Is there a lot of policy-space between conflict

and capitulation?

Author: Emilio Banqueri Barra

Teaching Asistant: Milton Andrade Figueira - Class T307AL

Date: 27/10/2017

Abstract:

There are more possible options than immersing us in a devastating armed conflict with North
Korea or giving up and recognising them as a nuclear power. US must evaluate critically their
previous policies and North Korean responses and looking at the missing ingredients,
international massive support and firmness. The current situation is not but the only possible
outcome when settling up with the devil and acting lead by its intimidations. It is time to act
determinedly and do whatever it takes to strengthen the international unit to implement and
enforce sanctions. The only possible and realistic way to freeze nuclearization without war is
effectuating a strict Pyongyang isolation.
Introduction

Since its independence, North Korea has followed an intense militarization policy. However, until
last decades it has never been seen as a threat by occident, who has been playing the “laissez-
faire” game with North Korea. In 2006, they achieve to test their first nuclear weapon. First test
of six, by now, which have been increasing its magnitude from 1 Kt to approximately 100 Kt in
the 3th September 2017 nuclear test (Figure 1) . That ballistic missile was estimated to have
potential to reach New York. It is true that South Korea, Japan and US possess anti-missile
systems but its efficacy has not be already proven. Therefore, it is obvious that North Korean
dramatic nuclear advance carried out last year is a risk for the global security and international
community cannot let it go further.

This risk has had a strong answer by American government. In fact, Donald Trump has stated to
be willing to “totally destroy North Korea” among any other eccentric statements and few days
ago, two American bombers flew over the Korean peninsula. Likewise, it is clear that the strategic
patience Obama’s policy is over and the armed conflict probability looks greater and greater.

But, what it is the right thing to do now, given the North Korean case characteristics? Is it possible
to stop Pyongyang nuclearization without hard power? In order to argue if there is policy-space
between conflict and capitulation I will firstly look back on North Korean history to understand
their reactions, then I will critically present how US has historically dealt with North Korean
militarization to examine what works and what does not. Afterwards, we will see why US policies
have failed. With all that data collected, I will present steps to avoid past mistakes and improve
sanctions efficiency. And finally, the big question will be answered: “Is it policy-space between
conflict and capitulation?”

What is the North Korean military strategy why? A historical point of view

To fully understand a state foreign policy, it is always necessary to deepen in its history. Thus,
we are going to immerse in the Korean history.

First of all, we must not overlook the fact that Korea had always been a unified state until WWII,
fact that obviously feed annexing feelings in North Korean population. Secondly, Korea has
historically dealt with a large amount of foreign invasions and has been subdued by China, Japan,
and even USA alternatively since XVIII Century. This is one of the reasons of North Korean
mistrust. However, the biggest determinants are WWII, Cold War and Korean War. After WWII,
Korea splits in two states: the northern one under soviet influence and the southern one under
American power. Afterwards, in 1950 North Korea invades South Korea, followed by South
Korean counterattacks what leads to a bloody war (around 2 million deaths) finished in 1953
without a peace treaty, dividing Korea by the 38º Parallel. From then to nowadays, there has been
a constant high tension climate in the border, which obliges the country to be militarly on alert.
Since 1953, North Korea follows nationalist policies that leads to a massive international isolation
and a poor country development. In 1994, isolation and crops wipeout cause a vast famine which
kills 3.5M people. That is an enormous shock for the country and afterwards, Korea intensifies
its militarization and thrives to launch their first nuclear test in 2006, gaining power over
neighbour states which allows it to import necessary goods in better conditions.

All those historic facts helps us to understand why North Korea policy is so focused on military
issues (23% of GDP expenditure on army). History teach us that it is perfectly reasonable for
North Korea to be concerned about national security and, therefore, it is logical to be military
prepared. Additionally, nuclear development has a positive economic effect. Firstly, it allow
North Korea to extort states to ease foods and necessary goods inflows. Secondly, it is a large
source of employment for North Korea population. And last but not least, North Korea has
exported nuclear technology to Iran, Irak or Syria.

Previous policies and results – Lessons learned

Once I have analysed how North Korea history influence its current military policy, now I proceed
to outline the main policies carried out by USA so as to contain North Korea and evaluate its
efficacy. In this way, I will try to get important lessons from the past. As Mark Twain said:
“History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme”.

In 1993, North Korea launch with potential to reach Japan. To face that threat US agreed with
North Korea to provide 500k oil tons per year if they stop their nuclear program. The result of
that aid policy was that by 1998 North Korea was surreptitiously developing nuclear weapons and
US spent billions of dollars without any kind of return.

Under the Bush mandate, US imposed strict sanctions and North Korea threatened to withdraw
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. To face the situation, US decides to negotiate, giving traded
food aid in exchange for a nuclear weapons building suspension. One year after the agreement,
in 2006 North Korea tests its first nuclear weapon and it is proven to be exporting weapons
technology to Syria. In this case, neither aid nor sanctions worked.

In the Obama’s stage, US decided to apply a strategic patience through sanctions and espionage,
aiming to isolate North Korea and trying to make them negotiate. However with that policy, US
did not yield results and North Korea amplified its nuclear armament, becoming a real threat for
America.
How will the next US policy be? State Secretary Rex Tillerson wants to break up with past
mistakes: 'The policy of strategic patience has ended. We are exploring a new range of diplomatic,
security and economic measures. All options are on the table.'

History tells us that it is really tough to reach to an agreement with North Korea in order to freeze
its nuclearization and furthermore, that after a hypothetical pact it may be ignored by the Kim-
Jong-Un’s regime. Besides, sanctions have not been effective at all against North Korean nuclear
progress. In fact, those disregarded agreements and ineffective sanctions has immensely
contributed to nuclear development. Below, we will see how to improve sanctions efficiency.

Why has North Korea coped well with sanctions? China’s ambiguity

The effectiveness of sanctions, does not only depend on the will of one state, but requires a
consensus in the international sphere. Sanctions are implemented by UN resolutions, and states
such as China or Russia has veto right in the UN Security Council. Thus, if they do not agree to
strengthen sanctions, resolution is not approved. Likewise, it is imperative for global issues,
getting the general support of the international community.

In this case, China has been an obstacle to squeeze North Korean economy and if US wants
isolation policies to yield returns, they must dissuade China to cut Pyongyang off. The importance
of China in North Korea economy is vital. It is the first trade partner of North Korea and almost
90% of the regime imports comes from China (Figure 2). In this way, China provides energy and
food and avoids that the dictatorship collapse. Moreover, Pyongyang receives aid directly from
Beijing.

China’s indifference to nuclearization, showed in its laxity to enforce sanctions and its evolution
of its volume trade with North Korea (figure 3), has supported the GDP growth in North Korea
(3,9% in 2016).

On account of this, it is a condition sine qua non the Chinese total support to use the occidental
economic leverage against North Korea, so US has to put all his efforts in persuading China to
really fight against nuclearization.

Why does not China take action?

China is not comfortable with the nuclearization, however international relations experts like Ely
Ratner (Council on Foreign Relations) states that: “For Beijing, stability on the Korean Peninsula
has been always prioritized over denuclearization”. Xi Jimping’s regime fears a hypothetical
collapse in North Korean system and that is a strong reason they remain immobile related to
nuclearization.

Other important actor`s position

On one hand, Russia is a tremendously important player on the table who has kept an ambiguous
position when tightening oil imports, and has obstructed the implementation of tougher UN
Resolutions.

On the other hand, South Korea and Japan have shown opposite sometimes to a common
aggressive sanctions policy, fearing military retaliation by North Korea.

How to act?

First of all, it is essential to get the whole support of the UN Security Council plus Japan and
South Korea and guarantee that those countries will firmly execute the sanctions approved by UN
resolutions. If we look back, sanctions have always failed with North Korea, however tight
sanctions have never been thoroughly enforced by South Korea, Japan, Russia and China
simultaneously.

It looks easy but…

As I’ve affirmed before, there are impediments that limit cohesion with China, the main obstacle
to sanctions efficiency. Therefore, China will not spontaneously cut North Korea off. The
international community must be firm with China if really wants to face North Korean problem.
China’s economy depends on exports, which represented 19.6% of their GDP in 2016. Thus, if
EU, US and rest of developed economies agree to constraint Chinese imports, they will have a
great opportunity to influence China’s decision on North Korea.

It can lead to retaliatory measures from Beijing, but being realistic, China is not going to commit
to the denuclearization without external pressure. Their actions show clearly that they fear a North
collapse.

What is next?

Then, the international community must ensure to restraint North Korean oil and food inflows as
much as possible through sanctions over states, individuals, and companies that trade with
Pyongyang. In addition, it would be quite effective to identify and retain Korean funds in foreign
banks.

There is not guarantee that isolating North Korea will lead us to an immediate freeze on
nuclearization, but it can reach to an agreement end at least with the nuclear tests.

However, the threat will be there while there was not a regime’s change. Therefore intelligence
measures intended to depose Kim-Jong-Un, addressing the North Korean human rights and giving
voice to regime´s defector are measures that must be taken into account to stop the threat in the
future by turning population against the Supreme Leader.

Are those measures too aggressive?

Some experts argue that diplomacy is the right path. They state that tightening sanctions will
provoke military reaction from North Korea. And, Pyongyang will probably threaten to do it, as
they did in 2005 when Bush government announced to strengthen sanctions. But, we cannot forget
that aids, unenforced sanctions and ignored settlements have been the greatest drivers of
nuclearization. Therefore, it is necessary a firm and immediate action to slow down North Korea
military development.

But, why not hard power?

There is a growing sector which defends that it is time to execute a preemptive strike. But, we are
missing that the likely consequences would be millionaire live losses in Seoul and a complex war
would start. It is unacceptable to choose war without trying other ways.

Conclusion – Recapping:

Yes, there is policy-space between conflict and capitulation. It is narrow but it is a duty to explore
it before an armed conflict. International community must make historically immobile states
(especially China) to act, whatever it takes. Then, stronger sanctions must be imposed and actually
enforced to North Korea in order to isolate and collapse the regime. Finally, we cannot permit us
to make again the same mistakes. We cannot be always the “Good Cop.”
ATTACHMENTS

Figure 1

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/11/how-has-north-koreas-nuclear-programme-
advanced-in-2017

Figure 2
http://infographic.statista.com/normal/chartoftheday_10683_north_korea_trading_partners_n.jp
g

Figure 3

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship
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