SPOUSES CONSTANTE AGBULOS vs.
NICASIO GUTIERREZ In an Order2 dated October 24, 2002, the RTC granted the petitioners’ motion and
G.R. No. 176530 June 16, 2009
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the review of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated February 6, 2007 in CA–G.R. CV No. 83994 which set aside the
dismissal of a complaint for declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of title,
reconveyance and damages.
The case stems from the following antecedents:
On October 16, 1997, respondents, Dr. Nicasio G. Gutierrez, Josefa Gutierrez de
Mendoza and Elena G. Garcia, through their counsel, Atty. Adriano B. Magbitang,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a complaint against
petitioners, spouses Constante Agbulos and Zenaida Padilla Agbulos, for declaration
of nullity of contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages. The
complaint alleged that respondents inherited from their father, Maximo Gutierrez, an
eight-hectare parcel of land located in Callos, Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-123790 in the name of Maximo Gutierrez.
Through fraud and deceit, petitioners succeeded in making it appear that Maximo
Gutierrez executed a Deed of Sale on July 21, 1978 when, in truth, he died on April 25,
1977. As a result, TCT No. NT-123790 was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. NT-188664,
was issued in the name of petitioners. Based on the notation at the back of the
certificate of title, portions of the property were brought under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and awarded to Lorna Padilla, Elenita Nuega and
Suzette Nuega who were issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).
In their defense, petitioners averred that respondents were not the real parties in
interest, that the Deed of Sale was regularly executed before a notary public, that
they were possessors in good faith, and that the action had prescribed.
On the day set for the presentation of the respondents’ (plaintiffs’) evidence,
petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the
subject matter of the case. Petitioners contended that the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), not the RTC, had jurisdiction since the subject
land was covered by the CARP, and CLOAs had been awarded to tenants.
Respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the motion had been filed beyond
the period for filing an Answer, that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case based on
the allegations in the complaint, and that the DARAB had no jurisdiction since the
parties had no tenancy relationship.
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC held that the DARAB had
jurisdiction, since the subject property was under the CARP, some portions of it were
covered by registered CLOAs, and there was prima facie showing of tenancy. 3
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. On November 13, 2003, the RTC
denied the motion.4
Atty. Magbitang filed a Notice of Appeal 5 with the RTC, which gave due course to
the same.6 The records reveal that on December 15, 2003, respondent Elena G.
Garcia wrote a letter to Judge Arturo M. Bernardo, Acting Judge of RTC Gapan,
Branch 87, stating that they were surprised to receive a communication from the
court informing them that their notice of appeal was ready for disposition. She also
stated in the letter that there was no formal agreement with Atty. Magbitang as to
whether they would pursue an appeal with the CA, because one of the plaintiffs was
still in America.7
On February 6, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
Order dated October 24, 2002 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, Branch 87, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the subject
complaint is reinstated and the records of the case is (sic) hereby remanded to the
RTC for further proceedings.1avvphi1
SO ORDERED.8
The CA concluded that the dispute between the parties was purely civil, not agrarian,
in nature. According to the CA, the allegations in the complaint revealed that the
principal relief sought was the nullification of the purported deed of sale and
reconveyance of the subject property. It also noted that there was no tenurial,
leasehold, or any other agrarian relations between the parties.
Thus, this petition, raising the following issues for the resolution of this Court:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the appeal despite the undisputed
fact that Atty. Magbitang filed the notice of appeal without respondents’ knowledge
and consent;
2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving due course to the appeal despite the fact
that Atty. Magbitang’s appellants’ brief failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements of Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court regarding the contents of an
appellants’ brief; and
3. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC (Regional Trial Court), not the
DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board) or the PARAD/RARAD
(Provincial/Regional Agrarian Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator), has jurisdiction
over respondents’ complaint.9
The CA did not err in giving due course to the appeal, on both procedural and
substantive grounds.
A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is presumed to represent such
client before the appellate court. Section 22 of Rule 138 creates this presumption,
thus:
SEC. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal.
— An attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be
presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal
petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.
A reading of respondent Elena Garcia’s letter to the RTC would show that she did not
actually withdraw Atty. Magbitang’s authority to represent respondents in the case.
The letter merely stated that there was, as yet, no agreement that they would pursue
an appeal.
In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client
either expressly or impliedly. Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyer’s first
appearance and validates the action taken by him.10 Implied ratification may take
various forms, such as by silence or acquiescence, or by acceptance and retention
of benefits flowing therefrom.11 Respondents’ silence or lack of remonstration when
the case was finally elevated to the CA means that they have acquiesced to the
filing of the appeal.
Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to "serve his client with competence and
diligence."12 Consequently, a lawyer is entreated not to neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him; otherwise, his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.13 In light of such mandate, Atty. Magbitang’s act of filing the notice of appeal
without waiting for her clients to direct him to do so was understandable, if not
commendable.
The CA was likewise correct in holding that the case is within the jurisdiction of the
RTC, not the DARAB.
For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a tenancy relationship
between the parties. It is, therefore, essential to establish all the indispensable
elements of a tenancy relationship, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and
the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4)
that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that
there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6)
that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee.14
Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint.15
Respondents’ complaint did not contain any allegation that would, even in the
slightest, imply that there was a tenancy relation between them and the petitioners.
We are in full agreement with the following findings of the CA on this point:
x x x A reading of the material averments of the complaint reveals that the principal
relief sought by plaintiffs-appellants is for the nullification of the supposedly forged
deed of sale which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. NT-188664 covering their 8-
hectare property as well as its reconveyance, and not for the cancellation of CLOAs
as claimed by defendants-appellees. Moreover, the parties herein have no tenurial,
leasehold, or any other agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this
controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws. Neither were the CLOA
awardees impleaded as parties in this case nor the latter’s entitlement thereto
questioned. Hence, contrary to the findings of the RTC, the herein dispute is purely
civil and not agrarian in nature falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial courts.
On the alleged deficiency of the appellants’ brief filed before the CA by the
respondents, suffice it to state that the requirements in Section 13, Rule 44 are
intended to aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper resolution of the
case. Obviously, the CA found the appellants’ brief sufficient in form and substance
as the appellate court was able to arrive at a just decision. We have repeatedly held
that technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not to suppress,
substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules may, thus, be
allowed in order to attain this prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice
is the core reason for the existence of courts.16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’
Decision dated February 6, 2007 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 WILFREDO M. CATU vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA
A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected
thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother,
Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu2
and Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for
them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the
Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila4 where
the parties reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to
conciliation meetings.5 When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement,
respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and
Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his
appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant
filed the instant administrative complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an
act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for
the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings
between the litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to
hear complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he
heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of
the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality
towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle
their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that
Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her
case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the
commission of a patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh
out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their
respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-
CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.7
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he
presided over the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and
Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented
Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio.
In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with
counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing,
respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement
or employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said
service.
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:8
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a
breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND,
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from
the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.9 This was adopted and approved
by the IBP Board of Governors.10
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well
as the recommendation on the imposable penalty.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former
Government Lawyers
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left
government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened while
in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former
government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service."
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act
complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of
Profession of Elective Local Government Officials
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their
incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession "unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the general law which applies to all
public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 716012 governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than
the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation,
or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members
who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government
unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the
local government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian
member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of
work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not
derive monetary compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by
elective local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of
profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of
RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public
officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.13
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays are the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the
members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the
municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities
and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the
members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than
the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are
required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and
attention to the performance of their official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may
practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their
session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are
required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week.14 Since the law itself grants
them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach
in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior
permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors,
provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial
proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang
barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are excluded from any
prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And
this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the
sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.16
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his
profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from
the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.
A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure
Prior Authority From The Head Of His Department
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be
fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only
with the written permission of the head of the department concerned.17 Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department:
Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted
permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours
should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not
involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in
any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the
management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors.
(emphasis supplied)
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written
permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his
appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers
are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is
to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and
importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission,
respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated
civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. (emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical
standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
(emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal
ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport
himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.19
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney
for violation of the lawyer's oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of
professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this
resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word
delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered
into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court
Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.