Realism Materialism Art

Eds. C. Cox J. Jaslcey S. Malile

Center for Curatorial Studies, Bard College

Sternberg Press
 /
*/

trn Defense of Representation,

Tt,istan Garcia
I

Throu-ehout the century of nrodernity

and postrnodernity, ..representation,,
been fi'ow4ed upon, even forbidden, has
to such a de_qree trrut ii has been
invent ways to dispense rvith this ord necessar,v to
and en-rbarraising concept in
art, politics, and
,:i|||,:il,-rflT:ili,::''nplincation'
reference' ;;;;''e
and simpre presen-
"'
There is an understanclable
aesthetic reason for the rejection
unsatisfying definition, capable neither of the concept: its
of anticipating nor irortoring
of art in the twe,tieth centur1,, fi-om the ,utations
I(azinrir Mareviciito Aila, Kaprou,,
Broodthaers to body art. But if ,,replesentation,, fi.om Marcer
no longer succeeds in accountins
for the naturar i,cri,ation of the piastic
events), it is aiso because phirosopiy
arts toward p..r.n..
(o1. objects, bodiei
has raired, hur,-,ot u..n .upuuie
and presenting to artists aweil-grounded of proposi,g
,,representation,,
concept of
matter and in the reality of objects. inscribed in

:tr.

{nV theory tirat claims to be

matelialist or realist shouid be judged according to
its abiiitv (or Iack thereof)
to provide an account for the
'{n imase' ror exampre, is ce,tainry status of representations.
a materiar object or a rear
atl.ther obiect that has the object, but it is arso
particuiar nature
of not being what it is: a watercoror
and gouache b-r' DLirer
that represents a hare is not itse]f
iiere the animar. it rvourd no ronger a hare; moreover if it
represent the animar. Br-rt if
tr a-i
rhe thin-s itseif,.horv can it is not in any
it repl-esent that thing? Nauri i
an ideal hare' in uor.,it the existence of
addition to its ;-ug.i'in ,t.,rt
real hare' the imase case, entities proliflerate:
of the hare, th'e hare of which there,s the
the hare of which this is tt
this is the i"rrg. .^ir,s neither
outside
image, bur rarher
in rhe mind of ;. ;;; who sees
tations from ob.iects, ir? This *ry L.*ove represen_"r';Iff;;:Ji:',i:f:
locate them in consciousness,
materialjst or naturarist and then, eventualrl,, seek a
theory or -irJ. Thus I am rid
of ,.p..r.ntations. trrese
;jHL1ffiT,,.T:ff p,.r i r.rate i n m atter, i,, .. uiityl
llT:,,r,,, l,; ;;;;;;.
it would be particularly stran,{e to
Yet
thi,i< that a materialist or realist
siruare fep'esenrarions i, trri,gs
I:1',0.or
oecaLlse themserves
mate'iarists, rearists. ancr ideariirs
rarher rh
u0 agree on trris
exist i, truth except by "r.,nil'l'.'',":::ffi:::
'.,t and for those things that they
represent. on
t rrauslator's note: Tire French
trre
title. "D6fense de Reprdse.tatior,.,
difficult to render in English: carries a dor.rble nreanirrg that
,.f.,r, *r'r,.rn borh clefler.rse anci prohibition. is

Representation
245
 IN DEFE\SE OF REI,RLSITNIATION

colltrary, I assert that an authentic realist or mirterialist way o1'thinking should be

able to accouut for the objective, real and utaterial, existence of representatioirs
produced by humait art. The secor,
The history of Western pirilosophy proposes at least three major ways to dominater
conceive the status of representational objects: the representational object is wor[< o1'C
understood to be either a copy, a sign, or a duplex. no longer
relationsh-
A bison dr
I representan
set of sign
The first model for thinking about representation is mimesis, whicl-r is the idea that irlte rp reta
in the West dominates antiquity and the classical age. The major conrribution oi in the pa.i1
mimetic theories is the affirmation that representation rs a relationship betu'een To itttc:p:',
two terms in which one olthe terms transposes the other bv extracting certain ol sign.. Th:
its qualities, thus a two-dimeusional representation of a charr transposes the chair nranr i.i.,
onto a surface, making an abstraction of its third dimension. Even. copr ntade br as s L-]c iaI l 11

representation is a diminished version of the representable object. Plato considers get a \ er-\
that tl-rere exists a ladder of ontological degradation lrorn the idea to the object and is to lrrtk r
lrom the object to the representation. Not only natural objects are susceptible to questiol.l c
bein-e imitated in tl-ris way-for Aristotle, that which is said or that which should \\'it
be is also representable. anvthing L
Mimesis can be understood as the linking ol two objects or of tw.o series what it re1
of objects: the first is present, or real, ar-rd the second is represented, meaning after an a1
transposed into a lorm that draws certain qualities from the first. The iderrtity rvere to di
between the two is assured by a certain resemblance: recovery, analogy, or structural representt
homology. However, three difficulties hobble such a definition of representation. a represen
First, as Nelson Goodman has noted, resemblance, unlike representation, bespeaks ofwhom,
a symmetrical relationship.'The portrait of Thomas More by Hans Hoibein surely representz
resembles Thomas More, and Thomas More resembles his portrait-but the portrait without si
represents the face of the irumanist while the face does not represent the portrait. Hov
So representation is not resemblance. Next, mimesis supposes not only the prece- to signific
dence but the pre-existence of that which is representecl relative to irs replesen- abilitv: tir
tation: one can not represent that which does not already exist. Finally, mimesis each airpc
implies an ontological degradation between what is represented and the represen- to embodr
tation: that which is represented is in some way "de-presented," since something a cigarettt
has been snatched fi'om its full and entire presence to make it exist under anothei verse line.
lorm, dirninished, as a copy. Ser',
can alter z

Let's try another model. A stearl L

3S
: See Nelson Goodnr an, Languages o/ArI (lndianapolis: Hackett. r976), 3fl I

246 Representation
 ]RiST{N C}ARCIA

ng shoLrld be
iI
:prese ntati on s
.F
tg The second model fbl' representiition is sienjfication. Thjs is the model thzit
: major \4/ays ttr Ig has
1 don,inated tnodernitv since the nineteenth century, under the ipfluence ol the
/ tional object is E
E
,,& worh of Charles Sanders Peirce ancl Fc-rdinand de Saussure. A representatiol
rS,
is
:i*,
,;is
no ion-eer tl-rought of as a copt' but rather as a sign. For Peirce, representation is
.:* a
relationship between three terrns ,lhe representamen, the object, and the interpretalt.:
E
A bison drawn with pigment tl-)at I perceive on the wall oi a paleolithic cave
$ is the
.& tepresentamen;the bison that these traces seern to lne to designate is the object;the
e&
: is'
set of signs that I mobilize in order to attach the first to th; second comprise
."8
'$. the
r is the idea that ::'& interpretant. All the images of bison, drawn or photographed, that I have perceived
contribution of ,n
in the past contribute to the composition of this speciflc representation of
g a bisor-r.
rnship between :i&
To interpret a sign is to triangulate ceaselessly between the sign, its object,
lE and other
cting certain of ,E signs. Tlre same word, witl'r the same spellir-rg and the same sound, can
F designate
poses the chair many different objects, depending on the irterpreta,ts brought into play.
/ copy made by
$
1B
*n.n
associating the word "rock" with the terms "chuck Berry,, and .,Telecart.r,,,
iF you
Plato considers :T get a very different object than if you reference ',granite', or ,.clay.,,
i.rg, Thus, to signify
r the object and g
e is to link a sign to an object through the mediation of other signs;
I susceptible to
s it is no lonler a
$ question of resembiance or imitation.
t which sl.rould s
F
Within the context of our semiotic model, representation would never
be
E anything bllt a type of signification: the porrrait of Emile zola by
i Manet relates to
f ol tu,o series g
wl"rat it represents, the French writer. by the mediation
F
of a series of other signs. If,
nted. meanin-9 after an apocalypse, survivors who lost all trace or memory
of the existence of Zola
.. The identitv were to discover the painting in an arcl-raeological excavation,
they would find a
y or strllctural represerrtation of a bearded man, but not of Emile
Zola. Andif we were to discover
epresentation. a representation of son-rething that we
couldn't identifly, made by an extir-rct people
tion. bespeaks olr'r'hom we know nothing, we would perhaps not
even be able to recogr1izsit as a
Holbein surel_r' representation. Thus, according to the semiotic
model, there is no ..pr.r.,rtation
rut the portrait u'ithout signification, that is to say without
interpretation.
rt the portrait. However' there is one maJor objection to the subordination
,n1),the prece-
of representation
to signification. An essential characteristic
of a representation as a sign is its vari-
r its represen- ability: the official sign for "t.to srnoking"
-rally, shows a cigarette in a barred circle. But
mimesis each airport, hospital, oL
cinema, in each region of the world, uses different images
the represen- to embody this sign-a
cigarette or perhaps a pipe, a cigarette with filter or without,
rce something a cigarette inscribed
in a circle o. u ,quu.., barred by a cross or by a simple trans-
tnder anot]rer verse line, on
a blacl< backgrou,d or white-yet the meaning remains
the same.
Several images can thus serve to signilyexactl,v
. tire saie thing, such that one
without altering what it nl.u,lr. But does the same go fbr the
iti:ll.:,lsign image/
'r b(eflm loconrolive can easily signify arry kind of train, because
it has becorr. ih.

-l See charles Srrrclers Peirce. "l-o-tic as Scmiotic: l-he Theorv olSigns."

in philosopltital writings oJ
Pein:e. ed. Justus BLrchler (Nerv York: Dover, 1955). g8_ug.

Representation 247
 lN DE F hNsir Ol' REPRESIT.N l-ATI ON

archetype o1'this rrode of,transport in the collective inragination. Bi-Lt even so. it
does not represeni all trains. And an image o1'a cigarette does not represent exactly
the same tl-rins zis an irnage of a pipe.
If the iilage can becoure sign. or the sign image, they nevertheless remain
absolutely distinct;u,hat separates them is the delicate attachment olthe image to
lvhat it represents.
'fhus. r-ro representation can be all-ected without affecting that rvirich it rep-
resents. Marcel Ducharnp's Mona Lisa with a inoustache is no longer the Mona Llsc of
Leonardo da Vinci; a photo-qraph retouched by software that permits the accentuation
of contrast or the erasure of blernishes no longer represents exactly what it represented
before. By contrast, the sign-determined by the trianguiar relation between the sign
itself, the object to which it refers, and tl-re interpretant that attaches one to tl-re other-
can vary without changing the object, so long as the interpretant adjLrsts the triansu-
lation. In signification, the presence of the sign erases itself behind rts relation u rth its
object n-rediated b-y an infinity of other signs, rvhile in representation there is nt-rtitins
other than a relation betu'eeu that which is present and that u,hich is reDresentecl.

III

To explain this phenon,enon, a third contemporary model exists, one that per-
tains neither to classical or ancient mimesis nor to modern sern iotics. The redefinition
of the image, as distinct fiom the sign, has been an important trend in analytic phi-
losoph,v since the r96os. This trend has submitted the notion of mimesis to scrutiny,
all the while resisting the semiotic and structuralist groundswell that, in the fifties
and sixties, increasingly classified the irnage as a sign among other signs.
In pondering the status of iconicity, Goodman, Richard Wollheim, I(endall
Walton, Jol-rn Hyman, and Flint Schier have attempted to propose a redefinition of
representatior-r. At the heart of their reflections, diverse as they are, lies the same
concern for understanding how an image can realiy combine two things in one: that
r,vhich represents and that which is represented. For this reason it is ternpting to
describe this third model as the duplex concept of representatior-i, since it is based
on the intuitron that a replesentation presents itself as other than tt is and that a
theory of representation should seek to model and explain this "duplicity."
It is possible to organize all the proposed answers by irnagining that thev have
all evolved in a space defined bv three axes: an ontological axis, a iosical axis. and a
psyctrological axis. Along the ontological axis, the theories oscillate between objec-
tivisrn and subjectrvism, according to whether the object represented is objectivel,v
or subjectively understood in the representinu object. On the logical zrxis, it is a
matter of the relation betv,,een the two that is clebateci: tlte posrtions \iri') beirveert
recourse to resernblance (which leacls to mimesis) and recoirrse to referelltiallr)
(which ieads to serniosis). Finally, the psychological axis is boundecl on the otre hand

248 Representation
 l''' ' r\ I \iir l\\

bv riatr:ralism (the recoqnition of inrages i-r .r natui'al cognitive facilit-1, clevelr:ped by

tfr
our species) and on the otherby conventionalism (recognitior-r of irT-iages is regulated
I
by conventiolls that vary front one cultttre to another).
in A1l the contemporary stances on the dupler ciraracter oi'representations
to situate tiremselves in this complex three-dinrensional space: Goodman is objec-
tivist, while supporting a logical theory of ref'erence and tending toward a nroder-
p- ated conventionalism; Hyman, by contrast, deltnds the determining character ol'
of resernblance (in his "occlusion shape principle"); 'rVollheim's theory of "seeing-in"
)n is ontologically subjectivist, logically midway betrveen resernblance and reference;
:d Walton's "make-believe" shifts this position toward a radical couventionalism, while
ln the defense ol "recogrrition" by Schier pushes it the otl-rer way. toward naturaiism.+
WI-rat stays constant throughout all these variations is the concept of the image
u- as a duplex reality: one thing is two, two tl-rings are one. All these theories, rvhat-
tS ever their respective r.nerits, tend to consider representation as the reiatiot-t between
1g two things presented in one alone. For this reason, they are condemned to develop
ontoiogically, logically, and psychologically between two poles, always still missing
an aspect of representation. The more they account lor the image as an object, the
less they can accollltt for tl-re object of tl-ris image, and vice versa. Their error is to
attribute a single presence shared between two objects (the representing and the rep-
resented), instead ofconceiving a single object shared between presence and absence.
r-
)n That ls rvlt1, I have been lvorkirrg for several years on a completely different model
i- ol representation.
-Y.

:S
IV
ili
rf To represent is first of all to absdnt.
le
lt All representation, be it visual, sonic, or even tactile, presupposes the work of
.o absenting present matter: an image is a three-dimensional object reduced to the state
,d of a quasi-surface, whose depth has been reduced to almost nothing, and one side
a of which has been transformed into the verso. Tl-tus, to apprehend a photograph as
a representation supposes that one is capable of not equally considering the edge,
the recto, and the verso of the photographic image: the recto becomes the prominent
a surface, the edge is overloohed, the verso is the blind back of the in-rage.
)'
ly
.1 See Goodmtrn. Langua,qes o/Arf: John Hyman, The Objective Eye: Color, Fornt. and Realitl, irt the Theor,),
a (Chicago: [-iniversilv o1'Chjcago Press. zoo(r): Richard \\'bllheim" "Se'eins-as. Seeing-ir]. and
of .Ar1

l1 Pictorial Representation," in Ari and lts Objeds. znd ed. (Cambridge: Canibridge University Press.
rg8o). :o5-26: I(endall \\alton. i\,linresis as NLake-Believe: On tlte Foundations o//he Rcpresertational Arts
v (Canrbricigc, MA: Harvard Univcrsity Press, r99o); and Flint Schier. Deepcr into Picturcs:
d An Esso_1, on Pictorial Representation (Canrbridge: Cambridge University Press. I986).

Representation 249
 I\ DEFENSE OI" REI'I{E,SE,NTATION

ThLrs. a visual representation cc;nsisls first ol a1l in the absenting of a spatial

dimensior-r. For a sonic representation, it's not exactly the same: r,vhen we hear, lor
example, the recording of a bird's song, what is absented is the spatialorigin olthe
sonic phenomel1oll. since we don't consider the speaker, the stereo, or the record o
to be tl,e one that sin-qs. Also, in a certain sense all music is represetrtative as sootl T(

as yoll separate the sound from its cause and no longer hear the effect of a guitar
or a violin. but lather a sonic developrnent where each sound seems to cause the tl
following sound, whether in a rhythir-ric or melodic pl-rrase' h
Visual representation, like sonic representatiot-t, is the absence of presence. n
of a din,ension of space or of the spatial source of a sound. And in absetlting a n
presence, one necessarily presents a presence. The key to oltr argulrent is that a1l sl

representation should be understood as:r system of exchange that takes place r.r''rthin a
objects themselves: in constraining a dimension or a portioll ol space to reditce il
itself to almost nothing (in absenting it, that is), one, not b) masic brtt iatiurtlalh. b
mahes sometl'Iing that isn't there appear. And the representation i,s t-tt'rt itlitialh iht \r
presentation olsomething absent that wourld exist elser'vhere. but tl-ie enler-sence trl p
something absent, owing to the absence of something present. One utlderstands thr.ts \,
that even Malevich's white square on a wl,ite background, tl-re blue mottochrornes b
of Yves Klein, or Pierre Soulages's black monochromes represent something in the d

sense that they absent a dintension ol space and therefore also present something
absent. What? At least a surface. Maybe a colored surface. Maybe a surface broken n
d
up by forms.
In this way, the great aestiretic illusion of the twentieth century-the belief
that we were done with representation because we l-rad discovered the power of h

abstractior-r-dissipates: all representation is an abstraction, the abstraction of the C

a
presence of things. And this abstraction has the necessary consequence of presenting
something absent: a countryside, a face, a feeling, shapes, colols, al-l event, and so
forth. What we see in an image, what we understand in a piece of music' iS never
(
there-the image and the ntusic plesent something absent because they absent
a
something present.
r
This absenting is neither a conventional decision nor a power of our cognition:
it is a constraint that the representing object exerts on our perception. Reptesetllatton I
t
is a constraint produced by art and incorporated ir-r an object by worlt, rvhtch lorces
t
ollr perception to absent a part of the presence of tl-rings. lnsofar as it is a constt'aint'
our perception cau ah,vays oppose it, and I can try to consider a photograph as
C
a
Z

three-dimensional objeci, obr.ruing u,ith equal interest its front, back, and side:
i
I can listen to music fbrcing rnyself not to perceive the sound as the el1bct of an
instrument. But in so doing I will need to spend considerable energy forcilrg llr\Sctt
to believe that I do not see or hear the representatiotr, because the t'epreselltattonaL
object contrives to constrain r-ny perception lrom recognizitlg it for what it is'
The representational object is not a copy: it does not imitate another pltttlj
Fonda
object, but rather, it presents an absent object. What a photograph ol Hertn'

250 Representation
 TRISTA\ GARCIA

ratial tn 141 Darling Clementi,ie seel.ns r.r present t,-r 1re is not really
Henry ltoncJa liin-rsell,
; ir, for but his absence.
f of the BLrt how to present an absencel ,\Jl represe
ntation possesses a certain degree
recorci oldeterrnination: in plesenting me lith an absence,.r,.,., o, emptiness,
s soolt
the rep_
resentatio, detern-ii,es, sur-r'ounds, or defines this e,rpti,ess. ft'l
merely trace a
-qu
itar circle on paper, I produce a lzrrge and enveloptn-s abserlce: it coLrld
U.
se the llrirru- Ille. )ou- a Lrrlloolt. rlte earth -iusr r' ersilr rs it corrid be He,r.v "f,ir"rirru
r.onJrl,
Iread. I, worl<irrg the circre. sc.utirrizi,g ir. I cirrr co,rsrr.ain ,t;J;;;",;',r.i*,
sence. tlate nlore and tlore possibilities: r.,iewing a face traced in
charcoal, with eyes and a
ting a mouth. I can always pretend to see the earth or a balloon, but my perceptio,
rat all must
strongly resist the drawing. By lortilying the strictures-for instance,
by i,cluding
vithin a captiot] inscribed at the bottorn of the drawing-l can
force tl-re drawing to des-
educe ignate Henry Fonda. But the representation wili never be
constrainin_e enough to
rnallY, be saturated, that is to say, to achieve the presence of
that which is presentedithis
ly the will,ever be the cut-offhead of Henry Foncia in person appearing
on the sheet of
rce ol paper in the same way that Henry Fbnda will rrever u. pr.r.,lt
in hii representation.
s thus what is present in a representation is an absence, which czrn be
'omes strongly determined
but never to the point of saturation with presence. In this
way, there is no ultimate
Ln the degree of reali:m ola representarion.
thin_r A representation is thus neither an imitation nor a type of signification;
'oiien it
neither resenlbles nor refers to what it represents.
It presents something absent and
determines it rvithor,rt otherwise translorming it
completely into presence.
relief In redefining representation this way-starting from
ar-r ontorogv of objects, a
er ol human art as a lorm of representation, a specific
of
-un,.,.. absenting a certain part
rl tite olthe presetrce o1'objects-l propose that it is possible
to restore it to the heart of art,
nting and to rethink the work of the artist
as that of,a transmuter of absence and presence.
rd so
IeveI *
)sent our representations are, then, neither in our minds
nor in ollr perceptio,s: they
are inscribed by human art in certain objects, which .onst.uin'ou;;;;;l;,";';;
tion: recoqnize the absence ol a presence
in them, and b,v way of compensatio, the
rtion presence of something absent.
This operation, which to me is the impetus of all
)TCCS human art. is neitl-rer tnimetic
nor semlotic; it reqr-rires a new model ol. ontoiogy to
aint, ttnderstand that it is not
a matter of magical, irreal, or immateriai
asa
thought: qLrite the
;ide;
:oltrury The only way lor ntaterialist or realist theories to recognize the status of
artislic representations is to understarTd that representation
is that whicir objectively
fan tnscribes absence
in rnatter, or in tire real.
,'Se11'

:na1 lianslated lront tire French b1, Mollv Whaletr

sent
nda

Representation 25r