Products, Firms and Consumption Cadbury and The

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Products, Firms and Consumption:

Cadbury and the Development of
Marketing, 1900–1939
Robert Fitzgerald
a
Royal Holloway, University of London
Published online: 24 May 2006.
To cite this article: Robert Fitzgerald (2005) Products, Firms and Consumption: Cadbury
and the Development of Marketing, 1900–1939, Business History, 47:4, 511-531, DOI:
10.1080/00076790500132977
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00076790500132977
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Products, Firms and Consumption: Cadbury and the
Development of Marketing, 1900–1939
ROBERT FITZGERALD
Royal Holloway, University of London
Studies focusing on the long-term development of marketing and consumer goods

have furnished insights into a range of issues, yet general conclusions have proved
Downloaded by [Universite De Paris 1] at 00:40 30 August 2013
more elusive.1 The history of British confectionery demonstrates both symptoms. By

the close of the nineteenth century, the industry was a mass producer of desired
luxuries. Following a decade of significant changes in the nature and scale of
marketing activity, cocoa and confectionery in 1929 accounted for 1.7 per cent of
total retail expenditure in the United Kingdom, comparable to that other mass semi-
luxury, tea, though smaller than the sums spent on tobacco or alcoholic beverages.2 In
the history of marketing, the confectionery industry constitutes a valuable test case,
but there are difficulties with the published research, not least because the policies of
the principal manufacturer, Cadbury, and its eventual partner, Fry, have not been
adequately examined. This bias arguably distorts our interpretation of the industry,
and, indeed, our understanding of consumer products and their origin. Within British
business history, Cadbury, Fry, and their unified, successor company were major
enterprises. As well as being Britain’s largest producer of confectionery, in terms of
sales and profits, Cadbury-Fry was, in 1930, Britain’s 24th most sizeable
manufacturing firm as measured by market capitalisation, and 6th amongst makers
of packaged or household consumer goods. By 1935, it was the nation’s 29th largest
employer.3 In the period before 1939, Cadbury’s marketing capabilities were a
primary cause of its commercial expansion, and exercised a formative influence on
the nature of the confectionery industry. The origin and character of those capabilities
have not been fully understood.
There exists an analysis of overseas operations, and a history of Rowntree
acknowledges Cadbury’s influence on its rival’s strategic development.4 But there exists
no detailed academic study, and – considering its leadership in matters of employment
relations, business administration, and production management, as well as marketing –
there is a gap in our evaluation of British business more generally.5 George Cadbury’s
biography was published in 1923, a history was written by a manager, I.A. Williams, in
1931, and Diaper’s survey of Fry terminates in 1918.6 None of these reveal how Cadbury
built the organisational capabilities to establish brands so amenable to mass advertising
and popular appeal, and so deeply entrenched in the consciousness of consumers. The
company’s combination of corporate strategy, production policies, product development,
sales and advertising deserve more precise consideration. Since Cadbury-Fry continued
during this period to be dominated by its founding families, its history also ventures into
the area of ‘personal capitalism’ and its potential deficiencies.7 Although the company
was responsible for a range of successful lines, it was especially associated with
Business History, Vol.47, No.4, October 2005, pp.511 – 531

ISSN 0007-6791 print/1743-7938 online
DOI: 10.1080/00076790500132977 ª 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd
512 BUSINESS HISTORY
Cadbury’s Dairy Milk, a distinctive chocolate bar, known for its quality, and sold at a
price deliberately reduced during the critical decades of market transition. How did
Cadbury create an organisation capable of offering and then sustaining this value
proposition to consumers? The emergence of so-called ‘modern’ marketing is linked to a
number of key factors, although, as we shall see, their application at Cadbury and the
circumstances shaping their introduction were to produce a unique mix of competencies.
Such a business model bestowed first-mover advantages that were impossible to imitate,
and ultimately required other confectionery firms to seek alternative marketing
capabilities.
Firstly, there were matters of production and management. As leading confectionery
companies exploited the advantages of large-scale manufacturing, they implemented
associated changes in corporate structure as well as scale. Trends in operations and
management, in turn, altered the perception and organisation of marketing within

companies. Production techniques fashioned products, their differentiation, price and
output, and expanded markets and consumer demand. Alongside factory and managerial
systems, marketing developed as a function and as an organisational capability. Cadbury
was able to exploit lines that offered, alongside widespread consumer appeal, high
degrees of standardisation, operational efficiency and output, and so transformed popular
consumption and mass advertising. For the company, the impact of scale on management
and then on marketing was particularly efficacious, and, as a result, its view and
application of marketing came to differ from competitors.
Secondly, with regard to product development and innovation, major modifications in
procedure are said to offer valuable insights into the perceived character of marketing. By
replacing an extensive, ‘scatter-gun’ approach with intensive, targeted and highly
promoted mass sellers, firms can give primacy to the wishes of customers and consumers,
as revealed through market research. They may, as a result, gain a competitive advantage.
As well as having implications for strategic intent and technological innovation, product
development is a critical indicator of managerial goals, shifting them from the
‘production of goods’ to ‘the satisfaction of consumers’. It was Rowntree that adopted
the ‘marketing-orientation’ concept during the 1930s, but Cadbury did not follow the
example of its revitalised rival. It is important to explain, nonetheless, why its attitude to
product development remained strategically sound and viable.8
Thirdly, ‘modern’ marketing has been identified with changes in the scale and nature
of advertising and with the linked theme of changes in the attitudes and perceptions of
consumers. Product development and differentiation facilitated branding and advertising,
which subsequently influenced the perceptions and habits of consumers. The frequency
with which individual purchasers could look beyond utility towards the ‘associational’
aspects of goods is significant. Consumer motivations were mirrored in business policies
and objectives: the importance of price as opposed to other marketing considerations,
such as differentiation and promotion, was central to the determination of corporate
strategies. Cadbury did not rely merely on its operational and price advantages, which are
better known, and its distribution and advertising policies led the creation of a national
mass market for confectionery in the 1920s. It is noteworthy that Cadbury honed its skills
in production and in marketing simultaneously. It is the compatibility of the two
functions within the company that provided its competitive advantage, exemplified by the
strength of its value proposition to consumers. This degree of unison was not apparent in
FIRMS, PRODUCTS AND CONSUMPTION 513
rival firms, where dissimilar price structures, product lines and objectives meant that
marketing capabilities evolved differently.
In placing events at Cadbury within a broader understanding of marketing history and
British industry, we encounter an immediate problem: British historians have been
reluctant to frame general explanations of twentieth-century marketing. Caution is
justified by the scale of the subject and the complexities of its definition, stretching from
the macro-economic and the cultural to the business dimensions of product development,
technology, management strategy and corporate change. Despite disagreements over
interpretation and evidence, stages in marketing’s development have been noted
elsewhere.9 Descriptions of production, product, sales and marketing orientations are a
workable heuristic device, revealing changes in corporate emphasis and indicating the
evolution of so-called ‘modern’ approaches. From this perspective, entrepreneurs
concentrated, firstly, on improving production technology and factory operations, often

seeking the twin objectives of better product quality and lower costs; secondly, they
became more concerned with selling and distribution; finally, the marketing orientation
gave priority to the wishes of consumers, increasingly through the use of market research,
and purchasing, product development, production and finance were brought under the
direction of the marketing department. Production and product-based approaches
indicate, it is said, companies driven by supply-side challenges, perhaps at earlier stages
of their growth. They may be the institutional legacy of successful production
management or mass output, and these achievements may, as a consequence, become
deeply embedded within a corporate culture. Nevertheless, the solution of issues
‘internal’ to the firm may achieve ‘external’ consumer satisfaction through price
competitiveness, product quality and availability. In contrast, the marketing-orientated
company initially aims to discover consumer wishes, and integrates its activities in a
manner best able to satisfy them. For management authorities, like Drucker, a thorough
understanding of the consumer would enable goods to sell themselves, and marketing
should seek to make the downstream activity of selling superfluous.10
Historians of US marketing have proved themselves more willing than their European
counterparts to provide schemata. The period between 1880 and 1920, for instance,
attracts a degree of consensus for the arrival of large-scale companies, national markets,
mass advertising, branding, department stores and mail order, alongside critical
improvements in distribution and storage. Some interpret these developments as the
beginnings of ‘modern’ marketing.11 Tedlow notes the relationship between corporate
policies, unitary mass markets, high volumes, low margins and large profits, but, after
1920, he detects a further phase, with firms switching to greater market segmentation,
more value-based pricing, and the use of emotive, associational advertising.12
The extent to which development models and periodisation assist explanation is
problematic in the case of Cadbury. The transition from a production-based to a
marketing-orientated approach, involving enhanced branding and unique product appeals,
better fits our understanding of Britain’s second largest confectionery firm, Rowntree,
and, to a lesser extent, the third, Mackintosh.13 When, after many years of adaptation and
experimentation, Cadbury unified its strengths in products, production, management,
distribution and advertising, it obtained a dominance of the British confectionery
industry. The value that it offered to consumers convincingly emphasised both price and
quality, so countering the nostrums of later business theorists.14 The creation of a mass
market, in which chocolate was a frequent consumable for the bulk of the population,
necessitated a viable price, propositions about food content or sustenance, and the appeal
of a semi-luxury. Cadbury’s tactics were attuned to the economic uncertainties of the
inter-war period and the rising aspirations of consumers. The shift that some competitors
were to make from a production to a marketing orientation was a mark of their product
weakness, and offered no strategic advantage to Cadbury. The evidence suggests that the
power of a value proposition was built on the equality of the production and marketing
functions.
II
The British confectionery industry developed gradually from breakthroughs in the
manufacture of pure cocoa essence and its solubility, plus, subsequently, the refinement
of eating chocolate and its milk variant. Once living standards, in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, offered greater possibilities for the sale of comparatively expensive
products, businessmen responded actively, and used advertising to encourage changes in
personal expenditure. Campaigns linked cocoa with medicinal benefits and demands for
food purity; temperance themes accelerated the decline in per capita beer consumption;
and branding offered a cachet not available to firms selling unlabelled, unpackaged
goods.15 Yet the confectionery industry as a whole continued to consist of many small
enterprises making a wide variety of goods and frequently serving a local or regional
market. One major factor in shaping its structure, especially in cocoa and chocolate, was
the rise of three Quaker-owned companies – Cadbury, Fry and Rowntree – which
progressively exploited the new technologies, acquired operational scale, and marketed
nationwide lines. They became associated with their principal, advertised brands of cocoa
essence, and their growth helped to divide the confectionery industry into two broad
product categories: goods consisting entirely of chocolate or containing chocolate, and
those based instead on sugar.16 By 1907, the three Quaker companies were responsible
for approximately 21 per cent of all confectionery employees, a demonstration of their
relative success, but the remaining 79 per cent were to be found in a diverse industry of
many small-scale producers.17 Cadbury, from its Bournville works, near Birmingham, led
innovations in the industry, especially in the more ‘chocolate-y’ alkalised cocoa essence.
Fry, which originated in Bristol, demonstrated early signs of managerial and commercial
decline. In 1870, Fry’s sales had been greater than Cadbury’s by a factor of over 2.5, and
they were nearly 20 times those of York-based Rowntree; by 1900, at £1.3 million and
£1.2 million respectively, Cadbury’s sales were comparable to those of Fry, while
Rowntree’s were noticeably smaller at £0.46m. John Mackintosh & Sons, located in
Halifax, was still an initiate, with a turnover of just £30,000. Growing demand in the late
1890s favoured its distinct toffee lines, just as, in the early 1900s, it persuaded Terry’s of
York, principally a manufacturer of sugar confectionery, to expand its chocolate
production.18
All five of these businesses converted into private limited concerns between 1895 and
1899. Their actions reflected a trend within British industry: responding to cases of
financial collapse, firms sought the security of limited status, and acted before the
introduction of stricter company legislation.19 For Cadbury and Terry, there was also a
settling of succession issues, and, amongst confectionery enterprises more generally, the
conversion acknowledged the growth in output and operations.20 Unfortunately, we know

little about Fry’s resulting internal organisation, but, engaged in a continuous building
programme, it changed legal status on 1 January 1896. Joseph Storrs Fry was appointed
chairman, and Conrad P. Fry became the director overseeing office staff, the commercial
travellers, and advertising, his responsibility for white-collar staff and the sales team
seemingly involving him in promotional matters. There is some suggestion of a
departmental structure at Fry – its size presumably making this a necessity – but the
extent to which responsibilities and procedures were formalised is unclear.21 Changes at
Rowntree and Cadbury lucidly reveal the expansion of factory operations and associated
sales operations. The newly created departments were allocated a director and manager,
and administrative teams grew in size and capability. Incorporation required a board of
directors, which usually focused on finance, and executive committees became a regular
and recorded means of interdepartmental discussion. Rowntree registered as a private

limited company on 3 March 1897, and established its sales department in the following
year.22 Cadbury converted on 13 June 1899, and five of its directors were placed in
charge of separate functional departments, including sales. To assist boardroom
deliberations and to effect decision-making, executive authority was delegated where
necessary to interdepartmental committees and managerial staff. A sales committee,
appointed in 1906, and chaired by William Adlington Cadbury, involved representatives
from the general, costs, advertising and export offices.23
One of the economic consequences of the First World War was a rise in the real value
of confectionery sales; another was the decline in foreign imports. Raw material and
labour shortages inspired greater attention to efficiency, standardisation and longer
production runs. In circumstances of mismatched supply and consumer demand, firms
minimised their marketing activities. Inter-company collaboration extended the reach and
complexity of restrictive agreements, leading amongst the Quaker triumvirate to merger
discussions.24 The demand for confectionery reached a peak in 1920, but, with output not
growing so fast, the effect on prices was inflationary (see Table 1). However, comparing
pre- and post-war net output per capita in real terms, productivity in the industry did
improve, in fact almost doubling, and changes in production management and other
organisational capabilities made the vital contribution to this improvement.25 Reflecting
trends occurring throughout British industry, business growth and post-war prospects
brought a series of re-capitalisations amongst confectionery firms. Between 1916 and
1920, Cadbury increased its issued ordinary and preference shares by 75 per cent in real
terms.26
Amalgamations proffered further operational gains, size and protection against
renewed overseas rivalry. Cadbury and Fry had in 1915 formed the collusive Cheltenham
Conferences, named after their venue, but Rowntree was reluctant to join. By July 1917,
the two members were privately considering union.27 The British Cocoa and Chocolate
Company Ltd (BCCC), formed in May 1919, adopted a holding company structure.
Contrary to some accounts, archival records show that BCCC established joint boards and
committees to deal with the ‘more important aspects of the two businesses, such as
Buying, Sales, Export and Finance’.28 The early dominance of the Cadbury management
was apparent, and to portray the two firms as ‘little more than allies’ for purchasing and
overseas operations is a misunderstanding.29 Through BCCC, Cadbury enhanced its
oligopolistic advantages, but, as we shall see, these were not the result of merger but
TABLE 1
S A L E S A N D O U T P U T O F UK C ON F E C T I O N E R Y, 19 0 0 – 3 8
Sales (£m 1913 = 100) Per Capita

Output
Cocoa & Sugar Total Total Conf. Expenditure £ per Consumption
Year Choc. Conf. Conf. Conf. (000 tonnes) year (1913 = 100) oz/week
1900 11.4 6.9 18.3 187 0.44 3.2
1907 14.4 9.1 23.5 226 0.54 3.6
1913 19.7 11.0 30.7 306 0.67 4.7
1916 34.5 36.7 71.2 353 1.53 5.3
1920 54.3 47.4 101.7 295 2.33 4.7
1922 39.9 32.1 72.0 308 1.62 4.9
1924 32.2 30.3 62.5 322 1.39 5.0
1929 29.3 24.6 54.0 382 1.18 5.9
1930 27.8 22.5 50.2 375 1.10 5.7
1935 22.0 18.1 40.1 455 0.85 6.8

1938 25.0 18.1 43.1 481 0.91 7.1
Sources: A.R. Prest and A.A. Adams, Consumers’ Expenditure in the United Kingdom, 1900–19 (Cambridge,
1954), Vols.I–II; R.A. Stone and D.A. Rowe, The Measurement of Consumers’ Expenditure in the UK,
1900–19 (Cambridge, 1966), Vols.I–II; Biscuit, Cake, Chocolate and Confectionery Alliance,
Statistical Yearbook (London, 1986).
stemmed from its approach to management, production and marketing, as differences in

organisational capabilities with Fry testify. Rowntree did not join the Cheltenham
Conferences until March 1918. Then, some three years later, pressured by the depths of
the post-war depression, it conceded its need to join BCCC. Cadbury was wary, and its
judgement withering. It concluded that its rival could not match or trade improvements in
efficiency and processes. Its proposed new partners would want ‘to take advantage of the
(apparently) better recipes, processes, methods of manufacture, and the organisation (as
regards such matters as sales, bonuses, and piece work systems and perhaps advertising),
which are presumably why only Cadbury and Fry are making profits and securing a larger
proportion of the trade while [Rowntree] is falling behind’. Cadbury decided, hard-
headedly, against merger in November 1921.30
Before the First World War, Cadbury had been begun to investigate work methods,
wages and efficiency, and, during the conflict, it introduced ‘production planning’ that
gave primacy to the maintenance of a continuous output flow rather than maximum
flexibility. The new Planning Office controlled economical yet operationally efficient
stock levels, curtailing the freedom of individual departments. In anticipation of post-war
consumer demand, another bout of reorganisation was initiated in 1919. The main aim
was to conceive and develop a factory and administrative system that could facilitate
mass production methods and cost control, and so provide Cadbury with greater
competitive power. In these aims, it was aided by the growth in sales and output of milk
chocolate bars. The company held that industrial management was a highly skilled
profession, recruited university graduates, and particularly invested in staff responsible
for costing, planning and selling. Detailed consideration of the wholesale and retailing
network maximised product exposure and served the operational objectives of greater
throughput and efficiency.31 During the early 1920s, the sales department began to draw
up an annual sales plan, and collected information on regional sales patterns and the
efficacy of distribution mechanisms. It is noteworthy that Cadbury first employed the

term ‘marketing’ in this period, and that the execution of the annual plan combined the
co-operating functions of selling, advertising and production. The firm came to view
itself as a ‘pioneer’ of market research, and, although the nature of the evidence prevents
certainty, it focused on distribution and sales forecasts and not on the assessment of
consumer wishes as a tool of creative product development.32 Seebohm Rowntree had, as
early as 1919, acknowledged how his main rival had used lengthening production runs,
standardisation and cost cutting to overcome problems of inadequate wartime capacity.33
From 1921, he sought to emulate Cadbury, and amongst several subsequent initiatives
was a Marketing Committee, appointed in 1923, to estimate demand and assist annual
production planning.34
Cadbury established its substantial lead over the confectionery industry during the
inter-war period, and its business structures reflected what might be termed a
‘production-cum-marketing’ policy. Through mechanisation, economies of scale and
internal efficiencies, it was able to undercut competitors, stimulate demand and capture
consumer loyalty. Production and supporting management structures had articulated
marketing objectives. The secret of Cadbury’s success could be found in the ownership
of a quality product suited to extensive mechanisation and capable of transforming
spending patterns. Cadbury’s Dairy Milk became the British confectionery industry’s
premier brand. In coping with deflationary pressures, it was the firm’s principal
commercial weapon, and one attuned to a policy of price competitiveness and
consumer value. As Seebohm Rowntree commented, Cadbury had over two decades
been implementing a successful policy of labour-saving technology and improved
product quality.35 Traditional sweets and unpackaged items had low ingredient costs,
but their manufacture was highly labour-intensive. The ingredient costs of moulded
chocolate were greater, but could be counterbalanced by standardisation and
mechanisation.36 Between 1924 and 1938, through investment in plant and machinery,
Cadbury’s labour costs and general overheads fell in real terms by 56 per cent.37
Because of declining prices between 1922 and 1938, confectionery expenditure
declined in real terms by over 40 per cent, despite the rise in output (see Table 1).
Market conditions were harsh, but Cadbury’s superior financial performance over its
rivals reveals the efficacy of its product and production strategies (see Table 2).
Growing consumption and output can undoubtedly be attributed to falling commodity
and retail prices, but the advantages that finally accrued to branded chocolate producers
and others stemmed from noted product, marketing and organisational innovations,
most notably those implemented at Cadbury.
By the 1920s, the company formed the view that, for standardised articles of known
quality and low unit price, the consumer was primarily motivated by guarantees of good
value. Therefore, it argued, ‘the question of price’ occupies a key position in ‘an active
sales policy’. Between 1920 and 1924, the price of a half pound of Cadbury milk
chocolate fell from two shillings to one shilling (10p–5p), and, during 1930, the firm
decided that economic depression necessitated additional price reductions, despite
sustaining its press, poster and other promotional efforts. Sales increased over the next
three years, as Cadbury achieved, in 1933, its price objective of ‘2d for 2oz’, a phrase that
it established as a famous slogan.38 Although corporate organisation, production
management and a high-volume structure were a platform for the firm’s marketing
518
TABLE 2
C A D B U R Y , R O W N T R E E A N D M A C K I N T O S H : F I N A NC I A L P E R F O R M A N C E , 1 9 0 0 – 3 8
Year Return on Total Assets (a) Return on Capital (b) Return on Sales (c)
Cadbury Rowntree Mackintosh Cadbury Rowntree Mackintosh Cadbury Rowntree Mackintosh
1900–14 6.9 35.3 23.8 13.5 3.9 (d)
1914–20 17.7 32.7 77.2 8.0 9.6
1921–28 10.6 39.7 (e) 4.6 16.2 18.2 (e) 3.2
1929–34 17.2 5.4 8.6 40.8 7.5 12.7 6.4
1935–38 17.1 5.4 8.5 40.0 8.1 14.7 5.1
Notes: (a) Net profit/total assets.
(b) Net profit/issued ordinary and preference share capital.
(c) Net profit/sales.
(d) Figures based on 1900–08 and 1910–13.
(e) Figures based on 1921–25.
Sources: Cadbury Archives, 121/003697, Annual Reports & Schedules, 1921–29; Cadbury Brothers, Reports and Accounts; R. Fitzgerald, Rowntree and the Marketing
Revolution (Cambridge, 1995), pp.220–34; G.W. Crutchley, John Mackintosh: A Life (London, 1921), p.120.
BUSINESS HISTORY
strategy, Cadbury’s interest in other dimensions of the marketing equation has been
overlooked. As well as co-ordinating production management with distribution, Cadbury
believed that, despite or even because of its price strategy, a quality line like Dairy Milk
had to be supported by advertising if its unique characteristics were to be explained. Its
managers were conscious of the threat from cheap chocolate producers and sugar-based
goods. The contribution which management and organisational development made to
Cadbury’s production and pricing strategy has been underestimated; similarly, its
emphasis on consumer values did not imply an absence of concern for advertising.
In the 1920s, Rowntree copied Cadbury’s administrative structures, but did not, despite
its efforts, have Dairy Milk and its mass production possibilities. A similar conception of
marketing was a poor weapon against Cadbury’s price competitiveness, sales or
advertising revenues.39 Fry shared these problems. From 1921, the business was moved
from the centre of Bristol to the outskirts, at a site called Somerdale, where the latest
machinery and plant layout were employed. The firm claimed that it was – finally –
embracing ‘modernity’.40 Yet, in 1935, the Cadbury board noted Fry’s decade of
declining sales, and eight years of absent profitability. Searching for remedies, and in a
prescient understanding of elements of the Chandler thesis, Cadbury’s Bournville
headquarters identified three weaknesses: ‘management’, factory organisation or
‘manufacturing’, and ‘marketing’. Brushing aside concerns for the offence felt by
colleagues in Bristol, it took direct control of its partner.41
Despite Cadbury being a family business, and contrary to Chandler’s stipulations, it
possessed formal business structures and a managerial staff, and, consequently,
institutionalised marketing capabilities within its organisation.42 Moreover, the unique
competencies connected with marketing at Cadbury evolved during the 1920s as an
integral part of an effective production management and business organisation, while, at
Rowntree, they arrived in the 1930s as a managerial philosophy that could operate despite
flawed production practice.
III
How were changing perspectives on marketing’s role and its place within corporate
organisation related to the development of lines suited to a growing and changing
market? The difficult economic conditions of the 1920s and Cadbury’s first-mover
advantages prevented competitors, notably Rowntree, from duplicating its achievements,
and limited, too, the prosperity of its partner, Fry. The Bournville firm’s hegemony had
been constructed on deep foundations. Both Rowntree and Cadbury had established
laboratories by the turn of the century, in order to monitor quality and processes within
their expanding mass-production factories. What Cadbury demonstrated in the early
1900s was greater adaptability to changes in consumer taste. Despite the firm’s historical
attachment to traditional cocoa essence, the Cadbury manager and historian, Williams,
noted its willingness ‘to drop old favourites which have had their day’, and its desire to be
‘ready with new and improved products’. Having studied chemistry at University
College, London, George Cadbury, Jr. was placed in charge of laboratory work and new
lines. He sought to match the alkalised essence made by the Dutch firm of Van Houten,
and then compete by offering better value. As a result, experiments in a more ‘chocolate-
y’ cocoa essence were being conducted by April 1904.43
Despite the cocoa market having priority, Swiss success and British shortfall in the
selling of milk chocolate bars additionally motivated Cadbury.44 The firm was
manufacturing milk chocolate lines as early as 1897, and Rowntree and Fry made their
first milk chocolate blocks in 1899 and 1902 respectively. Yet the ability to blend
chocolate and liquid milk on a mass scale eluded the British firms, which still used the
less inviting powdered form.45 When, in 1904, George Jr. had formulated a viable
product, the company agreed on the descriptive name of ‘Cadbury’s Dairy Milk’, and
devised the still familiar purple wrapper and blue and white sleeve and label. The use of
cheaper but acceptable varieties of cocoa bean was in the long term a critical product and
commercial innovation. At first, the executive Committee of Management believed that
the line would ‘not take the place of our present milk chocolate’. Dairy Milk was,
nonetheless, introduced in 1905, and the delayed alkalised essence, named Bournville,
finally followed in 1906. Promotional expenditure, customarily spent only on premier

brands, was initially switched to Bournville and not to Dairy Milk. There was, at this
stage, no conception of the company owning a product that, because it was capable of
standardisation and unprecedented mass appeal, could be the foundation of a distinctive
production-cum-marketing strategy. Cadbury’s opportunity, unforeseen, unfolded
iteratively, and, as with so many confectionery innovations before the 1930s, rested on
subsequent economic and commercial events.46
Cadbury described itself as ‘sales orientated’ in the years before the First World War,
though the phrase in all probability refers to a concern for sales, distribution and
advertising, not the later distinction from ‘production-orientated’ systems. The Sales
Department had responsibility for suggesting new lines and designs, but the Factory and
Production Departments, which supervised costings and shapes, were seemingly
indifferent to outside instructions. It was the introduction of the annual sales plan during
the 1920s that enhanced co-ordination between the production, distribution and
advertising functions. It gave the Sales Department, in conjunction with the planning
and costing offices, greater control over volumes, but, crucially, did not change product
development processes.47 While Cadbury emphasised both price and quality, Rowntree
vacillated but placed greater faith in the ultimate benefits of product quality, while
seeking, paradoxically, to reduce prices. Intriguingly, Fry was accused of a ‘lack of
policy’, attempting to imitate product niches dominated by competitors, and avoiding a
long-term approach. It focused on ‘count lines’, so deemed because they were sold by the
unit for their differentiated qualities, unlike chocolate bars that were sold by weight at
standard, convenient prices. This reliance was seen in the 1920s as a dangerous, unstable
strategy, because traditionally count lines had been seen as temporary novelties only. Fry
developed, furthermore, a product range that competed with low-price goods, and, once
associated with poor quality, the firm’s fortunes declined continuously.48
Surveying Cadbury’s dominance, Rowntree acknowledged in the 1920s that milk
blocks were ‘the standard article by which a chocolate house is judged in the minds of the
public and the trade. It is also a powerful adjunct in the sale of other lines’. Its desire
merely to imitate Dairy Milk was a policy of recurring failure. The board, inspired by its
rising executive, George Harris, turned its attention to assortments, but also towards
count lines. Their approach was guided by the advice of J. Walter Thompson, the US
advertising agency, which urged Rowntree to organise ‘to meet the greater demand,
which seems sure to come, for even greater variety and novelty in confectionery’. Only
an intensive policy of research could create a few, differentiated, high-quality, large-scale

brands.49 Harris was inspired by Milky Way – or the Mars Bar as it was called in Britain
– and in the potential of chocolate-enrobed count lines bought as a single product. They
could be intensively advertised; with unique selling properties, they had clear identities
suited to single-line marketing; they could be sold on a mass scale; and they would act as
consumption substitutes to Cadbury’s Dairy Milk. Using advanced marketing and market
research techniques, Rowntree launched Black Magic, KitKat, Aero, Smarties and Dairy
Box between 1933 and 1938.50 Commercial renaissance had twin origins. Threat of
bankruptcy between 1929 and 1932 and the dominance of a rival’s milk chocolate drove
the product range’s reinvention, and won the adoption of a novel means to realise the
transformation. Cadbury did not face such a threat, and it had no wish to propel market
trends that might undermine the appeal of Dairy Milk. Unlike Cadbury, Rowntree
required the concept of the marketing orientation both to restructure a failing production
management and to revitalise product development. Mackintosh had likewise been a
troubled company in the 1920s, and its transformation began in 1932 with the acquisition
of Caley of Norwich’s chocolate plant. The ensuing new lines, such as Rolo and Quality
Street, were distinctive combinations of chocolate and toffee. But success appears an
example of intuitive entrepreneurship, unassisted by Rowntree’s approach to marketing
research.51
The role of research and development within British industry by the end of the inter-
war period remains a subject of active debate, but large-scale confectionery firms
undoubtedly had established and integrated in-house capabilities.52 At Cadbury, research
was shaped at an early point by overseas producers and by substitute lines of milk
chocolate and alkalised cocoa.53 Competitive forces rather than technology-push explain
the level of this commitment. The particular importance of Cadbury’s Dairy Milk
revealed, progressively, the value of highly advertised, branded, standardised mass
products and concentrated output; the very scale of its success led inevitably to an early
abandonment of the ‘scatter-gun’ and ‘trial-and-error’ approach to product development.
During the inter-war period, the firm’s rivals undertook initiatives to transform a market
dominated by Dairy Milk, seeking to by-pass Cadbury’s first-mover advantages. At
Rowntree, systematic product development became a deliberative strategic tool.54 Its
benefit to Cadbury being not so obvious, the firm did not in the later 1930s then seek to
follow its competitor’s example.
IV
Although Cadbury had not been convinced initially that Dairy Milk or even Bournville
cocoa would replace traditional lines, it readily invested in their production and
marketing when alerted to their potential. They were partly responsible for the fact that,
by 1910, Cadbury’s sales were for the first time greater than those of Fry. Conferences
amongst sales staff and commercial travellers, recorded in detail, demonstrate a limpid
understanding of advertising and its impact. Personnel unanimously supported the use of
illustrations as a means of appealing and communicating to consumers. They argued that
slogans were more effective than the expected wordy ‘argument’, and criticised their
company for withdrawing catch-phrases before they were fully embedded in the public
mind. Sales staff argued that advertising be directed at women and children, so
strengthening association with the desirable aims and values of child-care and parental
responsibility. In the middle of a commercial battle against Dutch cocoa and Swiss milk
chocolate, Cadbury’s advertising stressed the ‘Britishness’ of its products. In promoting
Cocoa Essence and Bournville jointly, the travellers believed that there was a failure to
differentiate their appeal, confusing, for some undeclared reason, the ‘working classes’ in
particular.55 The Rowntree board, it should be stressed, had a more ambivalent attitude to
the power and value of mass advertising, but its sales director recognised, in 1909, that ‘it
is the large bold advertising in the newspapers that tells’.56
Both firms recognised, before 1914, that new consumers of their products, often
designated as the ‘working classes’, were being created. Despite inflation in the early
years of the Great War, earnings may have been maintained, or improved, and, between
1917 and 1919, even the value of wages increased. To meet ‘basic’ civilian demand and
large military orders, production was switched to the less luxurious commodities of cocoa
and chocolate bars. The growth in the ‘working class’ market was linked to a perceived
need for advertising based on illustrations, emotional appeals, personalities and story-
lines, all of them able, furthermore, to ‘make a strong appeal to the cinema-going type of
mind’. Just as the consumer had changed, so inevitably, it could be assumed, would
marketing and product appeal, and Rowntree acknowledged Cadbury’s lead in this new
environment. By 1922, Cadbury’s milk chocolate sales were 20 times larger than
Rowntree’s.57
Greater consumption underpinned the further development of distribution systems,
most importantly the rise of lorry transport. Cadbury established a joint distribution
department with Fry, and local advertising was co-ordinated through regional depots.
Between 1922 and 1938, Cadbury nearly halved its distribution costs, despite a greater
proportion of the final price going to wholesalers and the 250,000 retailing outlets the
company supplied.58 By 1938 independent wholesalers carried 30–40 per cent of the
chocolate made by the five largest manufacturers, or about 50 per cent of national
production.59 Relations between companies, wholesalers and retailers were moderated
through policies of resale price maintenance, although collusion failed to halt continuous
price falls in the inter-war period.60 Williams notes in the mid-1920s the development of
‘marketing’ as a science and as a function distinct from day-to-day selling operations. His
perspective represents Cadbury’s strategy, organisation and operational strengths:
marketing, he stressed, necessitated the co-operation of sales, advertising and factory,
and sought to forecast demand and relate them to factory capabilities. The collection of
sales statistics, an annual sales plan, and production planning became at Cadbury, and
then at Rowntree, the means of achieving these ends.61
Cadbury’s emphasis on price reductions was complicated by the consumer’s
preference for rounded, convenient prices. Purchases came also from impulse and easy
access to points of sale, factors that underlined the firm’s emphasis on distribution
systems and its relationships with wholesalers and retailers. When it responded to poor
trading conditions in 1930 with a vigorous policy of improved efficiency, greater volumes
and further price cuts, Cadbury increased advertising expenditure as a means of
maintaining demand and the appeal of its products.62 J.W. Gwynn of Nestle’s British
operation later commented that prices had reached a dangerously low level for ‘an
ordinary business’, but not for Cadbury. The Birmingham firm described its theory of
selling as expanding the market while not allowing cheap producers to thrive, and its
manufacturing policy was to supply the ‘best quality combined with the lowest price
compatible with a profit’. Nestle, its great milk chocolate rival, attempted to maintain
prices through heavy advertising, achieving rising sales but not high profits.63
Fry was disadvantaged by price and marketing trends in the 1920s. Although the
industry leader in previous generations, it never had a reputation in the highest class of
confectionery business, and, after the war, it failed to develop lines able to attract the
expanding numbers of middle- and lower-class consumers. In a bout of honest
introspection, Fry was to conclude that its quality had remained comparatively poor, that
its advertising had not won consumer loyalty, and that its moulded chocolate trade was,
ultimately, ‘at the mercy of Bournville’s dictatorship’.64 Terry avoided the worst
consequences of price competition and Cadbury’s competition by emerging in the 1920s
as Britain’s premier manufacturer of chocolate assortments, most famously its All Gold
brand.65 Despite the vigour of its pricing policy, Cadbury would have accepted Arnold
Rowntree’s statement, made in 1923, that ‘there could be no large sale for a proprietary
item article unless it were made known’. The greater use of packaging in the food
industry led Seebohm Rowntree to conclude that Britain was ‘beginning to go in the same
direction as America’, and that this trend encouraged branding and advertising. His sales
director acknowledged his continued inability to match the scale of Cadbury’s
promotions, commenting that mass advertising, as well as mass production and
standardisation, were critical to success in the bar chocolate market. But Cadbury was
in no mood during the Great Depression to accept its rival’s suggestion and end the
‘advertising war’.66
The relationship between growing consumer wealth and commercial innovation in the
1920s was recognised by the Manchester Guardian: ‘like the activity in other luxury
industries, such as motor cars, one of the surprising features of England’s post-war
economy has been the expansion in the confectionery trades. And, even more surprising,
such expansion has not been in the demand for cheaper varieties, as might have been
expected, but in the higher grades’.67 The worldwide fall in commodity prices enlarged
for the majority of the population the possibility of products associated with the ‘new’
industries. As well as real incomes and demand, matters of business organisation,
production management, product innovation and advertising were all contributors to this
phenomenon. The outcome was not predetermined. The consumer’s predominant view of
confectionery and chocolate – the motivation for its consumption – seems to have
evolved during the inter-war period. Cadbury, for example, became conscious of the
growing availability and appeal of chocolate as a pleasure item. A company publication
argued that chocolate, once seen as a food, was increasingly eaten as a semi-luxury and
for ‘intangible reasons’. Rising living standards enabled the consumption of more
expensive foods and delicacies that were associated with ‘enjoyment’ rather than simple
‘sustenance’.68 Advertising approaches continued to stress a mixture of themes, including
quality, food value and price. Companies represented chocolate bars as meal-substitutes,
but they additionally stressed cachet, aspirations, pleasure and preference.69
The association of these aspects of twentieth-century or ‘modern’ marketing with
expanding consumption is evident. Between 1922 and 1938, consumer expenditure grew
in real terms by 32 per cent, and food and drink sales rose by 14 per cent. As we have
seen, total confectionery demand actually fell in real terms by over 40 per cent, but,
critically, per capita consumption by weight rose by 31 per cent. The value of
confectionery output per unit – taken as an aggregate – was 61 per cent less in 1938 than
in 1922, 59 per cent in the case of sugar confectionery, and 69 per cent for cocoa and
chocolate. Despite deflationary pressures, sales were still in real terms greater throughout
the whole inter-war period than in 1913. High levels of personal consumption illustrate
early market saturation, and the success of production and marketing policies. Britons in
1938 revealed an ability to eat 7.1 oz of chocolate and sweets per week, not far from the
post-war norm of about 8 oz (see Table 1).
In 1930, at a meeting of leading firms, including Rowntree, delegates noted pointedly
that the ‘working class’ accounted for over 51 per cent of purchasing power.
Confectionery goods had been, it was finally acknowledged, re-conceived as an
everyday experience open to most, one that was dietetically beneficial but, in addition,
pleasurable and life-improving.70 Nonetheless, the combination of good quality
confectionery with standardised, mass volume was needed if the allegiance of this
new market was to be maintained.71 Later industry reports identified the 1920s and
1930s as the decades ‘enabling chocolate to be purchased by all sections of the
community as a staple part of their diet rather than a luxury article’. The growth in
retail outlets, reduced raw material costs, improved manufacturing processes, falling
prices, and mass advertising all endowed these trends.72 Seebohm Rowntree reflected
on the broad changes in marketing and purchasing habits. Fifty years previously, he
argued, manufacturers had broken the control of wholesalers through the promotion of
proprietary items that retailers were compelled by the resulting customer demand to
stock. With the arrival of deflation and spare capacity in the inter-war period, the major
firms had pioneered marketing developments, but could not ignore rival improvements
in the value and variety of cheaper lines. Despite new types of demand, price
competition withheld financial security and consumer loyalty from individual
companies. There was, furthermore, the competitive marvel of Cadbury’s Dairy Milk
to ponder – if, of course, you were not Cadbury – and other industries like cigarettes
were directly ‘competing for the consumer’s surplus’.73 Strategies based on production
skills, standardisation and reduced prices were necessary, but, to gain long-term
success, appropriate product, advertising and distribution approaches were needed in
addition. As a representative of J. Walter Thompson informed some of Britain’s leading
manufacturers: ‘it is only in the post-war years that the selling problem has become
vital, with a consequent shifting of importance from manufacturing policy to marketing
policy’.74
Through its own market research, Cadbury concluded, in 1935, that over 90 per cent of
all classes ate chocolate.75 Towards the end of the 1930s, J. Walter Thompson calculated
that 72 per cent of Britons regularly bought bar or block chocolate, and that differences of
incidence between classes were – with the important exception of assortments – not
pronounced. Assortments like Black Magic cultivated a sophisticated, ‘middle-class’
appeal, but focused, too, on the topics of romance and anniversaries. ‘Regulars’ bought
on average a chocolate bar every 3–4 days, and accounted for 69 per cent of all sales. A
total 96 per cent of the population ate confectionery, chocolate being the first preference
for all except children, with their greater liking for toffees, which were the second largest
confectionery item in expenditure terms before chocolate assortments and gums at third
and fourth.76 Confectionery had evolved into a frequent consumption choice for the
majority of the population and across all classes, and its eating was installed as a popular,
ingrained and affordable habit. Within the confectionery market, the growth in chocolate
assortments, with their particular characteristics and consumption appeal, showed a
variety of commercial opportunities, but it was the success of Cadbury’s Dairy Milk that
was remarkable.77
It was the product that led the mixing of price with quality, value with cachet, and mass
consumption with individual consumer association. But, by the early 1930s, questions
were being asked about the next stage of innovation and market change. J. Walter
Thompson presciently predicted that bar chocolate sales would peak and that consumers
would require greater discretion and variety.78 Cadbury, arguing that its success was built
on the manufacture of good chocolate as well as price reductions, was concerned about
losing its ‘quality image’ and ‘its middle-class clientele’.79 The outbreak of war obscures
our ability to judge how far issues of branding, ‘pull’ advertising and cachet were gaining
on those of price, value and sustenance. Yet the success of Rowntree’s new brands and its
distinct marketing orientation reveal, as Cadbury detected, the confectionery industry’s
next step. In transforming product development and marketing at Rowntree, Harris
stressed the greatest use of research techniques; single-line, intensive advertising;
branding identities that were not reliant on proprietary names; a preference for press and
poster promotions, and ‘pull’ advertising in general; and a reduced product range. The
‘marketing orientation’ infused a reinvigorated corporate culture at Rowntree’s York
headquarters. A strategy dependent on count-lines enabled the firm to challenge the
dominant Cadbury’s Dairy Milk by avoiding unsuccessful imitation, and differentiation
was supported by rising advertising expenditure. In 1938, chocolate manufacturers as a
group spent £405,000 on advertising, a sum equal to 1.2 per cent of sales, a ratio far
outstripped by Rowntree’s own advertising intensity of 9.8.80 With its Quality Street and
Rolo brands, Mackintosh seized advantages from general changes in products and
marketing.81 Along with Rowntree it was assisted by the growing sales of filled blocks
and count-lines, and these products accounted for 24.1 per cent of the total chocolate
market in 1937, compared to 38.9 per cent for chocolate blocks or bars, and 35.1 per cent
for assortments.82
Greater product differentiation, changes in consumer expectations, and a further rise
in living standards all suggested continued fluidity in the nature of British
confectionery marketing. Within competition for quality brands, the advantages of
standardisation and lower price had not disappeared. Cadbury’s Dairy Milk remained
the industry’s leading brand, and, in 1936, amounted to about 420 tons per week in a
national milk chocolate market of some 700 tons.83 Despite Rowntree’s high
advertising intensity, Cadbury’s total outlays remained significantly larger than its
nearest rival (see Table 3). Fry, in an acknowledgement of its failures, in 1934,
consulted its market research agency, the London Press Exchange, and wanted to
know why its sales had progressively declined despite a major advertising campaign.
Unlike Rowntree and Mackintosh, it was unable to respond to marketing opportunities
with appropriate count-lines. Nor could it replicate the ‘snob’ and exclusive appeal of
lines such as Black Magic. By 1935, and under Cadbury’s influence, Fry was seeking
a consistent product development policy, both firms ‘having as a major objective the
attainment of distinctiveness’, and therefore long-term viability. But Fry’s association
with cheapness persisted. Despite a small recovery between 1935 and 1937, the
subsequent setback exposed Fry’s inherent fragility.84
TABLE 3
A D VE R T IS I N G E XP E N DI T U R E IN T H E U K O N P R E S S , R AD I O A N D P O S T E R S : C HO C O L AT E
P R OD U C T S , 1 9 3 3 –3 8 ( £, cu r r e n t t e r m s )
Company 1933 1938

Cadbury 142,240 234,677
Rowntree 91,287 156,370
Fry 42,587 45,934
Nestle 15,082 4,836
Terry 600 6,848
Source: J. Walter Thompson, Rowntree File, Total Advertising Expenditure, 24 July 1939.
V
Why and how did the marketing capabilities of Cadbury differ from those of its major
rivals by the end of the inter-war period? Overall, production, business organisation,
advertising skills, product development and market trends were all contributory factors at
different points to the evolution of capabilities. Firstly, attempts to imitate foreign
competition revealed, before 1914, entrepreneurial persistence and market awareness.
Cadbury’s capacity to make appealing products with cheaper ingredients was, moreover,
an endogenous source of innovation. Secondly, raw material shortages and military
orders during the First World War fortuitously encouraged the simplification of output
towards newly forged product strengths in drinking cocoa and chocolate bars. Thirdly,
wartime conditions fortified an earlier interest in production methods and supporting
managerial and planning structures. By the early 1920s, the company possessed the
systems and the products capable of responding to circumstances of rising demand,
comprising a new class of consumers and altering purchase habits. Fourthly, Cadbury’s
Dairy Milk was the product that drove the policy of standardisation and operational
efficiency. Fifthly, price-based competition was a bold marketing endeavour that
responded to prevailing economic conditions while expanding the popular demand and
market for chocolate.
Sixthly, and lastly, Dairy Milk’s output, revenues and product qualities were a potent
combination that suited its sustained and credible mass advertising. It could compete
against cheaper manufacturers for value, but its virtues had to be distinguished from other
quality brands. It was not a strategy of balancing supply with the available demand, as
micro-economic theory might imply, but the complexities of business required
investment in consumer association and loyalty and in distribution networks; in other
words, the company was concerned with the very creation and not just the ‘optimisation’
of a semi-luxury market. Price was, for Dairy Milk, a necessary but not a sufficient means
of success. Despite its recognised manufacturing abilities, it would, historically, be
mistaken to identify Cadbury as merely ‘production-orientated’, poised for the next stage
of marketing development.
How was the market for confectionery influenced by Cadbury’s mix of marketing
competencies? Before 1914, unlabelled items and certain sugar-based goods catered for
the majority of consumers, and confectionery was for most a ‘treat’ rather than an item of
everyday impulse purchase. Greater spending power in the inter-war years increased the
demand for cheaper as well as more expensive goods, and the continuation of
manufacturing diversity should be stressed. With rising incomes and growing
expectations, there was deflation and economic uncertainty, and Cadbury’s great
achievement was to meet the purchase motivation of higher quality with lower price. The
firm’s advertising, accordingly, promoted food value, and reinforced associations with
pleasure and enhanced life opportunities. Cadbury was the principal architect of a
confectionery market characterised by high levels of personal consumption for the
majority of the population. Its approach induced the transformation of the British
confectionery industry, its structure, and popular spending patterns.
What are the lessons of the Cadbury case for our understanding of marketing and its
development? Firstly, the steps by which the firm realised its marketing capabilities do
not tidily accord with the available interpretations. As Tedlow might suggest, distribution
networks evolved alongside factory organisation before 1914, but, on the other hand, the
firm also employed associational as well as mass advertising at any early point in its
expansion. For Cadbury, production and marketing capabilities, far from being
‘complete’ in the inter-war period, underwent further critical developments. They
advanced simultaneously, because low prices, good quality, large-scale output and mass
advertising were a self-reinforcing combination designed to meet prevailing circum-
stances. The firm did not move sequentially from a production- to a marketing-orientated
firm, and, with its dominant market position, there was no strategic incentive to engage in
intensive product development and market segmentation in the 1930s. Cadbury’s
‘production-cum-marketing’ formula formed the basis of its success within a
confectionery market that was highly evolved in terms of systems, consumption, and
advertising techniques.
Secondly, while the British situation does not equate with the US, the history of
Cadbury and the confectionery industry does support arguments for a ‘turning-point’ in
the 1920s. Accentuated competitiveness and rising real expenditure bestowed a greater
strategic importance upon the ‘marketing problem’. Yet the marketing responses of
confectionery firms brought not uniformity but strategic differentiation. Businesses
achieved long-term success by establishing unique capabilities and assets, and gaining
inimitable, asymmetric positions amongst competitors and consumers. Such strategic
positioning can arise, as it did at Cadbury, not through the execution of ‘grand plans’ but
from the particular history of management, innovation and opportunities, ultimately
necessitating an investment in ‘irreversible’ and unique resources and routines.85 It is
difficult, as a result, to draw up a comprehensive detailed list of major corporate and
market characteristics that are general to the period. While, for example, Cadbury’s
achievements in products and operations were genuinely innovative, it was the
unforeseen market conditions of the inter-war years that forged its ‘production-cum-
marketing’ approach. Its continued consumer appeal, by the 1930s, did not depend on its
acquiring the comprehensive marketing orientation so closely associated with Rowntree,
whose strategic repositioning was, compared to Cadbury, more consciously arrived at.
Rowntree’s development fits the classic description of marketing textbooks, and its
organisation was purposively differentiated, but it was not, as a consequence,
competitively superior. There was a decision on its part to manufacture count-lines
and adopt systematic market research, which cannot be understood without prior
reference to Cadbury’s entrenched hegemony. On the other hand, Mackintosh acquired
new lines and practised associated intensive marketing, but without the same market
research principles, or its two rivals’ managerial systems.
In seeking to outline the rise of modern marketing, Cadbury demonstrates a need to
understand the integration of different but interdependent dimensions of this key
function; and a need to accommodate the role of markets and competitors in shaping but
also differentiating the choices and capabilities of firms. Positioning amongst consumers
was directly linked with organisational choices, so that, while Rowntree came to
emphasise marketing over production, Cadbury’s marketing mix continued to balance
and harmonise these resources. Each firm’s formula was successful and enduring, and
Cadbury’s value proposition and the achievements of Dairy Milk depended on the
continued centrality of the production as well as the marketing function. One further
lesson is that the firm’s long-term accretion of marketing capabilities was not an outcome
of a purposive strategy or mere serendipity, but the result of iterative strategic and
organisational adaptation.86
NOTES
1 See R. Church, ‘New Perspectives on the History of Products, Firms, Marketing, and Consumers in Britain
and the United States since the Mid-Nineteenth Century’, Economic History Review, Vol.52 (1999), pp.405–
35.
2 R. Stone and D.A. Rowe, The Measurement of Consumers’ Expenditure and Behaviour in the United
Kingdom, 1920– 38 (Cambridge, 1966), Vol.1, pp.151, 174, and Vol.2, p.110.
3 L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (London, 1983), pp.102–3; L. Johnman, ‘The Largest
Manufacturing Employers of 1935’, Business History, Vol.28 (1986), pp.239–41. Cadbury-Fry is listed as
the 52nd largest employer amongst manufacturers and non-manufacturers in D.J. Jeremy, ‘The Hundred
Largest Employers in the UK: 1907, 1935, 1955’, Business History, Vol.33 (1991), pp.100–103.
4 G. Jones, ‘Multinational Chocolate: Cadbury Overseas, 1918–39’, Business History, Vol.27 (1985), pp.59–
75; R. Fitzgerald, Rowntree and the Marketing Revolution, 1862–1939 (Cambridge, 1995).
5 R. Fitzgerald, ‘Ownership, Organisation and Management: British Business and the Branded Goods
Industries’, in Y. Cassis, F. Crouzet and T.R. Gourvish (eds.), Management and Business in Britain and
France: The Age of the Corporate Economy (Oxford, 1995).
6 A.G. Gardiner, A Life of George Cadbury (London, 1923); I.A. Williams, The Firm of Cadbury, 1831–1931
(London, 1931); S. Diaper, ‘J.S. Fry & Sons: Growth and Decline in the Chocolate Industry, 1753–1918’, in
C.E. Harvey and J. Press (eds), Studies in the Business History of Bristol (Bristol, 1988), pp.33–45.
7 A.D. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, MA, 2000).
8 Rowntree was acquired by Nestle in 1988.
9 S. Hollander and R. Germain, Was There a Pepsi Generation before Pepsi Discovered It? Youth
Segmentation in Marketing (Lincolnwood, IL, 1992); R. Fullerton, ‘How Modern is Modern Marketing?
Marketing’s Evolution and the Myth of the ‘‘Production Era’’’, Journal of Marketing, Vol.52 (1988),
pp.108–25.
10 P.F. Drucker, Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices (New York, 1973), pp.64–5.
11 R. Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 1920–1940 (Berkeley, CA,
1985); S. Strasser, SatisfactionGuaranteed: the Making of the American Mass Market (Washington, DC,
1995); T. Nevett and S. Hollander (eds), Marketing in Three Eras (Michigan, 1987); R. Marchand, Creating
the Corporate Soul: The Rise of Public Relations and Corporate Imagery in Big Business (California, 2001);
D. Pope, The Making of Modern Advertising (New York, 1986).
12 R. Tedlow, New and Improved: the Story of Mass Marketing in America (New York, 1990).
13 Fitzgerald, Rowntree; idem, ‘Markets, Management and Merger: John Mackintosh & Sons’, Business
History Review, Vol.74 (2000), pp.558–60.
14 See M.E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors (New York,
1980); idem, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance (New York, 1985).
15 Fitzgerald, Rowntree, pp.9–44; A.R. Prest and A.A. Adams, Consumer Expenditure in the U.K., 1900– 1919
(Cambridge, 1954), pp.69, 75, 175; W.G. Clarence-Smith, Cocoa and Chocolate, 1765– 1914 (London,
2000), pp.238–9; T.R. Gourvish and R.G. Wilson, The British Brewing Industry, 1830– 1980 (Cambridge,
UK, 1994), pp.127–226; J. Othick, ‘The Cocoa and Chocolate Industry in the Nineteenth Century’, in D.J.
Oddy and D.S. Miller (eds), The Making of the Modern British Diet (London, 1976), pp.77–90; W.H. Fraser,
The Coming of the Mass Market, 1850– 1914 (London, 1981), pp.ix–x, 3–23, 27–36, 42–3, 58–61, 67–8,
135–9, 143, 166–7, 172–3; P. Mathias, Retailing Revolution: A History of Multiple Retailing in the Food
Trades, based on the Allied Suppliers Group (London, 1967); J. Burnett, Plenty and Want: A Social History
of Diet in England from 1815 to the Present Day (London, 1989), pp.107–31, 216–40; S.D. Smith,
‘Accounting for Taste: British Coffee Consumption in Historical Perspective’, Journal of Interdisciplinary
History, Vol.27 (1996), pp.183–214.
16 Diaper, ‘J.S. Fry & Sons’, pp.33–45; Williams, Firm of Cadbury, pp.37–41; Fitzgerald, Rowntree, pp.45–74.
17 Census of Production, 1907; Fitzgerald, Rowntree, pp.220–34.
18 Cadbury Archives (hereafter CA), 121/003697, Annual Reports & Schedules, 1921–29; Cadbury Brothers,
Reports and Accounts; Fitzgerald, Rowntree, pp.220–34; G.W. Crutchley, John Mackintosh: A Life
(London, 1921), p.120; Joseph Terry & Sons, Terry’s of York, 1767– 1967 (privately published, 1967), pp.2–
7; Census of Production, 1907–35.
19 P.L. Cottrell, Industrial Finance, 1830– 1914: The Finance and Organization of English Manufacturing
Industry (London, 1980), pp.162–3.
20 Fitzgerald, Rowntree, pp.69–74; idem, ‘Markets, Management and Merger’, pp.558–66; Terry & Sons,
Terry’s of York, p.3.

21 Fry’s Works Magazine: Bi-Centenary Number, 1728–1928, pp.24, 33–4. Fry built 11 new factories on or
adjacent to its original Union Street site between 1860 and 1914.
22 Fitzgerald, ‘Ownership, Organisation and Management’, p.43; idem, Rowntree, pp.69–126, 185–201.
23 CA, 120/003696, Share Capital, Sept. 1927; Cadbury Bros, Industrial Record, 1919– 1939: A Review of the
Inter-War Years (Birmingham, 1945), p.8; E. Cadbury, Experiments in Industrial Organisation (London,
1912), pp.1–13; Williams, Firm of Cadbury, pp.77–8, 83–4, 95.
24 CA, 122/003698, Directors’ Annual Statements, 1936; Fitzgerald, Rowntree, pp.513–18.
25 Census of Production, 1907–35.
26 CA, 120/003696, Statement of Share Capital of Cadbury Brothers; 121/003697, Annual Reports and
Schedules, 1921–29; Cadbury Brothers, Reports and Accounts, 1929–38; Rowntree Archives, Reports and
Accounts, 1929–38; Mackintosh Archives, Borthwick Institute, York, M/F/1/3.
27 Fry Archives (hereafter FA), Profiteering Act 1919, Notes of Evidence, n.d.; Letter, E.E. Holloway to R.R.
Sly, 1 May 1943; Statement by E. Cater, n.d.; CA, Committee of Management, 21 Feb. 1917, Letter from
Cadbury to Rowntree, 17 Feb. 1917; Agreement between Cadbury and Fry, 13 June 1917; Letter to Conrad
Fry, 23 Oct. 1917; Letter to J.S. Fry & Sons, 20 Sept. 1917; Circular from Cadbury, April 1917; Meeting
between Fry, Rowntree, Cadbury, Caley and Manufacturing Confectioners’ Association, 24 April 1917;
Agreement for Fixing Minimum Prices, 15 March 1918; Meeting of Directors, Bournville, 25 July 1917;
190/003901, Memorandum and Articles of BCCC; Conference, Union St, 13 Aug. 1918; 122/003698,
Directors’ Annual Statements, 1918; Committee of Management, 17 and 21 Feb. 1917, 15 March 1917, 12
April 1917, 26 June 1917, 25 July 1917, 28 Nov. 1917, 12, 19, 30 Dec. 1917; Directors’ Annual Statements,
1919; Board of Directors, 2 and 20 Nov. 1921; Rowntree Archives, Directors’ Conferences, xxv, 10 Dec.
1917, 28 Jan. 1918, 4, 5 and 11 Feb. 1918.
28 Cadbury shareholders were allotted shares in BCCC worth £2.3m, while those from Fry received £985,714.
29 Diaper, ‘J.S. Fry & Sons’, p.51; Fitzgerald, ‘Ownership, Organisation and Management’, pp.38–43; idem,
Rowntree, pp.190–92; Chandler, Scale and Scope, p.246.
30 CA, 122/003698, Directors’ Annual Statements, 1918, 1921; Committee of Management, 1 and 24 Jan.
1917; 17 and 23 May 1917; 17 and 26 June 1917; 17 and 28 Nov. 1917; 13 and 18 Feb. 1918; 6, 18, 20 and
27 March 1918; 18 and 30 Dec. 1918; Joint Board, 30 Oct. 1918; Joint Board Minutes and Memoranda, 12
and 19 Oct. 1921, 15 Nov. 1921, 23 Nov. 1921, 7 Dec. 1921; Letter from Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths & Co.
to Barrow Cadbury, 19 Oct. 1921; Rowntree Archives (hereafter RA), Directors’ Conferences, xxxii, 6 and
20 Sept. 1921; 4, 11, 18 and 25 Oct. 1921; 1 and 29 Nov. 1921.
31 Cadbury Bros, Industrial Challenge: The Experience of Cadbury’s of Bournville in the Post-War Years
(London, 1964), pp.9–14, 17, 28–9; idem, Industrial Record, pp.8–16.
32 Industrial Challenge, pp.14–19, 28–9; Cadbury Archives, 122/003698, Directors’ Annual Statements, 1929;
Williams, Firm of Cadbury, pp.238, 244–7; Industrial Record, pp.8–16, 34–5.
33 RA, Directors’ Conferences, xxviii, 14 July 1919; xxix, 16 Dec. 1919.
34 Fitzgerald, ‘Ownership, Organisation and Management’, pp.43–7; idem, Rowntree, pp.84–5, 205–9, 244–6,
249–51.
35 RA, Directors’ Conferences, xxxiii, 6 and 27 Jan. 1925.
36 J. Walter Thompson, Rowntree File, Analysis of Sales and Distribution, Aug. 1931, 18 March 1938.
37 CA, 122/003698, Directors’ Annual Statements, 1929; Rowntree Archives, Directors’ Conferences, xxxiii,
15 March, 5 April 1927; Cadbury Bros, Industrial Record, pp.16, 34; Cadbury Bros, Industrial Challenge,
pp.14–19, 28–9.
38 Cadbury, Industrial Record, p.37. ‘2s’ and ‘1s’ are the symbols for pre-decimal currency, two shillings and
one shilling respectively, and ‘2d’ is the symbol for two pennies. There were 12 pennies to the shilling; and
20 shillings to the £. Therefore, 1s is equivalent to 5p, and 2d is equivalent to 1p in decimal terms.
39 CA, Joint Board Minutes and Memoranda, 6, 22 Oct. 1924; Views of B.S. Rowntree, 9 April 1930; Note, 23
June 1930; Statement, June 1930; Letter from B.S. Rowntree, 12 May 1930; RA, Directors’ Conferences,
xxxiv, 25 March, 1 April 1930.
40 Confectionery News, Aug. 1937, pp.97–8.
41 CA, Board of Directors, Memorandum, 12 March 1935; Minutes, 26 March 1935; Memorandum, 2 April
1935; J.S. Fry & Sons: Statement for B.C.C.C. Ltd, 9 Oct. 1935; Memorandum to Fry & Sons, 7 March
1935; Memorandum from Cadbury to Fry & Sons, 29 March 1935; Minutes, 24 July 1935; Shareholders, Fry
& Sons Ltd, 1935; Letter from W.A. Cadbury to C. Fry, 6 Dec. 1935; 122/003698, Directors’ Annual
Statements, 1936.
42 Fitzgerald, ‘Markets, Management, and Merger’, pp.576–83.
43 CA, Committee of Management, 26 April, 8 Nov. 1904, 3 and 15 Jan. 1905, 20 June 1905; Williams, Firm of
Cadbury, pp.81–3, 280.
44 See J. Heer, World Events, 1866–1966: the First Hundred Years of Nestle (Rivaz, 1966), pp.79–89, 105–6,
130–44; Statistical Abstract for the UK, 1887–1901, pp.86–9.

45 Diaper, ‘J.S. Fry & Sons’, pp.44–5.
46 CA, Committee of Management, 22 March, 26 July, 9 Aug 1904, 22 and 29 March 1905; Williams, Firm of
Cadbury, pp.73–4, 80–83; RA, Directors’ Conferences, xii, 6 and 27 April, 4 May 1909. The Milk Tray
assortment was introduced in 1915, Flake in 1920 and Wholenut in 1930.
47 Cadbury, Industrial Record, pp.8–- 16, 34–5.
48 RA, Laboratories/Experimental Work, I, A/1581, S. Allen, ‘Notes on Chemical Department, April 1897–
July 1946’, 1–6, 8–9; Directors’ Conferences, xxxii, 18 Oct. 1921, 10 Jan. 1922; 1, 15 and 29 May 1923; 8
Jan., 10 Sept. 1924; 914000992, Future Marketing Policy, 17 Jan. 1934.
49 J. Walter Thompson, Rowntree File, Rowntree’s sales history, 1932.
50 Fitzgerald, Rowntree, pp.300–323.
51 Fitzgerald, ‘Markets, Management, and Merger’, pp.576–83.
52 D. Edgerton, Science, Technology and the British Industrial Decline (London, 1996); D. Edgerton and S.
Horrocks, ‘British Industrial Research and Development before 1945’, Economic History Review Vol.47
(1994), pp.217–38; J.M. Sanderson, ‘Research and the Firm in British Industry’, Science Studies Vol.2
(1972), pp.107–51; S.B. Saul, ‘Research and Development in British Industry from the End of the
Nineteenth Century’, in T.C. Smout, The Search for Wealth and Stability (London, 1979), pp.114–38; G.N.
von Tunzelmann, Technology and Industrial Progress: The Foundations of Economic Growth (Aldershot,
1995); K. Pavitt (ed.), Technological Change and British Economic Performance (London, 1980).
53 See S.M. Horrocks, ‘Quality Control and Research: The Role of Scientists in the British Food Industry,
1870–1939’, in J. Burnett and D.J. Oddy (eds), The Origins and Development of Food Policies in Europe
(Leicester, 1994).
54 D. Fusfield, ‘Industrial Research: Four Stages of Progress’, Research Management Vol.18 (1975), pp.13–14;
M.L. Kamien and N.L. Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation (Cambridge, 1982); J. Schmookler,
Innovation and Economic Growth (Cambridge, MA, 1966). See also R. Church and C. Clark, ‘Product
Development of Branded, Packaged Household Goods in Britain, 1870–1914: Colman’s, Reckitt’s and
Lever Brothers’, Enterprise and Society Vol.2 (2001), pp.503–42.
55 CA, Committee of Management, 28 June, 26 July, 9 Aug., 6 Sept., 8 Nov. 1904; 3 Jan., 29 Feb., 15, 22 and
29 March, 19 April, 20 and 27 June, 4 July, 3 Oct., 28 Nov. 1905; Special Advertising Conference, 4 Nov.
1911; Cadbury, Industrial Record, pp.8–16.
56 RA, Directors’ Conferences, ii, 20 Feb. 1901; vii, 20 March 1906; iv, 3, 10 and 31 March 1903, 7 and 21
April 1903, 22 May 1903; 6 Nov. 1903, Special Conference on Milk Chocolate; xi, 17 and 24 Nov. 1908; xii,
23 and 30 March, 6, 22 and 27 April, 4 and 12 May 1909; xvi, 22 Dec. 1911.
57 RA, Directors’ Conferences, xxviii, 29 and 30 April 1919; xxviii, 14 July 1919; xxix, 16 Dec. 1919;
Advertising, ii, A/2683, Report on Sales, 1918–19; Advertising Expenditure Statement, 1911–43; xxviii, 14
July 1919; Miscellaneous, iii, Cocoa and Chocolate Industry in the UK (1961), 6; Cadbury Bros, Industrial
Challenge, pp.4, 34.
58 Cadbury, Industrial Record, pp.41–59; Williams, Firm of Cadbury, pp.238, 244–7.
59 RA, 0009 Series, Box 17, 28 June 1955; Wholesale Confectioners’ Association leaflet; J. Walter Thompson,
Rowntree File, Rowntree’s History 1725–1931.
60 Management Research Group, No. 1, W/8/30-32/14, Memorandum, 12 Sept. 1930; Talk by Iris Douglas, J.
Walter Thompson, formerly Rowntree, 23 May 1930.
61 Rowntree Archives, Directors’ Conferences, xxii, 11 Dec. 1923; Williams, Firm of Cadbury, pp.247–91.
62 Cadbury, Industrial Record, pp.16, 33–7.
63 CA, Board Memoranda, Vol.1, Five Firm Conference, 30 Oct. 1936; Meetings with Nestle, 17 Jan. 1936. In
1935, the Five Firm Conference was formed between Cadbury, Fry, Rowntree, Nestle and Terry to decide on
price maintenance, advertising expenditure, and promotional schemes.
64 CA, Board Memoranda, Next Year’s Advertising, 18 June 1930; Fry Archives, Future Marketing Policy, 17
Jan. 1934; Sales Research Department, Marketing Policy, 18 Jan. 1935.
65 Terry & Sons, Terry’s of York, pp.5–9.
66 Rowntree Archives, Directors’ Conferences, xxxii, 1, 15 and 29 May 1923; xxxiii, 4 and 11 March 1924;
Fitzgerald, Rowntree, pp.160–82.
67 Manchester Guardian Commercial, quoted in Confectioners’ Union, July 1928, p.39.
68 Cadbury, Industrial Challenge, pp.19–23.
69 Fitzgerald, Rowntree, pp.147–82, 277–346.
70 Advertising claims before the rationing concerns of the Second World War received little monitoring.
71 Management Research Group, No.1, W/8/30-32/14, Memorandum, 12 Sept. 1930. The figures relate to Jan.
1930.
72 RA, Miscelleaneous, iii, A/-, Cocoa and Chocolate Industry in the UK (1961?).
73 CA, Views by B.S. Rowntree, 9 April 1930; Joint Board Minutes, Vol.9, Private Interview with B.S.
Rowntree, 11 April 1930.

74 Management Research Group, No.1, W/8/30-32/14, Talk by Iris Douglas of J. Walter Thompson, formerly
Rowntree, 23 May 1930; J. Walter Thompson, Rowntree File, Rowntree’s History 1725–1931. Figures for
1930.
75 Advertisers’ Weekly, 3 Oct. 1935, pp.419–20.
76 J. Walter Thompson, Rowntree File, Report on Aero Chocolate, Sept. 1937; Present Market for Sweets,
1937?
77 Census of Production, 1924–35.
78 J. Walter Thompson, Rowntree File, Sales and Distribution Analysis, Aug. 1931, 18 March 1938;
Rowntree’s Sales History, 1932; Investigation by National Institute of Industrial Psychology on Assorted
Chocolates, Dec. 1932; Fitzgerald, Rowntree, pp.304–5.
79 CA, Board Memoranda, Next Year’s Advertising, 18 June 1930.
80 RA, Miscellaneous, iii, A/-, Cocoa and Chocolate Industry in the UK (1961?); Fitzgerald, Rowntree,
pp.303–12.
81 FA, Post-War Policy, 10 March 1943.
82 RA, Miscellaneous, iii, A/-, Cocoa and Chocolate Industry in the UK (1961?).
83 CA, Board Memoranda, Meeting between F.G. Fryer and P.S. Cadbury, 17 Dec. 1936; No. 2, Letter from
P.S. Cadbury to F.G. Fryer, 5 Jan. 1937; Advertising Dept, Annual Report, 1937; Joint Board Minutes and
Memoranda, Meeting with Nestle, 17 Jan. 1936; Advertisers’ Weekly, 21 March 1935, p.419.
84 FA, Future Marketing Policy, 17 Jan. 1934; Sales Research Department, Marketing Policy, 18 Jan. 1935, 30
July 1935; Marketing Plan, 9 Nov. 1935; Post-War Policy, Sales History.
85 See D.J. Teece, ‘Economic Analysis and Strategic Management’, California Management Review Vol.26
(1984), pp.87–110; C.K. Prahalad and G. Hamel, ‘The Core Competence of the Corporation’, Harvard
Business Review Vol.99 (1991), pp.79–91; J.A. Kay, Foundations of Corporate Success (Oxford, 1993). See
also E.T. Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (Oxford, 1959); D.C. North, Institutions,
Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1990); R.R. Nelson and S.G. Winter, An
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge, MA, 1982).
86 See, also, R. Church and C. Clark, ‘Purposive Strategy or Serendipity? Development and Diversification in
Three Consumer Product Companies, 1918–39: J. & J. Colman, Reckitt & Sons and Lever Bros. /Unilever’,
Business History Vol.45 (2003), pp.23–59.

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Studies focusing on the long-term development of marketing and consumer goods

more elusive.1 The history of British confectionery demonstrates both symptoms. By

Business History, Vol.47, No.4, October 2005, pp.511 – 531

management, in turn, altered the perception and organisation of marketing within

concentrated, ﬁrstly, on improving production technology and factory operations, often

conversion acknowledged the growth in output and operations.20 Unfortunately, we know

and recorded means of interdepartmental discussion. Rowntree registered as a private

Sales (£m 1913 = 100) Per Capita

1935 22.0 18.1 40.1 455 0.85 6.8

stemmed from its approach to management, production and marketing, as differences in

efﬁcacy of distribution mechanisms. It is noteworthy that Cadbury ﬁrst employed the

ﬁnally followed in 1906. Promotional expenditure, customarily spent only on premier

an intensive policy of research could create a few, differentiated, high-quality, large-scale

Company 1933 1938

Terry’s of York, p.3.

130–44; Statistical Abstract for the UK, 1887–1901, pp.86–9.

Rowntree, 11 April 1930.

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