Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Companies mentioned in this Canadian Heavy Oil Is Not a Discounted Product, It’s A
report: Stranded Product
BP p.l.c. (BP-L; Not Rated)
Bullish Heavy Oil: While we are cognizant that the appetite to invest in the
Enbridge (ENB-T; Not Rated) Canadian energy space has seldom been worse than it is currently, we believe that
there are structural reasons why investors can be bullish heavy oil. While Canada’s
ExxonMobil (XOM-N; Not Rated)
ability to participate to the fullest extent is hindered by its inability to build pipeline
infrastructure, the eventual ramp-up of crude-by-rail and the increasing need for
heavy oil in the global marketplace will support commodity prices in the medium
term. For the purposes of this report we have not addressed the dire nature of the
Canadian pipeline situation but direct readers interested in this topic to our recent
report on the topic here.
WCS Trades at a Premium to WTI: Global heavy oil benchmark crudes are
routinely being imported into the US Gulf Coast (USGC) at premium prices to WTI
while Canadian heavy oil priced in Alberta is trading at historic lows relative to the
benchmark. Many investors (and Canadians in general) would be surprised to know
that Western Canadian Select (WCS) barrels that are able to get to the USGC have
been earning a premium to WTI at times throughout H2/18 (albeit pricing at a slight,
US$2.80/bbl, discount at the time of publication).
Rail the Only Accessible Option for Now: Pipeline apportionments in Canada
are causing barrels to become stranded, forcing operators to place them into storage
or selling them at unjustifiably low prices. Oil in storage in Alberta surged during the
summer to ~85% of capacity currently available. Rail transportation may be the only
near term tool accessible to drain the storage as pipelines are likely to be
bottlenecked for at least twelve months (until the Enbridge [ENB-T; Not Rated] Line
3 Replacement Pipeline may be placed into service). Comments from Large Cap and
Integrated E&P’s point to rail costs being in the range of US$17.00-$19.00/bbl –
leaving us to believe that WCS differentials should average in the US$20-$25/bbl
range until additional pipeline capacity is in service (justifying far narrower
differentials than the >US$50/bbl seen in Oct. 2018).
The Punch Line: Despite sentiment towards Canadian energy being extremely
negative (heavy oil in particular), the reality is that heavy oil production is becoming
Nicholas Lupick, CFA an increasingly scarce commodity on the global stage and as such is beginning to
Daniel Morgan (Associate) warrant a premium commodity price. Investors with a long term investment horizon,
and the patience to allow market forces to debottleneck the Canadian transportation
landscape (be it pipelines or crude-by-rail), should evaluate further investment in the
Contact details provided at the back of
this report. sector, counter to the market’s short term sentiment.
Summary
In early 2017, AltaCorp introduced a thesis on the heavy oil market which is predicated on the
growing dislocation of supplies of different qualities of crude oil. Specifically, we highlighted
expectations for declines of heavier crudes to accelerate around the world and suggested that the
vast majority of global production growth (driven mostly by US shale) was coming in the form of
ultra-light hydrocarbons (which in many basins could be considered condensates vs black oil –
being in the >45°API range).
We are reiterating this thesis and show that the unprecedented discounts being applied to
Canadian heavy oil is solely the result of locational discounts rather than a lack of demand for the
heavy barrels – with Western Canadian Select (WCS) recently commanding a premium
price relative to WTI in the PADD III Houston market. When we initially introduced our
thesis, we suggested that it would not be incomprehensible for heavy crude oil to trade at a
premium to WTI, which has occurred a number of times since then.
Within this report we highlight the fundamental reasons for investors to be bullish on heavy oil
prices today. However, the only way for Canada to participate in our bullish outlook for global
heavy oil is to build much-needed and adequate transportation infrastructure to deliver barrels to
tidewater which would enable access to the global marketplace. For the purposes of this report
we have not addressed the dire nature of the Canadian pipeline situation but direct readers
interested in this topic to our recent report here.
$0
-$10
2018)
WCS @ Houston
-$30
-$50
-$60
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th
WCS USD Differential to WTI at Houston – October 9 2018
$1.40
$1.20
$1.00
$0.80
$0.60
US$/bbl
$0.40
$0.20
$0.00
($0.20)
($0.40)
($0.60)
With ongoing apportionments materially curbing takeaway capacity (the Enbridge [ENB-T; Not
Rated] system is seeing 40%-45% of nominations ‘kicked back’ on a regular basis in 2018), all
incremental barrels leaving the basin will have to depart on railcars until further pipeline capacity
is constructed.
However, there are some Canadian E&Ps which have the ability to capture this arbitrage. We
recommend contacting your AltaCorp salesperson for our top ideas on ways to invest in
companies exposed to USGC-priced production with firm transportation commitments and/or
companies which provide transportation logistics.
With 2.92 mmbbls/d of heavy crude being exported to the United States for feedstock into the
domestic refining market (see Figure 22 on page 18), US based refineries are reaping the benefits
of Canada’s misfortune as they have recently been purchasing a WCS barrel for US$30/bbl less
than they would if they had to buy the exact same barrel off of a seaborne tanker in Houston
(even after rail transport costs). This discrepancy is shown (once again) in Figure 5, with the
recent pricing of WCS barrels in Houston at a US$2.50/bbl discount vs a US$50.00 discount in
Edmonton. It should be noted that WCS has traded at a premium to WTI numerous times in
2018 (most recently on Oct. 9th, shown in the chart at a US$1.25/bbl premium to WTI for Nov.
2018 delivery).
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Said another way, of the ~5.0 mmbbls/d of heavy crude oil being consumed by the US refining
market (see Figure 3), Canada has recently been supplying nearly 60% of this demand at a
US$30/bbl cheaper cost to the refiner than if the same barrel were purchased in Houston (where
global prices prevail).
U.S. Refining Capacity
Total US Refining Capacity
PADD I 1,300 mbbl/d
PADD II 4,000 mbbl/d
PADD III 9,700 mbbl/d
PAD IV 700 mbbl/d
PADD V 3,000 mbbl/d
Domestic Market Dynamics: Before we reference the global market we once again reiterate that
the US refining market (the largest refining market in the world) is configured to consume ~5.0
mmbbls/d of heavy crude oil, but that the US Lower 48 produces very minimal volumes of heavy
oil (see Figure 11 on page 9) – leaving the US to import nearly all of its heavy oil refining
feedstock.
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As shown in the graph above, Canada is the only country to exhibit noticeable growth over the
past 24 months and should have been positioned to capitalize on capturing global market share –
but instead has been selling its crude for a large discount due to lack of infrastructure. This
decline in global supply in heavy crude has caused many medium and heavy crude slates to begin
to price at a premium to WTI (see Figure 5) – challenging the misnomer that all heavy barrels are
a ‘discounted product’.
$20
$10 Premium to
WTI
$0
WCS
US$/bbl
-$10
Mars
-$20
Arab Heavy
-$30 Oriente
-$40 Maya
-$50
-$60
Dec-12
Dec-13
Dec-14
Dec-15
Dec-16
Dec-17
Mar-13
Jun-13
Mar-14
Jun-14
Mar-15
Jun-15
Mar-16
Jun-16
Mar-17
Jun-17
Mar-18
Jun-18
Sep-12
Sep-13
Sep-14
Sep-15
Sep-16
Sep-17
Sep-18
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Mexico
Mexico’s state-owned oil company PEMEX has seen its heavy oil production decline by an
average of -5% each year since 2013, removing 292 mbbls/d of the crude from the market over
that time. The current President-Elect of the nation aims to restore production capability back to
2.5 mmbbls/d (a level not achieved since 2013), within two years, though this is highly unlikely
given the limited amount of capital the Mexican government is expected to feasibly attain to
explore and develop its offshore oil fields. As a result, macro forecaster consensus is that declines
are likely to continue for the foreseeable future, opening opportunity for other nations to fill the
US’ demand for heavy oil.
2.0
mmbbls/d
1.5
-5% Annual Decline
1.0
0.5
0.0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 YTD 2018
Venezuela
It’s no secret that Venezuela has been suffering major political and economic turmoil over the
past two years, impacting the efficiency of its energy sector. Since 2015, Venezuelan oil
production has declined by -1.1 mmbbls/d, or -19% annually, to ~1.20 mmbbls/d according to
OPEC secondary sources. Declines are highly likely to continue, with some macro forecasters
expecting production to fall below 1.0 mmbbls/d by mid-2019. US sanctions on the country have
made it difficult for the national oil company to repair key infrastructure, reducing export
capacity and ability to import much-needed naphtha blendstock.
US imports of crude oil from Venezuela have hovered around 500 mbbls/d over the past year,
though the rise in WCS blend prices in the US Gulf Coast leads to our conviction that refineries
are demanding Canadian crudes to replace barrels from other heavy oil producing nations in
decline such as Venezuela.
Iran
US sanctions being imposed on Iran has made a significant impact on crude oil production from
the Islamic Republic. Waterborne exports in September from the OPEC member reportedly
declined by -960 mbbls/d y/y and -400 mbbls/d m/m to 1.75 mmbbls/d. Exports are likely to
continue to fall precipitously in the coming months and could reach ~2.0 mmbbls/d by early 2019
– below its 2012-2015 level of ~2.7 mmbbls/d (during the sanctions imposed by the Obama
administration). As shown in Figure 12 on page 9, Iran crude oil is heavier than many may
realize at an API grade of ~27°, and will continue to have wide reaching effects on the market.
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8
<5.0 mmbbls/d
7
mmbbls/d
Venezuela
5
Mexico
4 Iran
3
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
4 Others
mmbbls/d
Colombia
3 Mexico
Venezuela
2
Saudi Arabia
Canada
1
0
Jul-16
Jul-09
Jul-10
Jul-11
Jul-12
Jul-13
Jul-14
Jul-15
Jul-17
Jan-09
Jan-10
Jan-11
Jan-12
Jan-13
Jan-14
Jan-15
Jan-16
Jan-17
Jan-18
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One of the issues which has begun to emerge within the US refining market is the fact that the
lightening of the country’s production slate has started to cause issues with the product output of
the complex refiners, with our friends at Energy Aspects recently stating the following after a trip
to visit US refiners:
“The growth in US shale production and the rapid growth in US exports since the lifting of the
export ban three years ago have resulted in a significant lightening of the crude slate around the
world. Refiners we met during our recent visit to Texas were very vocal about just how much
gasoline uplift they were receiving from running the domestic light slate, despite every attempt to
maximise diesel yields. And with sour crudes far more expensive compared to landlocked
domestic sweets, their LP models continue to choose the lighter slates.”
Importantly, this highlights the struggle to continue to produce the desired diesel but also
underscores the fact that global heavy crude has begun to trade at a premium due to both its
declining supply and desirable chemistry.
In fact, European refinery runs (which we highlight later as taking increasing volumes of US
Light barrels) have fallen y/y by -180 mbbls/d (during the summer of 2018) and yet gasoline
output has increased by +110 mbbls/d (underscoring our comments about altering the product
slates with lighter feedstocks).
The global outlook is far less bullish for gasoline (with some arguing that the world is nearing
peak demand) than it is for diesel and middle distillates which continue to see growing industrial
demand in non-OECD/developing nations. As can be seen in Figure 9 and Figure 10, growth in
gasoline demand is paltry (averaging +180 mbbls/d over the next fifteen months) compared to
that of diesel (estimated at +622 mbbls/d over the same time period).
World Gasoline Demand – y/y Change (mmbbls/d) World Diesel Demand – y/y Change (mmbbls/d)
2.0 2.0
1.5 1.5
1.0 1.0
mmbbls/d
0.5 0.5
World World
0.0 0.0
-0.5 -0.5
-1.0 -1.0
Q1/12
Q1/14
Q1/10
Q3/10
Q1/11
Q3/11
Q3/12
Q1/13
Q3/13
Q3/14
Q1/15
Q3/15
Q1/16
Q3/16
Q1/17
Q3/17
Q1/18
Q3/18
Q1/19
Q3/19
Q3/14
Q3/16
Q3/18
Q1/10
Q3/10
Q1/11
Q3/11
Q1/12
Q3/12
Q1/13
Q3/13
Q1/14
Q1/15
Q3/15
Q1/16
Q1/17
Q3/17
Q1/18
Q1/19
Q3/19
Figure 9. World Gasoline Demand – y/y Change (mmbbls/d) Figure 10. World Diesel Demand – y/y Change (mmbbls/d)
Source: Energy Aspects, AltaCorp Capital Inc. Source: Energy Aspects, AltaCorp Capital Inc.
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4.5
4.0
WTI Benchmark = 39o Extremely Light Crude
3.5
3.0
mmbbls/d
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
What’s more, is the fact that the two growth engines in the surge of US shale production are the
Eagle Ford and Permian basins. However, as Figure 12 shows, both basins have an API of nearly
45° - far beyond the 32° API average crude slate desired by the US refining market (discussed
next) and is likely to cause a dislocation in the global crude balance given the heavier API gravity
of all of the basins in decline (as noted previously).
Select Crude Slate API and Sulphur Content vs U.S. Refining Diet
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Shown differently, Figure 13 and Figure 14 illustrate the production growth by crude slate in
Texas and New Mexico (i.e. proxies for the Permian and Eagle Ford) as well as the steady state
of heavy oil imports into PADD III (and the elimination of light imports) – highlighting the
continued need for a supply of heavier feedstock.
mmbbls/d 4
0
Apr15
Apr16
Apr17
Apr18
Jan15
Jan16
Jan17
Jan18
Jul15
Jul16
Jul17
Jul18
Oct15
Oct16
Oct17
Figure 13. Texas and New Mexico Production of Crude Oil by Type
Source: EIA, AltaCorp Capital Inc.
5
mmbbls/d
4
Light (>35⁰ API)
0
Jul-09
Jul-10
Jul-11
Jul-12
Jul-13
Jul-14
Jul-15
Jul-16
Jul-17
Jan-09
Jan-10
Jan-11
Jan-12
Jan-13
Jan-14
Jan-15
Jan-16
Jan-17
Jan-18
Figure 14. Imports of Crude Oil to U.S. PADD III (Gulf Coast) by Type
Source: EIA, AltaCorp Capital Inc.
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U.S. Lower 48 Production and Refining Capacity by API Grade by API Gravity (Degrees)
33
32
31
30
29
28
Oct-2013
Mar-2014
Aug-2014
Jan-2015
Jan-2010
Nov-2010
Sep-2011
Feb-2012
Jul-2012
Nov-2015
Sep-2016
Feb-2017
Jul-2017
Apr-2011
Dec-2012
May-2013
Apr-2016
Dec-2017
May-2018
Jun-2010
Jun-2015
Figure 15. Refining Capacity by API Grade by API Gravity (Degrees)
Source: EIA, AltaCorp Capital Inc.
2.0
Africa
mmbbls/d
1.5
LatAm
1.0 Canada
Caribbean
0.5 Europe
Asia Pacific
0.0
Mar-2018
Mar-2017
Aug-2017
Oct-2016
Jul-2017
Oct-2017
Nov-2016
Jan-2017
Feb-2017
Sep-2017
Nov-2017
Jan-2018
Feb-2018
Jul-2018
Dec-2016
Apr-2017
May-2017
Dec-2017
Apr-2018
May-2018
Jun-2017
Jun-2018
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1) Q2/Q3 2018 marks the first time in which all of the major oil sands mining growth projects
of the last decade are on line (Suncor’s Fort Hills, Canadian Natural’s Horizon Phases 1-3
and Imperial’s Kearl Phases 1-2).
2) The US Refining complex saw a much larger turnaround season in the Fall of 2018 with
PADD II in particular seeing ~270 mbbls/d of capacity offline beyond what is typical (see
Figure 17). The most notable facility to go offline for an extended period is BP’s (BP-L; Not
Rated) 430 mbbls/d Whiting facility in Indiana (which is the single largest consumer of
Canadian heavy at ~250 mbbls/d).
800
700
600
18/19
mbbls/d
500
17/18
400
16/17
300
200
100
0
Mar. Apr. May. Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb.
3) Making the market reaction even more violent in response to the intense turnaround season
is the fact that Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) reported Alberta inventories have been
climbing and are approaching the estimated capacity of ~84 mmbbls (see Figure 18) –
leaving little room in the system for future interruptions and causing the market to trade with
a significant risk premium.
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At this differential the forward curve would be reflecting rail economics for the foreseeable
future (i.e. not reflecting normalized pipeline economics which would justify a ~US$12-$15/bbl
differential).
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As well, comments from management teams of a few of the largest crude oil producers in Canada
have stoked expectations for rail to export more than 450 mbbls/d of crude oil (in H2/19) from
206 mbbls/d in the summer of 2018.
150
mbbls/d
100
50
0
Feb.
Apr.
Jul.
Oct.
Sep.
May.
Aug.
Jan.
Mar.
Jun.
Nov.
Dec.
Figure 19. Canada Exports of Crude Oil by Rail
Source: Statistics Canada, AltaCorp Capital Inc.
We estimate an average net price improvement of ~US$14.50 in 2019 (based on recent strip
pricing and our estimated rail transport cost of US$18.00/bbl) for each barrel that is able to reach
the US Gulf Coast from the WCSB via rail (see Figure 20).
$0
-$10
WCS @ Houston
-$20
US$/bbl
-$60
Figure 20. WCS Differentials to WTI and margin uplift vs. Edmonton
Source: Net Energy, ATB Financial, Atlas Petroleum Markets, AltaCorp Capital Inc.,
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Despite sentiment towards Canadian energy being extremely negative (heavy oil in particular),
the reality is that heavy oil production is becoming an increasingly scarce commodity on the
global stage and as such is beginning to warrant a premium commodity price. Investors with a
long term investment horizon, and the patience to allow market forces to debottleneck the
Canadian transportation landscape, should evaluate further investment in the sector, counter to
the market’s short term sentiment.
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APPENDIX
IMO-2020; Some Food For Thought
Ultimately the impact of the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) new regulations
limiting the sulphur content from 3.5% to 0.5% beginning in 2020 is still yet to be determined.
However, we must point out that the market analysis on the impacts of IMO 2020 are among the
most polarizing we have ever seen, spanning from apocalyptic predictions of the regulations
causing the next global recession/financial crisis to others citing the regulations as being the most
overblown market fear seen in decades. As with most extreme views, we believe reality is
somewhere in the middle and here are a few points to remember:
1) Impact of 2.0 mmbbls/d; Not 4.0 mmbbls/d: Of the estimated 4 mmbbls/d of bunker fuel
demand estimated to be impacted by IMO 2020 the actual amount of excess bunker fuel
product expected to be in the market following the regulations is likely closer to 2 mmbbls/d.
This is because estimates are suggesting that roughly half of the bunker fuel produced is
likely to be reprocessed again through secondary coker runs – converting high sulphur
bunker fuel into Marine Gasoil (MGO) which is sulphur compliant. How much does the
extra processing cost? Likely a few dollars (but well less than $8 given that total opex of
complex refiners is in the $7-$12/bbl range typically).
a. We remind investors that the North American refining complex underwent a massive
buildout of investment in the 1980s to take a heavier (and more sour) crude diet. As
such, the North American refining market is well equipped to handle (and remove)
this sulphur as described via coking processes (it may just require additional
processing).
2) Global Heavy Oil Production is Becoming Short of Supply: Outside of Canada, global
heavy production is widely in decline (as we highlighted previously). As such, major
consumers of heavy barrels around the world (the largest growth areas being China and
India) are going to be increasingly in short supply of heavy crude oil (which typically have
higher sulphur content) and which their refineries are designed to consume. In fact, the only
barrels showing material growth around the world (outside of Canada) are on the light end of
the API spectrum (namely US Shale). As a result, for those Canadian entities who can get
their product to tidewater, the rest of the world is likely to bid for their heavy barrels.
3) Product Yields Need a ‘Full Bodied’ Barrel: Following on point two, in order for a
complex refinery to produce a wide spectrum of heavier middle distillates they will need a
more full bodied barrel as feedstock (sulphur content aside). Facilities configured to do this
are not able to run their facilities with light US shale oil barrels – and those which try are not
receiving the distillates they desire but are producing greater quantities of less desirable
gasoline (as we highlighted on page 8).
4) Differential Impacts Need the Context of Timing: For Canadian heavy producers, the timing
of IMO 2020 needs to be put into the context of the broader market dynamics. In 2020 it is
possible that Enbridge’s Line 3 replacement (adding 357 mbbls/d of southbound pipeline
capacity) could be in service and the Canadian federal government-owned 590 mbbls/d
TransMoutain expansion could be well on its way to being constructed. Once in service, these
pipelines should see Canadian heavy differentials return to the US$12.00-$15.00/bbl range
(justified by transportation costs + a moderately wider IMO 2020 sulphur discount) vs the
US$50.00/bbl differential recently. As such, hypothetically, even if the new regulations add
US$5.00/bbl (for example) to the differential the realized price will be much more supportive
of Canadian heavy than what the market is currently pricing in.
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5) Economics 101: When a cost needs to be borne within a value chain it get shared by both the
consumer and the producer. In this case, maritime shipping companies are going to pass along
higher costs to all consumers via higher prices on consumable goods shipped globally (as diesel
demand makes fuel costs higher) and high sulphur crudes will be somewhat discounted for
being less desirable feedstocks – coming with higher processing fees to handle said sulphur.
But to assume that 100% of the burden will be shouldered by one section of the value chain
(upstream producers in the way of differentials) simply isn’t how supply and demand
economics work.
6) (Some) Scrubbers Appear to be Coming: For the most part the shipping industry has not
adopted the use of onboard scrubbers through retro-fits of existing fleets (which would
enable compliance with the high sulphur fuel oil rules [HSFO]). As the price of HSFO
continues to fall, the economic incentive to install scrubbers increases (the spread between
HSFO and MGO is ~US$28/bbl). As shown in Figure 21, ~1,850 ships are slated to have
scrubbers installed (in a market of ~94,000 ships) (Source: Norwegian consultancy firm
DNV GL).
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
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Other Exhibits
Canadian Heavy Oil Exports to the U.S.
3.5
3.0
2.5
mmbbls/d
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Jan-10
Sep-10
Jan-11
Jan-12
Jan-13
Jan-14
Jan-15
Jan-16
Jan-17
Jan-18
Sep-11
Sep-12
Sep-13
Sep-14
Sep-15
Sep-16
Sep-17
May-10
May-11
May-12
May-13
May-14
May-15
May-16
May-17
May-18
Figure 22. Canadian Heavy Oil Exports to the U.S.
Source: NEB, AltaCorp Capital Inc.
10
8
mmbbls/d
0
Dec-11
Apr-14
Nov-14
Jun-15
Oct-10
Jul-12
Oct-17
Feb-13
Sep-13
Aug-09
Aug-16
Jan-09
Mar-10
May-11
Jan-16
Mar-17
May-18
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Energy 19
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Figure 26. Former Soviet Union Oil Production Volume and Quality – 2017
Source: Eni S.p.A.
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Figure 27. Middle East Oil Production Volume and Quality – 2017
Source: Eni S.p.A.
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Figure 29. Asia Pacific Oil Production Volume and Quality – 2017
Source: Eni S.p.A.
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Energy 25
Direct @altacorpcapital.com
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Institutional Equity Research
E&P- Domestic
Nicholas Lupick, CFA, Head of Research 403 539 8592 nlupick
Daniel Morgan, Associate 403 539 8635 dmorgan
Patrick J. O’Rourke, CFA, Analyst 403 539 8615 porourke
Jon Horsman, MBA Kyle Styner, Associate 403 539 8626 kstyner
Chairman & CEO Thomas Matthews, P.Eng., CFA, Analyst 403 539 8621 tmatthews
403 539 8611 Nicholas Koch, Associate 403 539 8581 nkoch
jhorsman@altacorpcapital.com
Infrastructure & Renewable Energy
Nate Heywood, CFA, Analyst 403 539 8584 nheywood
Ben Chiu, Associate 403 539 8590 bchiu
Paul Sarachman, CFA, FCSI
Oilfield Services
President
Tim Monachello, CFA, Analyst 403 539 8633 tmonachello
647 776 8250 Patrick Tang, CPA, Associate 403 539 8594 ptang
psarachman@altacorpcapital.com
Diversified Industries
Chris Murray, P.Eng., CFA, Senior Analyst 647 776 8246 cmurray
Lovish Gupta, Associate 647 776 8245 lgupta
ATB Financial Healthcare & Life Sciences
Curtis Stange David Kideckel, PhD, MBA, Senior Analyst 647 776 8240 dkideckel
President & CEO Matthew Pallotta, CPA, CA, Associate 647 776 8236 mpallotta
All Sectors
Jessica Kakoske, Assistant 403 539 8598 jkakoske
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Institutional Sales
Calgary
Kerk Hilton 403 539 8608 khilton
Toronto
Paul Sarachman, CFA, FCSI 647 776 8250 psarachman
Adam Carlson 647 776 8242 acarlson
Tim Miller 647 776 8237 tmiller
Anya Khomik 647 776 8222 akhomik
Denver
Colin Fatti* 720 683 6701 cfatti
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Institutional Trading
Calgary
CALGARY Shane Dungey 403 539 8605 sdungey
410, 585 – 8 Avenue SW Toronto
Calgary AB Canada T2P 1G1 Mervin Kopeck 647 776 8040 mkopeck
403 539 8600 Main Chris Petrow 647 776 8231 cpetrow
403 539 8575 Fax Denver
Brian Racanelli* 720 683 6700 bracanelli
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