Criminal Law; Criminal Liability; Wrongful act done be different from that which

was intended

Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended. [Article 4, par. 1, Revised Penal Code]

The essential requisites for the application of this provision are that

1. the intended act is felonious;

2. the resulting act is likewise a felony; and
3. the unintended graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts. [People v. Ortega,
G.R. No. 116736, July 24, 1997]

The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado"
or “he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.” Thus, petitioner committed an
unlawful act by punching his uncle who was much older than him, and even if he did not intend to cause
the death of such, he must be held guilty beyond reasonable doubt for killing his uncle. [Seguritan v.
People, G.R. No. 172896, April 19, 2010, US v. Brobst, G.R. No. 4935, October 25, 1909]

This paragraph presupposes that the act done is the proximate cause of the resulting felony. Proximate
cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion,
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. Thus, the
accused is still liable when the proximate cause of the death is the stab wound that he inflicted, although
the immediate cause of the death is mucuous colitis arising from the weakened condition of the victim. [
Bataclan v. Medina, G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957, citing Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American Jurisprudence, People v. Piamonte G.R. No. L-5775, January 28, 1954]

"Although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended," Article 4, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code contemplates instances when accused can be held liable:

1. Mistake in the identity of the victim or error in personae

Without first making any reasonable inquiry as to the identity, the accused fired their revolvers. The
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victim turned out to be an innocent man and not the wanted criminal. [People v. Oanis, G.R. No.
L-47722, July 27, 1943]

2. Mistake in the blow or aberratio ictus

The fact that the target of the accused was A and not B, did not excuse his hitting and killing of B. The
poor aim of the accused against A which resulted to the killing of B amounted to aberratio ictus, or
mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him from criminal responsibility nor mitigated
his criminal liability. [Talampas v. People, G.R. No. 180219, November 23, 2011]

3. The act exceeds the intent or praeter intentionem

A person may be convicted of homicide although he had no original intent to kill.The injurious result is
greater than that intended. Thus, the drowning was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
felony that appellant had intended to commit. [People v. Ortega, G.R. No. 116736, July 24, 1997]

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