LAWYER AND LEGAL PROFESSION respondent attached pictures supposedly of his friends and family with Pineda as well

as electronic mail messages (e-mails) purportedly coming from the latter.8

2. A.C. No. 8000 August 5, 2014
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
CHAMELYN A. AGOT, Complainant,
vs. In a Report and Recommendation9 dated April 17, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA, Respondent. Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable,
and accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension for a
DECISION period of four (4) months, with a warning that a repetition of the same would invite a
stiffer penalty.10
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in deceitful
conduct for: (a) misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer; (b) failing to deliver
Complaint-Affidavit1
For the Court's resolution is a dated August 30, 2008 filed by the services he contracted; and (c) being remiss in returning complainant’s
complainant Chamelyn A. Agot (complainant) against respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera downpayment of ₱350,000.00. The Investigating Commissioner did not lend credence
(respondent), charging him of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) to respondent’s defense anent his purported transactions with Pineda considering that
and the lawyer's oath for misrepresentation, deceit, and failure to account for and the latter’s identity was not proven and in light of respondent’s self-serving evidence,
return her money despite several demands. i.e., photographs and e-mails, which were bereft of any probative value.11

The Facts In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously
adopted and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation with the modification
In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that she was invited as maid of honor in increasing the period of suspension to six (6) months and ordering respondent to return
her best friend’s wedding on December 9, 2007 at the United States of America. To the amount of ₱350,000.0012 to complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of
facilitate the issuance of her United States (US) visa, complainant sought the services notice, with legal interest from the date of demand.13
of respondent who represented himself as an immigration lawyer. Thus, on November
17, 2007, they entered into a Contract of Legal Services (Contract), 2 whereby The Issue Before the Court
respondent undertook to facilitate and secure the release of a US immigrant visa in
complainant’s favor prior to the scheduled wedding. In consideration therefor,
complainant paid respondent the amount of ₱350,000.00 as downpayment and The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
undertook to pay the balance of ₱350,000.00 after the issuance of the US visa. 3 The administratively liable for violating the CPR.
parties likewise stipulated that should complainant’s visa application be denied for any
reason other than her absence on the day of the interview and/or for records of criminal The Court’s Ruling
conviction and/or any court-issued hold departure order, respondent is obligated to
return the said downpayment.4 However, respondent failed to perform his undertaking After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings,
within the agreed period. Worse, complainant was not even scheduled for interview in subject to the modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon
the US Embassy. As the demand for refund of the downpayment was not heeded, respondent.
complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa and the instant administrative
complaint against respondent.5
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. 14 In this regard,
In his Comment6 dated December 5, 2008, respondent claimed that his failure to Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides:
comply with his obligation under the Contract was due to the false pretenses of a
certain Rico Pineda (Pineda), who he had believed to be a consul for the US Embassy
and to whom he delivered the amount given by the complainant. Respondent CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
elaborated that he had a business relationship with Pineda on the matter of facilitating OF THE LANDAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
the issuance of US visas to his friends and family, including himself. He happened to
disclose this to a certain Joseph Peralta, who in turn referred his friend, the Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
complainant, whose previous US visa application had been denied, resulting in the conduct.
execution of the Contract. Respondent claimed that Pineda reneged on his
commitments and could no longer be located but, nonetheless, assumed the
responsibility to return the said amount to complainant.7 To buttress his claims,
In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer,
which resulted to complainant seeking his assistance to facilitate the issuance of her
US visa and paying him the amount of ₱350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal
services. In truth, however, respondent has no specialization in immigration law but
merely had a contact allegedly with Pineda, a purported US consul, who supposedly
processes US visa applications for him. However, respondent failed to prove Pineda’s
identity considering that the photographs and e-mails he submitted were all self-serving
and thus, as correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, bereft of any
probative value and consequently cannot be given any credence. Undoubtedly,
respondent’s deception is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the
legal profession; it reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law. 15
Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform his obligations under
the Contract, which is to facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of
complainant. This constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR,
to wit:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his
client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such
client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed upon him.16 Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter
entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be
held administratively liable,17 as in this case.
Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when
he failed to refund the amount of ₱350,000.00 that complainant paid him, viz.:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES
OF HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
xxxx
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. x x x.
Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and
prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith.18 The highly fiduciary nature of
this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property
collected or received for or from his client.19 Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as
of professional ethics.20
Anent the proper penalty for respondent’s acts, jurisprudence provides that in similar
cases where lawyers neglected their client’s affairs and, at the same time, failed to
return the latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the Court imposed upon
them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v.
Lawsin,21 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure to
perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client and to return
the money given to him by the latter. Also, in Jinon v. Jiz,22the Court suspended the
lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his failure to return the amount his client gave
him for his legal services which he never performed. In this case, not only did
respondent fail to facilitate the issuance of complainant’s US visa and return her
money, he likewise committed deceitful acts in misrepresenting himself as an
immigration lawyer, resulting in undue prejudice to his client. Under these
circumstances, a graver penalty should be imposed upon him. In view of the foregoing,
the Court deems it appropriate to increase the period of suspension from the practice
of law of respondent from six (6) months, as recommended by the IBP, to two (2)
years.
Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering respondent to return the
amount of ₱350,000.00 he received from complainant as downpayment. It is well to
note that "while the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only
revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his
civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed
liabilities which are purely civil in nature - for instance, when the claim involves moneys
received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and
not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement." 23 Hence, since respondent
received the aforesaid amount as part of his legal fees, the Court finds the return
thereof to be in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent) is found guilty of violating
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon the finality of this
Decision, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.1âwphi1
Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Chamelyn A. Agot the
legal fees he received from the latter in the amount of ₱350,000.00 within ninety (90)
days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will
warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

3. A.C. No. 8313 July 14, 2015
PILAR IBANA-ANDRADE and CLARE SINFOROSA ANDRADE-
CASILIHAN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is an administrative case filed against Atty. Eva Paita-Moya by Pilar Ibana-
Andrade and Clare Sinforosa Andrade-Casilihan. On 7 December 2009, this Court,
through the First Division, issued a Resolution1 referring the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision within
ninety (90) days from the receipt of records.
After the proceedings, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to the
Supreme Court on 18 November 2013 its Notice of Resolution, 2 alongside the Records
of the case. The IBP Board of Governors also passed a Resolution3 on 13 February
2013 adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation 4 of the Investigating
Commissioner for this case.
The Report and Recommendation summarizes the facts of this case as follows:
Here is complainants’ version. On October 3, 2007, complainant Pilar Andrade,
stockholder and Treasurer of Mabini College Inc. filed Civil Case No. 7617 for
Injunction, Mandamus and Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Daet,
Camarines Norte when she was illegally suspended by Luz Ibana-Garcia, Marcel
Lukban and respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya. In the said case then pending before the
Honorable Executive Judge Arniel Dating, respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya appeared
as counsel for all respondents.
Complainant Clare Sinforosa I. Andrade-Casilihan likewise filed an illegal dismissal
case against Mabini College Inc. and now pending before the Honorable Court of
Appeals. In the said labor case, respondent stood as counsel for Mabini College, Inc.
and co-respondent Luz I. Garcia and Marcel Lukban.
In another illegal dismissal case filed by Alven Bernardo I. Andrade on September 28,
2005 currently pending before the Court of Appeals, respondent acted as counsel for
Mabini College, Inc. Luz I. Garcia and Marcel Lukban.
After the aforementioned cases were filed, complainants had found out that on June
27, 2008, the Honorable Supreme Court promulgated a resolution in the case entitled
Wilson Cham versus Atty. Eva Paita-Moya docketed as A.C. No. 7484 suspending
respondent from the practice of law for one month.
Complainants were surprised. They later got a copy of the Office of the Bar Confidant’s
certification confirming that until date (apparently May 6, 2009, the dare [sic] OR No.
0304748 was issued) respondent’s suspension order has not yet been lifted.
On June 2, 2009, complainants were able to obtain a copy of the Supreme Court
Circular No. 51-2009 informing all courts that respondent was suspended from the
practice of law for one month and said suspension was received by respondent on
June 15, 2008.
However, despite of the subject June 27, 2009 Resolution on July 15, 2008 and despite
knowledge of her suspension from the practice of law, the said resolution having been
further posted in the website of the Supreme Court and is available in CD Asia’s Lex
Libris, respondent continued to practice law in wilful disobedience of the Supreme
Court’s suspension order in A.C. No. 7494.
In fact from June 27, 2008 until May 2009, respondent filed the following papers and
pleadings as counsel in Civil Case No. 7617, to wit:
Comment to Motion for Voluntary Inhibition dated July 15, 2008.
Motion to Admit Answer which was undated but submitted on November 12, 2008.
An undated Comments/Opposition to the Petitioner’s Formal Offer of Evidence in
Support of the Application for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction which was
received by petitioners’ counsel on November 26, 2008.Motion to Admit Amended
Motion for Reconsideration dated February 9, 2009 which was received by petitioners’
counsel on February 12, 2009.
Motion for Reconsideration dated January 23, 2009.
Motion to File Position Paper dated April 13, 2009; and
Pre-Trial Brief for Respondents dated May 13, 2009.
Also in connection with complainant Casahilan’s Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, respondent never withdrew her appearance. The same is true in the case of
Alven Bernardo Andrade. Respondent never withdrew her appearance therein.
Likewise and notwithstanding such suspension, respondent continued to practice law
and respondent clients in other cases before the four (4) branches of the Regional Trial
Court in Daet, Camarines Norte. Supporting this truthful assertion are the following:
CERTIFICATION dated May 29, 2009 issued by Atty. Michael Angelo S. Rieo, Branch
Clerk of Court, Branch 38, Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.
CERTIFICATION dated November 24, 2009 issued by Atty. Elaine Gay R. Belen,
Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 39, Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.
CERTIFICATION dated November 19, 2009 issued by Mr. Eddie E. Balonzo, Acting
Clerk of Court, Branch 40, Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte; and
CERTIFICATION dated November 5, 2009 issued by Mr. Chito B. Pacao, OIC/Legal
Researcher II, Branch 41, Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.
And per the November 5, 2009 letter of Atty. Michael Mortimer G. Pajarillo, Chapter
President, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Camarines Norte Chapter, Daet,
Camarines Norte, respondent "xxx Atty. Eva Paita-Moya has not complied with the
order of the Supreme Court relative to her suspension from the practice of law from
June 27, 2008 up to the present.5
Respondent’s version, as stated in the Report,6 is that she started serving the
suspension order on 20 May 2009. This was also her position in her Manifestation and
Motion to Suspend Proceedings7 dated 30 September 2010. She likewise alleged
therein that she had filed with the Supreme Court in December 2009 an Urgent Motion
to Lift Order of Suspension with the Supreme Court, which was unresolved as of the
date of her Manifestation.8Additionally, she argued that the resolution of the initial
administrative case docketed as A.M. No. 7464 was material to her position in this
particular case.9
The issue in this case falls solely on the question of whether Respondent engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law, that is, the practice of law despite the clear language
of this Court’s suspension order.
The Report and Recommendation recommended that Respondent be found liable. We
adopt the same, with modification.
The suspension order was received by Respondent on July 15, 2008. 10 Despite this,
she continued to practice law in various cases, as shown by the pleadings she filed and
the certifications noted by the Report.11 In fact, she continued receiving various fees for
her services throughout the duration of her suspension. 12
It is important to note that her defense consists of an admission that she was indeed
suspended, and allegedly served her suspension. 13 She claimed that she never
received the resolution that had allegedly suspended her.14 By logical inference
therefore, her sole defense is ignorance of the resolution that suspended her.
However, the records of this very Court belie her statements. Office of the Court
Administrator Circular No. 51-2009 stated the following:
For your information and guidance, quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of the
Resolution of the Third Division dated 27 June 2008, in Administrative Case No. 7494
entitled, "Wilson Cham vs. Atty. Eva Paita-Moya", to wit:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross misconduct and hereby
SUSPENDED for one month from the practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this
Decision. She is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with
more severely.
On 15 July 2008, Atty. Moya received the said resolution as per Registry Return
Receipt No. 2320. (Emphases supplied)15
Moreover, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued a Certification dated 8 May 2009 that
the suspension of Atty. Paita-Moya in A.C. No. 7494 had not yet been lifted.16
We had laid down guidelines in Maniago v. De Dios,
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the following guidelines
be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the
practice of law:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice
of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory
upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision
final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a
Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant,
stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has
not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of
the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has
pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared
as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondents
compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under
oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or
disbarment, as may be warranted.17
This case is not without precedent.18 Previously, we had already stated the standard for
discipline upon erring lawyers who continue practicing despite being suspended by the
Court, viz: Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to
any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.
— A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat, this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the
practice of law for six months for practicing his profession despite this court's previous
order of suspension.1âwphi1 We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding
his position as Regional Director despite lack of authority to practice law. 19
The Commissioner recommended the suspension of respondent from the active
practice of law for six ( 6) months with stem warning that any similar infraction in the
future would be dealt with more severely.20 In light of this and the jurisprudence already
cited, we adopt the recommendation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA is found GUILTY of
violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for an additional period of six (6) months from her one (1) month
suspension, totaling seven (7) months from service of this resolution, with a WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of
the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to respondent's
record as member of the Bar.
Atty. Paita-Moya is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this
Decision, to determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
4. ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-
LOZADA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated August 2, 2007 filed by Alvin S. Feliciano
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada (Atty. Lozada) for
violation of Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656
entitled “Bobie Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada”3 suspending Atty.
Lozada for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the dispositive portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty of
violating Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of
willfully disobeying a final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals. She is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years from notice,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, for their information and
guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.4
On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty. Lozada's motion for
reconsideration.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case
no. 101-V-07 entitled “Edilberto Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano, et al.,” where
complainant was one of the respondents, complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada
appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and her husband, Edilberto Lozada, and actively
participated in the proceedings of the case before Branch 75 of the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela City. To prove his allegation, complainant submitted certified true
copies of the minutes of the hearings, dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007 and July 6,
2007, wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name as one of the counsels, 6 as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes showing that Atty. Lozada conducted direct
examination and cross-examination of the witnesses during the trial
proceedings.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel while still
suspended from the practice of law constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions
of the Court which suspended her from the practice of law for two (2) years.
On September 12, 2007, the Court resolved to require Atty. Lozada to comment on the
complaint against him.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In her Comment9 dated November 19, 2007, Atty. Lozada explained that she was
forced by circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of her husband who is
embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed that she believed in good faith that her
appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law,
considering that she is defending her husband and not a client. She insisted that her
husband is a victim of grave injustice, and his reputation and honor are at stake; thus,
she has no choice but to give him legal assistance.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On January 30, 2008, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In its Report and Recommendation12 dated March 9, 2009, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty. Lozada guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the terms of her suspension from the practice of law as imposed by the Court. Thus,
the IBP-CBD recommended the disbarment of Atty. Lozada.
On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve with modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD such that it
recommended instead that Atty. Lozada be suspended from the practice of law for
three (3) months.
RULING
We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with modification.
Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When
this Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, as in the instant case,
the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal
knowledge within the period of suspension.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It
includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession" or
"[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.”14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no
doubt that Atty. Lozada's actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for
and in behalf of her husband, conducting or offering stipulation/admission of facts,
conducting direct and cross-examination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore,
the findings of the IBP would disclose that such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively
engaging in the practice of law in June-July 2007 were done within the period of her
two (2)-year suspension considering that she was suspended from the practice of law
by this Court in May 4, 2006. It would then appear that, at the very least, Atty. Lozada
cannot practice law from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear that when Atty. Lozada
appeared for and in behalf of her husband in Civil Case No. 101-V-07 and actively
participated in the proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or within the two (2)-year
suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well that at the
time she represented her husband, she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension
order. Yet, she failed to inform the court about it. Neither did she seek any clearance or
clarification from the Court if she can represent her husband. While we understand her
devotion and desire to defend her husband whom she believed has suffered grave
injustice, Atty. Lozada should not forget that she is first and foremost, an officer of the
court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, willful
disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. 15
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact
that it is part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will always look out
and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse.
Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her
husband and that in essence, she was not representing a client but rather a spouse,
we deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty.
Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan v. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy P.
Baliga,16 citing Molina v. Atty. Magat,17 where this Court suspended further
respondents from the practice of law for six (6) months for practicing their profession
despite this court's previous order of suspension, we, thus, impose the same penalty
on Atty. Lozada for representing her husband as counsel despite lack of authority to
practice law.
Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of
unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the
legal profession. While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring
lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as
not to frustrate its preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial
discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if, through it, the end desire
of reforming the errant lawyer is possible.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is
found GUILTY of violating Section 27,19 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is
hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months from the practice of law, with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe
penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of
the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to respondent’s
record as member of the Bar.
Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this
Decision, so that we can determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall take
effect.

This Decision is immediately executory.
6. A.C. No. 7241 October 17, 2011
[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1506]
ATTY. FLORITA S. LINCO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The instant case stemmed from an Administrative Complaint1 dated June 6, 2005 filed
by Atty. Florita S. Linco (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
against Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal for disciplinary action for his failure to perform his duty
as a notary public, which resulted in the violation of their rights over their property.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco),
the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements, consisting of 126 square
meters, located at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase I-A, B, C & D, Valley View Executive
Village, Cainta, Rizal and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 259001.
Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary public for
Mandaluyong City, notarized a deed of donation 2 allegedly executed by her husband in
favor of Alexander David T. Linco, a minor. The notarial acknowledgment thereof also
stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P. Toledo (Toledo), mother of the donee, allegedly
personally appeared before respondent on July 30, 2003, despite the fact that
complainant’s husband died on July 29, 2003.3
Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of Deeds of
Antipolo City cancelled TCT No. 259001 on March 28, 2005 4 and issued a new TCT
No. 292515 in the name of Alexander David T. Linco.
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She claimed that respondent's
reprehensible act in connivance with Toledo was not only violative of her and her
children's rights but also in violation of the law. Respondent's lack of honesty and
candor is unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.
In hisAnswer,6 respondent admitted having notarized and acknowledged a deed of
donation executed by the donor, Atty. Linco, in favor of his son, Alexander David T.
Linco, as represented by Lina P. Toledo.
Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by Atty. Linco, through an
emissary in the person of Claire Juele-Algodon (Algodon), to see him at his residence
located at Guenventille II D-31-B, Libertad Street, Mandaluyong City. Respondent was
then informed that Atty. Linco was sick and wanted to discuss something with him.
Respondent pointed out that Atty. Linco appeared to be physically weak and sickly, but
was articulate and in full control of his faculties. Atty. Linco showed him a deed of
donation and the TCT of the property subject of the donation. Respondent claimed that
Atty. Linco asked him a favor of notarizing the deed of donation in his presence along
with the witnesses.
However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that he would be notarizing a
document, he did not bring his notarial book and seal with him. Thus, he instead told
Algodon and Toledo to bring to his office the signed deed of donation anytime at their
convenience so that he could formally notarize and acknowledge the same.
On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon went to his law office
and informed him that Atty. Linco had passed away on July 29, 2003. Respondent was
then asked to notarize the deed of donation. Respondent admitted to have consented
as he found it to be his commitment to a fellow lawyer. Thus, he notarized the subject
deed of donation, which was actually signed in his presence on July 8, 2003.
During the mandatory conference/hearing on September 7, 2005, it was established
that indeed the deed of donation was presented to respondent on July 8,
2003.7 Respondent, likewise, admitted that while he was not the one who prepared the
deed of donation, he, however, performed the notarization of the deed of donation only
on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died.81avvphi1
On November 23, 2005, in its Report and Recommendation,9 the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the Notarial Law and the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD observed that respondent wanted it to appear that because the donor
appeared before him and signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, it was just
ministerial duty on his part to notarize the deed of donation on July 30, 2003, a day
after Atty. Linco died. The IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent should know that the
parties who signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, binds only the signatories to
the deed and it was not yet a public instrument. Moreover, since the deed of donation
was notarized only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died, the acknowledgement
portion of the said deed of donation where respondent acknowledged that Atty. Linco
"personally came and appeared before me" is false. This act of respondent is also
violative of the Attorney's Oath "to obey the laws" and "do no falsehood."
The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year, and that his notarial commission be revoked and he be
disqualified from re-appointment as notary public for a period of two (2) years.
On April 27, 2006, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-215,10 the IBP-Board of Governors
resolved to adopt and approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied.11
On July 29, 2009, considering respondent's petition for review dated May 19, 2009 of
IBP Resolution No. XVII-2006-215 dated April 27, 2006 and IBP Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-678 dated December 11, 2008, denying complainant's motion for reconsideration
and affirming the assailed resolution, the Court resolved to require complainant to file
her comment.12
In her Compliance,13 complainant maintained that respondent has not stated anything
new in his motion for reconsideration that would warrant the reversal of the
recommendation of the IBP. She maintained that respondent violated the Notarial Law
and is unfit to continue being commissioned as notary public; thus, should be
sanctioned for his infractions.
On August 16, 2011, in view of the denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration,
the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court, recommended that the instant
complaint is now ripe for judicial adjudication.
RULING
The findings and recommendations of the IBP are well taken.
There is no question as to respondent's guilt. The records sufficiently established that
Atty. Linco was already dead when respondent notarized the deed of donation on July
30, 2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he knew that Atty. Linco died a day before
he notarized the deed of donation. We take note that respondent notarized the
document after the lapse of more than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when he was
allegedly asked to notarize the deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of time from the
time he last saw Atty. Linco should have put him on guard and deterred him from
proceeding with the notarization of the deed of donation.
However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in order to
accommodate the alleged need of a colleague. The fact that respondent previously
appeared before him in person does not justify his act of notarizing the deed of
donation, considering the affiant's absence on the very day the document was
notarized. In the notarial acknowledgment of the deed of donation, respondent attested
that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet
obviously, Atty. Linco could not have appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because
the latter died on July 29, 2003. Clearly, respondent made a false statement and
violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a
lawyer.
We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of
the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.14 Respondent should not
notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein.15
Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public of the importance
attached to the act of notarization. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified
or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into
a public document; thus, making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to
rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument.16
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements
in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.17Hence, again, a notary
public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the
very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein.
This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer. A graver
responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to
do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is mandated to the sacred duties
appertaining to his office, such duties, being dictated by public policy and impressed
with public interest.18 Respondent's failure to perform his duty as a notary public
resulted not only in damaging complainant's rights over the property subject of the
donation but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public. He should, therefore,
be held liable for his acts, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
In Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,19 respondent having failed to discharge his duties as a
notary public, the revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the
practice of law for one year were imposed. We deem it proper to impose the same
penalty.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility,
the notarial commission of respondent ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, is REVOKED. He
is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. He is
also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year, effective
immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall
be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this
Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision
likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
7. KELD STEMMERIK vs. ATTY. LEONUEL N, MAS A.C. No. 8010

RESOLUTION
Per Curiam:
Complainant Keld Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. In one of his trips to
the Philippines, he was introduced to respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas. That was his
misfortune.
In one visit to the Philippines, complainant marveled at the beauty of the country
and expressed his interest in acquiring real property in the Philippines. He consulted
respondent who advised him that he could legally acquire and own real property in the
Philippines. Respondent even suggested an 86,998 sq.m. property in Quarry, Agusuin,
Cawag, Subic, Zambales with the assurance that the property was alienable.
Trusting respondent, complainant agreed to purchase the property through
respondent as his representative or attorney-in-fact. Complainant also engaged the
services of respondent for the preparation of the necessary documents. For this purpose,
respondent demanded and received a P400,000 fee.
Confident that respondent would faithfully carry out his task, complainant returned to
Denmark, entrusting the processing of the necessary paperwork to respondent.
Thereafter, respondent prepared a contract to sell the property between complainant,
represented by respondent, and a certain Bonifacio de Mesa, the purported owner of the
property.[1] Subsequently, respondent prepared and notarized a deed of sale in which de
Mesa sold and conveyed the property to a certain Ailyn Gonzales for P3.8
million.[2]Respondent also drafted and notarized an agreement between complainant and
Gonzales stating that it was complainant who provided the funds for the purchase of the
property.[3] Complainant then gave respondent the full amount of the purchase price
(P3.8 million) for which respondent issued an acknowledgment receipt.[4]
After the various contracts and agreements were executed, complainant tried to get in
touch with respondent to inquire about when the property could be registered in his name.
However, respondent suddenly became scarce and refused to answer complainants
calls and e-mail messages.
When complainant visited the Philippines again in January 2005, he engaged the
services of the Jimenez Gonzales Liwanag Bello Valdez Caluya & Fernandez Law Office
to ascertain the status of the property he supposedly bought. He was devastated to learn
that aliens could not own land under Philippine laws. Moreover, verification at the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources in Olongapo City revealed that the property was
inalienable as it was situated within the former US Military Reservation. [5] The CENRO
also stated that the property was not subject to disposition or acquisition under Republic
Act No. 141.[6]
Thereafter, complainant, through his attorneys-in-fact,[7] exerted diligent efforts to locate
respondent for purposes of holding him accountable for his fraudulent acts. Inquiry with
the Olongapo Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) disclosed that
respondent was in arrears in his annual dues and that he had already abandoned his
law office in Olongapo City.[8] Search of court records of cases handled by respondent
only yielded his abandoned office address in Olongapo City.
Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent in the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP.[9] He deplored respondents acts of
serious misconduct. In particular, he sought the expulsion of respondent from the legal
profession for gravely misrepresenting that a foreigner could legally acquire land in the
Philippines and for maliciously absconding with complainants P3.8 million.[10]
Respondent failed to file his answer and position paper despite service of notice at his
last known address. Neither did he appear in the scheduled mandatory conference. In
this connection, the CBD found that respondent abandoned his law practice in Olongapo
City after his transaction with complainant and that he did not see it fit to contest the
charges against him.[11]
The CBD ruled that respondent used his position as a lawyer to mislead complainant on
the matter of land ownership by a foreigner. [12] He even went through the motion of
preparing falsified and fictitious contracts, deeds and agreements. And for all these
shameless acts, he collected P400,000 from complainant. Worse, he pocketed the P3.8
million and absconded with it.[13]
The CBD found respondent to be nothing more than an embezzler who misused
his professional status as an attorney as a tool for deceiving complainant and absconding
with complainants money.[14] Respondent was dishonest and deceitful. He abused the
trust and confidence reposed by complainant in him. The CBD recommended the
disbarment of respondent.[15]
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of the
CBD with the modification that respondent was further required to return the amount
of P4.2 million to respondent.[16]
We agree with the IBP.
SUFFICIENY OF NOTICE OF
THE DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS
We shall first address a threshold issue: was respondent properly given notice of the
disbarment proceedings against him? Yes.
The respondent did not file any answer or position paper, nor did he appear
during the scheduled mandatory conference. Respondent in fact abandoned his last
known address, his law office in Olongapo City, after he committed the embezzlement.
Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his disappearing act. He can
neither defeat this Courts jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade
administrative liability by the mere ruse of concealing his whereabouts. Thus, service of
the complaint and other orders and processes on respondents office was sufficient notice
to him.
Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of notice on him impossible, the
notice requirement cannot apply to him and he is thus considered to have waived it. The
law does not require that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile.[17] The
law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a
way that they are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicality. [18]

In this connection, lawyers must update their records with the IBP by informing the IBP
National Office or their respective chapters [19] of any change in office or residential
address and other contact details.[20] In case such change is not duly updated, service
of notice on the office or residential address appearing in the records of the IBP National
Office shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for purposes of administrative
proceedings against him.
RESPONDENTS ADMINISTRATIVE INFRACTIONS
AND HIS LIABILITY THEREFOR
Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promote respect
for the law and uphold the integrity of the bar. As men and women entrusted with the law,
they must ensure that the law functions to protect liberty and not as an instrument of
oppression or deception.
Respondent has been weighed by the exacting standards of the legal
profession and has been found wanting.
Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is also guilty of
culpable violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the
legal profession.
All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do no
falsehood.[21] That oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is a sacred
trust that should be upheld and kept inviolable at all times. [22]
Lawyers are servants of the law[23] and the law is their master. They should not
simply obey the laws, they should also inspire respect for and obedience thereto by
serving as exemplars worthy of emulation. Indeed, that is the first precept of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall
be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
This Court has interpreted this provision, as early as the 1947 case Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds,[24] to mean that under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private
or agricultural lands, including residential lands. The provision is a declaration of
imperative constitutional policy.[25]
Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental
constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic
law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal.
By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant
and that de Mesa thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made the purchase for
and in behalf of complainant, he falsified public documents and knowingly violated the
Anti-Dummy Law.[26]
Respondents misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a
foreigner could legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring
complainant that the property was alienable, respondent deliberately foisted a falsehood
on his client. He did not give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by
complainant. Instead, he deceived complainant and misled him into parting
with P400,000 for services that were both illegal and unprofessional. Moreover, by
pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for the purchase
of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in nature.
Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the process, he committed
unethical act after unethical act, wantonly violating laws and professional standards.
For all this, respondent violated not only the lawyers oath and Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He also transgressed the following provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS
AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. (emphasis supplied)
A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and uses his
legal knowledge to further his selfish ends to the great prejudice of others, poses a clear
and present danger to the rule of law and to the legal system. He does not only tarnish
the image of the bar and degrade the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, he also
betrays everything that the legal profession stands for.
It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a bad name and make laymen
support Dick the Butchers call, Kill all lawyers! [27] A disgrace to their professional brethren,
they must be purged from the bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas is hereby DISBARRED. The
Clerk of Court is directed to immediately strike out the name of respondent from the Roll
of Attorneys.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Keld Stemmerik the
total amount of P4.2 million with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation
of this resolution until full payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the
Court proof of payment of the amount within ten days from payment.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is ORDERED to locate Atty. Mas
and file the appropriate criminal charges against him. The NBI is further DIRECTED to
regularly report the progress of its action in this case to this Court through the Bar
Confidant.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant who shall forthwith
record it in the personal file of respondent, the Court Administrator who shall inform all
courts of the Philippines, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which shall disseminate
copies to all its chapters and members and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies
of the Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
8. In Re: SC Decision dated May 20, 2008 In GR No. 161455 Under Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court vs. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin (AC No. 7940, 24 April 2012)
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case resolves the question of whether or not the conviction of a lawyer for
a crime involving moral turpitude constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment from the
practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The Facts and the Case
In May 1996, Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of the Ozamis City volleyball
team, wrote Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes of Ozamis City, requesting financial assistance
for his team. Mayor Fuentes approved the request and sent Abastillas letter to the City
Treasurer for processing. Mayor Fuentes also designated Mario R. Ferraren, a city
council member, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the city while Mayor Fuentes was
away. Abastillas eventually got the P10,000.00 assistance for his volleyball team.
Meanwhile, respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, then
a Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of Misamis Occidental, got a photocopy of
Abastillas letter and, using it, filed on June 24, 1996 a complaint with the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao against Ferraren for alleged illegal disbursement
of P10,000.00 in public funds. Atty. Pactolin attached to the complaint a copy of what he
claimed was a falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed that it was Ferraren, not Mayor
Fuentes, who approved the disbursement.
Aggrieved, Ferraren filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25665 a
complaint against Atty. Pactolin for falsification of public document. [1] On November 12,
2003 the Sandiganbayan found Atty. Pactolin guilty of falsification under Article 172 and
sentenced him to the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months
of prision correccional as minimum to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days
of prision correccional as maximum, to suffer all the accessory penalties
of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
Atty. Pactolin appealed to this Court but on May 20, 2008 it affirmed his
conviction.[2] Since the Court treated the matter as an administrative complaint against
him as well under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, it referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate action.
Because complainant Ferraren neither appeared nor submitted any pleading
during the administrative proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, on
October 9, 2010 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XIX-2010-632, adopting
and approving the Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation that the
case against Atty. Pactolin be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The Issue Presented
The only issue presented in this case is whether or not Atty. Pactolin should be
disbarred after conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification.
The Courts Ruling
In his pleadings before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Pactolin
reiterated the defenses he raised before the Sandiganbayan and this Court in the
falsification case. He claims that the Court glossed over the facts, that its decision and
referral to the IBP was factually infirmed[3] and contained factual exaggerations and
patently erroneous observation,[4] and was too adventurous.[5]
To recapitulate, this Court upheld the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the
copy of Abastillas letter which Atty. Pactolin attached to his complaint was
spurious. Given the clear absence of a satisfactory explanation regarding his possession
and use of the falsified Abastillas letter, this Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not
err in concluding that it was Atty. Pactolin who falsified the letter. This Court relied on the
settled rule that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of
and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification. [6]
This Courts decision in said falsification case had long become final and
executory. In In Re: Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,[7] the Court held that in disbarment
cases, it is no longer called upon to review the judgment of conviction which has become
final. The review of the conviction no longer rests upon this Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or
suspended on the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in
office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6)
violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without
authority so to do.
This Court has ruled that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary
to justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.[8] Moral
turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.[9]
Having said that, what penalty should be imposed then on Atty. Pactolin?
As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being the
most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most imperative
reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. [10] Yet this Court has also
consistently pronounced that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final
judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. [11]
 Here, Atty. Pactolins disbarment is warranted. The Sandiganbayan has
confirmed that although his culpability for falsification has been indubitably established,
he has not yet served his sentence. His conduct only exacerbates his offense and shows
that he falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal
profession.[12]
This Court once again reminds all lawyers that they, of all classes and
professions, are most sacredly bound to uphold the law. [13] The privilege to practice law
is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and,
equally important, morally. As such, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[14]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin is hereby DISBARRED and his
name REMOVED from the Rolls of Attorney. Let a copy of this decision be attached to
his personal records and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
10. A.C. No. 7269 November 23, 2011
ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana
(Noe-Lacsamana) against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Antecedent Facts
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 167, while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso
(Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulaso’s deed of sale over the property subject of
Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment
case before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil Case No.
9284, where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was filed
against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged
that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would
accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel.
Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine
times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged
that the court orders and notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmente’s collaborating
counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with this Court and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant
for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment with him ended in
2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the
help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmente’s former secretary. Busmente alleged
that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the
Answer1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation,2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
found that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as Busmente’s
collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente
claimed that Dela Rosa no longer worked for him since 2000, there was no proof of her
separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices from the MTC San Juan,
as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent to Busmente’s designated office
address. The IBP-CBD stated that Busmente’s only excuse was that Dela Rosa
connived with his former secretary Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would
not reach him.
The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmente’s
staff, alleging Macasieb’s failure to endorse pleadings and notices of Civil Case No.
9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD noted that Ortalez did not exactly refer to Ulaso’s
case in her affidavit and that there was no mention that she actually witnessed
Macasieb withholding pleadings and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also noted
that Macasieb was still working at Busmente’s office in November 2003 as shown by
the affidavit attached to a Motion to Lift Order of Default that she signed. However,
even if Macasieb resigned in November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso
until 2005, which belied Busmente’s allegation that Dela Rosa was able to illegally
practice law using his office address without his knowledge and only due to Dela
Rosa’s connivance with Macasieb. As regards Busmente’s allegation that his signature
on the Answer was forged, the IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate
with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was forged
but he failed to submit any report from the NBI despite the lapse of four months from
the time he reserved his right to submit the report.
The IBP-CBD recommended Busmente’s suspension from the practice of law for not
less than five years. On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271,3 the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with
modification by reducing the period of Busmente’s suspension to six months.
Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report 4 from the NBI
stating that the signature in the Answer, when compared with standard/sample
signatures submitted to its office, showed that they were not written by one and the
same person. In its 14 May 2011 Resolution No. XIX-2011-168, the IBP Board of
Governors denied Busmente’s motion for reconsideration.
 The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting
Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice
of law.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the IBP.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of
law.
The Court ruled that the term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding
oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in
consideration of his services.5 The Court further ruled that holding one’s self out as a
lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as
attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a
partner of a law office for the general practice of law.6
The Court explained:
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the
practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the
bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this
purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible
the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law
makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.7
In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the Bar,
misrepresented herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284.
The only question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her
illegal practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment in his office ended in 2000 and that
Dela Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice of law through connivance with
Macasieb, another member of Busmente’s staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD,
Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa
continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent to
Busmente’s office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosa’s practice should
have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.
We agree. Busmente’s office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No.
9284. The 7 December 2004 Order8 of Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban (Judge
Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284 showed that Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still
representing Ulaso in the case. In that Order, Judge Panganiban set the preliminary
conference of Civil Case No. 9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have been impossible
for Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case, considering Busmente’s
claim that Macasieb already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the files in
Busmente’s office.
Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-271,
submitted a copy of the NBI report stating that the signature on the Answer submitted
in Civil Case No. 9284 and the specimen signatures submitted by Busmente were not
written by one and the same person. The report shows that Busmente only submitted
to the NBI the questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report, however,
showed that there were other documents signed by Busmente, including the Pre-Trial
Brief dated 14 November 2003 and Motion to Lift Order of Default dated 22 November
2003. Noe-Lacsamana also submitted a letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her
as well as three letters dated 29 August 2003 addressed to the occupants of the
disputed property, all signed by Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn his signatures in
these other documents.
Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he
only came to know about the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its
status. Busmente’s allegation contradicted the Joint Counter-Affidavit9 submitted by
Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating that:
a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the
YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address
at suite 718 BPI Office Cond. Plaza Cervantes, Binondo Manila.
b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case which
have been filed by IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in representation of her
sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before
Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila.
c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases mentioned in
the Complaint-Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our lawyer;
d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the
notices or other court records as our legal counsel the same could not be
taken against us for, we believed in good faith that she was a lawyer; and we
are made to believe that it was so since had referred her to us (sic), she was
handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;
e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any
pleading which she filed in court in connection with our cases at all of those
 were signed by Atty. YOLANDO BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just
accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings;
f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in relation
to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) for the reason that the following
elements of the offense are not present, to wit:
1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the
facts narrated;
2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;
3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely false;
4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in
the narration of facts.
And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the integrity
which is not so in the instant case.
g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we
never ask her whether she was a real lawyer and allowed to practice law in
the Philippines; it would have been unethical and shameful on our part to ask
her qualification; we just presumed that she has legal qualifications to
represent us in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE
allowed her to accompany us and attend our hearings in short, she gave
us paralegal assistance[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case
No. 9284 and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.
Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to
prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We agree with the recommendation of the IBP, modifying the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should be suspended from the
practice of law for six months.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law for
SIX MONTHS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmente’s personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant.1âwphi1 Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all
chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
11. A.C. No. 6116 August 1, 2012
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant
Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco for grave
dishonesty, gross misconduct constituting deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
In his Complaint,1 complainant narrated that respondent undertook to give him 20%
commission, later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter would receive in
representing Spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an
action for partition of the estate of the late Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before
the Regional Trial Court of Aklan). Their agreement was reflected in a letter 2 dated
August 11, 1995. However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed commission
notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the total estate or about
₱ 40 million. Instead, he was informed through a letter3 dated July 16, 1997 that Sps.
Yap assumed to pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's
fees from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the payment of his commission 4 which
respondent ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral
standards required of his profession for having abandoned his legal wife, Milagros
Hilado, with whom he has two children, and cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with whom
he has four children. He also accused respondent of engaging in money-lending
business5without the required authorization from the BangkoSentralngPilipinas.
In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25%
contingent fee basis, and advanced all the expenses. He disputed the August 11, 1995
letter for being a forgery and claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainant's
commission which he clarified in his July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint and for the corresponding sanction against complainant's
counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless complaint.6
In the Resolution7 dated February 16, 2004, the Court resolved to refer this
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation8 dated October 10,
2008, the Investigating IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be
suspended for one (1) year from the active practice of law, for violation of the Lawyer's
Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code). The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the same in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-4539 dated August
28, 2010. Respondent moved for reconsideration10 which was denied in Resolution No.
XIX-2011-141 dated October 28, 2011.
After due consideration, We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession.
As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold
duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the
values and norms embodied in the Code.11 Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any
conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in their
private capacity.
In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the execution of
the August 11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have
undertaken the payment of complainant's commission but passing on the responsibility
to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02, 12 Canon 9 of the Code which
prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with
persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the
case at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal
family to cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children notwithstanding
that his moral character as well as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of
Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of
fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. 13 Consequently, We find no
reason to disturb the IBP's finding that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath 14 and
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have been
sufficiently established.1âwphi1 A "business" requires some form of investment and a
sufficient number of customers to whom its output can be sold at profit on a consistent
basis.15 The lending of money to a single person without showing that such service is
made available to other persons on a consistent basis cannot be construed asindicia
that respondent is engaged in the business of lending.
Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, We
are minded that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution and only in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and as member of the bar,16 or the misconduct borders on the
criminal, or committed under scandalous circumstance,17 which do not obtain here.
Considering the circumstances of the case, We deem it appropriate that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year as recommended.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of
violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same Code and SUSPENDED from the
active practice of law ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a
member of the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
12. A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and
Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration,
against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder)
for violation of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public
Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October
2004 from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-
affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and
graft and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr.
(Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The
Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by
one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City,
Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter
informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet
to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo
declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was
not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact.
On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed
signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and
submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolo’s affidavit and
other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing
Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally
dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the counsel’s signature posed a
prejudicial question to the Complaint’s validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman
ordered that separate cases for Falsification of Public Document 2 and Dishonesty3 be
filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that
he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as
evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of
Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and
that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office
secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the
Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of public document and dishonesty filed
against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for various
offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the
criminal case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency
of evidence. The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence,
without prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation
of RA 3019 and other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for
lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) a complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s
law partner. The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment
Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty.
Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the
Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants attached a
Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which
examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients,
allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned
signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty.
Bancolo were not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained
that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices,
they were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute
innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due
to Additional Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the
secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents
admitted that the criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against
complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder
Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged
that after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare
and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to some minor
lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be signed in his
name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the
disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial and
documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was
employed as secretary of their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the
parties were directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory
conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006.
On the said date, complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The
conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents failed
to appear despite receiving notice of the conference. Complainants manifested that
they were submitting their disbarment complaint based on the documents submitted to
the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to participate in the
mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit their respective
position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received complainants’ position paper
dated 18 October 2006 and respondents’ position paper dated 23 October 2006.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing
found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The
Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the
practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain
responsibilities in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature
appearing in the complaint filed against complainants’ Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony
J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the
findings that his signatures appearing in the various documents released from his office
were found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached
his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to
represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent
was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all
respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The
Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds
the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the notices
sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines’ Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of
courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder
Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over
matters under the charge of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the
principle of "command responsibility". x x x.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the
bar in 1995 and practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a
law firm designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty.
Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to
ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As a partner, it is his responsibility to provide efficacious control of court
pleadings and other documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he done that,
he could have known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo.
Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is administratively
liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of
the IBP approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo’s violation of
Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of
Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby
AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE
the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit.8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his
Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his
separate Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration
and Comment Filed by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied
both complainants’ and Atty. Bancolo’s motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board
found no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and
affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
The Court’s Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent
Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office
of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this
is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we
held:
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the
practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the
bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this
purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible
the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law
makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and
signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is
reserved exclusively for members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and
duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a
pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the
Rules of Court, counsel’s signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the
pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground
to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing one’s signature to
a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and
give legal effect to the document.1âwphi1
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to
believe that he was a victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his
unconditional trust and confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However,
Atty. Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he
gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed
with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo,
however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder
threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was
constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply
signed the verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses,
the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his
secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading.
This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved,
had knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in
allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the
finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one
year is warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of
merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule
9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is
warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record
in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
13. SECOND DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 11616 [Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2141], August 23, 2017 ]
LITO V. BUENVIAJE, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MELCHOR G. MAGDAMO,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is an Administrative Complaint dated December 28, 2007 filed by Lito
Buenviaje[1] (Buenviaje) against respondent Atty. Melchor G. Magdamo (Atty.
Magdamo), docketed as A.C. No. 11616 for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In the instant Complaint dated December 28, 2007, Buenviaje alleged that he was
married to the late Fe Gonzalo-Buenviaje as evidenced by NSO issued Marriage
Contract Register No. 87-13503-A.[2] Fe died on September 17, 2007.
Meanwhile, Atty. Magdamo was the counsel of Fe's sisters, Lydia and Florenia
Gonzalo, who filed a criminal case for bigamy against Buenviaje. They claimed that
Buenviaje was married to a certain Amalia Ventura in 1978, thus, making him guilty of
bigamy.
In an attempt to protect the rights and interests of his clients in securing the monies of
their sibling, deceased Fe Gonzalo, Atty. Magdamo sent a Notice of Death of
Depositor[3] dated October 11, 2007 to the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)-
Dagupan Branch where Buenviaje and Fe appeared to have a joint account. The
pertinent portion of said Notice reads as follows:
"x x x x
FE SOLIS GONZALO was formerly an Overseas Filipina Worker (OFW) Nurse in
Switzerland whose lifetime savings is now in an account in BPI-Dagupan. She came
back to the Philippines to spend the last days of her life with her family in San Fabian,
Pangasinan. Unfortunately, while she was terminally ill and while residing in
Manila so as to be near Saint Luke's Hospital, a clever swindler by the name of
LITO BUENVIAJE made it appear on spurious documents that he is the husband
of Fe Gonzalo when in truth and in fact LITO BUENVIAJE is married to AMALIA
VALERA.
xxxx
Moreover, ever since 24 August 2007, LITO V. BUENVIAJE has been a fugitive from
justice as he has been hiding from the criminal charge in People of the
Philippines versus Lito Buenviaje y Visayana, case number 7H-103365, pending in
the City of Manila.
xxxx
Fe never had a husband or child in her entire life. x x x" (Emphasis ours)
Aggrieved, Buenviaje filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Magdamo
for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 , Rule 7.03 and Rule 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Buenviaje averred that in Atty. Magdamo's Notice of Death
of Depositor dated October 11, 2007 sent to the BPI-Dagupan Branch, he untruthfully
and maliciously quoted the following statements: (1) "a clever swindler by the name of
Lito Buenviaje made it appear on spurious document that he is the husband of Fe
Gonzalo when in truth and in fact Lito Buenviaje is married to Amalia Valero", (2) "since
August 24, 2007, Lito V. Buenviaje has been a fugitive from justice as he has been
hiding from the criminal charge in People of the Philippines versus Lito Buenviaje y
Visayana, case number 7H-103365 pending in the City of Manila", and (3) "Fe never
had a husband or child in her entire life" to his prejudice.
Buenviaje alleged that he discovered the Notice's existence sometime in December
2007 when he inquired about the remaining balance of his joint account with Fe. He
lamented that he was shocked upon reading the letter and felt humiliated at the words
written against him as the bank manager and the other bank personnel might have
really thought that he was a swindler and a fugitive from justice. [4]
Buenviaje denied Atty. Magdamo's allegation that Fe was never married as they were
in fact married in a public civil rites in the presence of many relatives of Fe. As to his
alleged marriage with a certain Amalia Valera, Buenviaje admitted that he had
extramarital relationship with her and that they had two (2) sons. When they separated
and he subsequently worked overseas, it did not stop him from fulfilling his
responsibilities as a father to his sons. He was then advised to remit money to Amalia
but he was told that he needed a marriage contract to be able to do so, thus, he asked
someone to make a marriage contract for remittance purposes and that he was told
that there would be no record of it. Buenviaje claimed that at that time, he really
believed that no valid marriage took place between him and Amalia and that he was
single up to the time he married Fe.
Buenviaje lamented that Atty. Magdamo employed dirty and dishonest means and
tactics to ensure that BPI will prevent him from withdrawing money from the joint
account that he has with his late wife. He averred that in referring to him as a
"swindler", Atty. Magdamo succeeded in intimidating BPI-Dagupan into extrajudicially
"freezing" the joint account and in not transacting with him.
Buenviaje also pointed out that Atty. Magdamo, in referring to him as a fugitive from
justice, in effect, made BPI-Dagupan believe that a criminal complaint was already
pending against him when in truth and in fact, the August 24, 2007 complaint for
bigamy filed by Lydia and Florenia was still pending before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila at the time that they wrote and served the Notice to BPI-Dagupan.
Buenviaje further added that Atty. Magdamo even made threats to him as evidenced by
his text messages to him, to wit: "Sometime in the morning of 1 October 2007, I sent
text messages to Lito's last known Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) number
(+639062097612) requesting him to stop his merciless plunder and to voluntarily
surrender to the rule of law."
Finally, Buenviaje questioned Atty. Magdamo's fitness to continue in the practice of law
as he has displayed lack of ability to distinguish a fugitive from justice and a
respondent in a criminal investigation; employed of dirty and unprofessional tactics of
calling him a "swindler"; and by referring to his marriage contract with his wife as
"spurious document". He, thus, prayed that considering Atty. Magdamo's actuations, he
should be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.
On January 9, 2008, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) directed Atty.
Magdamo to submit his answer on the complaint against him.[5]
In its Report and Recommendation[6] dated October 23, 2013, the IBP-CBD
recommended that Atty. Magdamo be reprimanded for his unethical actuations.
However, the IBP-Board of Governors, in a Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-717
dated October 10, 2014, resolved to adopt and approve with modification the Report
and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD, and instead suspend Atty. Magdamo from the
practice of law for three (3) months.[7]
Aggrieved, Atty. Magdamo moved for reconsideration. However, in Resolution No.
XXII-2016-326[8] dated May 28, 2016, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to deny
Atty. Magdamo's motion for reconsideration and affirm the latter's suspension.
We concur with the findings and recommendation of the IBP-Board of Governors.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to
administrative liability. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against the opposing
counsel.
Rule 8.01. — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
In the instant case, Atty. Magdamo's actuations do not measure up to this Canon. The
records show that he referred to Buenviaje as a "swindler". He made this imputation
with pure malice for he had no evidence that Buenviaje is committing swindling
activities. Even if he was suspicious of Buenviaje, he should have refrained from
making such malicious reference or name-calling for he should know as a lawyer that
the mere filing of a complaint against a person does not guarantee a finding of guilt,
and that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Here, other than the
criminal complaint for bigamy which Fe's siblings filed before the prosecutor's office,
there were no other cases decided against Buenviaje.
Atty. Magdamo's malicious imputation against Buenviaje is further aggravated by the
fact that said imputation was made in a forum which is not a party to the legal dispute
between Fe's siblings and Buenviaje. He could have just informed BPI-Dagupan of the
death of its client and that there is a pending litigation regarding their client's estate,
and he did not have to resort to name-calling and make unnecessary commentaries in
order to support his cause. Undoubtedly, his malicious imputation against Buenviaje is
unfair as the latter was unnecessarily exposed to humiliation and shame even as there
was no actual case yet to be filed in the courts.
Moreover, Atty. Magdamo is likewise out of line when he made inference to the
marriage documents of Buenviaje and Fe as "spurious" as well as his conclusion that
"Fe never had a husband or child in her entire life". He should know better that without
the courts' pronouncement to this effect, he is in no position to draw conclusions and
pass judgment as to the existence, and validity or nullity of the marriage of Buenviaje
and Fe. That is not his job to do. While his statements in the Notice given to BPI-
Dagupan might be prompted by a good cause, it were nevertheless careless,
premature and without basis. At the very least, Atty. Magdamo's actuations are blatant
violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. (Emphasis ours)
Equally incredulous is Atty. Magdamo's statement in the Notice that "Lito V. Buenviaje
has been a fugitive from justice as he has been hiding from the criminal charge in
People vs. Lito Buenviaje y Visayana, case number 7H-103365, pending in the City of
Manila". Upon review, it appears that case number 7H-103365 is the same bigamy
case which Fe's siblings filed against Buenviaje before the Prosecutor's Office of
Manila. At the time Atty. Magdamo made the subjects statement in the Notice to BPI-
Dagupan, he knew that there was no final resolution yet from the prosecutor's office, no
case has yet to be filed in the courts, there was no warrant of arrest against Buenviaje,
and more importantly, there was no evidence that Buenviaje had any intent to flee
prosecution as he even filed the instant case and participated in the proceedings
hereto. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not
synonymous with guilt. There must always be sufficient evidence to support the
charge.[9] As to why Atty. Magdamo made such malicious statements is beyond this
Court's comprehension.
We had an occasion to say that the use of disrespectful, intemperate, manifestly
baseless, and malicious statements by an attorney in his pleadings or motions is a
violation of the lawyer's oath and a transgression of the canons of professional
ethics.[10] The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their
pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system. [11] Though a lawyer's
language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Atty. Magdamo ought to
have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession
in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. [12]
In this case, Atty. Magdamo's statements against Buenviaje were not only improper but
it also undoubtedly tended to mislead BPI-Dagupan into thinking that the latter is a
swindler and a fugitive as it was made without hesitation notwithstanding the absence
of any evidentiary support. The Court cannot condone this irresponsible and
unprofessional behavior.
As this Court emphasized in Re: Supreme Court Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in
G.R. Nos. 145817 & 145822:[13]
The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of
strengthening their cause in a motion for inhibition, make grave and unfounded
accusations of unethical conduct or even wrongdoing against other members of the
legal profession. It is the duty of members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the justness of the cause with which they are
charged. (emphasis ours)
Finally, it must be emphasized anew that, in support of the cause of their clients,
lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense within the authority of the
law. However, a client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between
liberty and license.[14] The lawyer's duty to its clients must never be at the expense of
truth and justice. As explained in Choa v. Chiongson:[15]
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his
genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well
as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds
of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable
results of his client's case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and
legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as it
appears to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon
admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; and that he will
conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients. Needless to state, the
lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common
sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does
not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against
the other party.
Based on the foregoing, We cannot countenance Atty. Magdamo's use of offensive and
disrespectful language in his Notice addressed to BPI-Dagupan. He clearly violated
Canons 8 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for his actions erode the
public's perception of the legal profession. We, thus, sustain the findings and
recommendation of the IBP-Board of Governors.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the October 10, 2014 and May 28, 2016
Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors in CBD Case
No. 08-2141 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Melchor G. Magdamo from the
practice of law for three (3) months effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Magdamo's personal record as an
attorney with the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy of the same be served to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.

THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS
1. G.R. No. L-12871 July 25, 1959
TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent.
Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner.
City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by
Timoteo V. Cruz against Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay
City, to restrain him from continuing with the preliminary investigation he was
conducting in September, 1957 in connection with the killing of Manuel Monroy which
took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City. To better understand the present case and
its implications, the following facts gathered from the pleadings and the memoranda
filed by the parties, may be stated.
Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as
involved and implicated in said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of
Pasay City found Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido
Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced
them to death. They all appealed the sentence although without said appeal, in view of
the imposition of the extreme penalty, the case would have to be reviewed
automatically by this Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial which was granted and
upon retrial, he was again found guilty and his former conviction of sentence was
affirmed and reiterated by the same trial court.
It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation
of the case. The purpose of said reinvestigation does not appear in the record.
Anyway, intelligence agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of
Malacañang conducted the investigation for the Chief Executive, questioned a number
of people and obtained what would appear to be confession, pointing to persons, other
than those convicted and sentenced by the trial court, as the real killers of Manuel
Monroy.
Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and
confessions obtained by those who had investigated the case at the instance of
Malacañang. Fiscal Salva conferred with the Solicitor General as to what steps he
should take. A conference was held with the Secretary of Justice who decided to have
the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and Malacañang
investigators made available to counsel for the appellants.
Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new
trial with this Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and confessions
of some of those persons investigated, such as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de
Guzman, Oscar Caymo, Pablo Canlas, and written statements of several others. By
resolution of this Tribunal, action on said motion for new trial was deferred until the
case was studied and determined on the merits. In the meantime, the Chief, Philippine
Constabulary, head sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the same affidavits and
confessions and written statements, of which the motion for new trial was based, and
respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation designating for said purposes
a committee of three composed of himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys
Herminio A. Avendañio and Ernesto A. Bernabe.
In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee,
petitioner Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on
September 21, 1957, to testify "upon oath before me in a certain criminal investigation
to be conducted at the time and place by this office against you and Sergio Eduardo, et
al., for murder." On September 19, 1957, petitioner Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent
Salva asking for the transfer of the preliminary investigation from September 21, due to
the fact that this counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would attend a hearing on that same day
in Naga City. Acting upon said request for postponement, Fiscal Salva set the
preliminary investigation on September 24. On that day, Atty. Baizas appeared for
petitioner Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the committee, particularly respondent
Salva, to conduct the preliminary investigation in view of the fact that the same case
involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was pending appeal in this Court, and on the
same day filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. This Tribunal gave due
course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition and upon the filing of a cash bond of
P200.00 issued a writ of preliminary injunction thereby stopping the preliminary
investigation being conducted by respondent Salva.
The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation being
conducted by respondent Salva and his committee was that affidavits and confessions
sent to Salva by the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, and which were being investigated,
implicated petitioner Cruz, even picturing him as the instigator and mastermind in the
killing of Manuel Monroy.
The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case
of People vs. Oscar Castelo, et al., G.R. No. L-10794, is pending appeal and
consideration before us, no court, much less a prosecuting attorney like respondent
Salva, had any right or authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation of the case for that would be obstructing the administration of justice
and interferring with the consideration on appeal of the main case wherein appellants
had been found guilty and convicted and sentenced; neither had respondent authority
to cite him to appear and testify at said investigation.
Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it
was because of the latter's oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the
investigation with his witnesses for his own protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut
any evidence therein presented against him. Salva claims that were it not for this
request and if, on the contrary, Timoteo Cruz had expressed any objection to being
cited to appear in the investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed him.
Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be
allowed to appear at the investigation, we are inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that
such a request had been made. Inasmuch as he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated
in the killing of Manuel Monroy by the affidavits and confessions of several persons
who were being investigated by Salva and his committee, it was but natural that
petitioner should have been interested, even desirous of being present at that
investigation so that he could face and cross examine said witnesses and affiants when
they testified in connection with their affidavits or confessions, either repudiating,
modifying or ratifying the same. Moreover, in the communication, addressed to
respondent Salva asking that the investigation, scheduled for September 21, 1957, be
postponed because his attorney would be unable to attend, Timoteo Cruz expressed
no opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he was objecting to his being cited
to appear at the investigation.
As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he
and his committee began ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened
though nominally, for according to respondent, two government attorneys had been
designed by the Secretary of Justice to handle the prosecution in the trial of the case in
the court below, is tried and decided and it is appealed to a higher court such as this
Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said fiscal have terminated; usually, the
appeal is handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor General.
Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to conduct a
reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in the appeal.
However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a justification
for his reinvestigation because according to him, in the original criminal case against
Castelo, et al., one of the defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not
included for the reason that he was arrested and was placed within the jurisdiction of
the trial court only after the trial against the other accused had commenced, even after
the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had begun to present its evidence.
Naturally, Realista remained to stand trial. The trial court, according to respondent, at
the instance of Realista, had scheduled the hearing at an early date, that is in August,
1957. Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the prosecution of Realista
he had to chart his course and plan of action, whether to present the same evidence,
oral and documentary, presented in the original case and trial, or, in view of the new
evidence consisting of the affidavits and confessions sent to him by the Philippine
Constabulary, he should first assess and determine the value of said evidence by
conducting an investigation and that should he be convinced that the persons criminally
responsible for the killing of Manuel Monroy were other than those already tried and
convicted, like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and co-appellants, including
Salvador Realista, then he might act accordingly and even recommend the dismissal of
the case against Realista.
In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and
as suggested by authorities, the duty and role of prosecuting attorney is not only to
prosecute and secure the conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.
We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of
the prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this court is
averse to any form of vacillation by such officers in the prosecution of public
offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to
do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already
filed the corresponding informations. In the language of Justice Sutherland of
the Supreme Court of the United States, the prosecuting officer "is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike
had blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as
it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. (69 United States
law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the case of Suarez vs. Platon,
69 Phil., 556)
With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify
before him at the scheduled preliminary investigation, under the law, petitioner had a
right to be present at that investigation since as was already stated, he was more or
less deeply involved and implicated in the killing of Monroy according to the affiants
whose confessions, affidavits and testimonies respondent Salva was considering or
was to consider at said preliminary investigation. But he need not be present at said
investigation because his presence there implies, and was more of a right rather than a
duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as claimed by respondent Salva,
petitioner expressed the desire to be given an opportunity to be present at the said
investigation, if he latter changed his mind and renounced his right, and even
strenuously objected to being made to appear at said investigation, he could not be
compelled to do so.
Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the
respondent. If, as contended by him, the purpose of said investigation was only to
acquaint himself with and evaluate the evidence involved in the affidavits and
confessions of Sergio Eduardo, Cosme Camo and others by questioning them, then
he, respondent, could well have conducted the investigation in his office, quietly,
unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less publicity.
However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the
investigation was conducted not in respondent's office but in the session hall of the
Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to
witness the proceeding, including members of the press. A number of microphones
were installed. Reporters were everywhere and photographers were busy taking
pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of, if not the encouragement by
the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a filed day. Not only this, but in
the course of the investigation, as shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes
taken during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar Caymo had
concluded his testimony respondent Salva, addressing the newspapermen said,
"Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am willing to let you do so and
the question asked will be reproduced as my own"; and the second, after Jose
Maratella y de Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the
newsmen, again said, "Gentlemen of the press is free to ask questions as ours." Why
respondent was willing to abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make and
address the questions to the witnesses under investigation, in favor of the members of
the press, is difficult for us to understand, unless he, respondent, wanted to curry favor
with the press and publicize his investigation as much as possible. Fortunately, the
gentlemen of the press to whom he accorded such unusual privilege and favor
appeared to have wisely and prudently declined the offer and did not ask questions,
this according to the transcript now before us.
But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place
during the investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations
of and comments on the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid
descriptions of the incidents that took place during the investigation. It seemed as
though the criminal responsibility for the killing of Manuel Monroy which had already
been tried and finally determined by the lower court and which was under appeal and
advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in the press, and all
with the apparent place and complaisance of respondent.
Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such
publicity and sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of
respondent Salva. In this, he committed what was regard a grievous error and poor
judgment for which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations
in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion and good taste. It is
bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by
the authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when said publicity and
sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is
pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even
abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to
put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate
disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.
Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the others
favored the imposition of a more or less severe penal sanction. After mature
deliberation, we have finally agreed that a public censure would, for the present, be
sufficient.
In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the
preliminary investigation involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is
concerned, for which reason the writ of preliminary injunction issued stopping said
preliminary investigation, is dissolved; that in view of petitioner's objection to appear
and testify at the said investigation, respondent may not compel him to attend said
investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by respondent against petitioner
is hereby set aside.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and
denied in part. Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H.
Salva is hereby publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide
publicity and sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in connection with his
investigation, which we consider and find to be contempt of court; and, furthermore, he
is warned that a repetition of the same would meet with a more severe disciplinary
action and penalty. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Barrera,
JJ., concur.
2. A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009
ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant,
vs.
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J.
Pobre invites the Court’s attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am
suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I
spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme
Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme
Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the
speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the
Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that
disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through
counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained
that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary
immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member
of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to
bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future
remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be
an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending out public
invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would
eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would
qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced
advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for
the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI,
Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of
Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Explaining the import of the
underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary
that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from
resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense."1
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long
experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of
the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its
equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators
are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not
for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value
if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon
a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a
judge’s speculation as to the motives.2
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the
institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the
Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the
Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and
its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members
in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms.
Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement
uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. 3 The disciplinary
authority of the assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or
correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity. 5
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint
for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt,
however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a
member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice.
To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good
professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were
intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating
that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court," and calling the Court a "Supreme Court of idiots."
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We draw her attention to the ensuing
passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and
believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law
into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.1avvphi1
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be
allowed to erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly
violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for
themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited
authority on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks,
and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member
of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity
and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in
public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of
social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.7Senator
Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements
would make on the people’s faith in the integrity of the courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to
crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an
afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once
more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am
suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in
the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was
to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were
expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of
Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official
parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used
as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its
magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that
parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members
of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the
benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in
insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly traceable to what she
considered as an "unjust act" the JBC had taken in connection with her application for
the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Court’s supervision,
its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBC’s ex-
officio chairperson,8 have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the
position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiago’s
wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of
critical and defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of
the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing
the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other
things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own
forum, from the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to
maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, 10 we reiterated our
pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer 11 that the duty of attorneys to the
courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the
judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the
Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty
of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon
lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The
attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity x x
x to the courts."
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v.
Cloribel12 that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency
to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice." Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the
judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of
the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice."13
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a
strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and
dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may
not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the
discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of
his/her oath as a lawyer.14
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity,
as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, 15 a good
character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and
for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the
Rules of Court speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not confined to
one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers’ professional
duties, but also covers any misconduct, which––albeit unrelated to the actual practice
of their profession––would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which their license and the law invest in them. 16
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people’s faith in courts and trust in the
rule of law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for
malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of
justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and
women who compose them. We have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente
Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty.
Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang17 who repeatedly insulted and threatened the
Court in a most insolent manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on
Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter
disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal
circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any
sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of
disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and
disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is
imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of
justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-
accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s
representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made
responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall. 18 It is
intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and
intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its
members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and
Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, "offensive or
improper language against another Senator or against any public institution."19 But
as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not
apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics
Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
circumstance.20 The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is
unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on
her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre’s motives in filing his complaint, stating that
disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot
agree with her more. We cannot overstress that the senator’s use of intemperate
language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation of
the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.21
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact
made the statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has
not categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said making
them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the
Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam
Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.
3. A.C. No. 10679
PO1 JOSE B. CASPE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. AQUILINO A. MEJICA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by POI Jose B. Caspe against Atty.
Aquilino A. Mejica2 for alleged violation of Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
specifically Rules 1.03,3 1.04,4 and 10.015 . The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board
of Governors (IBP BOG) recommended that Atty. Mejica be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three years.6
Caspe alleged the controversy started when Atty. Mejica disregarded conflict of interest
rules. Caspe said that when he filed a complaint for attempted murder against Antonio
Rodriguez, Jr., Atty. Mejica served as Caspe’s counsel. When Rodriguez, Jr. filed his
counter-affidavit, it was Atty. Mejica who counseled and represented him. 7
Caspe brought separate suits for damages and disbarment: one for conflict of
interest8 and the present complaint. Atty. Mejica tried to negotiate a settlement but
Caspe refused. Atty. Mejica allegedly then threatened Caspe that "he will help file
cases after cases against the complainant until he kneels before [him]. He will ‘put
down’ complainant so much so that he will be removed from the service."9 From then
on, Caspe alleged, Atty. Mejica maliciously encouraged the filing of suits against him.
In the present complaint, Caspe narrated that on December 21, 2007, Romulo
Gaduena,10 a barangay tanod, harassed Jan Mark Busa and Marcelino Jataas with a
gun. Caspe, who was on duty, together with PO1 Onofre Lopeña responded. They
recovered a caliber 0.357 revolver which was turned over to the Can-avid Police
station. The incident was recorded in the police blotter. Gaduena evaded arrest with
the help of barangay captain Prudencio Agda and other barangay tanods 11 who
allegedly clobbered Caspe and took his gun. In the interest of peace and harmony, the
Chief of Police12 called and requested that Caspe desist from filing charges against the
barangay captain and tanods, specifically Gaduena. Caspe acceded.
However, Gaduena, with Atty. Mejica as counsel, filed a complaint 13 for serious slander
by deed against Caspe, which was supported by a joint affidavit 14 of two barangay
tanods. It was alleged that Caspe kicked, collared and slapped Gaduena’s face. This
prompted Caspe to disregard the agreement with the Chief of Police and he filed cases
against the tanods. Suspecting that Atty. Mejica encouraged Gaduena to file the case
against him, Caspe filed the cases for damages 15 and disbarment16 against Atty.
Mejica before the IBP.
In its July 4, 2008 Order,17 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) ordered
Atty. Mejica to submit his answer.
A Notice of Mandatory Conference was issued on September 22, 2008 for a hearing
scheduled on October 21, 2008.18 Atty. Mejica, however, failed to appear. The hearing
was rescheduled on November 18, 2008.
On November 13, 2008, Atty. Mejica filed a manifestation that he never received a
copy of the complaints against him. He asked that the hearing be postponed and
rescheduled and that copies of the complaint be furnished to him.19 The hearing was
thus rescheduled to January 13, 200920 and a copy of the complaint was sent to him
via a private courier, LBC. It appeared however that he did not claim the mail. 21
On December 9, 2008, Atty. Mejica once more manifested that he did not receive any
notice from LBC of any mail to be claimed. He also expressed misgivings on the shift
from registered mail to the use of a private courier to send copies of the complaint. He
requested that a copy of the complaint be sent to him via registered mail.22
Atty. Mejica failed to appear in the January 13, 2009 hearing. The IBP CBD issued an
order warning him that his failure to appear in the next rescheduled hearing would
render him in default and the case would be submitted for decision.23
Atty. Mejica failed to appear for the February 3, 2009 hearing. The IBP CBD ordered
the case submitted for decision.24
In its Report andRecommendation,25 the IBP CBD found respondent guilty of violating
Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 of the CPR. It stated that Atty. Mejica was corruptly
motivated in encouraging the filing of suits against Caspe making good his threat to file
case upon case against the latter until he kneels before him. Notice was taken that this
was Atty. Mejica’s second infraction for a similar offense. In Baldado v. Mejica, 26 he
was suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months. 27 The IBP CBD
thus recommended that Atty. Mejica be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.28
In its April 15, 2013 Resolution, the IBP BOG adopted the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP CBD.29 Atty. Mejica moved for reconsideration.30
In its May 3, 2014 Resolution, the IBP BOG denied the motion for reconsideration and
modified the penalty by increasing the period of suspension to three years.31 The
resolution noted that Atty. Opinion, member of the BOG and counsel of Caspe for this
case, stepped out of the room when the case came for discussion and did not
participate in the voting.32
Atty. Mejica maintains that he was not afforded due process. He stated that he
received a Notice of Preliminary Conference for October 21, 2008 but did not appear
since he did not receive a copy of the complaint and was not ordered to answer. For
the scheduled February 3, 2009 Conference, Atty. Mejica reasoned that it was
impossible for him to attend the meeting since he received the Notice in the afternoon
of February 3, 2009.33 Furthermore, he was not given the opportunity to answer. Atty.
Mejica also maintained that he never threatened Caspe because he was not present
during the preliminary conference where he allegedly uttered the threatening words. 34
We adopt the findings of the IBP but modify the penalty imposed.
The only question the Court takes up in disbarment proceedings is whether the
member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not. 35 This Court has
stated that a lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in good moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor as to render him unworthy to continue
as an officer of the Court.36
In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of
evidence is required to establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by
complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court is more convincing and worthy
of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto, the imposition of disciplinary
sanction is justified.37 The Court has required that a complainant has the onus of
proving the charges against respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence.38
Based on the Report and Recommendation, the Court is convinced that there is
sufficient evidence to sanction Atty. Mejica. The following observation by the IBP CBD
is well taken:
x x x First, when the cases were initiated and filed against PO1 Caspe through the help
of [Atty. Mejica], he was already facing disbarment and civil cases which the former
filed against him. Second, these cases [were] filed after [Atty. Mejica] made [the] threat
[to] file cases against PO1 Caspe by reason of [the] refusal to withdraw the disbarment
and civil cases. Third, a gap of more than five months elapsed between the incident of
December 21, 2007 and the filing of the grave slander by deed and that during this
period, the chief of Police who [was] presumed to have regularly performed his job did
not prosecute the criminal cases against [Gaduena] and companions. Fourth, during
[the] said period, PO1 Caspe who [was] presumed to have taken ordinary care of his
cause did not file the criminal cases against [Gaduena] and companions. Fifth, the
existence of a settlement agreement between PO1 Caspe and Brgy. Captain Agda,
Kagawad Sobresida and the other tanods is therefore factual, but despite such
settlement, the case for grave slander by deed was still filed with [Atty. Mejica] as
counsel. Sixth, PO1 Caspe filed this disbarment case only after the grave slander by
deed and the multiple attempted murders were filed against him with the help of [Atty.
Mejica]. Seventh, and most importantly, despite ethical proscription, [Atty. Mejica]
served as counsel for the criminal complainants against PO1 Caspe.39
The IBP CBD concluded that there could be no other reason for Atty. Mejica to file the
cases against PO1 Caspe other than to get back at him. We agree that the confluence
of circumstances points to Atty. Mejica’s corrupt motive in helping Gaduena in filing
cases against Caspe, in violation of Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 of the CPR.
With respect to Atty. Mejica’s claim that he was not afforded due process, i.e., he was
not able to receive a copy of a complaint which in turn was the reason for him not to
have attended the mandatory conference, we find this untenable.
Section 5, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline
Integrated Bar of the Philippines provides that:
SEC. 5. Non-appearance of Parties, and Non-verification of Pleadings. a) Non-
appearance at the mandatory conference or at the clarificatory questioning date shall
be deemed a waiver of right to participate in the proceeding. Ex parte conference or
hearings shall then be conducted. Pleadings submitted or filed which are not verified
shall not be given weight by the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Mejica during the course of these proceedings has missed all four scheduled
hearings supposedly since he was not furnished any copy of the complaint. Records
suggest however that a copy of the complaint was sent to him on August 25, 2008, a
mail which he did not claim. He submitted two manifestations in response to notices he
received. He was thus placed on notice that there was an action against him.
It is the Court’s opinion that Atty. Mejica’s attitude toward the proceedings before the
IBP indicates a lack of respect for the IBP’s rules and procedures. In Cabauatan v.
Venida,40 we stated that in not heeding the IBP’s directives:
x x x Respondent’s refusal to obey the orders of the IBP "is not only irresponsible, but
also constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. His conduct is
unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders
and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives
being themselves officers of the court." Respondent should be reminded that -
only to the courts, but also to judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities,
including the IBP. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Court has empowered
the IBP to conduct proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of
attorneys.44
We thus hold that Atty. Mejica further violated Canon 11 45 of the CPR which calls for a
lawyer to observe and give due respect to courts and judicial officers.
Given that this is Atty. Mejica's second infraction, we thus rule it appropriate under the
circumstances to impose a two-year suspension from the practice of law.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica GUILTY of violation of
Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica from the practice of law
for TWO (2) YEARS effective upon finality of this Resolution, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

As an officer of the court, [he] is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not
a mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly and completely.
This is also true of the orders of the IBP as the investigating arm of the Court in
administrative cases against lawyers.

Respondent should strive harder to live up to his duties of observing and maintaining
the respect due to the courts, respect for law and for legal processes, and of upholding
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession in order to perform his responsibilities as
a lawyer effectively.41

In Heenan v. Espejo,42 a lawyer’s unjustified refusal to heed the directives of the IBP
and to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference constituted a blatant disrespect
for the IBP amounting to conduct unbecoming a lawyer. We looked back on our ruling
in Almendarez, Jr. v. Atty. Langit,43 where we stated that: 4. A.C. No. 5914

The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified refusal to heed the
orders of the IBP requiring him to file an answer to the complaint-affidavit and,
afterwards, to appear at the mandatory conference x x x he is justly charged with
conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is expected to uphold the law and promote
respect for legal processes. Further, a lawyer must observe and maintain respect not
SPOUSES ROGELIO AMATORIO and AIDA AMATORIO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO DY YAP and ATTY. WHELMA F. SITON-YAP, Respondents.
 RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This pertains to the complaint for disbarment filed by Spouses Rogelio Amatorio and
Aida Amatorio (Aida) (complainants) against Attys. Francisco Dy Yap (Francisco) and
Whelma Siton-Yap (respondents) for violating Rules 1.01, 7.03, 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In their complaint, the complainants alleged that the respondents employed deceit to
obtain favorable judgments, specifically by failing to inform the trial court that there was
already an out-of-court settlement between them and maliciously manifesting that their
counsel, Atty. Justo Paras (Atty. Paras) was suspended from the practice of law. 1
The complainants asseverated that they are clients of Atty. Paras in two collection
cases, particularly, Civil Case No. 2000-319 and Civil Case No. 2000-321, which were
filed against them by the respondents. In Civil Case No. 2000-319, respondents sued
the complainants to compel them to pay their indebtedness of 18,000.00, which was
evidenced by a promissory note. After they filed their answer to the complaint,
however, the respondents filed a motion to strike out the same and to declare them in
default on the ground that the said pleading was prepared by a lawyer suspended from
the practice of law and lacked proper verification. The motion was however denied. 2
On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 2000-321, the respondents sued the complainants
to collect the amount of 94,173.44. The answer filed by Atty. Paras was however
stricken off the record for the reason that he was suspended from the practice of law at
the time of its filing.3
Unable to find a lawyer to replace Atty. Paras, the complainants decided to seek an
out-of-court settlement. On May 23, 2001, Aida went to the respondents' law office.
She appealed for the respondents' consideration and asked that they be allowed to pay
their obligations by way of installment. The parties agreed on the terms of payment
and, on that same day, Aida tendered her first payment of 20,000.00, which was
received and duly acknowledged by Francisco in a written document with the
letterhead of Yap Law Office. When Aida asked the respondents if they should still
attend the pre-trial conference scheduled on May 28, 2001 and June 18, 2001 in the
civil cases filed against them, the latter told them they need not attend anymore as they
will be moving for the dismissal of the cases. Relying on the respondents' assurance,
the complainants did not attend the scheduled hearings. Subsequently, they were
surprised to receive copies of the decisions of the trial court in the two civil cases filed
by the respondents, declaring them in default for non-appearance in the pre-trial
conference and ordering them to pay the amount of their indebtedness and damages.
The decision however did not mention the out-of-court settlement between the parties.
Nonetheless, the complainants continued tendering installment payments to the
respondents upon the latter's assurance that they will disregard the decision of the trial
court since they already had an out-of- court settlement before the rendition of said
judgment. They were surprised to learn, however, that the respondents filed a motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 2000-319 and were in fact
issued said writ.4This prompted them to seek legal advice to address their
predicament. They went to Atty. Jose V. Carriaga who, after learning of the factual
milieu of their case, told them that they have a good ground to file a disbarment case
against the respondents. He, however, declined to handle the case himself as he
disclosed that his wife is a relative of the respondents. Instead, he referred the
complainants to Atty. Paras, who had just resumed his practice of law after his
suspension.5
As advised, the complainants went to Atty. Paras to engage his services as their
counsel. Initially, Atty. Paras refused to handle their case as he revealed that the
personal animosity between him and the respondents may invite unwelcome
repercussions. Even then, the complainants insisted to retain his services as their
counsel. Thus, Atty. Paras proceeded to file a disbarment case against the
respondents with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). 6
As foretold by Atty. Paras, the complainants experienced unpleasant backlash which
were allegedly instigated by the respondents who come from a very powerful and
affluent clan. They received threats of physical harm and Aida's continued employment
as a public school teacher was put in jeopardy. Also, suspicious-looking individuals
were seen loitering around their house. When they refused to yield to the respondents'
intimidation, the latter resorted to the filing of charges against them, to wit: (1) an
administrative case against Aida for failure to pay the same debts subject of this case;
and (2) a criminal case for perjury against the complainants. To alleviate their situation,
they filed a Joint-Affidavit,7 seeking the assistance of this Court to warn the
respondents and to stop them from employing deplorable acts upon them.
In their Comment on the Complaint and Counter-Petition for Disbarment dated March
14, 2003, the respondents denied having resorted to deceitful means to obtain
favorable judgments in Civil Case Nos. 2000-319 and 2000-321. They admitted that
they agreed to an out-of-court settlement, through the intercession of Rosa Yap Paras,
estranged wife of Atty. Paras, but denied that the complainants ever tendered any
installment payment. They claimed that Atty. Paras merely employed cajolery in order
to entice the complainants to file the instant case to retaliate against them. They
asseverated that Atty. Paras resented the fact that the respondents served as counsel
for his former wife, who previously filed the administrative case for immorality,
abandonment of family, and falsification and use of falsified documents which resulted
to his suspension.8
On their counter-petition for disbarment, the respondents asserted that Atty. Paras
clearly defied the authority of this Court when he represented the complainants and
filed an answer on their behalf during the period of his suspension from the practice of
law. They alleged that he appeared in several cases and filed numerous pleadings
despite his suspension.9
After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline issued a Report and
Recommendation10 dated June 23, 2005, which pertinently states as follows:
There is substantial evidence that Respondent Francisco Yap ha[s] deliberately
neglected, at the very least, offered and/or pleaded inaccurate allegations/testimonies
to purposely mislead or confuse the civil courts in Dumaguete City. Francisco Yap
failed to controvert the existence and the authenticity of the Acknowledgment Receipt
dated May 21, 2001 which bore his signature and written in a "Yap Law Office"
letterhead. Such documentary evidence supports the theory of the Complainants that
there was indeed an out-of-court settlement prior to the pre-trial hearings and that they
were most likely assured that these cases would be dismissed. Their absence during
the pre-trial hearings evidently resulted to decisions adverse to them. Moreover, the
Motions for the Writ of Execution did not fail to mention the existence of partial
payments and the prior agreement which, if disclosed, would have led the court not to
issue such writs. Since Respondent Francisco Yap's signature appear in all the
Acknowledgement Receipts and in all Motions filed in the civil courts, he alone should
be penalized. On the other hand, Respondent Whelma Siton Yap should not be
penalized in the absence of any evidence of her participation in such conduct. x x x.
All told, this Commissioner recommends that only Respondent Francisco Yap should
be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. At the same time, the
Counter Petition for Disbarment filed by herein Respondents against Atty. Justo Paras,
which appears to be VERY meritorious, be given due course in another proceeding
with utmost dispatch.11
Upon review of the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, the
IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-15912 dated December 17,
2005, disposing thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and for deliberately neglecting, offering inaccurate
allegations to purposely mislead or confuse the courts, Atty. Francisco D. Yap is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. Atty. Whelma F.
Siton-Yap is exonerated in the absence of any evidence of her participation in such
conduct; however Respondents are Warned for indirectly misleading the
Commission.13
On March 27, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Petition for
Review.14
On August 9, 2007, the complainants filed a Manifestation,15 terminating the services of
Atty. Paras and/or Paras-Enojo and Associates as their counsel for the reason that
they can no longer afford the services of a private counsel.
Surprisingly, on the same day, the complainants executed a Judicial
Affidavit,16 disclaiming knowledge and participation in the preparation of the complaint
and the pleadings filed on their behalf by Atty. Paras in connection with the disbarment
case against the respondents. They claimed that they merely signed the pleadings but
the contents thereof were not explained to them in a dialect which they understood.
They likewise expressed lack of intention to file a disbarment case against the
respondents and that, on the contrary, they were very much willing to settle and pay
their indebtedness to them. Further, they asserted that it was not the respondents, but
Atty. Paras who instructed them not to attend the pre-trial conference of the cases
which eventually resulted to a judgment by default against them. They claimed that
Atty. Paras told them that he will be the one to attend the pre-trial conference to settle
matters with the respondents and the court but he did not show up on the scheduled
date. They also asseverated that most of the statements contained in the complaint for
disbarment were false and that they wished to withdraw the said complaint.
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XIX-2011-
172,17 which reads:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration there being no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the
matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus,
Resolution No. XVII-2005-159 dated 17 December 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED.18
On August 18, 2011, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that
the admission of the complainants in the Judicial Affidavit dated August 9, 2007 proved
that the disbarment case filed against them was just fabricated by Atty. Paras. They
pointed out the complainants' statement that they were just made to sign the complaint
for disbarment by Atty. Paras to retaliate against them for having filed a case against
him for falsification of documents which sent him to prison for some time.
On August 18, 2011, the complainants sent a letter19 to the IBP, expressing
disappointment over the fact that the IBP Board of Governors did not dismiss the
disbarment case against Francisco. The letter pertinently stated:
We are very concerned and saddened by the fact that the disbarment case against
ATTY. FRANCISCO DY YAP was NOT DISMISSED. The reason is that we have
submitted our JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT relating the facts and circumstances wherein the
said disbarment complaint was prepared by our former legal counsel, ATTY. JUSTO J.
PARAS consisting of fabrications and not on facts. It was upon the machination and
instigation of ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, that the simple collection case of P94,000.00
more or less, became a multifaceted case in several forums.20(Emphasis in the
original)
The instant case is now referred to this Court for final action.
The Court notes that on September 16, 2011, the complainants filed a Motion to Admit
Judicial Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss and/or Withdraw Complaint,21 reiterating their
claim that the filing of the disbarment was a product of Atty. Paras' maneuverings and
that the allegations against the respondents stated therein were false.
After a careful examination of the facts of this case, the Court finds no compelling
reason to deviate from the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Notably, the respondents seek a reconsideration of the resolutions of the IBP Board of
Governors primarily on the basis of the Judicial Affidavit dated August 9, 2007, wherein
the complainants cleared them of the charges of misconduct and turned the blame on
their own counsel, Atty. Paras, for allegedly having made up the allegations in the
disbarment complaint. When the IBP Board of Governors sustained the imposition of
suspension to Francisco, the complainants themselves submitted a motion to admit the
said judicial affidavit to this Court, together with a motion to dismiss and withdraw
complaint.
The question now is whether the statements of the complainants, specifically
contesting the truthfulness of the allegations hurled against the respondents in their
own complaint for disbarment necessarily results to Francisco's absolution. The answer
is in the negative.
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It
is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to
possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's
faith in the legal profession.22
The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated to guide the members of the
bar by informing them of the deportment expected of them in leading both their
professional and private lives. Primarily, it aims to protect the integrity and nobility of
the legal profession, to breed honest and principled lawyers and prune the association
of the unworthy.
It is for the foregoing reason that the Court cannot simply yield to complainants' change
of heart by refuting their own statements against the respondents and praying that the
complaint for disbarment they filed be dismissed. It bears emphasizing that any
misconduct on the part of the lawyer not only hurts the client's cause but is even more
disparaging on the integrity of the legal profession itself. Thus, for tarnishing the
reputation of the profession, a lawyer may still be disciplined notwithstanding the
complainant's pardon or withdrawal from the case for as long as there is evidence to
support any finding of culpability. A case for suspension or disbarment may proceed
"regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainants, if the facts proven so
warrant."23 It follows that the withdrawal of the complainant from the case, or even the
filing of an affidavit of desistance, does not conclude the administrative case against an
erring lawyer.
This is so because the misconduct of a lawyer is deemed a violation of his oath to keep
sacred the integrity of the profession for which he must be disciplined.1âwphi1 "The
power to discipline lawyers who are officers of the court may not be cut short by
compromise and withdrawal of the charges. This is as it should be, especially when we
consider that the law profession and its exercise is one impressed with public interest.
Proceedings to discipline erring members of the bar are not instituted to protect and
promote the public good only but also to maintain the dignity of the profession by the
weeding out of those who have proven themselves unworthy thereof."24
Therefore, in the instant case, the Court cannot just set aside the finding of culpability
against the respondents merely because the complainants have decided to forgive
them or settle matters amicably after the case was completely evaluated and reviewed
by the IBP. The complainants' forgiveness or even withdrawal from the case does not
ipso facto obliterate the misconduct committed by Francisco. To begin with, it is already
too late in the day for the complainants to withdraw the disbarment case considering
that they had already presented and supported their claims with convincing and
credible evidence, and the IBP has promulgated a resolution on the basis thereof.
To be clear, "[i]n administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers,
the quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant."25 In the present case, it was clearly established that
Francisco received 20,000.00 as initial payment from the complainants in compliance
with the terms of their out-of-court settlement for the payment of the latter's outstanding
obligations. The amount was duly received and acknowledged by Francisco, who
drafted the same in a paper with the letterhead of his own law office, a fact he did not
deny. While the respondents deny that they told the complainants not to attend the pre-
trial of the case anymore and that they will be the one to inform the trial court of the
settlement, they did not bring the said agreement to the attention of the court. Thus, the
trial court, oblivious of the settlement of the parties, rendered a judgment by default
against the complainants. The respondents even filed a motion for execution of the
decision but still did not inform the trial court of the out-of-court settlement between
them and the complainants. They deliberately failed to mention this supervening event
to the trial court, hence, violating the standards of honesty provided for in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
xxxx
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
The complainants' belated claim that the respondents were faultless and that the
allegations stated in the disbarment complaint were just fabricated by their former
counsel cannot stand against the clear and preponderant evidence they earlier
presented. It is inexplicable how the complainants could now claim that the
respondents were blameless when the records tell otherwise. That they were simply
duped by Atty. Paras into signing the numerous pleadings he filed on their behalf is
hardly believable considering that Aida is well-lettered, being a public school teacher.
They also do not claim that they were prevented from reading the contents of the
pleadings or that their signatures were simply forged. At any rate, while it may be true
that Atty. Paras fabricated some of the facts stated in the disbarment complaint, these
matters are trivial and do not relate to the facts material to the charge of misconduct
against Francisco. What clearly appears is that the facts material to the violation
committed by Francisco are well-established notwithstanding Atty. Paras' supposed
fabrication of some insignificant particulars.
WHEREFORE, for deliberately misleading the Court, Atty. Francisco Dy Yap is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months effective upon
receipt of this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with severely.
For lack of evidence of her participation in the misconduct, Atty. Whelma F. Siton-Yap
is hereby EXONERATED of the charges against her.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator which shall circulate the same in all courts in the
country, and spread upon the personal records of the respondent lawyer in the Office
of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
5. A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A
STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law
professors1 in response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause
Resolution), directing them to show cause why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enumerated therein.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets this
as an administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Maria
Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno) to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution. Neither is this a disciplinary proceeding grounded on an allegedly
irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt as intimated by Associate Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her dissenting opinions to both the
October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution and the present decision.
With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind, the
Court finds that with the exception of one respondent whose compliance was adequate
and another who manifested he was not a member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted
explanations, being mere denials and/or tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly
unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses even more urgently behoove this Court to call
the attention of respondent law professors, who are members of the Bar, to the
relationship of their duties as such under the Code of Professional Responsibility to
their civil rights as citizens and academics in our free and democratic republic.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as
follows:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the
text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which
has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak
their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards
of their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the
Supreme Court, or any court for that matter, for a decision it has rendered, especially
during the pendency of a motion for such decision’s reconsideration. The accusation of
plagiarism against a member of this Court is not the real issue here but rather this
plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyone’s attention from the actual concern
of this Court to determine by respondents’ explanations whether or not respondent
members of the Bar have crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional
conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court through improper intervention or
interference as third parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it should be stressed that
it was respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act on their
Statement,2 which they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean
Leonen), for the Court’s proper disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of
speech and academic freedom invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing here
that the legal reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that freedom of
expression is not a defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using
intemperate speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to
respondents’ invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because
respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of
young aspiring attorneys that respondents’ own non-observance of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions,
cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court.
To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’ actuations, it is apropos to
revisit the factual antecedents of this case.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Antecedent Facts and Proceedings
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del
Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated.
On May 31, 2010, the counsel3 for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising solely the following grounds:
I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable
Courts’ (sic) assertion that the Executive’s foreign policy prerogatives are
virtually unlimited; precisely, under the relevant jurisprudence and
constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by international
human rights and humanitarian standards, including those provided for in the
relevant international conventions of which the Philippines is a party. 4
II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader,
if fundamental, responsibility of states to protect the human rights of its
citizens – especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga omnes
obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms.5
On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty.
Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited for the first time their charge
of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among
other arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:
I.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT’S
JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE SOURCES –
AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY
PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN
RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW – AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT
THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING
THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN
MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITION’S CLAIMS.7
They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of
extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized
sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying
the Petition."8
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya
decision were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article "A Fiduciary
Theory of Jus Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams’ book Enforcing Erga Omnes
Obligations in International Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis’ article "Breaking the Silence: On
Rape as an International Crime."11
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on July
19, 2010, journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled
"SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak
website.12 The same article appeared on the GMA News TV website also on July 19,
2010.13
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared
in the Manila Standard Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof.
Evan Criddle, one of the authors purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya
decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been
plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddle’s response to the post by Julian Ku
regarding the news report15 on the alleged plagiarism in the international law blog,
Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Ku’s blog entry in this wise:
The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration filed
yesterday with the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is available here:
http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-
supreme-court/
The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four sentences and
citations that are identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-
authored with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the
petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations until after the motion was filed today.
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens discussion is
that it implies that the prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and
torture are not jus cogens norms. Our article emphatically asserts the opposite. The
Supreme Court’s decision is available
here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm 17
On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court
in reply to the charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.18
In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya
decision, Dr. Mark Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:
Your Honours:
I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the last few
days.
Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am compelled, as a
question of the integrity of my work as an academic and as an advocate of human
rights and humanitarian law, to take exception to the possible unauthorized use of my
law review article on rape as an international crime in your esteemed Court’s Judgment
in the case of Vinuya et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of
28 April 2010).
My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by the
Philippine chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative
(SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-based Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI),
where I sit as trustee.
In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in footnote
65, pp. 27-28, of the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that
your esteemed Court may have misread the arguments I made in the article and
employed them for cross purposes. This would be ironic since the article was written
precisely to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for victims of war crimes, genocide,
and crimes against humanity.
I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law in 2006 has been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust that
your esteemed Court will take the time to carefully study the arguments I made in the
article.
I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the issues
raised by this letter.
With respect,
(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20
In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section
13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also
dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to
the Ethics Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC.
On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to
comment on the letter of Justice Del Castillo.21
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A
Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the
Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the
Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s website22 and on Atty. Roque’s blog.23 A report
regarding the statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA
News TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on the same date. The statement was likewise
posted at the University of the Philippines College of Law’s bulletin board allegedly on
August 10, 201026 and at said college’s website.27
On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University
of the Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The cover letter dated August 10,
2010 of Dean Leonen read:
The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines
Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona
Chief Justice
Subject: Statement of faculty
from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v Executive Secretary
Your Honors:
We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by thirty[-
]eight (38)28members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its points
could be considered by the Supreme Court en banc.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law
(Emphases supplied.)
The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the
actual signatures of the alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law
professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing beside each name. For convenient
reference, the text of the UP Law faculty Statement is reproduced here:
RESTORING INTEGRITY
 A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas
who had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they courageously came out with
their very personal stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort women", waited for
almost two decades for any meaningful relief from their own government as well as
from the government of Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse
in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they
only had these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law
views the charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism
and misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. The plagiarism and
misrepresentation are not only affronts to the individual scholars whose work have
been appropriated without correct attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity
and credibility of the Philippine Judicial System.
In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another
person’s work as one’s own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at
worst. It constitutes a taking of someone else’s ideas and expressions, including all the
effort and creativity that went into committing such ideas and expressions into writing,
and then making it appear that such ideas and expressions were originally created by
the taker. It is dishonesty, pure and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in
any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law
of the land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws
by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a complete perversion and falsification of the
ends of justice.
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the
ponente merely copied select portions of other legal writers’ works and interspersed
them into the decision as if they were his own, original work. Under the circumstances,
however, because the Decision has been promulgated by the Court, the Decision now
becomes the Court’s and no longer just the ponente’s. Thus the Court also bears the
responsibility for the Decision. In the absence of any mention of the original writers’
names and the publications from which they came, the thing speaks for itself.
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the
spokesman of the Court.
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is
a reference to the ‘primary’ sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not
acceptable, because the original authors’ writings and the effort they put into finding
and summarizing those primary sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The
inclusion of the footnotes together with portions of their writings in fact aggravates,
instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it provides additional evidence of a deliberate
intention to appropriate the original authors’ work of organizing and analyzing those
primary sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with
all legal and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal
unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands correct and careful attribution and
citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of diligence and competence expected
of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of the Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan
Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents the
conclusions of their work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main source
of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue that the classification of the crimes of
rape, torture, and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity have attained the status
of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its
aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of the same article to arrive at
the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of copying works
without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in
order to mislead and deceive.
The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with
State liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of
war, and the role of the injured parties’ home States in the pursuit of remedies against
such injury or damage. National courts rarely have such opportunities to make an
international impact. That the petitioners were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered
from horrific abuse during the Second World War made it incumbent on the Court of
last resort to afford them every solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this
case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of
many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed
the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court
decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme Court added
insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the Executive
Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition,
coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern
for even the most basic values of decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine
Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine legal profession before other
Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and
cannot accept excuses for failure to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed
upon all members of the Bench and Bar because these undermine the very foundation
of its authority and power in a democratic society. Given the Court’s recent history and
the controversy that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and
obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this would only further erode faith and
confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the significance of this decision to the
quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who
have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the
Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and
misinterpreted texts.
The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring
that its own conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach.
This necessarily includes ensuring that not only the content, but also the processes of
preparing and writing its own decisions, are credible and beyond question. The Vinuya
Decision must be conscientiously reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the
purpose of sanction, then at least for the purpose of reflection and guidance. It is an
absolutely essential step toward the establishment of a higher standard of professional
care and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are critical to improving the
system of administration of justice in the Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in
ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all controversies: a
position that requires competence and integrity completely above any and all reproach,
in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed
upon them as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the
University of the Philippine College of Law that:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is
unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct
and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;
(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the
entire Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of the Philippine
judicial system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the
establishment of legal precedents through dubious means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does
violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate
dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
recourse, such as the petitioners therein;
(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty
and to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is
necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his
position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may consider
appropriate;
(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by
which it conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in
order to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise
guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal
research and writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.
Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.
6. A.M. No. 1769 June 8, 1992
CESAR L. LANTORIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. IRINEO L. BUNYI, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, seeking disciplinary
action against respondent Irineo L. Bunyi, member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground
that respondent Bunyi allegedly committed acts of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and
conduct unbecoming of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
corruption of the judge and bribery", in connection with respondent's handling of Civil
Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 then pending before the Municipal Court of Experanza,
Agusan del Sur, presided over by Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia 1 in which
respondent Bunyi was the counsel of one of the parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia
Mascarinas.
Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was the
owner of d farm located in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant
Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said farm, receiving as such a monthly
allowance. 2 It appears that the complaint in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to
eject the squatters from the aforementioned farm. 3 These cases were assigned to the
Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Bur, the acting municipal judge of which was
the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time the regular judge of the
municipal court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur). 4 The defendants in the mentioned civil
cases were, in due course, declared in default.
In relation to the same three (3) civil cases, the records of the present case show that
complainant Lantoria wrote a letter to respondent Bunyi, dated 23 April 1974, which
reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Upon informing him of your willingness to prepare the corresponding judgements (sic)
on the 3 defaulted cases he said he has no objection in fact he is happy and
recommended that you mail the said decisions in due time thru me to be delivered to
him.
xxx xxx xxx
I will communicate with you from time to time for any future development.
My best regards to you and family and to Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas and all.
On 01 June 1974, respondent Bunyi wrote to the complainant regarding the said three
(3) cases, in this wise:
Dear Major Lantoria,
At last, I may say that I have tried my best to respond to the call in your several letters
received, which is about the preparation of the three (3) Decisions awaited by Judge
Galicia. The delay is that I have been too much occupied with my cases and other
professional commitments here in Manila and nearby provinces. Not only to Mrs.
Mascarinas I would say that I am so sorry but also to you. Mrs. Mascarinas has been
reminding me but I always find myself at a loss to prepare these Decisions at an early
date sa (sic) possible. So also with my calendar as to the dates for the next hearing of
the remaining cases over there.
Herewith now, you will find enclosed the three (3) Decisions against the (3) defaulted
defendants. I am not sure if they will suit to satisfy Judge Galicia to sign them at once.
However, it is my request to Judge Galicia, thru your kind mediation, that if the
preparation of these Decisions do not suit his consideration, then I am ready and willing
to accept his suggestions or correction to charge or modify them for the better. And to
this effect, kindly relay at once what he is going to say or thinks if he signs them readily
and please request for each copy for our hold.
xxx xxx xxx
Please excuse this delay, and thanks for your kind assistance in attending to our cases
there. Regards to you and family and prayer for your more vigor and success.
Dear Major Lantoria,
This is an additional request, strictly personal and confidential. Inside the envelope
addressed to Judge Vicente C. Galicia, are the Decisions and Orders, which he told me
to prepare and he is going to sign them. If you please, deliver the envelope to him as if
you have no knowledge and information and that you have not opened it. Unless, of
course, if the information comes from him. But, you can inquire from him if there is a
need to wait from his words about them, or copies to be furnished me, after he signs
them, it could be made thru you personally, to expedite receiving those copies for our
hold. According to him, this envelope could be delivered to him at his residence at No.
345 M. Calo St., Butuan City, during week end. or, at Bayugan if you happen to go
there, if he is not in Butuan City.
Thanking You for your kind attention and favor.
xxx xxx xxx
b) In the second place, the said letter of June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory and speaks
for itself, that if ever the same was written by the Respondent, it was due to the
insistence of the Complainant thru his several letters received, that the decisions in
question be drafted or prepared for Judge Galicia, who considered such preparation as
a big help to him, because he was at that time holding two (2) salas — one as being
the regular Municipal Judge of Bayugan and the other, as the acting Judge of
Esperanza, both of Agusan del Sur, with many pending cases and it was to the benefit
of the Complainant that the early disposition of the cases involved would not suffer
inconsiderable delay. But, the intention to draft or prepare the decisions in question
was never spawned by the Respondent. Instead, it came from the under-standing
between the Judge and the complainant who, from his several letters, had
demonstrated so much interest to eject at once the squatters from the farm he was
entrusted to manage. Furthermore, the Complainant's conclusion that the said
decisions were lutong macao is purely non-sense as it is without any factual or legal
basis. He himself knew that Judge Galicia asked for help in the drafting of said
decisions as at any rate they were judgments by default, the defendants lost their
standing in court when they were declared in default for failure to file their answers and
to appear at the place and time set for hearing thereof (See first paragraph, letter of
June 1, 1974)
c) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were in the form of drafts, as in
fact, the letter mentioned subject to suggestion or correction to change or modify for
the better by Judge Galicia (Second paragraph, Ibid);
d) Fourthly, in the some letter, Responding (sic) even apologized for the delay in
sending the same to the Complainant and expressed his gratitude for his assistance in
attending to the cases involved (Last paragraph, Ibid.)
In its resolution dated 28 November 1977, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. 9 On 21 July 1980, the Solicitor
General submitted his report to the Court, with the following averments, to wit: 1) that
the case was set for hearing on April 12, September 29, and December 18, 1978, but
in all said scheduled hearings only respondent Bunyi appeared; 2) that in the hearing of
16 January 1979, both respondent and complainant appeared; 3) that at the same
hearing, the Solicitor General reported the following development —
Atty. Mercado submitted a letter of complainant dated January 16, 1979 sworn to
before the investigating Solicitor, praying that the complaint be considered withdrawn,
dropped or dismissed on the ground that complainant "could hardly substantiate" his
charges and that he is "no longer interested to prosecute" the same. For his part,
respondent manifested that he has no objection to the withdrawal of the complaint
against him. At the same time, he presented complainant Lantoria as a witness are
elicited testimony to the effect that complainant no longer has in his possession the
original of the letters attached to his basic complaint, and hence, he was not prepared
to prove his charges. 10(emphasis supplied)
In his aforesaid report, the Solicitor General found as follows: a) that the letters of
respondent Bunyi (dated 4, March and 1 June 1974), addressed to complainant,
showed that respondent had indeed prepared the draft of the decisions in Civil Case
Nos. 81, 83 and 88 of the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, which he
submitted to Judge Vicente Galicia thru the complainant; b) that those letters indicated
that respondent had previous communications with Judge Galicia regarding the
preparation of the decisions; c) that the testimony of complainant to the effect that he
had lost the original of said letters, and complainant's withdrawal of the complaint in the
case at bar are of no moment, as respondent Bunyi, and his motion to dismiss filed
with the Supreme Court, admitted that he prepared the draft of the decisions in the said
civil cases, and be affirmed the existence of the letters.
Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that respondent is guilty of highly
unethical and unprofessional conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the
court, to help promote the independence of the judiciary and to refrain from engaging in
acts which would influence judicial determination of a litigation in which he is
counsel. 11 The Solicitor General recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. He filed with the Court the
corresponding complaint against respondent.
In his answer 12 to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General, respondent manifested
that in the future he would be more careful in observing his duties as a lawyer, and in
upholding the provisions of the canons of professional ethics.
On 10 December 1980, the date set by this Court for the hearing of this case, the
hearing was postponed until further notice. On 9 March 1981, respondent filed a
manifestation 13 alleging that no hearing was as yet set in the case since the last
setting on 10 December 1980, and he requested that the next hearing be not set until
after six (6) months when be expected to return from the United States of America
where he would visit his children and at the same time have a medical check-up.
On 28 October 1981, the date set by this Court for bearing in this case, respondent
Bunyi and the Solicitor General appeared, and respondent was directed to submit his
memorandum. Respondent Bunyi filed his memorandum on 16 November 1981. In
said memorandum, 14 respondent submitted that although he prepared the draft of the
decisions in the civil cases, he did not offer Judge Galicia any gift or consideration to
influence the Judge in allowing him to prepare the draft decisions. 15 He also offered his
apology to the Court for all the improprieties which may have resulted from his
preparation of the draft decisions.
We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the determination of the
merits of the instant case should proceed notwithstanding complainant's withdrawal of
his complaint in the case, the respondent himself having admitted that the letters in
question truly exist, and that he even asked for an apology from the Court, for whatever
effects such letters may have had on his duty as a lawyer.
With the admission by respondent of the existence of the letters upon which the
present administrative complaint is based, the remaining issue to be resolved is the
effect of the acts complained of on respondent's duty both as a lawyer and an officer of
the Court.
We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that respondent, by way
of disciplinary action, deserves suspension from the practice of law.
The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with
Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83,
and 88, and which he in fact prepared. Although nothing in the records would show that
respondent got the trial court judge's consent to the said preparation for a favor or
consideration, the acts of respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer and an officer of the Court.
Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which
were enforced at the time respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which
provides as follows:
3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court
Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled for
by the personal relations of the parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to
misconstructions of motive and should be avoided. A lawyer should not communicate
or argue privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves
rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special
personal consideration or favor. A self-respecting independence in the discharge of
professional duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy and respect due the
judge's station, is the only proper foundation for cordial personal and official relations
between bench and bar.
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility 16 a lawyer's attempt to influence the
court is rebuked, as shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court.
Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or
hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with
judges.
Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to
influence the court where he had pending civil case. 17
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year from the date of notice hereof. Let this
decision be entered in the bar records of the respondent and the Court Administrator is
directed to inform the different courts of this suspension.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa C.J., Paras, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
7. A.C. No. 5624 January 20, 2004
NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James
Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly
violating his oath as a lawyer "by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and
bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order."1
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the
legitimate spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are
estranged and living separately from each other. They have two children – namely,
Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three
years old – both of whom are in complainant’s custody. Complainant filed a case for
the annulment of her marriage with respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122,
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another
case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before the
Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, "James Benedict C.
Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al."
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainant’s
residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two
minor children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an
alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his
motion for temporary child custody.2 Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter
informed her that he had not received any motion for temporary child custody filed by
respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the
Court of Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined
the resolution closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and
November 29, 2001. Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of their
children to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the
ABC Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men,
suddenly arrived and demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children.
He threatened to forcefully take them away with the help of his companions, whom he
claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The
responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter
could be clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be
entered in the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI,
formally served on complainant the appellate court’s resolution/order. 3 In order to
diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent
for one night on condition that he would not take them away from Tanjay City. This
agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito
Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van
arrived at the hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them to
Bacolod City. Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room,
where they stayed until later in the morning.
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City,
Branch 31, a verified petition4for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his
right to custody of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals’ resolution.
In the meantime, complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a
certification dated January 18, 20025 from the Court of Appeals stating that no such
resolution ordering complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent
had been issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did
not appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his
attorney’s oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals’
Resolution in and outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused
the privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-
CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of three years with a warning that another offense of this nature will result in his
disbarment.6 On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Report and recommendation of the Commission with the modification that the penalty
of suspension be increased to six years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively
liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in
invoking the Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic.
This, however, is belied by the fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution
several times. As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed
Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition
for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No.
3898,7 which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and second,
when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to
recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was respondent who
used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer.1âwphi1 The burden cast on the
judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by
counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of
allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that
counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a client’s cause, it must
never be at the expense of the truth.8Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility
states:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a decision
or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by
repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings
in describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyer’s language should be forceful but
dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession.9 The lawyer’s arguments whether written or oral should
be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may
be properly addressed by one gentlemen to another.10 By calling complainant, a "sly
manipulator of truth" as well as a "vindictive congenital prevaricator", hardly measures
to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondent’s actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They
constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefore.- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law.
However, we find that the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead,
suspension for the lesser period of two years, which we deem commensurate to the
offense committed, is hereby imposed on respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a
member of the Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
8. A.C. No. 6942 July 17, 2013
SONIC STEEL INDUSTRIES, INC., COMPLAINANT,
vs.
ATTY. NONNATUS P. CHUA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Sonic Steel Industries, Inc.
against respondent, Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua.
The facts follow.
Complainant is a corporation doing business as a manufacturer and distributor of zinc
and aluminum-zinc coated metal sheets known in the market as Superzinc and
Superlume. On the other hand, respondent is the Vice-President, Corporate Legal
Counsel and Assistant Corporate Secretary of Steel Corporation (STEELCORP).
The controversy arose when, on September 5, 2005, STEELCORP, with the
assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation, applied for and was granted by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite City, Branch 17, a Search Warrant directed
against complainant.
On the strength of the search warrant, complainant’s factory was searched and,
consequently, properties were seized. A week after, STEELCORP filed before the
Department of Justice a complaint for violation of Section 168, in relation to Section
170, of Republic Act No. 82931 against complainant and the latter’s officers.
Based on three documents, to wit: (1) the Affidavit of Mr. Antonio Lorenzana (Executive
Vice-President of STEELCORP), in support of the application for the Search Warrant;
(2) the exchange between Mr. Lorenzana and Judge Melchor Sadang of Branch 17,
RTC of Cavite, during the searching inquiry conducted by the latter for the application
for warrant, as evidenced by the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) dated
September 5, 2005 in People v. John Doe a.k.a. Anthony Ong, et al.; and (3) the
Complaint-Affidavit executed by respondent and filed before the Department of Justice,
complainant asserts that respondent performed the ensuing acts:
(a)
In stating that STEELCORP is the exclusive licensee of Philippine Patent No. 16269,
respondent deliberately misled the court as well as the Department of Justice, because
Letters Patent No. 16269 have already lapsed, making it part of the public domain.
(b)
In refusing to provide the RTC of Cavite City, Branch 17 a copy of the patent,
respondent intentionally deceived said court because even the first page of the patent
will clearly show that said patent already lapsed. It appears that Letters Patent No.
16269 was issued on August 25, 1983 and therefore had already lapsed rendering it
part of the public domain as early as 2000. Had respondent shown a copy of the patent
to the judge, said judge would not have been misled into issuing the search warrant
because any person would know that a patent has a lifetime of 17 years under the old
law and 20 years under R.A. 8293. Either way, it is apparent from the face of the patent
that it is already a lapsed patent and therefore cannot be made basis for a supposed
case of infringement more so as basis for the application for the issuance of a search
warrant.
In the affidavit submitted by Mr. Antonio Lorenzana, complainant asserts that the same
includes statements expressing that STEELCORP is the licensee of Philippine Patent
No. 16269, to wit:
2. STEELCORP is the exclusive licensee of and manufacturer in the Philippines of
"GALVALUME" metal sheet products, which are coated with aluminum-zinc alloy,
produced by using the technical information and the patent on Hot Dip Coating of
Ferrous Strands with Patent Registration No. 16269 issued by the Philippine
Intellectual Property Office ("IPO"), a process licensed by BIEC International, Inc. to
STEELCORP for the amount of over Two Million Five Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars
($2,500,000.00).
xxxx
7. Specifically, the acts committed by RESPONDENTS of storing, selling, retailing,
distributing, importing, dealing with or otherwise disposing of "SUPERLUME" metal
sheet products which are similarly coated with aluminum-zinc alloy and cannot be
produced without utilizing the same basic technical information and the registered
patent used by STEELCORP to manufacture "GALVALUME" metal sheet products, the
entire process of which has been lawfully and exclusively licensed to STEELCORP by
BIEC International, Inc., constitute unfair competition in that –
xxxx
b. While SUPERLUME metal sheets have the same general appearance as those of
GALVALUME metal sheets which are similarly coated with aluminum-zinc alloy,
produced by using the same technical information and the aforementioned registered
patent exclusively licensed to and manufactured in the Philippines since 1999 by
STEELCORP, the machinery and process for the production of SUPERLUME metal
sheet products were not installed and formulated with the technical expertise of BIEC
International, Inc. to enable the SONIC to achieve the optimum results in the
production of aluminum-zinc alloy-coated metal sheets;
xxxx
8. On the [bases] of the foregoing analyses of the features and characteristics of
RESPONDENTS’ SUPERLUME metal sheet products, the process by which they are
manufactured and produced certainly involves an assembly line that substantially
conforms with the technical information and registered patent licensed to
STEELCORP, which should include, but are not limited to, the following major
components and specifications, viz.:
xxxx
9. It is plain from the physical appearance and features of the metal sheets which are
coated with aluminum-zinc alloy and produced by using the technical information and
the registered patent exclusively licensed to STEELCORP by BIEC International, Inc.;
the mark ending with the identical syllable "LUME" to emphasize its major component
(i.e., aluminum) which is used in Respondents’ "SUPERLUME" metal sheets while
having the same general appearance of STEELCORP’s genuine "GALVALUME" metal
sheets, that the intention of RESPONDENTS is to cash in on the goodwill of
STEELCORP by passing off its "SUPERLUME" metal sheet products as those of
STEELCORP’s "GALVALUME" metal sheet products, which increases the inducement
of the ordinary customer to buy the deceptively manufactured and unauthorized
production of "SUPERLUME" metal sheet products.
xxxx
11. STEELCORP has lost and will continue to lose substantial revenues and will
sustain damages as a result of the wrongful conduct of RESPONDENTS and their
deceptive use of the technical information and registered patent, exclusively licensed to
STEELCORP, as well as the other features of their SUPERLUME metal sheets, that
have the same general appearance as the genuine GALVALUME metal sheets of
STEELCORP. The conduct of RESPONDENTS has also deprived and will continue to
deprive STEELCORP of opportunities to expand its goodwill.2
Also, in the searching questions of Judge Melchor Sadang of the RTC of Cavite City,
Branch 17, complainant asserts that respondent deliberately misled and intentionally
deceived the court in refusing to provide a copy of Philippine Patent No. 16269 during
the hearing for the application for a search warrant, to wit:
[COURT to Mr. Lorenzana]
Q: You stated here in your affidavit that you are the Executive Vice-President of Steel
Corporation of the Philippines. Is that correct?
A: Yes sir.
Q: You also state that Steel Corporation owns a patent exclusively licensed to Steel
Corporation by BIEC International, Inc. Do you have document to show that?
ATTY. CHUA: We reserve the presentation of the trademark license, your Honor.
Q: Why are you applying a search warrant against the respondent Sonic Steel
Industries?
A: We will know that Sonic is not licensed to produce that product coming from the
technology which is exclusively licensed to our Company, your Honor. We know that
from our own knowledge. Also, the investigation of the NBI confirms further that the
product has already been in the market for quite some time. As a product, it has the
same feature and characteristic as that of GALVALUME, your Honor.
Q: In other words, you are not saying that Sonic is using the trademark GALVALUME
but only using the technology of the process which is only licensed to Steel
Corporation. Is that correct?
A: Yes, your Honor.
xxxx
Court to Lorenzana:
Q: The patent on the Hot Dip Coating of Ferrous Strands, do you have a document
regarding that?
A: Yes, your Honor. It is in the office.
ATTY. CHUA: We reserve the right to present it, your Honor.
Court:
Q: You stated a while ago that it is the Steel Corporation that has been licensed by the
BIEC International to manufacture sheet products which are coated with aluminum-zinc
alloy. Is that correct?
A: Yes, your Honor.3
Subsequently, respondent initiated a complaint for violation of Section 168 of Republic
Act No. 8293 against complainant, as well as its officers, before the Department of
Justice. In his complaint-affidavit, respondent stated that STEELCORP is the exclusive
licensee of Philippine Patent No. 16269 on Hot Dip Coating of Ferrous Strands which
was allegedly violated by complainant. Thus:
2. STEELCORP is the exclusive licensee and manufacturer in the Philippines of
"GALVALUME" metal sheet products, which are coated with aluminum-zinc alloy,
produced by using the technical information and the patent on Hot Dip Coating of
Ferrous Strands with Patent Registration No. 16269, issued by the Philippine
Intellectual Property Office ("IPO"), a process licensed by BIEC International, Inc. to
STEELCORP for the amount of over Two Million Five Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars
($2,500,000.00).
xxxx
13. x x x x
b. While SUPERLUME metal sheets have the same general appearance as those of
GALVALUME metal sheets which are similarly coated with aluminum-zinc alloy,
produced by using the same technical information and the aforementioned registered
patent exclusively licensed to and manufactured in the Philippines since 1999 by
STEELCORP, the machinery and process for the production of SUPERLUME metal
sheet products were not installed and formulated with the technical expertise of BIEC
International, Inc. to enable SONIC to achieve the optimum results in the production of
aluminum-zinc alloy-coated metal sheets;
xxxx
15. The natural, probable and foreseeable result of RESPONDENTS’ conduct is to
continue to deprive STEELCORP of the exclusive benefits of using the technical
information and patent for the manufacture and distribution of aluminum-zinc alloy-
coated metal sheet products, deprive STEELCORP of sales and goodwill, and continue
to injure STEELCORP’s relations with present and prospective customers.
16. STEELCORP has lost and will continue to lose substantial revenues and will
sustain damages as a result of the wrongful conduct by RESPONDENTS and their
deceptive use the technical information and patent, exclusively licensed by BIEC
International, Inc. to STEELCORP, used and/or intended to be used by
RESPONDENTS for the manufacture, retail, dealings with or otherwise disposals of
unauthorized SUPERLUME aluminum-zinc alloy-coated metal sheet products, as well
as the other features of its product, having the same general appearance and
characteristics as those of the genuine GALVALUME aluminum-zinc alloy-coated metal
sheet products. RESPONDENTS’ conduct has also deprived STEELCORP and will
continue to deprive STEELCORP of opportunities to expand its goodwill. 4
For his part, respondent counters that he never made an allegation or reservation that
STEELCORP owned Philippine Patent No. 16269. He asserts that he merely reserved
the right to present the trademark license exclusively licensed to STEELCORP by BIEC
International, Inc. which is composed of the technical information and the patent used
to produce GALVALUME metal sheet products, the same technology being utilized by
complainant without authority from STEELCORP.
Respondent further avers that the Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Department of
Justice did not categorically claim that STEELCORP is the owner of the patent, but
simply that STEELCORP is the exclusive licensee of the process by which
GALVALUME is produced.
The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
In its Report and Recommendation dated July 10, 2007, the IBP’s Commission on Bar
Discipline resolved to suspend respondent from the practice of law for three (3) months
with admonition that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
On August 17, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-76
wherein it resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Officer of the Commission on Bar Discipline, with the modification that
respondent is suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
Unfazed, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said Resolution, but
the same was denied on January 14, 2012.
Accordingly, the Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to
this Court for final action.
We affirm in toto the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
Pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility state:
Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal process.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
conduct.
xxxx
Canon 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court,
nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by an artifice.
Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice.
They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding truth and the rule
of law. They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the
court. Verily, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing
or consenting to any falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any
artifice. Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.5
In the present case, it appears that respondent claimed or made to appear that
STEELCORP was the licensee of the technical information and the patent on Hot Dip
Coating of Ferrous Strands or Philippine Patent No. 16269. However, an extensive
investigation made by the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline showed that
STEELCORP only has rights as a licensee of the technical information and not the
rights as a licensee of the patent, viz.:
x x x In respondent’s words and crafted explanation, he claimed that STEELCORP had
rights as a licensee of the process, consisting of a combination of the Technical
Information and the Patent. Considering, however, that STEELCORP’s rights as a
licensee of the process is severable into (a) rights as licensee of the technical
information and (b) rights as a licensee of Patent No. 16269, respondent was less than
candid in asserting that STEELCORP had rights to the entire process during the
relevant periods, as will be explained below.
Under the TECHNICAL INFORMATION AND PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENT
between STEELCORP and BIEC International, Inc., the terms "technical information"
and "patent" are separate and distinct. Thus, technical information is defined under
such contract as "Licensor’s existing proprietary data, know-how and technical
information which relates to the subject of Sheet and/or Strip coated with an aluminum-
zinc alloy xxx and to facilities and equipment for the manufacture and use thereof and
to data, know-how and technical information applicable thereto as of the Effective Date
xxxx." On the other hand, Licensed Patent is defined therein as "Patent No. 16269"
entitled "Hot dip coating of ferrous strands." The combination of such proprietary data,
know-how and the patent on Hot Dip Coating of Ferrous Strands is the process over
which STEELCORP claims it had proprietary license, and represents the same process
used by STEELCORP in producing GALVALUME products. This is supposedly the
basis upon which STEELCORP (through Mr. Lorenzana in his Affidavit in support of the
application for a search warrant, presumably under the direction of respondent) and
respondent (in his Complaint-Affidavit before the Department of Justice) asserted then
that it was the exclusive licensee of the technical information and registered Patent No.
16269.
However, from the time that STEELCORP applied for a search warrant over SONIC
STEEL’s premises (through the affidavit of Mr. Lorenzana and presumably with
respondent’s strategy as counsel), Patent No. 16269 had long expired. This fact is
crucial in that the license STEELCORP had, as claimed by respondent, was over the
entire process and not just the technical information as a component thereof.
Accordingly, when the application for search was filed and when respondent
subscribed to his Complaint-Affidavit before the Department of Justice, STEELCORP
had no more exclusive license to Patent No. 16269. Said patent had already become
free for anyone’s use, including SONIC STEEL. All that STEELCORP possessed
during those times was the residual right to use (even if exclusively) just the technical
information defined in its agreement with BIEC International, Inc. STEELCORP had
only an incomplete license over the process. The expiration of the patent effectively
negated and rendered irrelevant respondent’s defense of subsistence of the contract
between STEELCORP and BIEC International, Inc. during the filing of the application
for search warrant and filing of respondent’s affidavit before the Department of justice.
There is basis, therefore, to the claim that respondent has not been "candid enough" in
his actuations.
It would also appear that respondent was wanting in candor as regards his dealings
with the lower court.1âwphi1 The interjection made by respondent during Judge
Sadang’s (Branch 17, Regional Trial Court of Cavite) searching examination of Mr.
Lorenzana illustrates this, viz.:
Q: You also state here that Steel Corporation owns a patent exclusively licensed to
Steel Corporation by BIEC International, Inc. Do you have a document to show that?
ATTY. CHUA: We reserve the presentation of the trademark license, your Honor.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: The patent on the Hot Dip Coating of Ferrous Strands, do you have a document
regarding that?
A: Yes, your Honor. It is in the office.
ATTY. CHUA: We reserve the right to present it, your Honor.
It is worth underscoring that although Judge Sadang addressed his questions solely to
Mr. Lorenzana, respondent was conveniently quick to interrupt and manifest his client’s
reservation to present the trademark license. Respondent was equally swift to end
Judge Sadang’s inquiry over the patent by reserving the right to present the same at
another time. While it is not the Commission’s province to dwell with suppositions and
hypotheses, it is well within its powers to make reasonable inferences from established
facts. Given that Patent No. 16269 had been in expiry for more than five (5) years
when Judge Sadang propounded his questions, it logically appears that respondent, in
making such reservations in open court, was trying to conceal from the former the fact
of the patent’s expiration so as to facilitate the grant of the search warrant in favor of
STEELCORP. This is contrary to the exacting standards of conduct required from a
member of the Bar.
Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed upon by the
State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of those
requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their dealings is
the very essence of a practitioner’s honorable membership in the legal profession.
Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and
nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing
parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the
truth and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and
discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients.6
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent violated his duties as a lawyer to avoid
dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1) and to act with candor, fairness
and good faith (Rule 10.01, Canon 10). Also, respondent desecrated the solemn oath
he took before this Court when he sought admission to the bar, i.e., not to do any
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court. Thus, even at the risk of
jeopardizing the probability of prevailing on STEELCORP’s application for a search
warrant, respondent should have informed the court of the patent’s expiration so as to
allow the latter to make an informed decision given all available and pertinent facts.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months with ADMONITION that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
July 23, 2013
9. A.C. No. 4549 December 2, 2013
NESTOR FELIPE, ALBERTO V. FELIPE, AURORA FELIPE-ORANTE, ASUNCION
FELIPE-DOMINGO, MILAGROS FELIPE CABIGTING, and RODOLFO V.
FELIPE, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CIRIACO A. MACAPAGAL, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On March 5, 1996, a Petition1 for disbarment was filed against respondent Atty. Ciriaco
A. Macapagal, docketed as A.C. No. 4549. In A Resolution2 dated June 19, 1996, we
required respondent to comment. Respondent received a copy of the Resolution on
July 16, 1996.3 On August 15, 1996, respondent filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion For
Extension Of Tme To File Comment.4 He requested for additional period of 30 days
within which to file his comment citing numerous professional commitments. We
granted said request in our October 2, 1996 Resolution. 5 The extended deadline
passed sans respondent’s comment. Thus on January 29, 1997, complainants file
an Urgent Motion To Submit The Administrative Case For Resolution Without
Comment Of Respondent6 claiming the respondent is deemed to have waived his right
to file comment.
On February 24, 1997, we referred this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. 7
The case was initially assigned to Investigating Commissioner Elizabeth Hermosisima-
Palma who set the hearing on October 22, 1997 at 9:00 a.m.8
The Minutes of the Hearing9 showed that both parties were present.1âwphi1 The next
hearing was set on November 6, 199710 but was postponed upon request of the
complainants' counsel.11
Noting that more than five months had lapsed after the postponement of the last
hearing, complainants moved to calendar the case.12
The new Investigating Commissioner, Arturo C. Delos Reyes, set the hearing of the
case on January 12, 1999.13
During the scheduled hearing, complainants appeared and were directed to submit
their Position Paper.1âwphi1Respondent failed to attend despite receipt of notice.14
Complainants submitted their Position Paper15 on January 28, 1999.16
It took 11 years, more particularly on February 26, 2010, before the IBP, thru
Investigating Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, submitted its Report and
Recommendation.17
In his Report, the Investigating Commissioner quoted verbatim the allegations in the
Petition; he then narrated the proceedings undertaken by the IBP. Unfortunately, no
discussion was made regarding the merits of the complaint. However, it was
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1)
month. In Resolution No. XX-2011-246 dated November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for one (1) year. In their Petition, complainants alleged that they are co-plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. A-95-22906 pending before Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City while respondent is the counsel for the defendants therein; that
respondent committed dishonesty when he stated in the defendants' Answer in Civil
Case No. A-95-22906 that the parties therein are strangers to each other despite
knowing that the defendants are half-brothers and half-sisters of complainants; and that
they filed a criminal case for Perjury [against the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-
22906] docketed as Criminal Case No. 41667 pending before Branch 36 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Complainants also alleged that respondent
introduced a falsified Certificate of Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-
95-22906; and that they filed another Perjury charge [against the defendants in Civil
Case No. A-95-22906] before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City,
docketed as I.S. No. 95-15656-A. Next, complainants averred that respondent
knowingly filed a totally baseless pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction; that said pleading is not in accordance
with the rules of procedure; that the said filing delayed the proceedings in Civil Case
No. A-95-22906; and that they filed a Vigorous Opposition to the said pleading.
Complainants insisted that by the foregoing actuations, respondent violated his duty as
a lawyer and prayed that he be disbarred and ordered to pay complainants the amount
of ₱500,000 representing the damages that they suffered. In fine, complainants
charged respondent with dishonesty (1) when he stated in the defendants' Answer in
Civil Case No. A-95-22906 that the parties therein are strangers to each other; (2)
when he introduced a falsified Certificate of Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil
Case No. A-95-22906; and (3) when he knowingly filed a totally baseless pleading
captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction in the same case. At the outset, we note that in order to determine whether
respondent is guilty of dishonesty, we will have to delve into the issue of whether the
complainants are indeed related to the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 being
half-brothers and half-sisters. We would also be tasked to make an assessment on the
authenticity of the Certificate of Marriage which respondent submitted in the
proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-22906. Similarly, we will have to make a ruling on
whether the Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction which respondent filed was indeed baseless and irrelevant to the
proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-22906. Clearly, these prerequisites cannot be
accomplished in this administrative case. The resolution of whether the parties are
related to each other appears to be one of the issues brought up in Civil Case No. A-
95-22906 which is a complaint for Partition, Reconveyance, Declaration of Nullity of
Documents and Damages. The complainants claimed that they are the legitimate
children of the late Gregorio V. Felipe, Sr. This was rebutted by the defendants therein,
as represented by the respondent, who denied their filiation with the complainants.
Clearly, the issue of filiation must be settled in those proceedings, and not in this
administrative case. The same is true with regard to the issue of authenticity of the
Marriage Certificate which was submitted in evidence as well as the relevance of the
Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Besides, as complainants have asserted, a criminal case for Perjury had already been
filed against the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 41667 pending before Branch 36 of the Manila MeTC for their alleged
"untruthful" statement that they are strangers to each other. They had also filed another
Perjury charge against the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, docketed as I.S. No. 95-15656-A for allegedly
submitting in evidence a falsified Marriage Certificate. Moreover, they already filed
a Vigorous Opposition to the Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction filed by the respondent. In fine, these issues are proper subjects
of and must be threshed out in a judicial action. We held in Anacta v.
Resurreccion18 that -
x x x it is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary
authority of the Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against
lawyers. If the matter involves violations of the lawyer's oath and code of conduct, then
it falls within the Court's disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from acts
which carry civil or criminal liablity, and which do not directly require an inquiry into the
moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial
action which is understandably outside the purview of the Court's disciplinary authority.
x x x19
Similarly, we held in Virgo v. Amorin,20 viz:
While it is true that disbarment proceedings look into the worthiness of a respondent to
remain as a member of the bar, and need not delve into the merits of a related case,
the Court, in this instance, however, cannot ascertain whether Atty. Amorin indeed
committed acts in violation of his oath as a lawyer concerning the sale and conveyance
of the Virgo Mansion without going through the factual matters that are subject of the
aforementioned civil cases, x x x. As a matter of prudence and so as not to preempt the
conclusions that will be drawn by the court where the case is pending, the Court deems
it wise to dismiss the present case without prejudice to the filing of another one,
depending on the final outcome of the civil case.21 Thus, pursuant to the above
pronouncements, the Petition filed by complainants must be dismissed without
prejudice. However, we cannot end our discussion here. It has not escaped our notice
that despite receipt of our directive, respondent did not file his comment. Neither did he
file his Position Paper as ordered by the IBP. And for this, he must be sanctioned.
Respondent's unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of this Court and the IBP is not
only irresponsible, but also constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow
lawyers. His conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon
to obey court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying
with court directives being themselves officers of the court. As an officer of the court,
respondent is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but
an order which should be complied with promptly and completely. This is also true of
the orders of the IBP as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases
against lawyers.22
Under the circumstances, we deem a reprimand with warning commensurate to the
infraction committed by the respondent.23
ACCORDINGLY , respondent Atty. Ciriaco A. Macapagal is REPRIMANDED for failing
to give due respect to the Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. He is
WARNED that commission of a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
Resolution No. XX-2011-246 dated November 19, 2011 of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is SET ASIDE. A.C. No. 4549 is DISMISSED without prejudice. Let a copy
of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the
Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
10. A.C. No. 8954 November 13, 2013
HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial
Court, San Mateo, Rizal,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for the defendant in Civil
Case No. 1863 captioned as Marsha Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold Balmores
defendant a suit for damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal
and presided by herein complainant Judge Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan (Judge
Manahan). During the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1863, Judge Manahan issued an
Order1 dated January 12, 2011, whereby she voluntarily inhibited from hearing Civil
Case No. 1863. The said Order reads in part, viz:
More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations, his traits of
dishonesty and discourtesy not only to his own brethren in the legal profession, but
also to the bench and judges, would amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice
of law, a serious ground for disciplinary action of a member of the bar pursuant to
Rules 139 a & b.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to the Bar Discipline Committee,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to the Supreme Court en banc, for appropriate
investigation and sanction.2
Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
deemed the pronouncements of Judge Manahan as a formal administrative Complaint
against Atty. Flores. Docketed as A.C. No. 8954, the case was referred to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal for investigation, report and
recommendation.3
In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation,4 Investigating Judge Josephine
Zarate Fernandez (Investigating Judge) narrated the antecedents of the case as
follows:
A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San
Mateo, Rizal docketed as Civil Case No. 1863, entitled Marsha Aranas vs. Arnold
Balmores. The Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) thru Atty. Ferdinand P. Censon
represented the complainant while Atty. Rodolfo Flores appeared as counsel for the
defendant.
x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent Atty. Flores entered his
appearance and was given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief. x x x On May 24, 2010,
respondent Atty. Flores filed his Pre-Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance
hence it was expunged from the records without prejudice to the filing of another Pre-
Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance. x x x Atty. Flores asked for ten
(10) days to submit proof.
The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11, September 8) for
failure of respondent Atty. Flores to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating
thereon his MCLE compliance. The court a quo likewise issued Orders dated
September 15 and October 20, 2010 giving respondent Atty. Flores a last chance to
submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that failure to do so shall be considered a
waiver on his part.
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court dated September 14,
2010 stating among others, the following allegations:
xxxx
4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar, you promised to serve
truth, justice and fair play. Do you think you are being truthful, just and fair by
serving a cheater?
 5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which reason even Erap was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan.1âwphi1But even worse is a lawyer who
violates the law.
6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the Philippine
Constitution commands: Give every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by the
plaintiff is violative of the foregoing divine and human laws.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number which
was merely superimposed without indicating the date and place of compliance. During
the preliminary conference on November 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores manifested
that he will submit proof of compliance of his MCLE on the following day. On December
1, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores again failed to appear and to submit the said promised
proof of MCLE compliance. In its stead, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Letter of even
date stating as follows:
If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro plaintiff sentiment, I am
hereby filing the attached Motion which you may once more assign to the waste basket
of nonchalance.
With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the defendant to look for another
lawyer to represent him for I am no longer interested in this case because I feel I
cannot do anything right in your sala.5
The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the
court by failing to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with
the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using
intemperate language in his pleadings. The Investigating Judge recommended that
Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of law for one year.6
The OBC adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge.7
Our Ruling
There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s order to submit proof
of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. "Court
orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be
respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the
judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely essential if our Government is to
be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not because of the
incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them. Disrespect
to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branc the Government to which they belong,
as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system."8
Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the
court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Atty.
Flores failed in this respect.
At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion to his
client's genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's
rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only
within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his c1iticism within the context of
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised
responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom
is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity
to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of
justice. It must be done within the confines of reason and common sense. 9
However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with the
infractions committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction
committed by respondent. Also, we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the
penalty of one-year suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested
before this Court that he has been in the practice of law for half a century.10 Thus, he is
already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing, we deem it proper to fine
respondent in the amount of ₱5,000.00 and to remind him to be more circumspect in
his acts and to obey and respect court processes.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the amount of ₱5,000.00
with STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
11. A.C. No. 7676 June 10, 2014
AMADO T. DIZON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NORLITA DE TAZA, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This concerns an administrative complaint1 for disbarment against Atty. Norlita De Taza
(Atty. De Taza) for the latter's demand for and receipt of exorbitant sums of money
from her client purportedly to expedite the proceedings of their case which was pending
before the Court.
The Facts
Amado Dizon (complainant) alleged that sometime in February 2005, he, along with his
siblings engaged the services of Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to represent
them in the case of Eliza T. Castaneda, et al. v. Heirs of Spouses Martin and Lucia
Dizon with G.R. No. 174552.2 The complainant claimed that sometime in February
2007, Atty. De Taza demanded the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00) from him to expedite the proceedings before the Court. This amount was
over and above the parties’ stipulated retainer fee as evidenced by a contract. 3
According to the complainant, unknown to him at that time was that, a month earlier or
in January 2007, Atty. De Taza had already demanded and received a total of Eight
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱800,000.00) from his sibling Aurora Dizon, for the same
reason that Atty. De Taza proffered to him, which was to expedite the proceedings of
their case before the Court. Handwritten receipts4 signed by one Atty. Norlita De Taza
were submitted by the complainant, which state:
15 Jan. 2007
Receipt
That the amount received ₱300,000 shall be used to expedite the case which, in turn
shall result in the following:
1. Decision favorable to plaintiff w/in 2 mos. from receipt of said amount;
2. Back rentals up to present should be returned, if the same should not be
included in the Decision, the 300,000.00 shall be returned.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza518 Jan. 2007
Receipt
The amount of ₱500,000 has been advanced as part of expense [sic] to expedite the
process before the courts. The said amount has been advanced by Ms. Aurora Dizon
and the same should be reimbursed to her by her siblings upon winning the case with
finality.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza6
On October 24, 2007, the complainant went to this Court in Padre Faura, Manila and
learned that the Court had already denied the petition on November 20, 2006, contrary
to Atty. De Taza’s representations that the case was still pending. He tried to
communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she could no longer be found.7
Thereafter, on November 6, 2007, the complainant instituted a complaint for
disbarment8 against Atty. De Taza. He also attached several affidavits and
documents9 from other individuals who attested that Atty. De Taza issued bouncing
checks and/or failed to pay off her debts to them. A certain Ana Lynda Pineda executed
an affidavit10which was attached to the complaint, alleging that Atty. De Taza issued 11
checks11 in her favor amounting to ₱481,400.00, which were all dishonored by the
bank. Demand letters sent to her went unheeded.
Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of Atty. De Taza, whose Affidavit 12 was attached
to the complaint, averred that Atty. De Taza issued a check13 for ₱50,000.00 as
payment for her loan. Said check was dishonored by the bank for being drawn against
a closed account.
Furthermore, a certain Eleanor Sarmiento submitted an affidavit,14 stating that Atty. De
Taza owes her ₱29,560.39 and failed to pay the said amount despite repeated
demands.
On November 14, 2007, the complainant through a letter15 informed the Court that Atty.
De Taza is planning to leave the country as she was joining her husband in the United
States of America (U.S.A.).
In a Resolution16 dated December 10, 2007, Atty. De Taza was required by the Court
to file a Comment. However, the copy of the Resolution was returned unserved with the
postal carrier’s notation "RTS (Return to Sender)-Moved". The Court then resolved by
virtue of the Resolution17 dated July 2, 2008, to send a copy to Atty. De Taza’s office
address at Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates. Said copy was also returned
unserved with the notation "RTS-not connected."
It was then required in the Resolution18 dated October 8, 2008 that the complainant
inform the Court of Atty. De Taza’s new address, which the complainant faithfully
complied with by giving Atty. De Taza’s new address in the U.S.A. The Court, in its
Resolution19 dated January 26, 2009, directed the Clerk of Court to resend a copy of
the Resolution dated December 10, 2007 with a copy of the complaint to Atty. De Taza
using the latter’s U.S.A. address.
Like the previous occasions, the copy of the Resolution dated December 10, 2007 with
the complaint was returned; this time, with the postal carrier’s notation "RTS-
Unclaimed". The Court in its Resolution20 dated September 9, 2009, held that the said
copy of the Resolution was deemed served and resolved to consider Atty. De Taza as
having waived the filing of her comment. The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
A Notice of Mandatory Conference21 was sent to the parties, in which they failed to
appear. Thus, the parties were directed to file their respective position papers. The
complainant, in a letter22 addressed to the IBP, averred that he was already residing
abroad and maintained that he had already submitted his documentary evidence at the
time of the filing of his complaint. Atty. De Taza, for her part, did not file any position
paper.
In its Report and Recommendation23 dated January 4,2011, the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline recommended that Atty. De Taza be suspended for a period of two years
from the practice of law.
The IBP Board of Governors modified the Commission on Bar Discipline’s
recommendation in a Resolution24 dated January 3, 2013, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s demand of [P]800,000.00 to
expedite the case pending in the Supreme Court when, in fact, the case had long been
dismissed, Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year.25 (Emphasis supplied)
The Issue
WHETHER ATTY. DE TAZASHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR
ISSUING BOUNCING CHECKS, DEMANDING AND/OR RECEIVING MONEY FROM
HER CLIENTS UNDERTHE GUISE OF HAVING THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE
COURT EXPEDITED. Ruling
The Court acknowledges the fact that Atty. De Taza was not able to refute the
accusations against her. Numerous attempts were made to afford her an opportunity to
defend herself from the complainant’s allegations, but all these efforts were only met
with silence. Whether her transfer of residence was an unscrupulous move on her part
to evade her creditors, only she would certainly know. But as far as the Court is
concerned, all means were exhausted to give Atty. De Taza an avenue to oppose the
complainant’s charges. Her failure and/or refusal to file a comment will not be a
hindrance for the Court to mete out an appropriate sanction.
The Court has time and again ruled that disciplinary proceedings are investigations by
the Court to ascertain whether a lawyer is fit to be one. There is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. As this Court held in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v.
Atty. Naldoza,26 citing In the Matter of the Proceedings for Disciplinary Action Against
Atty. Almacen, et al. v. Yaptinchay:27 "Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action
or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They]
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x
x.28 (Italics supplied)
"In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
required."29 Based on the documentary evidence submitted by the complainant, it
appears that Atty. De Taza manifested a propensity for borrowing money, issuing
bouncing checks and incurring debts which she left unpaid without any reason. The
complainant even submitted a document evidencing Atty. De Taza’s involvement in an
estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 22 case filed before the Office of the
City Prosecutor in Angeles City (I.S. 07-J-2815-36) for drawing checks against a closed
account, among other complaint-affidavits executed by her other creditors. Such
conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to an ordinary person, is much more
abhorrent when the same is exhibited by a member of the Bar. As a lawyer, Atty. De
Taza must remember that she is not only a symbol but also an instrument of justice,
equity and fairness.
"We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having
been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of
worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the
deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order.1âwphi1 It also
manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she
joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she
should hold in high esteem."30
Atty. De Taza’s actuations towards the complainant and his siblings were even worse
as she had the gall to make it appear to the complainant that the proceedings before
the Court can be expedited and ruled in their favor in exchange for an exorbitant
amount of money. Said scheme was employed by Atty. De Taza just to milk more
money from her clients. Without a doubt, Atty. De Taza’s actions are reprehensible and
her greed more than apparent when she even used the name of the Court to defraud
her client.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that
particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the
lawyer must immediately return the money to his client.31 In this case, the purpose for
which Atty. De Taza demanded money is baseless and non-existent. Thus, her
demand should not have even been made in the first place.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or
suspension of a lawyer for any of the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority to do so.32
The Court in Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo 33 suspended the respondent
from the practice of law for two years when the latter issued checks which were
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio,34 the
same penalty was meted out by this Court to the erring lawyer who issued worthless
checks to pay off her loan.
Additionally, in Anacta v.Resurreccion,35 the Court held that suspension from the
practice of law for four years was the appropriate sanction for a lawyer who defrauded
his client into paying ₱42,000.00 to him for the purported filing of a petition for
annulment of marriage. The respondent therein presented to his client a copy of the
petition with stamped receipt from the trial court when in reality, no such petition was
filed.
In Celaje v. Atty. Soriano,36 the respondent therein demanded ₱14,000.00 from the
complainant to be put up as injunction bond and asked for additional sums of money on
other occasions, supposedly to pay the judge who was handling the case. When the
complainant verified this with the judge, the judge denied the respondent’s allegations.
The complainant later learned that the bond was also unnecessary, as the application
for a writ was already denied by the trial court. Due to the foregoing, the Court
suspended the respondent from the practice of law for two years.
"Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon
individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important,
morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at
all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the
public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach." 37 "The
Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of corruption and malpractice.
For a member of the legal profession to further stoke the embers of mistrust on the
judicial system with such irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be
tolerated."38
All told, the Court holds that there is no reason to deviate from the report and
recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline which is to suspend Atty. De
Taza from the practice of law for two years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for TWO YEARS with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and
guidance, and let it be entered in Atty. Norlita De Taza's record in this Court.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
12. A.C. No. 6760 January 30, 2013
ANASTACIO N. TEODORO III, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROMEO S. GONZALES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for the forum shopping he allegedly committed.
In his complaint,1 Anastacio N. Teodoro Ill related that Atty. Gonzales acted as counsel
of Araceli Teodoro-Marcial in two civil cases that the latter filed against him. The first
ccise, Special Proceeding No. 99-95587,2 involved the settlement of the intestate
estate of Manuela Teodoro. While the settlement proceeding was pending, Atty.
Gonzales assisted
Teodord-Marcial in filing Civil Case No. 00-99207,3 for Annulment of Document,
Reconveyance and Damages, without indicating the special proceeding earlier tiled.
The tiling of the civil cases, according to Anastacio, was a deliberate act of forum
shopping that warrants the disbarment of Atty. Gonzales.
Atty. Gonzales admitted that he assisted Teodoro-Marcial in tiling the two cases. He
asserted, however,, that he did not violate the forum shopping rule as the cases were
not identical in terms of parties, subject matter and remedies. Atty. Gonzales also
opined that the complainant only filed the disbarment case to harass him. 4
The Investigating Commissioner’s Findings
In our Resolution5 dated March 13, 2006, we referred the disbarment complaint to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation 6 dated
July 5, 2010, Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay found Atty. Gonzales administratively
liable for forum shopping.
According to Commissioner Dulay, both Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 and Civil
Case No. 00-99207 hinged on the same substantial issue, i.e., on whether Manuela
held the Malate property in trust for Carmen Teodoro-Reyes, Donato T. Teodoro, Jorge
I. Teodoro and Teodoro-Marcial.
In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, Carmen, Donato, Jorge I. Teodoro, Jorge T.
Teodoro and Teodoro-Marcial claimed that they are the heirs of Manuela. During her
lifetime, Manuela was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Malate,
Manila. According to the heirs, Manuela held the lot in trust for them, but she sold it to
Anastacio and Rogelio Ng. Thus, the heirs prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration so that Manuela’s properties could be inventoried and settled in
accordance with law.
In Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of Manuela claimed to be the beneficiaries of a
trust held by Manuela over the same parcel of land contested in Special Proceeding
No. 99-95587. They alleged that during her lifetime, Manuela sold a portion of this land
to Anastacio. They asked the trial court to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by Manuela; to cancel the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of
Anastacio; and to issue a new one in their names.
The commissioner found that a ruling in either case would result in res judicata over the
other. Thus, Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he instituted Civil Case
No. 00-99207 without indicating that Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was still
pending. In committing forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales disregarded the Supreme Court
Circular prohibiting forum shopping and thus violated Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Commissioner Dulay recommended that Atty. Gonzales be suspended for one month
from the practice of law, with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense would merit
a more severe penalty.
The Board of Governors of the IBP reversed the commissioner’s recommendation. In a
resolution7 dated December 10, 2011, the Board of Governors dismissed the case
against Atty. Gonzales for lack of merit.
The Issue
The case directly poses to us the question of whether Atty. Gonzales committed forum
shopping and thereby violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings of the commissioner and accordingly reverse the resolution
of the IBP Board of Governors, but we modify the commissioner’s recommended
penalty to censure and a warning that another violation would merit a more severe
penalty.
Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in
anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means
other than appeal or certiorari.8
There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. They are as follows:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both
actions, (b) identity of rights or causes of action, and (c) identity of relief sought. 9
Under this test, we find that Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he filed
Civil Case No. 00-99207 while Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was pending.
Identity of Parties
An identity of parties exists in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 and Civil Case No. 00-
99207. In both cases, the initiating parties are the same, to wit: Carmen, Donato,
Teodoro-Marcial, Jorge I. Teodoro, Rowena Teodoro, Abigail Teodoro and Jorge T.
Teodoro. They represented the same interest in both cases. All claimed to be the
legitimate heirs of Manuela and co-owners of the land that she held in trust for them.
Meanwhile, Anastacio, the oppositor in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, is also the
sole defendant in Civil Case No. 00-99207. In both cases, he espoused the same
interest, as transferee-owner of the lot allegedly held in trust by Manuela.
Identity of causes of action
The test of identity of causes of action does not depend on the form of an action taken,
but on whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the
present causes of action.10 The heirs of Manuela cannot avoid the application of res
judicata by simply varying the form of their action or by adopting a different method of
presenting it.11
In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, the trial court held that it had no jurisdiction over
the case, as Manuela left no properties at the time of her death. The lot in Malate,
Manila, which was the sole property that the heirs of Manuela claim should be included
in her estate, has been sold to Rogelio and Anastacio when Manuela was still alive.
The trial court did not give credence to their claim that Manuela held the property in
trust for them.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 00-99207, the trial court issued an order granting
Anastacio’s Motion for Demurrer to Evidence. It held that the heirs of Manuela had
been unable to prove their claim that Manuela held the lot in trust for their benefit.
Neither were they able to prove that the sale of a portion of the lot to Anastacio was
void.
In both cases, the issue of whether Manuela held the lot in Malate, Manila in trust had
to be decided by the trial court. The initiating parties’ claim in the two cases depended
on the existence of the trust Manuela allegedly held in their favor. Thus, the evidence
necessary to prove their claim was the same.
Identity of relief sought
In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, the heirs of Manuela prayed for the issuance of
letters of administration, the liquidation of Manuela’s estate, and its distribution among
her legal heirs.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of Manuela asked for the annulment
of the deed of absolute sale Manuela executed in favor of Anastacio. They likewise
asked the court to cancel the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title issued in favor of the
latter, and to issue a new one in their names.
While the reliefs prayed for in the initiatory pleadings of the two cases are different in
form, a ruling in one case would have resolved the other, and vice versa. To illustrate,
had the lot been declared as part of the estate of Manuela in Special Proceeding No.
99-95587, there would have been no need for a decision annulling the sale in Civil
Case No. 00-99207. Conversely, had the sale in Civil Case No. 00-99207 been
annulled, then the property would go back to the hands of the heirs of Manuela. Placing
the property under administration, as prayed for in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587,
would have been unnecessary.
Thus, the relief prayed for, the facts upon which it is based, and the parties are
substantially similar in the two cases. Since the elements of litis pendentia and res
judicata are present, Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he filed Civil
Case No. 00-99207 without indicating that Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was still
pending.
As Commissioner Dulay observed:
Respondent was fully aware, since he was the counsel for both cases, that he raised
the issue of trust with respect to the Malate property in the 1999 Letters of
Administration case and that he was raising the same similar issue of trust in the 2000
annulment case xxx
To advise his client therefore to execute the affidavit of non-forum shopping for the
second case (annulment case) and state that there is no pending case involving the
same or similar issue would constitute misconduct which should be subject to
disciplinary action. It was his duty to advise his client properly, and his failure to do so,
in fact his deliberate assertion that there was no falsity in the affidavit is indicative of a
predisposition to take lightly his duty as a lawyer to promote respect and obedience to
the law.12
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct that tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes this obligation." 13
The Court has repeatedly warned lawyers against resorting to forum shopping since
the practice clogs the Court dockets and can lead to conflicting rulings. 14 Willful and
deliberate forum shopping has been made punishable either as direct or indirect
contempt of court in SC
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994.15
In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. He also disregarded his duty to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, 16 and the prohibition against unduly
delaying a case by misusing court processes. 17
To our mind, however, the supreme penalty of disbarment would be very harsh in light
of all the circumstances of this case. Neither is the commissioner’s recommended
penalty of suspension consistent with prior rulings of the Court.
In Guanzon, Vda. de, etc. v. Judge Yrad, Jr., etc., et al.18 we severely censured
Renecio Espiritu, the counsel who filed a petition in the Court of Appeals thirty-three
days after a similar petition had been filed with the Supreme Court. We also found him
guilty of direct contempt.
The present case finds favorable comparison with Guanzon. Like Espiritu, Atty.
Gonzales misused court processes in contravention of the express rule against forum
shopping. We held then that Espiritu should be penalized and we imposed the penalty
of censure —the penalty usually imposed for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser
nature.19
Lawyers are also censured for minor infractions against the lawyer’s duty to the Court
or the client.20 As earlier stated, Atty. Gonzales’ act of forum shopping disregarded his
duty to obey and promote respect for the law and legal processes, as well as the
prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes.21 It also
violated his duty as an officer of the court to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.22
WHEREFORE, we find the basis for the complaint meritorious and accordingly
CENSURE Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales for resorting to forum shopping. He is WARNED
that any future violation of his duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely. A
copy of this reprimand should be attached to Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales’ personal file in
the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
13. A.C. No. 6677 June 10, 2014
EUPROCINA I. CRISOSTOMO, MARILYN L. SOLIS, EVELYN MARQUIZO,
ROSEMARIE BALATUCAN, MILDRED BATANG, MARILEN MINERALES, and
MELINDA D. SIOTING, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. PHILIP Z. A. NAZARENO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint 1 filed by complainants
Euprocina I. Crisostomo (Crisostomo), Marilyn L. Solis (Solis), Evelyn Marquizo
(Marquizo), Rosemarie Balatucan (Balatucan), Mildred Batang (Batang), Marilen
Minerales (Minerales), and Melinda D. Sioting (Sioting) against respondent Atty. Philip
Z. A. Nazareno (Atty. Nazareno), charging him with making false declarations in the
certifications against forum shopping subject of this case in disregard of Section 5,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, and malpractice as a notary public in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
Sometime in 2001, complainants individually purchased housing units (subject
properties) in Patricia South Villa Subdivision, Anabu-II, Imus, Cavite, from Rudex
International Development Corp. (Rudex).2 In view of several inadequacies and
construction defects3 in the housing units and the subdivision itself, complainants
sought the rescission of their respective contracts to sell before the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking the refund of the monthly amortizations they
had paid.4 The first batch of rescission cases was filed by herein complainants
Sioting5 on May 24, 2002, and Crisostomo6 and Marquizo7 on June 10, 2002, while the
second batch of rescission cases was filed by complainants Balatucan8 on March 3,
2003, Solis9 and Ederlinda M. Villanueva10 (represented by Minerales) on May 12,
2003, and Batang11 on July 29, 2003. In all the foregoing rescission cases, Rudex was
represented by herein respondent Atty. Nazareno.
Judgments of default were eventually rendered against Rudex in the first batch of
rescission cases.12 Sometime in August 2003, Rudex filed three (3) petitions for
review13 before the HLURB assailing the same. In the certifications against forum
shopping attached to the said petitions, Rudex, through its President Ruben P. Baes,
and legal counsel Atty. Nazareno, stated that it has not commenced or has knowledge
of any similar action or proceeding involving the same issues pending before any court,
tribunal or agency14 – this, notwithstanding the fact that Rudex, under the
representation of Atty. Nazareno, previously filed an ejectment case on September 9,
2002 against Sioting and her husband, Rodrigo Sioting (Sps. Sioting), before the
Municipal Trial Court of Imus, Cavite (MTC).15
On January 29, 2004, Rudex, again represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed another
complaint16 against Sps. Sioting before the HLURB for the rescission of their contract
to sell and the latter’s ejectment, similar to its pending September 9, 2002 ejectment
complaint. Yet, in the certification against forum shopping attached thereto executed by
the Head of its Credit and Collection department, Norilyn D. Unisan,17 Rudex declared
that it has not commenced or is not aware of any action or proceeding involving the
same issues pending before any court, tribunal or agency.18The said certification was
notarized by Atty. Nazareno himself.19
On April 1, 2004, six (6) similar complaints20 for rescission of contracts to sell and
ejectment, plus damages for non-payment of amortizations due, were filed by Atty.
Nazareno, on behalf of Rudex, against the other complainants before the HLURB. The
certifications against forum shopping attached thereto likewise stated that Rudex has
not commenced or has any knowledge of any similar pending action before any court,
tribunal or agency.21
On February 21, 2005, complainants jointly filed the present administrative complaint
for disbarment against Atty. Nazareno, claiming that in the certifications against forum
shopping attached to the complaints for rescission and ejectment of Rudex filed while
Atty. Nazareno was its counsel, the latter made false declarations therein that no
similar actions or proceedings have been commenced by Rudex or remained pending
before any other court, tribunal or agency when, in fact, similar actions or proceedings
for rescission had been filed by herein complainants before the HLURB against Rudex
and Atty. Nazareno, and an ejectment complaint was filed by Rudex, represented by
Atty. Nazareno, against Sps. Sioting. In addition, complainants asserted that Atty.
Nazareno committed malpractice as a notary public since he only assigned one (1)
document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) in all the certifications against forum shopping
that were separately attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for rescission and
ejectment.22
Despite notice, Atty. Nazareno failed to file his comment and refute the administrative
charges against him.23
In the interim, the HLURB, in the Resolutions dated April 14, 2005 24 and May 12,
2005,25 dismissed Rudex’s complaints for rescission and ejectment26 on the ground
that its statements in the certifications against forum shopping attached thereto were
false due to the existence of similar pending cases in violation of Section 5,Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation27 dated March 8, 2012, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero recommended the
suspension of Atty. Nazareno for a period of six (6) months for his administrative
violations.
The Investigating Commissioner found, among others, that there were unassailable
proofs that the certification against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s ejectment
complaint against Sps. Sioting had been erroneously declared, considering that at the
time Rudex filed the said complaint in September 2002, Sps. Sioting’s rescission
complaint against Rudex, filed on May 24, 2002, was already pending. Hence, it was
incumbent upon Rudex to have declared its existence, more so, since both complaints
involve the same transaction and essential facts, and a decision on the rescission
complaint would amount to res judicata on the ejectment complaint. 28 In this relation,
the Investigating Commissioner observed that Atty. Nazareno cannot claim innocence
of his omission since he was not only Rudex’s counsel but the notarizing officer as well.
Having knowingly made false entries in the subject certifications against forum
shopping, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Nazareno be held
administratively liable and thereby penalized with six (6) months suspension. 29
In a Resolution30 dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, but modified
the recommended penalty from a suspension of six (6) months to only one (1) month.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not Atty. Nazareno should be held
administratively liable and accordingly suspended for a period of one (1) month.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court affirms the IBP’s findings with modification as to the penalty imposed.
Separate from the proscription against forum shopping31 is the violation of the
certification requirement against forum shopping, which was distinguished in the case
of Sps. Ong v. CA32 as follows:
The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and the certification
requirement should by now be too elementary to be misunderstood. To reiterate,
compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from and
independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference
in the treatment between failure to comply with the certification requirement and
violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of imposable
sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The former constitutes sufficient
cause for the dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the complaint or initiatory
pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary
dismissal thereof and for direct contempt. x x x.33
Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a
certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court, and
subjects the erring counsel to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions,
viz.:
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a)
that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he
shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a
cause for administrative sanctions. (Emphases supplied)
In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code) which read as follows:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LANDAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
xxxx
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false declarations in the
certifications against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s pleadings, for which he
should be held administratively liable.
Records show that Atty. Nazareno, acting as Rudex’s counsel, filed, in August 2003,
petitions for review assailing the judgments of default rendered in the first batch of
rescission cases without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the
existence of the ejectment case it filed against Sps. Sioting which involves an issue
related to the complainants’ rescission cases. Further, on January 29, 2004, Rudex,
represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed a complaint for rescission and ejectment against
Sps. Sioting without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the
existence of Sioting’s May 24, 2002 rescission complaint against Rudex as well as
Rudex’s own September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint also against Sps. Sioting. Finally,
on April 1, 2004,Atty. Nazareno, once more filed rescission and ejectment complaints
against the other complainants in this case without disclosing in the certifications
against forum shopping the existence of complainants’ own complaints for rescission.
Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of cases, Atty.
Nazareno – as mandated by the Rules of Court and more pertinently, the canons of the
Code – should have truthfully declared the existence of the pending related cases in
the certifications against forum shopping attached to the pertinent pleadings.
Considering that Atty. Nazareno did not even bother to refute the charges against him
despite due notice, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the IBP’s
resolution on his administrative liability.1âwphi1 However, as for the penalty to be
imposed, the Court deems it proper to modify the IBP’s finding on this score.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat,34 a penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of
law was imposed against the lawyer therein who was shown to have deliberately made
false and untruthful statements in one of his pleadings. Given that Atty. Nazareno’s
infractions are of a similar nature, but recognizing further that he, as may be gleaned
from the foregoing discussion, had repetitively committed the same, the Court hereby
suspends him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a notary
public, considering that he assigned only one document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) to
the certifications against forum shopping attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004
complaints for rescission and ejectment despite the fact that each of them should have
been treated as a separate notarial act. It is a standing rule that for every notarial act,
the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of the notarization, among
others, the entry and page number of the document notarized, and that he shall give to
each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a
number corresponding to the one in his register.35 Evidently, Atty. Nazareno did not
comply with the foregoing rule.
Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping attached to
all the aforementioned complaints, fully aware that they identically asserted a material
falsehood, i.e., that Rudex had not commenced any actions or proceedings or was not
aware of any pending actions or proceedings involving the same issues in any other
forum. The administrative liability of an erring notary public in this respect was clearly
delineated as a violation of Rule 1.01,Canon 1 of the Code in the case of Heirs of the
Late Spouses Villanueva v. Atty. Beradio,36 to wit:
Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or
information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her
notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly
as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of
the notarization process may be undermined and public confidence on notarial
documents diminished. In this case, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also
violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.37 (Emphasis supplied)
In said case, the lawyer who knowingly notarized a document containing false
statements had his notarial commission revoked and was disqualified from being
commissioned as such for a period of one (1) year. Thus, for his malpractice as a
notary public, the Court is wont to additionally impose the same penalties of such
nature against him. However, due to the multiplicity of his infractions on this front,
coupled with his willful malfeasance in discharging the office, the Court deems it proper
to revoke his existing commission and permanently disqualify him from being
commissioned as a notary public. Indeed, respondent ought to be reminded that: 38
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making
that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative
agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon he acknowledgment
executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
xxxx
When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of the document under
his hand and seal he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the
purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in
addition to the solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of
documents, is to authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their
execution and delivery. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is
placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood
or consent to the doing of any. Failing in this, he must accept the consequences of his
unwarranted actions.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno is found GUILTY of making
false declarations in the certifications against forum shopping subject of this case, as
well as malpractice as a notary public. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. Further, he is PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public and, his notarial commission, if currently existing, is
hereby REVOKED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended
to respondent's personal record as attorney.1âwphi1 Likewise, copies shall be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
14. Adm. Case No. 8108 July 15, 2014
DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.
x-----------------------x
Adm. Case No. 10299
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.
 RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court is the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty. Felisberto Verano liable for improper and
inappropriate conduct tending to influence and/or giving the appearance of influence
upon a public official. The Joint Report and Recommendation submitted by
Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III recommended that respondent beissued a
warning not to repeat the same nor any similar action, otherwise the Commission will
impose a more severe penalty. The Commission adopted the said ruling on 16 April
2013.2
The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8108 are Dante La Jimenez and
Lauro G. Vizconde, while complainant in Adm. Case No. 10299 is Atty. Oliver O.
Lozano. At the time of the filing of the complaints, respondent Atty. Verano was
representing his clients Richard S. Brodett and Joseph R. Tecson.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the Complaint as the
"Alabang Boys") werethe accused in cases filed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) for the illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs. 3In a Joint Inquest
Resolution issued on 2 December 2008, the charges were dropped for lack of probable
cause.4
Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions
during the evaluation of the case, several media outlets reported on incidents of bribery
and "cover-up" allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug trade.This prompted the
House Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional hearings. It was
revealed during one such hearing that respondenthad prepared the release order for
his three clients using the letterhead ofthe Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
stationery of then Secretary Raul Gonzales.5
Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They
stated that respondent had admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby
committed a highly irregular and unethical act. They argued that respondent had no
authority to use the DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a
member of the bar.6
For his part, Atty. Lozano anchoredhis Complaint on respondent’s alleged violation of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall
upholdthe Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respectfor legal
processes.7 Atty. Lozano contended that respondent showed disrespect for the law and
legal processes in drafting the said order and sending it to a high-ranking public official,
even though the latter was not a government prosecutor.8 Atty. Lozano’s verified
ComplaintAffidavit was filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP and
docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2356.9
Officers of the IBP, Cebu CityChapter, issued a Resolution condemning the unethical
conduct of respondent and showing unqualified support for the VACC’s filing of
disbarment proceedings.10 On 27 February 2009, Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint
on the ground that a similar action had been filed by Dante Jimenez. 11 On 2 June 2009,
the Court referred both cases to the IBP for consolidation, as well as for investigation,
report and recommendation. RESPONDENT’S VERSION
In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint Inquest Resolution dropping the
charges against his clients for lack of probable cause, arguing that the resolution also
ordered the immediate release of Brodett and Tecson. He reasoned that the high
hopes of the accused, together with their families, came crashing down when the
PDEA still refused to release his clients.12 Sheer faith in the innocence of his clients
and fidelity to their cause prompted him to prepare and draft the release order.
Respondent admits that perhaps he was overzealous; yet, "if the Secretary of Justice
approves it, then everything may be expedited."13 In any case, respondent continues,
the drafted release order was not signed by the Secretary and therefore remained "a
mere scrap of paper with no effect at all."14
FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER
The Commissioner noted that both complaints remained unsubstantiated, while the
letter-complaint of Jimenez and Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore, no
evidence was adduced to prove the charges.
However, by his own admissions inparagraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment, respondent
drafted the release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ Secretary. This act of
"feeding" the draft order to the latter was found to be highly irregular, as it tended to
influence a public official. Hence, Commissioner Abelita found respondent guilty of
violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that
he be issued a warning not to repeat the same or any similar action. 15
RULING OF THE COURT
We emphasize at the outset thatthe Court may conduct its own investigation into
charges against members of the bar, irrespective of the form of initiatory complaints
brought before it. Thus, a complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the
case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.16 By now, it is
basic that there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar. 17
As to Atty. Lozano’s withdrawal of his verified Complaint, we reiterate our ruling in
Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant
does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment
may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters
is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven x x x. The complainant or the person
who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense
a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of justice.Hence, if the evidence on record warrants,
the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant
or his withdrawal of the charges.18 (Emphasis supplied)
After a careful review of the records,we agree with the IBP in finding reasonable
grounds to hold respondent administratively liable. Canon 13, the provision applied by
the Investigating Commissioner, states that "a lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his
cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court." We believe that other provisions in the Code of
Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of influence-peddling not limited to the
regular courts, but even in all other venues in the justice sector, where respect for the
rule of law is at all times demanded from a member of the bar.
During the mandatory hearing conducted by the Committee on Bar Discipline,
respondent stated that the PDEA refused to release his clients unless it received a
direct order from the DOJ Secretary. This refusal purportedly impelled him to take more
serious action, viz.:
ATTY VERANO: x x x By Monday December 22 I think my only recourse was to see
the Secretary himself personally. The Secretary is the type of a person who opens his
[sic] kasihe is very political also so he opens his office. If I’m not mistaken that day
because of the timing we will afraid [sic] that Christmas time is coming and that baka
nga sila maipit sa loob ng Christmas time. So the family was very sad x x x kung
pwede ko raw gawan ng paraan na total na-dismissed na ang kaso. So, what I did was
thinking as a lawyer now…I prepared the staff to make it easy, to make it convenient
for signing authority that if he agrees with our appeal he will just sign it and send it over
to PDEA. So hinanda ko ho yon. And then I sent it first to the Office of the other
Secretary si Blancaflor.
xxxx
So I think it’s a Tuesday I had to do something and I said I will see the Secretary first
with the parents of Rodette, yong nanay at saka tatay, so we went to see him after 1:00
o’clock or 1:30 in the afternoon. By then, that draft was still with Blancaflor. Andon ho
ang Secretary tinanggap naman kami, so we sat down with him x x x Pinaliwanag ho
namin inexplain x x x Anyway, sabi niya what can I do if I move on this, they will think
that kasama rin ako dyan sa Fifty Million na yan. Sabi ko, Your Honor, wala akong Fifty
Million, hindi naman ho milyonaryo ang mga pamilyang ito. So, sabi ko pwede ho bang
maki-usap…sabi niya okay I will see what I can do. I will study the matter, those
particular words, I will study the matter. Tumuloy pa ho ang kwentuhan, as a matter of
fact, 2 oras ho kami ron eh. They were not pushing us away, he was entertaining us,
and we were discussing the case.19
Respondent likewise stated that his "experience with Secretary Gonzales is, he is very
open;" and that "because of my practice and well, candidly I belong also to a political
family, my father was a Congressman. So, he (Gonzalez) knows of the family and he
knows my sister was a Congresswoman of Pasay and they weretogether in Congress.
In other words, I am not a complete stranger to him."20 Upon questioning by
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco, respondent admitted that he was personally
acquainted with the Secretary; however, they were not that close.21
These statements and others made during the hearing establish respondent’s
admission that 1) he personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the
case was still pending before the latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation of
the draft release order on official DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do so,
with the end in view of "expediting the case."
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special
treatment and consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of
improper behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar.
Respondentis duty-bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be
seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the people’s faith inthe judicial
process is diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of
justice.1âwphi1 To that end, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of
a member of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law
and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to bythe
lawyer, even inthe pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and
unethical.22
Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Further, according to Rule 15.06,
"a lawyershall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal
or legislative body." The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer "to impress
upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."
Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s cause must always be within the bounds of
the law.23 A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is expected
if an attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that
respondent fell short of these exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a
warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve as commensurate penalty for
the offense.
In Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya- Chua, the Court saw fit to impose a six-
month suspension against a judge who likewise committed acts of influence peddling
whenshe solicited ₱100,000.00 from complainant Santos when the latter asked for her
help in the case of her friend Emerita Muñoz, who had a pendingcase with the
Supreme Court, because respondent judge was a former court attorney of the high
court.24 We find that the same penalty is appropriate in the present case.
WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found
GUILTYof violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation to Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for
six (6) months effective immediately. This also serves as an emphaticWARNING that
repetition of any similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be appended to the respondent’s bar records. The Court
Administrator is hereby directed to inform the different courts of this suspension.
SO ORDERED.
15. SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 8084, August 24, 2015
PATROCINIA H. SALABAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANDRES C. VILLARUEL,
JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Patrocinia H. Salabao (complainant) against
Atty. Andres C. Villaruel, Jr. (respondent) for abuse of court processes in violation of
Canons 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1 After respondent filed
his Answer2 we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.3redarclaw
Factual Background
The facts pertinent to this complaint are summarized in the Report and
Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Complainant narrates that in 1995 she filed a case against Elmer Lumberio for his
deceitful or fraudulent conduct of taking her precious real property situated in Taguig
City. After hearing, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162, Pasig City issued its
resolution in her favor in 2002.
Respondent then entered the picture as counsel for Lumberio. From then on,
Complainant complained that Respondent had made her suffer because of his abuse
of processes and disregard for her rights as a litigant.
She narrates as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
In 2002, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig City which tried Civil Case No.
65147 issued its resolution in her favor. In order to delay the case, Respondent brought
the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals under CA-GR CV No. 76360. The Court of
Appeals decided in her favor on January 13, 2004 but Respondent again filed an
appeal before the Supreme Court under GR No. 167413. Lumberio lost and the case
became final and executory.
Undeterred, respondent tried to defer the execution of the decision of the RTC, Branch
162, by bringing to the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under
CA-GR SP No. 97564. When rebuffed, he again appealed to the Supreme Court under
GR No. 181243 sans a clear or new arguments other than what he had presented
before the Court of Appeals.
Still, Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul the 29 November 2007
Order of the RTC before the Court of Appeals under CA-GR SP No. 101992 which was
however dismissed. From hereon, there was not stopping the Respondent. Once again
he filed a new complaint before the RTC of Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64 under Civil
Case No. 08-0666-M. Apart from this, Respondent filed several Motion, Inhibition and
Contempt that were meant to delay the resolution of the case. He likewise filed an
administrative case against Judge Briccio Ygaña of RTC Branch 153, Taguig City.
Complainant then complained that Respondent had done more than enough to
suppress her rights as a winning litigant and filed this case for abuse of processes
pursuant to Rule 10.03 and Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Respondent, for his part, denied the accusation and clarified that the several pleadings
he had filed had centered on the legality of the court's decision ordering the
cancellation of the title of Lumberio in such ordinary proceeding for cancellation of the
title. To his mind, the said ordinary proceeding for cancellation of title before the RTC
Branch 153, Taguig City was void because the law vests upon the government through
the Solicitor General the power to initiate a reversion case if there is such a ground to
cancel the title issued by the Land Management Bureau in favor of Lumberio.
With respect to the civil case before the RTC of Ma[u]ban, Branch 64, he explained that
the said case does not show that herein counsel committed any act of dishonesty
which may subject him to any prosecution as he is just exercising his profession to the
best of his ability.4
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found at
respondent "relentlessly filed petitions and appeals in order to exhaust all possible
remedies to obtain relief for his client"5 which he considered as tantamount to "abusive
and a spiteful effort to delay the execution of Judgment." 6 He noted that after the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 162 issued a Resolution in Civil Case
No. 65147 adverse to his client, respondent filed a barrage of cases/pleadings such as
an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the RTC ruling, a petition for
review with the Supreme Court which was denied for having been filed out of time; a
petition for annulment of the RTC judgment which was dismissed by the CA; another
petition for review before this Court which was again denied; a petition
for certiorari which was dismissed by the CA; another civil case before the RTC of
Mauban, Quezon which was dismissed for "improper venue, res judicata, and violation
of the anti-forum shopping law"7 and that it involved the same issues as the one filed in
Pasig RTC. Moreover, he filed several inhibitions, motions and an administrative
complaint against the presiding judge. The Investigating Commissioner,
stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x [O]ne can immediately appreciate and see the abusive and spiteful conduct of
Respondent. He as a lawyer could have hardly missed knowing that his subsequent
actions were merely meant to harass the opposing litigant as in fact the Supreme Court
had already issued its final ruling on the matter. After the ruling of the High Court,
Respondent should have known that the case had been finally adjudicated and no
amount of judicial exercise could turn the decision in his client's favor. From then on, he
should have saved his efforts of filing cases and motions in court, as they are futile
anyway, because he has his duty to the court above that to his client.
Needless to state, the Respondent is found herein to have violated Canon 12, Rule
12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the CPR for which he should be meted with the appropriate
administrative penalty.8
He thus recommended that respondent be meted out the penalty of suspension for four
months.
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-251 dated 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 20, 2013, stating
that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
2. x x x he had only exhausted all possible remedies available under the premises;
xxxx
With all candor and honesty, undersigned believes that he was only doing his legal
duty as a lawyer to exhaust all legal remedies taking steps within its framework. He has
not done any wrongdoing while taking such routes. He has never been dishonest;
xxxx
4. Respondent believes that undersigned deserves an acquittal given the fact that it
was not shown that he acted in bad: faith in taking such legal remedies.
5. Respondent cannot also be charged with abuse of judicial process because
complainant has other recourse available to execute the said decision in her favor
while there were petitions filed, complainant also did not allege that respondent has
abused the judicial process. The courts to which the said petitions were filed also did
not cite the respondent in contempt of court [nor was a warning] given.
xx x x
6. Moreover, respondent is now suffering from renal failure which requires him to
undergo dialysis three (3) times in a week. To suspend him for four months would
mean that he would stop his dialysis for four moths [sic] which may cause his
immediate death. This Honorable Commission would not be too happy to see one of its
members begging for alms from PCSO and government officials to shoulder his
dialysis of about P100,000.00 per month.9
In a subsequent Resolution No. XXI-2014-182 dated March 23, 2014, the IBP Board of
Governors affirmed its earlier Resolution and denied respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration, saying that there was no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the
Commission on Bar Discipline.
The Court's Ruling
While it is true that lawyers owe "entire devotion" to the cause of their clients, 10 it
cannot be emphasized enough that their first and primary duty is "not to the client but to
the administration of justice."11 Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states that "A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice." Thus, in the use of Court processes, the
lawyer's zeal to win must be tempered by the paramount consideration that justice be
done to all parties involved, and the la|wyer for the losing party should not stand in the
way of the execution of a valid judgment. This is a fundamental principle in legal ethics
and professional responsibility that has iterations in various forms:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The Lawyer's Oath:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with
all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Rule 138, Section 20, Rules of Court:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Duties of attorneys. - It is the duty of an attorney: xxxx
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be
just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law;
xxxx
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or
proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest; (Emphasis
supplied)
Code of Professional Responsibility:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice.
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse Court processes. (Emphasis supplied)
Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of
justice, any act of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts, or impedes the administration of
justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him. 12redarclaw
In this case, the judgment in favor of complainant had become final and executory by
July 27, 2005. Respondent however proceeded to file no less than twelve (12) motions
and cases in various courts subsequent to the Entry of Judgment:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
 behavior and dilatory tactics. This is not true. In her Order inhibiting herself from the
Regional Trial Court of Taguig City: case, Judge Homena-Valencia stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

1. Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated April 27,2006 This presiding judge would like to emphasize that, having assumed her position as
acting presiding judge of this branch only last September 2005, she does not know any
2. Motion to Admit Affidavit of Third-Party Claimant of the parties from Adam. As such, she could not be inclined to show bias in favor of
one of them. She refuses, however, to be drawn into a discussion, to put it mildly, with
respondent's counsel as to her knowledge of the law.
3. Motion for Early Resolution
However, to obviate any suspicion as to her objectivity, she inhibits herself from further
4. Motion to Observe Judicial Courtesy while the case is pending appeal with the hearing this case although the reasons stated by the defendant are not one of those
Court of Appeals provided for in the Rules for the voluntary inhibition of a judge.

5. Urgent Motion to Defer/Suspend Execution in view of the Order of the CA Respondent's counsel is hereby advised to be more professional in his language, he,
being a lawyer, is first and foremost an officer of the court. 13
6. Urgent Motion to Reconsider Order
In the October 23, 2007 Decision14 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 97564, respondent
was rebuked for the misuse of court processes, thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Court of Appeals:
This Petition for Annulment of Judgment is petitioner's last-ditch effort to defer the
execution of the 31 July 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
1. Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of
Branch 162, which has long attained finality.
Appeals
xxxx
2. Motion for Reconsideration
In epitome, to sustain petitioner's insinuation of extrinsic fraud is to make a mockery of
3. Petition for Certiorari Our judicial system. We take exception to the unjustified delay in the enforcement of
the RTC Decision dated 31 July 2002 which has long become final and executory. This
4. Urgent Motion to Reiterate the Issuance of Order for Judicial Courtesy is obviously a spiteful ploy to deprive respondent of the fruits of her victory.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DISMISSED.15

Supreme Court:
1. Petition for Certiorari
2. Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
From the nature and sheer number of motions and cases filed, it is clear that
respondent's intention was to delay the execution of the final judgment.
But even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent was only doing his duty
as a lawyer to exhaust all legal remedies to protect the interest of his client, his other
actions belie his claim of good faith. Respondent filed a civil case for damages with the
Regional Trial Court of Mauban, Quezon in what was clearly a case of forum-shopping.
Moreover, respondent filed three Motions to Inhibit against the three judges hearing
these cases, and even a motion to cite the sheriff in contempt of court who was simply
carrying out his duty to execute the decision.
In his defense, respondent argued that the Courts did not call attention to his improper
Moreover, in his Omnibus Order16 dated September 18, 2008, Judge Briccio C.
Ygaña17 stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This case is a clear example of how a party, aided by a smart lawyer, could unduly
delay a case, impede the execution of judgment or misuse court processes. Defendant
and counsel are very lucky that the herein plaintiff has the patience of Job. Should this
case reach the attention of the Supreme Court, where the whole story will be known,
they will have a lot of explaining to do.18
It is quite clear that respondent has made a mockery of the judicial process by abusing
Court processes, employing dilatory tactics to frustrate the execution of a final
judgment, and feigning ignorance of Ms duties as an officer of the court. He has
breached his sworn duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice,
and violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 20 (c) and (g) of the Rules of Court. In so doing, he
is administratively liable for his actions.
Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court provides the penalties of disbarment and
suspension as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A one month deposit, both of which are equivalent of one month rental payment.
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the However, he did not comply with the same. Atty. Bassig instead paid the monthly rental
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, from June 13, 2010 to July 13, 2010.1
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission Atty. Bassig then paid his rents belatedly from July 2010 to January 2012. However,
to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for after said period, he stopped making any payment, to wit 2 :
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so
to do x x x.
Month/s covered Payment date Amount paid
In previous decisions involving abuse of court processes, 19 this Court has imposed the
penalty of suspension ranging from six months to two years. In light of the following July 13, 2010 to August 12, 2010 PhP
aggravating circumstances - multiplicity of motions and cases filed by respondent, the August 13, 2010 8,500.00
malice evinced by his filing of various motions to prevent the judges and sheriff from
fulfilling their legal duties, feigned ignorance of his duties as an officer of the court, and August 13, 2010 to November 24, PhP
his lack of remorse for his actions - the Court finds that a penalty of suspension for 18 October 13, 2010 2010 17,000.00
months would be commensurate to the damage and prejudice that respondent has
inflicted on complainant Salabao for his actions. October 13, 2010 October 13, PhP
to November 13, 2010 8,500.00
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Andres C. Villaruel, Jr. is 2010
hereby found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer's Oath and Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby suspended from the practice of November 13, January 4, 2012 PhP
law for a period of eighteen (18) months. 2011 to December 8,500.00
13, 2011
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in
December 13, March13, 2012 PhP
Atty. Villaruel's record as a member of the Bar.
2011 to January 8,500.00
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary 13, 2012

16. A.C. No. 11836
CARLINA P. ROBIÑOL, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. EDILBERTO P. BASSIG, Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This is a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Edilberto P. Bassig (Atty. Bassig)
for violation of Code of Professional Responsibility and Lawyer's Oath.
The Facts
In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant Carlina Robiñol (Robiñol) alleged that
respondent rented a house from her in Brgy. Tanong, Marikina City, for a monthly
rental of ₱8,500.00. Said lease, without any written contract, was for a period of two
years, or from June 12, 2010 to August 12, 2012. Upon the start of the lease
agreement, it was agreed that Atty. Bassig will pay a one month advance and another
Robiñol alleged that the last payment in the amount of ₱l7,000.00, for two months' rent
was made in July 2012, but no receipt was issued upon Atty. Bassig's instruction. Atty.
Bassig told Robiñol that he will be receiving a big amount from his client and that he
will thereafter pay the remaining unpaid rent. 3
Believing that Atty. Bassig will remain truthful to his promise, Robiñol allowed him to
stay in the premises. However, when Typhoon Habagat struck Marikina City, Atty.
Bassig left the house because of the heavy flood. When he left, he neither informed
Robiñol of his intended destination nor satisfied his unsettled obligation.4
When the situation in Marikina City got better, Atty. Bassig still failed to return to his
rented house.5
Later on, Robiñol chanced upon Atty. Bassig's daughter and learned that Atty. Bassig
was living with her. Robiñol then went to the said house and demanded payment from
Atty. Bassig. As a consequence, he executed a promissory note6 dated August 18,
2012, undertaking to pay the amount of ₱127,500.00 on installment basis. The
promissory note indicates that half of the amount due would be paid on August 31,
2012 and the other half on September 30, 2012. However, Atty. Bassig reneged on his
obligation.7
Because of the foregoing incidents, Robiñol was constrained to hire a counsel to
protect her interest.1âwphi1 Thus, a demand letter8 was sent to Atty. Bassig on
December 8, 2012.
In an unverified answer, Atty. Bassig acknowledged his obligation to Robiñol and
promised to pay the same within the next two months after the answer was filed. He
maintained that he had difficulty in managing his finances as· he was paying for his
son's medical expenses and his car's monthly amortizations.9
A Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing10 dated January 21, 2015 was issued by
the IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala. However, the Orders dated
February 25, 201511 and March 25, 201512 issued by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) reveals that only Robiñol
appeared in the scheduled mandatory conferences. The latter Order also expunged the
answer filed by Atty. Bassig for lack of verification. In view thereof, the parties were
directed to file their respective position paper.
In a Report and Recommendation dated November 20, 201513 , the IBP-CBD
recommended the suspension of Atty. Bassig from the practice of law for a period of
two years. The IBP Commissioner ruled that Atty. Bassig's failure to file his answer
despite due notice and to appear on the scheduled hearings showed his resistance to
lawful orders and illustrated his despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which
deserves disciplinary sanction. The fallothereof reads:
IN VIEW THEREOF, we respectfully recommend that respondent, ATTY. EDILBERTO
P. BASSIG, be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO (2) YEARS from receipt hereof, from
the practice of law and as member of the Bar.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.14
In a Resolution No. XXII-2016-165,15 CBD Case No. 14-4447, entitled Carlina P.
Robiñol v. Atty. Edilberto P. Bassig, dated February 25, 2016, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted the recommendation of the IBPCBD and disposed thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
imposing a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years considering
that there was a previous sanction of suspension of two (2) years against the same
Respondent in another disbarment case.
As this Court has disciplinary authority over members of the bar, We are tasked to
resolve the instant case against Atty. Bassig.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant 16 and the
proper evidentiary threshold is substantial evidence.17
Here, Robiñol failed to discharge the burden of proof. For one, the evidence submitted
were inadmissible. It must be noted that the receipts showing payment of Atty. Bassig
to Robiñol and the promissory note executed and signed by Atty. Bassig were
photocopies of the original.
A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown
that the original is unavailable.18 Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC.5 When original document is unavailable.-When the original document has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part,
may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
In the case of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Antonio Lagman 19 , the Court
held that:
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the
original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production
in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed. xxx20
In this case, nowhere in the record shows that Robiñol laid down the predicate for the
admission of said photocopies. Thus, aside from the bare allegations in her complaint,
Robiñol was not able to present any evidence to prove that Atty. Bassig failed to pay
his rent and that he had in fact leased a house from Robiñol.
Moreover, We cannot deem Atty. Bassig's failure to file his verified answer and to
attend in the scheduled mandatory conferences as an admission of the allegations in
the complaint. The consequences of such omission are clearly laid down in Section 5,
Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, to
wit:
Section 5. Non-appearance of parties, and Non-verification of Pleadings.- a) Non-
appearance at the mandatory conference or at the clarificatory questioning date shall
be deemed a waiver of the right to participate in the proceedings. Ex parte conference
or hearings shall then be conducted. Pleadings submitted or filed which are not verified
shall not be given weight by the Investigating Commissioner.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis-neither purely civil nor purely
criminal. They do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather investigations by
the Court into the conduct of its officers.21 While these proceedings are sui
generis, compliance with the basic rules on evidence may not be altogether dispensed
with. More so, in this case when the evidence in consideration fails to comply with
basic rules on admissibility.
Nevertheless, Atty. Bassig is not completely exculpated from any administrative
liability.
It must be noted that Atty. Bassig, despite due notice, repeatedly failed to abide by the
orders of the IBP, i.e. filing a verified answer, appearing in two mandatory conferences
and filing of position paper. In fact, when the IBP ordered him to file a position paper, it
is in view of the expunction of his answer. Notwithstanding, Atty. Bassig still ignored the
directive.
For his behavior, Atty. Bassig committed an act in violation of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
His attitude of refusing to obey the orders of the IBP indicates his lack of respect for the
IBP's rules and regulations22 , but also towards the IBP as an institution. Remarkably,
the IBP is empowered by this Court to conduct proceedings regarding the discipline of
lawyers.23 Hence, it is but proper for Atty. Bassig to be mindful of his duty as a member
of the bar to maintain his respect towards a duly constituted authority.
Verily, Atty. Bassig's conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly
called upon to obey court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in
complying with court directives being themselves officers of the court. 24 In disregarding
the orders of the IBP, he exhibited a conduct which runs contrary to his sworn duty as
an officer of the court.
As a final note, We commiserate with Robiñol, a nonagenarian, on her unfortunate
circumstances as she should no longer be dealing with this kind of anxiety.
Nevertheless, We sanction Atty. Bassig to pay a fine in the amount of ₱l0,000.00 for
his arrant neglect to maintain acceptable deportment as member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Edilberto P. Bassig is hereby
ORDERED to pay a FINE in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱l0,000.00) with the
STERN WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will
result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
SO ORDERED.
17. A.C. No. 11668
JOY T. SAMONTE, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, Respondent
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint1 dated March 15, 2013, filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), by complainant Joy T. Samonte (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil (respondent), praying that the latter be
disbarred for acts unbecoming of a lawyer and betrayal of trust.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that sometime in October 2012, she received summons from the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch Xl, Davao
City, relative to an illegal dismissal case, i.e., NLRC Case RAB-XI-10-00586-12, filed
by four (4) persons claiming to be workers in her small banana
plantation.2Consequently, complainant engaged the services of respondent to prepare
her position paper, and paid him the amount of ₱8,000.003 as attorney's fees.4 Despite
constantly reminding respondent of the deadline for the submission of her position
paper, complainant discovered that he still failed to file the same. 5 As such, on January
25, 2013, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision6 based on the evidence on record,
whereby complainant was held liable to the workers in the total amount of
₱633,143.68.7 When complainant confronted respondent about the said ruling, the
latter casually told her to just sell her farm to pay the farm workers.8 Because of
respondent's neglect, complainant claimed that she was left defenseless and without
any remedy to protect her interests against the execution of the foregoing
judgment;9 hence, she filed the instant complaint.
In an Order10 dated March 26, 2013, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
directed respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint.
In his Answer11 dated April 19, 2013, respondent admitted that he indeed failed to file a
position paper on behalf of complainant. However, he maintained that said omission
was due to complainant's failure to adduce credible witnesses to testify in her favor. In
this relation, respondent averred that complainant instructed her to prepare an
Affidavit12 for one Romeo P. Baol (Romeo), who was intended to be her witness;
nevertheless, respondent was instructed that the contents of Romeo's affidavit were
not to be interpreted in the Visayan dialect so that the latter would not know what he
would be testifying on. Respondent added that complainant's uncle, Nicasio Ticong,
who was also an intended witness, refused to execute an affidavit and testify to her
lies. Thus, it was complainant who was deceitful in her conduct and that the complaint
against him should be dismissed for lack of merit. 13
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation14 dated March 14, 2014, the IBPCBD found
respondent administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Essentially, the IBP-
CBD found respondent guilty of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10, and Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice.15
In a Resolution16 dated December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the aforesaid Report and Recommendation, finding the same to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable.
The Court's Ruling
The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP, with modification, however,
as to the penalty in order to account for his breach of the rules on notarial practice.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and
confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful
of their cause, and accordingly, exercise the required degree of diligence in handling
their affairs. Accordingly, lawyers are required to maintain, at all times, a high standard
of legal proficiency, and to devote their full attention, skill, and competence to their
cases, regardless of their importance, and whether they accept them for a fee or for
free.17 To this end, lawyers are enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain
lawful objectives.18 These principles are embodied in Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule
18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR, which respectively read as follows:
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.1âwphi1
CANON 18 -A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In this case, it is undisputed that a lawyer-client relationship was forged between
complainant and respondent when the latter agreed to file a position paper on her
behalf before the NLRC and, in connection therewith, received the amount of
₱8,000.00 from complainant as payment for his services. Case law instructs that a
lawyer-client relationship commences when a lawyer signifies his agreement to handle
a client's case and accepts money representing legal fees from the latter, 19 as in this
case. From then on, as the CPR provides, a lawyer is duty-bound to "serve his client
with competence and diligence," and in such regard, "not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him."
However, it is fairly apparent that respondent breached this duty when he admittedly
failed to file the necessary position paper before the NLRC, which had, in fact, resulted
into an adverse ruling against his client, i.e., herein complainant. To be sure, it is of no
moment that complainant purportedly failed to produce any credible witnesses in
support of her position paper; clearly, this is not a valid justification for respondent to
completely abandon his client's cause. By voluntarily taking up complainant's case,
respondent gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend the latter's
interest therein. Verily, he owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.20 In A bay v. Montesino,21 it was explained that
regardless of a lawyer's personal view, the latter must still present every remedy or
defense within the authority of the law to support his client's cause:
Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must
serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Otherwise stated, he owes entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply
means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense
that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every
such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the
client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty
with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community
to the legal profession.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In light of the foregoing, the Court therefore agrees with the IBP that respondent should
be held administratively liable for violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
Likewise, the IBP correctly found that respondent violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the
CPR. Records show that he indeed indulged in deliberate falsehood when he
admittedly prepared23 and notarized24 the affidavit of complainant's intended witness,
Romeo, despite his belief that Romeo was a perjured witness. In Spouses Umaguing v.
De Vera,25the Court highlighted the oath undertaken by every lawyer to not only obey
the laws of the land, but also to refrain from doing any falsehood, viz. :
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also
to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of
any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a
servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an
exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore,
that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically
reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice."26 (Emphases supplied)
Notably, the notarization of a perjured affidavit also constituted a violation of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. Section 4 (a), Rule IV thereof pertinently provides:
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not perform any notarial act
described in these Rules for any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the
appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is
unlawful or immoral[.] (Emphasis supplied)
On this score, it is well to stress that "notarization is not an empty, meaningless
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest. It must be underscored that
the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document,
making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity
thereof. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For
this reason, a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity
of this form of conveyance would be undermined." 27
Having established respondent's administrative liability, the Court now determines the
proper penalty.
The appropriate penalty to be meted against an errant lawyer depends on the exercise
of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. In Del Mundo v.
Capistrano,28 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure
to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client. Similarly,
in Conlu v. Aredonia, Jr.,29 the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer for his
inexcusable negligence in failing to file the required pleading to the prejudice of his
client. Hence, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court adopts the penalty
recommended by the IBP and accordingly suspends respondent from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year. Moreover, as in the case of Dela Cruz v.
Zabala,30 where the notary public therein notarized an irregular document, the Court
hereby revokes respondent's notarial commission and further disqualifies him from
being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil is found GUILY of violating Rule
10.01, Canon 10 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his
receipt of this Resolution. Moreover, in view of his violation of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, his notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he
is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2)
years. Finally, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended
to respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the
same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
18. A.C. No. 8208
RET. JUDGE VIRGILIO ALPAJORA, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. RONALDO ANTONIO V. CALAYAN, Respondent
DECISION
GESMUNDO, J.:
Before the Court is a Counter-Complaint1 filed by complainant (Ret.) Judge Virgilio
Alpajora (Complainant) against respondent Atty. Ronaldo Antonio V.
Calayan (Respondent), which originated from an administrative complaint filed by the
latter against the former before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
ignorance of the law and/or issuance of undue order. The administrative complaint
against Judge Alpajora was dismissed by the Court in a Resolution, 2 dated March 2,
2009, on the ground that the matters raised therein were judicial in nature.
In his Comment/Opposition with Counter-Complaint to Discipline
Complainant,3 complainant charged respondent with (a) filing a malicious and
harassment administrative case, (b) propensity for dishonesty in the allegations in his
pleadings, (c) misquoting provisions of law, and (d) misrepresentation of facts.
Complainant prayed for respondent's disbarment and cancellation of his license as a
lawyer.
The Antecedents
Prior to this case, an intra-corporate case docketed as Civil Case No. 2007-10 and
entitled "Calayan Educational Foundation Inc. (CEFI), Dr. Arminda Calayan, Dr.
Bernardita Calayan-Brion and Dr. Manuel Calayan vs. Atty. Ronalda A.V. Calayan,
Susan S. Calayan and Deanna Rachelle S. Calayan, " was filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City designated as commercial court and presided by
Judge Adolfo Encomienda. Respondent was President and Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of CEFI. He signed and filed pleadings as "Special Counsel pro se" for
himself. Court proceedings ensued despite several inhibitions by judges to whom the
case was re-raffled until it was finally re-raffled to complainant. Thereafter, complainant
issued an Omnibus Order,4dated July 11, 2008 for the creation of a management
committee and the appointment of its members. That Order prompted the filing of the
administrative case against the Judge Alpajora.
The administrative case against complainant was dismissed. The Court, however,
referred the comment/opposition with counter-complaint filed by complainant in the
administrative case against him to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
appropriate action.
The OBC deemed it proper to re-docket the counter-complaint as a regular
administrative case against respondent. Thus, in a Resolution, 5 dated June 3, 2009,
upon recommendation of the OBC, the Court resolved to require respondent to submit
his comment on the counter-complaint.
In its Resolution,6 dated September 9, 2009, the Court noted respondent's comment
and referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
After a mandatory conference before the IBP, both parties were directed to submit their
respective verified position papers.
Position of complainant
Complainant alleged that he partially tried and heard Civil Case No. 2007-10, an intra-
corporate case filed against respondent, when he later voluntarily inhibited himself from
it on account of the latter's filing of the administrative case against him.
The intra-corporate case was previously tried by Presiding Judge Adolfo
Encomienda (Presiding Judge Encomienda) until he voluntarily inhibited after
respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Recuse and a Supplement to Defendant's Urgent
Motion to Recuse on the grounds of undue delay in disposing pending incidents, gross
ignorance of the law and gross inefficiency.7 The motions came after Presiding Judge
Encomienda issued an order appointing one Atty. Antonio Acyatan (Atty. Acyatan) as
receiver, who was directed to immediately take over the subject corporation.
After Presiding Judge Encomienda inhibited himself, the case was re-raffled to the sala
of Executive Judge Norma Chionglo-Sia, who also inhibited herself because she was
about to retire. The case was referred to Executive Judge Eloida R. de Leon-Diaz for
proper disposition and re-raffle.8 The case was finally raffled to complainant.9
Complainant averred that the administrative case against him by respondent was
brought about by his issuance of the omnibus order, dated July 11, 2008, where he
ordered the creation of a management committee and appointment of its members.
Meanwhile, the RTC resolved that Atty. Acyatan continue to discharge his duties and
responsibilities with such powers and authority as the court-appointed receiver. The
trial court also authorized the foundation to pay Atty. Acyatan reimbursement expenses
and professional charges. Complainant claimed that his order was not acceptable to
respondent because he knew the import and effect of the said order - that he, together
with his wife and daughter, would lose their positions as Chairman, Treasurer and
Secretary, respectively, and as members of the Board of Trustees of the CEFI.10
Complainant further claimed that before the records of Civil Case 2007-10 was
transmitted to his sala and after he had inhibited from said case, respondent filed
thirteen (13) civil and special actions before the RTC of Lucena City. 11Atty. Calayan
also filed two (2) related intra-corporate controversy cases - violating the rule on
splitting causes of actions - involving the management and operation of the foundation.
According to complainant, these showed the propensity and penchant of respondent in
filing cases, whether or not they are baseless, frivolous or unfounded, with no other
intention but to harass, malign and molest his opposing parties, including the lawyers
and the handling judges. Complainant also revealed that respondent filed two (2) other
administrative cases against a judge and an assisting judge in the RTC of Lucena City,
which were dismissed because the issues raised were judicial in nature. 12
Complainant also disclosed that before his sala, respondent filed eighteen (18)
repetitious and prohibited pleadings.13 Respondent continuously filed pleadings after
pleadings as if to impress upon the court to finish the main intra-corporate case with
such speed. To complainant's mind, the ultimate and ulterior objective of respondent in
filing the numerous pleadings, motions, manifestation and explanations was to prevent
the takeover of the management of CEFI and to finally dismiss the case at the pre-trial
stage.
Complainant further revealed that due to the series of motions for recusation or
inhibition of judges, there is no presiding judge in Lucena City available to try and hear
the Calayan cases. Moreover, respondent filed nine (9) criminal charges against
opposing lawyers and their respective clients before the City Prosecutor of Lucena
City. In addition, there were four (4) administrative cases filed against opposing
counsels pending before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. 14
Based on the foregoing, complainant asserted that respondent committed the following:
(1) serious and gross misconduct in his duties as counsel for himself; (2) violated his
oath as lawyer for [a] his failure to observe and maintain respect to the courts (Section
20(b), Rule 138, Rules of Court); [b] by his abuse of judicial process thru maintaining
actions or proceedings inconsistent with truth and honor and his acts to mislead the
judge by false statements (Section 20(d), Rule 138); (3) repeatedly violated the rules of
procedures governing intra-corporate cases and maliciously misused the same to
defeat the ends of justice; and (4) knowingly violated the rule against the filing of
multiple actions arising from the same cause of action.
Position of respondent
In his Position Paper,15 respondent countered that the subject case is barred by the
doctrine of res judicata.
According to him, the counter-complaint was integrated with the Comment/Opposition
of complainant in the administrative case docketed as A.M. OCA LP.I. No. 08-2968-
RTJ filed by respondent against the latter. He stressed that because no disciplinary
measures were levelled on him by the OCA as an outcome of his complaint, charges
for malpractice, malice or bad faith were entirely ruled out; moreso, his disbarment was
decidedly eliminated.16Respondent argued that the doctrine of res judicata was
embedded in the OCA's finding that his complaint was judicial in nature. 17 He likewise
averred that the conversion of the administrative complaint against a judge into a
disbarment complaint against him, the complaining witness, was hideously adopted to
deflect the charges away from complainant. Respondent insisted that the counter-
complaint was not sanctioned by the Rules of Court on disbarment and the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline.18
Respondent also claimed that the counter-complaint was unverified and thus, without
complainant's own personal knowledge; instead, it is incontrovertible proof of his lack of
courtesy and obedience toward proper authorities and fairness to a fellow lawyer. 19
Further, respondent maintained that complainant committed the following: (1) grossly
unethical and immoral conduct by his impleading a non-party;20 (2) betrayal of his
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR);21 (3) malicious and
intentional delay in not terminating the pre-trial,22 in violation of the Interim Rules
because he ignored the special summary nature of the case; 23 and (4) misquoted
provisions of law and misrepresented the facts.24
Lastly, it was respondent's submission that the counter-complaint failed to adduce the
requisite quantum of evidence to disbar him, even less, to cite him in contempt of court
assuming ex gratia the regularity of the referral of the case.25
Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation,26 the Investigating Commissioner noted that,
instead of refuting the allegations and evidence against him, respondent merely
reiterated his charges against complainant. Instead of asserting his defense against
complainant's charges, the position paper for the respondent appeared more to be a
motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated March 2, 2009 rendered by the
Supreme Court, dismissing the administrative case against complainant. 27
In any case, based on the parties' position papers, the Investigating Commissioner
concluded that respondent violated Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,28 Rules
8.01, 10.01 to 10.03, 11.03, 11.04, 12.02 and 12.04 of the CPR29 and, thus,
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years,30 for the
following reasons:
First, respondent did not deny having filed four (4) cases against the counsel involved
in the intra-corporate case from which the subject administrative cases stemmed, and
nine (9) criminal cases against the opposing parties, their lawyers, and the receiver
before the Office of the Prosecutor of Lucena City - all of which were subject of judicial
notice. The Investigating Commissioner opined that such act manifested respondent's
malice in paralyzing these lawyers from exerting their utmost effort in protecting their
client's interest.31
Second, respondent committed misrepresentation when he cited a quote from former
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as a thesis when, in fact, it was a dissenting opinion.
The Investigating Commissioner further opined that describing the supposed
discussions by the judge with respondent's adverse counsels as contemplated crimes
and frauds is not only grave but also unfounded and irrelevant to the present case. 32
Third, respondent grossly abused his right of recourse to the courts by the filing of
multiple actions concerning the same subject matter or seeking substantially identical
relief.33 He admitted filing pleadings indiscriminately, but argued that it was within his
right to do so and it was merely for the purpose of saving CEFI from imminent
downfall.34 The Investigating Commissioner opined that the filing of multiple actions not
only was contemptuous, but also a blatant violation of the lawyer's oath. 35
Fourth, respondent violated Canon 11 of the CPR by attributing to complainant ill-
motives that were not supported by the record or had no materiality to the case. 36 He
charged complainant with coaching adverse counsel on account of their alleged close
ties, inefficiency in dealing with his pleadings, acting with dispatch on the adverse
party's motions, partiality to the plaintiffs because he was a townmate of Presiding
Judge Encomienda, and arriving at an order without predicating the same on legal
bases under the principle of stare decisis.37 According to the Investigating
Commissioner, these charges are manifestly without any basis and also established
respondent's disrespect for the complainant.38
Based on the findings, the Investigating Commissioner ultimately concluded:
As a party directly involved in the subject intra-corporate controversy, it is duly noted
that Respondent was emotionally affected by the ongoing case. His direct interest in
the proceedings apparently clouded his judgment, on account of which he failed to act
with circumspect in his choice of words and legal remedies. Such facts and
circumstances mitigate Respondent's liability. Hence, it is hereby recommended that
Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. 39
Consequently, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution 40 adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. It
recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years.
Aggrieved, respondent moved for reconsideration.
In a Resolution,41 dated May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent's
motion for reconsideration as there was no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the
Commission and the motion was a mere reiteration of the matters which had already
been threshed out.
Hence, pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,42 the Resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors, together with the whole record of the case, was
transmitted to the Court for final action.
Ruling of the Court
The Court adopts the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It
is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to
possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's
faith in the legal profession.43
When lawyers, in the performance of their duties, act in a manner that prejudices not
only the rights of their client, but also of their colleagues and offends due administration
of justice, appropriate disciplinary measures and proceedings are available such as
reprimand, suspension or even disbarment to rectify their wrongful acts.
The Court, however, emphasizes that a case for disbarment or suspension is not
meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the
ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public
and the courts.44 Proceedings to discipline erring members of the bar are not instituted
to protect and promote the public good only, but also to maintain the dignity of the
profession by the weeding out of those who have proven themselves unworthy
thereof.45
In this case, perusal of the records reveals that Atty. Calayan has displayed conduct
unbecoming of a worthy lawyer.
Harassing tactics against opposing counsel
As noted by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not deny filing several
cases, both civil and criminal, against opposing parties and their counsels. In his
motion for reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution, he again
admitted such acts but expressed that it was not ill-willed. He explained that the placing
of CEFI under receivership and directing the creation of a management committee and
the continuation of the receiver's duties and responsibilities by virtue of the Omnibus
Order spurred his filing of various pleadings and/or motions.46 It was in his desperation
and earnest desire to save CEFI from further damage that he implored the aid of the
courts.47
The Court is mindful of the lawyer's duty to defend his client's cause with utmost zeal.
However, professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with
necessary restrictions and qualifications.48 The filing of cases by respondent against
the adverse parties and their counsels, as correctly observed by the Investigating
Commissioner, manifests his malice in paralyzing the lawyers from exerting their
utmost effort in protecting their client's interest.49 Even assuming arguendo that such
acts were done without malice, it showed respondent's gross indiscretion as a
colleague in the legal profession.
Unsupported ill-motives attributed to a judge
As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and judicial officers. They are to abstain from offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the court and must refrain from attributing to a judge
motives that are not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.50
Here, respondent has consistently attributed unsupported imputations against the
complainant in his pleadings. He insisted that complainant antedated the order, dated
August 15, 2008, because the envelopes where the order came from were rubber
stamped as having been mailed only on August 26, 2008. 51 He also accused the
complainant judge of being in cahoots and of having deplorable close ties with the
adverse counsels;52 and that complainant irrefutably coached said adverse
counsels.53 However, these bare allegations are absolutely unsupported by any piece
of evidence. Respondent did not present any proof to establish complainant's alleged
partiality or the antedating. The date of mailing indicated on the envelope is not the
date of issue of the said order.
Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the CPR state that:
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
xxx
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record
or have no materiality to the case.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent guilty of attributing unsupported ill-
motives to complainant. It must be remembered that all lawyers are bound to uphold
the dignity and authority of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair
administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of
the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.54
Hence, no matter how passionate a lawyer is towards defending his client's cause, he
must not forget to display the appropriate decorum expected of him, being a member of
the legal profession, and to continue to afford proper and utmost respect due to the
courts.
Failure to observe candor, fairness and good faith before the court; failure to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice
It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the
expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor
and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the
other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the
administration of justice would gravely suffer if indeed it could proceed at all. 55
In his Motion for Reconsideration56 of the Resolution dated February 10, 2014 of the
IBP Board of Governors, respondent wrote:
Anent, the Respondent's alleged commission of falsehood in his pleadings, suffice it to
state that if certain pleadings prepared by the Respondent contained some allegations
that turned out to be inaccurate, the same were nevertheless unintentional and only
arose out of the Respondent's honest misappreciation of certain facts; 57
The records, however, showed that respondent's allegations were not brought about by
mere inaccuracy. For one of his arguments against the complainant, respondent relied
on Rule 9 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies which
provides:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Management Committee. - As an incident to any of the
cases filed under these Rules or the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation, A
PARTY MAY APPLY for the appointment of a management committee for the
corporation, partnership or association, when there is imminent danger of: xxx
[Emphasis supplied]
He stressed that the courts cannot motu proprio legally direct the appointment of a
management committee when the Interim Rules predicate such appointment
exclusively upon the application of a party in the complaint a quo.58
By employing the term "exclusively" to describe the class of persons who can apply for
the appointment of a management committee,59 respondent tried to mislead the Court.
Lawyers are well aware of the tenor of a provision of law when "may" is used. "May" is
construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion. 60 Thus, when the Interim
Rules stated that "a party may apply x x x, " it did not connote exclusivity to a certain
class. It simply meant that should a party opt for the appointment of such, it may do so.
It does not, however, exclude the courts from ordering the appointment of a
management committee should the surrounding circumstances of the case warrant
such.
Further, as regards his alleged misquotation, respondent argues that he should have
been cited in contempt.1âwphi1 He found justification in Cortes vs. Bangalan,61 to wit:
xxx. The alleged offensive and contemptuous language contained in the letter-
complaint was not directed to the respondent court. As observed by the Court
Administrator, "what respondent should have done in this particular case is that he
should have given the Court (Supreme Court) the opportunity to rule on the complaint
and not simply acted precipitately in citing complainant in contempt of court in a
manner which obviously smacks of retaliation rather than the upholding of a court's
honor."
A judge may not hold a party in contempt of court for expressing concern on his
impartiality even if the judge may have been insulted therein. While the power to punish
in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and
to uphold the due administration of justice, judges, however, should exercise their
contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in
view of utilizing their contempt powers for correction and preservation not for retaliation
or vindication.62
As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the jurisprudence quoted
precisely cautions a judge against citing a party in contempt, which is totally
contradictory to the position of respondent. He misrepresented the text of a decision, in
violation of the CPR.
Moreover, in defense of the multiple pleadings he filed, respondent avers that there is
no law or rule that limits the number of motions, pleadings and even cases as long as
they are sufficient in form and substance and not violative of the prohibition against
forum shopping.63 He maintains that his pleadings were filed in utmost good faith and
for noble causes, and that he was merely exercising his constitutionally protected rights
to due process and speedy disposition of cases.64
Ironically, Atty. Calayan's indiscriminate filing of pleadings, motions, civil and criminal
cases, and even administrative cases against different trial court judges relating to
controversies involving CEFI, in fact, runs counter to the speedy disposition of cases. It
frustrates the administration of justice. It degrades the dignity and integrity of the
courts.
A lawyer does not have an unbridled right to file pleadings, motions and cases as he
pleases. Limitations can be inferred from the following rules:
1. Rules of Court
a. Rule 71, Section 3. Indirect Contempt to be Punished After Charge and Hearing. -
After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:
xxx
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice;
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2. Code of Professional Responsibility
a. Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
b. Canon 10, Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and
shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
c. Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
d. Canon 12, Rule 12.04 -A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a Judgment or misuse Court processes.
Respondent justifies his filing of administrative cases against certain judges, including
complainant, by relying on In Re: Almacen (Almacen).65 He claims that the mandate of
the ruling laid down in Almacen was to encourage lawyers' criticism of erring
magistrates.66
In Almacen, however, it did not mandate but merely recognized the right of a lawyer,
both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful
terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. 67 In addition, the
Court therein emphasized that these criticisms are subject to a condition, to wit:
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on
the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. 68 [Emphasis
supplied.]

Indubitably, the acts of respondent were in violation of his duty to observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers and his duty to never seek
to mislead the judge or any judicial officer.69

In his last ditch attempt to escape liability, respondent apologized for not being more
circumspect with his remedies and choice of words. He admitted losing objectivity and
becoming emotional while pursuing the cases involving him and the CEFI. The Court,
however, reiterates that a lawyer's duty, is not to his client but primarily to the
administration of justice. To that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate. His
conduct ought to, and must always, be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics.
Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in
the pursuit of his devotion to his client's cause, is condemnable and unethical. 70

For having violated the CPR and the Lawyer's Oath, respondent's conduct should be
meted with a commensurate penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the Resolution of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines - Board of Governors dated September 28, 2013. Accordingly,
Atty. Ronaldo Antonio V. Calayan is found GUILTY of violating The Lawyer's Oath and
The Code of Professional Responsibility and he is hereby ordered SUSPENDEDfrom
the practice of law for two (2) years, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or a similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the: (a) Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance;
(b) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (c) the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a
copy of this decision be attached to the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.