Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS
DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.

Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner.

Antonio E. Escober and Jurado Law Office for respondent Twin Peaks Development Corporation.

COURTS, J.:

Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter dated April
2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was
cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty
Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of
all logs found in the concession area [Annexes "6" and "7" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 54-63].

Petitioner made the following allegations:

(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement designated as TLA No. 87 with the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was
issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of
public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva
Vizcaya * from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990;

(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development [hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"],
Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and
Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires,
pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena
[Annex "5" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 49];

(c) that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, the contents of which were as follows:

PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU ARE REQUESTED TO STOP

ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS TO CONSERVE REMAINING FORESTS PLEASE CONDUCT THE
ORDERLY PULL-OUT OF LOGGING MACHINERIES AND EQUIPMENT AND COORDINATE
WITH THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICT FORESTERS FOR THE INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT PRIOR
TO THIS ORDER THE SUBMISSION OF A COMPLIANCE REPORT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS
SHALL BE APPRECIATED — [Annex "4" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 48];

(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent a letter addressed to then
President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its
contributions to alleging that it was not given the forest conservation and opportunity to be heard prior to the
cancellation of its logging 531, but no operations (Annex "6" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 50 favorable action was taken
on this letter;
(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of the area formerly covered by TLA
No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Reality Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was set to
expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit
of a formal award or license; and,

(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.
Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR through then Minister Ernesto Maceda issued an order dated July 22, 1986
denying petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process
clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so
demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires
whose licenses were revoked in 1983. Moreover, emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in the
provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposed on April 2, 1986, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

It should be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request for reinstatement has been denied in view of
the total ban of all logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and
Ifugao which was imposed for reasons of conservation and national security.

The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great responsibility it bear [sic] in respect to
forest t considers itself the trustee thereof. This being the case, it has to ensure the availability of
forest resources not only for the present, but also for the future generations of Filipinos.

On the other hand, the activities of the insurgents in these parts of the country are well documented.
Their financial demands on logging concessionaires are well known. The government, therefore, is
well within its right to deprive its enemy of sources of funds in order to preserve itself, its established
institutions and the liberty and democratic way of life of its people.

xxx xxx xxx

[Annex "9" of the Petition, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 65-67.]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforestated order reiterating, among others. its request that TLA No. 356
issued to private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however denied this motion in an order dated
September 15, 1986. stating in part:

xxx xxx xxx

Regarding [petitioner's] request that the award of a 26,000 hectare portion of TLA No. 87 to Twin
Peaks Realty Development Corporation under TLA No. 356 be declared null and void, suffice it to
say that the Ministry is now in the process of reviewing all contracts, permits or other form of
privileges for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of natural resources entered
into, granted, issued or acquired before the issuance of Proclamation No. 3, otherwise known as the
Freedom Constitution for the purpose of amending, modifying or revoking them when the national
interest so requires.

xxx xxx xxx

The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development, has jurisdiction and authority over all forest
lands. On the basis of this authority, the Ministry issued the order banning all logging
operations/activities in Quirino province, among others, where movant's former concession area is
located. Therefore, the issuance of an order disallowing any person or entity from removing cut or
uncut logs from the portion of TLA No. 87, now under TLA No. 356, would constitute an unnecessary
or superfluous act on the part of the Ministry.

xxx xxx xxx

 [Annex "11" of the Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.]

On November 26, 1986, petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Meanwhile, per
MNR Administrative Order No. 54, series of 1986, issued on November 26, 1986, the logging ban in the province of
Quirino was lifted.

Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. In a resolution dated
July 6, 1987, the Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied
petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. The Office of the President ruled that the appeal of petitioner was prematurely
filed, the matter not having been terminated in the MNR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on
August 14, 1987.

Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction, on August 27, 1987. On October 13, 1987, it filed a supplement to its petition
for certiorari. Thereafter, public and private respondents submitted their respective comments, and petitioner filed its
consolidated reply thereto. In a resolution dated May 22, 1989, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition.

After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Court finds several factors which militate against
the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner.

1. Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory administrative orders does not
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon
their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These
decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been
rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once
determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction [See Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497
(1956); Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA
72; San Luis v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989].

In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dated March 17, 1986 and April 2, 1986, respectively, sought the
reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest Development which cancelled its timber
license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private
respondents in 1984.

But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No.
705 as amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent
its letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the MNR requesting reconsideration of the above
Bureau actions, these were already settled matters as far as petitioner was concerned [See Rueda v. Court of
Agrarian Relations, 106 Phil. 300 (1959); Danan v. Aspillera G.R. No. L-17305, November 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 609;
Ocampo v. Arboleda G.R. No. L-48190, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 374].

No particular significance can be attached to petitioner's letter dated September 19, 1983 which petitioner claimed
to have sent to then President Marcos [Annex "6" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 50-53], seeking the reconsideration of the
1983 order issued by Director Cortes of the Bureau. It must be pointed out that the averments in this letter are
entirely different from the charges of fraud against officials under the previous regime made by petitioner in its letters
to public respondents herein. In the letter to then President Marcos, petitioner simply contested its inclusion in the
list of concessionaires, whose licenses were cancelled, by defending its record of selective logging and reforestation
practices in the subject concession area. Yet, no other administrative steps appear to have been taken by petitioner
until 1986, despite the fact that the alleged fraudulent scheme became apparent in 1984 as evidenced by the
awarding of the subject timber concession area to other entities in that year.

2. Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of certiorari in the present case because he
failed to file his petition within a reasonable period.
The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instant petition is whether or not public respondents
herein acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to overturn
administrative orders issued by their predecessors in the past regime. Yet, what the petition ultimately seeks is the
nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling TLA No. 87 and granting TLA No. 356 to private respondent, which were
issued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively.

Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to have the earlier administrative
actions reviewed by the courts through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause. For although no specific
time frame is fixed for the institution of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the same must nevertheless be done within a "reasonable time". The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a
petition for certiorari is the "reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from the commission of the acts
complained of up to the institution of the proceeding to annul the same" [Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No. 56761,
November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 566, 571]. And failure to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of
time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches [Municipality of Carcar v. Court
of First Instance of Cebu, G.R. No. L-31628, December 27, 1982, 119 SCRA 392).

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it [Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29; Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2,
1987, 156 SCRA 113]. The rule is that unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged
right may, depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws aid those who are
vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights (Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt) [See Buenaventura
v. David, 37 Phil. 435 (1918)].

In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the
period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally
operating at the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches.
Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie.

3. Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and
against public respondents herein. It is precisely this for which prevents the Court from departing from the general
application of the rules enunciated above.

A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister Maceda of the MNR which were ed by
the Office of the President, will disclose public policy consideration which effectively forestall judicial interference in
the case at bar,

Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to develop and conserve
the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements
entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. In fact, both the executive and
legislative departments of the incumbent administration are presently taking stock of its environmental policies with
regard to the utilization of timber lands and developing an agenda for future programs for their conservation and
rehabilitation.

The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing global concern
over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological
system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed, most especially in this country. The Court takes
judicial notice of the profligate waste of the country's forest resources which has not only resulted in the irreversible
loss of flora and fauna peculiar to the region, but has produced even more disastrous and lasting economic and
social effects. The delicate balance of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been
triggered and the supply of food and energy resources required by the people seriously depleted.

While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the country's immediate financial
requirements, the more essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable
environment demands effective and circumspect action from the government to check further denudation of
whatever remains of the forest lands. Nothing less is expected of the government, in view of the clear constitutional
command to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation
of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies [See Espinosa v.
Makalintal, 79 Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v. Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905
(1960); Suarez v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19828, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 461; Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, G. R. No. L-21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Villegas v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-
21352, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877; Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-28218, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 745;
Lacuesta v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-33646, January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage,
G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80]. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private
logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest
conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining
the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should
enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources [Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23
SCRA 1183; Lim, Sr. v. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-26990, August 31, 1970,
34 SCRA 751]. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can
hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in
the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They
may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require.
Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3 (ee) and
20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983,
125 SCRA 302].

In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than suffice to justify the Court's refusal to
interfere in the DENR evaluation of timber licenses and permits issued under the previous regime, or to pre-empt
the adoption of appropriate corrective measures by the department.

Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding alleged irregularities in the issuance of timber
license agreements to a number of logging concessionaires.

The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if done in contravention of the procedure
outlined in the law, or as a result of fraud and undue influence exerted on department officials, is indicative of an
arbitrary and whimsical exercise of the State's power to regulate the use and exploitation of forest resources. The
alleged practice of bestowing "special favors" to preferred individuals, regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this
power. And this Court will not be a party to a flagrant mockery of the avowed public policy of conservation enshrined
in the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, should the appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of
discretion on the part of officials in the DENR and related bureaus with respect to the implementation of this public
policy, the Court win not hesitate to step in and wield its authority, when invoked, in the exercise of judicial powers
under the Constitution [Section 1, Article VIII].

However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondents herein, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the affirmative reliefs
sought.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 85502 February 24, 1992

SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALFONSO G. ABAD, as Judge RTC, Br. 22 of Pagadian City, COURT OF APPEALS, ISIDRO
GILBOLINGO AND ROBUSTIANO BUGTAI, respondents.

Manuel V. Trinida for petitioner.

Adolf Leo P. Boncavil for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The Court will focus its attention only on one of the issues raised in this petition — the correct application of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and utilize timber within
the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years
expiring on September 31, 1992.

On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of
forestry laws and regulations.

The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a complaint for injunction
with damages against the petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of
Pagadian City.

The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over the
complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was
expressly prohibited by section 1 of PD 605.

Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December 11, 1987, 1 and the motion for reconsideration on
February 15, 1988. 2 The petitioner then elevated the matter to the respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained
the trial court in a decision dated July 4, 1988, 3 and in its resolution of September 27, 1988, denying the motion for
reconsideration. 4

The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without exception and
pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent court
found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial intervention, which it
explained thus:

The lower court found out that sometime on July 1981, the City Council of Pagadian in its Resolution
No. 111 requested the Bureau of Forest Development to reserve 1,000 hectares in Lison Valley.
This request remained unacted upon. Instead in 1982, a TLA covering 29,500 hectares, including
the area requested, was given to petitioner.
 Then the fear expressed by the City Council of Pagadian in its resolution became reality.

"As averred in the complaint, the erosion caused by the logging operations of the
defendant has caused heavy siltation not only in the Labangan River (as predicted by
the City Council of Pagadian City in 1981) but also in the Tukuran River, Salug River,
Sindangan River, and Sibuguey River. In other words, the adverse effects of the
logging operations of the defendant have already covered a wider area than that
feared to be adversely affected by the City Council of Pagadian City.

Floods are unknown phenomena in heavily forested areas years back, particularly in
the Island of Mindanao. When the grant of logging concessions started, so was the
denudation of forests. . . . It is common knowledge that heavy floods have occurred
in areas/places adjoining logging concessions. (Resolution dated December 11,
1987, p. 5).

Thus, it is urgent that indiscriminate logging be stopped. Irreparable damage would ensue unless the
court intervenes. Reliance on the DENR may not be enough, judging from its inaction on the
council's request seven years back.

The respondent court cited in support of this conclusion the case of De Lara v. Cloribel, 5 where "irreparable damage
and injury" was allowed as an exceptional ground, and Arrow Transportation Corporation v. Board of
Transportation, 6 where the doctrine was waived because of "the strong public interest in having the matter settled"
as soon as possible.

The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which provides:

Sec. 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out of the issuance,
approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper
administrative official or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any kind
in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or development of the
natural resources of the Philippines.

This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts by
Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution. The respondent court cited Export Processing Zone Authority
v. Dulay, 7where several presidential decrees were declared unconstitutional for divesting the courts of the judicial
power to determine just compensation in expropriation cases.

The petitioner is now before the Court, contending that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was
not correctly applied and that the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605 was improper.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative
authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the
courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, 8 which is one of the grounds
allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a waiver of the objection as a
ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been observed.

One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a
becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of
the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions
addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified
by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative decisions are
usually questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict
enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise
would burden their heavily loaded dockets. 9
As correctly suggested by he respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when the doctrine may be
dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: 1) when the
question raised is purely legal; 10 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 11 3) when the act complained of is
patently illegal; 12 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 13 5) when the claim involved is small; 14 6)
when irreparable damage will be suffered; 15 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 16 8)
when strong public interest is involved; 17 9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; 18 and 10) in quo
warranto proceedings. 19

The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the exceptions because forestry laws do not
require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial action; the question they are raising is purely
legal; application of the doctrine will cause great and irreparable damage; and public interest is involved.

We rule for the petitioner.

Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to administrative remedies, the
reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its observance. Even if such
reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power
and function "to regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country's forests" and
"to exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the "management and disposition of all lands of the public domain," 20 and in the
Forest Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of
the forestry laws aid regulations 21 here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment
clearly implies at the very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any controversy
coming under its express powers before the courts of justice may intervene.

The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The private
respondents have charged, both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil case before the
Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the
provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The charge involves factual issues calling for the presentation of
supporting evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing their
specialized knowledge of the agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to exercise
their powers of review.

As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the claimed adverse impact of the case on the national
interest, the record does not show that the petitioners have satisfactorily established these extraordinary
circumstances to justify deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion of administrative remedies and immediate resort
to the courts of justice. In fact, this particular submission must fall flat against the petitioner's uncontested contention
that it has since 1988 stopped its operations under the TLA in compliance with the order of the DENR.

In the Petition for prohibition filed with the respondent court, the petitioner alleged that its logging operations had
been suspended pursuant to a telegram 22 received on February 23, 1988, by the District Forester from the Regional
Executive Director of the DENR, Zamboanga City; reading as follows:

DISTRICT FORESTER
PAGADIAN CITY

QUOTED HEREUNDER IS RADIO MESSAGE DATED FEBRUARY 22, 1988 FROM SECRETARY
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR. QUOTE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY CMA SUSPEND ALL
LOGGING OPERATIONS OF SUNVILLE IN VIEW OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF FOREST
PROTECTION AND REFORESTATION UNQUOTE SUBMIT REPORT ASAP.

RED BATCAGAN

The petition now before us contains the allegations that the "petition for cancellation of petitioner's TLA is still
pending up to this date and that petitioner's logging operations (were) ordered suspended by the Secretary of the
DENR pending further investigation." 23
In the memorandum filed by the petitioner with this Court, it is informed that "the Secretary of the DENR suspended
petitioner's logging operations until further investigation. The suspension is still in force up to this date after the
lapse of almost 3 years." 24

These statements have not been disputed by the private respondents in their pleadings before the respondent court
and this Court and are therefore deemed admitted.

There in no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent court. Nevertheless,
as the wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as a result of the unlawful logging activities of the
petitioner, it will be necessary first to determine whether or not the TLA and the forestry laws and regulations had
indeed been violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of this question is the primary responsibility of the
Forest Management Bureau of the DENR. The application of the expertise of the administrative agency in the
resolution of the issue raised is a condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same
question by a court of justice.

In view of the above observations, we find that there was no need for the respondent court to declare the
unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605. The rule is that a question of constitutionality must be avoided where the
case can be decided on some other available ground, 25 as we have done in the case before us. The resolution of
this same question must await another case, where all the indispensable requisites of a judicial inquiry into a
constitutional question are satisfactorily established. In such an event, it will be time for the Court "to make the
hammer fall, and heavily," in the words of Justice Laurel, if such action is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated July 4, 1988, and its
resolution dated September 27, 1988, as well as the resolutions of the trial court dated December 11, 1987 and
February 15, 1988, are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of
Pagadian City is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997

LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director (RED),
Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional
Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to
recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines?

Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?

These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution.

The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de
Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver
could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito
Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May
23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an
explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required
explanation. On June 22, 1989,1 Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner
Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree
No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June
28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent
order of July 12, 1989.2 Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to
private respondents' statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would
be denied then "this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary."3 Pending resolution however of the
appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner
Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan4 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan,5 which issued a writ
ordering the return of the truck to private respondents.6 Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a
motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated December
28, 1989.7 Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the
petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial court's order ruling that the question
involved is purely a legal question.8 Hence, this present petition,9 with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the
petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993,10 the prayer for the
issuance of temporary restraining order of petitioners was granted by this Court.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally
entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section
68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the
operation of this principle asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the
justification that (1) due process was violated because they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the
seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no
authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as
admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.

Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the opinion
that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.

This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be
exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought, The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal
to one's cause of action.11 Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal
for lack of cause of
action.12 This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for
one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are
not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is
not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness
of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due
process,13 (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,14 (3) when the administrative action is patently
illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,15 (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative
agency concerned,16 (5) when there is irreparable injury,17 (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,18 (7) when to require
exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,19 (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a
claim,20 (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,21 (10) when the rule does not provide
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.22

In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was
forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents
through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989,23 private respondents
clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the
resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter should be
considered as an appeal to the
Secretary.24

It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of
their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available
and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court's intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their
relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.

Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand
unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by
the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into
the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court
to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.25 In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary,26 which
was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez,27 this Court held:

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases
establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the
special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated.
However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private
respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there was violation of due process because they did not
receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due
process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.28 One may
be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than
oral argument, through pleadings.29 In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense.30 Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to
be heard on his motion for reconsideration,31 as in the instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly
given the opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was,
however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan, In Navarro III vs. Damasco,32 we ruled
that :

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative

proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute
lack of notice or hearing.

Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck because the
administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts under the law. They insisted that
only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products as can
be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision
reads as follows:

Sec. 68. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as
the machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found. (Emphasis ours)

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents' thinking not only because the
aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include "conveyances" that can be the subject of
confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private respondents' interpretation of the subject
provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A,
which is quoted herein below:

Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To
Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations,
the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest
 products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used
either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Emphasis ours)

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the
authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations. The phrase "to dispose of the same" is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor
of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made "in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or
policies on the matter." In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose
projected in the statute.33 Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or
mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the
mischief, and secure the benefits intended.34 In this wise, the observation of the Solicitor General is significant, thus:

But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws "more responsive to present situations and
realities" and in view of the "urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country," that the
government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative
remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is
intended to supplant the inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws through
criminal actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most
revealing:

"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the

country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected

through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and
regulations;

WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties,
due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of
the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts

more responsive to present situations and realities;"

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not
only "conveyances," but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products
by the "court" in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents
insist, the power on confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section
68, then Section 68-A would have no Purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have
provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, supra.35

Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the petitioners themselves admitted in
the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that the truck of private respondents was not used in
the commission of the crime. This order, a copy of which was given to and received by the counsel of private
respondents, reads in part, viz.:

. . . while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commission of the crime,
we uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime and in no case could a criminal
case be filed against her as provided under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . .36

We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated order and obviously misinterpreted the
intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the petitioners when they stated that the truck "was not used in the
commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a
criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was being used in the commission of another crime, that is,
the breach of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners
pointed out:
 . . . However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended and further amended by Executive Order
No. 277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport of forest
products not covered by the required legal documents. She may not have been involved in the
cutting and gathering of the product in question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or
fare the same is therefor liable. . .37

Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishable under Section 68 other than
qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that private respondents could not be
charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private
respondents could not have committed an act constituting a crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the
provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No.
277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:

Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. — Any person
who shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under
a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and
punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 68,
P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277)

Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is hereby amended to read as
follows:

Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without
license. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations,
shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 1, E.O. No. 277 amending Section
68, P.D. 705 as amended)

With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering,
collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now
from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that
provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive
Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code" and inserted the words "shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code". When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room
for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.38

From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the
subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the
P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents'
failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead
of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion
of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one's recourse to the courts and
more importantly, being an element of private respondents' right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the
lower court.

It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully
withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully
detained.39 "To detain" is defined as to mean "to hold or keep in custody,"40 and it has been held that there is tortious
taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without
any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient.41 Under the Rules of
Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to
the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of
detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so
seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the property.42 Private respondents miserably
failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be
noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without the required
permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of
P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of
DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws.
Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture
proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.

Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and
forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the
said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the
enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may
not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads:

Sec. 8. REVIEW — All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or
upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final
and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said
decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of
1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a
special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1991
and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order
promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve
the controversy with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-44649 April 15, 1988

DAYLINDA A. LAGUA, MANUEL P. LAGUA, HONORATO ACHANZAR and RESTITUTO DONGA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Davao City, Branch I, CONSTANCIO MAGLANA and the EASTCOAST DEVELOPMENT
ENTERPRISES, respondents.

Wilfred D. Asis for petitioner.

Carlos A. Carbonilla for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for mandamus originated from a complaint for damages which was instituted by the petitioners against the private respondents for closing a logging
road without authority.

In their complaint, the petitioners, alleged, among others:

In Paragraph 5(a):

a) On 1 January 1976, Atty. Ernesto Nombrado, legal counsel for defendants, issued a
memorandum to the Chief Security Guard of Defendant Eastcoast directing the latter to prevent the
passage of Plaintiff Laguas' hauling trucks loaded with logs for the Japanese vessel (there were no
other trucks hauling logs at that time) on the national highway loading towards where the vessel was
berthed. In compliance with this directive, the security force of Defendant Eastcoast closed the road
to the use by plaintiffs trucks and other equipments and effectively prevented their passage thereof
while the vehicles and trucks of other people were curiously not disturbed and were allowed passess
on the same road. It resulted that the loading of logs on the M/S "Kyofuku Maru" was discontinued. A
xeroxed copy of this Nombrado memorandum, the original of which is however in the possession of
defendants, is hereto attached as Annex "C" and made an integral part hereof.

In Paragraph 5(b):

b) Upon representations made to Indalecio L. Aspiras, Acting Station Officer-in-Charge, BFD

Lambajon Forest Station, and in response to plaintiff Laguas' complaint, a letter dated 2 January
1976 was addressed by Aspiras to the Resident Manager of Defendant Eastcoast with instructions
to open and allow Plaintiff Laguas' trucks and machineries to pass that road closed to them (but not
to others) by Defendant Eastcoast. A xeroxed copy of this letter is hereto attached as Annex "D" and
made a part hereof. Accordingly, Sagrado Constantino, Resident Manager of Defendant Eastcoast,
issued an order to their Chief Security Guard for the latter to comply with the Aspiras letter. These
events, however, took the whole day of 2 January 1976 so that notwithstanding the lifting of the road
closure no hauling of logs could be made by Plaintiff Laguas on that day.

In Paragraph 5(c):

c) When Plaintiffs Laguas were already resuming the hauling operations of their logs towards the
Japanese Vessel on 3 January 1976, again that same road, only the day before ordered by the BFD
to be opened for use and passage by plaintiffs, was closed to them by Defendant Eastcoast's
 security men upon a radio message order of Defendant Maglana. Even the vessel M/S "Kyofuku
Maruwas" ordered by Defendant Maglana to untie her anchor contrary to existing laws, rules and
regulations of the Bureau of Customs and the Philippine Coastguard. A xeroxed copy of the Maglana
message, the original of which is in the possession of the defendants, is hereto attached as Annex
"E" and made an integral part hereof.

And in paragraph 5(d):

d) Given no recourse in the face of the blatant and illegal closure of the road in defiance of BFD
orders to the contrary by the Defendant Eastcoast through the order of Defendant Maglana, Plaintiff
Laguas had to depart postpaste to Mati, Davao Oriental, from Baganga where the shipment and the
road closure were made, to seek the assistance of the PC thereat. Thus on 5 January 1976,
Provincial Commander Alfonso Lumebao issued a directive to the PC Detachment Commander at
Baganga to lift the illegal checkpoint made by defendants. A xeroxed copy of this directive is hereto
attached as Annex "F" and made a part hereof. (Rollo, pp. 57-58)

The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds, namely: (1) lack of jurisdiction, and (2) lack of
cause of action.

The private respondents extended that as the acts complained of by the petitioners arose out of the legitimate
exercise of respondent Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc., rights as a timber licensee, more particularly in the
use of its logging roads, therefore, the resolution of this question is properly and legally within the Bureau of Forest
Development, citing as authority Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705. The private respondents also argued that
petitioner Daylinda Laguas has no capacity to sue as her name was not registered as an "agent" or "dealer" of logs
in the Bureau of Forestry.

On August 3, 1976, the trial court issued the questioned order dismissing the petitioners' complaint on the basis of
the abovementioned grounds. It ruled:

The Court agrees with the defendants that under the law, the Bureau of Forest Development has the
exclusive power to regulate the use of logging road and to determine whether their use is in violation
of laws. Since the damages claimed to have been sustained by the plaintiffs arose from the alleged
illegal closure of a logging road — in the language of the defendants on page 3 of their motion to
dismiss. The simple fact is there was an illegal closure of the national highway affecting the private
rights of the plaintiffs who sustained damages and losses as a consequence thereof — the question
whether or not the road was illegally closed must first be determined by the Bureau of Forest
Development. If the said Bureau finds that the road was legally closed, an action for damages may
be filed in Court. Otherwise, no civil action would prosper, for there would be no tortious act. (Rollo,
pp. 58-69).

xxx xxx xxx

After the logging road was closed for the first time, more so after the second time, by the defendant
Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc., the plaintiffs should have asked the Bureau of Forest
Development to determine the legality or illegality of the closure since they wanted to file, as they did
file, an action for damages based on the alleged illegal closure. The fact that the letter of January 2,
1976, directed defendant Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc. to open the road does not
necessarily mean that the Bureau of Forest Development had found that the closure was illegal.
There must be a positive finding that the closure was illegal. ... (Rollo, p. 60)

xxx xxx xxx

As an attorney-in-fact, Daylinda A. Lagua is not entitled to, and cannot cannot claim, damages in her
personal capacity. For she could not have sustained damages as a result of the alleged illegal
closure of the road in her personal capacity while acting in her representative capacity. So if she and
her husband sustained damages, it must have been because their legal rights were violated by a
tortious act committed by the defendants other than the alleged illegal closure of the road. But as
stated elsewhere in this order, even the plaintiffs admit that the damages they claimed to have
 sustained arose from the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Assuming, however, that
another tortious act violated the legal rights of the Laguas, still they could not joint Achanzar and
Donga in this complaint for there would be misjoinder of parties. (Rollo, pp. 61-62)

Hence, this petition for mandamus which we will treat as a petition for certiorari in the interest of justice.

The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the regular courts have jurisdiction over the same.
According to them, the respondent court had no basis for holding that the Bureau of Forestry Development must first
determine that the closure of a logging road is illegal before an action for damages can be instituted.

We agree.

P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in the Bureau of Forest
Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such
determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted
by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not
such closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by
the private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power
and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less
award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development. As we have held in Ateneo de Manila University v. Court of
appeals (145 SCRA 100, 110):

The issue in this court was whether or not the private respondents can recover damages as a result
of the of their son from the petitioner university. This is a purely legal question and nothing of an a
administrative nature is to or can be done (Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230; Tapales v.
University of the Philippines, 7 SCRA 533; Limoico v. Board of Administrators. (PJA) 133 SCRA 43;
Malabanan v. Ramonte, 129 SCRA 359). The case was brought pursuant to the law on damages
provided in the Civil Code. The jurisdiction to try the case belongs to the civil courts.

The private respondents, in their memorandum filed with the respondent court, alleged that the logs of petitioner
Achanzar were cut down and removed outside of the area granted to the latter under his Private Timber License No.
2 and therefore inside the concession area of respondent company's Timber License Agreement. This, apparently,
was the reason why the respondent company denied to the petitioners the use of the logging road. If we hold the
respondents to their contention that the Bureau of Forest Development has the power and authority not only to
regulate the use or blockade of logging roads but also to exclusively determine the legality of a closure of such
roads, why then did they take it upon themselves to initially close the disputed logging road before taking up the
matter with the Bureau and why did they close it again notwithstanding the Bureau's order to open it after the
petitioners had duly informed the said Bureau of the closure? To use the Bureau's authority which the respondents
ignored to now defeat the court's jurisdiction would be totally unacceptable. We, therefore, find that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter.

Anent the legal capacity to sue of the petitioners, spouses Laguas, we affirm the trial court's ruling that since they
were mere agents of petitioners Achanzar and Donga and were suing in their own behalf, they did not have the
capacity to sue for damages. They are not the real parties in interest. However, the complaint can still be
maintained. It cannot be dismissed because the real parties in interest, Achanzar and Donga were also plaintiffs.
Thus, the trial court should have ordered only the dropping of the names of the spouses Laguas pursuant to Section
11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court but not the dismissal of the complaint.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned order of the respondent
court is SET ASIDE and this case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 134209 January 24, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision1dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69 in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1.

The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows:

This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more
particularly described in the amended application filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional
Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the
said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same
from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in
possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no
mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in
possession thereof.

On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the application on the
ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the
muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a
bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicant’s claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of
Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general default as against the whole world, with the
exception of the Office of the Solicitor General, and proceeded with the hearing of this registration case.

After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . . applicant rested her case. The Solicitor General, thru
the Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no objection to the admission of the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial
Prosecutor manifest (sic) that the Government had no evidence to adduce. 3

In a decision4 dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment for herein respondent Celestina Naguiat,
adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in question and decreeing the registration thereof in her name, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the parcels of land situated in Panan, Botolan,
Zambales, appearing on Plan AP-03-003447 containing an area of 3,131 square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-
003446 containing an area of 15,322 containing an area of 15,387 square meters to herein applicant Celestina T.
Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Rommel Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga
together with all the improvements existing thereon and orders and decrees registration in her name in accordance
with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1529. This
adjudication, however, is subject to the various easements/reservations provided for under pertinent laws,
presidential decrees and/or presidential letters of instructions which should be annotated/ projected on the title to be
issued. And once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be immediately issued.
(Words in bracket added)

With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, petitioner Republic went on appeal to the
CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001.
As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of May 29, 1998, affirmed that of the trial
court, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the Republic’s present recourse on its basic submission that the CA’s decision "is not in accordance with
law, jurisprudence and the evidence, since respondent has not established with the required evidence her title in fee
simple or imperfect title in respect of the subject lots which would warrant their registration under … (P.D. 1529 or
Public Land Act (C.A.) 141." In particular, petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the
length of respondent’s occupation of the property subject of her application for registration and for not considering
the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to
alienable and disposable property.

Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the Government so that
they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private
appropriation.5 As to these assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.6 Given this postulate, the
principal issue to be addressed turns on the question of whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have
the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act7 and the Constitution8 classifying lands of the public domain into
"agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks," do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded
land or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui 9-

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. xxx. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. xxx

Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,10 which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State – the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.11 All lands not appearing to be
clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the State.12 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain.13 Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying
lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive
Branch of the government and not the court.14 Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence,
the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the
applicant.15

In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already alienable and disposable. Wrote the
appellate court:

The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the public domain cannot be sustained as it is
directly against the above doctrine. Said doctrine is a reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases . .
. that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for period prescribed by law creates the
legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or
other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property …. (Word in bracket and underscoring
added.)

The principal reason for the appellate court’s disposition, finding a registerable title for respondent, is her and her
predecessor-in-interest’s open, continuous and exclusive occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years.
Prescinding from its above assumption and finding, the appellate court went on to conclude, citing Director of Lands
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)16 and Herico vs. DAR,17 among other cases, that, upon the completion of the
requisite period of possession, the lands in question cease to be public land and become private property.
Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not, however, winning cards for the respondent,
for the simple reason that, in said cases, the disposable and alienable nature of the land sought to be registered
was established, or, at least, not put in issue. And there lies the difference.

Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official
proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.18 Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence
the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which, needless to state, provided no information respecting
the classification of the property. As the Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome
the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.19

It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has been a notorious practice resorted
to in land registration cases.20 For this reason, the Court has made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that
declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable
lands need an express and positive act from the government.21

The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-in-interest have been in
open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of little moment. For,
unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.22

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondent’s application for
original registration of title in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales,
Branch 69, is DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.