In Re: Edillon 84 SCRA 554 (1978)

Facts: This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership dues assailing the
provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. He
contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights of being compelled to be a member
of the IBP in order to practice his profession and thus deprives his rights to liberty and property and thereby null and
void.

Issue: Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of the respondent.

Held: The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that are organized
by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP however is an official national body
of which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which
includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives and implementation of
regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does not infringe the constitutional rights of the respondent
as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement.
The name of Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.

In Re: Vicente Almacen

31 SCRA 562 – Legal Ethics – A Lawyer’s Right to Criticize the Courts

Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion
for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said
motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court
with regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court which
outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution.

This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional. He then filed before the Supreme Court a
petition to surrender his lawyer’s certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession when
members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client
was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and that he became “one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy.” He also stated “that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb.”

The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to ctually surrender
his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his lawyer’s certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked
that he may be permitted “to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an open and
public hearing.” He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is “the complainant, prosecutor and Judge.” Almacen
was however unapologetic.

ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court cannot accept every
case or write full opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out its
constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide “only those cases which present questions whose resolutions
will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved.” It should be remembered that a petition to review
the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain
the court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has the
right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen
to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary,
has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts.

In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have known that a motion for reconsideration
which failed to notify the opposing party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by the
court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.

In Re: Luis Tagorda

53 Phil 37 – Legal Ethics – Malpractice – Solicitation of Legal Business – Advertisement in the
Legal Profession – Stirring Up of Litigation

In 1928, Luis Tagorda was a provincial board member of Isabela. Before his election, he
campaigned that he is a lawyer and a notary public; that as a notary public he can do notarial acts
such as execution of deeds of sale, etc.; that as a lawyer, he can help clients collect debts; that he
offers free consultation; that he is willing to serve the poor.

When he won, he wrote a letter to the barrio lieutenant of Echague, Isable advising the latter that
even though he was elected as a provincial board member, he can still practice law; that he wants
the lieutenant to tell the same to his people; that he is willing to receive works regarding
preparations of sales contracts and affidavits etc.; that he is willing to receive land registration
cases for a charge of three pesos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of malpractice.

HELD: Yes. Tagorda admitted doing the foregoing acts. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.

The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially
with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well- merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and
conduct. Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications
or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional
to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or
trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in
exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement
for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the lawyer’s position, and all
other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where
ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so.

Tagorda’s liability is however mitigated by the fact that he is a young inexperienced lawyer and
that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts. So instead of being disbarred, he was
suspended from the practice of law for a month.

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN

THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR,

ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004

Facts:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to
impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation,
and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling
allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other
people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the
latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to
the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face
to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.

In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez
because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding
with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral
ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three
cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as “closed and
terminated.” Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve
moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really contained
the word “Attorney” as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-
disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar
Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can
dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to
disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations
are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

Issue: WON the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling is proper and shall subsequently
barred him from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of Attorneys

Held:

The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling
as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the
Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take
effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath
and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having
become moot and academic.

Rationale:

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good
moral character. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission
to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of
good moral character of the applicant. The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would
aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By
concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are
ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the
applicant