The articles by Sundstöm (2007), Tallberg (2011) and McNamara (2011) are discussing three

different perspectives on the institutional theory.

Sundström article ‘Management by results: Its origin and development in the case of the Swedish
state’ (2007), examines the origin and development of a new public management policy, which
implies management by results approach to the Swedish state administration with focus on how
the MBR policy is used by ministries to control central agencies. The author analyses the events
trough a historical institutional perspective, trying to explain when was the rationalistic steering
model introduced in the Swedish state, its development and success. Taking a historical, rather
than rationalistic perspective helps to bring light to some aspects of the MBR development and
implementation success. He identifies a rather long critical juncture of 8 years, beginning with
the initiation of an ad hoc commission in order to handle the old problem of rigid and inefficient
working of the public sector. Using a power-based positive feedback the author examines the
difference of distribution of power from political institutions to different actors who then have
different incentives to influence institutions. As most of the other historical perspective
approaches, this paper focuses too much detailing of events in the past, not so much on the
results today.

Using the rational choice approach, Jonas Tallberg is trying to explain the why and how’s of the
functioning of the European Union in 'Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How and
with What Consequences?’ (2002). As representative political authority and legitimacy is the
foundation of the nation states, delegating decision power to a supranational institution requires a
extremely careful setup of organizational rules and regulations in order for member states to keep
a balance of power with the supranational institutions, to be able to affect the decision making
process, keep their sovereignty and protect their electorate if needed. The paper fails to address
some of the accidental or purposely made omissions when creating the control mechanism that
lead to the majority citizens of the nation states to feel that the EU has too big of an influence in
the inside politics and resistance towards complying with the collective action and rise of
nationalism.

In the final article ‘Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and Social Logic of
Delegation’ (2002), the author, Kathleen McNamara examines the logic and effectiveness of the
world wide phenomena of national central banks going independent from the elected government
in order for a more stable economic governance to be produced by dividing monetary policies
from politics. This article suggests that central bank independency may have troubling
implications for democratic legitimacy and accountability, and this claim is supported by the
empirical evidence of the European Central Bank, which caused unresolved problems with its
legitimacy. The central argument is that “governments choose to delegate monetary policy to
independent central banks because it is rational instrument given a particular cultural event” – it
is the symbolic properties which are more substantial than the functional properties of
delegation. This is supported by sociological institutionalist arguments about the sources and
working designs which depart from the conventional wisdom of delegation. From this
perspective “delegation is a culturally rational strategy achieved through coercive and normative
processes of institutional isomorphism”. The author attempted to challenge the functionality of
central bank independence and to provide a new insight that it should be understood as a social
process that is highly political. However, the ECB experience is insufficient evidence to support
authors claim. The independence of central banks cannot does not exist in a vacuum of political
processes and the author did not consider the environment in which the economic governance is
taking place.