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Sexism in animal observation remains common and is one reason why fem-
inism has shied away from considering animals. In doing so, however, fem-
inism unwittingly relies on evolutionary discontinuity. Feminist scholarship
emphasizes how gender and sexuality are socially constructed and rejects
ideas rooted in biological determinism (e.g. that gender depends on biology).
Fine—but the èexibility implied by social constructionism extends only to
human behavior: Bodily functions remain biological, beyond èexibility, and
often untheorized (Birke, 1999). Moreover, the behavior of nonhuman ani-
mals remains largely in the realm of biology, outside the remit of most fem-
inist inquiry (Noske, 1993; Birke, 1994). So, discontinuity is reinforced implicitly,
and the chasm yawns between human culture and the rest of nature.
Nevertheless, several feminist theorists have analyzed the ways that gender,
race, and animality are deeply entwined concepts in our culture—they are
concepts that discursively construct one another (Haraway, 1989). Similarly,
Bryld and Lykke (2000) discuss the multiple and shifting meanings attached
to dolphins. That is, images of whales and dolphins have become particu-
larly potent symbols in cultural debate about what it means to be human.
“‘Human’ is deénitely not a neutral or innocent category, but a highly gen-
dered and racialized one,” as Bryld and Lykke (p. 33) point out. So, while
Ways Forward?
Clearly, cultural meanings of animals and gender are complex and power-
ful. But both éelds of inquiry could beneét from greater dialogue. Human-
animal studies could make more use of ideas of gender as a construct, as
something performed (Butler, 1990) rather than something we intrinsically
are.4 Although Butler was not addressing animals, we might ask how “gen-
der” becomes performed whenever we observe nonhuman animals. Is the
performance in the animals’ behavior or in our understandings of it (if we
can make that separation)? Or is it in our own performance in relation to that
of the animals?
Feminist studies, by contrast, need to think more about what animals are and
the gender-laden meanings of both generalized and speciéc kinds of “ani-
mals.” Relatedly, feminist theory needs to consider its reliance on evolution-
ary discontinuity (Hawkins, 1998). It does not help feminism to assume,
however implicitly, that “animals” are “other.” Feminist theory focuses par-
ticularly on the creation and meaning of difference; but, important though
that move is, it still rests on a generalized, nonhuman “other,” just a differ-
ent one (Kappeler, 1995). It is ironic that, while feminist theorists emphasize
the èuidity of gender, the same theory assumes an underlying éxity of nature
and animals. Moreover, in rejecting biological determinism, feminists should
not fear a “dumbing down” to what has emerged culturally as “animality”;
rather, we should recognize the myriad ways in which various nonhumans
engage with their worlds. We need other ways to include animals in femi-
nist theories rather than rejecting them as “outside culture.” Doing so might
move us beyond simple dichotomies of biology/determinism versus social
constructionism (Birke, 1994).
Notes
1
Correspondence should be addressed to Lynda Birke, Institute of Women’s Studies,
University of Lancaster, Lancaster, UK LA1 4YW. Email: ghv37@dial.pipex.com. I
am very grateful to Consuelo Rivera, Lori Gruen, Nina Lykke, and Mette Bryld for
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper and to my various canine and
equine friends who ensure that I sometimes leave the computer.
2
There are exceptions: Several ecofeminist writers focus on animals (Adams, 1994;
Gaard, 1993; Gruen, 1994). Gender is sometimes included as a variable in empir-
ical studies of human/animals (Kruse, 1999) but is rarely problematized as a
concept.
3
There are numerous examples of denigrating animal words applied to women—
chick, cow, beaver, pussy, for example. When animal words refer to men, it is usu-
ally to imply something more highly valued, even if ambivalently: Calling men
studs or stags are examples.
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