1) RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC. vs. HON. JANSEN R.
legally disinherited, hence, prohibited from receiving any share from the estate of
RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND
LUCINA SANTOS, substituted by her son, EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA
(November 28, 2011 REYES, J.)
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the December 14, 2009 Decision[2] and July 8, 2010
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99856. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us DENYING the petition filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the assailed Orders dated March 15, 2007 and May
16, 2007 issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 6, in Manila in Civil Case No. 02-105251.[4]
The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Factual Antecedents
Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3, 2002,[5] the
respondents filed a Complaint[6] against the petitioners and Stronghold Insurance
Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia
Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and
all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his successors-
in-interest.
The Complaint, captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of
Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of
Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a]
Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction," was docketed
as Civil Case No. 02-105251 and raffled to Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (RTC).
In the Complaint, the respondents alleged the following as causes of
action:
First Cause of Action. They are the heirs of Lim San, also known as Antonio Ching
/ Tiong Cheng / Ching Cheng Suy (Antonio). Respondents Joseph Cheng (Joseph)
and Jaime Cheng (Jaime) are allegedly the children of Antonio with his common-law
wife, respondent Mercedes Igne (Mercedes). Respondent Lucina Santos (Lucina)
claimed that she was also a common-law wife of Antonio. The respondents averred
that Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonio's and Lucina's son when in truth and
in fact, he was adopted and his birth certificate was merely simulated. On July 18,
1996, Antonio died of a stab wound. Police investigators identified Ramon as the
prime suspect and he now stands as the lone accused in a criminal case for murder
filed against him. Warrants of arrest issued against him have remained unserved as
he is at large. From the foregoing circumstances and upon the authority of Article
919[7] of the New Civil Code (NCC), the respondents concluded that Ramon can be
Antonio.
Second Cause of Action. On August 26, 1996, prior to the conclusion of the police
investigations tagging Ramon as the prime suspect in the murder of Antonio, the
former made an inventory of the latter's estate. Ramon misrepresented that there
were only six real estate properties left by Antonio. The respondents alleged that
Ramon had illegally transferred to his name the titles to the said properties. Further,
there are two other parcels of land, cash and jewelries, plus properties in Hongkong,
which were in Ramon's possession.
Third Cause of Action. Mercedes, being of low educational attainment, was sweet-
talked by Ramon into surrendering to him a Global Business Bank, Inc. (Global
Bank) Certificate of Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio, and the
certificates of title covering two condominium units in Binondo which were
purchased by Antonio using his own money but which were registered in Ramon's
name. Ramon also fraudulently misrepresented to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes
that they will promptly receive their complete shares, exclusive of the stocks in Po
Wing Properties, Inc. (Po Wing), from the estate of Antonio. Exerting undue
influence, Ramon had convinced them to execute an Agreement[8] and a Waiver[9]
on August 20, 1996. The terms and conditions stipulated in the Agreement and
Waiver, specifically, on the payment by Ramon to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes of
the amount of P22,000,000.00, were not complied with. Further, Lucina was not
informed of the execution of the said instruments and had not received any amount
from Ramon. Hence, the instruments are null and void.
Fourth Cause of Action. Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po Wing, which constitute 60%
of the latter's total capital stock, were illegally transferred by Ramon to his own
name through a forged document of sale executed after Antonio died. Po Wing
owns a ten-storey building in Binondo. Ramon's claim that he bought the stocks
from Antonio before the latter died is baseless. Further, Lucina's shares in Po Wing
had also banished into thin air through Ramon's machinations.
Fifth Cause of Action. On October 29, 1996, Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate[10] adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire
estate to the prejudice of the respondents. By virtue of the said instrument, new
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) covering eight real properties owned by Antonio
were issued in Ramon's name. Relative to the Po Wing shares, the Register of
Deeds of Manila had required Ramon to post a Surety Bond conditioned to answer
for whatever claims which may eventually surface in connection with the said
stocks. Co-defendant Stronghold Insurance Company issued the bond in Ramon's
behalf.
Sixth Cause of Action. Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to co-
defendant Asia Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was
part of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at
an unreasonably low price. By reason of Ramon's lack of authority to dispose of any
part of Antonio's estate, the conveyances are null and void ab initio.
Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now manages
Antonio's estate. She has no intent to convey to the respondents their shares in the
estate of Antonio.

The respondents thus prayed for the following in their Complaint:
1. x x x a temporary restraining order be issued restraining the defendant RAMON
CHING and/or his attorney-in-fact Belen Dy Tan Ching from disposing, selling or
alienating any property that belongs to the estate of the deceased ANTONIO
CHING;
xxx
4. x x x
a.) Declaring that the defendant RAMON CHING who murdered his
father ANTONIO CHING disqualified as heir and from inheriting to
(sic) the estate of his father;
b.) Declaring the nullity of the defendant RAMON CHING transfer
(sic) of the six [6] parcels of land from the name of his father
ANTONIO CHING to his name covered by TCT No. x x x;
c.) Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and WAIVER executed
by plaintiffs x x x in favor of x x x RAMON CHING for being patently
immoral, invalid, illegal, simulated and (sic) sham;
d.) Declaring the nullity of the transfer of the shares of stocks at (sic)
PO WING from the names of ANTONIO CHING and LUCINA
SANTOS to the defendant ANTONIO CHING's name for having been
illegally procured through the falsification of their signatures in the
document purporting the transfer thereof;
e.) Declaring the nullity and to have no force and effect the
AFFIDAVIT OF SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE executed by x x x
RAMON CHING for being contrary to law and existing jurisprudence;
f.) Declaring the nullity of the DEED OF SALES (sic) executed by x x
x RAMON CHING (i) over two (2) parcels of land x x x to defendant
ASIA ATLANTIC BUSINESS VENTURES, Inc.; and (ii) one (1) parcel
of land x x x sold to x x x ELENA TIU DEL PILAR for having illegally
procured the ownership and titles of the above properties;
x x x.[11]
The petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss[12] alleging
forum shopping, litis pendentia, res judicata and the respondents as not being the
real parties in interest.
On July 30, 2004, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order[13] denying the
petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.
The respondents filed an Amended Complaint[14] dated April 7, 2005
impleading Metrobank as the successor-in-interest of co-defendant Global Bank.
The Amended Complaint also added a seventh cause of action relative to the
existence of a Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in the amount of
P4,000,000.00 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. The respondents prayed
that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA and that it be immediately
released to them. Alternatively, the respondents prayed for the issuance of a hold
order relative to the CPPA to preserve it during the pendency of the case.
On April 22, 2005, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with
Counterclaim.[15]
On October 28, 2005, the RTC issued an Order[16] admitting the
respondents' Amended Complaint. The RTC stressed that Metrobank had already
filed Manifestations admitting that as successor-in-interest of Global Bank, it now
possesses custody of Antonio's deposits. Metrobank expressed willingness to abide
by any court order as regards the disposition of Antonio's deposits. The petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration filed to assail the aforecited Order was denied by the
RTC on May 3, 2006.
On May 29, 2006, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with
Counterclaim to the respondents' Amended Complaint.
On August 11, 2006, the RTC issued a pre-trial order.[17]
On January 18, 2007, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss[18] the respondents'
Amended Complaint on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the Complaint. The petitioners argued that since the Amended
Complaint sought the release of the CPPA to the respondents, the latter's
declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, the suit
partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for
declaration of nullity. Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and
not to the RTC acting as an ordinary court.
On March 15, 2007, the RTC issued an Order[19] denying the petitioners' Motion to
Dismiss on grounds:
In the case at bar, an examination of the Complaint would disclose that the
action delves mainly on the question of ownership of the properties described
in the Complaint which can be properly settled in an ordinary civil action. And
as pointed out by the defendants, the action seeks to declare the nullity of the
Agreement, Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale,
Transfer Certificates of Title, which were all allegedly executed by defendant Ramon
Ching to defraud the plaintiffs. The relief of establishing the status of the
plaintiffs which could have translated this action into a special proceeding
was nowhere stated in the Amended Complaint. With regard [to] the prayer to
declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owner[s] of the CPPA and that the same be
immediately released to them, in itself poses an issue of ownership which
must be proved by plaintiffs by substantial evidence. And as emphasized by the
plaintiffs, the Amended Complaint was intended to implead Metrobank as a co-
defendant.
As regards the issue of disinheritance, the court notes
that during the Pre-trial of this case, one of the issues raised by
the defendants Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties is: Whether
or not there can be disinheritance in intestate succession?
Whether or not defendant Ramon Ching can be legally
disinherited from the estate of his father? To the mind of the Court,
 the issue of disinheritance, which is one of the causes of
action in the Complaint, can be fully settled after a trial on the
merits. And at this stage, it has not been sufficiently
established whether or not there is a will.[20] (Emphasis
supplied.)
The above Order, and a subsequent Order dated May 16, 2007 denying
the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, became the subjects of a petition for
certiorari filed with the CA. The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99856, raised
the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
petitioners' Motion to Dismiss despite the fact that the Amended Complaint sought
to establish the status or rights of the respondents which subjects are within the
ambit of a special proceeding.
On December 14, 2009, the CA rendered the now assailed Decision[21]
denying the petition for certiorari on grounds:
Our in-depth assessment of the condensed allegations supporting the causes of
action of the amended complaint induced us to infer that nothing in the said
complaint shows that the action of the private respondents should be
threshed out in a special proceeding, it appearing that their allegations were
substantially for the enforcement of their rights against the alleged fraudulent
acts committed by the petitioner Ramon Ching. The private respondents also
instituted the said amended complaint in order to protect them from the
consequence of the fraudulent acts of Ramon Ching by seeking to disqualify
Ramon Ching from inheriting from Antonio Ching as well as to enjoin him
from disposing or alienating the subject properties, including the P4 Million
deposit with Metrobank. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such issues, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Furthermore, we agree with the trial
court that the probate court could not take cognizance of the prayer to
disinherit Ramon Ching, given the undisputed fact that there was no will to be
contested in a probate court.
The petition at bench apparently cavils the subject amended
complaint and complicates the issue of jurisdiction by reiterating the
grounds or defenses set up in the petitioners' earlier pleadings.
Notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter
is determined by the allegations of the complaint without regard to
whether or not the private respondents (plaintiffs) are entitled to
recover upon all or some of the causes of action asserted therein. In
this regard, the jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the
defenses pleaded in the answer or in the motion to dismiss, lest the
question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
petitioners (defendants).[22] Hence, we focus our resolution on the
issue of jurisdiction on the allegations in the amended complaint and not
on the defenses pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the subsequent
pleadings of the petitioners.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject the action of the petitioners in a
special proceeding since the nullification of the subject documents
could be achieved in the civil case, the lower court should proceed to
evaluate the evidence of the parties and render a decision thereon upon
the issues that it defined during the pre-trial in Civil Case No. 02-105251.
[23] (emphasis supplied)
The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA
through a Resolution[24] issued on July 8, 2010.
The Issue
The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[25] is anchored on the issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE MOTION
TO DISMISS FILED BY THE PETITIONERS ON THE ALLEGED GROUND OF
THE RTC'S LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
AMENDED COMPLAINT, TO WIT, (A) FILIATIONS WITH ANTONIO OF
RAMON, JAIME AND JOSEPH; (B) RIGHTS OF COMMON-LAW WIVES,
LUCINA AND MERCEDES, TO BE CONSIDERED AS HEIRS OF ANTONIO;
(C) DETERMINATION OF THE EXTENT OF ANTONIO'S ESTATE; AND (D)
OTHER MATTERS WHICH CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED IN A SPECIAL
PROCEEDING AND NOT IN AN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION.
The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the authority to
determine (a) who are the heirs of a decedent; (b) the validity of a waiver of
hereditary rights; (c) the status of each heir; and (d) whether the property in the
inventory is conjugal or the exclusive property of the deceased spouse.[26] Further,
the extent of Antonio's estate, the status of the contending parties and the
respondents' alleged entitlement as heirs to receive the proceeds of Antonio's CPPA
now in Metrobank's custody are matters which are more appropriately the subjects
of a special proceeding and not of an ordinary civil action.
The respondents opposed[27] the instant petition claiming that the
petitioners are engaged in forum shopping. Specifically, G.R. Nos. 175507[28] and
183840,[29] both involving the contending parties in the instant petition were filed by
the petitioners and are currently pending before this Court. Further, in Mendoza v.
Hon. Teh,[30] the SC declared that whether a particular matter should be resolved
by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate
jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. Besides,
the petitioners, having validly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC
and having actively participated in the trial of the case, are already estopped from
challenging the RTC's jurisdiction over the respondents' Complaint and Amended
Complaint.[31]
The Court's Ruling
We resolve to deny the instant petition.
The petitioners failed to comply with a lawful order of this Court directing
them to file their reply to the respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant
Petition. While the prescribed period to comply expired on March 15, 2011, the
petitioners filed their Manifestation that they will no longer file a reply only on
October 10, 2011 or after the lapse of almost seven months.
 Further, no reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA
when they both ruled that the denial of the petitioners' second motion to dismiss
Civil Case No. 02-105251 was proper.
Even without delving into the procedural allegations of the respondents
that the petitioners engaged in forum shopping and are already estopped from
questioning the RTC's jurisdiction after having validly submitted to it when the latter
participated in the proceedings, the denial of the instant Petition is still in order.
Although the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint sought, among
others, the disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the respondents of
the CPPA now under Metrobank's custody, Civil Case No. 02-105251 remains to be
an ordinary civil action, and not a special proceeding pertaining to a settlement
court.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a
civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased
person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the
nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of
specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.[32] A special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.[33]
It is distinguished from an ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.[34] To
initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed.
Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only
through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees
with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents in their Complaint and
Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument
supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence,
despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not
partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate
court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended Complaint,
seeking the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA under Metrobank's
custody and the nullification of the instruments subject of the complaint, necessarily
require the determination of the respondents' status as Antonio's heirs.
It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was that they be
declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA which was in Mercedes' possession
prior to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver. The respondents also prayed
for the alternative relief of securing the issuance by the RTC of a hold order relative
to the CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits with Metrobank during the pendency of
the case. It can thus be said that the respondents' prayer relative to the CPPA was
premised on Mercedes' prior possession of and their alleged collective ownership of
the same, and not on the declaration of their status as Antonio's heirs. Further, it
also has to be emphasized that the respondents were parties to the execution of the
Agreement[35] and Waiver[36] prayed to be nullified. Hence, even without the
necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have the standing
to seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that there
was no consideration for their execution, and that Ramon exercised undue influence
and committed fraud against them. Consequently, the respondents then claimed
that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonios estate executed by Ramon,
and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and void as
well. Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues raised shall first require a
declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is not
determinative of which court shall properly exercise jurisdiction.
In Marjorie Cadimas v. Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo,[37] the Court
declared:
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set
up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the
question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant.
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action
pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the
matters to be consulted.
In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the
documents subject of Civil Case No. 02-105251 could be achieved in an ordinary
civil action, which in this specific case was instituted to protect the respondents from
the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon. In the event that the RTC will find
grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only consequence
will be the reversion of the properties subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio.
Civil Case No. 02-105251 was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues
relating to the administration, liquidation and distribution of Antonio's estate, hence,
not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may
not be strategically sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still
follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been
illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of respondents'
Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated
therein are matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The petitioners' (a) Opposition to the
respondents' Motion to Admit Substitution of Party;[38] and (b) Manifestation[39]
through counsel that they will no longer file a reply to the respondents' Comment/
Opposition to the instant petition are NOTED. SO ORDERED.
2 FILOMENA PECSON, as administratix of the last will and testament of
Florencio Pecson, et al., vs. ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO, defendant-appellee
(September 29, 1914 JOHNSON, J.)
It appears from the record that some time prior to the 17th day of September, 1910,
the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Albay for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at
law, opposed the legislation of the will on the ground that it had not been authorized
nor signed by the deceased, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure. After hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, judge,
found that the will had been signed and executed in accordance with the provisions
of law, and denied the opposition on the 17th day of September, 1910.
On the 18th day of September, 1910, the said Tomas Lorayes, representing Basiliso
Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion in the words following:
1. That Rosario Mediavillo is and Joaquin Mediavillo was a legitimate child of
the deceased Teresa Pecson, who also was a daughter of the testator,
Florencio Pecson, and therefore the first mentioned is and the second was a
grandchild of the latter.
2. That the said granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, was
disinherited by her grandfather, the testator Florencio Pecson, according to
clause 3 of the will, because she failed to show him due respect and on a
certain occasion raised her hand against him.
3. That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps she
did, it was due to the derangement of her mental faculties which occurred a
long time ago and from which she now suffers in periodical attacks.
By reason of all the foregoing and because the disinheriting clause 3 of the will is
unfounded, the undersigned prays the court to annul the said clause and to make
the testator's died without succession, but is represented now by his father, Basiliso
Mediavillo), participants in the estate left by their grandfather; and, finally, that the
court grant such other relief as it may deem just and equitable.
After a consideration of the question presented by said motion, the lower court, on
the 22d day of September, 1911, rendered the following decision:
This case has come up to-day for a hearing on the declaration of heirs of the
decease Florencio Pecson, who died in Daraga, about the year 1910.
From the evidence it appears that the deceased had eight children by his
wife Nicolasa Manjares, likewise deceased, which children are those named
Emerenciano, Teresa, Filomena, Asunsion, Rufino, Zoila, Emiliano, and
Perfecto, all surnamed Pecson. It also appears that Rufino Pecson absented
himself from these Islands twenty-five years ago, going to Australia, and that
nothing has been heard of him for the past twenty years. The said Rufino
Pecson left no children in the Philippines and was unmarried when he
emigrated. As nothing has been heard of him for twenty years, it is presumed
that he died and it is held that the part of this estate to which he was entitled
must be divided among the other heirs.
It also appears from the evidence that Teresa Pecson married Basiliso
Mediavillo, by whom she had two children, Joaquin and Rosario Mediavillo.
Teresa also died, leaving these two children and her husband, Basiliso
Mediavillo. Her son Joaquin died, unmarried and childless, before the death
of the testator, Florencio Pecson. Rosario is the only living daughter of
Teresa and the latter's husband, Basiliso Mediavillo, is also living. The
evidence shows that this girl Rosario became insane in 1895, when she went
to Nueva Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it was
previous to this date that she disobeyed her grandfather and raised her hand
against him, and, as the testator states in the third paragraph of his will, he
disinherited her. This court understands that this Rosario, who was then 14
years of age, and who shortly afterwards became insane, was not
responsible for her acts and should not have been disinherited by her
grandfather.
The court therefore decrees that this part of the will is contrary to law and
sets it aside as being of no force or value whatever. The court further holds
that Rosario Mediavillo, the daughter of Teresa Pecson, is the heiress of the
one-half of the share of this estate pertaining to the said Teresa, and that her
father, as the heir of his son Joaquin, also Teresa's son, is the heris of the
other one-half of the said share pertaining to Teresa — that is, of the one-
seventh of this estate that pertains to the latter. Moreover, the court decrees
that, besides the two heirs just above mentioned, Emerciano, Filomena,
Asuncion, Zoila, Emiliano, and Perfecto, surnamed Pecson, and the children
of Teresa, are also heirs of the estate of Florencio Pecson.
From the decision the plaintiff appealed to this court and made the following
assignments of error:
FIRST ERROR
The lower court erred in finding that the part of the will which disinherits Rosario
Mediavillo is contrary to law, and in setting it aside as being of no force or value
whatever.
SECOND ERROR
The lower court erred by decreeing that Basaliso Mediavillo, the father of Joaquin
Mediavillo, is the heir by representation of the one-half of the one seventh of this
estate pertaining to Joaquin Mediavillo.
With reference to the first assignment of error it may be said that from the record it
appears that during the lifetime of Florencio Pecson he had been married to
Nicolasa Manjares, with whom he had eight children, named Filomena, Asuncion,
Zoila, Emerenciano, Emiliano, Perfecto, Rufino and Teresa Pecson; that before the
death of Florencio Pecson he executed and delivered the will in question. The will
made no provision for the said Rufino Pecson, neither was there any provision in the
will for the said Teresa. All of the other children were named as heirs in said will. It
appears that Teresa had been married with one Basiliso Mediavillo, and that some
time before the making of the will in question she died, leaving her husband and two
children, Joaquin Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, as her heirs. It also appears
from the record that Joaquin Mediavillo died without heirs, leaving as the only heirs
of the said Teresa Pecson, her husband, Basilio Mediavillo and the said Rosario
Mediavillo. The said Joaquin Mediavillo died before his grandfather, Florencio
Pecson, and probably before the will in question was made.
Paragraph 3 of the will disinherited Rosario Mediavillo in the following language:
I declare that one of my daughters, named Teresa, now deceased, left a legitimate
daughter named Rosario Mediavillo. I also declare that I disinherit my
granddaughter, the said Rosario Mediavillo, because she was grossly disrespectful
to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not remember, she raised her
hand against me. Therefore, it is my will that the said Rosario Mediavillo shall have
no share in my property.
The defendant, Rosario Mediavillo, in the motion which she presented and which is
copied above, alleges that she was disinherited without case. Upon a consideration
of that question, the lower court found that she had been disinherited without cause
and annulled said paragraph 3 of the will. That order of the lower court constitutes
the error complained of by the appellant in her first assignment of error.
By reference to said paragraph 3 above quoted, it will be seen that Florencio
Pecson disinherited the said Rosario Mediavillo "because she was grossly
disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not remember,
she raised her hand against me. Therefore it is my will that she, the said Rosario
Mediavillo, shall have no share in my property."
The lower court admitted proof the question of the responsibility of the said Rosario
Mediavillo at the time she offered the offense to her grandfather, Florencio Pecson.
After hearing the proof, the lower court reached the following conclusion:
The evidence shows that this girl Rosario became insane in 1895, when she
went to Nueva Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it was
previous to this date that she disobeyed her grandfather and raised her hand
against him, and, as the testator states in the third paragraph of his will, he
disinherited her. This court understands that this Rosario, who was then 14
years of age, and who shortly afterwards became insane, was not
responsible for her acts and should not have been disinherited by her
grandfather.
The first assignment of error presents the question whether or not the courts, when
a parent disinherits his children, may inquire into the cause of the disinheritance and
decide that there was or was not ground for such disinheritance. The Civil Code (art.
848) provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one of the causes
expressly fixed by law. In accordance with the provisions of that article (848) we find
that articles 756 and 853 provide the cases or causes for disinheritance; or, in other
words, the cases or causes in which the ancestors may by will disinherit their heirs.
Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the disinheritance can only be effected by
the testament, in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such
disinheritance. If it is true that heirs can be disinherited only by will, and for causes
mentioned in the Civil Code, it would seen to follow that the courts might properly
inquire whether the disinheritance has been made properly and for the causes
provided for by law. The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether
there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by
express provisions of the Civil Code. Article 850 provides that "the proof of the
truthfulness of the reason for disinheritance shall be established by the heirs of the
testator, should the disinherited person deny it." It would appear then that if the
person disinherited should deny the truthfulness of the cause of disinheritance, he
might be permitted to support his allegation by proof. The right of the court to inquire
whether or not the disinheritance was made for just cause is also sustained by the
provisions of article 851, which in part provides that:
Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth
of which, if contradicted, should not be proven . . . shall annul the designation
of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited.
It seems clear from the above-quoted provisions, that the courts may inquire into the
justice of a disinheritance such as was attempted in the present case, and if they
find that the disinheritance was without cause, that part of the testament or will may
be pronounced null and void. It remains, however, to be seen whether the evidence
adduced during the trial of the present cause was sufficient to show that the
disinheritance made in paragraph 3 of the will was made for just cause. It appears
from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years of age, she had
received some attentions from a young man — that she had received a letter from
him — and that her grandfather, Florencio Pecson, took occasion to talk to her
about the relations between her and the said young man; that it was upon that
occasion when, it is alleged, the disobedience and disrespect were shown to her
grandfather, and that was the cause for her disinheritance by her grandfather. The
record shows that very soon after said event she lost the use of her mental powers
and that she has never regained them, except for very brief periods, up to the
present time. The lower court, taking into consideration her tender years, and the
fact that she very soon thereafter lost the use of her mental faculties, reached the
conclusion that she was probably not responsible for the disrespect and
disobedience shown to her grandfather in the year 1894 or 1895.
After a careful consideration of the record, we are inclined to believe that the same
supports the conclusions of the lower court and that the same supports the
conclusions of the lower court that he did not commit the error complained of in the
first assignment of error.
With reference to the second assignment of error, it will be remembered that Teresa
Pecson, the mother of Rosario Mediavillo, at the time of her death left two children,
Rosario and Joaquin, and her husband Basiliso Mediavillo, and that said Joaquin
Mediavillo died without heirs. The lower court gave one-half of the inheritance of the
said Teresa Pecson to Rosario Mediavillo and the share that would have gone to
Joaquin Mediavillo, and the share that would have gone to Joaquin Mediavillo, to his
father Basiliso Mediavillo. In that conclusion of the lower court we think error was
committed. The appellant relies upon the provisions of article 925 of the Civil Code,
in his contention that the lower court committed an error.
Article 925 provides that:
The right of representation shall always take place in the direct descending line, but
never in the ascending. In collateral lines, it shall take place only in favor of the
children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the whole or half blood.
The appellee, in support of the conclusions of the lower court, cites articles 935 and
936 of the Civil Code. Article 935 provides that:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his
ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.
Article 936 provides that:
The father and mother, if living shall inherits share and share alike. If one of them
only survive, he or she shall succeed to the son's entire estate.
It will be remembered that the whole argument of the appellants with reference to
the first assignment of error was that Rosario Mediavillo had been disinherited and
the court evidently believed that there were no "legitimate children, descendants of
the deceased, surviving," and that therefore the father or mother of said legitimate
children would inherit as ascendants. Inasmuch, however, as there was a
descendant in the direct line, surviving, the inheritance could not ascend, and for the
reason the lower court committed an error in declaring that Basiliso Mediavillo was
entitled to inherit that share of the estate that would have belonged to Joaquin
Mediavillo, had he been living. Therefore, and for all the foregoing, that part of the
judgment of the lower court nullifying and setting aside paragraph 3 of the will is
hereby affirmed, and that art of said judgment which decrees to Basiliso Mediavillo
one-half of the estate of Florencio Pecson, belonging to Teresa Pecson and which
would have been given to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been surviving, is hereby
revoked. And without any findings as to costs, it is hereby ordered that the cause be
remanded to the lower court, with direction that judgment be entered in accordance
herewith, and that such further proceedings be had as the interested parties may
deem necessary, for the purpose of disposing of that part of the inheritance of
Teresa Pecson would have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been surviving.
3 TESTATE ESTATE OF VICENTE SINGSON PABLO, deceased. ROSALIA
ROSARIO VDA. DE SINGSON vs. JOSEFINA F. VDA. DE LIM, oppositor-appellee,
EMILIA FLORENTINO, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, EVARISTO SINGSON, ET
AL., oppositors-appellants (February 19, 1943 OZAETA, J.)
Don Vicente Singson Pablo, a lawyer of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, died on April 15, 1938,
without any descendant or ascendant, his nearest surviving relatives being his
widow Doña Rosalia Rosario, four brothers, and four nieces, the children of a
deceased sister. He left a will which was duly probated, clause 8 of which reads as
follows:
Octavo. — Orderno y mando que todos mis bienes no dispuestos de otro modo en
este testamento, se distribuiran en partes iguales a todos los que tienen derecho a
ello.
The widow, as administratrix, presented a project of partition in which the properties
not disposed of in the will were adjudicated to the four brothers and the four nieces
of the deceased "in the proportion provided in paragraph 8 of the will." The brothers,
appellants herein, objected to the project of partition insofar as it includes the nieces
of the deceased, on the ground that under clause 8 of the will, in relation to article
751 of the Civil Code, they were not entitled to any share. The nieces also objected
to the project of partition, alleging that certain other specified properties had been
omitted therefrom, which formed part of the properties not disposed of and which
under clause 8 of the will "should be distributed in equal parts to all who are entitled
thereto." The trial court sustained the contention of the nieces (appellees herein)
and ordered the administratrix "to amend the project of partition so as to include
therein the said properties and that all of those not disposed of in the will be
adjudicated in equal parts to the brothers and nieces of the deceased."
The only question raised in this appeal is the interpretation of clause 8 of the will
above quoted. Said clause provides that "all of my properties not disposed of
otherwise in this testament shall be distributed in equal parts to all who are entitled
thereto." In this connection appellants invoke article 751 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "a disposition made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives
shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree."
The trial court noted that the testator, who was a lawyer, did not use the word
"relatives" in the clause in question. We do not need to decide here whether, had
the testator used the word "relatives," the nieces would be excluded. The authorities
differ on the interpretation of article 751. Some hold that under said article the
nephews and nieces inherit by representation together with the brothers and sisters
of the testator, as in legal succession; while others. Manresa among them, hold that
said article excludes nephews and nieces when brothers and sisters survive. We
think the testator, by referring to "all who are entitled thereto," instead of referring to
his "relatives," precisely meant to avoid the uncertainty of the interpretation of article
751 and to indicate his wish that the residue of his estate be distributed in equal
parts to all who would have been entitled to inherit from him had he dies intestate.
The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
4 LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA,
for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE
DOROTHEO (December 8, 1999 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.)
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically
void in an order that has become final and executory still be given effect? This is the
issue that arose from the following antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and
Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro
died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandros death, petitioner, who claims to
have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the
probate of the latters last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order
admitting Alejandros will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said
order. In 1983, they filed a Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void. The trial
court granted the motion and issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring
Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the
last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the
oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the
only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose
respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on
intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the government.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some
compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she
admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for
reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was
dismissed for failure to file appellants brief within the extended period granted.[2]
This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a
corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on
May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the lower court to implement the
final and executory Order. Consequently, private respondents filed several motions
including a motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer Certificates
of Titles (TCT) covering the properties of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused
to surrender the TCTs, private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said
titles and for issuance of new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the motion.
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting
aside the final and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order
directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was
merely interlocutory, hence not final in character. The court added that the
dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the estate of the
deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private respondents filed a
petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two assailed Orders dated
November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case
filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule
65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner
contends that in issuing the two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to
have no jurisdiction because he was particularly designated to hear the case.
Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of
the January 30, 1986 Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandros will
that was earlier admitted to probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the
late Alejandro and to maintain the status quo or lease of the premises thereon to
third parties.[3] Private respondents opposed the motion on the ground that
petitioner has no interest in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of the late
Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no
longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside
the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified
the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower
court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so
would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has
been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the
whole world.[4]
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a
judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time.
Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question determined by the
court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or
in a different motion. The matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the
testator acquired the character of res judicata and cannot again be brought into
question, all juridical questions in connection therewith being for once and forever
closed.[5] Such final order makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to
its extrinsic validity and due execution.[6]
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated,[7] particularly on three aspects:
whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedents last will and testament;
compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
the testamentary capacity of the testator;[8]
and the due execution of the last will and testament.[9]
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the
testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had
freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue
influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery,[10] that he was of the proper
testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from
making a will.[11]
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may
still be raised even after the will has been authenticated.[12] Thus, it does not
necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always
intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for
dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful
inheritance according to the laws on succession,[13] the unlawful provisions/
dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had
already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void.
Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court
which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically
valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity
to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be
reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And
if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved
by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied
with the decision or order. As early as 1918, it has been declared that public policy
and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of
courts must at some point of time fixed by law[14] become final otherwise there will
be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium - the very object of which
the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies.[15] To fulfill this
purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be
set up to spur on the slothful.[16] The only instance where a party interested in a
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by
reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence,[17] which circumstances do not concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic
invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom.
Although the final and executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private
respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those who are not parties
thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the same constitutes res
judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate proceedings.
Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that
would amount to forum-shopping. It should be remembered that forum shopping
also occurs when the same issue had already been resolved adversely by some
other court.[18] It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and
his spouse should be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory,
hence it can still be set aside by the trial court. In support thereof, petitioner argues
that an order merely declaring who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is
entitled cannot be the basis of execution to require delivery of shares from one
person to another particularly when no project of partition has been filed.[19] The
trial court declared in the January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal wife
of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three legitimate children (petitioners herein),
and at the same time it nullified the will. But it should be noted that in the same
Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the late spouses be distributed
according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that
order of intestate distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic
provisions of the same will.

It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of
successional rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy.[20] But before there could
be testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards
provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to
prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the
estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give - Nemo
praesumitur donare.[21] No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and
unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is
extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity
thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity that
is whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In
this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the
intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly
held by the trial court.

Furthermore, Alejandros disposition in his will of the alleged share in the

conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his only beloved wife,
is not a valid reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary
dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or properties
which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to
who owns the properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still
be properly ventilated and determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement
of his and that of his late spouses estate.

Petitioners motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot

considering that she was not married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an
heir. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.