Anthropomorphism in Animated Films:

Wallace & Gromit, and Beyond.

A literary review by Matias D. Heker.

University of Hertfordshire. December, 2017.

Anthropomorphism is the act of attributing human emotions or characteristics to the non-

human (Bliss, 2017; Jacobson, 1997; DiSalvo and Gemperle, 2003). This is frequently used in the

world of animation, where characters are often hybrids of humans and animals (Bliss, 2017).

There have been very early explorations of our interaction with animals, such as Aristotle’s

History of Animals (1902), written in the fourth century BC. This was the first major scientific

work on the question. He argued about the existence of a divide between the human and non-

human, and formulated hierarchies with humans always at the topmost of the ladder.

Nevertheless, the meaning and validity of the term has evolved throughout the years. As early

as 1958, the term was renamed ‘anthropocentrism’ by writers such as Robbe-Gillet, pointing at

the notion that anthropomorphism often carries the belief that the world is intrinsically

meaningful, as it exists for us (Meyer, 2012). Other terms such as ‘egomorphism’ (Milton, 2005),

as portraying individual experiences, have been coined.

This has led to a negative connotation of the word anthropomorphism. Bliss (2017) adds that

this might be due to the uneasiness felt by many towards the linking of human and animals. He

alludes to recent animal welfare movements that have revived the positive connotation of the

term. Many artists have tried to go against anthropocentrism. One particular case is the

Minimalist movement, where the beholder became the ‘manipulated’, rather than the one

endowing the art object with its meaning (Fried, 1967; Meyer, 2012).

Philosopher Frederick Ferré (1984) argues against this stigma as well, making a sharp distinction

between the two terms: anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism, being more lenient on the

use of the latter, which he sees as inevitable and justified. Adding to this, Bliss (2017) claims that

the result of the creative process is not human nor animal, but a combination of emotions,

responses and interactions. Bousé (1995) follows the same line of thought by pointing out that,

in our need to understand nature to ensure our survival, it is impossible not to use ourselves as
the point of reference, a concept also explored by DiSalvo and Gemperle (2003) and Vale and

McRae (2016).

Anthropomorphism has been present throughout the entire history of mankind in almost every

single culture. From cave paintings (Bliss, 2017), to religious beliefs (Vale and McRae, 2016): The

Hindus imagined the earth as being held on the back of an elephant (Berger, 1980). Berger

(1980:6) commented: ‘belongs to a tradition, almost as old as man itself. Animals interceded

between man and their origin because they were both like and unlike man’. This refers to a

dualism between the subjection and worship of animals. Bullock (2002) shows how this dualism

is expressed through the use of metaphors in ordinary speech, as some convey veneration

towards animals, whilst others seem to denigrate them.

Nonetheless, there has been a vast shift in our perception of non-human animals after the

Industrial Revolution in the 19th century, where most practices that were mediated between

man and nature faded away. Before this, men depended upon animals for most of their needs:

food, clothing, work and transport. This is relevant because pre-industrialist anthropomorphism

was an expression of proximity between man and animal. In the past few centuries though,

animals have been vanishing from our daily lives (Berger, 1980). ‘And in this new solitude,

anthropomorphism makes us doubly uneasy’ (op.cit:11).

There is no better example of the current marginalization of animals than ‘the zoo’: animals are

reduced to mere spectacle, marginalized and disposed as a product of the larger capitalist

system. (Berger, 1980). ‘Naturalness’ then becomes a social construct. (Burt, 2002) a view

shared by Wells (2009).

To better understand anthropomorphism and its role in our society it is relevant to comprehend

the many reasons behind the human tendency to anthropomorphize. From a cognitive point of

view, it has been argued that anthropomorphizing, particularly with animals, is a crucial part of

human cultural development (Boyd, 2009; Ingold, 1994). As children, relating to objects and

phenomena (Hayward, 1977), which usually take animal form, is a significant part of cognitive

development, and can help solve anxieties and develop the concept of ‘similar and different’

and ’internal and external’, as has been stated by Winnicott (1971) and Case (2005).

This concept has also been looked into by influential figures such as Sigmund Freud (1913), who

wrote about the way people are replaced by animals in dreams as a response to repressed,

inadmissible emotions, a concept studied further by Ernest Jones (1931). According to them, the

dreamer cannot stand to picture their emotions felt towards people and thus projects them onto

animals (Doniger, 2005).

As described by Berger (1980), the wild animal thus becomes the representation of an idealized

notion of nature, and the manifestation of a repressed want. Or according to Sandler (1997) the

representation of the fear for the unknown and unclassifiable. This last idea is also explored by

Disalvo and Gemperle (2003), who add that in some situations humans anthropomorphize to

feel in control, to place the strange in a familiar setting.

Bousé (1995) points out that animal stories become fantasies to preserve the values that our

society cannot live up to, animals then becoming extensions of ourselves. They reassure us that

our social organization is still ‘natural’. Nature arises as a moral place where to deposit our own

values. This is seen in many tales, in which nature is represented by ‘virtuous, brave and

resourceful heroes (…) and villains who always pay the price of their transgressions. There is good

and evil, right and wrong’ (op.cit:36).

Berger (1980) delved into the reasons behind our strong tendencies to anthropomorphize non-

human animals. He comments: ‘Animals are born, are sentient and mortal. In these things they
resemble man. (…) in their physical capacities, they differ from man, they are both like and unlike’

(op.cit: 4). Men see a certain ‘innocence’ in animals, which evokes nostalgia. This can have a

negative implication. Relating to what was explained earlier in this review regarding post-

industrialism, this reductionism of animals is part of the same machinery that has reduced men

into mere units of production and consumerism, Berger (1980) explains.

Having described different stances regarding the what and the why of anthropomorphism, there

is one noteworthy issue that has caused substantial disagreement between writers on the

subject. That is whether anthropomorphism is beneficial, or whether it should be avoided

altogether, particularly in case of non-human animals being portrayed in animated films.

Wells (2009) argues against claims that representational tropes of animals have no validity and

show a lack of understanding of the animal. He maintains that non-human animals do possess

many human characteristics, such as vocabulary. A positive perception of anthropomorphic and

zoomorphic representations as part of the artists’ way of expression is also shared by Bliss

(2017). He adds that they can even be beneficial for the animals, as many artists have taken on

the issue of ecology as part of their narratives.

One should be careful though, argues Bousé (1995), as there is a question of whether it is

ethically correct to render the lives of animals in such an implausible way, as this may be

misleading to viewers. He (ibid.) points out: ‘many (…) are disappointed when wild animals turn

out to be shy, retiring creatures rather than amusing characters involved in fast-paced

adventures. And there’s not a story in sight’. A very tangible example of this is Bambi’s (1942)

forest fire sequence, which has shaped a wrong depiction of nature in collective imagination,

leading to over-dramatized portrayals of forest fires in the media (Bousé, 1995).

Fischer (1991) has found a mid-ground. While he assets that it is unreasonable to pretend that

humans and animals share no characteristics, an idea shared by Dean (2012),

anthropomorphizing in the world of science is not intellectually sound. Therefore,

anthropomorphism is only appropriate in certain contexts, such as in the arts, or ‘imaginative

anthropomorphism’ as described by Fischer.

A useful case study for the role of anthropomorphized animals in human society and animated

films is Wallace and Gromit: The Wrong Trousers (1993). This short film has been scrutinized in

depth by Esther Leslie in Wallace and Gromit: An Animating Love (1997), and shows many

instances of anthropomorphism.

Leslie attributes the success of the film to its premise: ‘the affinity between an Englishman and

his dog’ (ibid.). It captivates audiences because of this remarkable relationship. This may be due

to the dog being one of the few animals with which humans have created an intimate

connection. The human want of ‘fidelity’ is personified in Gromit. Gromit lives a life just like

Wallace’s. He reads, knits and listens to music, and yet he will always remain loyal to his master.

And thus ‘the appeal of the pet is that he is just like us. He is anthropomorphous.’ (ibid.).

Adding to this point, Balazs (1952) asserts that in film, all animals are caricatures of humans. This

is because we find placing our trust on animals a lot easier that on other humans. According to

Atkinson (2006), this trust and feeling of unconditional fidelity is due to the animal’s lack of

human language and full communication, and thus its inability to lie to us. This has been proven

even further in scientific studies (Bonas, 2000) where pet dogs score higher than humans when

it comes to their capacity to provide support and nurturance.

Berger (1980), redeems the role of animals as companions by pointing out that these offer a

relationship unlike any other. This is a companionship to the solitude of the human as a species.

He goes as far as to say that it is often man who lacks the capacity to communicate with animals,

rather than the other way around. He does, however, strongly disagree with the notion of

animals as ‘pets’. He considers them ‘mementoes of the outside world’ (ibid.). And by living in
the same ways as their ‘owners’, they are deprived of their animal instincts and independence.

To Berger, this is merely an attempt to regain some sort of contact to nature in the urban era.

Leslie (1997) seems to disagree with Berger. Wallace and Gromit depict an equitable

partnership. They embody the idealized connection between man and nature. This

humanization of animals, more specifically dogs, is beneficial as it distances the perception of

animals away from the soulless machines conceived by Descartes (Leslie, 1997; Allen and

Trestman, 1995).

Wallace and Gromit also plays on the concept of the zoo as prison as described by Berger (1980).

The clearest example of this when the penguin antagonist is locked behind bars. But as the

camera pulls back this is revealed to be a zoo. This is representative of the previously mentioned

dualism of our feeling of affinity towards animals, and the isolation of our species (Leslie, 1997).

A less evident way Wallace and Gromit: The Wrong Trousers plays with anthropomorphism is

with its use of a moldable material to build its world: clay. This carries strong anthropomorphous

associations: In the Book of Genesis God is the ‘original animator’, who shapes man from the

earth’s clay (Leslie, 1997). Seeing inanimate objects change form provokes great enjoyment

(Barthes, 1973) and this exploited by Wallace and Gromit.

Some theorists have described the idea of a sliding scale to define animals that are in one way

or another anthropomorphous, with animal characteristics at one end and human ones at the

other (Collignon, 2008; Atkinson, 2006; Bliss, 2017). Bliss (2017) also adds that processes and

materials should also be taken into consideration in this scale, thus the scale becoming a grid. In

the scale, the character of Gromit would be closer to zoomorphism (assigning animal features

to a human, object or god), than to anthropomorphism (ibid.), and the limitations of its building

block: clay, would also be considered in Bliss’ proposed grid.

 Fig. 1: In Wallace and Gromit: The Wrong Trousers, animals are almost zoomorphic, becoming

indistinguishable from humans in their actions (Bliss, 2017). (Source: ‘Wallace and Gromit: The Wrong

Trousers’, 1993)

Having analyzed anthropomorphism in different contexts, it is important to examine more in

depth how it has and can be useful in the world of animated films. The use of anthropomorphic

‘actors’ has been reflected on by Danston and Mitman (2005). Following the line of thought of

Balazs (1952), Atkinson (2006), and Bonas (2000) previously elaborated on in this writing, they

build on how the use of ‘prototypes’, simplified qualities (‘the brave lion’, ‘the cunning fox’) in

animals are important in narratives, as they would be found flat if applied to humans. This is

because we do not tend to try to find out minute details about animal actors, thus making it

easier to get a message across in a story. Characters become more relatable and universal, and

avoid coming across as bland, something harder to achieve in human characters.

These views are shared by Atkinson (2006), who adds that animals create a great empathic

reaction in humans. This can be blended with a straightforward narrative to achieve a big

emotional response in audiences. Relating to the aforementioned views of Berger (1980)

regarding nature idealization, Atkinson (2006) argues that many pet owners are more inclined

to identify with animal characters in film. Animals are believable as characters because of the

trust we project onto them. No human actor can outdo animals when it comes to authenticity

(Balazs, 1952) and most nonverbal communication in animals is well known to man (Wells,

2009).

It has been noted by a few writers that one ought to be cautious when making

anthropomorphized animals or objects interact with humans, as this can break the spell, and

interrupt the illusion of the ‘pure animal’ (Hooks, 2007; Wells, 2009).

On a more ‘commercial’ perspective, Bousé (1995) mentions that one of reasons for the

popularity of anthropomorphized animals in animated films is its ‘exportability’, as many of

these narratives do not rely on language, but on the visual element to get the story across.

Hence the history of animation has been deeply intertwined with the use of anthropomorphism

(Bliss, 2017; Wells, 2009). A major example is the work of the Walt Disney Animation Studios.

Walt Disney himself believed animals had real character traits. Quoted in Schickel’s The Disney

Version (1986/1968:180-181), Disney very eloquently explained:

‘Often the entire body comes into play. Take a joyful dog. His tail wags, his torso wiggles,

his ears flop. (…) But how does a human being react to stimulus? He’s lost the sense of

play he once had and he inhibits physical expression. (…) No scope for animation, too

stiff, too limited.’

Human-like characters are a great resource to be exploited by animators and filmmakers

(Atkinson, 2006). Being part of our human nature, we can see that anthropomorphism is here

to stay (Bousé, 1995).

Bibliography
Allen, C. and Trestman, M. (1995) Animal Consciousness, No. 2. Historical Background. Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Aristotle (1902). Aristotle's History of Animals. London: G. Bell.

Atkinson, N. (2006). The Use of Anthropomorphism in the Animation of Animals. Bachelor of Arts.
Bournemouth University National Centre for Computer Animation.

Bambi. (1942). Directed by D. Hand [film]. Burbank: Walt Disney Productions.

Balazs, B. (1952). Theory of the Film. Translated from the Hungarian by Bone, E. London: Dobson LTD.

Barthes, R. (1973). Mythologies. New York: Hill & Wang

Berger, J. (1980) Why Look at Animals?. In: About Looking. New York: Pantheon Books

Bliss, G. (2017). Animals with attitude: finding a place for animated animals. In: Calvert, C. et al.
Proceedings of the Conference: Critical Perspectives on Animals in Society, pp.37-44. Available at:
https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/8582/critical-perspectives-on-animals-in-
society-2012-conference-proceedings.pdf [Accessed 6 Dec. 2017].

Bonas, S., et al. (2000) Pets in the Network of Family Relationships : an Empirical Study. In: Podberscek,
A., et al. (Eds.) Companion Animals and Us: Exploring Relationships between People and Pets. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Bousé, D. (1995) True Life Fantasies: Storytelling Traditions in Animated Features and Wildlife Films.
Animation Journal. Spring 3(2). pp. 19‐39.

Boyd, B. (2009) On the Origin of Stories, Evolution, Cognition and Fiction, Cambridge: Harvard University
Press

Burt, J. (2002). Animals in Film. London: Reaktion Books.

Bullock, M. (2002). Watching Eyes, Seeing Dreams, Knowing Lives. In: Rothfels, pp. 99-118.

Case, C. (2005) Imagining Animals: Art, Psychotherapy and Primitive States of Mind,Hove: Routledge

Chaminade, T., Hodgins, J. and Kawato, M. (2007). Anthropomorphism influences perception of computer-
animated characters’ actions. Oxford University Press.

Collignon, S. (2008). They Walk, They Talk: A study of the anthropomorphisation of non human character
in animated films. In: Animatrix 16

Dean, C. (2012). Carolyn Dean. In: Anthropomorphism: Notes from the Field. Art Bulletin. pp. 15

DiSalvo, C. and Gemperle, F. (2003) From Seduction to Fulfillment: The Use of Anthropomorphic Form in
Design. In: Proceedings of the 2003 international conference on Designing pleasurable products and
interfaces. New York, NY: ACM., pp. 67‐72. Available at:
https://dlacmorg.ezproxy.herts.ac.uk/citation.cfm?id=782913

Doniger, W. (2005): Thinking With Animals In Other Times and Places: Zoomorphism in Ancient India

Danston, D. and Mitman, G.: Thinking With Animals. USA: Columbia University Press

Ferré, F. and Ferré, R. (1984) In Praise of Anthropomorphism. International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion. 16. pp. 203‐212. Available at: http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.herts.ac.uk/stable/40012658?pq‐
origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Fisher, J. A. (1991) Disambiguating Anthropomorphism: An Interdisciplinary Review. In: Bateson, P. P. G.
and Klopfer, P. H. Perspectives in Ethology Vol. 9. Plenum Publishing. Available at:
http://spot.colorado.edu/~jafisher/OnLine%20papers//Fisher%20Disambiguating%20Anthropomorphis
m.pdf

Fried, M. (1967). Art and Objecthood. Artforum. (Summer)

Freud, S. (1913). The interpretation of dreams. Macmillan

Hayward, S. (1977). Scriptwriting for Animation. New York: Hastings House/Focal Press.

Hooks, E. (2005). Acting in Animation: A Look at Twelve Films. Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann.

Ingold, T., ed. (1994) What is an Animal?, London: Routledge

Jacobson, H. (1997). Seriously Funny: From the Ridiculous to the Sublime. London: Viking.

Jones, E. (1931). On the Nightmare. London: The Hogarth Press

Leslie, E. (1997). Wallace and Gromit: an animating love. Soundings, [online] (5 Spring), pp.149-156.
Available at: http://banmarchive.org.uk/collections/soundings/05_149.pdf.

Meyer, J. (2012). James Meyer. In: Anthropomorphism: Notes from the Field. Art Bulletin. pp. 24-26

Milton, K. (2005). Anthropomorphism or egomorphism? The perception of non-human persons by human

ones. In: Knight, J. ed. Animals in Person: Cultural Perspectives on Human-Animal Intimacies. Berg, pp.
255-271.

Sandler, K. (1997). Pogs, Dogs, or Ferrets: Anthropomorphism and ‘Animanaics.’. Animation Journal 6, no.
1 (Fall)

Schickel, R. (1986 /1968). The Disney Version. London: Michael Joseph.

Thomas, K. (1983). Man and the Natural World. London: Allen Lee, pp. 301

Vale, M. and McRae, D. (2016). The Cutopia Paradox: Anthropomorphism as Entertainment. Ecozon@,
7(1).

Wallace and Gromit: The Wrong Trousers. (1993). Directed by N. Park [film]. Bristol: Aardman Animations,
Ltd..

Wells, P. (2009) The Animated Bestiary: Animals, Cartoons, and Culture. New Brunswick, NJ and London:
Rutgers University Press.

Winnicott, D.W. (1971) Playing and Reality, London: Tavistock Publications