of moral
damages, the same is reduced to One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos.
The rest of the awards are deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Evidently unwilling to accept a judgment
short of complete exemption from any liability to
Calderon, EBC is now with us via the instant
petition on its lone submission that THE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO MORAL
DAMAGES NOTWITHSTANDING ITS FINDING
THAT PETITIONERS ACTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN
ATTENDED WITH ANY MALICE OR BAD
FAITH.[7]
The petition is impressed with merit.
In law, moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation and similar
injury.[8] However, to be entitled to the award
thereof, it is not enough that one merely suffered
sleepless nights, mental anguish or serious
anxiety as a result of the actuations of the other
party.[9] In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[10] we have had
the occasion to reiterate the conditions to be met
in order that moral damages may be recovered,
viz:
An award of moral damages would require, firstly,
evidence of besmirched reputation, or physical,
mental or psychological suffering sustained by the
claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission
factually established; thirdly, proof that the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the damages sustained by the
claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated
on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by
Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.
Particularly, in culpa contractual or breach
of contract, as here, moral damages are
recoverable only if the defendant has acted
fraudulently or in bad faith,[11] or is found guilty
of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in
wanton disregard of his contractual
obligations.[12] Verily, the breach must be
wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith,
oppressive or abusive.[13]
Here, the CA ruled, and rightly so, that no
malice or bad faith attended petitioners dishonor
of respondents credit card. For, as found no less
by the same court, petitioner was justified in
doing so under the provisions of its Credit Card
Agreement[14] with respondent, paragraph 3 of
which states:
xxx the CARDHOLDER agrees not to exceed
his/her approved credit limit, otherwise, all
charges incurred including charges incurred
through the use of the extension CARD/S, if any in
excess of credit limit shall become due and
demandable and the credit privileges shall be
automatically suspended without notice to the
CARDHOLDER in accordance with Section 11
hereof.
We are thus at a loss to understand why,
despite its very own finding of absence of bad
faith or malice on the part of the petitioner, the
CA nonetheless adjudged it liable for moral
damages to respondent.
Quite evidently, in holding petitioner liable
for moral damages, the CA justified the award on
its assessment that EBC was negligent in not
informing Calderon that his credit card was
already suspended even before he left for
Hongkong, ratiocinating that petitioners right to
automatically suspend a cardholders privileges
without notice should not have been
indiscriminately used in the case of respondent
because the latter has already paid his past
obligations and has an existing dollar deposit in
an amount more than the required minimum for
credit card at the time he made his purchases in
Hongkong. But, as explained by the petitioner in
the memorandum it filed with this
Court,[15] which explanations were never
controverted by respondent:
xxx prior to the incident in question (i.e., April
30, 1986 when the purchases at the Gucci store
in Hongkong were made), respondent made
credit purchases in Japan and Hongkong from
August to September 1985 amounting to
US$14,226.12, while only having a deposit of
US$3,639.00 in his dollar account as evidenced
by the pertinent monthly statement of
respondents credit card transactions and his
bank passbook, thus exceeding his credit limit;
these purchases were accommodated by the
petitioner on the condition that the amount
needed to cover the same will be deposited in a
few days as represented by respondents
secretary and his companys general manager a
certain Mrs. Zamora and Mr. F.R. Oliquiano;
respondent however failed to make good on his
commitment; later, respondent likewise failed to
make the required deposit on the due date of the
purchases as stated in the pertinent monthly
statement of account; as a consequence thereof,
his card privileges for dollar transactions were
suspended; it was only four months later on 31
January 1986, that respondent deposited the
sum of P14,501.89 in his dollar account to cover
his purchases; the said amount however was not
sufficient to maintain the required minimum
dollar deposit of $3,000.00 as the respondents
dollar deposit stood at only US$2,704.94 after
satisfaction of his outstanding accounts; a day
before he left for Hongkong, respondent made
another deposit of US$14,000.00 in his dollar
account but did not bother to request the
petitioner for the reinstatement of his credit card
privileges for dollar transactions, thus the same
remained under suspension.[16]
The foregoing are based on the sworn affidavit of
petitioners Collection Manager, a certain
Lourdes Canlas, who was never cross examined
by the respondent nor did the latter present any
evidence to refute its veracity.
Given the above, and with the express
provision on automatic suspension without
notice under paragraph 3, supra, of the parties
Credit Card Agreement, there is simply no basis
for holding petitioner negligent for not notifying
respondent of the suspended status of his credit
card privileges.
It may be so that respondent, a day before
he left for Hongkong, made a deposit of
US$14,000.00 to his dollar account with
petitioner. The sad reality, however, is that he
never verified the status of his card before
departing for Hongkong, much less requested
petitioner to reinstate the same.[17]
And, certainly, respondent could not have
justifiably assumed that petitioner must have
reinstated his card by reason alone of his having
deposited US$14,000.00 a day before he left for
Hongkong. As issuer of the card, petitioner has
the option to decide whether to reinstate or
altogether terminate a credit card previously
suspended on considerations which the
petitioner deemed proper, not the least of which
are the cardholders payment record, capacity to
pay and compliance with any additional
requirements imposed by it. That option, after
all, is expressly embodied in the same Credit
Card Agreement, paragraph 12 of which
unmistakably states:
The issuer shall likewise have the option of
reinstating the card holders privileges which
have been terminated for any reason whatsoever
upon submission of a new accomplished
application form if required by the issuer and
upon payment of an additional processing fee
equivalent to annual fee.[18]
Even on the aspect of negligence, therefore,
petitioner could not have been properly
adjudged liable for moral damages.
Unquestionably, respondent suffered
damages as a result of the dishonor of his card.
There is, however, a material distinction
between damages and injury. To quote from our
decision in BPI Express Card Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals:[19]
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results
from the injury; and damages are the recompense
or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered.Thus, there can be damage without
injury in those instances in which the loss or
harm was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty. In such cases the consequences must
be borne by the injured person alone, the law
affords no remedy for damages resulting from an
act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may
maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries
resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence of
injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by
the person causing it. The underlying basis for the
award of tort damages is the premise that an
individual was injured in contemplation of
law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some
duty and the imposition of liability for that breach
before damages may be awarded; and the breach
of such duty should be the proximate cause of the
injury. (Emphasis supplied).
In the situation in which respondent finds
himself, his is a case of damnum absque injuria.
We do not take issue with the appellate
court in its observation that the Credit Card
Agreement herein involved is a contract of
adhesion, with the stipulations therein contained
unilaterally prepared and imposed by the
petitioner to prospective credit card holders on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis. As said by us in Polotan,
Sr. vs. Court of Appeals:[20]
A contract of adhesion is one in which one of the
contracting parties imposes a ready-made form
of contract which the other party may accept or
reject, but cannot modify. One party prepares the
stipulation in the contract, while the other party
merely affixes his signature or his adhesion
thereto giving no room for negotiation and
depriving the latter of the opportunity to bargain
on equal footing.
On the same breath, however, we have
equally ruled that such a contract is as binding as
ordinary contracts, the reason being that the
party who adheres to the contract is free to
reject it entirely.[21]
Moreover, the provision on automatic
suspension without notice embodied in the same
Credit Card Agreement is couched in clear and
unambiguous term, not to say that the
agreement itself was entered into by respondent
who, by his own account, is a reputable
businessman engaged in business activities here
and abroad.
On a final note, we emphasize that moral
damages are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claim for actual
injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on
the wrongdoer.[22]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED and the decision under review
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-
Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164273 March 28, 2007
EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, Petitioner,
vs.
CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines), Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 62554 dated January 30,
2004 which set aside the November 25, 1998
Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch
10, Cebu City and reinstated the Decision of RTC
Branch 20 of Cebu City dated May 29, 1998 in
Civil Case No. CEB-16474; and the CA Resolution
dated May 26, 2004 denying petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), a known
businessman2 in Cebu, is a holder of a Preferred
Master Credit Card (Mastercard) bearing
number 5423-3920-0786-7012 issued by
Citibank with a credit limit of ₱150,000.00. As he
and his wife, Zoraida, planned to take their two
grandchildren, Melissa and Richard Beane, on an
Asian tour, Aznar made a total advance deposit
of ₱485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention
of increasing his credit limit to ₱635,000.00.3
With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased
plane tickets to Kuala Lumpur for his group
worth ₱237,000.00. On July 17, 1994, Aznar, his
wife and grandchildren left Cebu for the said
destination.4
Aznar claims that when he presented his
Mastercard in some establishments in Malaysia,
Singapore and Indonesia, the same was not
honored.5 And when he tried to use the same in
Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency)
in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it
was again dishonored for the reason that his
card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor
forced him to buy the tickets in cash.6 He further
claims that his humiliation caused by the denial
of his card was aggravated when Ingtan Agency
spoke of swindlers trying to use blacklisted
cards.7 Aznar and his group returned to the
Philippines on August 10, 1994.8
On August 26, 1994, Aznar filed a complaint for
damages against Citibank, docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-16474 and raffled to RTC Branch 20,
Cebu City, claiming that Citibank fraudulently or
with gross negligence blacklisted his Mastercard
which forced him, his wife and grandchildren to
abort important tour destinations and prevented
them from buying certain items in their tour.9 He
further claimed that he suffered mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched
reputation and social humiliation due to the
wrongful blacklisting of his card.10 To prove that
Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar
presented a computer print-out, denominated as
ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT
ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan
Agency (Exh. "G") with the signature of one
Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi)11 which shows that
his card in question was "DECL OVERLIMIT" or
declared over the limit.12
Citibank denied the allegation that it blacklisted
Aznar’s card. It also contended that under the
terms and conditions governing the issuance and
use of its credit cards, Citibank is exempt from
any liability for the dishonor of its cards by any
merchant affiliate, and that its liability for any
action or incident which may be brought against
it in relation to the issuance and use of its credit
cards is limited to ₱1,000.00 or the actual
damage proven whichever is lesser.13
To prove that they did not blacklist Aznar’s card,
Citibank’s Credit Card Department Head, Dennis
Flores, presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins
which contained the list of its canceled cards
covering the period of Aznar’s trip.14
On May 29, 1998, RTC Branch 20, Cebu City,
through Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, rendered its
decision dismissing Aznar’s complaint for lack of
merit.15 The trial court held that as between the
computer print-out16presented by Aznar and the
Warning Cancellation Bulletins17 presented by
Citibank, the latter had more weight as their due
execution and authenticity were duly established
by Citibank.18 The trial court also held that even
if it was shown that Aznar’s credit card was
dishonored by a merchant establishment,
Citibank was not shown to have acted with
malice or bad faith when the same was
dishonored.19
Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration with
motion to re-raffle the case saying that Judge
Marcos could not be impartial as he himself is a
holder of a Citibank credit card.20 The case was
re-raffled21 and on November 25, 1998, the RTC,
this time through Judge Jesus S. De la Peña of
Branch 10 of Cebu City, issued an Order granting
Aznar’s motion for reconsideration, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby GRANTED. The DECISION dated May 29,
1998 is hereby reconsidered, and consequently,
the defendant is hereby condemned liable to pay
the following sums of money:
a) ₱10,000,000.00 as moral damages;
b) ₱5,000,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
c) ₱1,000,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
d) ₱200,000.00 as litigation expenses.22
Judge De la Peña ruled that: it is improbable that
a man of Aznar’s stature would fabricate Exh. "G"
or the computer print-out which shows that
Aznar’s Mastercard was dishonored for the
reason that it was declared over the limit; Exh.
"G" was printed out by Nubi in the ordinary or
regular course of business in the modern credit
card industry and Nubi was not able to testify as
she was in a foreign country and cannot be
reached by subpoena; taking judicial notice of
the practice of automated teller machines
(ATMs) and credit card facilities which readily
print out bank account status, Exh. "G" can be
received as prima facie evidence of the dishonor
of Aznar’s Mastercard; no rebutting evidence
was presented by Citibank to prove that Aznar’s
Mastercard was not dishonored, as all it proved
was that said credit card was not included in the
blacklisted cards; when Citibank accepted the
additional deposit of ₱485,000.00 from Aznar,
there was an implied novation and Citibank was
obligated to increase Aznar’s credit limit and
ensure that Aznar will not encounter any
embarrassing situation with the use of his
Mastercard; Citibank’s failure to comply with its
obligation constitutes gross negligence as it
caused Aznar inconvenience, mental anguish and
social humiliation; the fine prints in the flyer of
the credit card limiting the liability of the bank to
₱1,000.00 or the actual damage proven,
whichever is lower, is a contract of adhesion
which must be interpreted against Citibank.23
Citibank filed an appeal with the CA and its
counsel filed an administrative case against
Judge De la Peña for grave misconduct, gross
ignorance of the law and incompetence, claiming
among others that said judge rendered his
decision without having read the transcripts. The
administrative case was held in abeyance
pending the outcome of the appeal filed by
Citibank with the CA.24lawphi1.net
On January 30, 2004, the CA rendered its
Decision granting Citibank’s appeal thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED.
The assailed order of the Regional Trial Court,
7th Judicial Region, Branch 10, Cebu City, in Civil
Case No. CEB-16474, is hereby SET ASIDE and
the decision, dated 29 May 1998 of the Regional
Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 20, Cebu
City in this case is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.25
The CA ruled that: Aznar had no personal
knowledge of the blacklisting of his card and
only presumed the same when it was dishonored
in certain establishments; such dishonor is not
sufficient to prove that his card was blacklisted
by Citibank; Exh. "G" is an electronic document
which must be authenticated pursuant to Section
2, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence26 or
under Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court27 by anyone who saw the document
executed or written; Aznar, however, failed to
prove the authenticity of Exh. "G", thus it must be
excluded; the unrefuted testimony of Aznar that
his credit card was dishonored by Ingtan Agency
and certain establishments abroad is not
sufficient to justify the award of damages in his
favor, absent any showing that Citibank had
anything to do with the said dishonor; Citibank
had no absolute control over the actions of its
merchant affiliates, thus it should not be held
liable for the dishonor of Aznar’s credit card by
said establishments.28
Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration which
the CA dismissed in its Resolution dated May 26,
2004.29
Parenthetically, the administrative case against
Judge De la Peña was activated and on April 29,
2005, the Court’s Third Division30 found
respondent judge guilty of knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment and ordered his suspension
for six months. The Court held that Judge De la
Peña erred in basing his Order on a
manifestation submitted by Aznar to support his
Motion for Reconsideration, when no copy of
such manifestation was served on the adverse
party and it was filed beyond office hours. The
Court also noted that Judge De la Peña made an
egregiously large award of damages in favor of
Aznar which opened himself to suspicion.31
Aznar now comes before this Court on a petition
for review alleging that: the CA erroneously
made its own factual finding that his Mastercard
was not blacklisted when the matter of
blacklisting was already a non-issue in the
November 25, 1998 Order of the RTC; the RTC
found that Aznar’s Mastercard was dishonored
for the reason that it was declared over the
credit limit; this factual finding is supported by
Exh. "G" and by his (Aznar’s) testimony; the issue
of dishonor on the ground of ‘DECL OVERLIMIT’,
although not alleged in the complaint, was tried
with the implied consent of the parties and
should be treated as if raised in the pleadings
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure;32 Exh. "G" cannot be excluded as
it qualifies as an electronic evidence following
the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides
that print-outs are also originals for purposes of
the Best Evidence Rule; Exh. "G" has remained
complete and unaltered, apart from the
signature of Nubi, thus the same is reliable for
the purpose for which it was generated; the RTC
judge correctly credited the testimony of Aznar
on the issuance of the computer print-out as
Aznar saw that it was signed by Nubi; said
testimony constitutes the "other evidence
showing the integrity and reliability of the print-
out to the satisfaction of the judge" which is
required under the Rules on Electronic Evidence;
the trial court was also correct in finding that
Citibank was grossly negligent in failing to credit
the additional deposit and make the necessary
entries in its systems to prevent Aznar from
encountering any embarrassing situation with
the use of his Mastercard.33
Citibank, in its Comment, contends that: Aznar
never had personal knowledge that his credit
card was blacklisted as he only presumed such
fact; the issue of dishonor on the ground that the
card was declared over the limit was also never
tried with the implied consent of both parties;
Aznar’s self-serving testimony is not sufficient to
prove the integrity and reliability of Exh. "G";
Aznar did not declare that it was Nubi who
printed the document and that said document
was printed in his presence as he merely said
that the print-out was provided him; there is also
no annotation on Exh. "G" to establish that it was
Nubi who printed the same; assuming further
that Exh. "G" is admissible and Aznar’s credit
card was dishonored, Citibank still cannot be
held liable for damages as it only shows that
Aznar’s credit card was dishonored for having
been declared over the limit; Aznar’s cause of
action against Citibank hinged on the alleged
blacklisting of his card which purportedly caused
its dishonor; dishonor alone, however, is not
sufficient to award Aznar damages as he must
prove that the dishonor was caused by a grossly
negligent act of Citibank; the award of damages
in favor of Aznar was based on Article 117034 of
the Civil Code, i.e., there was fraud, negligence or
delay in the performance of its obligation; there
was no proof, however that Citibank committed
fraud or delay or that it contravened its
obligations towards Aznar; the terms and
conditions of the credit card cannot be
considered as a contract of adhesion since Aznar
was entirely free to reject the card if he did not
want the conditions stipulated therein; a person
whose stature is such that he is expected to be
more prudent with respect to his transactions
cannot later on be heard to complain for being
ignorant or having been forced into merely
consenting to the contract.35
In his Reply, Aznar contended that to a layman,
the term "blacklisting" is synonymous with the
words "hot list" or "declared overlimit"; and
whether his card was blacklisted or declared
over the limit, the same was dishonored due to
the fault or gross negligence of Citibank.36
Aznar also filed a Memorandum raising as issues
the following:
I. Whether or not the augmentation
deposit in the amount of ₱485,000.00
of the Petitioner constitutes relative
extinctive novation;
II. Whether or not the purchases made
by Petitioner were beyond his credit
limit;
III. Whether or not the issues of
dishonor by reason of overlimit was
tried with the consent of the parties;
IV. Whether or not the "On Line
Authorization Report" is an electronic
document."
V. Whether or not the "On Line
Authorization Report" constitutes
electronic evidence;
VI. Whether or not the agreement
between the parties is a contract of
adhesion;
VII. Whether or not the Respondent is
negligent in not crediting the deposits
of the Respondent.37
Aznar further averred in his Memorandum that
Citibank assured him that with the use of his
Mastercard, he would never be turned down by
any merchant store, and that under Section 43,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, Exh. "G" is
admissible in evidence.38
Citibank also filed a Memorandum reiterating its
earlier arguments.39
Stripped to its essentials, the only question that
needs to be answered is: whether Aznar has
established his claim against Citibank.
The answer is no.
It is basic that in civil cases, the burden of proof
rests on the plaintiff to establish his case based
on a preponderance of evidence. The party that
alleges a fact also has the burden of proving it.40
In the complaint Aznar filed before the RTC, he
claimed that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard
which caused its dishonor in several
establishments in Malaysia, Singapore, and
Indonesia, particularly in Ingtan Agency in
Indonesia where he was humiliated when its
staff insinuated that he could be a swindler
trying to use a blacklisted card.
As correctly found by the RTC in its May 29,
1998 Decision, Aznar failed to prove with a
preponderance of evidence that Citibank
blacklisted his Mastercard or placed the same on
the "hot list."41
Aznar in his testimony admitted that he had no
personal knowledge that his Mastercard was
blacklisted by Citibank and only presumed such
fact from the dishonor of his card.
Q Now, paragraph 12 also states and I quote: "its
entry in the "hot" list was confirmed to be
authentic".
Now, who confirmed that the blacklisting of your
Preferred Citibank Mastercard was authentic?
A. Okey. When I presented this Mastercard, my
card rather, at the Merchant’s store, I do not
know, they called up somebody for verification
then later they told me that "your card is being
denied". So, I am not in a position to answer that.
I do not know whom they called up; where they
verified. So, when it is denied that’s presumed
to be blacklisted.
Q. So the word that was used was denied?
A. Denied.
Q. And after you were told that your card was
denied you presumed that it was blacklisted?
A. Definitely.
Q. So your statement that your card was
allegedly blacklisted is only your
presumption drawn from the fact, from your
allegations, that it was denied at the
merchandise store?
A. Yes, sir.42 (Emphasis supplied)
The dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard is not
sufficient to support a conclusion that said credit
card was blacklisted by Citibank, especially in
view of Aznar’s own admission that in other
merchant establishments in Kuala Lumpur and
Singapore, his Mastercard was accepted and
honored.43
Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE
AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY
REPORT, a computer print-out handed to Aznar
by Ingtan Agency, marked as Exh. "G", to prove
that his Mastercard was dishonored for being
blacklisted. On said print-out appears the words
"DECL OVERLIMIT" opposite Account No. 5423-
3920-0786-7012.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA,
however, such exhibit cannot be considered
admissible as its authenticity and due execution
were not sufficiently established by petitioner.
The prevailing rule at the time of the
promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that
whenever any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved
either by (a) anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker.
Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh.
"G," did not actually see the document executed
or written, neither was he able to provide
evidence on the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said
computer print-out. Indeed, all he was able to
allege in his testimony are the following:
Q I show to you a Computer Print Out captioned
as On Line Authorization Activity Report where
it is shown that the Preferred Master Card
Number 5423392007867012 was denied as per
notation on the margin of this Computer Print
Out, is this the document evidencing the
dishonor of your Preferred Master Card?
xxxx
A Yes sir, after that Ingtan incident, I went
straight to the Service Agency there and on the
left hand side you will be able to see the name of
the person in-charged [sic] there certifying that
really my card is being blacklisted and there is
the signature there of the agency.
ATTY. NAVARRO:
The witness, your honor, is pointing to the
signature over the handwritten name of Victrina
Elnado Nubi which I pray, your honor, that the
Computer Print Out be marked as our Exhibit "G"
and the remarks at the left hand bottom portion
of Victorina Elnado Nubi with her signature
thereon be encircled and be marked as our
Exhibit "G-1".
xxxx
Q Mr. Aznar, where did you secure this
Computer Print Out marked as Exhibit "G"?
A This is provided by that Agency, your
honor. They were the ones who provided me
with this. So what the lady did, she gave me
the Statement and I requested her to sign to
show proof that my Preferred Master Card
has been rejected.44 (Emphasis supplied).
Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001,
and which is being invoked by Aznar in this case,
the authentication of Exh. "G" would still be
found wanting.
Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The
person seeking to introduce an electronic
document in any legal proceeding has the burden
of proving its authenticity in the manner
provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any
private electronic document offered as authentic
is received in evidence, its authenticity must be
proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been
digitally signed by the person
purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate
security procedures or devices as may
be authorized by the Supreme Court or
by law for authentication of electronic
documents were applied to the
document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its
integrity and reliability to the
satisfaction of the judge.
Aznar claims that his testimony complies with
par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the "other evidence
showing integrity and reliability of Exh. "G" to
the satisfaction of the judge." The Court is not
convinced. Aznar’s testimony that the person
from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the
computer print-out and that he thereafter asked
said person to sign the same cannot be
considered as sufficient to show said print-out’s
integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out
by Judge Marcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision,
Exh. "G" does not show on its face that it was
issued by Ingtan Agency as Aznar merely
mentioned in passing how he was able to secure
the print-out from the agency; Aznar also failed
to show the specific business address of the
source of the computer print-out because while
the name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by
Aznar, its business address was not reflected in
the print-out.45
Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the
information reflected on the print-out was
generated and how the said information could be
relied upon as true. In fact, Aznar to repeat,
testified as follows:
ATTY. NERI
Q Now, paragraph 12 also states and I quote: "its
entry in the "hot" list was confirmed to be
authentic"
Now, who confirmed that the blacklisting of your
Preferred Citibank Mastercard was authentic?
A Okey. When I presented this Mastercard, my
card rather, at the Merchant’s store, I do not
know, they called up somebody for verification
then later they told me that "your card is being
denied". So, I am not in a position to answer
that. I do not know whom they called up;
where they verified. So, when it is denied
that’s presumed to be blacklisted.46 (Emphasis
supplied)
Aznar next invokes Section 43 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, which pertains to entries in the
course of business, to support Exh. "G". Said
provision reads:
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. – Entries
made at, or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer, by a person deceased or unable
to testify, who was in a position to know the facts
therein stated, may be received as prima
facie evidence, if such person made the entries in
his professional capacity or in the performance
of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.
Under this rule, however, the following
conditions are required:
1. the person who made the entry must
be dead, or unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the
time of the transactions to which they
refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know
the facts stated in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his
professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether legal,
contractual, moral or religious; and
5. the entries were made in the
ordinary or regular course of business
or duty.47
As correctly pointed out by the RTC in its May
29, 1998 Decision, there appears on the
computer print-out the name of a certain
"Victrina Elnado Nubi" and a signature
purportedly belonging to her, and at the left
dorsal side were handwritten the words "Sorry
for the delay since the records had to be retrieved.
Regards. Darryl Mario." It is not clear therefore if
it was Nubi who encoded the information stated
in the print-out and was the one who printed the
same. The handwritten annotation signed by a
certain Darryl Mario even suggests that it was
Mario who printed the same and only handed the
print-out to Nubi. The identity of the entrant,
required by the provision above mentioned, was
therefore not established. Neither did petitioner
establish in what professional capacity did Mario
or Nubi make the entries, or whether the entries
were made in the performance of their duty in
the ordinary or regular course of business or
duty.
And even if Exh. "G" is admitted as evidence, it
only shows that the use of the credit card of
petitioner was denied because it was already
over the limit. There is no allegation in the
Complaint or evidence to show that there was
gross negligence on the part of Citibank in
declaring that the credit card has been used over
the limit.
The Court is also perplexed that stated on Exh.
"G" is the amount of "6,289,195.10" opposite
petitioner's account number, which data,
petitioner did not clarify.48 As plaintiff in this
case, it was incumbent on him to prove that he
did not actually incur the said amount which is
above his credit limit. As it is, the Court cannot
see how Exh. "G" could help petitioner's claim for
damages.
The claim of petitioner that Citibank blacklisted
his card through fraud or gross negligence is
likewise effectively negated by the evidence of
Citibank which was correctly upheld by the RTC
and the CA, to wit:
xxx Mr. Dennis Flores, the Head of the Credit
Card Department of defendant Bank, presented
documents known as Warning Cancellation
Bulletin for July 10, 17, 24, and 31, 1994
(Exhibits ‘3’, ‘3-1’ to ‘3-38’, ‘4’, ‘4-1’ to ‘4-38’ ‘5’,
‘5-1’ to ‘5-39’ and ‘6’, ‘6-1’ to ‘6-39’), for August 7,
1994 (Exhibit[s] ‘7’, ‘7-1’ to ‘7-37’), for August 8,
1994 (Exhibit[s] ‘8’, ‘8-1’ to ‘8-20’) which show
that plaintiff’s Citibank preferred mastercard
was not placed in a hot list or was not
blacklisted.
The Warning Cancellation Bulletins (WCB)
(Exhibits ‘3’, ‘4’, ‘5’, ‘6’, ‘7’, ‘8’ and their
submarkings) which covered the period of four
(4) days in July 1994 (from July 10, 17, 24 and
31, 1994), and two (2) days in August 1994,
(August 7 and 8, 1994), when plaintiff traveled in
the aforementioned Asian countries showed that
said Citibank preferred mastercard had never
been placed in a ‘hot list’ or the same was
blacklisted, let alone the fact that all the credit
cards which had been cancelled by the defendant
bank were all contained, reported and listed in
said Warning Cancellation Bulletin which were
issued and released on a regular basis.
These three hundred (300) Warning
Cancellation Bulletins pieces of documentary
proofs, all in all, adduced by defendant pointed
to the fact that said plaintiff’s credit car (sic) was
not among those found in said bulletins as
having been cancelled for the period for which
the said bulletins had been issued.
Between said computer print out (Exhibit ‘G’)
and the Warning Cancellation Bulletins (Exhibits
‘3’ to ‘8’ and their submarkings) the latter
documents adduced by defendant are entitled to
greater weight than that said computer print out
presented by plaintiff that bears on the issue of
whether the plaintiff’s preferred master card
was actually placed in the ‘hot list’ or blacklisted
for the following reasons:
The first reason is that the due execution and
authentication of these Warning Cancellation
Bulletins (or WCB) have been duly established
and identified by defendant’s own witness,
Dennis Flores, one of the bank’s officers, who is
the head of its credit card department, and,
therefore, competent to testify on the said
bulletins as having been issued by the defendant
bank showing that plaintiff’s preferred master
credit card was never blacklisted or placed in the
Bank’s ‘hot list’. But on the other hand, plaintiff’s
computer print out (Exhibit ‘G’) was never
authenticated or its due execution had never
been duly established. Thus, between a set of
duly authenticated commercial documents, the
Warning Cancellation Bulletins (Exhibits ‘3’ to ‘8’
and their submarkings), presented by
defendants (sic) and an unauthenticated private
document, plaintiff’s computer print out (Exhibit
‘G’), the former deserves greater evidentiary
weight supporting the findings of this Court that
plaintiff’s preferred master card (Exhibit ‘1’) had
never been blacklisted at all or placed in a so-
called ‘hot list’ by defendant.49
Petitioner next argues that with the additional
deposit he made in his account which was
accepted by Citibank, there was an implied
novation and Citibank was under the obligation
to increase his credit limit and make the
necessary entries in its computerized systems in
order that petitioner may not encounter any
embarrassing situation with the use of his credit
card. Again, the Court finds that petitioner's
argument on this point has no leg to stand on.
Citibank never denied that it received
petitioner’s additional deposit.50 It even claimed
that petitioner was able to purchase plane
tickets from Cebu to Kuala Lumpur in the
amount of ₱237,170.00, which amount was
beyond his ₱150,000.00 limit, because it was
able to credit petitioner’s additional deposit to
his account. Flores of Citibank testified:
COURT:
Q When was this ticket purchased, after the
account was augmented
or before?
A After the account was augmented, Your Honor,
because there is no way we can approve a
P250,000.00 purchase with a P150,000.00 credit
limit.51
xxx
ATTY. NERI:
For the record, your honor, the deposit of
P450,000.00 was made as per exhibit of the
plaintiff on June 28. The purchase of the
tickets amount to P237,000.00 was approved
and debited on the account of Mr. Aznar on
July 20, your honor. The deposit was made
about a month before the purchase of the
tickets as per documentary exhibits, your
honor.
COURT:
So, Atty. Navarro, what do you say to that
explanation?
ATTY. NAVARRO [counsel of petitioner]:
That is correct, your honor, that is borne out
by the records, your honor. (Emphasis
supplied)
COURT: (to witness)
Q So, I think Atty. Navarro is only after whether a
credit line could be extended?
A Yes, your honor.
Q Even if there is no augmenting?
A No, sir, it is not possible. So, the only way the
₱237,000.00 transaction could be approved
was by way of advance payment which
actually happened in this case because there
is no way that the ₱237,000.00 can be
approved with the ₱150,000.00 credit
limit.52 (Emphasis supplied)
The allegations of blacklisting not having been
proved, is Citibank liable for damages for the
dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard?
Again, the answer is no.
Citibank, in its attempt to evade liability, invokes
paragraphs 7 and 15 of the terms and conditions
governing the issuance of its Mastercard which
read:
7. MERCHANT AFFILIATES. [Citibank is] not
responsible if the Card is not honored by any
merchant affiliate for any reason. Furthermore,
[the cardholder] will not hold [Citibank]
responsible for any defective product or service
purchased through the Card.
xxxx
15. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. In any action
arising from this agreement or any incident
thereto which [the cardholder] or any other
party may file against [Citibank], [Citibank’s]
liability shall not exceed One Thousand Pesos
[₱1,000.00] or the actual damages proven,
whichever is lesser.53
On this point, the Court agrees with Aznar that
the terms and conditions of Citibank’s
Mastercard constitute a contract of adhesion. It
is settled that contracts between cardholders
and the credit card companies are contracts of
adhesion, so-called, because their terms are
prepared by only one party while the other
merely affixes his signature signifying his
adhesion thereto.54
In this case, paragraph 7 of the terms and
conditions states that "[Citibank is] not
responsible if the Card is not honored by any
merchant affiliate for any reason x x x". While it
is true that Citibank may have no control of all
the actions of its merchant affiliates, and should
not be held liable therefor, it is incorrect,
however, to give it blanket freedom from liability
if its card is dishonored by any merchant
affiliate for any reason. Such phrase renders the
statement vague and as the said terms and
conditions constitute a contract of adhesion, any
ambiguity in its provisions must be construed
against the party who prepared the contract,55 in
this case Citibank.
Citibank also invokes paragraph 15 of its terms
and conditions which limits its liability to
₱1,000.00 or the actual damage proven,
whichever is lesser.
Again, such stipulation cannot be considered as
valid for being unconscionable as it precludes
payment of a larger amount even though damage
may be clearly proven. This Court is not
precluded from ruling out blind adherence to the
terms of a contract if the attendant facts and
circumstances show that they should be ignored
for being obviously too one-sided.56
The invalidity of the terms and conditions being
invoked by Citibank, notwithstanding, the Court
still cannot award damages in favor of petitioner.
It is settled that in order that a plaintiff may
maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries
resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff – a concurrence
of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility
by the person causing it. The underlying basis for
the award of tort damages is the premise that an
individual was injured in contemplation of law;
thus there must first be a breach before damages
may be awarded and the breach of such duty
should be the proximate cause of the injury.57
It is not enough that one merely suffered
sleepless nights, mental anguish or serious
anxiety as a result of the actuations of the other
party. It is also required that a culpable act or
omission was factually established, that proof
that the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is shown as the proximate cause of the
damage sustained by the claimant and that the
case is predicated on any of the instances
expressed or envisioned by Arts. 221958 and
222059 of the Civil Code.60
In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral
damages are recoverable only if the defendant
has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found
guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith,
or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligations. The breach must be wanton,
reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or
abusive.61
While the Court commiserates with Aznar for
whatever undue embarrassment he suffered
when his credit card was dishonored by Ingtan
Agency, especially when the agency’s personnel
insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to
use blacklisted cards, the Court cannot grant his
present petition as he failed to show by
preponderance of evidence that Citibank
breached any obligation that would make it
answerable for said suffering.
As the Court pronounced in BPI Express Card
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,62
We do not dispute the findings of the lower court
that private respondent suffered damages as a
result of the cancellation of his credit card.
However, there is a material distinction between
damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion
of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm
which results from the injury; and damages are
the recompense or compensation awarded for
the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury to those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must
be borne by the injured person alone, the law
affords no remedy for damages resulting from an
act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria.63
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141880. September 27, 2004]
ZENAIDA F. DAPAR alias ZENAIDA D.
BIASCAN petitioner, vs. GLORIA
LOZANO BIASCAN and MARIO
BIASCAN respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV- No. 57306 reversing the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 120, in Civil Case No. C-
16184 and its Resolution[3] denying the motion
for the reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
Sometime in 1966, Spouses Gloria and
Mario Biascan were married in civil rights in
Quezon City.[4] They were, thereafter, blessed
with four (4) children, namely, Robert, Edward,
Glomary, and Eric.[5]
Mario Biascan, an electrician by profession,
worked in Saudi Arabia as an overseas contract
worker from 1977 to 1981. It was in 1979 when
he met Zenaida Dapar, who was then working as
a domestic helper. That first meeting ripened
into an intimate relationship. Both being lonely
in a foreign land, Zenaida and Mario became
lovers, which resulted in the latters failure to
give support to his wife and family.
Zenaida returned to the Philippines in
1981. Upon Marios return to the country, he
joined Zenaida to live in a rented house in Pag-
asa Subdivision, Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. They opened a joint account with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), Valenzuela
Branch, under Savings Account No. 498-514587-
9[6] on March 30, 1982. Mario returned to Saudi
Arabia in February 1984, while Zenaida stayed
behind and worked in a garment factory. He
remitted his earnings to Zenaida, and the latter
deposited the said amounts in the PNB joint
savings account through the Barclay Bank, PLS
Athens. These remittances were credited in the
said account, as well as others coming from
Zenaidas relatives who were also working
abroad. As of May 21, 1901, the balance of the
bank account was P257,225.[7]
In the meantime, on July 8, 1985, a contract
to sell was executed by and between State Land
Investment Corporation, on the one hand, and
Sps. Mario M. Biascan/ & Zenaida D. Biascan, on
the other, over a parcel of land consisting of 150
square meters, described as Lot 11, Block 2,
Narra St., Hillcrest Village, Camarin Road,
Novaliches, Caloocan City forP177,189.00.[8] A
Deed of Sale[9] was, thereafter, executed in favor
of the Sps. Mario M. Biascan and Zenaida D.
Biascan, as vendees, as a result of which Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 207197 was issued
by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City under
their names on February 8, 1990.[10]
On November 15, 1993, Gloria L. Biascan
filed a complaint against Zenaida for annulment
of title, reconveyance, and damages in the RTC of
Caloocan City, Branch 120, docketed as Civil Case
No. C-16184. She made the following allegations:
4. That said Mario M. Biascan, then an overseas
worker, and with the use of his earnings,
purchased a lot and house situated at Bo.
Camarin, Caloocan City, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 207197, a copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex A and made [an]
integral part hereof; said properties have a total
value of P104,000.00 per Tax Declaration No.
196644, a copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex B and made integral part hereof;
5. That said Transfer Certificate of Title No.
207197 (Annex A) and Tax Declaration No.
196644 (Annex B), were issued to Spouses Mario
M. Biascan and Zenaida D. Biascan, thru the
fraudulent misrepresentation of defendant that
she is the legal wife of Mario M. Biascan;
6. That the inclusion of the name of defendant in
the said transfer certificate of title and tax
declaration, is without any legal basis
whatsoever, because defendant is not the legal
wife of Mario M. Biascan, and that the money
used in acquiring the lot and house belonged to
Mario M. Biascan;
7. That the defendants use of the surname
Biascan is a usurpation of surname under Article
377 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, and
as such, plaintiff, who is the legal wife of Mario
M. Biascan, is entitled to recover damages from
defendant;
8. That by reason of defendants illegal acts in
causing the inclusion of her name in the
aforesaid transfer certificate of title and tax
declaration, plaintiff, the legal wife of Mario M.
Biascan, is unduly deprived of her right over the
property covered by said title and declaration,
and to vindicate such right, she is constrained to
institute the instant action and retain the
services of counsel to which she has agreed to
pay the sum of P20,000.00 for and as attorneys
fees and the sum of P1,000.00 as appearance
fee.[11]
Gloria prayed that judgment be rendered in
her favor, as follows:
1) Declaring as null and void the issuance of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207197 in favor
of Spouses Mario M. Biascan and Zenaida D.
Biascan, including Tax Declaration No. 196644;
2) Defendant to recover the undivided one-half
(1/2) portion of the lot in question to plaintiff,
who is the legal wife of Mario M. Biascan;
3) Defendant to pay to plaintiff the amount of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) Philippine
Currency, as damages for usurping the surname
Biascan which rightfully belongs to the plaintiff;
4) Defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) Philippine
Currency, for and as attorneys fees; and
5) To pay the costs of this suit.
Plaintiff further prays for such other relief this
Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in
the premises.[12]
Zenaida filed a Motion to Dismiss[13] on
January 20, 1994, principally on the ground that,
under Article 113 of the Civil Code and Section 4,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a married woman
cannot sue or be sued alone without joining her
husband, and that, as registered co-owner of the
subject property, the latter was an indispensable
party. She also alleged that she had no idea that
Mario was a married man; that she tried to leave
him when such fact came to her knowledge; and
that Mario made repeated promises of marriage.
According to Zenaida, she was fraudulently
and maliciously forced by Mario and his family to
vacate the house and lot in question. Thus, on
January 14, 1992, she instituted an action for
partition before Branch 129 of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, docketed as Civil Case No.
C-259. Zenaida, likewise, alleged that she
instituted an action for the enforcement of the
Amicable Settlement made before the barangay,
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan
City for the recovery of personal properties.
Thereafter, on May 3, 1993, the RTC of Caloocan
City rendered its Decision[14] in Civil Case No. C-
259, declaring that she was a co-owner of the
subject lot. She averred that, after receipt of the
decision, Mario and Gloria sent her a
Letter[15] dated May 18, 1993, persuading her to
agree to a very unreasonable settlement.
Zenaida claimed that Mario filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 32512, which was
dismissed[16] on December 17, 1993 on the
ground that the decision rendered by the RTC of
Caloocan City had long since become final and
executory; thus, based on the doctrine of res
judicata, her ownership of the one-half portion of
the lot covered by TCT No. 207197 could no
longer be questioned. Zenaida posited that
pursuant to paragraph (c), Sec. 3 of Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court, the facts and conclusions
contained in the said decision are conclusively
presumed to be true.
The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss in an Order[17] dated March 23, 1994.
In her answer, Zenaida alleged that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case, as the
cause of action therein was barred by prior
judgment. She, likewise, alleged that aside from
her savings from her work in Saudi Arabia, she
had other sources of income: her earnings from
working as a dressmaker at the Flores Garment
International Corporation; income from buying
and selling jewelry; a dollar pension from her
brother who was with the U.S. Navy; and
financial support from her mother and older
brothers. She averred that most of the money
used for the amortization and purchase of the
subject lot, as well as the construction of the
improvements thereon, was sourced from her
earnings and income and not solely from Mario
Biascan. She further alleged that Mario was, in
fact, unemployed from the later part of 1985 to
the early part of 1988, and that they had to
secure a loan in the total amount of P80,000
from her mother, which was used to pay part of
the amortization of the property and, which to
date, has remained unpaid.
She further alleged the following by way of
counterclaim:
18. That the institution of the instant case is
tainted with malice, for plaintiff know[s] for a
fact that the defendant is a lawful co-owner of
the subject lot and the house erected thereon,
because said plaintiff was always present during
the hearing of the Partition case filed by the
defendant before Branch 129 of this Honorable
Court, docketed under Civil Case No. C-259, and
of the fact that said case had already been
decided in favor of the defendant;
19. That plaintiff and Mario Biascan even tried to
convince to settle the case although [the said]
decision was already rendered, showing plaintiff
knowledge of the fact that the defendant is
indeed entitled to one-half of the property;
20. That obviously, the institution of the case
was made to delay and frustrate the immediate
enforcement of the decision in Civil Case No. C-
259 because plaintiff and her children, and Mario
Biascan, are enjoying the use of the subject
property to the prejudice of the defendant;
21. That because of the baseless and malicious
institution of the instant case, the defendant
suffered serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feeling[s] and sleepless nights to which
plaintiff should be held answerable in the sum of
not less than P50,000.00 plus P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages;
22. That for her protection, the defendant is
constrained to secure the services of the
undersigned counsel at an agreed attorneys fees
of P20,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per court
appearances (sic) to which plaintiff should,
likewise, be held answerable;
23. That plaintiff, in connivance with Mario
Biascan, has forcibly ousted the defendant from
the premises through strategy and stealth, and
because plaintiff, Mario Biascan and their
children are presently occupying that portion
owned by the defendant, it is but just and fair
that they be adjudged to pay reasonable rent
of P2,500.00 per month from date of the decision
in Civil Case No. C-259 for the use thereof, up to
the time said portion is surrendered to the
defendant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully prayed to the Honorable Court that
after due hearing judgment be rendered in favor
of the defendant and against the plaintiff,
DISMISSING the complaint and GRANTING all the
counterclaim[s] interposed by the defendant.
Defendant further prays for such other reliefs as
are just and equitable under the premises.[18]
After the parties submitted their respective
pre-trial briefs, Gloria filed an amended
complaint,[19] impleading her husband Mario as
party-defendant. Thereafter, in an Order[20]dated
July 6, 1994, the RTC, Branch 120, issued a writ
of preliminary injunction restraining and
enjoining the enforcement of the writ of
execution[21] issued by the RTC, Branch 129 in
Civil Case No. C-259. Gloria then filed a bond in
the amount of P50,000 which was duly approved
by the RTC, Branch 120.[22]
After trial, the court ruled in favor of
defendant Zenaida and dismissed the complaint
on October 28, 1997. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
complaint is dismissed. On the counterclaim,
plaintiff is ordered to pay co-defendant Zenaida
Dapar:
1. Attorneys fees in the sum
of P20,000.00,
plus P1,000.00 per court
appearance
2. Exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000.00; and
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[23]
The trial court ruled that the law on co-
ownership governed the property relations of
Mario and Zenaida, who were living in an
adulterous relationship or in a state of
concubinage at the time the house and lot in
question was acquired. The trial court further
explained that under Article 148 of the Family
Code, properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money
shall be owned in common in proportion to their
respective contributions, and in the event that
the amount of such contributions could not be
determined, as in the present case, they shall be
presumed to be equal. The trial court concluded
that the shares of Mario and Zenaida as
described in TCT No. 207197 was in accordance
with the sharing prescribed in Article 148. As
such, there was no legal basis to order the
reconveyance of the one-half share of the
petitioner in favor of Gloria Biascan.
Anent Zenaidas use of the surname
Biascan, the trial court ruled that Gloria was not
entitled to damages since Mario consented
thereto.
On appeal, however, the appellate court
reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled
in favor of Gloria as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision
dated October 28, 1997 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu
thereof, another judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the appellant and against the appellee as
follows:
1. declaring the Transfer Certificate of Title No.
207197 of the Register of Deeds for Caloocan
City, registered in the name of the spouses Mario
M. Biascan and Zenaida D. Biascan, null and void;
2. ordering appellee to reconvey in favor of the
appellant one-half (1/2) undivided portion of the
property described in said title, she being the
legal wife of Mario M. Biascan;
3. ordering the appellee to pay the appellant
attorneys fee in the amount of P20,000.00
4. ordering the appellee to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[24]
The appellate court ruled that Zenaidas
contention that Mario was unemployed from
1985 to 1988, and that she had savings and
substantial earnings from her jewelry business
was untenable. The appellate court also ruled
that the remittances from relatives as claimed by
Zenaida were not meant for her, as they were
either unsigned or addressed to someone else.
Clearly, the appellate court ruled, such
remittances were not intended to increase
Zenaidas resources to support her claim that she
contributed to the payment of the house and lot
in question from her own funds. The appellate
court noted that the appellees income was so
meager that it was not even enough for her, and
that she failed to establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, that her savings and/or the
remittances of her mother and brothers were
deposited to the PNB joint savings account. The
appellate court further ratiocinated as follows:
For failure of the appellee to prove by
satisfactory evidence that she contributed
money to the purchase price of the house and lot
in question, there is no basis to justify her co-
ownership; the same must revert to the conjugal
partnership [of] Mario Biascan and his lawful
wife, the appellant (Agapay v. Palang, 276 SCRA
340). The entry in the Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 207197, the word Spouses Mario M.
Biascan and Zenaida D. Biascan, where the latter
is not legally married to the former, is no proof
that she contributed her money for the purchase
of the property in question. In the case at bar, no
iota of evidence was adduced to prove
contribution. In the determination of the nature
of the property acquired during their live-in
partner status, the controlling factor is the
source of the money utilized in the purchase.
Evidently, from the Contract to Sell (Exh. 2),
Mario M. Biascan was in Saudi Arabia and the
appellee was probably of the impression that is
she made it appear that they are spouses, the
same belong to both of them. Regrettably, there
is no law to support such belief.
Indeed, there was fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation in the acquisition of the
property in question, depriving the lawful wife,
the appellant herein, the property acquired
during the marriage which forms part of the
conjugal partnership between Mario M. Biascan
and Gloria Lozano Biascan.[25]
Zenaidas motion for reconsideration was,
likewise, denied in a Resolution dated February
4, 2000.
The Present Petition
Zenaida, now the petitioner, raises the
following issues for the resolution of the Court in
the instant petition:
I. The subject properties are acquired
thru (sic) the common funds of
petitioner and respondent Mario
Biascan;
II. Petitioner has source of income
and had contributed in the
purchase of the subject properties
(sic);
III. The subject properties (sic) were
acquired in good faith by
petitioner and not with
fraudulent means;
IV. There are (sic) no proper and legal
basis in the annulment of title and
reconveyance of the subject
properties (sic);
V. No proper basis for the award of
attorneys fees against petitioner;
and
VI. The decision in Civil Case No. C-
259 must be respected for
being res judicata.[26]
The petitioner catalogues the deposits
made in the PNB account from 1985 to
November 1988,[27] and avers that such deposits
could not possibly be considered as remittances
of respondent Mario Biascan because he was
jobless in 1983, and, thereafter, from 1985 to
1988, and was then in the Philippines wholly
dependent upon her for support. The petitioner
also avers that the alleged remittances cannot be
considered as respondent Mario Biascans record
of employment abroad, and that based on the
evidence on record, he could not have paid even
one-half () of the purchase price of the subject
property. However, since the contribution of the
petitioner and respondent could not be
determined, considering that no specific
amounts were properly identified as actual
deposits of the parties in the joint account, such
shares are presumed equal.
The petitioner also points out that Article
148 of the Family Code does not provide for an
annulment of title of any of the properties
acquired during an illicit relationship, but merely
provides for forfeiture of the properties of the
party in bad faith in accordance with the said
provision.
According to the petitioner, it is, likewise,
evident from the evidence presented that
respondent Gloria Biascan had knowledge of the
petitioners illicit relationship with her husband,
did nothing to stop it, and, in fact, benefited from
such relationship. The petitioner contends that
the award of attorneys fees in favor of such
respondent cannot be allowed, as the appellate
court made no express findings or reasons in its
decision to justify such award.
Finally, the petitioner points out that the
decision in Civil Case No. C-259, which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 32512, already became final and executory,
and that the court a quo issued a writ of
execution on September 24, 1993. The petitioner
cites the ruling of the Court in Mendiola v. Court
of Appeals[28] to bolster her claim.
For their part, the respondents allege that
the decision rendered in Civil Case No. C-259 is
not res judicata in the instant case. While the
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss invoking the
defense of bar by former judgment, such motion
was denied by the court a quo. According to the
respondents, the petitioner did not file a motion
for reconsideration or appeal, much less raise
the same as an error before the appellate court.
The respondents allege that the silence of the
petitioner on the matter of res judicata before
the Court of Appeals is an indication of her
conformity to the correctness of the ruling of the
lower court.
The respondents also posit that the
petitioner employed fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation in her inclusion as a co-owner
of the property, as a result of which the lawful
wife, respondent Gloria Biascan, was deprived of
the property in question; thus, the annulment of
the title and reconveyance of the property in
question was legal and proper. Furthermore, due
to such fraudulent and deceitful acts of the
petitioner, respondent Gloria Biascan, the
aggrieved party, is legally entitled to the award
of attorneys fees.
The issue in the present case is whether or
not the action of respondent Gloria Biascan is
barred by the decision of the RTC in Civil Case
No. C-259. A secondary issue is whether or not
the petitioner is liable to respondent Gloria
Biascan for damages for usurpation of the
surname of respondent Mario Biascan under
Article 377 of the Civil Code.
The Courts Ruling
We find and so hold that the action of
respondent Gloria Biascan was barred by the
decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. C-259.
For res judicata to bar the institution of
subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the former judgment must be final;
(2) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties;
(3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4)
there must be, between the first and second
actions (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of
subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of
action.[29] The foundation principle upon which
the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties
ought not to be permitted to litigate the same
issue more than once; that when a right or fact
has been judicially tried and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon
the parties and those in privity with them in law
or estate.[30] As we ruled in Oropeza Marketing
Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation:[31]
Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged; a
thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment. Res judicata lays the
rule that an existing final judgment or decree
rendered on the merits, and without fraud or
collusion, or by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or
any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in
the first suit. The principle of res judicata has
two aspects, namely: (a) bar by prior judgment
as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 49(b) of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and (b)
conclusiveness of judgment which is contained
in Rule 39, Section 47(c).
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between
the first case where the judgment was rendered
and the second case that is sought to be barred,
there is identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in
the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the
second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or
decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on
the merits concludes the litigation between the
parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a
bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first
and second cases, but no identity of causes of
action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to
those matters actually and directly controverted
and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. This is the concept of res
judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment.
Stated differently, any right, fact, or matter in
issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved
in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which judgment is rendered
on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies whether or
not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject
matter of the two actions is the same.[32]
Contrary to the contentions of the
respondents, the petitioner consistently invoked
the finality of the judgment of the RTC of
Caloocan City, Branch 129, in Civil Case No. C-
259 for partition of the property covered by TCT
No. 207197, as well as a 1976 model Toyota car.
Eighty-three (83) days after learning of the said
decision,[33] respondent Mario Biascan filed a
petition for relief from judgment, which the trial
court dismissed, and which dismissal was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 32512 promulgated on December 17, 1993.
The decision in Civil Case No. C-259 became final
and executory, thus satisfying the first requisite.
Furthermore, such judgment was on the merits
and was rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties.
In the meantime, on October 27, 1993,
respondent Gloria Biascan filed Civil Case No. C-
16184 for annulment of TCT No. 207197,
reconveyance and damages.
It is clear that there is identity of subject
matter between the two cases; that is, the parcel
of land in Caloocan City covered by TCT No.
207197. Such property was adjudicated in favor
of the petitioner and the respondent, as co-
owners in equal shares. It must be stressed that
in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks,
first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the
subject properties; and second, the conveyance
of his lawful shares. An action for partition is at
once an action for declaration of co-ownership
and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the properties
involved.[34] As we ruled in a recent case:[35]
To split the proceedings into declaration of
nullity of the deed of sale and trial for the
partition case, or to hold in abeyance the
partition case pending resolution of the nullity
case would result in the multiplicity of suits,
duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay, as
the lower court observed. The conduct of
separate trials of the parties respective claims
would entail a substantial duplication of effort
and time not only of the parties but also of the
courts concerned. On the other hand, it would be
in the interest of justice of the partition court
hears all the actions and incidents concerning
the properties subject of the partition in a single
and complete proceeding.
After all, the issue of nullity can be properly
ventilated before the partition court. Thus, even
with the dismissal of the action for nullity,
petitioner is not without recourse. She can still
dispute the execution of the deed of absolute sale
and assert her rights to the properties subject of
the said instrument in the partition case. There is
no need for a separate case to resolve the
matter.[36]
Indeed, the difference in form and nature of
the two actions is immaterial and is not a reason
for exemption from the effects of res judicata.
The philosophy behind this rule prohibits the
parties from litigating the same issue more than
once. When a right or fact has been judicially
tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction or an opportunity for such trial has
been given, the judgment of the court, as long as
it remains unreversed, should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with
them.[37] Whatever has once been irrevocably
established as the controlling legal principle in
an earlier final judgment continues to be the law
of the case between the same parties in another
suit, as long as the facts on which such decision
was predicated continue to be the facts of the
dispute before the court.[38]
It may be argued that there is no identity of
parties in the first and second case. In the first
case for partition, the plaintiff was the petitioner,
while the defendant was respondent Mario
Biascan; in the second case for annulment of title
and reconveyance of the same property,
respondent Gloria Biascan was the plaintiff,
while the defendants were the petitioner and
respondent Mario Biascan. However, absolute
identity of parties is not required for the
principle of res judicata to apply. Mere
substantial identity of parties, or a community of
interests between a party in the first case and a
party in the subsequent case, even if the latter
was not impleaded in the first case, is
sufficient.[39]
It cannot be ignored that the evidence
presented in the two cases were substantially
the same: among others, the PNB Bank account,
the Contract to Sell, the Deed of Sale, and the
certificates of remittances. In fact, both trial
courts made similar findings, and adjudicated
the property in favor of both respondent Mario
Biascan and the petitioner. This cannot be done
without violating the rule on finality of
judgments. The Court reiterates the following
pronouncement in Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo:[40]
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a
judgment attains finality it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it
or by the highest court of the land. Just as the
losing party has the right to file an appeal within
the prescribed period, the winning party also has
the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his case. The doctrine of finality of
judgment is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound
practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors,
the judgments or orders of courts must become
final at some definite time fixed by law;
otherwise, there would be no end to litigation,
thus setting to naught the main role of courts of
justice which is to assist in the enforcement of
the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and
order by settling justiciable controversies with
finality.[41]
Indeed, it is readily apparent that the
action for annulment of judgment was, in effect, a
second cycle of review regarding a subject
matter which has already been finally
decided.[42] It is, likewise, not lost upon this
Court that respondent Gloria Biascan resorted to
filing the second case for annulment of title as an
afterthought, after realizing her husbands failure
to appeal Civil Case No. C-259, and the inevitable
dismissal of the petition for relief from judgment
by the trial court and, thereafter, the petition for
certiorari before the appellate court.
Anent respondent Gloria Biascans claim for
damages for the petitioners alleged usurpation
of her husbands name, we rule that she is not
entitled to an award therefor.
The usurpation of name under Article 377
of the Civil Code[43] implies some injury to the
interests of the owner of the name. It consists in
the possibility of confusion of identity between
the owner and the usurper, and exists when a
person designates himself by another name. The
elements are as follows: (1) there is an actual use
of anothers name by the defendant; (2) the use is
unauthorized; and (3) the use of anothers name
is to designate personality or identify a
person.[44] None of the foregoing exist in the case
at bar. Respondent Gloria Biascan did not claim
that the petitioner ever attempted to
impersonate her. In fact, the trial court found
that respondent Mario Biascan allowed the
petitioner to use his surname, viz:
On the other cause of action referring to the use
by Zenaida of the family name Biascan for which
damages is prayed for by the plaintiff, there is
evidence to show that defendant Mario Biascan
was the one who suggested, and in fact
authorized Zenaida Dapar to use said family
name. It would appear that the very first time
that Zenaida Dapars name had the surname
Biascan was when defendant Mario Biascan had
executed the affidavit of undertaking in Puno, (Chairman), Austria-
connection with his employment in Saudi Arabia, Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
wherein he designated as his beneficiary Zenaida Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.
Dapar Biascan. The undertaking was sworn to by
the defendant on April 7, 1982 and which also
showed that his effective date of employment in
Saudi Arabia was April 1982 and to expire on
February 1984 (Exhibit A). This is an
extrajudicial admission that would not allow
proof to the contrary. Zenaida appeared to have
no participation in the preparation of said
document. Moreover, when the contract to sell
and the deed of sale of the property in question
were executed, Zenaida Dapar used the surname
Biascan and defendant Mario Biascan did not
object to the use of such surname. Also, in the
joint bank account with the PNB Valenzuela, the
name Zenaida Dapar Biascan is described as a
joint depositor.

Defendant Zenaida Dapar testified that she used

the surname Biascan because she was instructed
by her co-defendant to do so and she thought the
latter was not married. She only became aware
of his civil status a few years later after their
living together in 1981.

The use by Zenaida Dapar of the surname of her

co-defendant Mario Biascan was allowed by the
latter and in no case could it be considered
usurpation of surname. Accordingly, co-
defendant Zenaida Dapar can no longer be held
liable for damages for the use thereof.[45]

The mere use of a surname cannot be

enjoined; it is the use thereof coupled with the
representation that one is the lawful wife, or the
usurpation of the wifes status, which gives rise to
an action for damages.[46]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 57306 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
complaint of respondent Gloria Biascan is
DISMISSED on the ground of res judicata. The
counterclaims of the petitioner against
respondent Gloria Biascan are DISMISSED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.