TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS V.

vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL

G.R. No. L-23678

June 6, 1967

Facts:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander
Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had
three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had
three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

Six (6) years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two (2) wills, apportioning the
remainder of his estate and properties to his seven surviving children. The appellants filed their
oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes to
which they were entitled according to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased
wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two
separate wills.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the
illegitimate children’s successional rights

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under
the texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of
his will should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then
his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.

Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for
his national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of
the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
 PHILIPPINE TRUST CO.

vs.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN

G.R. No. L-12105

January 30, 1960

Facts:

Testator Bohanan was born in Nebraska and was a US citizen. He has some properties
in California. Despite his long residence in the Philippines, his stay was found by the CFI to be
merely temporary, and he remained to be a US citizen. The CFI declared his will as fully in
accordance with the laws of Nevada and admitted it to probate. The Philippine Trust Co. was
named executor of the will.

A project of partition was filed by Phil Trust which distributed the residuary estate into 3:
1) ½ to his grandson, 2) ½ to his brother and sister, to be distributed equally, 3) legacies of P6,000
each to his son and daughter, and 4) legacies to other people.

Respondent Magdalena Bohanan, his ex-wife, questions the validity of the partition,
claiming that she and her children were deprived of their legitimes. (It must be noted that
Magdalena and decedent C.O. Bohanan were married in 1909 but he divorced her in 1922. She
re-married in 1925 and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of decedent.) Nevada
law allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will. His ex-wife and children
oppose the project of partition filed by the executor-petitioner, saying they were deprived of their
legitimes. According to them, Philippine law must prevail, requiring decedent to reserve the
legitime for surviving spouse and children.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine law be applied.

Ruling:

Old CC Art. 10(2), now NCC Art. 16(2) “Nevertheless, legal and testamentary
successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the extent of the successional
rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession
is in question.”

As in accordance with Art. 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions
are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not
disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated
above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case at
bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the
testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
 Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO
G.R. No. L-22595
November 1, 1927
Facts:

The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased, Joseph Brimo, filed a scheme of
partition. However, one of the brothers of the deceased opposed the said partition. ccording to
the scheme and its provision, that the deceased requests that all his relatives respect his wishes,
otherwise those who opposed the same shall be cancelled in said disposition in favor of the
oppositor. The apellant in the case, who opposed the same, based his opposition on the fact that
the deceased was a Turkish citizen, that his disposition should be in accordance with the laws of
his nationality.

Issue: Whether or not the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws

Ruling:

No, although the disposition provides an express provision that it shall be governed by
Philippine Laws and those who opposed the condition of the provisions given shall be cancelled
from the disposition, the fact is that the condition itself is void for being contrary to law. Article 792
of the Civil Code provides:

“Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as
not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should
the testator otherwise provide.”
 ORION SAVINGS BANK
vs.
SHIGEKANE SUZUKI
G.R. No. 205487
November 12, 2014
Facts:

Respondent Shigekane Suzuki, a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja to inquire
about a condominium unit and a parking lot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly
owned by Yung Sam Kang, a Korean national. Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered
by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 18186] and Parking Slot No. 42 [covered by CCT
No. 9118] were for sale. Soneja likewise assured Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the parking
slot were clean. After payment of the price of the unit and parking slot, Kang then executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale. Suzuki took possession of the condominium unit and parking lot, and
commenced the renovation of the interior of the condominium unit. Kang thereafter made several
representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties, which were then allegedly in
possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several
verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the documents.
Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the status
of the properties. He learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the Parking Slot No. 42
contained no annotations although it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. Despite the
cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties remained in possession of Perez.
Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles. Orion, through Perez, however, refused to
surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult Orion’s legal counsel as its reason.

ISSUE: Whether or not Korean Law should be applied in conveying the conjugal property of
spouses Kang?

Ruling:
In the present case, the Korean law should not be applied. It is a universal principle that
real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is
located. Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by
what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can
pass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost.
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the
national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the
burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and
proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.
Matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine
law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property shall be governed by South
Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
 In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the
conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the
Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as
sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly
authenticated.
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not
proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that
Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married
to Hyun Sook Jung. There is no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki
for the supposed lack of spousal consent.
It is undisputed that notwithstanding the supposed execution of the Dacion en Pago on
February 2, 2003, Kang remained in possession of the condominium unit. In fact, nothing in the
records shows that Orion even bothered to take possession of the property even six (6) months
after the supposed date of execution of the Dacion en Pago. Kang was even able to transfer
possession of the condominium unit to Suzuki, who then made immediate improvements thereon.
 SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES v.

COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 122191

October 8, 1998

Facts:

Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudi Arabian Airlines. In 1990, while
she and some co-workers were in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab co-worker tried to
rape her in a hotel room. Fortunately, a room boy heard her cry for help and two of her Arab co-
workers were arrested and detained in Indonesia. Later, Saudi Airlines re-assigned her to work in
their Manila office. While working in Manila, Saudi Airlines advised her to meet with a Saudi
Airlines officer in Saudi. She did but to her surprise, she was brought to a Saudi court where she
was interrogated and eventually sentenced to 5 months’ imprisonment and 289 lashes; she
allegedly violated Muslim customs by partying with males. The Prince of Makkah got wind of her
conviction and the Prince determined that she was wrongfully convicted hence the Prince
absolved her and sent her back to the Philippines. Saudi Airlines later on dismissed Morada.
Morada then sued Saudi Airlines for damages under Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Saudi
Airlines filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case
because the applicable law should be the law of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Airlines also prayed for other
reliefs under the premises.

Issue: Whether or not Saudi Airlines’ contention is correct.

Ruling:

No. Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudi Airlines when the latter filed a
motion to dismiss with petition for other reliefs. The asking for other reliefs effectively asked the
court to make a determination of Saudi Airlines’s rights hence a submission to the court’s
jurisdiction.

Secondly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case because as alleged in the
complaint of Morada, she is bringing the suit for damages under the provisions of our Civil Law
and not of the Arabian Law. Morada then has the right to file it in the QC RTC because under the
Rules of Court, a plaintiff may elect whether to file an action in personam (case at bar) in the place
where she resides or where the defendant resides. Obviously, it is well within her right to file the
case here because if she’ll file it in Saudi Arabia, it will be very disadvantageous for her (and of
course, again, Philippine Civil Law is the law invoked).

Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a case, if there is a foreign
element involved, is the so called “locus actus” or where an act has been done. In the case at
bar, Morada was already working in Manila when she was summoned by her superior to go to
Saudi Arabia to meet with a Saudi Airlines officer. She was not informed that she was going to
appear in a court trial. Clearly, she was defrauded into appearing before a court trial which led to
her wrongful conviction. The act of defrauding, which is tortuous, was committed in Manila and
this led to her humiliation, misery, and suffering. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts
case, the SC finds that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the
alleged tortious conduct took place).
 Hasegawa and Nippon Eng. v.

Kitamura
G.R. No. 149177
November 23, 2007
Facts:

The petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co. is a Japanese consultancy firm which
provides technical and management support in the infrastructure project of foreign governments.
It entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Kitamura, a
Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines. Under the ICA, the respondent will
extend professional services to the petitioner for a year. Subsequently Kitamura was assigned as
project manager of STAR project in 1999. In 2000, he was informed by the petitioner that it will
no longer renew the ICA and that he will be retained until its expiration. Kitamura filed a civil case
for specific performance before the RTC of Lipa and damages. The lower court ruled that it has
jurisdiction over the dispute and denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss since accordingly, it is
vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil case filed by Kitamura. The Court of
Appeals upheld the lower court's decision.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling:

Yes, the only issue is the jurisdiction, hence, choice-of-law rules as raised by the petitioner
is inapplicable and not yet called for (reference to lex loci, lex contractus, or state of most
significant rule). The petitioner prematurely invoked the said rules before pointing out any conflict
between the laws of Japan and the Philippines. The doctrine on forum non conveniens cannot be
invoked to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. Dismissing the case on this ground requires a factual
determination hence the principle is considered to be more a matter of defense.
 Saudi Arabia Airlines and Brenda Betia v.
Ma. Jopette Rebesencio
GR No: 198587
Jan.14,2015

Facts:

Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is a foreign corporation established and existing under
the Royal Decree No. M/24 of Jeddah, who hired Respondents as flight attendants. After
undergoing seminars required by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration for
deployment overseas, as well as training modules offered by Saudi, Respondents became
Temporary and then eventually Permanent Flight Attendants; they entered into the necessary
Cabin Attendant Contracts with Saudi. Respondents were released from service on separate
dates in 2006; claimed that such release was illegal since the basis of termination of contract was
solely because they were pregnant. They claim that they had informed Saudi of their respective
pregnancies and had gone through the necessary procedures to process their maternity leaves
and while initially, Saudi had given its approval, they ultimately reneged and rather required them
to file for resignation. Respondents claim that Petitioner Airlines threatened that if they would not
resign, they would be terminated along with loss of benefits, separation pay, and ticket discount
entitlements; they anchored such on its “Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin
Attendants" which provides that “if the Air Hostess becomes pregnant at any time during the term
of this contract, this shall render her employment contract as void and she will be terminated due
to lack of medical fitness.

Respondents filed a Complaint with the Labor Arbiter against Saudi and its officers for
illegal dismissal and for underpayment, along with moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees. Petitioner Airlines contests the Labor Arbiter’s jurisdiction, as the contract’s points referred
to foreign law and that Respondents had no cause of action since they already voluntarily
resigned. Executive Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, but on appeal the NLRC reversed the
Labor Arbiter’s decision and denied Petitioner Airlines’ Motion for Reconsideration, hence the
current appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC has jurisdiction over Saudi Arabian Airlines
and apply Philippine jurisdiction over the dispute?

Ruling:

Yes, the summons was validly served on Saudi and jurisdiction over it validly acquired.
No doubt that the pleadings were served to Petitioner Airlines through their counsel, however they
claim that the NLRC and Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction since summons were served to Saudi
Airlines Manila and not to them, Saudi Airlines Jeddah. Saudi Airlines Manila was neither a party
to the Cabin attendant contracts nor funded the Respondents, and it was to Saudi Jeddah that
they filed their resignations. Court ruled however that by its own admission, Saudi, while a foreign
corporation, has a Philippine office, and that under the Foreign Investments act of 1991, they are
a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines and therefore are subject to Philippine
jurisdiction. Petitioner Airlines also asserts that the Cabin Attendant Contracts require the
application of the laws of Saudi Arabia rather than those of the Philippines. It claims that the
difficulty of ascertaining foreign law calls into operation the principle of forum non convenience,
thereby rendering improper the exercise of jurisdiction by Philippine tribunals. Court: Forum non
convenience finds no application and does not operate to divest Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction
and to require the application of foreign law. Though Article 1306 of the Civil Code provides that
Parties may stipulate terms they may deem convenient, Philippine tribunals may not lose sight of
considerations of law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy that underlie the
contract.

Article II, Sections 1 and 14 of the 1987 Constitution ensures the equal protection of
persons, and the equality between men and women. Though pregnancy does present physical
limitations that may render difficult the performance of functions associated with being a flight
attendant, it would be the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a disability so permanent and
immutable that, it must entail the termination of one's employment. Furthermore, contracts relating
to labor and employment are impressed with public interest. Article 1700 of the Civil Code
provides that "[t]her elation between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good.

As the present dispute relates to (what the respondents allege to be) the illegal termination
of respondents' employment, this case is immutably a matter of public interest and public policy.
Consistent with clear pronouncements in law and jurisprudence, Philippine laws properly find
application in and govern this case
 Republic of the Philippines v.

Marelyn Manalo

G.R. No. 221029

April 24, 2018

Facts:

On January 20, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a
judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court. The petition was later amended and captioned
as a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. The petition alleged, among
others, that: Petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named
Yoshido Minoro; Recently, a case for divorce was filed by petitioner in Japan and after due
proceeding, a divorce decree was rendered by the Japanese Court. The trial court (RTC) denied
the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be
recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not
afford Filipinos the right to file a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they
are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or
in another country” and that unless Filipinos “are naturalized as citizens of another country,
Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipino family rights and duties, together
with determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations,
including marriages”.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26
of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed
for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no
longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. v.
Exec. Secretary, ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers
and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to consider
Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the
appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential.

Issue: Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a
favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity
to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.

Ruling:

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien

spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision,
it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce
decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
 The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective
in the country where it is rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a
corrective measure to address the anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to remarry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino
spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage
bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or a wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end
of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In
both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce
decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the
latter’s national law.

There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her
alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered Filipinos who
have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are
alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses
who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them are based
merely on superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly
unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Thus, a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a
favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity
to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
 DAVID A. NOVERAS v.

LETICIA T. NOVERAS

GR No. 188289

August 20, 2014

Facts:

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with
the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the
divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005. The California court
granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple's properties in the USA.

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property
before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David's
failure to comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer...
all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling
the subject conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor
of her children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the
Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of P50,000.00 and P100,000.00 litigation expenses.

In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was
entered on 29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded
that the conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated
and... that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney's fees of both parties be charged against
the conjugal partnership.

David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines.
Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein
the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the
Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal properties.

Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is
highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the
spouses had been living separately... since 2003 when David decided to go back to the
Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has
been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha
Apolonio, who worked in the hospital... where David was once confined, testified that she saw the
name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. Third and more
significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2015.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the
petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

Issues: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and
the same can be included in the judicial separation prayed for.
Ruling:

We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction
over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly
states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country... where
it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the
spouses in the absolute community properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their
children's presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:

Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc
property. While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property,
absent a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have...
come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the
redemption money.

David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property
for the benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of
P120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election
expenses... in the amount of P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed
in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required
under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections.
Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as
the same had not benefited the family.

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate
children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the
mother." The children are therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net... assets
of the absolute community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same,
as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property
including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00.

Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as
their presumptive legitimes therefrom.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED. At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case
to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the
trial court's Decision with respect to liquidation.
 Norma Del Socorro v.

Van Wilsem

G.R. No. 193707

December 10, 2014

Facts:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended
by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and
her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines,
Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again
the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint
against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child
with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information
do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien

Issues: Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine
law, and whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for
his unjustified failure to support his minor child.

Ruling:

Yes, while it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether
he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This
does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In
international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity
to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is
not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and
prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to
support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice
to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law;
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles
of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a
parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation
is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be
denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

Yes, the court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living
here in the Philippines and committed the offense here.
 Republic of the Philippines v.

Orbecido

G.R. No. 154380

October 5, 2005

Facts:

Orbecido and Villanueva were married ad had two children. Wife went to US to work and
later became a US citizen. Thereafter he learned from his son that his wife obtained divorce and
married another man. Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of
the Family Code. RTC Zamboanga del Sur granted his petition. The SolGen's motion for
reconsideration was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the
RTC.

Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 (2).

Ruling:

Yes. Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise
be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage.

The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of celebration of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time the divorce decree is obtained abroad by alien spouse capacitating him/her
to remarry. However, Orbecido is barred from remarrying because he did not present competent
evidence showing his wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried.
 Republic of the Philippines v.

Albios

G.R. No. 198780

October 16, 2013

Facts:

Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge Calo
in Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC
a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to her, the marriage was
a marriage in jest because she only wed the American to acquire US citizenship and even
arranged to pay him $2,000 in exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state and complying with their marital obligations. The court
even sent summons to the husband but he failed to file an answer.

Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the marriage was void ab initio
for lack of consent because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they
had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00. However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
elevated the case to the SC. According to the OSG, the case does not fall within the concept of a
marriage in jest as the parties intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage. That
the parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

Issues: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

Ruling:

NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.

Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to
do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly
and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was
a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and
(2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the
sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45
and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. None of these
are present in the case.

Therefore, their marriage remains valid.

 Republic of the Philippines v.

Dayot

G.R No. 175581

March 28, 2008

Facts:

Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu
of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least
5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were
both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993
an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham
and his consent was secured through fraud.

Issue: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

Ruling:

CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at
the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started
living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage
on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to
the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to
a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an
action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe
and may be raised any time.
 Minoru Fujiki v.

Maria Paz Galela Marinay

G.R. No. 196049

June 26, 2013

Facts:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well
with petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi
Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started
to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and

Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara
and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in
the National Statistics Office (NSO).

The RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition. The RTC cited the following
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC). Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.

The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of
the Family Code of the Philippines on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by
Philippine courts

Issues: Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
Ruling:

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition
and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the
foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. Article 15 of
the Civil Code provides that "laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State
may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment... affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal
capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts
can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment
in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.

 Republic of the Philippines v.

Azucena Saavedra Batuigas

G.R. No. 183110

October 7, 2013

Facts:

This Petition for Review assails the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Decision of the
RTC that granted the Petition for Naturalization of respondent Azucena Saavedra Batuigas
(Azucena). On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of
Zamboanga del Sur. She stated that she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the
Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and that she will reside continuously in
the Philippines from the time of the filing of her Petition up to the time of her naturalization.

After all the jurisdictional requirements had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor
General filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged
in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade. The OSG maintained that Azucena is not
allowed under the Retail Trade to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade. The OSG likewise
disputed Azucena’s claim that she owns real property because aliens are precluded from owning
lands in the country. Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the
RTC denied said Motion. Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to
Chinese parents, Azucena has never departed the Philippines since birth. Azucena can speak
English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and tertiary education were
taken in Philippine schools. After earning a degree in education, she then practiced her teaching
profession in several different schools in Mindanao.

In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas (Santiago), a natural-born
Filipino citizen. They have five children, all of whom studied in Philippine public and private
schools and are all professionals. After her stint as a teacher, Azucena and her husband, as
conjugal partners, engaged in the retail business of and later on in milling/distributing rice, corn,
and copra. As proof of their income, Azucena submitted their joint annual tax returns and balance
sheets from 2000- 2002 and from 2004-2005. During their marital union, the Batuigas spouses
bought parcels of land in Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the citizenship requirement as required by
law to become a naturalized citizen of the Philippines.

Ruling:

Yes, under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial
naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the
“Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option, called derivative naturalization, which
is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473,
which provides that: “Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.”

Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be
deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they
possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to
submit themselves to judicial naturalization.

Records, however, show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of
Registration by reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID granted her application.
However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it found no sufficient evidence
that Azucena’s husband is a Filipino citizen, as only their marriage certificate was presented to
establish his citizenship. As the records before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino citizenship
has been adequately proven. Under judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth certificate
indicating therein that he and his parents are Filipinos. He also submitted voter’s registration, land
titles, and business registrations/licenses, all of which are public records.

Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the citizenship
privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family members, thus:

It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that
a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should
be different from that of the other. Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that
she is qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of making
her a part of a truly Filipino family.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is Denied. The Decision of the Court of which affirmed the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, that granted the Petition for Naturalization, is hereby Affirmed. Subject
to compliance with the period and the requirements under Republic Act No. 530 which
supplements the Revised Naturalization Law, let a Certificate of Naturalization be issued to
AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS after taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. Thereafter, her Alien Certificate of Registration should be cancelled.