CONSTI CASE DIGESTS

DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY

The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons,
including the highest officials of the land must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its intentions, if it
conflicts with the constitution. The constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this
law. , if a law/contract violates the constitution, law/contract is null & void & without any force & effect.
Constitution is deemed written in every statute/contract

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the
eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of
Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a
manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated
with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

SECTION 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning
agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments.
The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the matching
bid of the petitioner.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. It is a self-executing provision.
1. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected,
is self-executing.
2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing,
the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
law.
3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
It is per sejudicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. The Court agree.
1. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
 Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos.
2. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel
has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the
venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.
3. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the
equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority
and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel
and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
3. It is not premature.
1. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match
the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go
to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy
provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated
in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would
be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
2. The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But
the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny.
These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign
jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies
or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the
laws of the forum.
4. There was grave abuse of discretion.
1. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the
bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player,
and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino
people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather
remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the
habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
2. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of
MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not
only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding
 rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to
issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives G.R. No. 160261
Facts:
On June 2, 2003, an impeachment complaint (1st impeachment complaint) was filed by
former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and 7 Associate Justices for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes”.

On October 22, 2003, the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the complaint for being
insufficient in substance, although it was sufficient in form. On October 23, 2003, a day after the
House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the complaint or 4 months and 3 weeks since the
filing thereof, a 2nd impeachment complaint was filed with the House’s Secretary General by
Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and Funtabella against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on
the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).”

The 2nd impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/

Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Due
to the events that took place, several instant petitions were filed against the House of
Representatives, mostly contending that the filing of the 2nd impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates Article XI Section 5 of the Constitution that “no impeachment
proceedings shall be INITIATED against the same official more than once within a period
of one year”; and that sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings of the 12th Congress are unconstitutional as well.

The House of Representatives argues that sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the present Constitution,
contending that the term " initiate" does not mean "to file", and concludes that the one year bar
prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have
been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and the 7 Associate
Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body,
has yet to act on it.

The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate".

Section 3 (2), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution

3 ways to file an impeachment complaint:
1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or
2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member (of the House of
Representatives); or
3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives

Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules (of the 12th Congress)
Impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated:
1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is sufficient in substance; or
2)once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance; or
3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of
a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House
Held:

Statutory Construction (of the Constitution)

1. First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. We look to the
language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there,
but that is where we begin.
2. Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. The object is to ascertain the
reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the
words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
3. Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. It is a
well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to
be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon
a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the
great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered
and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section
is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to
stand together. In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make
the words idle and nugatory.

Judicial Review and Separation of Powers

7. The Court’s power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in
Article VIII section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
8. Judicial review is an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances
which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our
republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit
of the people for which it serves.
9. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; rather, it only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to check the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
10. The power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings.

Requisites for exercise of Judicial Review

11. The courts' power of judicial review is subject to several limitations. In order for the courts to
exercise its judicial review power, the following requisites must be established:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Locus Standi
12. Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged.
Citizen standing
13. When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a
statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any
government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
14. When the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a
citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
Taxpayer standing
15. In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he
has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that
he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or
contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public. At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit
should be entertained.
16. In this case, the Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation
that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing
trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
Legislator standing
17. As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which
he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in his office.
Association’s standing
18. While an association has legal personality to represent its members, especially when it is
composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests, the mere
invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the
duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to
clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry.
19. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the
issues presented by it.
Class suits
20. When dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be
sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned to enable the court to deal
properly with all interests involved in the suit, for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class
whether or not they were before the court.
21. Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by
the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a
class suit ought to fail.
22. However, since petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, their
petition will stand.
Impeachment, meaning of “to Initiate” (Impeachment case vs Impeachment Proceeding)
23. The word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to
file the complaint and take initial action on it."Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to
mean, as dictionaries do: to begin, to commence, or set going.
24. According to Father Bernas, an amicus curiae, an impeachment proceeding is not a single
act. It is a complexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end.
The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on
Justice. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the
articles of impeachment. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate.
25. An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. The
Constitution provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case
to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of
impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in
the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be
"initiated."
26. An impeachment proceeding takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists
of several steps:
(1) the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a
private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives;
(2) the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the
complaint or uphold it;
(3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution
must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and
(4) the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms
a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third
of all the members.

(5) If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are
prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an
impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully
impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the
Senate as impeachment court.
27. Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the
complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding
and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment
proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the
Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the impeachment
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps
that follow. He concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no
second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
28. Therefore, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., along with 7 Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Civil Liberties Union Vs. The Executive Secretary

FACTS:
The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 issued
by President Corazon C. Aquino. The assailed law provides that:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member
of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two
positions in the government and government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to
ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is
the Chairman.

The petitioners alleged that the cited provision of EO 284 contravenes the provision of Sec. 13,
Article VII which declares:
The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office
or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The petitioners maintained that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used
in Section 13 of Article VII meant that the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution.
Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in
the Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the
appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned. The provision relied upon by the respondents
provides:
Sec. 7. . . . . .
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

ISSUE No. 1 : Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive
officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB?
No.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President
and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is
concerned.

Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of
multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public
officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article
VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in
the Constitution itself. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when
expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down
the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13,
Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation
to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being
appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those
instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

ISSUE No. 2: Does the prohibition apply to positions held in ex officio capacity?
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article
VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive
officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no
comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly
an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. The term ex-officio means "from office;
by virtue of office." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence
of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." The
additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the official's primary
functions. If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent,
incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions
would fall under the purview of "any other office" prohibited by the Constitution.

ISSUE No. 3: Can the respondents be obliged to reimburse the perquisites they have received from the
offices they have held pursuant to EO 284?

During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers
and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that "in cases where
there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has
discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in
an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. Any per
diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered
in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.

Overall, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it actually allows a member of the cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold
multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.

ARTICLE VIII
 Judicial Department
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.

SECTION 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement,
or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules
of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application,
or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 157584. April 2, 2009.]

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA of the 2nd District of Bataan, petitioner, vs. THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, CALTEX
PHILIPPINES, INC., PETRON CORPORATION, and PILIPINAS SHELL
CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J p:

For the second time, petitioner Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. (petitioner Garcia) asks this Court to
examine the constitutionality of Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8479(R.A. No. 8479), otherwise known
as the Oil Deregulation Law of 1998) through this petition for certiorari. 1 He raises once again before
us the propriety of implementing full deregulation by removing the system of price controls in the
local downstream oil industry — a matter that we have ruled upon in the past.
THE FACTS
After years of imposing significant controls over the downstream oil industry in the
Philippines, the government decided in March 1996 to pursue a policy of deregulation by
enacting Republic Act No. 8180 (R.A. No. 8180) or the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of
1996".
R.A. No. 8180, however, met strong opposition, and rightly so, as this Court concluded in its
November 5, 1997 decision in Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy. 2 We struck down the law
as invalid because the three key provisions intended to promote free competition were shown to
achieve the opposite result; contrary to its intent, R.A. No. 8180's provisions on tariff differential,
inventory requirements, and predatory pricing inhibited fair competition, encouraged monopolistic
power, and interfered with the free interaction of market forces. We declared: THcEaS
R.A. No. 8180 needs provisions to vouchsafe free and fair competition. The need for
these vouchsafing provisions cannot be overstated. Before deregulation, PETRON,
SHELL and CALTEX had no real competitors but did not have a free run of the market
because government controls both the pricing and non-pricing aspects of the oil
industry. After deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX remain unthreatened by real
competition yet are no longer subject to control by government with respect to their
pricing and non-pricing decisions. The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is a deregulated
market where competition can be corrupted and where market forces can be
manipulated by oligopolies. 3
Notwithstanding the existence of a separability clause among its provisions, we struck down R.A. No.
8180 in its entirety because its offensive provisions permeated the whole law and were the principal
tools to carry deregulation into effect.
 Congress responded to our Decision in Tatad by enacting on February 10, 1998 a new oil
deregulation law, R.A. No. 8479. This time, Congress excluded the offensive provisions found in the
invalidated law. Nonetheless, petitioner Garcia again sought to declare the new oil deregulation law
unconstitutional on the ground that it violated Article XII, Section 19 of the Constitution. 4 He
specifically objected to Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 which, in essence, prescribed the period for
removal of price control on gasoline and other finished petroleum products and set the time for the
full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry. The assailed provision reads:
SEC. 19. Start of Full Deregulation. — Full deregulation of the Industry shall start five
(5) months following the effectivity of this Act: Provided, however, That when the public
interest so requires, the President may accelerate the start of full deregulation upon
the recommendation of the DOE and the Department of Finance (DOF) when the prices
of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and the value of
the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable, taking into account relevant trends and
prospects; Provided, further, That the foregoing provision notwithstanding, the five (5)-
month Transition Phase shall continue to apply to LPG, regular gasoline and kerosene
as socially-sensitive petroleum products and said petroleum products shall be covered
by the automatic pricing mechanism during the said period.
Upon the implementation of full deregulation as provided herein, the Transition Phase
is deemed terminated and the following laws are repealed:
a) Republic Act No. 6173, as amended;
b) Section 5 of Executive Order No. 172, as amended;
c) Letter of Instruction No. 1431, dated October 15, 1984;
d) Letter of Instruction No. 1441, dated November 20, 1984, as amended;
e) Letter of Instruction No. 1460, dated May 9, 1985;
f) Presidential Decree No. 1889; and
g) Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137:
Provided, however, That in case full deregulation is started by the President in
the exercise of the authority provided in this Section, the foregoing laws shall
continue to be in force and effect with respect to LPG, regular gasoline and
kerosene for the rest of the five (5)-month period.
Petitioner Garcia contended that implementing full deregulation and removing price control
at a time when the market is still dominated and controlled by an oligopoly 5 would be contrary to
public interest, as it would only provide an opportunity for the Big 3 to engage in price-fixing and
overpricing. He averred that Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 is "glaringly pro-oligopoly, anti-competition,
and anti-people", and thus asked the Court to declare the provision unconstitutional. cDICaS
On December 17, 1999, in Garcia v. Corona (1999 Garcia case), 6 we denied petitioner
Garcia's plea for nullity. We declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 as
we found the question replete with policy considerations; in the words of Justice Ynares-Santiago,
the ponente of the 1999 Garcia case:
It bears reiterating at the outset that the deregulation of the oil industry is a policy
determination of the highest order. It is unquestionably a priority program of
 Government. The Department of Energy Act of 1992 expressly mandates that the
development and updating of the existing Philippine energy program "shall include a
policy direction towards deregulation of the power and energy industry."
Be that as it may, we are not concerned with whether or not there should be
deregulation. This is outside our jurisdiction. The judgment on the issue is a settled
matter and only Congress can reverse it.
xxx xxx xxx
Reduced to its basic arguments, it can be seen that the challenge in this petition is not
against the legality of deregulation. Petitioner does not expressly challenge
deregulation. The issue, quite simply, is the timeliness or the wisdom of the date when
full deregulation should be effective.
In this regard, what constitutes reasonable time is not for judicial
determination. Reasonable time involves the appraisal of a great variety of relevant
conditions, political, social and economic. They are not within the appropriate range of
evidence in a court of justice. It would be an extravagant extension of judicial authority
to assert judicial notice as the basis for the determination. [Emphasis supplied.]
Undaunted, petitioner Garcia is again before us in the present petition for certiorari seeking
a categorical declaration from this Court of the unconstitutionality of Section 19 of R.A. No.
8479. SEIaHT
THE PETITION
Petitioner Garcia does not deny that the present petition for certiorari raises the same issue
of the constitutionality of Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479, which was already the subject of the 1999
Garcia case. He disagrees, however, with the allegation that the prior rulings of the Court in the two
oil deregulation cases 7 amount to res judicata that would effectively bar the resolution of the
present petition. He reasons that res judicata will not apply, as the earlier cases did not completely
resolve the controversy and were not decided on the merits. Moreover, he maintains that the present
case involves a matter of overarching and overriding importance to the national economy and to the
public and cannot be sacrificed for technicalities like res judicata. 8
To further support the present petition, petitioner Garcia invokes the following additional
grounds to nullify Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479:
1. Subsequent events after the lifting of price control in 1997 have confirmed the
continued existence of the Big 3 oligopoly and its overpricing of finished
petroleum products;
2. The unabated overpricing of finished petroleum products by the Big 3 oligopoly is
gravely and undeniably detrimental to the public interest;
3. No longer may the bare and blatant constitutionality of the lifting of price control be
glossed over through the expediency of legislative wisdom or judgment call in
the face of the Big 3 oligopoly's characteristic, definitive, and continued
overpricing;
4. To avoid declaring the lifting of price control on finished petroleum products as
unconstitutional is to consign to the dead letter dustbin the solemn and explicit
constitutional command for the regulation of monopolies/oligopolies. 9
 THE COURT'S RULING
We resolve to dismiss the petition.
In asking the Court to declare Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 as unconstitutional for contravening
Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution, petitioner Garcia invokes the exercise by this Court of its
power of judicial review, which power is expressly recognized under Section 4 (2), Article VIII of the
Constitution. 10 The power of judicial review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive
and legislative acts for their conformity with the Constitution. 11 Through such power, the judiciary
enforces and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution. 12 For a court to exercise this power, certain
requirements must first be met, namely:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 13
Actual Case Controversy
Susceptible of Judicial Determination
The petition fails to satisfy the very first of these requirements — the existence of an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power. An actual case or controversy is one that
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Stated otherwise, it is not the mere existence of
a conflict or controversy that will authorize the exercise by the courts of its power of review; more
importantly, the issue involved must be susceptible of judicial determination. Excluded from these
are questions of policy or wisdom, otherwise referred to as political questions:
As Tañada v. Cuenco puts it, political questions refer "to those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of government." Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of
the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of
government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political question. In
the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, "[p]rominent on the surface
of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on the one question." 14[Emphasis supplied.]
 Petitioner Garcia's issues fit snugly into the political question mold, as he insists that by
adopting a policy of full deregulation through the removal of price controls at a time when an
oligopoly still exists, Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 contravenes the Constitutional directive to regulate
or prohibit monopolies 15 under Article XII, Section 19 of the Constitution. This Section states:
The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
Read correctly, this constitutional provision does not declare an outright prohibition of
monopolies. It simply allows the State to act "when public interest so requires"; even then, no outright
prohibition is mandated, as the State may choose to regulate rather than to prohibit. Two elements
must concur before a monopoly may be regulated or prohibited:
1. There in fact exists a monopoly or an oligopoly, and
2. Public interest requires its regulation or prohibition.
Whether a monopoly exists is a question of fact. On the other hand, the questions of (1) what public
interest requires and (2) what the State reaction shall be essentially require the exercise of discretion
on the part of the State.
Stripped to its core, what petitioner Garcia raises as an issue is the propriety of immediately
and fully deregulating the oil industry. Such determination essentially dwells on the soundness or
wisdom of the timing and manner of the deregulation Congress wants to implement through R.A. No.
8497. Quite clearly, the issue is not for us to resolve; we cannot rule on when and to what extent
deregulation should take place without passing upon the wisdom of the policy of deregulation that
Congress has decided upon. To use the words of Baker v. Carr, 16 the ruling that petitioner Garcia
asks requires "an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion"; the branch
of government that was given by the people the full discretionary authority to formulate the policy is
the legislative department.
Directly supporting our conclusion that Garcia raises a political question is his proposal to
adopt instead a system of partial deregulation — a system he presents as more consistent with the
Constitutional "dictate". He avers that free market forces (in a fully deregulated environment) cannot
prevail for as long as the market itself is dominated by an entrenched oligopoly. In such situation, he
claims that prices are not determined by the free play of supply and demand, but instead by the
entrenched and dominant oligopoly where overpricing and price-fixing are possible. 17 Thus, before
full deregulation can be implemented, he calls for an indefinite period of partial deregulation through
imposition of price controls. 18
Petitioner Garcia's thesis readily reveals the political, 19 hence, non-justiciable, nature of his
petition; the choice of undertaking full or partial deregulation is not for this Court to make. By enacting
the assailed provision — Section 19 — of R.A. No. 8479, Congress already determined that the
problems confronting the local downstream oil industry are better addressed by removing all forms
of prior controls and adopting a deregulated system. This intent is expressed in Section 2 of the
law: SIacTE
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. — It shall be the policy of the State to liberalize and
deregulate the downstream oil industry in order to ensure a truly competitive market
under a regime of fair prices, adequate and continuous supply of environmentally-clean
and high-quality petroleum products. To this end, the State shall promote and
 encourage the entry of new participants in the downstream oil industry, and introduce
adequate measures to ensure the attainment of these goals.
In Tatad, we declared that the fundamental principle espoused by Section 19, Article XII of the
Constitution is competition. 20 Congress, by enacting R.A. No. 8479, determined that this objective is
better realized by liberalizing the oil market, instead of continuing with a highly regulated system
enforced by means of restrictive prior controls. This legislative determination was a lawful exercise of
Congress' prerogative and one that this Court must respect and uphold. Regardless of the individual
opinions of the Members of this Court, we cannot, acting as a body, question the wisdom of a co-
equal department's acts. The courts do not involve themselves with or delve into the policy or wisdom
of a statute; 21 it sits, not to review or revise legislative action, but to enforce the legislative
will. 22 For the Court to resolve a clearly non-justiciable matter would be to debase the principle of
separation of powers that has been tightly woven by the Constitution into our republican system of
government.
This same line of reasoning was what we used when we dismissed the first Garcia case. The
petitioner correctly noted that this is not a matter of res judicata(as the respondents invoked), as the
application of the principle of res judicata presupposes that there is a final judgment or decree on the
merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To be exact, we are simply declaring that then,
as now, and for the same reasons, we find that there is no justiciable controversy that would justify
the grant of the petition.
Grave Abuse of Discretion
Recourse to the political question doctrine necessarily raises the underlying doctrine of
separation of powers among the three great branches of government that our Constitution has
entrenched. But at the same time that the Constitution mandates this Court to respect acts performed
by co-equal departments done within their sphere of competence and authority, it has also allowed
us to cross the line of separation on a very limited and specific point — to determine whether the acts
of the executive and the legislative departments are null because they were undertaken with grave
abuse of discretion. IBP v. Zamora teaches us that —
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to
whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.
xxx xxx xxx
[W]hile this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of
the President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made
in grave abuse of discretion. A showing that plenary power is granted either
department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the
improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable
controversy. 23 [Emphasis supplied.]
Jurisprudence has defined grave abuse of discretion to mean the capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment that is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 24
Significantly, the pleadings before us fail to disclose any act of the legislature that may be
characterized as patently capricious or whimsical. A reading of the congressional deliberations made
on R.A. No. 8479 indicates that the measure was thoroughly and carefully considered. Indeed,
petitioner Garcia was among the many who interpellated the law's principal author, then
Congressman Dante O. Tinga, now a Member of this Court.

We note, too, that petitioner Garcia has not adequately proven at this point that an oligopoly
does in fact exist in the form of the Big 3, and that the Big 3 have actually engaged in oligopolistic
practices. He merely cites (in his argument against the applicability of res judicata) and relies on the
facts and findings stated in the two prior cases on oil deregulation. This calls to mind what former
Chief Justice Panganiban said in his Separate Opinion in the 1999 Garcia case:
Petitioner merely resurrects and relies heavily on the arguments, the statistics and the
proofs he submitted two years ago in the first oil deregulation case, Tatad v. Secretary
of the Department of Energy. Needless to state, those reasons were taken into
consideration in said case, and they indeed helped show the unconstitutionality of RA
8180. But exactly the same old grounds cannot continue to support petitioner's
present allegation that the major oil companies — Petron, Shell and Caltex —
persist to this date in their oligopolistic practices, as a consequence of the current Oil
Deregulation Law and in violation of the Constitution. In brief, the legal cause and
effect relationship has not been amply shown. [Emphasis supplied.] cCAaHD
This observation is true in the present case as it was true in the 1999 Garcia case; the
petitioner has simply omitted the citation of facts, figures and statistics specifically supporting his
petition. To prove charges of continued overpricing or price-fixing, he refers to data showing price
adjustments of petroleum products for the period covering February 8, 1997 to August 1, 1997.
Insofar as R.A. No. 8479 is concerned, however, these data are irrelevant, as they cover a period way
beforeR.A. No. 8479 was enacted. 25
Petitioner Garcia contends that the identity in the pricing patterns of the Big 3 confirms the
existence of an oligopoly and shows that they have colluded to engage in unlawful cartel-like
behaviour. His reasoning fails to persuade us. That the oil firms have the same prices and change them
at the same rate at the same time are not sufficient evidence to conclude that collusion exists. An
independent study on local oil prices explains:
[W]hen products are highly substitutable with each other (or what economists call
"homogeneous products"), then firms will tend to set similar prices, especially when
there are many competing sellers. Otherwise, if one firm tried to set a price significantly
higher than the others, it would find itself losing customers to the others. 26
Even assuming that the Big 3 have indeed colluded in fixing oil prices, this development will
not necessarily justify a declaration against the validity and constitutionality of Section 19 of R.A. No.
8479. The remedy against the perceived failure of the Oil Deregulation Law to combat cartelization is
not to declare it invalid, but to set in motion its anti-trust safeguards under Sections 11, 27 12, 28 and
13. 29
Lis Mota
Lis Mota — the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will undertake judicial review
— means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly
presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute
or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless
the constitutional question raised is determined. 30 This requirement is based on the rule that every
law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; 31 to justify its nullification, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or
argumentative.
Petitioner Garcia argues against full deregulation implemented through the lifting of price
control, as it allows oligopoly, overpricing and price-fixing. R.A. No. 8479, however, does not condone
these acts; indeed, Section 11 (a) of the law expressly prohibits and punishes cartelization, which is
defined in the same section as "any agreement, combination or concerted action by refiners, importers
and/or dealers, or their representatives, to fix prices, restrict outputs or divide markets, either by
products or by areas, or allocate markets, either by products or by areas, in restraint of trade or free
competition, including any contractual stipulation which prescribes pricing levels and profit margins".
This definition is broad enough to include the alleged acts of overpricing or price-fixing by the Big
3. R.A. No. 8479has provided, aside from prosecution for cartelization, several other anti-trust
mechanisms, including the enlarged scope of the Department of Energy's monitoring power and the
creation of a Joint Task Force to immediately act on complaints against unreasonable rise in the price
of petroleum products. 32 Petitioner Garcia's failure is that he failed to show that he resorted to these
measures before filing the instant petition. His belief that these oversight mechanisms are unrealistic
and insufficient does not permit disregard of these remedies. 33
CONCLUSION
To summarize, we declare that the issues petitioner Garcia presented to this Court are non-
justiciable matters that preclude the Court from exercising its power of judicial review. The immediate
implementation of full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry is a policy determination by
Congress which this Court cannot overturn without offending the Constitution and the principle of
separation of powers. That the law failed in its objectives because its adoption spawned the evils
petitioner Garcia alludes to does not warrant its nullification. In the words of Mr. Justice Leonardo A.
Quisumbing in the 1999 Garcia case, "[a] calculus of fear and pessimism . . . does not justify the remedy
petitioner seeks: that we overturn a law enacted by Congress and approved by the Chief Executive". 34
BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMISSION
FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC)
dated July 30, 2010. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers
and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration,
and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC
has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create
a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the
Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to
create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth
Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code
of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar
species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be
indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive
power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence,
authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman
and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not
duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly
created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
 2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which
they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution. Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the
validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. With
regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and
direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1. Locus standi is “a right of appearance
in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in
interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
“public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general
public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient
interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court,
however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the
petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The
powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the
recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies
to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be
properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will
be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC
shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all,
the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function
of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains
to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so
that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of
its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is
to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s
duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2)
It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Arroyo administration is but just a member of
a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle
for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification. The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have
the authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution
Salonga vs Cruz Pano

G.R. No. L-59524

FACTS:

The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due
process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an
information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks this Court to prohibit and prevent the
respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the
democratic opposition in the Philippines.

Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act after he was
implicated, along with other 39 accused, by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. He
was tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the leader of subversive organizations for two reasons (1)
because his house was used as a contact point; and (2) because of his remarks during the party of Raul
Daza in Los Angeles. He allegedly opined about the likelihood of a violent struggle in the Philippines
if reforms are not instituted immediately by then President Marcos.

When arrested, he was not informed of the nature of the charges against him. Neither was counsel
allowed to talk to him until this Court intervened through the issuance of an order directing that his
lawyers be permitted to visit him. Only after four months of detention was the petitioner informed for
the first time of the nature of the charges against him. After the preliminary investigation, the petitioner
moved to dismiss the complaint but the same was denied. Subsequently, the respondent judge issued a
resolution ordering the filing of an information after finding that a prima facie case had been established
against the forty persons accused.

Hence, this petition questioning the resolution of the judge.

HELD:

After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds the evidence offered by the prosecution
utterly insufficient to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner. We grant the petition.

The respondents call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to quash or to
dismiss, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari; that since the question of
dismissal will again be considered by the court when it decides the case, the movant has a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that public interest dictates that criminal
prosecutions should not be enjoined.

The SC held that infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal
procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but
also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if a
person is carelessly included in the trial of around forty persons when on the very face of the record no
evidence linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists.
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo GR171396

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle
I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential
Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was
aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits
issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally
permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they
seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency
(Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was
however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His
supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David
and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and
it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration
is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in
the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP
1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued
that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the
declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take
care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is
still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP.
Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and
at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A
reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration
of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day,
the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from
the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented
nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the
President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must
not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’
statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases.
Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related
conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover,
the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’
Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally
unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which,
by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at
all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of
conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s
‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not
prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or
whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has
validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’
of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only
criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President
may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such
criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art
6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress.
They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the
power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled
that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate
‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The
president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in
the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a
distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency
powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The
authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise
of the calling out power of the president by the president.
 RANDOLF DAVID, et al. v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, et al. G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409,
171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 and 171424, 3 May 2006, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. (En Banc)
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
“sequence” of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power,
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial
Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.” But the President must be careful in the exercise of her powers. Every act that goes
beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. There lies the wisdom of
our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People
Power I, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in a move to suppress alleged plans to overthrow the
government, issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of national
emergency. She cited as factual bases for the said issuance the escape of the Magdalo Group and their
audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day; the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines; and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. On the same day, she issued
General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) setting the standards which the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) should follow in the suppression and prevention of acts
of lawless violence. The following were considered as additional factual bases for the issuance of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5: the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan;
the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three soldiers; and the directive of
the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila
radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests.
Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th People Power I anniversary celebration. It revoked permits to hold rallies.
Members of the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and the National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang
Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), who marched from various parts of Metro Manila to converge at the EDSA
Shrine, were violently dispersed by anti-riot police. Professor Randolf David, Akbayan partylist
president Ronald Llamas, and members of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU were arrested without a
warrant. In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and confiscated news stories,
documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen were stationed inside the
editorial and business offices, as well as outside the building. A few minutes after the search and
seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition
paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante. The PNP warned that it would take over
any media organization that would not follow “standards set by the government during the state of
national emergency.”
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week from the declaration of a state of national emergency
and after all the present petitions had been filed, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation
No. 1021 (PP 1021), declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist and lifting PP
1017. These consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. It is contended that respondent
officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions,
are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence,
such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
 1.) Whether or not the issuance of PP 1021 rendered the present petitions moot and
academic;
2.) Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing;
3.) Whether or not there were factual bases for the issuance of PP 1017;
4.) Whether or not PP 1017 is a declaration of Martial Law;
5.) Whether or not PP 1017 arrogates unto the President the power to legislate;
6.) Whether or not PP 1017 authorizes the President to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest; and
7.) Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional
HELD: The Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.

The issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic because all
the exceptions to the “moot and academic” principle are present.
The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade
the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1)there
is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2)the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; (3)the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4)the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review. All these exceptions are present here. It is alleged that the issuance of
PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised
affect the public interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to the freedoms of expression,
of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and
the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given
by constitutional guarantees. Lastly, the contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the
present petitions are subject to judicial review.
All the petitioners have legal standing in view of the transcendental importance of the issue
involved.
It has been held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.
Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that
the following requirements are met: (a)the cases involve constitutional issues; (b)for taxpayers, there
must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(c)for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
(d)for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and (e)for legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Being a mere procedural technicality, however, the requirement of locus standi may be
waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. The question of locus standi is but corollary to
the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. Undoubtedly, the validity of PP No. 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. In view of
the transcendental importance of this issue, all the petitioners are declared to have locus standi.
 There were sufficient factual bases for the President’s exercise of her calling-out power, which
petitioners did not refute.
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora (338 SCRA 81 [2000]), the Court considered the
President’s “calling-out” power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. It is incumbent
upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. Nonetheless,
the Court stressed that “this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion.” Under the expanded power of judicial review, the courts are authorized not only
“to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,” but
also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.” As to how the
Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of the power, Lansang v. Garcia (42 SCRA 448 [1971])
adopted the test that “judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the
President’s decision is correct,” but that “the President did not act arbitrarily.” Thus, the standard laid
down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing
PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment
and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the records. Petitioners did not refute such events. Thus, absent
any contrary allegations, the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Judging
the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do
nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In times
of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the
basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate
within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.
PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law, but merely an invocation of the President’s
calling-out power.
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
“sequence” of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power,
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial
Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.” Considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to
issue PP 1017. Owing to her Office’s vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine
the actual condition of the country. But the President must be careful in the exercise of her powers.
Every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. There
lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations. In declaring
a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, but also on Sec. 17, Art. XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over
privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest.
It is plain in the wordings of PP 1017 that what President Arroyo invoked was her callingout
power. PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that can
be done only under a valid declaration of Martial Law. Specifically, arrests and seizures without udicial
warrants, ban on public assemblies, take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship, and
issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-
in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus.
PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
decrees.
The second provision of the operative portion of PP 1017 states: “and to enforce obedience
to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.” The operative clause of PP 1017 was lifted from PP 1081, which gave former President
Marcos legislative power. The ordinance power granted to President Arroyo under the Administrative
Code of 1987 is limited to executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum
orders, memorandum circulars, and general or special orders. She cannot issue decrees similar to
those issued by former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of
the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the
exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Neither Martial Law nor
a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced.
She cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws. She can only order the military,
under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
PP 1017 does not authorize President Arroyo during the emergency to temporarily take over
or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest
without authority from Congress.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. However, knowing that during
grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers,
the framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the
President, subject to certain conditions, thus: (a)there must be a war or other emergency; (b)the
delegation must be for a limited period only; (c)the delegation must be subject to such restrictions as
the Congress may prescribe; and (d)the emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national
policy declared by Congress. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just
another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Sec. 17, Art. XII
of the Constitution states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to her
pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
There is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a state of national
emergency and her authority to exercise emergency powers. Her authority to declare a state of
national emergency is granted by Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, hence, no legitimate
constitutional objection can be raised. The exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This
requires a delegation from Congress. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances
exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. Nor can she determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public
interest that should be taken over.
 The illegal implementation of PP 1017, through G.O. No. 5, does not render these issuances
unconstitutional.
The criterion by which the validity of a statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential
basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion. PP 1017 is
limited to the calling out by the President of the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue
PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal
arrest, search or violate the citizens’ constitutional rights. But when in implementing its provisions,
pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights
under the Constitution, the Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.
David, et al. were arrested without a warrant while they were exercising their right to peaceful
assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present
danger that warranted the limitation of that right. Likewise, the dispersal and arrest of members of
KMU, et al. were unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of
Malacañang’s directive canceling all permits to hold rallies. The wholesale cancellation of all permits
to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a
right to prevent.” Furthermore, the search of the Daily Tribune offices is illegal. Not only that, the
search violated petitioners’ freedom of the press. It cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives
exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing
of policemen in the vicinity of the offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media,
are plain censorship.
The “acts of terrorism” portion of G.O. No. 5 is, however, unconstitutional. G.O. No. 5
mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the “necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.” The phrase “acts of
terrorism” is still an amorphous and vague concept. Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,”
it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts
constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently,
there can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over
the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the
administration. All these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the
calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the Constitution
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Group vs COMELEC
Facts: The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
COMELEC Res. No. 98-1419 which resolved to approve the issuance of restraining order to stop
the petitioner or any groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit survey. The
electoral body believed that the exit survey might conflict with the official COMELEC count, as
well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). It also
had not authorized or deputized petitioner to undertake the exit survey.
The petitioner filed for a temporary restraining order which was granted by the court on May 9,
1998.
Solicitor General contends that the petition is already moot and academic because the May 11,
1998 elections has already been held and done with and there is no longer any actual
controversy. SG further contends that the Petition should be dismissed for petitioner’s failure to
exhaust available remedies before issuing forum, especially the filling of a motion for
reconsideration.
The Court believed that the issue is not totally moot because of the basic feature of our
democratic government which is the periodic elections where exit polling is said to be tied with
it. The Court ruled that the procedural requirement may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage
of justice when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and
speedy remedy available. The Court based its judgment on the span of time the instant petition
was filed by the respondent and the time when the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof. Under
the circumstances, the court believed that there was hardly enough opportunity to move for
reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover,
not only is time of the essence; the Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. And
the court also resolved to settle the issue because the fundamental freedoms of speech and of
the press are being invoked.
Argument of the Petitioner:
 The petitioner argues that holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their
results are valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press.
 That the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion and grossly violated the petitioner’s
constitutional right.

Argument of the Respondent:

 It insists that the issuance was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to
promote a clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections" and "to
protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot."
 That "exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the
sanctity of the ballots," as the "voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in
violation of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution; and relevant provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code.
 That the exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and
integrity of the electoral process
Issue: Whether or not the respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the
petitioner or any other group, its agents or representatives from conducting exit polls during the
May 11, 1998 elections.
Ruling:
Validity of Conducting Exit Polls: No law prohibits the holding and the reporting of exit polls.
Nature and Scope of Freedoms of Speech and of the Press: Freedom of expression is a
fundamental principle of our democratic government. Our Constitution clearly mandates that no
law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. Limitation: a limitation on
the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character that
the state has a right to prevent.
Even though the government’s purpose is legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by
means that broadly conceal fundamental liberties, when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
Secrecy of the Ballots
The Court noted that the COMELEC has the duty to secure the secrecy of the ballot and to
preserve the sanctity and the integrity of the electoral process. However, in order to justify a
restriction of the people's freedoms of speech and of the press, the state's responsibility of
ensuring orderly voting must far outweigh them. The Court contends that the contention of
public respondent that exit polls indirectly violated the sanctity of the ballot is off-tangent to the
real issue. The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter
identification. What is forbidden is the association of voters with their respective votes, for the
purpose of assuring that the votes have been casted in accordance with the instruction of a third
party.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Moreover, the revelation
of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but VOLUNTARY.
On the contention of the COMELEC that exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the
credibility and integrity of the electoral process, the court ruled that such arguments are purely
speculative and clearly untenable. Because: 1) the participants are selected at random; 2) the
survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official COMELEC count. It is merely an
opinion. 3) credibility and integrity of the elections are not at stake here. The holding and the
reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the exit poll
is only part of the election.
The Court argues that the COMELEC has other valid and reasonable ways and means to avoid or
minimize disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys.

The petition is granted and the temporary restraining order issued by the court is made
permanent.
Resolution No. 98-1419 issued by the COMELEC is nullified and set aside.
Ynot v. intermediate appellate court GR 74457
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of
carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot
was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation
of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard
or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly
confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled
against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general
welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A
ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos
from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue.
Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred
before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due
process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken.
JESUS C. GARCIA vs.THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for
herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE
ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA’

G.R. No. 179267

June 25, 2013

CONCURRING OPINIONS

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

ISSUE: Constitutionality of RA 9262

WON R.A. NO. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

FACTS:

Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to have inflicted violence against private
respondents. Petitioner admitted having an affair with a bank manager. He callously boasted
about their sexual relations to the household help. His infidelity emotionally wounded private
respondent. Their quarrels left her with bruises and hematoma. Petitioner also
unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann, whom he blamed for squealing on him.

All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia(wife) to despair causing her to attempt suicide
on December 17, 2005 b y slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her to the hospital, petitioner
left the house. He never visited her when she was confined for seven (7) days. He even told
his mother-in-law that respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not
cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he
would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if
she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted
him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full
information about their businesses.
 Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence
against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders
(TPO) ordering petitioner, among other things, to surrender all his firearms including a .9MM
caliber firearm and a Walther PPK.

Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of RA 9262 for

1. making a gender-based classification, thus, providing remedies only to wives/women and not to
husbands/men.

2. He claims that even the title of the law, "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children" is
already sex-discriminatory because it means violence by men against women.

3. The law also does not include violence committed by women against children and other women.

4. He adds that gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under it
because its avowed purpose is to curb and punish spousal violence. The said remedies are discriminatory
against the husband/male gender.

5. There being no reasonable difference between an abused husband and an abused wife, the equal
protection guarantee is violated.

Important and Essential Governmental Objectives:

1. Safeguard Human Rights,

2. Ensure Gender Equality and

3. Empower Women

International Laws

By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that human rights and
fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone.

1. It was one of the countries that voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR). In addition, the Philippines is a signatory to many United Nations human rights
treaties such as the

2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,

3. the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the

4. Convention Against Torture, and the

5. Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.

UDHR

As a signatory to the UDHR, the Philippines pledged itself to achieve the promotion of
universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, keeping in
mind the standards under the Declaration. Among the standards under the UDHR are the
following:

Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

xxxx

Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in
violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by
law.

Declaration of Policy in RA 9262

 enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the government’s obligation to
safeguard the dignity and human rights of women and children by providing effective
remedies against domestic violence or physical, psychological, and other forms of abuse
perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father of the victim.

 The said law is also viewed within the context of the constitutional mandate to ensure
gender equality, which is quoted as follows:

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
 HELD:

RA 9262 is NOT UNCONSITUTIONAL.

1. RA 9262 - compliance with the CEDAW

It has been acknowledged that "gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that

seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with
men." RA 9262 can be viewed therefore as the Philippines’ compliance with
the CEDAW, which is committed to condemn discrimination against women and directs its
members to undertake, without delay, all appropriate means to eliminate discrimination
against women in all forms both in law and in practice.

CEDAW

Known as the International Bill of Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the central and most
comprehensive document for the advancement of the welfare of women. The CEDAW, in its
preamble, explicitly acknowledges the existence of extensive discrimination against women,
and emphasized that such is a violation of the principles of equality of rights and respect
for human dignity.

2. Philippine’s obligation as state-party to CEDAW

The Philippines is under legal obligation to ensure their development and advancement for
the improvement of their position from one of de jure as well as de facto equality with men.
The CEDAW, going beyond the concept of discrimination used in many legal standards and
norms, focuses on discrimination against women, with the emphasis that women have
suffered and are continuing to suffer from various forms of discrimination on account of
their biological sex.
 The governmental objectives of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, which
includes promoting gender equality and empowering women, as mandated not only by
our Constitution, but also by commitments we have made in the international sphere, are
undeniably important and essential.

RA 9262 provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are victims of
violence, which are often reported to have been committed not by strangers, but by a father
or a husband or a person with whom the victim has or had a sexual or dating relationship.

3. The Gender-Based Classification in RA 9262 is Substantially Related to the

Achievement of Governmental Objectives

Historical Perspective:

 A foreign history professor noted that: "from the earliest civilizations on, the subjugation
of women, in the form of violence, were facts of life,

 Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and the Common Law Legal Code: all
"assumed patriarchy as natural; that is, male domination stemming from the view of male
superiority."

 18th century legal expert William Blackstone, reflected the theological assumption that:
husband and wife were ‘one body’ before God; thus "they were ‘one person’ under the law,
and that one person was the husband," a concept that evidently found its way in some of our
Civil Code provisions prior to the enactment of the Family Code.

 Society and tradition dictate that the culture of patriarchy continues. Men are expected
to take on the dominant roles both in the community and in the family. This perception
naturally leads to men gaining more power over women – power, which must necessarily be
controlled and maintained. Violence against women is one of the ways men control women to
retain such power.

 In ancient western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the
authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.

 The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if
she endangered his property right over her.
 Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family
strengthened the male dominated structure of society.

 English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women.

 However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit
the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of
thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their
thumb.

Statistics:

The enactment of RA 9262 was in response to the undeniable numerous cases involving
violence committed against women in the Philippines.

 In 2012, the Philippine National Police (PNP) reported that 65% or 11,531 out of 15,969
cases involving violence against women were filed under RA 9262.

 From 2004 to 2012, violations of RA. 9262 ranked first among the different categories of
violence committed against women. The number of reported cases showed an increasing
trend from 2004 to 2012,

 The law recognizes, with valid factual support based on statistics that women and
children are the most vulnerable victims of violence, and therefore need legal
intervention. On the other hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis to anchor a
conclusion that men need legal protection from violence perpetuated by women.

4. Different treatment of women and men based on biological, social, and cultural
differences

The persistent and existing biological, social, and cultural differences between women and
men prescribe that they be treated differently under particular conditions in order to
achieve substantive equality for women. Thus, the disadvantaged position of a woman as
compared to a man requires the special protection of the law, as gleaned from the following
recommendations of the CEDAW Committee:

 The Convention requires that women be given an equal start and that they be empowered by
an enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee women
 treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally
constructed differences between women and men must be taken into account. Under certain
circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be required in order to
address such differences. Pursuit of the goal of substantive equality also calls for an
effective strategy aimed at overcoming under representation of women and a redistribution
of resources and power between men and women.

 Equality of results is the logical corollary of de facto or substantive equality. These results
may be quantitative and/or qualitative in nature; that is, women enjoying their rights in
various fields in fairly equal numbers with men, enjoying the same income levels, equality in
decision-making and political influence, and women enjoying freedom from violence.

The government’s commitment to ensure that the status of a woman in all spheres of her
life are parallel to that of a man, requires the adoption and implementation of ameliorative
measures, such as RA 9262. Unless the woman is guaranteed that the violence that she
endures in her private affairs will not be ignored by the government, which is committed to
uplift her to her rightful place as a human being, then she can neither achieve substantive
equality nor be empowered.

5. RA 9262 justified under the Constitution

The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the government to actively undertake

ameliorative action that would remedy existing inequalities and inequities experienced by
women and children brought about by years of discrimination. The equal protection clause
when juxtaposed to this provision provides a stronger mandate for the government to
combat such discrimination. Indeed, these provisions order Congress to "give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people
to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and remove cultural
inequities."

RA 9262 is “THE” ameliorative action

 In enacting R.A. 9262, Congress has taken an ameliorative action that would address the
evil effects of the social model of patriarchy, a pattern that is deeply embedded in the
society’s subconscious, on Filipino women and children and elevate their status as human
beings on the same level as the father or the husband.
 R.A. 9262 aims to put a stop to the cycle of male abuses borne of discrimination against
women. It is an ameliorative measure, not a form of "reverse discrimination"
against. Ameliorative action "is not an exception to equality, but an expression and
attainment of de facto equality, the genuine and substantive equality which the Filipino
people themselves enshrined as a goal of the 1987 Constitution." Ameliorative measures are
necessary as a redistributive mechanism in an unequal society to achieve substantive
equality.

Ameliorative measures to achieve substantive equality

In the context of women’s rights, substantive equality has been defined by the Convention
on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as equality which
requires that women be given an equal start and that they be empowered by an enabling
environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee women treatment
that is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally
constructed differences between women and men must be taken into account. Under certain
circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be required in order to
address such differences.

Women’s struggle for equality with men has evolved under three models:

1. Formal equality - women and men are to be regarded and treated as the same. But this
model does not take into account biological and socially constructed differences between
women and men. By failing to take into account these differences, a formal equality approach
may in fact perpetuate discrimination and disadvantage.

2. Protectionist model – this recognizes differences between women and men but
considers women’s weakness as the rationale for different treatment. This approach
reinforces the inferior status of women and does not address the issue of discrimination of
women on account of their gender.

3. Substantive equality model – this assumes that women are "not vulnerable by nature, but
suffer from imposed disadvantage" and that "if these imposed disadvantages were
eliminated, there was no further need for protection." Thus, the substantive equality model
gives prime importance to women’s contexts, realities, and experiences, and the outcomes or
results of acts and measures directed, at or affecting them, with a view to eliminating the
disadvantages they experience as women.
6. The gender-based classification of RA 9262 does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause (application of the substantive equality model)

The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is
justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the
state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social,
and culturally endowed differences between men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are
vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental
objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The
gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of
women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such
objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny.
The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection
clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

Justice Brion: As traditionally viewed, the constitutional provision of equal protection

simply requires that similarly situated persons be treated in the same way. It does not
connote identity of rights among individuals, nor does it require that every person is treated
identically in all circumstances. It acts as a safeguard to ensure that State-drawn
distinctions among persons are based on reasonable classifications and made pursuant to a
proper governmental purpose. In short, statutory classifications are not unconstitutional
when shown to be reasonable and made pursuant to a legitimate government objective.

R.A. No. 9262 as a measure intended to strengthen the family. Congress found that
domestic and other forms of violence against women and children contribute to the failure
to unify and strengthen family ties, thereby impeding the State’s mandate to actively
promote the family’s total development. Congress also found, as a reality, that women and
children are more susceptible to domestic and other forms of violence due to, among
others, the pervasive bias and prejudice against women and the stereotyping of roles within
the family environment that traditionally exist in Philippine society. On this basis, Congress
found it necessary to recognize the substantial distinction within the family between men,
on the one hand, and women and children, on the other hand. This recognition, incidentally,
is not the first to be made in the laws as our law on persons and family under the Civil Code
also recognize, in various ways, the distinctions between men and women in the context of
the family.

Justice Leonen: It may be said that violence in the context of intimate relationships should
not be seen and encrusted as a gender issue; rather, it is a power issue.

By concurring with these statements I express a hope: that the normative constitutional
requirements of human dignity and fundamental equality can become descriptive reality. The
socially constructed distinctions between women and men that have afflicted us and spawned
discrimination and violence should be eradicated sooner. Power and intimacy should not co-
exist.

The intimate spaces created by our human relationships are our safe havens from the helter
skelter of this world. It is in that space where we grow in the safety of the special other
who we hope will be there for our entire lifetime. If that is not possible, then for such time
as will be sufficient to create cherished memories enough to last for eternity.

I concur in the ponencia. Against abominable acts, let this law take its full course.

Justice Abad: RA 9262 is a historic step in the Filipino women's long struggle to be freed
from a long-held belief that men are entitled, when displeased or minded, to hit their wives
or partners and their children. This law institutionalizes prompt community response to this
violent behavior through barangay officials who can command the man to immediately desist
from harming his home partner and their children. It also establishes domestic violence as
a crime, not only against its victims but against society as well. No longer is domestic violence
lightly dismissed as a case of marital dispute that law enforcers ought not to get into.

Chief Justice Puno on Expanded Equal protection and Substantive Equality

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno espouses that the equal protection clause can no longer be
interpreted as only a guarantee of formal equality but of substantive equality. "It ought to
be construed in consonance with social justice as ‘the heart’ particularly of the 1987
Constitution—a transformative covenant in which the Filipino people agreed to
enshrine asymmetrical equality to uplift disadvantaged groups and build a genuinely
egalitarian democracy." This means that the weak, including women in relation to men, can
be treated with a measure of bias that they may cease to be weak.

Chief Justice Puno goes on: "The Expanded Equal Protection Clause, anchored on the human
rights rationale, is designed as a weapon against the indignity of discrimination so that in
the patently unequal Philippine society, each person may be restored to his or her rightful
position as a person with equal moral status."
 MIRASOL VS CA

[351 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 128448; 1 Feb 2001]

Facts:

The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar
production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements,
a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage
empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations
to it.

President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase
sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that whatever
profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were more than
enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners
continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank.
PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB real
properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.

Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated,
could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was
nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National
Government.

On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB.

Issue:

Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor
General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.

Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.

Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.

Held:

It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute,
presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare
a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.

The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or
not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General
such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners'
stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies.
The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief.
Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all actions assailing
the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is
mandatory.

Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating the due process clause
and the prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court
to exercise its power of judicial review.

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must be before the
Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe
for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the
question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
FUNA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

[G.R. No. 184740. February 11, 2010.]

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Office of the President, SEC. LEANDRO
R. MENDOZA, in his official capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications, USEC.
MARIA ELENA H. BAUTISTA, in her official capacities as
Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications and as Officer-in-Charge of the Maritime
Industry Authority (MARINA), respondents.

Facts:

On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr.,
Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent
capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.

On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed
the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is
proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment.

Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in
violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as interpreted and explained by this Court in
Civil Liberties Issue:

1. Whether or not petitioner has legal standing

a. Held: Yes Ratio: Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional
prohibition against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2)
or more positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen
sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public
officials.
b. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, summarizing the rules culled from jurisprudence, we held
that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to
sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
i. (1) cases involve constitutional issues;
ii. 2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or
that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
iii. (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question;
iv. (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
 v. (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

2. Whether or not the case petitioned is moot and academic

a. Held: No Ratio: As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done.
However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question
otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. In the present case, the
mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. The question of the constitutionality
of the President’s appointment or designation of a Department Undersecretary as officer-
in-charge of an attached agency will arise in every such appointment.

3. Whether or not there is violation of art 7, section 13 of 1987 constitution.

Held: Yes Ratio: Undersecretary Bautista’s designation as MARINA OIC falls under the
stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with,
or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus
covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot
invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office
is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of
MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.

4. Whether or not there is incompatible of duties.

a. Held: Incompatibility of offices is irrelevant in this case, unlike in the case of PCGG
Chairman Magdangal Elma in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma. Therein we held that
Section 13, Article VII is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman or to the Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel, as he is not a cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary.

Decision: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as
Officerin-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with
her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for
being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.
Title: Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council

SCRA Citation: 632 SCRA 146

Date Promulgated: October 5, 2010

Petitioners: This is a consolidation of 6 petitions, thus:

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. NGO
GR No. 178552 Concerned citizen,
Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr.
taxpayer, and lawyer
GR No. 178554 KMU, NAFLU-KMU, CTUHR citizens
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW,
LFS, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, HEAD, Guingona, Jr., Lumbera,
GR No. 178581 Constantino, Jr., Sr. Manansan, OSB, Dean Paz, Atty. Lichauco, Ret. certiorari and prohibition
Col. Cunanan, Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Pagaduan-Araullo, Reyes, Ramos,
De Jesus, Baua, Casambre
GR No. 178890 SELDA, EMJP, PCPR
GR No. 179157 IBP, CODAL, Senator Madrigal, Osmena III, and Tañada
BAYAN-ST, other reg’l chapters and orgs mostly based in Southern
GR. No. 179461
Tagalog

Respondents:

 Anti-Terrorism Council, composed of:

o Chairperson Eduardo Ermita
o Vice-Chair Raul Gonzales
o Acting Defense Secretary Alberto Romulo
o National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales
o DILG Secretary Ronaldo Puno
o Finance Secretary MargaritoTeves
 AFP Chief of Staff General HermogenesEsperon
 PNP Chief General Oscar Calderon
 PGMA
 Support agencies of the Anti-Terrorism Council, namely:
o National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
o NBI
o Bureau of Immigration
o Office of Civil Defense
o Intelligence Service of the AFP
o Anti-Money Laundering Center
o Philippine Center on Transnational Crime
o PNP intelligence and investigative elements

FACTS:

 This case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, “An Act to Secure the State
and Protect our People from Terrorism,” aka Human Security Act of 2007.
 Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected “communist fronts” by the
government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the “transcendental importance” doctrine and their
status as citizens and taxpayers.
 KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP, and PCR allege they have been subjected to
“close security surveillance by state security forces,” their members followed by “suspicious persons” and
“vehicles with dark windshields,” and their offices monitored by “men with military build.” They likewise claim
they have been branded as “enemies of the State.”
 BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT,
Migrante, HEAD, and Agham would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents’ alleged action of
tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the CPP and NPA. They claim such tagging is
tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law.
 Meanwhile, IBP and CODAL base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution.
 Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous,
leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
ISSUES:

1. WON petitioners’ resort to certiorari is proper NO.

2. WON petitioners have locus standiNO.
3. WON the Court can take judicial notice of the alleged “tagging” NO.
4. WON petitioners can invoke the “transcendental importance” doctrine NO.
5. WON petitioners can be conferred locus standi as they are taxpayers and citizens NO.
6. WON petitioners were able to present an actual case or controversy NO.
7. WON RA 9372 is vague and broad in defining the crime of terrorism NO.
8. WON a penal statute may be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners NO.
9. WON there is merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity
NO.

HELD AND RATIO:

1. Petition for certiorari is improper.

a. Certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states that petition for certiorari applies when any tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
b. Petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or
in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
c. The power of judicial review has 4 requisites:
i. There must be an actual case or controversy.
ii. Petitioners must possess locus standi.
iii. Question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity.
iv. The issue of constitutionality must be the lismota of the case.
The present case lacks the 1st 2 requisites, which are the most essential.

2. Petitioners lack locus standi.

a. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure concrete adverseness.
b. In Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary,locus standihas been defined as
that requiring:
i. That the person assailing must have a direct and personal interest AND
ii. That the person sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct
inquiry as a result of the act being challenged.
c. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, he must show that:
i. He has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury;
ii. The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; AND
iii. The injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
d. RA 9372 is a penal statute. While Chavez v. PCGG holds that transcendental public importance
dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering
direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an
altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. Such necessitates closer judicial scrutiny of
locus standi.
e. The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does no, however, suffice to clothe the
IBP or any of its members with standing. They failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate
under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and duties.
f. Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal who claims to have been the subject of “political
surveillance” also lacks locus standi. The same is true for WigbertoTañada and Osmeña III, who
cite their being a human rights advocate and an oppositor, respectively. No concrete injury has
been pinpointed, hence, no locus standi.
3. Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged “tagging.”
a. Matters of judicial notice have 3 material requisites:
i. matter must be one of common and general knowledge
ii. must be well and authoritatively settled, not doubtful or uncertain or capable of accurate
and ready determination
iii. known to be within thelimits of the jurisdiction of the court
 b. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety. It can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts
of general notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to: (1) facts evidenced by
public records and (2) facts of general notoriety.
c. A court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-
existence of a fact of which the Court has no constructive knowledge.
d. Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or
proscription under RA 9371 has been filed against them, 3 years after its effectivity, belies any
claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging. They fail to
particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury
to their organization and members.
e. Notwithstanding the statement of Ermita and Gonzales that the Arroyo administration will adopt the
US and EU classification of CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations, there is yet to be filed before
the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or
outlawed organization under RA 9372.
4. In Kilosbayan v. Guingona,to invoke the transcendental doctrine, the following are the determinants:
a. The character of the funds or other assets involved in the case
b. The presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government;
c. The lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised
In the case at bar, there are other partiesnot before the Court withdirect and specific interests in the
questions being raised.

5. Petitioners cannot be conferred upon them as taxpayers and citizens.

a. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of
Congress, whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.
b. RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its
implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal
interest in the implementation of the law.
c. Generalized interest, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus
standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.
6. Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA
9372.
a. Judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. An actual case or
controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.
b. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest. The pleadings
must show:
i. an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right and
ii. a denial thereof
c. However, a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional
interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is
qualified by the presence of sufficient facts.
d. Prevailing American jurisprudence allows adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory petition
clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks
to do, as there would be a justiciable controversy. However, in the case at bar, the petitioners have
failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or
activity. No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real and existing one.
e. Petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported “surveillance” and the
implementation of RA 9372. Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic “surveillance” and
supposedly being tagged as “communist fronts” in no way approximate a credible threat of
prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which
is not its function. If the case is merely theorized, it lies beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events.
7. The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since
these doctrines apply only to free speech cases and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
a. Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan: The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special
application only to free speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal
statutes.
b. Romualdez v. COMELEC:A facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, but the Court
nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject
election offense under the Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners were
 charged, is couched in precise language.
c. The aforementioned cases rely heavily on Justice Mendoza’s Separate Opinion in the Estrada
case: Allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its
validity. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one, which is overbroad
because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. This rationale does not apply to
penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect. If facial challenge is allowed,
the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. Overbreadth
and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt
for testing the validity of penal statutes.
8. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited
vagueness analysis of the definition of “terrorism” in RA 9372 is legally impossible absent an actual
or imminent chargeagainst them.
a. The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same
plane.
i. A statute or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness when:
1. It lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 ways:
a. Violates due process for failure to accord fair notice of conduct to avoid
b. Leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
ii. The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means, which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
b. A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as applied” challenge.
i. “As applied” challenge considers only extant facts affecting real litigants.
ii. “Facial” challenge is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on
the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.
1. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. If facial
challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No
prosecution would be possible.
9. There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its
validity.
a. Section 3 of RA 9372 provides the following elements of the crime of terrorism:
i. Offender commits an act punishable under RPC and the enumerated special penal laws;
ii. Commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace;
iii. The offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand.
b. Petitioners contend that the element of “unlawful demand” in the definition of terrorism must
necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What RA 9372 seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
c. Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on
just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some
mincing of words on the part of offender. Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to
the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially
harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech.

Concurring opinion of Justice Abad:

- He concurs with the majority opinion, but he says he needs to emphasize that the grounds for dismissal in this case are more
procedural than substantive. Hence, when an actual controversy arises and when it becomes ripe for adjudication, the specific
questions raised here may be raised again.