Jocelyn Limkaichong v.

COMELEC
G.R. 178831-32
April 1, 2009

FACTS

Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st district of Negros Oriental, with Paras as her rival. Paras, together with other
concerned citizens, filed a disqualification case against Limkaichong. They alleged that she was not a natural born citizen
of the Philippines because when she was born, her father was still a Chinese, although her mom was a Filipino, also lost
her citizenship by virtue of marriage. When the case was still pending in the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), election
still continued and votes were casted. The results showed that Limkaichong won over her rival, Paras. COMELEC, after
due hearing declared Limkaichong disqualified, at about 2 days after the counting of votes. On the following days however,
notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing
Limkaichong as the winner of the conducted elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy
guidelines of not suspending theproclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be
without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras then petitioned before the
COMELEC, regarding its proclamation. Limkaichong, on the other hand argued that the Commission had already proclaimed
her as winner, and with that, COMELEC could no longer exercise jurisdiction over the matter. It should be the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which should exercise jurisdiction from then on, not the COMELEC. And the
COMELEC agreed.

ISSUE

1. When does the jurisdiction of the COMELEC end and when does the jurisdiction of the HRET begin?

2. Whether or not the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid. Whether or not COMELEC should still exercise
jurisdiction over the matter.

HELD

1. In Limkaichong's case, the HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong's proclamation. The Supreme Court
has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives (HOR), the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and disqualification ends. With that, the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It follows that the
proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the
time of the proclamation. The party questioning COMELEC's proclamation should now present his case before the
HRET, which is the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House
of Representatives. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution and Section 250 of the OEC underscores,
the word "sole" is used to emphasize the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction over election contests
relating to its members. Case is dismissed.

Jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals

2. The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint Resolution dated
May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for
reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the
motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. Since the
execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation
of Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. – A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a
Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the
execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.

The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the HOR, the COMELEC's jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It
follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending
before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper
proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the
House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word “sole” in
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals'
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. Nos. 178831-32 is GRANTED and the Joint Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division dated May 17, 2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. All the
other petitions (G.R. Nos.179120, 179132-33, 179240-41) are hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957

LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,
vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL
SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing officer,
respondents.

Petitioner Tañada- member of the Senate and President of the Citizens Party
Petitioner Macapagal- member of HoR; one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate, at the General
elections held in November, 1955 where Warns, Sumulong, Quintin Paredes, Francisco Rodrigo, Pedro Sabido, Claro M.
Recto, Domocao Alonto and Rosales, were proclaimed elected. Subsequently, the elections of this Senators-elect-who
eventually assumed their respective seats in the Senate-was contested by petitioner Macapagal.
FACTS:
• February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate of the Philippines consists of 23 members of the Nacionalista
Party and one (1) member of the Citizens Party, namely, Senator Tañada, who is, also, the president of said party.
• In the session of the Senate held on February 21, 1956, Senator Sabido moved that Senator Tañada, "the President
of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate 3 members" of the Senate Electoral Tribunal referring to those who
should be nominated by "the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate.
• Senator Tañada objected formally to this motion upon the-ground: (a) that the right to nominate said members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal belongs, not to the Nacionalista Party of which Senator Sabido and the other Senators are
members-but to the Citizens Party, as the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, so that, being
devoid of authority to nominate the aforementioned members of said Tribunal, the Nacionalista Party cannot give it to the
Citizens Party, which, already, has such authority, pursuant to the Constitution; and (b) that Senator Sabido's motion would
compel Senator Tañada to nominate three (3) Senators to said Tribunal, although as representative of the minority party in
the Senate he has "the right to nominate one, two or three to the Electoral Tribunal," in his discretion. Senator Tañada
further stated that he reserved the right to determine how many he would nominate, after hearing the reasons of Senator
Sabido in support of his motion. After some discussion the Senate adjourned until the next morning,
• Then, said issues were debated upon more extensively, with Senator Sumulong, not only seconding the opposition
of Senator Tañada, but, also, maintaining that "Senator Tañada should nominate only one" member of the Senate, namely,
himself, he being the only Senator who belongs to the minority party in said House.
• Thus, a new issue was raised - whether or not one who does not belong to said party may be nominated by its
spokesman, Senator Tañada. Senator Sabido withdrew his motion above referred to.
• Thereupon, Senator Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, nominated, and the Senate elected, Senators
Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, Senator Tañada nominated
himself.
• Without an objection, this nomination was approved by the House. Then, Senator Primicias nominated two other
members to complete the membership of the Tribunal: Senators Delgado and Cuenco.".
• Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the
Nacionalista Party-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made without power or
authority, for, after the nomination by said party, and the election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias,
as members of said Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be members thereof, must necessarily be nominated by the
party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens Party, to which
Senator Tañada belongs and which he represents.
• Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be
compose of nine (9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as
the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after the nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party, and their election
by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Tañada nominated himself only, on behalf of the
minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
Said Senator Primicias and the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law, relative
to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de
jure members of said body, and the appointment of their co-respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio
and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful.
• Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed upon his recommendation of said respondent: (1) Techinical
Assistant - Alfredo Cruz and Private Secretary Catalina Cayetano to Senator Cuenco, as supposed member of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal,; and (2) Technical Assistant Serapio and Private Secretary Reyes to Senator Delgado, as supposed
member of said Electoral Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.
• Petitioners allege
1. that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate, in
choosing these respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or color of
authority and in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution";
2. that "in assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, said respondents had "acted absolutely without
color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution, usurping, intruding into and
exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal";
3. that, consequently, the appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes, as technical assistants
and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who caused said appointments to be made-as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void;
Petitioners pray that:
"1. a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against respondents restraining them from continuing to hold or exercise the
said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the SET, and to respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him
from paying the salaries of respondent pending this action.
"2. After hearing, judgment be rendered ousting respondent from the aforementioned public offices in SET and that they be
altogether excluded therefrom and making the Preliminary injunction permanent, with costs against the respondents.".
• Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the legality,
and validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
and of the appointment of respondent as technical assistants and private secretaries to said respondents Senators.
ISSUE: Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and
lawful?
Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party
having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
(Emphasis supplied.).
RULING: Respondents Cuenco and Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
We hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been
nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the
Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second
largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as
members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person
or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the
Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said
Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.
It is clear that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an Electoral
Commission, and then of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial
impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two
devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the party having the second largest
number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given the same number of representatives
in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the
adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said
body the same number of representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the former may be
decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.
As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to hold,
however, that their appointments were null and void. Although recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are
not lawful members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent of
the majority of the de jure members of said body or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held in Suanes vs. Chief
Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter falling within the jurisdiction and control of said body,
and there is every reason to believe that it will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4) respondents
abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar.The petition is
dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Without special
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

ABBAS V. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

G.R. No. 83767 October 27, 1988
GANCAYCO, J.:

Facts:
On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No.
002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987
congressional elections by the Commission on Elections. On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of
Senator Estrada but including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been designated Member of the Tribunal replacing
Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the Liberal Party and resigned as the Opposition's representative in the
Tribunal) filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from
the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as
respondents therein.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself from participating in the hearings and
deliberations of the respondent tribunal in both SET Case
No. 00287 and SET Case No. 001-87, the latter being another contest filed by Augusto's Sanchez against him and Senator
Santanina T. Rasul as alternative respondents, citing his personal involvement as a party in the two cases.
The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process
imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be the
foundation petition of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both practicable and constitutionally
unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being
decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)—requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the
adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining
members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice and may adopt resolutions by majority
vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the
context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this
Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

Issue:
Whether the proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) is neither unfeasible nor repugnant to the
Constitution.

Held:
No. We opine that in fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution
itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its
jurisdiction and powers.
It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and
Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial' and 'legislative' components commonly share
the duty and authority of
deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated
one part of this proposition when it held that said provision "... is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests ...
shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators') peers in that Chamber are represented." The other part,
of course, is that the constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of decision of a
representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.
Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-an
unmistakable indication that the "legislative component"
cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the
spirit and intent of the Constitution.
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his
other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court
or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware
of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon.
Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24
seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations
or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such
situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of
justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where
he sincerely feels that his personal interests
or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of
the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators
and that no amendment
of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato Renato J. Unico were among the candidates for the lone congressional district of
Camarines Norte during the May 2010, 2004 synchronized national and local election.
In her petition filed with the Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”), petitioner Chato alleged that during the canvassing of
the election returns before the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Labo (MBC Labo) from May 10 to 12, 2004, her counsel
raised several objections and pointed to manifest errors or obvious discrepancies in the election returns from various
precincts of the municipality of Labo.
On May 14, 2004 the Provincial Board of Canvassers (“PBC”) proclaimed respondent Unico as representative-elect of the
lone congressional district of Camarines Norte.
The COMELEC (First Division) issued the Resolution dated April 13, 2005, dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It stated
preliminarily that the MBC is precluded from entertaining pre-proclamation controversies on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of the election returns or certificates of canvass involving the
positions of President, Vice-President, Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives and Party-List.
Aggrieved, petitioner Chato filed a motion for reconsideration thereof which was elevated to the COMELEC en banc for
resolution.
In the assailed Resolution dated March 17, 2006. The COMELEC en banc denied petitioner Chato’s motion for
reconsideration ruling that the Commission already lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the fact that respondent Unico
had already taken his oath as a Member of the 13th Congress.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in
promulgating the questioned resolution on March 17, 2006.

Held:
The petition is bereft of merit.
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution reads: The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns,
and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. 13 Stated in another manner, where the candidate has
already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of the petitioner is to file an electoral protest
with the HRET.
In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a
Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already
lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato's petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of
returns and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed to the sound
judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that respondent Unico's proclamation is null and void
does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.
WALDEN BELLO V COMELEC
The Electoral Tribunals- Function/Power/Judicial Review

OSS:
Three consolidated actions for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition that commonly aim to disqualify Juan Miguel "Mikey"
Arroyo as the nominee of the Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List (AGPP) in the May 10, 2010 elections.

Facts:
AGPP filed with the COMELEC its manifestation of Intent to Participate in the May 2010 elections. It also filed its Certificate
of Nomination together with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees.

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 88073 which prescribed the rules of procedure applicable to petitions to disqualify a party-
list nominee for purposes of the May 2010 elections.
Section 6 of the resolution provides that the party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence to duly
prove that the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, and to the sectoral party,
organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent. It also provides that such need to be submitted not later than
3 days from the last day of filing of the list of nominees.
Section 10 provides that the COMELEC may motu proprio effect the disqualification of party-list nominees who violate any
of the limitations mentioned in Section 7 of the Resolution. Section 8 of Rule 32 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure also
states that the COMELEC may cancel motu proprio the registration of any party registered under the party-list system for
failure to comply with applicable laws, rules or regulations of the Commission. The deadline for submitting the requirements
mentioned in Section 6 of the latter Resolution was on March 29, 2010.

Petitioners Maza, Ocampo, and Bayan Muna Party-List filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against Arroyo.
They argued that not only must the the party-list organization factually and truly represent the marginalized and the
underrepresented, the nominee must as well be a Filipino citizen belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties—Arroyo is not a member of the sector which AGPP represents (tricycle drivers and
security guards) because he is an incumbent member in the House of Representatives, the Chairman of the House’s energy
Committee, and a member of key committees in the House.
Arroyo counter-argued that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over issues involving the qualifications of party-list nominees.
RA 7941 merely requires that the party-list nominee must be a bona de member of the party or organization which he seeks
to represent at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election.

Petitiober Bayan Muna filed with the COMELEC another petition for disqualification against Arroyo alleging that the latter
was not qualified to be a party list nominee because he does not belong to AGPP, he has not been a bona fide member of
AGPP 90 days prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, he is a member of the House of Representatives, and that AGPP is not
a legitimate and qualified party-list group and has no authority to nominate him.
Arroyo reiterated that the COMELEC does not have jurisdiction over cases involving the qualifications of party-list nominees.
He stated as well that he is a bona fide member of AGPP at least 90 days prior to the elections

On April 6, 2010 , petitioners Bello and Rosales wrote the requested the COMELEC for a copy of the documentary evidence
submitted by AGPP in compliance with Section 6 of Resolution 8807.
COMELEC replied that AGPP has not yet submitted any documentary evidence.
Petitioners requested the COMELEC to declare the disqualification of the nominees of AGPP for theirr failure to comply with
the requirements of Resolution 8807.
COMELEC did not respond.

In a Joint resolution, the COMELEC second division dismissed the petitions of disqualification against based oon Sec 9 of
RA 7941. Arroyo became a member of AGPP on November 2009(more than 90 days preceding the day of the elections)

The COMELEC en banc concluded that Arroyo possessed all the requirements mandated by Sec 9 of RA 7941.

AGPP obtained the required percentage of votes sufficient to secure a single seat. This entitled Arroyo, as AGPP's first
nominee, to sit in the HOR. He was proclaimed by the COMELEC .

WON mandamus lies to compel the COMELEC to disqualify AGPP’s nominees motu proprio or to cancel AGPP’s
registration
NO
Petitioners failed to comply with the condition that there be "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law." They should have filed with COMELEC a petition for disqualification based on Resolution 8807 and RA
7941.
WON the COMELEC can be enjoined from giving course to AGPP’s participation in the May 2010 elections, the canvassing
of AGPP's votes, and proclaiming it a winner
NO
This has been rendered moot by the supervening participation, election and proclamation of AGPP after it secured the
required percentage of votes in the May 2010 elections.

WON HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyo's qualifications as AGPP's nominee after his proclamation and
assumption to office as a member of the HOR
YES
The HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of
office. It is not disputed that Arroyo, AGPP's first nominee, has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a
Member of the HOR. SC has no jurisdiction over the present petitions and that the HRET now has the exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and rule upon Arroyo's qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives.

PETITIONS DISMISSED.
 Jalosjos v COMELEC
[GR No. 192474, June 26, 2012]

Facts:
In 2007 Jalosjos won as the mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte. While serving as mayor, he bought and occupied
a house at Zamboanga Sibugay in 2008. In 2009 Jalosjos applied with Election Registration Board (ERB) for the transfer
of his voter’s registration record to Zamboanga Sibugay. Erasmo, herein private respondent, opposed said application.
Jalosjos’ application was approved by ERB, consequently denying Erasmo’s opposition. Erasmo appealed his petition at
MCTC which granted Erasmo’s petition (thereby reversing ERB’s decision) and later on affirmed by RTC. Jalosjos appealed
to CA.
Pending decision from CA, on Nov. 28,2009 Jalosos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the 2010 elections for the
position of Representative of the 2nd District of Zamboanga Sibugay. This prompted Erasmo to file with COMELEC for
cancellation of Jalosjos’ COC. Erasmo’s petition was denied by COMELEC 2 nd Division, so he appealed to COMELEC en
banc. Pending decision from COMELEC en banc, May 2010 elections took place, in which Jalosjos won.
After declaration of 2010 election winners, COMELEC granted Erasmo’s petition declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the sought
position since the latter did not satisfy the residency requirement (Note: Jalosjos was mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga del
Norte while residing in Zamboanga Sibugay). CA, on the other hand, declared that the lower courts erred in excluding
Jalosjos from the voters list of Zamboanga Sibugay since he was qualified under the Constitution and RA8189 to vote in
that place. (So basically, COMELEC and CA’s decisions were in direct contrast to the other.)
Both Jalosjos and Erasmo came up to the SC on certiorari.

Issue:
WON the SC has jurisdiction at this time to pass upon the question of Jalosjos’ residency qualification for running for the
position of Representative for the 2nd District of Zamboanga Sibugay considering that he has been proclaimed winner in the
election and has assumed the discharge of that office.

Held:
The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating
to election, returns and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of HRET. Here, when COMELEC en banc
issued its order declaring Jalosjos ineligible for candidacy of the sought position, the latter has already been proclaimed a
winner in the election.
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election cases ceased upon Jalosjos’ winning in the 2010 election. Such case is now under
HRET’s jurisdiction.

Vilando v. HRET (House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal)

FACTS
 Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong ran as a Member of the House of Representatives representing the First District of
Negros Oriental. She won against Olivia Paras and was proclaimed winner on May 18, 2007.
 Petitioners, (Biraogo, Paras, Vilando) filed an action in COMELEC questioning the citizenship of Limkaichong.
The court favored Limkaichong, reversing the decision of COMELEC. The petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of
the HRET for a determination of Limkaichongs citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity
of the naturalization of Julio Sy.
 Limkaichong was the daughter of a Chinese man (Julio Sy) whose naturalization was not at finality. Her mother,
who acquired Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter.
 Limkaichong maintained the defense that she was a natural-born Filipino Citizen. She averred that the acquisition
of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular.
 HRET dismissed the case and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives
 Petitioners sought reconsideration but was again denied. Vilando defended and said that HRET, having plenary,
absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to determine Limkaichong’s qualification can pass upon the efficacy certificate
of naturalization.
 It should be noted that Limkaichong’s term of office had already expired throughout the pendency of the case.
The issue questioning her eligibility had been rendered moot and academic, but the court deemed it proper to
resolve the petition on merits that this position finds support in the rule that courts will decide a question, even if
moot and academic, if it is capable of repetition.
ISSUES
 (1) WON HRET had jurisdiction over the case
 (2) WON Limkaichong is qualified to hold office
RULING
1. NO. The court has acknowledged the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET. The power granted to HRET by
the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislative. But
 no matter how complete and exclusive, it does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the
judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong.
2. YES. Under PH Law, an attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.
There was no direct action, since they filed action questioning Limkaichong’s ability to hold position, not
questioning the validity of her father’s naturalization.
Moreover, records show that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete in 1959, when the governing constitution was
still the 1935 constitution. Therefore, she is a citizen under the category of those persons whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines. It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization.
Therefore, she is considered a natural-born Filipino.

Guerrero v. COMELEC GR. No. 137004, July 26,2000

FACTS:
Rodolfo C. Fariñas was elected Congressman in the May 11, 1998 elections. He took his oath of office as member of the
House of Representatives on June 3, 1998. However, a petition to disqualify Fariñas as a candidate for the elective office
of Congressman, claiming that his Certificate of Candidacy was fatally defective, was haunting the COMELEC. And when
the COMELEC ruled that the determination of the validity of the Certificate of Candidacy of Fariñas is already within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), this petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court was filed.|

ISSUE:
WoN the COMELEC made grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of the validity of the certificate of
candidacy of respondent Farinas is already with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives. –NO
COMELEC had noted that respondent Fariñas had taken his oath and assumed office as a Member of the 11th Congress
and by express mandate of the Constitution, it had lost jurisdiction over the case.
While the COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise
that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Fariñas is a recognition of the jurisdictional
boundaries separating the COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (HRET). Under Article
VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC's jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
Thus, the COMELEC's decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference to the HRET's
own jurisdiction and functions.
In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and
assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-
evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to
the people's mandate.
Whether respondent Fariñas validly substituted Chevylle V. Fariñas and whether respondent became a legitimate
candidate, in our view, must likewise be addressed to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. Only thus can we
demonstrate fealty to the Constitutional provision that the Electoral Tribunal of each House of Congress shall be the "sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members.

HENRY “JUNE” DUEÑAS, JR., vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and
ANGELITO “JETT” P. REYES
GR No. 185401
July 21, 2009
En banc
Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodies? (But who is to guard the guardians themselves?)

Under our constitutional scheme, the Supreme Court is the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, particularly of the allocation
of powers, the guarantee of individual liberties and the assurance of the people’s sovereignty. The Court has the
distinguished but delicate duty of determining and defining constitutional meaning, divining constitutional intent and deciding
constitutional disputes. Nonetheless, its judicial supremacy is never judicial superiority (for it is co-equal with the other
branches) or judicial tyranny (for it is supposed to be the least dangerous branch). Instead, judicial supremacy is the
conscious and cautious awareness and acceptance of its proper place in the overall scheme of government with the
objective of asserting and promoting the supremacy of the Constitution. Thus, whenever the Court exercises its function of
checking the excesses of any branch of government, it is also duty-bound to check itself. Otherwise, who will guard the
guardian?
FACTS:
Petitioner Henry “Jun” Dueñas, Jr. and private respondent Angelito “Jett” P. Reyes were rival candidates for the position of
congressman in the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections.
After the canvass of the votes, petitioner was proclaimed the winner, having garnered 28,564 votes as opposed to private
respondent’s 27,107 votes. Not conceding defeat, private respondent filed an election protest, praying for a
revision/recount, alleging that he was cheated in the protested 170 of 732 precincts through insidious and well-orchestrated
electoral frauds and anomalies which resulted in the systematic reduction of his votes and the corresponding increase in
petitioner’s votes.
In an order dated September 25, 2008, the HRET directed the continuation of the revision and appreciation of the remaining
75% of the counter-protested precincts pursuant to Rule 88 of the HRET Rules. Instead of complying with the order,
petitioner filed an urgent motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts on October 27, 2008.
This was denied by the HRET, reiterating its order directing the continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining 75%
counter-protested precincts and recalling its order requiring petitioner to augment his cash deposit. The Tribunal instead
ordered the use of its own funds for the revision of the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.
On November 27, 2008, the HRET issued a resolution under Rule 88 of the HRET Rules and settled jurisprudence, ruling
that it had the discretion either to dismiss the protest or counter-protest, or to continue with the revision if necessitated by
reasonable and sufficient grounds affecting the validity of the election. This was with the end in view of ascertaining the
true choice of the electorate. It was the HRET’s position that the mere filing of a motion to withdraw/abandon the unrevised
precincts did not automatically divest the HRET of its jurisdiction over the same. Moreover, it ruled that its task of determining
the true will of the electorate was not confined to the examination of contested ballots. Under its plenary power, it could
motu propio review the validity of every ballot involved in a protest or counter-protest and the same could not be frustrated
by the mere expedient of filing a motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining counter-protested precincts. Convinced that it
could not determine the true will of the electorate of the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City on the basis alone of the initial
revision of the 100% protested precincts and the 25% counter-protested precincts, it had no other recourse but to continue
the revision and appreciation of all the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the
Resolution, to continue the revision and appreciation of all the remaining 75% counter protested precincts.
(2) Whether or not HRET’s assumption of the burden of the costs of the continued revision amounted to an illegal and
unconstitutional disbursement of public funds under Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its
jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court …. the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal x x x excludes the
exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.
Guided by this basic principle, the Court will neither assume a power that belongs exclusively to the HRET nor substitute
its own judgment for that of the Tribunal.
(1) HRET’s Power to Deny the Motion to Withdraw / Abandon Counter-protest
First, there are 732 precincts in the 2nd Legislative District of Taguig City, where respondent protested the election results
in 170 precincts and petitioner counter-protested 560 precincts. All in all, therefore, 730 precincts were the subject of the
revision proceedings. While 100% of the protested precincts were already revised, only 25% or 140 of the counter-protested
precincts (or a total of 310 precincts) were actually done. Yet, with 420 more precincts to go had the HRET only been
allowed to continue its proceedings, petitioner claims that respondents were only speculating that a sufficient number of
fake/spurious ballots would be discovered in the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts and that these fake/spurious
ballots would overturn the result of the election.
Indeed, due regard and respect for the authority of the HRET as an independent constitutional body require that any finding
of grave abuse of discretion against that body should be based on firm and convincing proof, not on shaky assumptions.
Any accusation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET must be established by a clear showing of arbitrariness
and improvidence. But the Court finds no evidence of such grave abuse of discretion by the HRET.
Second, the Constitution mandates that the HRET “shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications” of its members. By employing the word “sole,” the Constitution is emphatic that the jurisdiction of the
HRET in the adjudication of election contests involving its members is exclusive and exhaustive. Its exercise of power is
intended to be its own — full, complete and unimpaired.
Protective of its jurisdiction and assertive of its constitutional mandate, the Tribunal adopted Rule 7 of the HRET Rules:
The Tribunal shall have exclusive control, direction and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and
operation.
In this connection and in the matter of the revision of ballots, the HRET reserved for itself the discretion to continue or
discontinue the process. The meaning of Rule 88 is plain. The HRET could continue or discontinue the revision proceedings
ex propio motu, that is, of its own accord. Thus, even if we were to adopt petitioner’s view that he ought to have been
allowed by HRET to withdraw his counter-protest, there was nothing to prevent the HRET from continuing the revision of its
own accord by authority of Rule 88.
The only prerequisite to the exercise by the HRET of its prerogative under Rule 88 was its own determination that the
evidence thus far presented could affect the officially proclaimed results. Much like the appreciation of contested ballots and
election documents, the determination of whether the evidence could influence the officially proclaimed results was a highly
technical undertaking, a function best left to the specialized expertise of the HRET.
At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive prerogative of the HRET as the sole judge of election contests involving
its members, the Court cannot substitute its own sense or judgment for that of the HRET on the issues of whether the
evidence presented during the initial revision could affect the officially proclaimed results and whether the continuation of
the revision proceedings could lead to a determination of the true will of the electorate. The Court should merely test whether
or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or had
a different view. If the Court will dictate to the HRET on how to proceed with these election protest proceedings, the
Tribunal will no longer have “exclusive control, direction and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and
operation.” It will constitute an intrusion into the HRET’s domain and a curtailment of the HRET’s power to act of its own
accord on its own evaluation of the evidentiary weight and effect of the result of the initial revision.
Finally, it is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of the parties but continues until
the case is terminated. Thus, in Robles v. HRET, the Court ruled: The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the
remaining uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal
of its jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until
the case is terminated. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes
effective only when the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction
already acquired.
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders
within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. This rule more
appropriately applies to respondent HRET whose independence as a constitutional body has time and again been upheld
by Us in many cases. As explained in the case of Lazatin v. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Timbol,
G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988, thus:
The use of the word ‘sole’ emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral Commission,
supra, at 162]. The exercise of the Power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as
`intended to be complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature’ [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of
power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as ‘full, clear and complete’ [Veloso v. Board of Canvassers
of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon
the Electoral Tribunal [Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as full, clear and
complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission [Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379,
September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 140]. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under
the 1987 Constitution. Thus, ‘judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal is (thus) possible
only in the exercise of this Court’s so called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the tribunal’s decision
or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or, paraphrasing Morrera,
upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due
process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such a GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.
(emphasis supplied)
(2) HRET’s Discretion to Use Its Own Funds in Revision Proceedings
When jurisdiction is conferred by law on a court or tribunal, that court or tribunal, unless otherwise provided by law, is
deemed to have the authority to employ all writs, processes and other means to make its power effective. Where a general
power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of the
other is also conferred. Since the HRET possessed the authority to motu propio continue a revision of ballots, it also had
the wherewithal to carry it out. It thus ordered the disbursement of its own funds for the revision of the ballots in the remaining
counter-protested precincts. We hark back to Rule 7 of the HRET Rules which provides that the HRET has exclusive control,
direction and supervision of its functions. The HRET’s order was but one aspect of its power.
Moreover, Rule 8 of the HRET Rules provides that the Tribunal shall have and exercise all such powers as are vested in it
by the Constitution or by law, and such other powers as are necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of its purposes
and functions as set forth in the Constitution or as may be provided by law. (emphasis supplied)
Certainly, the HRET’s order that its own funds be used for the revision of the ballots from the 75% counter protested
precincts was an exercise of a power necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of its primary function as sole judge of
election protest cases involving its members.
First, if petitioner hypothetically admits that the HRET has the power to order the continuation of the revision of the 75%
remaining counter-protested precincts, then he should also necessarily concede that there is nothing to prevent the HRET
from using its own funds to carry out such objective. Otherwise, the existence of such power on the part of the HRET
becomes useless and meaningless.
Second, Section 1, Chapter 1 of RA 9498 provides that the HRET has an allotted budget for the “Adjudication of Electoral
Contests Involving Members of the House of Representatives.” The provision is general and encompassing enough to
authorize the use of the HRET’s funds for the revision of ballots, whether in a protest or counter-protest. Being allowed by
law, the use of HRET funds for the revision of the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts was not illegal, much less
violative of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. To reiterate, the law (particularly RA 9498) itself has appropriated funds
for adjudicating election contests in the HRET. As an independent constitutional body, and having received the proper
appropriation for that purpose, the HRET had wide discretion in the disbursement and allocation of such funds.
Third, HRET ha[s] the inherent power to suspend its own rules and disburse its funds for any lawful purpose it deemed best.
This is especially significant in election contests such as this where what is at stake is the vital public interest in determining
the true will of the electorate. In any event, nothing prevented the HRET from ordering any of the parties to make the
additional required deposit(s) to cover costs, as respondent in fact manifested in the HRET. Such disbursement could not
be deemed a giving of unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to a party since the benefit would actually redound to
the electorate whose true will must be determined. Suffrage is a matter of public, not private, interest. The Court declared
in Aruelo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals that “[o]ver and above the desire of the candidates to win, is the deep public interest to
determine the true choice of the people.” Thus, in an election protest, any benefit to a party would simply be incidental.
All told, it should be borne in mind that the present petition is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It
alleges that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated
Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008. But what is “grave abuse of discretion?” It is such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The
abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there
must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. There is also grave abuse of discretion
when there is a contravention of the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. Using the foregoing as yardstick, the
Court finds that petitioner miserably failed to discharge the onus probandi imposed on him.
[G.R. No. 123037. March 21, 1997.]
TEODORO Q. PEÑA, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ALFREDO E.
ABUEG, JR., respondents.
v.
Villaraza & Cruz for petitioner.
Pablo S. Ebol and Pedro J Callero, Jr. for private respondent.
TORRES, JR., J p:
OSS: Assailed herein is the October 12, 1995 Resolution of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
dismissing the Petition Ad Cautelam of the Petitioner Teodoro Q. Peña in HRET Case No. 95-014. Petitioner questioned
the election of the private respondent Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr. as Member of the House of Representatives representing the
Second District of the province of Palawan.
Petitioner and the private respondent were contenders for the said Congressional Office in the May 8, 1995 elections. On
May 12, 1995, upon canvassing the votes cast, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan proclaimed the private
respondent as the winner.
FACTS:
• May 22, 1995, the instant petition was filed with the HRET, wherein the petitioner, as protestant, averred that:
"7. The elections in the precincts of the Second District of Palawan were tainted with massive fraud, widespread vote-
buying, intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities committed before, during and after the voting, and during
the counting of votes and the preparation of election returns and certificates of canvass which affected the results of the
election. Among the fraudulent acts committed were the massive vote-buying and intimidation of voters, disenfranchisement
of petitioner's known supporters through systematic deletion of names from the lists of voters, allowing persons to vote in
excess of the number of registered voters, misappreciation, misreading and non-reading of protestant's ballots and other
irregularities.
8. According to the Statement of Votes by Precinct/Municipality/City, the protestee allegedly obtained 52,967 votes, while
the protestant allegedly obtained 46,023 votes, or a difference of 6,944 votes. A copy of said document is attached hereto
as Annex 'B'.
9. Had the massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities not been committed, the
result of the elections for Member of the House of Representatives would have been different and the protestant would have
garnered the highest number of votes for the Office of Member of the House of Representatives in the Second District of
Palawan, which was the true expression of the will of the voters of the Province of Palawan.
10. The proclamation by the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan that the protestee was allegedly
the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Second District of Palawan is contrary to law and to the
true expression of the will of the voters of the Province of Palawan."
• June 5, 1995- Private respondent-Protestee Abueg filed an Answer With Affirmative Defense, Counterclaim and
Counter-Protest on, to which Peña filed a Reply on June 23, 1995.
• June 22, 1995- Subsequent to the filing of his Answer, Abueg filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition averring that
the HRET has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition, the same being insufficient in form and substance. In essence, the
motion to dismiss anchors its challenge on the fact that the petition failed to allege the precincts where the massive fraud
and disenfranchisement of voters occurred, nor did it point out how many votes would be gained by the protestant as a
result of the same.
• July 10, 1995 - Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss attaching thereto a Summary of Contested
Precincts, naming 700 precincts where election irregularities allegedly occurred.
• In its Resolution of October 12, 1995, the respondent HRET ruled that although it had jurisdiction over the petition,
as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives, the said petition, however, fails to state a cause of action, and is therefore, insufficient in form and
substance, meriting its dismissal.
• Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was denied by the respondent tribunal
• In this Petition for Certiorari, filed on December 29, 1995, petitioner argues that the respondent HRET acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to having acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the election protest of
petitioner considering that:
I
"THE PETITION AD CAUTELAM DATED 22 MAY 1995 STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AND IS SUFFICIENT IN FORM
AND SUBSTANCE.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PETITION WAS INITIALLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT FAILED TO SPECIFY THE
CONTESTED PRECINCTS, SAID DEFECT WAS CURED WHEN PETITIONER SUBMITTED A SUMMARY OF THE
CONTESTED PRECINCTS WHICH FORMS PART OF THE RECORD OF THE RESPONDENT HRET."
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT: that the instant election protest is sufficient in form and substance even while failing to specify
the precincts where irregularities allegedly occurred. Nowhere is it provided that the specification of the precincts is a
jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with in order that an election protest can be entertained by the HRET.
Moreover, the fact that the HRET did not summarily dismiss the Petition Ad Cautelam, and instead, required the private
respondent Abueg to file an Answer, the HRET has thus made a prior determination that the petition is sufficient in form
and substance.
ISSUE: W/N HRET have acquired jurisdiction over the petition.
RULING: Court HAVE JURISDICTION. Court hereby resolves to DISMISS the present petition for lack of merit.
In the first place, in requiring the private respondent to answer the petition, the HRET was not ruling on the formal and
substantive sufficiency of the petition. The order to require an answer is but a matter of course, as under the Revised Rules
of Procedure of the HRET, it is provided that:
"RULE 22. Summons. — Upon the filing of the petition, the Clerk of the Tribunal shall forthwith issue the corresponding
summons to the protestee or respondent together with a copy of the petition, requiring him within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof to file his answer."
As to the adequacy of the protest, we agree with respondent HRET in ruling for the insufficiency of the same.
A perusal of the Petition Ad Cautelam, reveals that Petitioner makes no specific mention of the precincts where widespread
election, fraud and irregularities occurred. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into the very substance of the protest. Under
Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of HRET, insufficiency in form and substance of the petition constitutes a
ground for the immediate dismissal of the Petition.
The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance means that the petition must be more than merely
rhetorical. If the allegations contained therein are unsupported by even the faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then
there is no other course than to dismiss the petition, otherwise, the assumption of an elected public official may, and will
always be held up by petitions of this sort by the losing candidate.
Notably, the instant petition ad cautelam poses a more serious inadequacy than a mere failure to specify the number of
votes which would inure to the protestant, as was the case in Gallares vs. Casenas, or the failure to impugn the validity of
some of the ballots cast, as in Yalung vs. Atienza, supra, both of which cases were decided in the 1920s. The defect in the
instant case arises from the failure to allege the contested precincts. Only a bare allegation of "massive fraud, widespread
intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities", without specification, and substantiation, of where and how these
occurrences took place, appears in the petition. We cannot allow an election protest based on such flimsy averments to
prosper, otherwise, the whole election process will deteriorate into an endless stream of crabs pulling at each other, racing
to disembark from the water.
On his second point of argument, Petitioner likewise fails to impress. The Court has already ruled in Joker P. Arroyo vs.
HRET, that substantial amendments to the protest may be allowed only within the same period for filing the election protest,
which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules of Procedure is ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner.
Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the power to annul an election should be exercised with the greatest care as it
involves the free and fair expression of the popular will. It is only in extreme cases of fraud and under circumstances which
demonstrate to the fullest degree a fundamental and wanton disregard of the law that elections are annulled, and then only
when it becomes impossible to take any other step. This is as it should be, for the democratic system is good for the many
although abhorred by a few.
In sum, this Court's jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals operates only upon a showing of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal. Only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the electoral tribunal's judgment. There is no such showing in the present petition.
COSETENG v. MITRA
Facts:
Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in representatives from diverse political parties Petitioner Anna Dominique
Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA.
A year later, the “Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino” or LDP was organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members
of the House of Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees, including the House representation
in the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized. Petitioner Coseteng then wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon
Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and
House Electoral Tribunal.
On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, revised the House majority membership in the Commission on
Appointments to conform with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson,
LDP, however, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member representing the House minority.
On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs praying that the Supreme
Court declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon,
Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin
them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing them as members of the Commission
on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional
representation
Issue:
1. WON the question raised is political.
2. WON the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Holding/
Held:
1. No, it is not. The “political question” issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson, where this Court ruled that “the legality, and
not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution” is justiciable,
and, “even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality
of the government.”
3. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads: “Sec. 18. There
shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex oficio Chairman, twelve
Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall
act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.) The composition of the
House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political
parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House
membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on
Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The
remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the
Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is
no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done “on the
basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein.” There is no merit in the petitioner’s contention
that the House members in the Commission on Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their
respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in
the House. They were elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments-eleven (11) from the Coalesced
Majority and one from the minority-is unassailable.

REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner,

vs.
REP LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, respondent.
FACTS:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats
in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties represented in the chamber, including the Lakas ng
Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL, Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen
and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the
House of Representatives. Twenty-four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP,
thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members.
The House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat
occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set
of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson
as the additional member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to the Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and
the assumption of his seat by the respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that the contention of the petitioner that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments and
invoking the doctrine of Cunanan v. Tan is valid.
HELD:
Yes, petitioner’s plea is valid. While he may be technically correct in arguing that it is not he who caused the petitioner's
removal. The feel that this objection is also not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this controversy. For one thing,
the Court treat this proceeding as a petition for quo warranto as the petitioner is actually questioning the respondent's right
to sit as a member of the Commission on Appointments. For another, the Justices held as early as in the Emergency Powers
Cases that were serious constitutional questions are involved.
The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by the House of Representatives or
the Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman,
twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule
by a majority vote of all the Members.
Wherefore, the petition is Dismissed. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989, isLifted. The Court holds
that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume
his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs.
Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales
Fact:
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators,
and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the
parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected.
The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD,
and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because
he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also
pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should
consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD,
opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the CoA.
HELD:
It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule o n
proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution
leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties
is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator
by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with
its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The
election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party
either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in
the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally
claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional
representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.