SAUDIA v.

CA
FACTS: Petitioner SAUDIA hired private respondent MORADA as a flight attendant in 1988,
based in Jeddah. On 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, she went to party with 2 male
attendants, and on the following morning in their hotel, one of the male attendants attempted to
rape her. She was rescued by hotel attendants who heard her cry for help. The Indonesian police
arrested the 2. MORADA returned to Jeddah, but was asked by the company to go back to Jakarta
and help arrange the release of the 2 male attendants. MORADA did not cooperate when she got
to Jakarta. What followed was a series of interrogations from the Saudi Courts which she did not
understand as this was in their language. In 1993, she was surprised, upon being ordered by
SAUDIA to go to the Saudi court, that she was being convicted of (1) adultery; (2) going to a
disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the
male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and
to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with the 2, for
what happened in Jakarta. SAUDIA denied her the assistance she requested, But because she was
wrongfully convicted, Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave
Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by
SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause. On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a
Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi (“Al-Balawi”), its country
manager. SAUDIA ALLEGES: Private respondent’s claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant
case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti
commissi rule. MORADA ALLEGES: Since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 and
21 of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law.
ISSUE: WON the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try the case
HELD: YES.
On the presence of a “Foreign Element” in the case: A factual situation that cuts across territorial
lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a “foreign element”.
The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals
and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception. The forms
in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element may simply consist in
the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract
between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the
foreign element may assume a complex form.
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a
resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also,
by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events
did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila,
Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a “conflicts” situation to arise.
COURT disagrees with MORADA that his is purely a domestic case. However, the court finds
that the RTC of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Its authority
to try and hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit: BP129
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney`y’s fees, litigation expenses, and cots or the value of the property in controversy exceeds
One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred Thousand pesos
(P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court — the venue, Quezon City, is appropriate:
Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. — [Now Regional Trial Court]
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) Personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any
of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at
the election of the plaintiff.
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the
Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private
respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she
no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to
her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience
have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private
respondent) should be upheld.
The trial court also acquired jurisdiction over the parties. MORADA through her act of filing, and
SAUDIA by praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction.
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two
important questions:
(1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred
in two or more states; and
(2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the “connecting factor” or
“point of contact” could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred.
And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a
situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in
the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and
working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of
its rights and in the performance of its duties, “act with justice, give her due and observe honesty
and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of
the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is important
here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person,
reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff
below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the
situs of the alleged tort.
In applying “State of the most significant relationship” rule, to determine the State which has the
most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the
injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place
where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the
Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national,
working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of
international air carriage. Thus, the “relationship” between the parties was centered here, although
it should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the
claim that the Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, raised by
private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been
properly established.

HASEGAWA v. NIPPON
FACTS: Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing
technical and management support in the infrastructure projects national permanently residing in
the Philippines. The agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend professional services to
Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the
Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR project was near completion,
DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering &
construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru
was named as the project manger in the contract. Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its
International Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had no more intention
of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the
substantial completion of the STAR Project. Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI
project. Nippon insisted that Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru
then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.
Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese
nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination
of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the
principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The
CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere
in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was
correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for
specific performance & damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign
nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, “the state of
the most significant relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens.
HELD: NO.
In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction,
choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2
distinct concepts.Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state;
choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law w/c will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does
notautomatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and
the choice of the lex foriwill often coincide, the “minimum contacts” for one do not always provide
the necessary “significant contacts” for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can
be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have
jurisdiction to enter a judgment.In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate
a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent,
over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or
the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation.In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon
is actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial
proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes and organizes the court. It is
given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations
of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the
matter submitted to it because no lawgrants it the power to adjudicate the claims. In the instant
case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction
to hear the subject controversy for a civil case for specific performance & damages is one not
capable of pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.What they
rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the “state of the most significant relationship rule.” The
Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound. Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of
the place of the ceremony” or the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex
contractus or lex loci contractusmeans the “law of the place where a contract is executed or to be
performed.” It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain to
the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or
implicitly. Under the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” to ascertain what state law
to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection
to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where
the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business,
or place of incorporation of the parties.This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates
them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved. Since
these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are
rules proper for the 2nd phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied
in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case
is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.
Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they
have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining
which law should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the
application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to
provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and
proved. It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought
before a court or administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the latter in disposing of
it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over
the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3)
assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or
States. The court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the
laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign
sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights
provided by foreign sovereigns. Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be
used to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss
because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit
should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts
of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the RTC
decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle
requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a
matter of defense.

SAUDIA V. REBESENCIO
FACTS: Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is a foreign corporation established and existing under
the Royal Decree No. M/24 of Jeddah, who hired Respondents as flight attendants. After
undergoing seminars required by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration for
deployment overseas, as well as training modules offered by Saudia, Respondents became
Temporary and then eventually Permanent Flight Attendants; they entered into the necessary
Cabin Attendant Contracts with Saudi. Respondents were released from service on separate dates
in 2006; claimed that such release was illegal since the basis of termination of contract was solely
because they were pregnant. They claim that they had informed Saudia of their respective
pregnancies and had gone through the necessary procedures to process their maternity leaves and
while initially, Saudia had given its approval, they ultimately reneged and rather required them to
file for resignation. Respondents claim that Petitioner Airlines threatened that if they would not
resign, they would be terminated along with loss of benefits, separation pay, and ticket discount
entitlements; they anchored such on its “Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin
Attendants" which provides that “ if the Air Hostess becomes pregnant at any time during the term
of this contract, this shall render her employment contract as void and she will be terminated due
to lack of medical fitness. “ November 8,2007 - Respondents filed a Complaint with the Labor
Arbiter against Saudia and its officers for illegal dismissal and for underpayment, along with moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Petitioner Airlines contests the Labor Arbiter’s
jurisdiction, as the contract’s points referred to foreign law and that Respondents had no cause of
action since they already voluntarily resigned. Executive Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint,
but on appeal the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision and denied Petitioner Airlines’
Motion for Reconsideration, hence the current appeal.
ISSUE: WON the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC has jurisdiction over Saudi Arabian Airlines and
apply Philippine jurisdiction over the dispute
HELD: YES.
Summons were validly served on Saudia and jurisdiction over it validly acquired. No doubt that
the pleadings were served to Petitioner Airlines through their counsel, however they claim that the
NLRC and Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction since summons were served to Saudi Airlines Manila
and not to them, Saudi Airlines Jeddah. Saudi Airlines Manila was neither a party to the Cabin
attendant contracts nor funded the Respondents, and it was to Saudi Jeddah that they filed their
resignations. Court ruled however that b y its own admission, Saudia, while a foreign corporation,
has a Philippine office, and that under the Foreign Investments act of 1991, they are a foreign
corporation doing business in the Phils and therefore are subject to Philippine jurisdiction.
Petitioner Airlines also asserts that the Cabin Attendant Contracts require the application of the
laws of Saudi Arabia rather than those of the Philippines. It claims that the difficulty of
ascertaining foreign law calls into operation the principle of forum non conveniens, thereby
rendering improper the exercise of jurisdiction by Philippine tribunals. Court: Forum non
conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction
and to require the application of foreign law. Though Article 1306 of the Civil Code provides that
Parties may stipulate terms they may deem convenient, Philippine tribunals may not lose sight of
considerations of law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy that underlie the
contract. Article II, Sections 1 and 14 of the 1987 Constitution ensures the equal protection of
persons, and the equality between men and women. Though pregnancy does present physical
limitations that may render difficult the performance of functions associated with being a flight
attendant, it would be the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a disability so permanent and
immutable that, it must entail the termination of one's employment. Furthermore, contracts relating
to labor and employment are impressed with public interest. Article 1700 of the Civil Code
provides that "[t]he relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Pakistan
Airlines Ruling: relationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable
Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some
other law to govern their relationship. As the present dispute relates to (what the respondents allege
to be) the illegal termination of respondents' employment, this case is immutably a matter of public
interest and public policy. Consistent with clear pronouncements in law and jurisprudence,
Philippine laws properly find application in and govern this case.

REPUBLIC V. MANALO
FACTS: Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national
named Yoshino Minoro. A case for divorce was filed by the petitioner Manalo in Japan and after
due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court.
Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the civil registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a japanese court and that she be allowed
to return and use her maiden surname, Manalo. RTC denied the petition for lack of merit. It ruled
that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized based on Article 15 of the
New Civil Code which does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in
the country or living abroad, whether married to a filipino or to foreigners or if they celebrated
they marriage in the Philippines or in another country and that unless Filipinos are naturalized
citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have conrol over issues related to Filipinos’
family rights and duties, together with the determination of the condition and legal capacity to
enter into contracts and civil relations including marriages. The Court of Appeals overturned the
RTC decision and held that Article 26 of the Family code of the Philippines is applicable even if
it was Manalo who filed for Divorce against her Japanese husband because the Decree they
obtained makes the latter no longer maried to the former, capacitating him to remarry; that the fact
that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequetial. CA ruled that the meaning of the
law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind
Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese
National, who in turn is no longer married to her.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES A FILIPINO CITIZEN HAS THE CAPACITY TO REMARRY AFTER
INITIATING A DIVORCE PROCEEDING ABROAD AND OBTAINING A FAVORABLE
JUDGMENT AGAINST HIS OR HER ALIEN SPOUSE.
HELD: YES.
The filipina spouse who initiated the divorce and has succesfully obtained a divorce decree against
an alien spouse may remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The Purpose of
Article 26 (2) of the Family code of the Philippines is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. Even if
the word obtained should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually
initiated by the alien spouse, still the court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so
would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Indeed, where the interpretion of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legilature, it should be construed according to the spirit and reason, disregarding as
far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may, therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirt or intent. Whether the filipino
spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage
bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result. Therefore, the
subject provision shall not make a distinction. The existence of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code
of the Philippines is a testament that the state may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover,
blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust
discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected
by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only
if they are constitutional. The limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated
by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary and whimsical
classification. There is no real and substantial difference between a filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceedings and a filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her
alien spouse. To make a distinction between them based merely on superficial difference of
whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives
undue favor to one and unjustly discrimate against the other. Further, the differentiation is
arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by a filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based
on grounds similar to Articles 35,36, 37 and 38 of the family court. The state cannot effectively
enforce its obligation to protect and defend among others the right of the children from all forms
of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditi ons prejudicial to their development if
the court will limit the application of the subject provision only to those foreign divorce initiated
by the alien spouse. Moreover, the court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value
the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights and ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

NOVERAS V. NOVERAS
Facts: David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in the US and in the
Philippines. Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia obtained a decree of
divorce from the Superior Court of California wherein the court awarded all the properties in the
US to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial
Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC. The RTC awarded the properties in the
Philippines to David, with the properties in the US remaining in the sole ownership of Leticia. The
trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law
should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not
submit any proof of their national law. On appeal, the CA directed the equal division of the
Philippine properties between the spouses. David insists that the CA should have recognized the
California Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the California properties.
Held: No.
Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. For Philippine
courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our Rules of Evidence, together with the

DEL SOCCORO V. VAN WILSEM

FACTS: Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended
by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and
her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines,
Ernst never gave support to Roderigo.Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again the
Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against
Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information do
not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien.

ISSUES:
1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

RULING:
1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree
with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he
is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does
not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In international
law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.
While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to
support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the
national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their
child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover,
foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the
citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a
law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict
of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s
obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still
duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied
of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living here
in the Philippines and committed the offense here.

REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO
FACTS: Orbecido and Villanueva were married ad had two children. Wife went to US to work
and later became a US citizen. Thereafter he learned from his son that his wife obtained divorce
and married another man. Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry under the Article 26
(2) of the Family Code. RTC Zamboanga del Sur granted his petition. The SolGen's motion for
reconsideration was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of
the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 (2).

RULING: Yes.
Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed
to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of celebration of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time the divorce decree is obtained abroad by alien spouse capacitating him/her
to remarry. However, Orbecido is barred from remarrying because he did not present competent
evidence showing his wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried.

REPUBLIC V. ALBIOS
FACTS: Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge
Calo in Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with the
RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to her, the
marriage was a marriage in jest because she only wed the American to acquire US citizenship and
even arranged to pay him $2,000 in exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state and complying with their marital obligations. The court
even sent summons to the husband but he failed to file an answer. Both the RTC and CA ruled in
favor of Albios declaring that the marriage was void ab initio for lack of consent because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.. However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) elevated the case to the SC.
According to the OSG, the case do not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest as the parties
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage. That the parties here intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to
acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
ISSUE: W/N a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent.
RULING: NO.
Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent because it was
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and
intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such
plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would
be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish
their goal. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given
and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the
sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45
and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. None of these
are present in the case. Therefore, their marriage remains valid.

REPUBLIC V. DAYOT
FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In
lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least
5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both
employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an
action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham
and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD: CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at
the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living
together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on
November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court. The
solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a
marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of
Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential
fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence,
Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of
marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised
any time.

FUJIKI V. MARINAY
Facts: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent
Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage
did not sit well with petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other. In 2008, Marinay met
another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they
were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from
a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code
of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing
the petition. The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) Fujiki moved
that the Order be reconsidered. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent
with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines on bigamy and was therefore entitled to
recognition by Philippine courts.
Issues: Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
Ruling:
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of
the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State
may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment... affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen. A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring
a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the
foreign laws under which the... foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their
judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a
fact according to... the rules of evidence. There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply
prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family
Court judgment is fully... consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family
Court judgment... in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
REPUBLIC V. BATUIGAS
FACTS: This Petition for Review assails the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Decision of
the RTC that granted the Petition for Naturalization of respondent Azucena Saavedra Batuigas
(Azucena). On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of
Zamboanga del Sur. She stated that she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines
and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate,
state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and that she will reside continuously in the
Philippines from the time of the filing of her Petition up to the time of her naturalization. After all
the jurisdictional requirements had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful
occupation or in some known lucrative trade. The OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed
under the Retail Trade to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade. The OSG likewise
disputed Azucena’s claim that she owns real property because aliens are precluded from owning
lands in the country. Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the
RTC denied said Motion. Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to
Chinese parents, Azucena has never departed the Philippines since birth. Azucena can speak
English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and tertiary education were
taken in Philippine schools. After earning a degree in education, she then practiced her teaching
profession in several different schools in Mindanao. In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married
Santiago Batuigas (Santiago), a natural-born Filipino citizen. They have five children, all of whom
studied in Philippine public and private schools and are all professionals. After her stint as a
teacher, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail business of and later
on in milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their income, Azucena submitted their
joint annual tax returns and balance sheets from 2000- 2002 and from 2004-2005. During their
marital union, the Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the citizenship requirement as required by
law to become a naturalized citizen of the Philippines.
RULING: Yes.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial
naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the
“Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option, called derivative naturalization,
which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA
473, which provides that: “Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.” Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be
deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess
other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit
themselves to judicial naturalization. Records, however, show that in February 1980, Azucena
applied before the then Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation
of her Alien Certificate of Registration by reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID
granted her application. However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it found
no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s husband is a Filipino citizen, as only their marriage
certificate was presented to establish his citizenship. As the records before this Court show,
Santiago’s Filipino citizenship has been adequately proven. Under judicial proceeding, Santiago
submitted his birth certificate indicating therein that he and his parents are Filipinos. He also
submitted voter’s registration, land titles, and business registrations/licenses, all of which are
public records. Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the
citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family members,
thus: It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that
a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should
be different from that of the other. Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that
she is qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of making
her a part of a truly Filipino family. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, that granted the Petition for
Naturalization, is hereby AFFIRMED. Subject to compliance with the period and the
requirements under Republic Act No. 530 which supplements the Revised Naturalization Law, let
a Certificate of Naturalization be issued to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS after taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, her Alien Certificate of
Registration should be cancelled.