SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Case Digests/Rule 72 1 of 7
CASE DIGEST 1: RULE 72 - SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY OF
GENERAL RULES
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR,
Respondent, G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014, PERALTA, J.:
FACTS OF THE CASE:RESPONDENT requested from the National Statistics
Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the
requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt
thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son
Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice.
She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she
did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the
solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage
certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF
ENTRIES IN THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT, especially the entries in the wife
portion thereof.Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City,
as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.
RESPONDENT testified on her behalf and explained that she could
not have appeared before Judge MamertoCaliflores, the supposed
solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated,
because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in
HansaoPharma. She completely denied having known the supposed husband,
but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as
she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension
House. She believed that HER NAME WAS USED BY A CERTAIN JOHNNY
SINGH, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport.
Respondent also presented as witness a certain EufrocinaNatinga,
an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son
Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the ALLEGED
WIFEwho appeared was definitely not respondent. Lastly, a document
examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was
forged.
RTCgranted petition in favor of the petitioner,
Merlinda L. Olaybar.RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of
cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Courtbeing the appropriate adversary proceeding required.
Considering that respondent’s identity was used by an unknown person to
contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for
respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it
is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whetheror not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract
which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108
proceeding.YES
RULING:RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURTprovides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may
either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil
status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v.
Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule
108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error
availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An
APPROPRIATE ADVERSARY SUIT OR PROCEEDING is one where the trial
court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where OPPOSING COUNSEL have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence
has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
***It is true that in SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, formal pleadings and
a hearing may be dispensed with, and the REMEDY isgranted upon mere
application or motion. However, a SPECIAL PROCEEDINGis not always
summary. The PROCEDURE LAID DOWN IN RULE 108is not a summary
proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the
inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be
affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar
and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that
although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after
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hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the same. Thus, as long as the PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN
RULE 108 ARE FOLLOWED, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to
effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
***In this case, the ENTRIES MADE IN THE WIFE PORTION OF
THE CERTIFICATE OF MARRIAGEareadmittedly the personal circumstances of
respondent. The latter, however, claims that her SIGNATURE was forged and
she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband.
In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there
was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled
that WHEN RESPONDENT TRIED TO OBTAIN A CENOMAR FROM THE NSO, it
appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the
cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such
evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather,
RESPONDENTshowed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was
entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The
testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only
"evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While
we maintain that RULE 108cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all
the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of
respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the
parties had already been admitted and examined. RESPONDENT indeed
sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of,
but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set
forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in ALLOWING THE CORRECTION OF
THE SUBJECT CERTIFICATE OF MARRIAGE BY CANCELLING THE WIFE
PORTION THEREOF, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage
void as there was no marriage to speak of.
CASE DIGEST 2: RULE 72 - SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY OF
GENERAL RULES
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, vs.ABSOLUTE
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Respondent, G.R. No. 170498
January 9, 2013, BRION, J.:
FACTS OF THE CASE:On October 5, 2000, SHERWOOD HOLDINGS
CORPORATION, INC. (SHCI) filed a complaint for sum of money against
Absolute Management Corporation(AMC). SHCI alleged that it made
advance payments to AMC for the purchase of 27,000 pieces of
plywood and 16,500 plyboards in the sum of ₱12,277,500.00, covered
by Metrobank Check Nos. 1407668502, 140768507, 140768530,
140768531, 140768532, 140768533 and 140768534. These checks were
all crossed, and were all made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua,
AMC’s General Manager, in 1998.
CHUA died in 1999, and a special proceeding for the
settlement of his estate was commencedbefore the RTC of Pasay City.
This proceeding was pending at the time AMC filed its answer with
counterclaims and third-party complaint. SHCI made demands on AMC,
after Chua’s death, for allegedly undelivered items worth
₱8,331,700.00. According to AMC, these transactions could not be
found in its records. Upon investigation, AMC discovered that in 1998,
Chua received from SHCI 18 Metrobank checks worth ₱31,807,500.00.
These were all payable to AMC and were crossed or "for payee’s account
only."
AMC averred that it had no knowledge of Chua’s transactions
with SHCI and it did not receive any money from the latter. AMC also
asked the RTC to hold Metrobank liable for the subject checks in case it
is adjudged liable to SHCI.METROBANK admitted that it deposited the
checks in question to the account of Ayala Lumber and Hardware, a sole
proprietorship Chua owned and managed. The deposit was allegedly
done with the knowledge and consent of AMC. According to Metrobank,
CHUAthen gave the assurance that the arrangement for the handling of
the checks carried AMC’s consent. Chua also submitted documents
showing his position and interest in AMC. These documents, as well as
AMC’s admission in its answer that it allowed Chua to manage AMC
with a relative free hand, show that it knew of Chua’s arrangement with

Metrobank. Further, Chua’s records show that the PROCEEDS OF THE
CHECKS were remitted to AMC which cannot therefore now claim that
it did not receive these proceeds.Subsequently, METROBANK filed a
motion for leave to admit fourth-party complaint against Chua’s estate.
It alleged that CHUA’S ESTATE should reimburse Metrobank in case it
would be held liable in the third-party complaint filed against it by AMC.
RTC denied Metrobank’s motion.The RTC categorized
METROBANK’S ALLEGATION IN THE FOURTH-PARTY COMPLAINT as a "cobro
de lo indebido"27 – a kind of quasi-contract that mandates recovery of what
has been improperly paid. Quasi-contractsfall within the concept of implied
contracts that must be included in the claims required to be filed with the
judicial settlement of the deceased’s estate under Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court. As such claim, it should have been filed in Special Proceedings
No. 99-0023, not before the RTC as a fourth-party complaint. The RTC,
ACTING IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS GENERAL JURISDICTION, does not have the
authority to adjudicate the fourth-party complaint. As a TRIAL COURT
HEARING AN ORDINARY ACTION, it cannot resolve matters pertaining to
special proceedings because the latter is subject to specific rules.CAaffirmed
the RTC’s ruling that Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint should have been
filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023.CA held that SECTION 5, RULE 86 OF
THE RULES OF COURTis a special provision that should prevail over the
general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court. The
LATTERapplies to money claims in ordinary actions while a MONEY CLAIM
AGAINST A PERSON ALREADY DECEASEDfalls under the settlement of his
estate that is governed by the rules on special proceedings. If at all, RULES
FOR ORDINARY ACTIONSonly apply suppletorily to special proceedings.
ISSUE: Whetheror not Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint, as a
contingent claim, falls within the claims that should be filed under
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.YES
RULING:METROBANK’S FOURTH-PARTY COMPLAINT, as a contingent
claim, falls within the claims that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86
of the Rules of Court.A distinctive character of METROBANK’S FOURTH-
PARTY COMPLAINTis its CONTINGENT NATURE– the claim depends on
the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a
future event that may or may not happen. This characteristic
unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be
included in the claims falling under the terms of SECTION 5, RULE 86 OF
THE RULES OF COURT:Sec. 5. CLAIMS WHICH MUST BE FILED UNDER
THE NOTICE. IF NOT FILED, BARRED; EXCEPTIONS. – ALL CLAIMS FOR
MONEY AGAINST THE DECEDENT, arising from contract, express or
implied, WHETHER THE SAME BE DUE, NOT DUE, OR CONTINGENT, all
claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed
within the time limited in the notice.
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5, RULE 86 OF THE RULES
OF COURTprevail over general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the
Rules of Court.
***Metrobank argues that Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of
Court should apply because it impleaded Chua’s estate for
reimbursement in the same transaction upon which it has been sued by
AMC. On this point, the Court supports the conclusion of the CA, to
wit:Notably, a COMPARISON OF THE RESPECTIVE PROVISIONS OF
SECTION 11, RULE 6 AND SECTION 5, RULE 86 OF THE RULES OF
COURTreadily shows that SECTION 11, RULE 6applies to ordinary civil
actions while SECTION 5, RULE 86 specifically applies to money claims
against the estate. The SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5, RULE 86 x x
x must therefore prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6.
***We read with approval the CA’s use of the statutory
construction principle of lex specialis derogat generali, leading to the
conclusion that the SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5, RULE 86 OF
THE RULES OF COURTshould prevail over the general provisions of
Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the SETTLEMENT OF THE
ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS(where claims against the deceased
should be filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings,
while the RULES PROVIDED FOR ORDINARY CLAIMS, INCLUDING
SECTION 11, RULE 6 OFTHE RULES OF COURT, merely apply suppletorily.
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In sum, on all counts in the considerations material to the
issues posed, the resolution points to the affirmation of the assailed CA
decision and resolution. METROBANK'S CLAIM IN ITS FOURTH-PARTY
COMPLAINT AGAINST CHUA'S ESTATEis based on quasi-contract. It is
also a contingent claim that depends on another event. BOTH BELONG
TO THE CATEGORY OF CLAIMSagainst a deceased person that should be
filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Comi and, as such, should
have been so filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023. Hence, the
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS dated August 25, 2005, holding
that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Company's motion for leave to admit fourth-party complaint is affirmed.
CASE DIGEST 3: RULE 72 - SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY OF
GENERAL RULES
LUISA KHO MONTAER, ALEJANDRO MONTAER, JR., LILLIBETH
MONTAER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAER-
DALUPAN, Petitioners vs. SHARIA DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH
SHARIA JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN,
AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER, Respondents, G.R. No.
174975, JANUARY 20, 2009, PUNO, C.J.:
FACTS OF THE CASE:On August 17, 1956, PETITIONER LUISA KHO
MONTAER, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at the
Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. PETITIONERS
ALEJANDRO MONTAER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAER-BARRIOS, AND
RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAER-DALUPAN are their children. On
May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died.
On August 19, 2005, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS LILING
DISANGCOPAN AND HER DAUGHTER, ALMAHLEEN LILING S.
MONTAER, both Muslims, filed a Complaint for the judicial
partition of properties before the Sharia District Court. In the said
complaint, PRIVATE RESPONDENTSmade the following allegations:
(1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro
Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) PETITIONERS are the first family of the
decedent; (4) LILING DISANGCOPANis the widow of the decedent; (5)
ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAERis the daughter of the decedent;
and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising
the estate of the decedent.PRIVATE RESPONDENTS prayed for the
Sharia District Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the
partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of
an administrator for the estate of the decedent.
PETITIONERS filed an Answer with a MOTION TO DISMISS
MAINLY ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS: (1) the SHARIA DISTRICT
COURThas no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro
Montaer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) PRIVATE
RESPONDENTSfailed to pay the correct amount of docket fees; and
(3) PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COMPLAINTis barred by prescription, as
it seeks to establish filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montaer
and the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.
SHARIA DISTRICT COURT dismissed the private
respondents complaint. The DISTRICT COURT held that Alejandro
Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to
the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims.
In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the SHARIA
DISTRICT COURTreconsidered its order of dismissal dated November
22, 2005. The DISTRICT COURTallowed private respondents to
adduce further evidence. In its second assailed order dated
September 21, 2006, the SHARIA DISTRICT COURTordered the
continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further
evidence, and pre-trial conference.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint filed by the respondents in the
Shari’a District Court for the settlement of the estate is an ordinary
civil action. NO

RULING:The underlying assumption in petitioners argument that the
PROCEEDING BEFORE THE SHARIA DISTRICT COURT is an
ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION AGAINST A DECEASED PERSON, rests on
an erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a
quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the PROCEEDING
BEFORE THE SHARIA DISTRICT COURT, where the parties were
designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was
denominated as a special civil action.
***We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a
quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a SPECIAL
PROCEEDING. SECTION 3(C) OF THE RULES OF COURT (RULES)
defines a SPECIAL PROCEEDING as a remedy by which a party seeks
to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. This Court has
applied the Rules, particularly the RULES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS,
for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim. In a PETITION
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION, SETTLEMENT,
AND DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE, the applicants seek to establish the
fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as
among the decedents heirs, which would allow them to exercise
their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the
estate of the decedent. Here, the RESPONDENTS seek to establish
the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death and, subsequently, for
private RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAERto be
recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.
***Petitioners argument, that the prohibition against a
decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a civil
action applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the
estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a CIVIL ACTION which
has definite adverse parties, a SPECIAL PROCEEDING has no
definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special
proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A
CIVIL ACTION, in which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong
necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff
or defendant. On the other hand, a SPECIAL PROCEEDING, by which
aparty seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact, has one
definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status,
right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at
bar, it bears emphasis that the ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT is not
being sued for any cause of action. AS A SPECIAL PROCEEDING, the
PURPOSE OF THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT is
to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities, and to
distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.
Petitioners fifth argument is premature. Again, the
SHARIA DISTRICT COURT has not yet determined whether it has
jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that a
SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A
DECEDENT IS PENDING, questions regarding heirship, including
prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised
and settled in the said proceeding. The COURT, IN ITS CAPACITY AS
A PROBATE COURT, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of
the decedent. In the case at bar, the DETERMINATION OF THE HEIRS
OF THE DECEDENTdepends on an affirmative answer to the question
of whether the Sharia District Court has jurisdiction over the estate
of the decedent.
CASE DIGEST 4: RULE 72 - SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY OF
GENERAL RULES
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
HEIRS OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL
ROSARIO-MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO
FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO
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DEL ROSARIO, respondents, G.R. No. 133000. October 2, 2001, BUENA,
J.:
FACTS OF THE CASE:SPOUSES GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO AND GRACIANA
ESGUERRAwere registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of
9,322 square meterslocated in Manila. Upon the DEATH OF GRACIANA
IN 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani,
Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of Gracianas estate on 09 February 1954
adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real propertysubject of
TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Gracianoreceived 8/14 share
while each of the six childrenreceived 1/14 share of the said property.
Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the six children.
Further, on 09 February 1954, SAID HEIRSexecuted and
forged an Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with
Waiver of Rights where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of
land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. GRACIANO then
donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in
the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60
square meters registered under Gracianos name, as covered by TCT No.
35988. Subsequently, the LAND SUBJECT OF TCT NO. 35988was further
subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land area of
80.90 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the
second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was registered
under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, GRACIANOsold the first lot to a third
person but retained ownership over the second lot.
On 20 March 1980, GRACIANOmarried herein petitioner
Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, GRACIANOsold the land
covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT
No. 186059 was issued in the latters name. On 07 October 1985,
Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his
first marriage, as heirs.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS alleged that upon
Gracianos death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it
appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Saledated 25 June 1987 in
favor of herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443
and the issuance of TCT No. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher.
Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a
consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been
impaired.
HEREIN PETITIONER NATCHERaverred that she was legally
married to Graciano on 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was
likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further
alleged that during Gracianos lifetime, GRACIANOalready distributed, in
advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents
may not anymore claim against Gracianos estate or against herein
petitioners property.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ruled that the deed of sale executed
by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited
by law and thus a complete nullity. Although the deed of sale cannot be
regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded as an
extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory
heir of the deceased. COURT OF APPEALSreversed and set aside the
lower courtsdecision. It held that it is the probate court that has
exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
The COURT A QUO, trying an ordinary action for
reconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it
performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person. Thus the court a quo erred
in regarding the subject property as an advance inheritance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo went beyond its jurisdiction it
performed acts for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person.
YES

RULING:***We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in
the instant petition.SECTION 3, RULE 1 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE defines CIVIL ACTION AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, in this
wise:X XX a) A CIVIL ACTIONis one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.A CIVIL ACTIONmay either be ordinary or special. BOTH are
governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules
prescribed for a special civil action.X XXc) A SPECIAL PROCEEDINGis a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact.
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked
DISTINCTION BETWEEN AN ACTION AND A SPECIAL PROCEEDING. An
ACTION is a formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in the
manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of
applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGmay be defined as an application or proceeding to
establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, no formal pleadings are required unless the
statute expressly so provides. In SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, the remedy is
granted generally upon an application or motion.
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial
Law expounds further:It may accordingly be stated generally that
ACTIONS include those proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted
according to the ordinary rules and provisionsrelating to actions at law
or suits in equity, and that SPECIAL PROCEEDINGSinclude those
proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and
prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of
proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without
regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. X XX A
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGmust therefore be in the nature of a distinct and
independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted
independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice.
Applying these principles, an ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE
AND ANNULMENT OF TITLE WITH DAMAGESis a civil action, whereas
MATTERS RELATING TO SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED
PERSONsuch as advancement of property made by the decedent,
partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
Clearly, matters which involve SETTLEMENT AND
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENTfall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction.
Thus, under SECTION 2, RULE 90 OF THE RULES OF COURT, QUESTIONS
AS TO ADVANCEMENT MADE OR ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY
THE DECEASED TO ANY HEIR may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the FINAL ORDER OF
THE COURT THEREON shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heir.
Corollarily, the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT in the instant case,
acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an
adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property
in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075
for RECONVEYANCE AND ANNULMENT OF TITLE WITH DAMAGESis not,
to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover,
under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not
properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the
question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario
to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and
proceedings in the present case, reveals that the TRIAL COURTfailed to
observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the
estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to
sanction the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby
holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a PROBATE COURT, IN
THE EXERCISE OF ITS LIMITED JURISDICTION, is indeed the best forum
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to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other
related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosarios estate.
CASE NO. 10:
G.R. No. 172547 June 30, 2009
PRECY BUNYI and MILA BUNYI, Petitioners, vs. FE S.
FACTOR, Respondent.
Facts:
 Respondent Fe Factor and Gloria Factor Labao
were co-owners of an 18-hectare parcel of land in
Almanza, Las Piñas City. The ownership of the
land originated from respondent’s paternal
grandparents Constantino Factor and Maura
Mayuga-Factor who had been in actual,
continuous, peaceful, public, adverse and exclusive
possession and occupation of the land even before
1906.
 In 1994, the RTC granted the petition of
Constantino and Maura’s children for Original
Registration and Confirmation of Imperfect Title
to the said parcel of land. They sold seven hectares
of the property. The siblings, except Enrique
Factor, respondent’s father, shared and divided
the proceeds of the sale among themselves, with
the agreement that Enrique would have as his
share the portion of the property known as the
Factor compound, where several houses were
constructed including a rest house. Petitioners
were among the tenants in one of the houses.
 When Enrique died, the property was entrusted to
Gloria who, together with her husband Ruben
Labao and their son Reggie F. Labao, lived in Tipaz,
Taguig, Metro Manila but visited and sometimes
stayed in the rest house because Gloria collected
the rentals of the residential houses and oversaw
the Factor compound. When Gloria died on
January 15, 2001, the administration and
management of the Factor compound including
the subject rest house, passed on to respondent Fe
S. Factor as co-owner of the property. As an act of
good will and compassion considering that Ruben
was sick, she let the latter live in the property. One
year thereafter, he got married to Precy, but
eventually died.
 Respondent discovered that petitioners forcibly
opened the doors of the rest house and stole all
the personal properties owned by the Factor
family and then audaciously occupied the
premises. Respondent alleged that petitioners
unlawfully deprived her and the Factor family of
the subject property’s lawful use and possession.
Petitioners, for their part, questioned Fe’s claim of
ownership of the subject property and the alleged
prior ownership of her father Enrique Factor.
They asserted that the subject property was
owned by Ruben Labao, and that petitioner Precy
with her husband moved into the subject property,
while petitioner Mila Bunyi, mother of Precy,
remained in No. 8 Antioch St.

 MCTC ruled in favor of respondent, which was
later on affirmed by RTC and then CA.
Issue: Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals seriously
erred when it misappreciated the fact that the respondent
has a better right of physical and material possession of
the subject property.
Ruling: NO.
 For one to be considered in possession, one need
not have actual or physical occupation of every
square inch of the property at all times. Possession
can be acquired not only by material occupation,
but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the
action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such
right. Possession can be acquired by juridical acts.
These are acts to which the law gives the force of
acts of possession. Examples of these are
donations, succession, execution and registration
of public instruments, and the inscription of
possessory information titles.
 The right of respondent’s predecessors over the
subject property is more than sufficient to uphold
respondent’s right to possession over the same.
Respondent’s right to the property was vested in
her along with her siblings from the moment of
their father’s death. As heir, respondent had the
right to the possession of the property, which is
one of the attributes of ownership. Such rights are
enforced and protected from encroachments made
or attempted before the judicial declaration since
respondent acquired hereditary rights even before
judicial declaration in testate or intestate
proceedings.
 As a consequence of co-ownership, soon after the
death of Gloria, respondent, as one of the
surviving co-owners, may be subrogated to the
rights of the deceased co-owner, which includes
the right to the administration and management of
the subject property.
 As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners’
unsupported claim of possession must yield to
that of the respondent who traces her possession
of the subject property to her predecessors-in-
interest who have always been in possession of
the subject property. Even assuming that
respondent was never a resident of the subject
property, she could legally continue possessing
the property. Visiting the property on weekends
and holidays is evidence of actual or physical
possession. The fact of her residence somewhere
else, by itself, does not result in loss of possession
of the subject property.
 The Court stresses, however, that its
determination of ownership in the instant case is
not final. It is only a provisional determination for
the sole purpose of resolving the issue of
possession. It would not bar or prejudice a
separate action between the same parties
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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Case Digests/Rule 72 5 of 7
involving the quieting of title to the subject
property.
 As regards the means upon which the deprivation
took effect, it is not necessary that the respondent
must demonstrate that the taking was done with
force, intimidation threat, strategy or stealth. The
Supreme Court, in Bañes v. Lutheran Church in the
Philippines, explained:
 In order to constitute force that would justify a
forcible entry case, the trespasser does not have to
institute a state of war. The act of going to the
property and excluding the lawful possessor
therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force
over the property which is all that is necessary
and sufficient to show that the action is based on
the provisions of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court.
 Respondent, as co-owner, has the control of the
subject property even if she does not stay in it. So
when petitioners entered said property without
the consent and permission of the respondent and
the other co-owners, the latter were deprived of
its possession. Moreover, the presence of an
unidentified man forbidding respondent from
entering the subject property constitutes force
contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court.
CASE NO. 11:
G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000
RUFINA LUY LIM, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED
DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS,
ALLIANCE MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION
COMPANY, INC. respondents.
Facts:
 Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse
of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of
probate proceedings in special proceedings.
Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation,
Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed
Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and
Action Company are corporations formed,
organized and existing under Philippine laws and
which owned real properties covered under the
Torrens system.
 Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as
surviving spouse and duly represented by her
nephew George Luy, fried on 17 March 1995, a
joint petition for the administration of the estate of
Pastor Y. Lim. Private respondent corporations,
whose properties were included in the inventory
of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a
motion for the lifting of lis pendens and motion7 for
exclusion of certain properties from the estate of
the decedent.
 RTC granted respondents’ twin motions, but was
later on set aside reinstating the annotation of lis
pendens. The probate court appointed Rufina Lim

as special administrator11 and Miguel Lim and
Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special administrators
of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which letters of
administration were accordingly issued. Acting on
an ex parte motion filed by petitioner, the probate
court ordered banks to produce and submit
records of the savings/current accounts/time
deposits and other deposits in the names of Pastor
Lim and/or corporations above-mentioned.
 Private respondent filed a special civil action
for certiorari , with an urgent prayer for a
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,
before the CA questioning the orders of the RTC,
sitting as a probate court, which the CA granted.
 Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether CA erred in reversing the orders of the
lower court which merely allowed the preliminary or
provisional inclusion of the private respondents as
part of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim with the respondent
CA arrogating unto itself the power to repeal, to
disobey or to ignore the clear and explicit provisions
of Rules 81,83,84 and 87 of the Rules of Court and
thereby preventing the petitioner, from performing
her duty as special administrator of the estate as
expressly provided in the said Rules.
Ruling: NO.
 Aside from ruling on the merits of the case, the
Supreme Court reviewed the rules on jurisdiction
over probate proceedings.
 The provisions of Republic Act 769117 , which
introduced amendments to Batas Pambansa Blg.
129. Under said law, the determination of which
court exercises jurisdiction over matters of
probate depends upon the gross value of the
estate of the decedent.
 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and
intestate, where the gross value of the estate
exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000)
or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where
such gross value exceeds Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000);
 Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions
and probate proceedings, testate and intestate,
including the grant of provisional remedies in
proper cases, where the value of the personal
property, estate or amount of the demand does
not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos
UMin-CLE_SPECPRO2017-2018
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Case Digests/Rule 72 6 of 7
(P100,000) or, in Metro Manila where such
personal property, estate or amount of the
demand does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000), exclusive of interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs, the amount of which must be
specifically alleged, Provided, that interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's, litigation
expenses and costs shall be included in the
determination of the filing fees, Provided further,
that where there are several claims or causes of
actions between the same or different parties,
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of
the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all
the causes of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions; xxx
 In Pastor, Jr. vs CA, the Court ruled: As a rule, the
question of ownership is an extraneous matter
which the probate court cannot resolve with
finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not
be included in the inventory of estate properties,
the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto,
but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to resolve title.
 In Morales vs CFI: All that the said court could do
as regards said properties is to determine whether
they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered
by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well
and good; but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title
because the probate court cannot do so.
 where the parcels of land are registered in the
name of private respondent corporations, the
jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY
vs., ALCID 24 is of great essence and finds
applicability: If a property covered by Torrens title
is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of
such title should be given due weight, and in the
absence of strong compelling evidence to the
contrary, the holder thereof should be considered
as the owner of the property in controversy until
his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate
ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case
at bar, possession of the property itself is in the
persons named in the title.
 Inasmuch as the real properties included in the
inventory of the estate of the Late Pastor Y. Lim
are in the possession of and are registered in the
name of private respondent corporations, which
under the law possess a personality separate and
distinct from their stockholders, and in the
absence of any cogency to shred the veil of
corporate fiction, the presumption of
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Case Digests/Rule 72 7 of 7

conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private

respondents should stand undisturbed.
 While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court,
acting in a restricted capacity and exercising
limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is
competent to issue orders involving inclusion or
exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of
the estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit,
provisionally the question of title over properties,
it is no less true that such authority conferred
upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence,
should be exercised judiciously, with due regard
and caution to the peculiar circumstances of each
individual case.
 Notwithstanding that the real properties were
duly registered under the Torrens system in the
name of private respondents, and as such were to
be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of
title, the probate court obviously opted to shut its
eyes to this gleamy fact and still proceeded to
issue the impugned orders.
 By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the
probate court in effect acted in utter disregard of
the presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor
of private respondents. Certainly, the probate
court through such brazen act transgressed the
clear provisions of law and infringed settled
jurisprudence on this matter.

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