ART IX-A. COMMON PROVISIONS pressures and temptations.
● “Practice of a profession” does not include teaching
SECTION 1
The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit.
Constitutional Commissions (CC):
● CC perform key function in the government
● They are made independent constitutional bodies to protect their
integrity
1. Civil Service Commission
● Personnel office of the government
● First made a constitutional body by the 1973 Consti
2. Commission on Audit
● Auditing office
● Already a constitutional body in the 1935 Consti
○ one-man office
3. Commission on Elections
● Charged with the administration of the all important electoral
process
● Already a constitutional body in the 1935 Consti
SECTION 2
No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold
any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of
any profession or in the active management or control of any business
which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall
he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or
in any franchise or privilege granted by the government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
● Sec 2 imposes a list of prohibitions engaging in activities which can
distract them from their responsibilities or subject them to
○ Lawyer who teaches law does not violate the prohibition
● “Active management” of a business does not prohibit a
Commissioner from owning a business
○ BUT prohibits him from being a managing officer or a
member of the governing board of a business “which, in any
way, may be affected by the functions of his office” (does
not apply to the prohibition of practice of profession)
● prohibition of financial interest in government contracts or
franchises applies also to contracts with “subsidiaries” of
government corporations.
SECTION 3
The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law
and shall not be decreased during their tenure.
● Protects their salary from diminution during their continuance in
office
SECTION 4
The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and
employees in accordance with law.
● CC are offices specifically authorized by the Consti to appoint their
officials.
● Appointments are still subject to Civil Service Law and Rules.
○ All matters pertaining to appointments are within the realm
of expertise to the CSC, all laws, rules and regulations it
issues on appointments must be complied with
○ Not full independence for CC (if the framers wanted then
they would have done so)
SECTION 5
The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
 ● Obligation of Department of Budget and Management (DBM):
○ Automatically release amounts appropriated for offices with
fiscal autonomy
○ DBM may not retain a portion of the amount nor may it
program release
● "No report, no release" policy of COA may not be validly enforced
against offices vested with fiscal autonomy
○ Appropriations must be automatically released
○ No condition to fund releases may be imposed (not subject
to pre-audit)
SECTION 6
Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning
pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules
however shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
● Protected against outside influences and political pressures
● CCs have authority to promulgate their own rules of procedure
(sitting en banc)
○ In case of conflict with Rules of Court, Rules of CC shall
prevail if the proceeding is before the Commission
○ Otherwise, Rules of Court shall prevail if before a court
○ SC has no power to disapprove CC rules except through
“judicial review” when such rules violate the Constitution
(Art 8, Sec 5 (5) does not apply to them)
○ These rules shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rules
○ If rules are contrary to statute, statute prevails
○ Congress also has no power to approve, review, amend and
revise CC rules
○ Commissioners are given a fixed term and are removable only by
impeachment
SECTION 7
Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by
law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof.
● Since the Commissions are collegial bodies, the decisions are made
by the body and not by individual members of the body
● Cannot promulgate rules which require unanimity
○ Applies whether en banc or in division
● Must decide by a majority of all its members within 60 days from
the date of its submission for decision or resolution
○ majority of ALL its members not only of those who
participated and took part in the deliberations
e.g. COMELEC
● A resolution or decision of the COMELEC is considered complete
and validly rendered or issued when there is concurrence by the
required majority of the Commissioners
○ Ex.: where 2 Commissioners who participated in the
consideration of the case retired before the promulgation
of the COMELEC decision, the remaining 4 Commissioners
constitute the total membership and constituted a quorum,
the vote of 3 would be a majority vote of all
● No requirement of a dissenting opinion before a decision can be
considered validly rendered and complete (nothing in the
Constitution nor in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure)
● No final decision unless the draft is signed and promulgated
SECTION 8
Each Commission shall perform such other functions as may be provided
by law.
ART IX-B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
● The Civil Service Commission is an administrative agency. It can only
perform powers that are administrative in nature (executive
 powers, quasi-judicial powers, and quasi-legislative/rule-making
powers)
SECTION 1
(1) The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission
composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public
administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term
of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years,
and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Composition of the Civil Service Commission:
1. Chairman
2. Two Commissioners
Qualifications:
1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines
2. At least 35 years of age at the time of his appointment
3. With proven capacity for public administration
4. Must NOT have been candidates for any elective position in the
elections immediately preceding their appointment
Duration of term:
1. Chairman- 7 years without reappointment
2. Commissioner (1)- 5 years without reappointment
3. Commissioner (2)- 3 years without reappointment
➔ Staggering of terms is for the purpose of continuity
Fiscal Autonomy
The Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to
the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and
the Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding
or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that
extent, place petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy
on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy,
thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution
(CSC v. DBM).
SECTION 2
(1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.
(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit
and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to
positions which are policy- determining, primarily confidential, or highly
technical, by competitive examination.
(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law.
(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or
indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.
(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
employees.
(6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such
protection as may be provided by law.
● Section 2 paragraph 1 defines the scope of the Civil Service
Commission
○ For GOCCs, the Civil Service system covers only those with
original charter. The test of whether a GOCC is subject to
the Civil Service Law is through the manner of its creation.
 Those incorporated under the Corporation Law are not
subject to the CSC.
● Appointments in the Civil Service
○ Distinction between competitive and non-competitive
position → both require merit and fitness but in competitive
positions, merit and fitness are determined through a
competitive exam
○ Classes of non-competitive positions
i. Policy-determining
- is one charged with the duty to "formulate
a method of action for the government or
any of its subdivisions.
ii. Primarily confidential
- The ultimate test is the nature of the
responsibilities of the position, not the
administrative or legislative description that
is given to the position
iii. Highly technical
- to possess a technical skill or training in the
supreme or superior degree.
○ Classification of positions according to the Civil Service Code
(PD 807)
i. Career Service
● entrance based on merit
● and fitness to be determined as far as
practicable by competitive examinations, or
based on highly technical qualifications;
● security of tenure; and
● opportunity for advancement to higher
career positions
ii. Non-career Service
● entrance on bases other than those of the
usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for
the career service;
● tenure which is limited to a period specified
by law, or which is coterminous with that of
the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or which is limited to the duration
of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made.
● Security of tenure
○ Security of tenure is important for the morale of officers
and employees in the service
○ non-competitive positions are also covered by the
guarantee of security of tenure but temporary appointees
are not
● Abolition of Office
○ Abolition of office does not imply removal of the incumbent
officer except when it is done in good faith
○ An abolition of office is constitutional if
i. It is made in good faith
ii. It is not for personal or political reasons
iii. Not in violation of the law
○ President has the authority to reorganize the executive
department, this includes deactivation of offices
● Partisan political activity
○ Includes “every form of solicitation of the elector’s vote in
favor of” a specific candidate
○ Provision on partisan political activity does not prevent an
officer from expressing his views on current political
problems or issues or from mentioning candidates he
supports
SECTION 3
The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness,
and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards
system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels
and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public
accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual
report on its personnel programs.
● The general objective of the Civil Service System is to establish and
promote professionalism and efficiency in public service.
 ● The Power of the CSC is limited. It can never dictate who shall be
appointed to a certain position. It can only attest to the eligibility or
ineligibility of an appointee.
SECTION 4
All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to
uphold and defend this Constitution.
● Covers all civilian public officers (whether elective or appointive)
SECTION 5
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of
government officials and employees, including those in government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into
account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the
qualifications required for, their positions.
SECTION 6
No candidate who has lost in any election, shall within one year after such
election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any
Government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their
subsidiaries.
• The candidates mentioned above are called “political lameducks.” It is an
elected official whose tenure is about to end because they have lost a
reelection or are no longer eligible to serve.
SECTION 7
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment
in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries
• 1st par. is a prohibition for ELECTIVE officials for accepting appointments
(other than members of the Congress)
- If the elective official accepts an appointment without first resigning
his elective position, the appointment is invalid
- Unlike appointive officers in the next paragraph, Congress may not
create an exception to this rule
• 2nd par. is prohibition for APPOINTIVE officers for holding any other
office or employment in the gov’t or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries
- the prohibition is not absolute since they may hold office allowed by
law or if it is by the primary function of their position (like ex officio)
SECTION 8
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically
authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any
present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign
government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or
indirect compensation.
• Additional compensation
- when an extra reward in the form, for instance, of a bonus is added
to a fixed compensation for the same office. This is not allowed in
the absence of a law specifically authorizing such extra reward
(including additional compensation in the form of cost of living
allowances, incentives, and Christmas bonuses). The Court,
however, was careful to point out that when a per diem or an
allowance is given as reimbursement for expenses incident to the
discharge of an officer's duties, it is not an additional compensation
prohibited by the Constitution.
• Double compensation
- two sets of compensation for two different offices held concurrently
by one officer. In instances when holding a second office is allowed,
when an officer accepts a second office, he can draw the salary
attached to such second office only when he is specifically
 authorized by law to receive double compensation. See Quimson v.
Ozaeta, 98 Phil. 705 (1956)
• Mandatory bonuses such as 13th month pay do not constitute double
compensation. But if there is an instance where a bonus was agreed upon in
a trust agreement and said agreement was made arbitrarily, the CSC
interpreted such bonus to be double compensation (Dimagiba v. Espartero).
ART IX - C. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
SECTION 1
(1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and
six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective positions in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term
of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three
Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Composition:
● A chairman
● Six other Commissioners
Qualifications
● Must be a natural born citizen of the Philippines at the time of their
appointment.
● At least 35 years of age
● College degree holder
● Majority including the chairman should be members of the
Philippine Bar
● Engage in the Practice of Law for ten years.
Appointment
● Appointed by the president with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of 7 years without reappointment.
● Those of the first appointed, 3 shall hold office for 7 years, 3 for
5years, and the last three for 3 years
● The result is that any one time only 3 Commissioners retire together
● Since appointment to any vacancy is only for the unexpired portion
of
● the term of the predecessor, the regularity of the staggered
rotational system remains undisturbed even by vacancies occurring
in mid-term
● No members shall be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
● The constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad
interim appointment. Thus, it takes effect immediately.
● A second ad interim appointment can only be a re-appointment to
prevent the body from serving beyond seven years
SECTION 2
The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction,
or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction. 
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on
election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be
final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling
places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration
of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the
Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or
unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or
which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration. 
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their
agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates
related to elections, constitute interference in national affairs, and, when
accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their
registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may
be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in
court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts
or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall
be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds,
offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it
has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for
violation or disregard of, or disobedience to, its directive, order, or
decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive report on
the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
● COMELEC possesses executive, quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative
powers
○ Judicial power is limited to: “sole judge of all contest
relating to elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective”
○ Only questions that may not be touched are those
“involving the right to vote”
○ In Relampagos v. Cumba, Commission has limited powers to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus granted
by Sec. 50 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 in connection with its
appellate jurisdiction under Article IX-C, Section 2 (2).
○ Review decisions of municipal courts on municipal election
contest.
○ In Ututalam v. Commission on Elections, the functions of the
Commission under the Constitution are:
 executive (enforcement)
 administrative (administration)
● COMELEC has the power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall. (Antonio v. COMELEC) Power to declare a failure of
election
○ GENERAL RULE: Proclamation of a congressional candidate
divests COMELEC of jurisdiction in favor of the proper
Electoral Tribunal.
● Commission may deputize law enforcement agencies with the
concurrence of the president to ensure a peaceful, free, orderly,
honest, and credible elections
○ Registration of parties and organizations
 Registration creates juridical personality
○ Has no disciplinary powers over the officers it may deputize,
all they can do is recommend disciplinary action to the
President
● Fiscals can only file information on an election offense ONLY if the
commission has deputized them.

● Powers not given to the COMELEC
○ To decide on the questions involving the right to vote.
○ Inclusion of exclusion of voters
○ Transfer of Congressional Districts to another for the
purpose of attaining proportionality.
○ No disciplinary powers over the officers it may deputize
SECTION 3
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of
election cases, including pre- proclamation controversies. All such election
cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Commission Decisions
● Whether en banc or in division, decisions on any case or matter are
reached by a majority votes
○ Rules may not require unanimity
● Sec 257, Omnibus Election Code requires that COMELEC decide all
cases brought before it within 90 days from the date of submission
○ not a hard and fast rule
○ Court recognized that manpower and logistic is limited
○ Section prescribes 2 important rules:
1. motions for reconsideration are decided en banc
a. required only when the subject for reconsideration
is a “decision” or resolution of a substantive issues
b. reconsideration of a dismissal based on lack of
interest may be heard in division
c. MR must precede certiorari (Rule 65) limits
certiorari to decisions of the COMELEC en banc
2. election cases are decided in division
a. any decision by the Commission en banc as regards
election cases decided by it in the first instance is
null and void
● Hence, a case may be brought to the Supreme Court only after
reconsideration.
SECTION 4
The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or
information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its
subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal
opportunity, time, and space ,and the right to reply, including reasonable,
equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
- Transportation and other public utilities as well as mass media play
a very important role in elections and can be used to disrupt free,
orderly and honest elections
○ During election periods they may be supervised or
regulated by the COMELEC
○ Constitutional problems may arise:
 due process
 equal protection
 freedom of speech and press
● Power subsists not just during the period of voting for public
officers but also during referenda and plebiscites especially if
constitutional amendments are at issue
● BP Blg 881
○ compels COMELEC to procure print space and broadcast
time to be allocated impartially among candidates
○ repealed by ruling in Philippine Press Institute v COMELEC as
it would “amount to a prohibited taking of property without
just compensation.”
SECTION 5
No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of
election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President
without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
 ● Pardon recommendation of the Commission must be “favourable”
SECTION 6
A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the
free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.
SECTION 7
No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be
valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided
in this Constitution.
SECTION 8
Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-
list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards,
boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar
bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
accordance with law.
● 1935 Consti, PH Election law, and 1971 Election Code
○ gave preferred position to the 2 major political parties
○ 1935 Consti gave representation in the CA to the various
parties proportional to the membership strength in the
Senate and HoR
● Constitutional and statutory advantages resulted in the stranglehold
which 2 major political parties had on the electoral process
● This provision promotes a multi-party or open party system
○ Free and open party system refers to a disengagement from
the sterile 2-party system of the past and the multi-
party system will be allowed to develop
SECTION 9
Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election
period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall
end thirty days thereafter.
Campaign period vs. Election Period 

● CP
○ period of active solicitation of votes
○ may be set by the legislature for a period less than EP
○ In special cases, the COMELEC is authorized to fix a different
period
● EP
○ period of time needed for administering an election
○ can go beyond the date for the casting of ballots
SECTION 10
Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination.
● nothing more than a specification of the equal protection clause of
the Bill of Rights
○ special reference to unaffiliated or partyless bona fide
candidates
SECTION 11
Funds certified by the Commission as necessary to defray the expenses for
holding regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda,
and recalls, shall be provided in the regular or special appropriations and,
once approved, shall be released automatically upon certification by the
Chairman of the Commission.
Fiscal Autonomy
● This provision, together with the exemption of the COMELEC from
pre-audit, should help towards strengthening the independence of
the Commission
ART IX-D. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
● It is through the Commission on Audit that the people can verify
whether their money has been properly spent
SECTION 1
(1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and
two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
Certified Public Accountants with not less than ten years of auditing
experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately
preceding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of the
Commission belong to the same profession.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term
of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one Commissioner for five
years, and the other Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
● Congress, through its power to tax, raises public funds and, through
its power to appropriate, authorizes the expenditure of public funds
for specific purposes. Various administrative officials collect, keep
and expend these public funds and are required to keep accurate
financial records
Composition of the COA:
1. Chairman
2. Two (2) Commissioners
Qualifications:
1. Natural-born citizens of the Philippines;
2. At least thirty-five years (35) of age, at the time of their
appointment;
3. Certified public accountants (CPA) with a minimum of ten years of
auditing experience, OR members of the Bar with a minimum
exposure of ten years in the practice of law but at no time shall all
of them belong to the same profession
4. They must not have been candidates for any elective position in
immediately preceding their appointment
Appointment and Term of the Chairman and Commissioners
1. Appointed by the President with the consent of the CA
2. Term of seven years; No reappointment
3. Staggered term of seven years
• Chairman – seven (7) years
• Commissioner 1 – Five (5) years
• Commissioner 2 – Three (3) years
4. No temporary appointment/designation and reappointment
SECTION 2
(1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or
held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post- audit
basis:
● constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been
granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution;
● autonomous state colleges and universities;
● other government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries; and
● such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity,
directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are
required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit
as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal
control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the
Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or
special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the
deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government
and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the
vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the
limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds
and properties.
Powers and functions of the COA
1. To examine and audit all forms of gov’t revenue
2. To examine and audit all forms of gov’t expenditures
3. To settle gov’t accounts
● to settle liquidated accounts, that is, those accounts which
may be adjusted simply by an arithmetical
● The power of COA to settle gov’t accounts has reference
only to liquidated claims and not to unliquidated claims
4. To define the scope and techniques for its own auditing procedures
-> exclusive
5. To promulgate accounting and auditing rules including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures
6. To decide administrative cases involving expenditure of public funds
● The power of COA to define the scope of its audit and examination
and to establish the techniques it will follow is exclusive
● Auditing authority of the COA over GOCCs extends only to those
with original charter
● Has authority not just over accountable officers but also over other
officers who perform functions related to accounting such as
verification of evaluations and computation of fees collectible, and
the adoption of internal rules of control
Post-audit authority over:
● Constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been
granted
● fiscal autonomy under this Constitution
● Autonomous colleges and universities
● Other GOCCs and their subsidiaries
● Such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly
or indirectly, from or through the gov’t, which are required by law
or by the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition
of subsidy or equity
● BUT: where the internal control system of the audited agencies is
inadequate, COA may adopt such measures, including temporary or
special pre-audit as are necessary and appropriate to correct the
deficiencies
Authority of the Commission
● For government owned corporations, auditing authority extends
only to those “with original charter”
● Has authority over other officers who perform functions related to
accounting.
○ E.g., evaluator/computer
● Constitutional competence of the COA relates solely to the
administrative aspect of the expenditure of public funds.
A charter is a document that spells out the powers, duties and structures of
government and the rights of citizens. It is often compared to constitutions
at the local level.
Auditing Authority of the Commission
● ONLY has post-audit authority over the ff: Constitutional bodies,
commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy
under this Constitution;
○ Autonomous state colleges and universities
○ Other GOCCs and their subsidiaries
○ Such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity,
directly or indirectly, from or through to submit to such
audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.
Private auditors
● Auditing power of the COA is non-exclusive: therefore gov’t
institutions with private investments in them require the presence
of private auditing firms, not exclusively, but concurrently
● BUT the COA’s findings and conclusions necessarily prevail
over those of private auditors, at least insofar as gov’t
agencies and officials are concerned
● Some investors require presence of private auditing firms
(concurrent)
○ There are certain instances where private auditing may be
required
 recommend measures necessary to improve their effectiveness and
● Does the COA have exclusive authority to audit government banks? efficiency. It shall submit such other reports as may be required by law.
○ No. the COA does not have the exclusive power to examine
and audit government agencies

COA vs. Private auditors

● COA > private auditors; concerning government agencies and
officials.
● COA > Central Bank
● because COA constitutionally mandated auditor of government
banks

Review power of the SC

● Limited certiorari power under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
● On money matters only, NOT over decisions on personnel
movements.

There is nothing in the constitution that holds back COA from post-auditing
an already pre-audited transaction. Any deficiency it may find in said post-
audit can be raised and made demandable to the proper parties. (DBP v
COA)

SECTION 3

No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its

subsidiaries in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds,
from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.

● The jurisdiction of COA extends to the government itself, including

LGU’s, and can thus disallow disbursements of Local Government
funds if they are found to be excessive. (Veloso v. COA)

SECTION 4

The Commission shall submit to the President and the Congress, within
the time fixed by law, an annual report covering the financial condition
and operation of the Government, its subdivisions, agencies, and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and non-governmental entities subject to its audit, and
 ART IX-A. COMMON PROVISIONS

Funa v. Chairman, CSC

GR 191672, November 25, 2014

FACTS
 Petitioner asserts that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title
I-A, Book V of EO 292, which states that the chairman of the
CSC will be part of the Board of Directors of other governing
bodies, violates the independence of the CSC, which was
constitutionally created to be protected from outside
influences and political pressures due to the significance of its
government functions.5 He further asserts that such
CASE DIGESTS independence is violated by the fact that the CSC is not a part
of the Executive Branch of Government while the concerned
GOCCs are considered instrumentalities of the Executive
Branch of the Government.6 In this situation, the President
may exercise his power of control over the CSC considering
that the GOCCs in which Duque sits as Board member are
attached to the Executive Department.7

ISSUE
 Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of
Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the independence of
the CSC?

HELD
 The Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter
3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declared EO 864
 unconstitutional and the designation of Duque in an ex officio
capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of
the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
 Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is clear that
the CSC Chairman’s membership in a governing body is
dependent on the condition that the functions of the
government entity where he will sit as its Board member must
affect the career development, employment status, rights,
privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees.
 Based on this, the Court finds no irregularity in Section 14,
Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 because matters
affecting the career development, rights and welfare of
government employees are among the primary functions of
the CSC and are consequently exercised through its Chairman.
The CSC Chairman’s membership therein must, therefore, be
considered to be derived from his position as such.
Accordingly, the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3,
Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is upheld.
 However, Duque’s designation as member of the governing
Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the
independence of the CSC because the President sits at the
apex of the Executive branch, and exercises "control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices." There can be no
instance under the Constitution where an officer of the
Executive branch is outside the control of the President. The
Executive branch is unitary since there is only one President
vested with executive power exercising control over the entire
Executive branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is
not under the control of the President is a lost command
whose existence is without any legal or constitutional basis.
Gualberto J. Dela Llana v. The Chairperson, Commission on
Audit
GR 180989, 07 February 2012. (decisions and orders of the COA reviewable by the
court via a petition for certiorari refer to the COA’s quasi -judicial capacity not its
quasi-legislative or rule-making powers)
FACTS
 Petitioner Gualberto Dela Llana, as a taxpayer, wrote to the
Commission on Audit (COA) regarding the recommendation of
the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food that the
Department of Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service.
 The COA replied to Dela Llana informing him of the prior
issuance of Circular No. 89-299 which provides that whenever
the circumstances warrant, the COA may reinstitute pre-audit
or adopt such other control measures as necessary and
appropriate to protect the funds and property of an agency.
 Dela Llana filed a petition for certiorari alleging that the pre-
audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere
circular, considering that the pre- audit is a constitutional
mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE
 WON the petition for certiorari filed by Dela Llana is proper?
RULING
 Petitioner is correct in that decisions and orders of the COA
are reviewable by the court via a petition for certiorari.
 However, these refer to decisions and orders which were
rendered by the COA in its quasi-judicial capacity.
  Circular No. 89-299 was promulgated by the COA under its
quasi-legislative or rule-making powers. Hence, Circular No.
89-299 is not reviewable by certiorari.
Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC
(supra. Art 2, Sec. 26)
FACTS
 On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted 2 tarpaulins within a
private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten
feet (10') in size.
o They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No.
10354.
o The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.
This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote"
and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay"
with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an
"X" mark.
o The electoral candidates were classified according to
their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,
otherwise known as the RH Law.
 TEAM PATAY
 TEAM BUHAY
 COMELEC through Majarucon as Election Officer of Bacolod
City conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor
paid for by any candidate.
 Diocese also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of
candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who
helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates
for that election.
 Majarucon as Election Officer of Bacolod City Notice to
Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most
Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer ordered
the tarpaulin’s removal within 3 days from receipt for being
oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size
requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).
 Petitioner Bishop contends that (1) he be given a definite
ruling by COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin;
and (2) pending this opinion and the availment of legal
remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain.
 COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the
immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be
constrained to file an election offense against petitioners.
 Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their
exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case praying
that:
o (1) the petition be given due course;
o (2) a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ
of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
respondents from further proceeding in enforcing their
orders for the removal of the Team Patay tarpaulin;
and
o (3) after notice and hearing, a decision be rendered
declaring the questioned orders of respondents as
unconstitutional and void, and permanently restraining
respondents from enforcing them or any other similar
order.
ISSUES
 Whether the notice/order by Election Officer Majarucon and
the order by the COMELEC Law Department are considered a)
judgments, b) final orders, c) resolutions of the COMELEC
which would warrant a review of this court via Rule 65
Petition? Yes.
A. Whether petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts
doctrine and jurisprudential rules governing appeals
from COMELEC decisions;
B. Assuming arguendo that the aforementioned orders
are not considered judgments/final
orders/resolutions of the COMELEC, whether there
are exceptional circumstances which would allow this
court to take cognizance of the case
HELD
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary
restraining order previously issued is hereby made
permanent. The act of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed
notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter dated February 27,
2013 is declared unconstitutional.
RATIO
MAIN ISSUE FOR THIS ARTICLE: Jurisdiction of SC over COMELEC
cases
 Respondents (EO Majarucon and COMELEC) ask that this
petition be dismissed on the ground that the notice and letter
are not final orders, decisions, rulings, or judgments of the
COMELEC En Banc issued in the exercise of its adjudicatory
powers, reviewable via Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
o Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the
COMELEC. Rule 65 is applicable especially to raise
objections relating to a grave abuse of discretion
resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction. As a special civil
action, there must also be a showing that there be no
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law.
 Respondents contend that the assailed notice and letter are
not subject to review by this court, whose power to review is
"limited only to final decisions, rulings and orders of the
COMELEC En Banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial power."
o Respondents claim that the assailed notice and letter
are reviewable only by COMELEC itself pursuant to
Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution on
COMELEC’s power to decide all questions affecting
elections. Respondents invoke the cases of Ambil, Jr. v.
COMELEC, Repol v. COMELEC, Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC,
Blanco v. COMELEC, and Cayetano v. COMELEC, to
illustrate how judicial intervention is limited to final
decisions, orders, rulings and judgments of the
COMELEC En Banc.
 Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC (The General Rule)
This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the
Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an
interlocutory order of a division
o The Supreme Court has no power to review via
certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final
 resolution of a Division of the Commission on
Elections
 Repol v. COMELEC (Exceptions to the General Rule)
o This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this
procedural requirement [of filing a motion for
reconsideration] may be glossed over if:
1) It will prevent the miscarriage of justice;
2) The issue involves a principle of social justice;
3) The issue involves the protection of labor;
4) The decision or resolution sought to be set
aside is a nullity; or
5) The need for relief is extremely urgent and
certiorari is the only adequate and speedy
remedy available.
 In the present case, petitioners are not candidates seeking for
public office. Their petition is filed to assert their fundamental
right to expression.
 All these cases cited by respondents pertained to COMELEC’s
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power.
 When it issued the notice and letter, the COMELEC was
allegedly enforcing election laws.
OTHER ISSUES:
Rule 65, grave abuse of discretion, and limitations on political
speech
 The main subject of this case is an alleged constitutional
violation: the infringement on speech and the "chilling effect"
caused by respondent COMELEC’s notice and letter.
 Jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter is determined
from the allegations in the petition. Subject matter jurisdiction
is defined as the authority "to hear and determine cases of the
general class to which the proceedings in question belong and
is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the
court and defines its powers.
 Political speech is motivated by the desire to be heard and
understood, to move people to action. It is concerned with the
sovereign right to change the contours of power whether
through the election of representatives in a republican
government or the revision of the basic text of the
Constitution.
 We evaluate restrictions on freedom of expression from their
effects. We protect both speech and medium because the
quality of this freedom in practice will define the quality of
deliberation in our democratic society.
 COMELEC’s notice and letter affect preferred speech.
o Under the conditions in which it was issued and in view
of the novelty of this case, it could result in a "chilling
effect" that would affect other citizens who want their
voices heard on issues during the elections
o Other citizens who wish to express their views
regarding the election and other related issues may
choose not to, for fear of reprisal or sanction by the
COMELEC
o Rule 65 is also the procedural platform for raising
grave abuse of discretion.
 Respondents relied on its constitutional mandate to decide all
questions affecting elections. Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the
Constitution, provides:
o Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
o (3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections, including determination
 of the number and location of polling places,
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and
registration of voters.
o Respondents’ reliance on this provision is misplaced.
 We are confronted with the question as to whether the
COMELEC had any jurisdiction at all with its acts threatening
imminent criminal action effectively abridging meaningful
political speech.
 The use of the word "affecting" in this provision cannot be
interpreted to mean that COMELEC has the exclusive power to
decide any and all questions that arise during elections.
COMELEC’s constitutional competencies during elections
should not operate to divest this court of its own jurisdiction.
 Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution. This provision
provides for this court’s original jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari and prohibition. This should be read alongside the
expanded jurisdiction of the court in Article VIII, Section 1 of
the Constitution.
 breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is
grave abuse of discretion
 It will, thus, be manifest injustice if the court does not take
jurisdiction over this case.
 Exceptions to strict implementation of HoC:
Hierarchy of courts
 This brings us to the issue of whether petitioners violated the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts in directly filing their petition
before this court.
 Necessity of the application of the hierarchy of courts:
o The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on
the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy
is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The
strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court
from having to deal with causes that are also well
within the competence of the lower courts, and thus
leave time to the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the
Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on
petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely
necessary or when serious and important reasons exist
to justify an exception to the policy.
o Supreme Court’s role to interpret the Constitution and
act in order to protect constitutional rights when these
become exigent should not be emasculated by the
doctrine in respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has
never been the purpose of such doctrine.
o Doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad
rule. This court has "full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil
actions for certiorari . . .filed directly with it for
exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by
the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised
in the petition.”
 First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there
are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to
this court includes availing of the remedies of certiorari
and prohibition toassail the constitutionality of actions of
both legislative and executive branches of the government
o expression in the present case, but also of others
in future similar cases. The case before this court
 involves an active effort on the part of the
electorate to reform the political landscape. This
has become a rare occasion when private citizens
actively engage the public in political discourse.
 Second exception is when the issues involved are of
transcendental importance.
 Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to
this court
 Fourth, the constitutional issues raise dare better
decided by this court
 Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be
ignored.
 Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional
organ
o COMELEC is a constitutional body. In Albano v.
Arranz, cited by petitioners, this court held that
"[i]t is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if
the Court of First Instance of each and every
province were [to] arrogate itself the power to
disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the
Commission on Elections: that constitutional body
would be speedily reduced to impotence."
o if petitioners sought to annul the actions of
COMELEC through pursuing remedies with the
lower courts, any ruling on their part would not
have been binding for other citizens whom
respondents may place in the same situation
 Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law that could free them from the injurious
effects of respondents’ acts in violation of their right to
freedom of expression.
 Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated
by public welfare and the advancement of public policy,
or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the
orders complained of were found to be patent nullities,
or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate
remedy.”
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
 Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for
adjudication. Ripeness is the "prerequisite that something
had by then been accomplished or performed by either
branch [or in this case, organ of government] before a
court may come into the picture."
 Political speech enjoys preferred protection within our
constitutional order. In Chavez v. Gonzales, Justice Carpio
in a separate opinion emphasized: "[i]f ever there is a
hierarchy of protected expressions, political expression
would occupy the highest rank, and among different kinds
of political expression, the subject of fair and honest
elections would be at the top." Sovereignty resides in the
people.109 Political speech is a direct exercise of the
sovereignty. The principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies yields in order to protect this fundamental right.
 Time and again, we have held that this court "has the
power to relax or suspend the rules or to except a case
from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant,
or when the purpose of justice requires it, [and when]
[w]hat constitutes [as] good and sufficient cause that will
 merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the
court".
Fortune Life and General Insurance v. COA
– 748 SCRA 286
FACTS
 Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the
petitioner executed a memorandum of agreement concerning
the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries,
treasurers and tanod, the former obligating P4,393,593.60 for
the premium payment, and subsequently submitting the
corresponding disbursement voucher to COA-Antique for pre-
audit. The latter office disallowed the payment for lack of legal
basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied.
 Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim
in the COA. On November 15, 2012, the COA issued its
decision denying the petition, holding that under Section 447
and Section 458 of the Local Government Code only municipal
or city governments are expressly vested with the power to
secure group insurance coverage for barangay workers; and
noting the LGU’s failure to comply with the requirement of
publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184
(Government Procurement Reform Act).
 The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on
December 14, 2012, and filed its motion for reconsideration
on January 14, 2013. However, the COA denied the motion,9
the denial being received by the petitioner on July 14, 2014.
 Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August
12, 2014, but the petition for certiorari was dismissed as
earlier stated through the resolution promulgated on August
19, 2014 for (a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-
submission of the proof of service and verified declaration;
and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondents.
ISSUE
 WON the “fresh period rule” applies on Rule 64?
HELD
 No.
RATIO
 There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule
42 and the petition for certiorari under Rule 64.
 As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal
from the judgment or final order rendered by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such
appeal is on a question of fact, or of law, or of mixed question
of fact and law, and is given due course only upon a prima
facie showing that the Regional Trial Court committed an error
of fact or law warranting the reversal or modification of the
challenged judgment or final order.17 In contrast, the petition
for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or the
Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is not designed to
correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.18
Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine
whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
  The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are
different. In the former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days
to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed
decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration.19 In the latter, the
petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or
final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the
procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the
period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved
party may file the petition within the remaining period, which
shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from
the notice of denial.
 The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January
14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving the assailed
decision of the COA on December 14, 2012.21 Pursuant to
Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days from receipt of the
denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition.
Considering that it received the notice of the denial on July 14,
2014, it had only until July 19, 2014 to file the petition.
However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which was
25 days too late.
 Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of
an injustice that is not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed
procedure.24 Absent this reason for liberality, the petition
cannot be allowed to prosper.
Querubin v. COMELEC
GR 218787, December 8, 2015
FACTS
 On October 27, 2014, the COMELEC en banc, through its
Resolution No. 14-0715, released the bidding documents
for the “Two-Stage Competitive Bidding for the Lease of
Election Management System (EMS) and Precinct-Based
Optical Mark Reader (OMR) or Optical Scan (OP-SCAN)
System. Thus,
 The joint venture of Smartmatic-TIM Corporation (SMTC),
Smartmatic International Holding B.V., and Jarltech
International Corporation (collectively referred to as
“Smartmatic JV”) responded to the call and submitted bid for
the project on the scheduled date.
 During the opening of the bids, Smartmatic JV, in a
sworn certification, informed the BAC that one of its partner
corporations, SMTC, has a pending application with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to amend its
Articles of Incorporation (AOI)
 Upon evaluation of the submittals, the BAC, through its
Resolution No. 1 dated December 15, 2014, declared
Smartmatic JV and Indra eligible to participate in the second
stage of the bidding process.
 After the conduct of post-qualification, the BAC, through
Resolution No. 9 dated May 5, 2015, disqualified Smartmatic
JV on two grounds, viz:
 Failure to submit valid AOI; and the demo unit failed to meet
the technical requirement that the system shall be capable of
writing all data/files, audit log, statistics and ballot images
simultaneously in at least two (2) data storages.
 Aggrieved, Smartmatic JV filed a Protest, seeking permission
to conduct another technical demonstration of its SAES
1800 plus OMR (OMR+), the OMR Smartmatic JV
 presented during the public bidding before the COMELEC
en banc.
 The COMELEC GRANTED the petition of the SMARTMATIC and
declared as the lowest calculated Bid.
ISSUE
 WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPREME COURT HAS THE RIGHT
AND DUTY TO ENTERTAIN THIS PETITION
HELD
 Yes.
 The COMELEC included, that may be brought directly to the
Supreme Court on certiorari is not all-encompassing, and that
it only relates to those rendered in the commissions’
exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. In the case
of the COMELEC, this would limit the provision’s coverage to
the decisions, orders, or rulings issued pursuant to its
authority to be the sole judge of generally all
controversies and contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of elective offices.
ART IX-B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Gaminde v. COA
GR 140335, December 13, 2000
FACTS
 On June 11, 1993, President Ramos appointed petitioner
Thelma P. Gaminde as, ad interim, Commissioner of the Civil
Service Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993,
after taking an oath of office.
 On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment,
Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment stating
in her appointment paper that her term will expire on
February 2, 1999.
 Petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President
as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply, the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel opined that petitioner’s term of
office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02,
1999. And so Gaminde remained in office after February 2,
1999.
 Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon wrote to COA asking if
Gaminde and her co-terminous staff will be paid their salaries
notwithstanding that their appointments had expired on
February 2, 1999.
 COA General Counsel issued an opinion that "the term of
Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as
stated in her appointment…” Consequently, CSC Resident
Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99-
002-101 (99).
 Petitioner appealed to the COA en banc. COA dismissed the
appeal affirming the disallowance in reference to her
appointment paper further stating that “the Commission is
bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not
even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the
President.”
ISSUE
 Whether the term of office Atty. Gaminde expired on February
02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February
02, 2000, as claimed by her? February 02, 1999
HELD
 WHEREFORE, we adjudge that the term of office of Ms.
Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, under an appointment extended to her by
President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on
February 02, 1999.
 However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until
February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and
other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently,
the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such
salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-
terminous staff.
 ACCORDINGLY, we REVERSE the decisions of the Commission
on Audit insofar as they disallow the salaries and emoluments
of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her coterminous
staff during her tenure as de facto officer from February 02,
1999, until February 02, 2000.
RATIO
 The 1973 Constitution introduced the first system of a regular
rotation or cycle in the membership of the Civil Service
Commission. The provision on the 1973 Constitution reads:
o x x x The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the Prime Minister for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of the Commissioners
first appointed, one shall hold office for seven years,
another for five years, and the third for three
years. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for
the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.
Rotational Plan
 In Republic vs. Imperial, it says that the operation of the
rotational plan requires two conditions, both indispensable to
its workability:
o (1) that the terms of the first three (3) Commissioners
should start on a common date, and,
o (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or
disability before the expiration of the term should
only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the
term.
Term vs. Tenure
 In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction
between "term" and "tenure." "[T]he term of an office must
be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent.
o The term means the time during which the officer may
claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
another.
o The tenure represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds the office.
 The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure
may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond
the power of the incumbent."
 The transitory provisions do not affect the term of office fixed
in Article IX, providing for a seven-five-three year rotational
interval for the first appointees under this Constitution. (1986-
1987 Transition period and effect of the 1987 Consti) What it
contemplates is tenure not term of the incumbent Chairmen
and Members of the Constitutional Commissions.
 Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that the incumbent
members of the Constitutional Commissions shall continue in
 office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution
under their existing appointments at the discretion of the
appointing power, who may cut short their tenure by: (1) their
removal from office for cause; (2) their becoming
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, or (3)
their appointment to a new term thereunder, all of which
events may occur before the end of the one year period after
the effectivity of the Constitution.
 Gaminde’s situation is similar to previous CSC chair
appointments.
o Patricia Sto. Tomas: On March 02, 1988, the
Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination. She assumed office on March 04,
1988. Her term ended on February 02, 1994. She
served as de facto Chairman until March 04, 1995.
o Alma G. De Leon: regular seven-year term. This term
must be deemed to start on February 02, 1994,
immediately succeeding her predecessor, whose term
started on the common date of the terms of office of
the first appointees under the 1987 Constitution. She
assumed office on March 22, 1995, for a term expiring
February 02, 2001.
o Atty. Samilo Barlongay: Commissioner Five-year
term. February 02, 1987 to February 02, 1992. On
January 30, 1988, the President nominated Atty.
Samilo N. Barlongay Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission. On February 17, 1988, the Commission
on Appointments, Congress of the Philippines,
confirmed the nomination. He assumed office on
March 04, 1988. His term ended on February 02,
1992. He served as de facto Commissioner until March
04, 1993.
o Thelma Gaminde: Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, for a term
expiring February 02, 1999. This terminal date is
specified in her appointment paper. On September 07,
1993, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
appointment. She accepted the appointment and
assumed office on June 22, 1993.She is bound by the
term of the appointment she accepted, expiring
February 02, 1999.
 In this connection, the letter dated April 07, 1998, of Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona clarifying that her term
would expire on February 02, 2000, was in error. What was
submitted to the Commission on Appointments was a
nomination for a term expiring on February 02, 1999. Thus,
the term of her successor must be deemed to start on
February 02, 1999, and expire on February 02, 2006.
Illustration:
The line of succession, terms of office and tenure of
the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission
may be outlined as follows:
Chairman Term Tenure
 (7-year original)
o Sto. Tomas 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987 to Mar.
04, 1988 to Feb. 02, 1994 [March 08, 1995 (de
facto)]
o De Leon 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1994 to March
22, 1995 to (incumbent) Feb. 02, 2001 Feb. 02,
2001
 o - 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 2001 to Feb. 02, 2008
2nd Member Term Tenure
 (5-year original)
o Barlongay 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987 to March
04, 1988 to Feb. 02, 1992 [March 04, 1993 (de
facto) ]
o Gaminde 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1992 to June
11, 1993 to Feb. 02, 1999 [ Feb. 02, 2000 (de
facto) ]
o Valmores 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 1999 to Sept.
08, 2000 to
 (incumbent) Feb. 02, 2006 Feb. 02, 2006
rd
3 Member Term Tenure
 (3-year original)
o Yango - 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987 to May 30,
1988 to
 Feb. 02, 1990 [May 31, 1991 (de facto) ]
o Ereeta 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1990 to Dec. 12,
1991 to Feb. 02, 1997 Feb. 02, 1997
o Erestain, Jr. 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 1997 to Feb.
11, 1997 to (incumbent) Feb. 02, 2004 Feb. 02,
2004
We see the regular interval of vacancy every two (2)
years, namely, February 02, 1994, for the first
Chairman, February 02, 1992, for the first five-year term
Commissioner, and February 02, 1990, for the first three-year
term Commissioner.
Their successors must also maintain the two year
interval, namely: February 02, 2001, for Chairman, February
02, 1999, for Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, and February
02, 1997, for Commissioner Ramon P. Ereeta, Jr.
MWSS v. Hernandez
–143 SCRA 602 *1986+ (GOCC’s with charter and created by special law)
FACTS
 Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) was
hauled before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC on charges
of willful failure to pay wage differentials, allowances and
other monetary benefits to its contractual employees
numbering 2,500 or so.., MWSS assessed that it is a GOCC and
therefore NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case. The LA made
the observation that if the employees are regular employees
of MWSS, they are governed by the Civil Service however,
complainants are not a regular employee of the MWSS, but
one of a hired workers or employees for limited period, that is
upon completion of the project for which they were hired,
they can be removed by the respondent, because there is no
more work or the contract has already been terminated. The
LA ruled that the Civil Service Decree applies to employees in
government corporations in all matters except "monetary
claims"; as regards the latter, it is the Labor Code that
governs.
ISSUE
 WON employees of the MWSS are covered by the Labor Code
or by laws and regulations governing the civil service
HELD
 Republic Act No. 6234 created it as a "government
corporation to be known as the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System. Employment in the MWSS is governed not
 by the Labor Code but by the civil service law, rules and
regulations; and controversies arising from or connected with
that employment are not cognizable by the NLRC. The
argument of the Labor Arbiter that it is only disputes between
the MWSS and its regular employees that are beyond the
jurisdiction of the NLRC, not those between it and its "non-
regular or contractual" employees, is sophistical. There is no
legal or logical justification for such a distinction.
BLISS v. Callejo
– 237 SCRA 271 [1994] (par. 1; GOCC’s without charter and created under
corporation code)
FACTS
 On October 10, 1986, petitioner, a duly registered labor union,
filed with the Department of Labor, NCR Region, a petition for
certification election of private respondent Bliss Development
Corporation (BDC)
 Department of Labor dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction stating that the majority of BDC’s stocks is owned
by the Human Settlement Development Corporation (HSDC),
a wholly-owned government corporation, and therefore BDC
is a government-owned corporation
 As a GOCC, the employees are not governed by the Labor
Code but subject to the coverage of the Civil Service law, rules
and regulations
 BDC’s employees therefore, are prohibited to join or form
labor organizations.
 Petitioner then filed an appeal with the Bureau of Labor
Relations
 In the meantime, on June 1, 1987, President Aquino issued EO
No. 180, extending to government employees the right to
organize and bargain collectively. Section 1 & 7 of said Order
provide:
o Sec. 1. This Executive Order applies to all employees of
all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original
charters. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
o Sec. 7. Government employees' organizations shall
register with the Civil Service Commission and the
Department of Labor and Employment. The application
shall be filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations of the
Department which shall process the same in
accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code of
the Philippines, as amended. Applications may also be
filed with the Regional Offices of the Department of
Labor and Employment which shall immediately
transmit the said applications to the Bureau of Labor
Relations within three (3) days from receipt hereof.
 On August 7, 1987, Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja of the Bureau
of Labor Relations issued an order dismissing the appeal.
 Calleja held that with the issuance of EO No. 180, government
employees are now given the right to organize and bargain
collectively, and must apply with the Civil Service Commission
pursuant to Section 7 of EO No. 180
 Petition dismissed, without prejudice to its refiling after
petitioner is granted registration.
 Petitioner assailed the decision of Cellja and sought to annul
the decision on the following ground:
 ● The director abused her discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when she ordered petitioner to register under
SECTION 7 of EO No. 180, WHICH DOES NOT COVER
PETITIONER. EO No. 180 only applies to GOCCs with ORIGINAL
CHARTERS
● The case was brought to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
 WON BDC falls under EO No. 180?
HELD
 No.
RATIO
 The SC held that Section 1 of Executive Order No. 180
expressly limits its application to only government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters. Hence, public
respondent's order dated August 7, 1987 requiring petitioner
to register in accordance with Section 7 of executive Order No.
180 is without legal basis.
 A corporation is created by operation of law. It acquires a
judicial personality either by special law or a general law. The
general law under which a private corporation may be formed
or organized is the Corporation Code.
- On the other hand, a government corporation is
normally created by special law, referred to often
as a charter.
 The court held that BDC is a GOCC created under the
Corporation law. It is without a charter, governed by the Labor
Code and not by the Civil Service Law, hence EO No. 180 does
not apply to it.
 Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
petition to register under Section 7, of EO No. 180 as a
precondition for filing a petition for certification election.
 Petition GRANTED. The order of Director Calleja is SET ASIDE.
Torres V. De Leon
GR. 199440, January 18, 2016
FACTS
 The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Internal Auditing
Office conducted an audit of its funds and accounts of the
PNRC General Santos City Chapter. From the period of
November 6, 2002 to March 14, 2006, the report submitted to
the respondent, Alma G. De Leon, that there was a technical
shortage incurred in the amount of P4,306,574.23 by the
petitioner who is the Chapter Administrator of PNRC, General
Santos Chapter.
 De Leon, in a memorandum, formally charged Torres with
grave misconduct for violating the PNRC Policies on
Oversubscription, Remittances and Disbursement of Funds.
After the investigation case was completed, De Leon issued
another memorandum against Torres regarding the penalties
of one month suspension and transfer to the National
Headquarters
 Torres appealed to the Board of Governors of the PNRC and
furnished a copy to the PNRC. Respondent and CSC both
denied the appeal, and the latter imposed the penalty of
dismissal of service. Torres questioned the jurisdiction of CSC
 because the PNRC is not a government owned and controlled
corporation.
ISSUE
 Whether or not the CSC has Appellate jurisdiction over the
case? – YES
HELD
 Looking into the nature of the PNRC, there is nothing like it in
terms of it structure, but also in terms of history, public
service, and official status making its structure sui generis.
National Societies, such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries of public
authorities in their own countries in the humanitarian field
and provide a range of services including disaster relief and
health and social programs and acts under the obligations of
the Geneva Conventions. The PNRC must have must have an
autonomous status to carry out its humanitarian in a neutral
and impartial matter. Its independence does not necessarily
mean it must be under the Corporation Code since it is
regulated by the by the international humanitarian law. Its sui
generis in character requires the court to approach
controversies in a case-to-case basis. Since what was involved
here is the enforcement of labor laws and penal statutes, the
PNRC can be treated as a GOCC. Thus, having jurisdiction over
the PNRC, the CSC had the authority to modify the penalty and
order the dismissal of Torres from service. Moreover, the CSC
has appellate jurisdiction on administrative cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than 30 days or
fine in amount exceeding thirty days’ salary.
Samson v. CA
– 145 SCRA 654 [1986] (positions in competitive service)
SUMMARY: AO 3 was issued by the then Mayor Samson of Caloocan
City, summarily terminating the services of the Feliciano C. Talens,
who held the position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor, on the
ground of "lack and loss of confidence" and appointing in place of the
latter Hermogenes Liwag. The sole issue to be resolved in this case is
the legality of such AO. Cited in support of the challenged AO is
section 5(f) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, as amended. This
provision declares the position of secretaries to city mayors non-
competitive and this was interpreted by herein petitioner Mayor as to
include the position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor. The SC held
that as a general rule, position in all branches, subdivisions and
instrumentalities of the governmentalities of the government,
including those in GOCCs, belong to the competitive service. The only
exceptions are those expressly declared by law to be in the non-
competitive service and those which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical in nature. Under the rules of StatCon,
exceptions must be construed strictly and when an enumeration is
provided for, it should exclude those not expressly mentioned. Asst.
Secretaries are not among those expressly declared as non-
competitive. Furthermore, it is the nature of the functions which
ultimately determines whether such position is policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical. It is not the powers and
duties exercised and discharged by the Assistant Secretary. Contrary
to Petitioner’s arguments that it falls under the general term
“secretaries” in Sec. 5(f), an assistant merely helps, aids or serves in a
subordinate capacity to the person who is actually clothed with all the
duties and responsibilities of "secretary." The functions strictly
attributable to a "secretary" and which would repose on such person
the trust and confidence of the employer, is not automatically vested
or transferred to an "assistant secretary," because the latter simply
assists or aids the former in the accomplishment of his duties.
FACTS
 In a resolution dated October 29, 1982, the SC granted the
motion of the widow of Feliciano Talens to substitute the heirs
of private respondent Feliciano C. Talens in place of
respondent, in view of the latter's death on August 28, 1982.
o There is no dispute as to the factual antecedents of
this case.
o Feliciano C. Talens, a civil service eligible, was
appointed on March 16, 1970 by then City Mayor
Macario Asistio of Caloocan City, as Assistant Secretary
to the Mayor.
▪ His appointment was attested to as a
permanent one under Section 24(b) of RA 2260,
as amended by the Commissioner of Civil
Service.
▪ He performed the duties of Assistant Secretary
to the Mayor and even twice received increases
in salary.
 On January 11, 1972, City Mayor Marcial F. Samson, successor
of Mayor Asistio, furnished Talens with AO 3 stating that,
pursuant to Sec. 5(f) of the Civil Service Law, he has been
terminated as Asst. Secretary to the Mayor for lack and loss of
confidence, given that such position is non-competitive and
that inherent in the nature of such position to be primarily
and highly confidential.
 Talens, acknowledging receipt of said order, demurred on the
ground Sec. 5(f) of the Civil Service Law, which specifies as
non-competitive only the positions of "secretaries of
provincial city and municipal boards and councils."
o He asked that the AO be recalled as he was
permanently appointed to a classified position in the
city government and that in accordance with Section
32, his position as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor
was not covered by the Civil Service Law; thus, he can
be removed only for cause and after due process has
been observed.
 On January 17, 1972, Mayor Samson declined to recall the AO
for the same reasons stated in the AO.
 Talens filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
and quo warranto with the CFI of Caloocan on January 21,
1972 in order to annul the disputed AO, to enjoin the
petitioner mayor, treasurer and auditor from enforcing the
same, and to compel all the said public officials to pay to
private respondent the salaries and emoluments due to him as
Assistant Secretary to the Mayor.
o He also sought the ouster from the disputed position
of Hermogenes Liwag, one of the petitioners herein,
who was appointed by Mayor Samson as Assistant
Secretary.
 CFI ruled for Talens
 CA affirmed CFI decision.
 Hence the petition.
 According to petitioners, the only issue which this Court has to
resolve is the legality of the termination of Talens' services.
They contend that the termination of his services is authorized
by Section 5(f) of the Civil Service Acy which declares the
position of Secretaries of City Mayors as belonging to the non-
competitive service. Further, they aver that termination of the
 services of Talens is justified by the fact that the disputed
position is inherently and primarily highly confidential in
nature.
ISSUE
 WON AO 3 is valid—NO.
HELD
 CA decision AFFIRMED.
RATIO
 Section 5 of RA No. 2260, as amended by RA 6040 provides
that "That non-competitive service shall be composed of
positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-
competitive service and those which are policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical in nature" and
continues with an enumeration of specific officers and
employees embraced within the scope of non-competitive
service.
o Among those included in the enumeration are heads of
departments created in charters of cities and
secretaries of provincial governors, city mayors and
municipal mayors.
 Although the position of assistant secretary to the city mayor
is not among those therein expressly declared, petitioners
argue that an assistant secretary is also a secretary, and thus
comprised within the general term "secretaries" as provided
for in Section 5(f).
 The SC disagreed.
 As may be noted, the general purpose of the Civil Service Law
(RA 2260) is "to insure and promote the constitutional
mandate regarding appointment only according to merit and
fitness, and to provide within the public service a progressive
system of personal administration to insure the maintenance
of an honest and efficient progressive and courteous civil
service in the Philippines."
 As a general rule, position in all branches, subdivisions and
instrumentalities of the governmentalities of the government,
including those in GOCCs, belong to the competitive service.
o The only exceptions are those expressly declared by
law to be in the non-competitive service and those
which are policy-determining, primarily confidential
or highly technical in nature.
 Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a
general rule, should be strictly, but reasonably construed and
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provisions rather than the exception.
o Where a statute enumerates the subjects or things on
which it is to operate, it is to be construed as
excluding from its effects all those not expressly
mentioned (Martin, Statutory Construction, 1979 ed.,
p. 71 citing Dave's Place vs. Liquor Control Comm., 269
N.W., p, 504).
 The exceptions provided for in Section 5 should be strictly
construed.
o It follows then that on this general governing principle,
the position of assistant secretary to the City Mayor
of Caloocan City should be considered as not
belonging to the non-competitive service.
 The parties agreed that the nature of the functions ultimately
determines whether such position is policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical.
 o It is not the powers and duties exercised and
discharged by the Assistant Secretary to the Mayor as
may be delegated and assigned by the Mayor that
makes the position of Assistant Secretary primarily
confidential.
o While duties possibly involving confidential matters are
sometimes handled by the Assistant Secretary to the
Mayor, this does not necessarily transform the nature
of the position itself as one that is primarily and highly
confidential.
 It should be stressed that the position of Secretary to the
Mayor and that of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor are two
separate and distinct positions.
o While both individuals may be called "secretary," one
is certainly of a higher category and rank than the
other with the added distinction that a Secretary must
enjoy the confidence of the Mayor.
o However, the position of Assistant Secretary need not
carry the requisites attaching to the primarily
confidential position of the actual Secretary to the
Mayor.
 Moreover, if it was the intention of Congress to include the
Assistant Secretaries within the purview of Section 5(f) of
R.A. No. 2260, the law could have been easily worded
"secretaries and their assistance."
 Further, the SC disagreed with petitioners contention that an
Asst. Secretary is also a secretary included in the general term
under Sec. 5(f).
o An "assistant" merely helps, aids or serves in a
subordinate capacity to the person who is actually
clothed with all the duties and responsibilities of
"secretary."
o The functions strictly attributable to a "secretary" and
which would repose on such person the trust and
confidence of the employer, is not automatically
vested or transferred to an "assistant secretary,"
because the latter simply assists or aids the former in
the accomplishment of his duties.
 The rulings of this Court in De Los Santos vs. Mallare and Besa
vs. PNB invoked by the petitioners do not provide support to
petitioners' case.
o The case of De los Santos vs. Mallare, relates to a quo
warranto proceeding, questioning the legality of the
appointment of the respondent therein to the office of
the City Engineer for the City of Baguio which
petitioner De los Santos was then occupying. Said
position was in fact declared to be neither primarily
confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical
and petitioner therein was adjudged to be entitled to
remain in office and the respondent's appointment
was declared ineffective.
o Neither would the other case of Besa vs. PNB find any
application to the instant case because the position
therein involved was that of Chief Legal Counsel which,
by its very nature, was rightfully ruled to be both
impressed with a highly technical aspect and
confidential character.
o The facts and circumstances in the present case and
even the principal issue involved in the case at bar are
distinctly different from the cases cited by petitioners.
  Further, in Ingles vs. Mutuc, the SC held that the fact that
they, at times, handle 'confidential matters' does not suffice
to characterize their 'positions' as primarily confidential.
Indeed, it is admitted that plaintiffs, likewise, handle 'other
routine matters,' and it has not even been shown that their
work is, at least, principally confidential.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED but
considering the notice of death given to this Court of the death of the
herein private respondent Feliciano C. Talens, on August 28, 1982
(Rollo, p. 184), the dispositive portion of the subject decision of the
trial court in Civil Case No. C-2308, is hereby MODIFIED, to now read
as follows:
 IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court
hereby renders judgment in favor of Petitioner Feliciano C.
Talens, and against the Respondents, and Declaring
Administrative Order No. 3, dated January 10, 1972, of
Respondent City Mayor Marcial F. Samson, null and void;
 Ordering Respondents, except private respondent
Hermogenes Liwag, to pay Petitioner Feliciano C. Talens, all
the salaries and emoluments appurtenant to and due to the
latter as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor of Caloocan City, but
for a limited period of three years. Without costs.
Grino v. CSC
– 194 SCRA 458 [1991] (test of confidentiality of positions )
FACTS
 Grino terminated the services of Arandela and all the legal
officers due to a loss of trust and confidence.
ISSUE
 WON confidentiality is necessary for the position of provincial
attorney and other legal officers of the governor.
HELD
 First the courts determined the nature of the positions held by
the provincial attorney and its subordinates. Based on
Cadiente VS. Santos, their position is indeed one which is
primarily confidential in nature. Next, the courts decided that
the Cadiente case is applicable here by virtue of Republic Act
No. 5185. Bothe provincial attorney and legal officer serve as
the legal adviser and legal officer for the civil cases of the
provinces and the city that they work for. Their services are
precisely categorized by law to be “trusted services.” The lack
thereof does not remove or dismiss them rather it is when
their tenure ends. It can be viewed as an expiration of tenure
which is what happened between Grino and Arandela. Thus,
there being no removal or dismissal, there was no violation of
a constitutional provision that ‘no officer or employee in the
civil service shall be suspended or dismissed except for a cause
as provided by lay’ (Article XII-B, Section 1 (3) , 1973
constitution).
CSC v. Salas
– 274 SCRA 414 [1997] (nature of duties determinative of the confidentiality of
position)
The present petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the
decision of the Court of Appeals, dated September 14, 1995, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 38319 which set aside Resolution No. 92-1283 of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) and ordered the reinstatement of herein
private respondent Rafael M. Salas with full back wages for having
been illegally dismissed by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), but without prejudice to the filing of
administrative charges against him if warranted.
FACTS
 On October 7, 1989, respondent Salas was appointed by the
PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff (ISS) member and
assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel.
 However, his employment was terminated by the Board of
Directors of PAGCOR on December 3, 1991, allegedly for loss
of confidence, after a covert investigation conducted by the
Intelligence Division of PAGCOR.
o The summary of intelligence information claimed that
respondent was allegedly engaged in proxy betting as
detailed in the affidavits purportedly executed by two
customers of PAGCOR who claimed that they were
used as gunners on different occasions by respondent.
o The two polygraph tests taken by the latter also
yielded corroborative and unfavorable results. Salas
submitted a letter of appeal to the Chairman and the
Board of Directors of PAGCOR, requesting
reinvestigation of the case since he was not given an
opportunity to be heard, but the same was denied.
 CSC issued Resolution No. 92-1283 which affirmed the
decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MPSB).
 Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision with the
finding that herein respondent Salas is not a confidential
employee; hence he may not be dismissed on the ground of
loss of confidence.
 Petitioners (CSC) aver that respondent Salas, as a member of
the Internal Security Staff of PAGCOR, is a confidential
employee for several reasons:
o Presidential Decree No. 1869 which created the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
expressly provides under Section 16 thereof that all
employees of the casinos and related services shall be
classified as confidential appointees;
o The Supreme Court has classified PAGCOR employees
as confidential appointees
o CSC Resolution No. 91-830, dated July 11, 1991, has
declared employees in casinos and related services as
confidential appointees by operation of law;
o Based on his functions as a member of the ISS, private
respondent occupies a confidential position.
 Furthermore, he was not dismissed from the service but,
instead, his term of office had expired. They additionally
contend that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the
"proximity rule" because even if Salas occupied one of the
lowest rungs in the organizational ladder of PAGCOR, he
performed the functions of one of the most sensitive positions
in the corporation.
 On the other hand, respondent Salas argues that it is the
actual nature of an employee's functions, and not his
designation or title, which determines whether or not a
position is primarily confidential, and that while Presidential
Decree No. 1869 may have declared all PAGCOR employees to
be confidential appointees, such executive pronouncement
may be considered as a mere initial determination of the
classification of positions which is not conclusive in case of
conflict, in light of the ruling enunciated in Tria vs. Sto. Tomas,
et al.

ISSUE
 Whether the position of Salas in PAGCOR is a confidential
position such that the loss of confidence could be the basis for
his dismissal? No.
HELD
 WHEREFORE, the impugned judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
RATIO
 Section 2, Rule XX of the Revised Civil Service Rules,
promulgated pursuant to the provisions of Section 16(e) of
Republic Act No. 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959), which was
then in force when Presidential Decree No. 1869 creating the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation was passed,
provided that "upon recommendation of the Commissioner,
the President may declare a position as policy-determining,
primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature." It appears
that Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 was
predicated thereon, with the text thereof providing as follows:
o "All positions in the corporation, whether technical,
administrative, professional or managerial are exempt
from the provisions of the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations, and shall be governed only by the
personnel management policies set by the Board of
Directors. All employees of the casinos and related
services shall be classified as 'confidential' appointees."
 When Republic Act No. 2260 was enacted on June 19, 1959,
Section 5 thereof provided that "the non-competitive or
unclassified service shall be composed of positions expressly
declared by law to be in the non-competitive or unclassified
service or those which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical in nature." In the case
of Piero, et al. vs. Hechanova, et al., the Court obliged with a
short discourse there on how the phrase "in nature" came to
find its way into the law, thus:
o "The change from the original wording of the bill
(expressly declared by law x x x to be policy-
determining, etc.) to that finally approved and enacted
('or which are policy-determining, etc. in nature') came
about because of the observations of Senator Taada,
that as originally worded the proposed bill gave
Congress power to declare by fiat of law a certain
position as primarily confidential or policy-
determining, which should not be the case. The
Senator urged that since the Constitution speaks of
positions which are 'primarily confidential, policy-
determining, or highly technical in nature', it
is not within the power of Congress to declare what
positions are primarily confidential or policy-
determining. 'It is the nature alone of the position
that determines whether it is policy-determining or
primarily confidential.' Hence, the Senator further
observed, the matter should be left to the 'proper
implementation of the laws, depending upon the
nature of the position to be filled', and if the position
is 'highly confidential' then the President and the Civil
Service Commissioner must implement the law.
 Hence the dictum that, at least since the enactment of the
Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the nature of the position which
finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential,
 policy-determining or highly technical. And the court in the
aforecited case explicitly decreed that executive
pronouncements, such as Presidential Decree No. 1869, can
be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive
in case of conflict
 Who determines the confidentiality of the position:
o Initial decision is made by the legislative body or by the
executive department, but the final decision is done by
the court. The Supreme Court has constantly held that
whether or not a position is policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical, it is
determined not by the title but by the nature of the
task that is entrusted to it. For instance, we might have
a case where a position is created requiring that the
holder of that position should be a member of the Bar
and the law classifies this position as highly
technical. However, the Supreme Court has said before
that a position which requires mere membership in the
Bar is not a highly technical position. Since the term
'highly technical' means something beyond the
ordinary requirements of the profession, it is always a
question of fact.
 Effect of a declaration that a position is policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical as an exception is to
take it away from the usual rules and provisions of the Civil
Service Law and to place it in a class by itself so that it can
avail itself of certain privileges not available to the ordinary
run of government employees and officers.
 All it says is that there are certain positions which should not
be determined by competitive examination. There are other
ways of determining merit and fitness than competitive
examination. This is not a denial of the requirement of merit
and fitness
 It must be stressed further that these positions are covered by
security of tenure, although they are considered non-
competitive only in the sense that appointees thereto do not
have to undergo competitive examinations for purposes of
determining merit and fitness.
 Piero doctrine continues to be applicable up to the present
and is hereby maintained. Such being the case, the submission
that PAGCOR employees have been declared confidential
appointees by operation of law under the bare authority of
CSC Resolution No. 91-830 must be rejected.
 The facts of which are substantially similar to the case at bar,
involving as it did employees occupying positions in various
capacities in the Port Patrol Division of the Bureau of
Customs. The Court there held that the mere fact that the
members of the Port Patrol Division are part of the Customs
police force is not in itself a sufficient indication that their
positions are primarily confidential
 Source of confidentiality: (Confidence as primary reason for
the existence of the position)
o "As previously pointed out, there are no proven facts
to show that there is any such close intimacy and
trust between the appointing power and the
appellees as would support a finding that confidence
was the primary reason for the existence of the
positions held by them or for their appointment
thereto. Certainly, it is extremely improbable that the
service demands any such closed trust and intimate
relation between the appointing official and, not one or
two members alone but the entire Customs patrol
 (Harbor Police) force, so that every member thereof
can be said to hold 'primarily confidential' posts
 SALAS DOES NOT ENJOY CLOSE INTIMACY WITH THE
APPOINTING AUTHORITY OF PAGCOR . As an Internal Security
Staff member, private respondent routinely
a. performs duty assignments at the gaming and/or non-
gaming areas to prevent irregularities, misbehavior,
illegal transactions and other anomalous activities
among the employees and customers,
b. reports unusual incidents and related
observations/information in accordance with
established procedures for infractions/mistakes
committed on the table and in other areas;
c. coordinates with CCTV and/or external security as
necessary for the prevention, documentation or
suppression of any unwanted incidents at the gaming
and non-gaming areas;
d. acts as witness/representative of Security Department
during chips inventory, refills, yields, card shuffling and
final shuffling;
e. performs escort functions during the delivery of table
capital boxes, refills and shoe boxes to the respective
tables, or during transfer of yields to Treasury.
 While it may be said that honesty and integrity are primary
considerations in his appointment as a member of the ISS, his
position does not involve "such close intimacy" between him
and the appointing authority, that is, the Chairman of
PAGCOR, as would ensure "freedom from misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust.”
 Although appointed by the Chairman, ISS members do not
directly report to the Office of the Chairman in the
performance of their official duties. An ISS member is subject
to the control and supervision of an Area Supervisor who, in
turn, only implements the directives of the Branch Chief
Security Officer. The latter is himself answerable to the
Chairman and the Board of Directors. Obviously, as the lowest
in the chain of command, private respondent does not enjoy
that "primarily close intimacy" which characterizes a
confidential employee.
Achacoso v. Macaraig
–195 SCRA 235 [1991] (temporary appointments)
FACTS
 Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. He assumed
office on October 27, 1987.
 On January 2, 1990 the President addressed a request to “all
Department Heads, Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries,
Bureau Heads,” and other government officials to file a
courtesy resignation.
 On April 10, 1990 the Secretary of Labor requested him to
turn over his office to the Deputy Administrator as officer-in-
charge.
 He protested his replacement and declared he was not
surrendering his office because his resignation was not
voluntary but filed only in obedience to the President’s
directive. On the same date, respondent Jose N. Sarmiento
was appointed Administrator of the POEA, vice the petitioner.
  Achacoso was informed thereof the following day and was
again asked to vacate his office. He filed a motion for
reconsideration but this was denied. He then came to this
Court for relief. The petitioner invokes security of tenure
against his claimed removal without legal cause. Achacoso
contends that he is a member of the Career Service of the Civil
Service and so enjoys security of tenure, which is one of the
characteristics of the Career Service as distinguished from the
Non-Career Service.
 His argument is that in view of the security of tenure enjoyed
by the above-named officials, it was “beyond the prerogatives
of the President” to require them to submit courtesy
resignations. Such courtesy resignations, even if filed, should
be disregarded for having been submitted “under duress,” as
otherwise the President would have the power to remove
career officials at pleasure, even for capricious reasons
 The respondents assert he is not entitled to the guaranty
because he is not a career official (the petitioner did not
possess the necessary qualifications when he was appointed
Administrator of the POEA in 1987).
ISSUE
 WON Achacoso is protected by the security of tenure clause?
HELD
 NO.
RATIO
 It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only
"to a person who meets all the requirements for the position
to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate
eligibility prescribed." Achacoso did not. At best, therefore, his
appointment could be regarded only as temporary. And being
so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority
and "at a moment's notice," conformably to established
jurisprudence.
 A permanent appointment can be issued only “to a person
who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is
being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed.”
 The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service
does not automatically confer security of tenure on its
occupant even if he does not possess the required
qualifications. A person who does not have the requisite
qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the
first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be
appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of
appropriate eligibles.
 The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to
prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by
authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the
selection of a permanent or another appointee.
 The person named in an acting capacity accepts the position
under the condition that he shall surrender the office once he
is called upon to do so by the appointing authority.
 In these circumstances, the acting appointee is separated by a
method of terminating official relations known in the law of
public officers as expiration of the term. His term is
understood at the outset as without any fixity and enduring at
the pleasure of the appointing authority. When required to
relinquish his office, he cannot complain that he is being
removed in violation of his security of tenure because removal
 imports the separation of the incumbent before the expiration
of his term. This is allowed by the Constitution only when it is
for cause as provided by law. The acting appointee is
separated precisely because his term has expired. Expiration
of the term is not covered by the constitutional provision on
security of tenure.
Santiago v. CSC
– 178 SRA 733 *1989+ (“next in rank rule” not mandatory)
FACTS
 Tanada promoted Santiago as Customs Collector III
 JOSE argued the he was supposed to be the one promoted
because he was next-in-rank.
 March 17, 1987 Santiago was replaced by Jose due to the
latter’s appeal to the Board.
ISSUE
 WON the Board abused its jurisdiction when it revoked
santiago’s promotion and appointed Jose as the new Customs
Collector III
HELD
 The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. As explained in
the Taduran vs CSC, the next-in-rank is only entitled to
preference appointment but this does not assure him of the
position. Rather, if there is no one qualified or if the positions
has been left vacant, then the next-in-rank shall take over.
 To apply the next-in-rank as mandatory rule would impose a
strict and narrow formula which would greatly limit the
appointing power contrary to the policy of the law that among
those qualified and eligible, the appointing authority is
granted discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he
deems fit for appointment.
 The Commission is only meant to check the eligibility of the
appointed members and if he does possess the required
qualification he is then approved. No other criterion is
permitted by law to be employed by the Commission.
Hernandez v. Villegas
– 14 SCRA 544 [1965] (loss of confidence as ground for termination – expiration of
term not removal from office)
FACTS
 On 1 November 1955, Epifanio Villegas was appointed
Director for Security (DS) of the Bureau of Customs. He was
sent to the US to study enforcement techniques and custom
practices.
 When he returned in 1957, he was temporarily detailed to the
Arrastre Service while a certain James Keefe was designated
Acting Director for Security. Villegas continued to receive
salary of DS.
 On 9 January 1958, Secretary of Finance Jaime Hernandez
(petitioner) proposed to the President the permanent
appointment of Villegas as Arrastre Superintendent. 
[APPROVED] by Executive Secretary. Court of Appeals noted
and observed this as a promotion for Keefe to DS and a
demotion for respondent Villegas.
 Villegas didn’t know of his appointment February 1958. On 3
March 1958, he served notices that he would resume his
office as DS and to disapprove the appointment of Keefe. 
[FAILED]
  Villegas then filed action for quo warranto in the CFI of
Manila.  judgment in favor of Villegas with right to collect
backpay.
 Then, petitioners appealed to the SC arguing that the position
of DS, which has functions related to security, is primarily
confidential, thus, effecting that position to be excluded from
the merit system and allowing their dismissal at pleasure of
officers.
ISSUES
 W/N the office of DS in the Bureau of Customs, is a primarily
confidential position?
 W/N the DS can be transferred to another position without
cause?
HELD
 The Court held that whether or not it is a confidential position
is immaterial in this case.
 No. the DS cannot be transferred to another position without
cause.
RATIO
 Even assuming the position is confidential, it is still subject to
the Constitutional provision that “No officer or employee in
the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause.” (Phil. Const., Art. XII, sec. 4)  phrasing of this
provision provides for no exception
o *Note* in the 1987 Constitution however, it has the
exception of “provided by law” (1987 Constitution, Art
IX – B, sec. 2 (3))
 It is to be understood that officials and employees holding
primarily confidential positions continue only for so long as
confidence in them endures. The termination of their official
relation can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence
because in that case their cessation from office involves no
removal but merely the expiration of the term of office. The
point is, as long as confidence in them endures, the
incumbent is entitled to continue in office.
o In this case, respondent Villegas did not do anything to
warrant loss of confidence. Therefore, he is entitled to
resume his office as Director for Security.
Briones v. Osmeña
– 104 PHIL. 588 [1958] (abolition in good faith)
FACTS
 Concepcion G. Briones is a first grade civil service eligible, she
was appointed as Clerk-Stenographer in the Office of the City
Treasurer of Cebu and was transferred to the Office of the City
Mayor, in the same capacity as Clerk-Stenographer, but with
permanent status. Petitioner Faustino O. Rosagaran is a
second grade civil service eligible and was employed in the
Office of the City Mayor of Cebu and was promoted to
Administrative Officer. On February 20, 1956, the City Mayor,
approved Ordinance No. 192, abolishing 15 positions in the
City Mayor's office and 17 positions in the Office of the
Municipal Board, or a total of 32 positions in both offices.
Among the positions abolished in the Office of the City Mayor
were those occupied by petitioners.
ISSUE
  WON the abolition of the positions is void.
HELD
 YES
 The reason given for the abolition of the positions is untrue,
and constitutes a mere subterfuge for the removal without
cause of the said appellees, in violation of Civil Service tenures
as provided by the Constitution. A decent respect for the Civil
Service provisions of our Constitution dictates that civil service
eligibles, who have rendered long and honorable services,
should not be sacrificed in favor of non-eligibles given
positions of recent creation, nor should be left at the mercy of
political changes.
 It is evident that the mayor could not legally remove the
petitioner without cause, for being a member of the Civil
Service, his tenure of office is protected by Section 4, Article
XII of the Constitution, which says: 'No officer or employee in
the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause as provided by law.' The Committee on Civil Service of
the Constitutional Convention, in recommending said
provision said:
. . . . The merit system will be ineffective if no safeguards are placed
around the separation and removal of the public employees. The
Committees' report requires that removal shall be made only for
cause' and in the manner provided by law. This means that there
should be bona fide reasons and action may be taken only after the
employee shall have been given a fair hearing. This affords to public
employees reasonable security of tenure. (Aruego, the Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, 1949 Ed., p. 567)
 “This Court has always upheld these salutary principle. in
Gacho, et al., vs. Osmeña, etc. et al., 94 Phil., 208, we ruled
that while abolition of the office does not imply removal of
the incumbent. For an abolition to be valid: (1) done in good
faith, (2) must not be for personal or political reasons, and (3)
does not violate the law (Briones v.Osmena)
Santos v. Yatco
106 PHIL 21 (electioneering or partisan political activity (par 4)
FACTS
 Alejo SANTOS is the Secretary of National Defense. Before an
election, he was campaigning for Governor Tomas Martin,
candidate of the Nacionalista Party in the Province of Bulacan.
 A case was filed against SANTOS for his supposed partisan
political activity in violation of the Civil Service Act of 1959,
 The act prohibits all officers and employees in the civil service,
"whether in the competitive or classified, or non-competitive
or unclassified service," from engaging directly or indirectly in
partisan political activities or taking part in any election except
to vote.
 Judge YATCO ruled that the Secretary of National Defense is
embraced within the civil service who are prohibited to take
part in partisan political activities. A preliminary injunction
was issued by him restraining the secretary of National
Defense to campaign. The case was appealed to the Supreme
Court by the Office of the Solicitor General.
ISSUE
 WON Cabinet members/department secretaries are covered
in the Constitutional prohibition against partisan political
activity
HELD
 NO
RATIO
 The ban does not extend to those officers and employees
outside of the civil service such as members of the Cabinet.
 The Secretary of National Defense is not embraced within
the terms: "officers and employees in the civil service" (as
disclosed in the proceedings in the Constitutional Convention
wherein the attempt of Delegate Mumar to include the heads
of executive departments within the civil service was rejected)
who are prohibited to take part in partisan political activities.
 Cabinet Members serve at the behest and pleasure of the
President. As such, their positions are essentially political.
 Although such campaigning is may be seen as improper
(because of SANTOS’ supposed deleterious influence upon the
members of the Armed Forces, who are administratively
subordinated to the Secretary of National Defense, and who
are often called upon by the Commission on Election to aid in
the conduct of orderly and impartial elections), it is not
considered as illegal. Injunction set aside.
GSIS v. Kapisanan
- 510 SCRA 622 (no strike)
FACTS
 A four day concerted demonstration, rallies and en masse
walkout was held in front of the GSIS main building in Pasay
City. The mass action participants were GSIS personnel,
among them are members of the herein KAPISANAN, a public
sector union of GSIS rank and file employees. Said mass action
targets the herein petitioner GARCIA and his management
style.
 On October 10, 2004 the manager of the GSIS Investigating
Unit issued a Memo directing 131 union and non-union
members to show cause why they should not be charged
administratively for participating in the rally. KAPISANAN’s
counsel, Atty. Molina sought reconsideration of the said
memo on the ground that the subject employees resumed
work in obedience of the return to work issued.
 However, the plea of reconsideration was denied by the filing,
on October 25 2004, of the administrative charges against
some 110 KAPISANAN members for grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
KAPISANAN then filed a Petition for Prohibition before the CA,
on the grounds that:
1. Members should not be made to explain why they
supported their union’s cause
2. Petitioner Garcia blatantly disregarded Civil Service
Reso No. 021316 otherwise known as the
Guidelines for Prohibited Mass Action
 Pending resolution of the petition for prohibition of the CA,
the GSIS Management proceeded with the investigation of the
admin cases which resolved 207 out of 278 cases, resulting to
the exoneration of 20 respondent-employees, reprimand of
182 and suspension of 5.
 On June 16 2005, the CA rendered the herein ASSAILED
decision holding that Garcia’s filing of admin charges against
361 of KAPISANAN’s members is TANTAMOUNT to GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION which may be the proper subject of the
writ of prohibition. Unable to accept the above ruling,
petitioner GARCIA sought reconsideration, which was denied.
  Hence this petition.
ISSUE
 Whether or not the right of public sector to form unions or
associations include right to strike?
HELD
 No. Employees in the public service may not engage in strikes
or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work. The right
of government employees to organize is limited to the
formation of unions or associations, without including the
right to strike. Fact remains that the erring employees,
instead of exploring non-crippling activities during their free
time, had taken a disruptive approach to attain whatever it
was they were specifically after. As events evolved, they
assembled in front of the GSIS main office building during
office hours and staged rallies and protests, and even tried to
convince others to join their cause, thus provoking work
stoppage and service-delivery disruption, the very evil sought
to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by
government personnel.
 To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery
of services remained at the usual level of efficiency at the GSIS
main office during those four (4) days of massive walkouts and
wholesale absences would be to understate things. And to
place the erring employees beyond the reach of
administrative accountability would be to trivialize the civil
service rules, not to mention the compelling spirit of
professionalism exacted of civil servants by the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. Relevant also is CSC Resolution No. 021316 which
provides rules on prohibited concerted mass actions in the
public sector.
 It should be stressed right off that the civil service
encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
(GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS, or those created
by special law. As such, employees of covered GOCCs are part
of the civil service system and are subject to circulars, rules
and regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
on discipline, attendance and general terms/conditions of
employment, inclusive of matters involving self-organization,
strikes, demonstrations and like concerted actions. In fact,
policies established on public sector unionism and rules issued
on mass action have been noted and cited by the Court in at
least a case.
Gloria v. CA
- GR 119903, August 15, 2000
Summary: Icasiano was assigned as school division superintendent
but was later reassigned as vocational schools superintendent (which
according to petitioners is only until a new superintendent is
appointed). He questioned his reassignment arguing that it wasn’t
temporary. CA agreed with him—the tenor of the recommendation
memo which stated that his reassignment will "best fit his
qualifications and experience" being "an expert in vocational and
technical education” seems indefinite. SC affirmed CA. Agreed with
the finding of the CA that the reassignment wasn’t temporary and this
violates security of tenure. The mantle of the security of tenure
extends not only to employees removed without cause but also to
cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal
removals. While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is
permissible even without the employee’s prior consent, it cannot be
done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is
a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed
to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a
transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards
the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service
FACTS
 CASE: Petition for review on certiorari to question decision of
CA.
 June 29, 1989: respondent ICASIANO was appointed as school
division superintendent, Division of City School, QC.
 Oct 10, 1994: petitioner Sec GLORIA recommended to the
President to reassign ICASIANO as vocational school
superintendent of the MIST (Marikina Institute of Science and
Technology) to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of
its superintendent.
o President approved and a copy of this approved
recommendation for reassignment was transmitted to
ICASIANO
o NOTE: it is contended by the petitioners that the
reassignment was only temporary lasting only until
new appointment of new superintendent.
 Oct 14, 1994: other petitioner Dir ROSAS informed ICASIANO
of his reassignment effective October 17, 1994
o ICASIANO requested GLORIA to reconsider but this was
denied by the latter. ICASIANO then prepared a letter
to the President asking for reconsideration (copy
furnished to the DECS) but subsequently changed his
mind and refrained from filing in with the PREZ.
o NOTE: he contends that the reassignment is not
temporary.
 Oct 19, 1994: petition filed in CA
o CA issued TRO then on 28 March 1995 issued the
assailed decision:
o “WHEREFORE, for lack of a period or any indication
that it is only temporary, the reassignment of the
petitioner from Schools Division Superintendent,
Division of City Schools, Quezon City, to Vocational
Schools Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of
Science and Technology pursuant to the Memorandum
of Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria to the President of the
Philippines dated 10 October 1994, is hereby declared
to be violative of petitioner’s right to security of tenure,
and the respondents are hereby prohibited from
implementing the same.”
ISSUE
 Whether the reassignment is violative of security of tenure
HELD
 Denied, CA decision affirmed.
RATIO
Argument of Petitioner:
1. Petitioners contend that the doctrine in Bentain vs. Court of
Appeals that "a reassignment that is indefinite and results in a
reduction in rank, status and salary, is in effect, a constructive
removal from the service" -- does not apply in the present case for
the reassignment in question was merely temporary, lasting only
 until the appointment of a new Vocational School Superintendent
of MIST.
SC disagrees:
2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the
respondent court that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST
"appears to be indefinite".
a. The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of
Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect
that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit
his qualifications and experience" being "an expert in
vocational and technical education."
b. It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is more
than temporary as the private respondent has been
described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in
the field.
c. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show
that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary
or would only last until a permanent replacement is found
as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an
intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private
respondent with no definite period or duration.
d. Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely
violative of the security of tenure of the private
respondent.
3. Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally
guaranteed feature of our civil service. The mantle of its
protection extends not only to employees removed without cause
but also to cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount
to illegal removals
a. While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is
permissible even without the employee’s prior consent, it
cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step
toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from
his permanent position, or designed to indirectly
terminate his service, or force his resignation.
b. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision
which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in
the Civil Service
4. Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST
to be violative of his security of tenure, the order for his
reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced.
NOTE: SC did not attach or quote the whole recommendation memo,
just the ones I used here.
Flores v. Drilon
– 223 SCRA 568 [1993] (supra, Art. 7, Sec. 13; prohibition against designation of
elective officer during tenure) RE: Gross Violation of Civil Service Law on the
Prohibition Against Dual Employment and Double Compensation in the Government
Service Committed by Mr. Eduardo V. Escala, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security
Division, Office of Administrative Services., A.M. No. 2011-04-SC, 05 July 2011.
FACTS
 constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d) of RA 7227 Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992
o "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of
public funds by way of salaries and other operational
expenses attached to the office
 SEC 13 (D) infringes on the following constitutional and
statutory provisions:
o Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which
states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public officer or position during his tenure,"
 o Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides
that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint"
 it was congress that appointed Gordon
ISSUE
 Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing
authority of the President.
RULING
 YES
o although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the
power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has
no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City.
o The power of choice is the heart of the power to
appoint.
o Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of
whom to appoint.
o Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the
power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same
time limit the choice of the President to only one
candidate.
o Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of
the appointing power to choose and constitutes an
irregular restriction on the power of appointment.
o While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets
the qualifications of the officer during the first year of
operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of
Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of
congressional authority to prescribe qualifications
where only one, and no other, can qualify.
o Since the ineligibility of an elective official for
appointment remains all throughout his tenure or
during his incumbency, he may however resign first
from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-
attached disqualification before he may be
considered fit for appointment.
o Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an
elective official remains ineligible for appointment to
another public office.
(d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a
professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a
compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio
chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive
officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first
year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of
the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority (emphasis supplied).
Saduesta v. Municipality of Surigao
– 72 PHIL. 482 [1941] (specific authority from la w to review additional
compensation)
FACTS
 Zacarias Sadueste is a district engineer of the Province of
Surigao. He was designated by the Director of Public Works as
sanitary and waterworks engineer pursuant to the provisions
 of Sec 1916 of the Revised Administrative Code, approved by
the provincial board of Surigao.
 He had an additional compensation of not more than P60 a
month payable from the income of the waterworks system
under his supervision.
 He rendered services from January 1, 1936 to March 30, 1939
but was not provided with the necessary appropriation in the
aggregate sum of P2,338.06
 Thus, he instituted an action for its recovery with claim for
damages in the amount of P300.
 The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the
provision of law (Sec 1916 of the Rev. Adm. Code, as amended
by Acts Nos. 3257 and 3978) authorizing such additional
compensation has been repealed by Section 17 of Act No.
4187, otherwise known as the General Appropriation Act for
1936.
ISSUE
 Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing petitioner’s
claim for additional compensation? No.
HELD
 Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
RATIO
 Section 1916 of the Administrative Code provided for the
additional compensation for a district engineer. This has been
repealed by Section 17 of Act No. 4187 or the General
Appropriation Act which abolishes additional compensation
for full time officer or employee of the government. But, it
was contended that section 17 of Act No. 4187 is
unconstitutional, it being offensive to Article 3 of the Jones
Law.
 However, it is not even necessary to pass upon the
constitutional question raised because Article XI, Section 3, of
then Philippine Constitution (now Art IX-B, Sec 8) provides
that "no officer or employee of the Government shall receive
additional or double compensation
unless specifically authorized by law."
 There being no law by which the appellant
is specifically authorized to receive additional compensation
for his services as Sanitary and Waterworks Engineer, his claim
therefor must fail.
 The authority granted in the last paragraph of section 1916 of
the Revised Administrative Code is a general authority given
to all district engineers. The authority required by the
Constitution to receive double or additional compensation is a
specific authority given to a particular employee or officer of
the Government because of peculiar or exceptional reasons
warranting the payment of extra or additional compensation.
 The purpose of the Constitution is to prohibit, generally,
payment of additional or double compensation except in
individual instances where such appears to be not only just
but necessary.
ART IX-C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Cayetano v. Monsod
– 201 SCRA 210 [1991] (meaning of practice of law)
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Section 1.
1. There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman
and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective positions in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
Doctrine:
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
(111 ALR 23)
FACTS
 Respondent, Christian Monsod, was nominated by President
Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the
COMELEC. Petitioner, Renato Cayetano, opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.
 On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed
the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the
validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen
and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections be declared null and void.
ISSUE
 WON Atty. Monsod possesses the qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for ten years.
HELD
 Yes.
RATIO
 This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association
v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
 The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)

Atienza v. COMELEC
– 612 SCRA 761 [2010]
FACTS
 On March 2, 2016, Atienza hosted an election which replaced
all of LP’s ruling body. The March 2 elections was deemed
invalid due to noncompliance with the Salonga Constitution.
 Then, Roxas was elected as the new LP president when 59
NECO members out of the 87 qualified to vote were in
attendance. However, Atienza contested that the quorum was
not reached based on the 60th anniversary souvenir program.
Roxas attested that the list was prior to the 2007 elections.
After the elections events occurred that changed the
composition of the party. Thus the list was considered an
inappropriate basis for the qualified members to vote.
 Furthermore, other members that sided with Atienza were
deemed resigned due to the invalid election they help on
March 2, 2006.
 COMELEC ruled that Roxas was the valid new Valid President
and that the 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program was an
invalid basis for the qualified members. It also ruled that the
issue concerning the current status of Atienza as a LP member
was beyond its jurisdiction since the matter was an internal
matter which the party should resolve on its own.
ISSUE
 WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld
the NECO membership that elected Roxas as LP president.
 WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it resolved
the issue concerning the validity of the NECO meeting without
first resolving the issue concerning the expulsion of Atienza et
al. from the party.
HELD
 Using the 60th Anniversary souvenir program in prior cases
did not make it binding to the case at bar since the part had
already undergone changes in their composition after the
2007 elections. Furthermore, the NECO was validly convened
in accordance with the amended LP Constitution.
 The Court decided that the expulsion of Atienza was not the
main issue of the case but rather the validity of the NECO
assembly that elected Roxas. Even if objections were raised,
during the election proper, by the faction of Atienza, the court
held that since the NECO composition was already deemed
valid, it can be said that said objections were voted against by
the majority.
Arroyo v. DOJ
– 681 SCRA 181 [2012]
FACTS
 The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the
creation of a joint committee with the Department of Justice
(DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the
alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the
2004 and 2007 elections.
 The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011
creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding
Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud
and manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ
and the Comelec. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team
 concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14,
2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South
Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The
Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. be subjected to preliminary
investigation for electoral sabotage.
 After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc
adopted a resolution ordering that information/s for the crime
of electoral sabotage be filed against Arroyo, et al. while that
the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should
be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
 Consequently, petitioners assail the validity of the creation of
COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
 Whether the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid?
Yes.
HELD
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions and
supplemental petitions are DISMISSED. Comelec Resolution
No. 9266 dated August 2, 2011, Joint Order No. 001-2011
dated August 15, 2011, and the Fact-Finding Team’s Initial
Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID.
In view of the constitutionality of the Joint Panel and the proceedings
having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure,
the conduct of the preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.
RATIO
 Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates
the powers and functions of the Comelec. The grant to the
Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute election
offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration
of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to
effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest
conduct of elections. The constitutional grant of prosecutorial
power in the Comelec was reflected in Section 265 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code.
 Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct
preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with the
Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same
provision of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of
other prosecuting arms of the government. Thus, under the
Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigation had been lodged with the
Comelec, the prosecutors had been conducting preliminary
investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated authority
given by the Comelec.
 Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of
the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed
not as an abdication of the constitutional body’s
independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the
prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as
an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections.
 ART IX-D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Mison v. COA
– 187 SCRA 445 [1990] (COA as collegial body)
FACTS
 In Customs Case No. 813, Mison, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Customs, declared illegal the seizure by
elements of the Philippine Navy of the M/V "Hyojin Maru", a
vessel of Japanese registry. So he ordered the release of the
vessel and its cargo to the claimants, Chan Chiu On and
Cheung I. However, the vessel was not released because it
sank while in the custody of the Bureau of Customs and could
not be salvaged because of lack of funds.
 Chan Chiu On and Cheung I then filed a claim with the COA for
the payment of the value for the vessel. Mr. Rogelio B.
Espiritu, Manager, Technical Service Office of the COA, acting
by authority of the Acting Chairman, denied the claim through
Decision No. 77-142. Claimant’s counsel, Atty. Juan David,
moved for reconsideration.
 Acting COA Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, denied the motion
on the ground that the reglementary period of 30 days from
the date of receipt of the Decision has already lapsed and
thus, the Decision had already become “final and executory.”
 Mr. David replied that the Decision was void because it was
rendered only by the Manager, Technical Service Office of the
COA, and "not (by) the Acting Chairman, much less . . . the
Commission on Audit." As specifically provided by Section 2,
Article XII-D of the (1973) Constitution,” the matter could
validly be acted upon only by "the Commission on Audit duly
constituted, by the appointment and qualification of its
Chairman and two Commissioners.”
 In a 4th Indorsement addressed “to the Auditor, Bureau of
Customs,” Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, acting "FOR THE
COMMISSION," reconsidered the Decision of Acting
Commissioner of Audit Tantuico, supra. granting the instant
claim subject to the usual auditing and accounting
requirements.
 Mison sought clarification of "the legal implication of the 4th
Indorsement. The response was a letter entitled "COA
Decision No. 992," signed by "the full complement of three (3)
members of the Commission on Audit." It pointed that the
earlier decision cannot be recognized by the present
Commission because it was signed merely by the then
Manager of the Technical Service Office who was not acting
for the Commission but only for the then Acting Chairman.
And therefore held that the 4th Indorsement should be
"deemed for all legal intents and purposes as the final decision
on the matter . . .”
 The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion
was denied by letter entitled "COA Decision No. 1053," also
signed by the Chairman and the two (2) Members of the
Commission.
 Petitioner seasonably filed a petition for certiorari to nullify
said COA Decisions No. 992 and 1053, pursuant to Section 7,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE
 Whether or not Decision No. 77-142 by Mr. Espiritu and COA
decisions reversing the former were proper? No.
HELD
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit,
without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
RATIO
 The "Espiritu decision" was void ab initio. As manager of the
COA Technical Service Office, Mr. Espiritu obviously had no
power whatever to render and promulgate a decision of or for
the Commission. Even the Chairman, alone, had not that
power because, as clearly stated in the Constitution, the
power was lodged in the Commission on Audit, "composed of
a Chairman and two Commissioners.”
 It was the Commission, as a collegial body, which had the
jurisdiction to "(d)ecide any case brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for resolution," subject to
review by the Supreme Court on certiorari.
 Hence, the adoption or ratification of the Espiritu Decision by
the Acting COA Chairman was inconsequential. Ratification
cannot validate an act void ab initio because it was done
absolutely without authority. The act has to be done anew by
the person or entity duly endowed with authority to do so.
 Moreover, even conceding the contrary, no proper ratification
or validation could have been effected by the Acting Chairman
since he was not the Commission, and he himself had no
power to decide any case brought before the Commission
because, again, the power is lodged only in the Commission
itself, as a collegial body.
 It must be made clear that the Espiritu Decision was not
merely "technically invalid," as the petitioner describes it. It
was substantively void ab initio rendered without jurisdiction.
It had an essential inherent defect that could not be cured or
waived.
Blue Bar Coconut Phil. Tantuico
– 163 SCRA 716 [1988] (post-audit authority)
FACTS
 PD276 was then issued establishing a coconut stabilization
fund. Under this PD, the PCA was authorized to implement a
stabilization scheme for coconut-based consumer goods.
 The proceeds from the levy will then be deposited with the
PNB or other gov’t bank in the account of the Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) which is a separate trust
fund that does not form part of the general fund of the gov’t.
 This fund will be used to subside the sale of coconut based
product at a price set by the Price Control Council.
 On December 1974, Marcos issued PD 623 which reduced the
number of members of PCA’s board from 11 to 7.
 On Jan 8, 1975, PCA’s board issued a resolution reducing the
rate of levy of copra. This was made effective on jan11. Then
on Jan 29, 1975, the same board of PCA issued a resolution
deferring the collection of the CCSF levies from the desiccated
coconut industry for a period not exceeding 6 months. Note
however that it was only on February 26, 1975 that the
reduced governing board of PCA (now only 7) qualified under
PD623.
 The Acting Chairman of COA initiated a special audit of
coconut and end-user companies (petitioners are end-user
companies, thus, levy collectors and remitters; all copra
exporters, oil millers and desiccators are end-users) with
 regard to their CCSF collections and the subsidies they
received.
 The result of such audit was that Blue Bar et al were short on
levies they remitted and overpaid their subsidies.
 Blue Bar et al allege that the deficient levy and overpaid
subsidy finding of the COA was based on the fact that the
latter refused to recognize the validity of the resolutions
issued by the PCA board in January 1975 (resolutions issued by
the board before they qualified).
 After some negotiations, COA agreed that PCA may release
the subsidy payments of the petitioners provided a bond
equal to the aggregate amount of the disputed claims must be
posted.
 As a result of the initial findings of the Performance Audit
Office, respondent Acting COA Chairman directed the
Chairman, the administrator, and the Military Supervisor of
the PCA and the Manager of the Coconut Consumers
Stabilization Fund to collect the short levies and overpaid
subsidies, and to apply subsidy claims to the settlement of
short levies should the petitioners fail to remit the amount
due.
ISSUE
 WON the COA has authority to audit petitioners?
HELD
 YES
RATIO
 In the case at bar, the petitioners have failed to show that acts
were done withgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Case dismissed
 Petitioners contend that they are outside the ambit of COA’s
audit power. Allegedly, such power is confined to GOCCs.
 However, note that Sec 2(1) of Article IX-D of the Consti
provides that, “The Commission on Audit shall have the
power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts... such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy
or equity directly or indirectly from or through the
Government which are required by law or the granting
institution to submit such audit as a condition of subsidy or
equity.”
 Thus, the Consti expressly establishes the rule private entities
who handle government funds or subsidies in trust may be
examined or audited in their handling of said funds by gov’t
auditors.
 It is of no importance that the petitioner, or even other groups
part of the PCA, are private corporations because it is made
plain in Article IXD that groups being funded by the
government are still subject to auditing by the COA.
POI v. Aud. Gen.
– 94 PHIL. 868 [1953-1954] (power to settle accounts)
FACTS
 The petitioner herein, Philippine Operations, Inc., entered into
a barter agreement with the Bureau of Prisons whereby it
agreed to deliver to the Bureau a sawmill, complete, with a
diesel fuel engine, a stop saw edge and log turner, etc., and
two LCMs in good running condition, in exchange for 350,000
 board feet of sawed lumber. The barter agreement did not
state the value thereof. The Bureau of Prisons failed to fulfill
their obligation such as there was no belting for the main saw;
there was one carriage frame broken; one head block was
without hook and doe; there was no steel rope cable for
carriage drive; and all other important parts of the machine
were worn out and rusty and needing overhauling. And so, POI
filed a claim with the Auditor General. The Director of Prisons
offered to deliver the first installments of lumber but the
petitioner rejected because it had already came too late. The
petitioner then demanded a cash payment of P70,000 plus
damages of P35,000.
 Upon the presentation of the claim with the Auditor General,
the latter sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice, held
that inasmuch as the contract entered into was one of barter,
pure and simple, and not one of purchase and sale, and as no
money consideration ever entered the minds of the parties at
the time of the agreement, the demand of the petitioner for
P70,000 should be denied, and that instead in view of the
willingness of the Bureau of Prisons to perform its part of the
obligation, the contract be carried out by the immediate
delivery of the 350,000 board feet of lumber stipulated in the
agreement. On the basis of this opinion, the Auditor General
denied the petitioner’s claim, and the latter thereafter
appealed to this Court.
ISSUE
 Whether or not the Auditor General has jurisdiction over such
claims?
HELD
 No. The court ruled that the Auditor General did not have
jurisdiction over POI’s claim because such claim was
unliquidated. The power of the treasury over the settlement
of accounts has always been distinguished from their power
over claims. An account is something, which may be adjusted
and liquidated by an arithmetical process. But no law
authorizes Treasury officials to allow and pass in accounts a
number not the result of numerical computation upon a
subject within the operation of a mutual part of contract. On
the other hand, claims for unliquidated damages require for
their settlement the application of the qualities of judgment
and discretion. The results to be reached in such cases can in
no just sense be called an account and are not committed by
law to the control and decision of treasury accounting officers.
 An examination of the provisions of the Constitution fails to
disclose any power vested in or granted to the Auditor
General to consider claims. All that is vested in the Auditor
General is the settlement of accounts. "Accounts," because of
the absence of any reasons to the contrary, must be deemed
to have the same meaning as accounts under the laws in force
before the approval of the Constitution. The Constitution does
not grant the Auditor General the right to consider claims.
ICNA v. Republic
– 21 SCRA 40 [1967] (power to act on specific debt claim)
Defendant-Appellees: Republic of the Philippines, Bureau of Customs,
United States Lines Company and/or Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
Main Doctrine! Power to Act on a Specific Debt Claim
FACTS
 Appellant would however next take issue with the statement
in the Mobil case that plaintiff therein should have filed its
claim thru the Auditor General, it being for money, under the
provisions of Commonwealth Act 327. It is now urged that the
claims for money that may be filed with the Auditor General
under said law, in relation to Act No. 3083, are only those
accounts subject to liquidation by an arithmetical computation
and only where the liability of the Government is not in issue.
Appellant cites Compañia General de Tabacos v. French.
 The principle recognized in Compania General, was that a
money claim for damages the amount of which cannot be
readily determined from vouchers, reports or other means
within reach of accounting officers, but calls for the
application of judgment and discretion upon the measure of
damages, is not within the competence of the Auditor General
to decide.
o In the present case, the amount of the claim is already
fixed and is readily determinable from the bills of
lading and other shipping papers. Accordingly, such
claim should be addressed to the Auditor General.
 Neither did Compania General hold that where the liability of
the Government is in issue, the claim cannot be filed with the
Auditor General. It is precisely for the Auditor General to
determine whether the claim is tenable or not, and if not, to
deny the same.
 The real issue in said Tabacalera case was whether the Auditor
General (then Insular Auditor) may offset against a specific,
liquidated and undisputed debt of the Government, an
unliquidated claim for damages in favor of the Government
against the creditor; and the ruling stated that he may not.
o Such ruling does not apply to bar a case, like the
present, where no question of offset is involved, but
simply that of allowing or disallowing a specific and
liquidated claim against the Government.
o Rather, it in effect sustains the power of the Auditor
General to take cognizance of such a claim, for if the
same be found in order and allowable, the amount
recoverable is fixed and liquidated, as determined or
readily determinable from papers and invoices
available to him, instead of being subject to his
discretion, as would be the case in an unliquidated
claim for damages.
• IMPT: Stated otherwise, where the existence of a specific and
fixed debt is the issue, the Auditor General has power to act on the
claim; but when not only the existence but also the amount of an
unfixed and undetermined debt is involved, said official has no
competence to consider such a claim. The present case is of the first
kind, the assertion of the existence of a specific and fixed
indebtedness on the part of the Government. It should therefore be
lodged with the Auditor General.
Summary:
ICNA filed before CFI Manila an action for recovery of a
liquidated amount of 86,081.30, the amount of the value of
shipments of 82 cartons of goods allegedly lost in the custody of
either of the defendants. One of the defendants is the Bureau of
Customs, an agency of the Republic of the Philippines. RP and BoC
moved to dismiss the complaint claiming immunity from suit. CFI
Manila dismissed the complaint because the state cannot be sued
without its consent. Instead, ICNA should have filed its claim with the
Auditor General. Aggrieved, ICNA appealed to the SC. The SC held
that CFI Manila was correct in dismissing the suit. Note that the debt
here is a fixed and liquidated amount. Where the existence of a
specific and fixed debt is the issue, and is also readily determinable
from the bills of lading and other shipping papers, the Auditor
General has power to act on the claim. The complaint should be
lodged with him. However, when not only the existence but also the
amount of an unfixed and undetermined debt is involved, and the
amount of which cannot be readily determined from vouchers,
reports or other means within reach of accounting officers, but calls
for the application of judgment and discretion upon the measure of
damages, is not within the competence of the Auditor General to
decide.
Facts:
 On October 1965, plaintiff ICNA filed before CFI Manila (this
fact is very crucial) an action for the recovery of a P86,081.30.
 Such amount is the insured value of a shipment of eighty-two
(82) cartons of goods, allegedly lost in the custody of either of
the following (either of the ff kasi di sila sure kung sino may
kasalanan):
o the carrier, defendant United States Lines, Co.;
o the lighter operator, defendant Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation; or
o the arrastre operator, defendant Bureau of Customs,
an agency of defendant Republic of the Philippines
(RP).
 The RP and the Bureau of Customs (BoC) moved to dismiss the
complaint, claiming State immunity from suit. Plaintiff
opposed this.
 On December 1965, CFI Manila initially denied the motion to
dismiss of RP and BoC.
 Meanwhile, the case of Mobil Philippines Exploration vs.
Bureau of Customs was decided by the Supreme Court on
December 1966.
 Here is the main doctrine of Mobil relevant to our discussion:
“Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for
obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be sued without its
consent. (Suability of the State issue) Plaintiff should have
filed its present claim to the General Auditing Office, it being
for money under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327,
which state the conditions under which money claims against
the Government may be filed (COA issue).”
 CFI Manila took notice of such decision and dismissed the case
with respect to RP and BoC.
 Hence, plaintiff appealed such decision.
ISSUE
 Whether or not the plaintiff is correct in filing a collection case
against RP and BoC in the trial Court instead of filing a claim
with the Auditor General
HELD
 No.
RATIO
 In the Mobil case, it was held that the Bureau of Customs, in
operating the arrastre service itself, does so in the
performance of a necessary incident to the prime
governmental function of taxation, and, as such, is not suable
for alleged losses resulting therefrom. A fortiori, neither is the
Republic suable for said activity of the Bureau of Customs.