1

G.R. No. L-22036, April 30, 1979 "Doy y dejo como legado CUATRO (4)
PARCELAS de terreno palayeros, situados en
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND el municipio de Guimba de la provincia de
FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE PARISH NUEVA ECIJA, cuyo num. de CERTIFICADO DE
PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC TRANSFERENCIA DE TITULO
CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC, SON: - Titulo Num. 6530, mide 16,249
PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. BELINA m. cuadrados de superficie; Titulo Num.
RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA 6548, mide 242,998
ESCOBAR DE RIGOR AND JOVITA m. cuadrados de superficie; Titulo Num.
ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO, RESPONDENTS- 6525, mide 62,665 m. cuadrados de superficie;
APPELLEES. y Titulo Num. 6521, mide 119,251
m. cuadrados de superficie;
DECISION a cualquier pariente miovaron mas cercano que
estudie la carrera eclesiastica hasta ordenarse d
e Presbiterado o
AQUINO, J.:
sea Sacerdote; las condiciones de
estate legado son:
"(1.a) Prohibe en absoluto la
venta de estos terre
This case is about the efficaciousness or nos arriba situados
enforceability of a devise of ricelands located objectos de este leg
at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of ado;
around forty-four hectares. That devise was
made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor,
a native of Victoria, Tarlac, in favor of his nearest "(2.a) Que el legatario parien
male relative who would study for the priesthood. te mio mas cercano
tendra derecho de e
mpezar a gozar y a
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a dministrar de este le
trustee of the said lands, appealed to this Court gado al principiar a
from the decision of the Court of Appeals curzar la Sagrada T
affirming the order of the probate court declaring eologia,
that the said devise was inoperative (Rigor vs. y ordenado de Sace
Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of rdote, hasta su mue
Victoria, Tarlac, CA-G. R. No. 24319-R, August rte; pero que pierde
1, 1963). el legatario este der
echo de administrar
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the y gozar de este leg
parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August ado al dejar de conti
9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, nuar sus estudios p
1933 which was probated by the Court of First ara ordenarse de Pr
Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, esbiterado (Sacerdo
1935. Named as devisces in the will were the te).
testator's nearest relatives, namely, his three
sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, BelinaRigor- "Que el legatario una vez Sacerdote ya, estara o
Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The bligado a celebrar cada año VEINTE
testator gave a devise to his (20) Misas rezadas en sufragio de mi alma y
cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda. de mis padres difuntos, y si el
actual legatario, quedase excomulgado, IPSO
In addition, the will contained the following FACTO se el despoja este legado, y
controversial bequest (paragraphing supplied to la administracion de esto pasara a cargo del
facilitate comprehension of the testamentary actual Parroco y sus sucesores de
provisions): la Iglesia Catolicade Victoria, Tarlac.
"Y
en intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario ac

ondicionado segun lo arriba queda expresado, p
asara la administracion de este legado a
cargo del actual Parroco Catolico y sus sucesor
es, de Victoria, Tarlac.
"El Parroco administrador de
estate legado, acumulara anualmente todos los
productos que puede tener estate legado, ganan
do o sacando de los productos anuales el
CINCO (5) por ciento para su administracion,
y los derechos correspondientes de las VEINTE
(20) Misas rezadas que debiera el Parroco celeb
rar cada año, depositandotodo lo restante de los
productos de estate legado, en un banco,
a nombre de estate legado."
To implement the foregoing bequest,
the administratrix in 1940 submitted a project of
partition containing the following item:
"5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH
"That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy
purported to be given to the nearest male relative
who shall take the priesthood, and in the interim
to be administered by the actual Catholic Priest of
the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac,
Philippines, or his successors, the real properties
herein below indicated, to wit:
"Title No. Lot No. Area in
T-6530 3663
T-6548 3445-C
T-6525 3670
T-6521 3666
"Total area and value -
Judge Roman A. Cruz in his order of August 15,
1940, approving the project of partition, directed
that after payment of the obligations of the estate
(including the sum of P3,132.26 due to the
church of the Victoria parish)
the administratrix should deliver to the devisees
their respective shares.
2
It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge
Cruz did not bother to analyze the meaning and
implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his
nearest male relative who would study for the
priesthood. Inasmuch as no nephew of the
testator claimed the devise and as
the administratrix and the legal heirs believed
that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to
administer the ricelands, the same were not
delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testate
proceeding remained pending.
About thirteen years after the approval of the
project of partition, or on February 19, 1954, the
parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate
proceeding a petition praying for the appointment
of a new administrator (succeeding the
deceased administratrix, Florencia Rigor), who
should deliver to the church the said ricelands,
and further praying that the possessors thereof
be ordered to render an accounting of the
fruits. The probate court granted the petition. A
new administrator was appointed. On January
31, 1957 the parish priest filed another petition for
the delivery of the ricelands to the church as
trustee.
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with
a petition dated March 25, 1957 praying that the
Has. bequestTaxbe Dec. Ass. Value
declared inoperative and that they be
adjudged as the persons entitled to the
said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish
priest of Victoria, "no nearest male relative of" the
1.6249 18740 P 340.00
testator "has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp.
25 and 35, Record on Appeal). That petition was
24.2998 18730priest of Victoria. 7,290.00
opposed by the parish
6.2665 18736
Finding that petition 1,880.00
to be meritorious, the lower
court, through Judge Bernabe de Aquino,
11.9251
declared 18733the 3,580.00
bequest
inoperative and adjudicated the ricelands to the
testator's legal heirs in his order of June 28,
44.1163 P13,090.00”
1957. The parish priest filed two motions for
reconsideration.
Judge De Aquino granted the second motion for
reconsideration in his order of December 10,
1957 on the ground that the testator had a
grandnephew named Edgardo G. Cunanan(the
grandson of his first cousin) who was a
seminarian in the San Jose Seminary of the
Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City. The administrator

was directed to deliver the ricelands to the parish
priest of Victoria as trustee.
The legal heirs appealed to the Court of
Appeals. It reversed that order. It held that
Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for
his nearest male relative who would take the holy
orders but that such trust could exist only for
twenty years because to enforce it beyond that
period would violate "the rule against
perpetuities". It ruled that since no legatee
claimed the ricelands within twenty years after
the testator's death, the same should pass to his
legal heirs, citing articles 888 and 912(2) of the
old Civil Code and article 870 of the new Civil
Code.
The parish priest in this appeal contends that the
Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
testator created a public charitable trust and in not
liberally construing the testamentary provisions
so as to render the trust operative and to prevent
intestacy.
As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court
of Appeals declared the bequest inoperative
because no one among the testator's nearest
male relatives had studied for the priesthood and
not because the trust was a private charitable
trust. According to the legal heirs, that factual
finding is binding on this Court. They point out
that appellant priest's change of theory cannot be
countenanced in this appeal.
In this case, as in cases involving the law of
contracts and statutory construction, where the
intention of the contracting parties or of the
lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the primary
issue is the determination of the testator's
intention which is the law of the case
(dicat testor et erit lex. Santos vs. Manarang, 27
Phil. 209, 215; Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-
28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546).
The will of the testator is the first and principal law
in the matter of testaments. When his intention is
clearly and precisely expressed, any
interpretation must be in accord with the plain and
literal meaning of his words, except when it may
certainly appear that his intention was different
from that literally expressed (In re Estate of
Calderon, 26 Phil. 333).
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"The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in
the construction of wills". It is "the life and soul of
a will". It is "the first greatest rule, the sovereign
guide, the polestar, in giving effect to a will". (See
Dissent of Justice Moreland
in Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 223, 237-
8.)
One canon in the interpretation of the
testamentary provisions is that "the testator's
intention is to be ascertained from the words of
the will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made", but
excluding the testator's oral declarations as to his
intention (Art. 789, Civil Code of the Philippines).
To ascertain Father Rigor's intention, it may be
useful to make the following restatement of the
provisions of his will:
1. That he bequeathed the ricelands to
anyone of his nearest male relatives
who would pursue an ecclesiastical
career until his ordination as a priest.
2. That the devisee could not
sell the ricelands.
3. That the devisee at the inception of his
studies in sacred theology could
enjoy and administer the ricelands,
and once ordained as a priest, he
could continue enjoying and
administering the same up to the
time of his death but the devisee
would cease to enjoy and administer
the ricelands if he discontinued his
studies for the priesthood.
4. That if the devisee became a priest, he
would be obligated to celebrate every
year twenty masses with prayers for
the repose of the souls of Father
Rigor and his parents.
5. That if the devisee is excommunicated,
he would be divested of the legacy
and the administration of
the ricelands would pass to the
incumbent parish priest
of Victoria and his successors.

6. That during the interval of time that
there is no qualified devisee, as
contemplated above, the
administration of the ricelands would
be under the responsibility of the
incumbent parish priest of Victoria
and his successors, and
7. That the parish priest-administrator of
the ricelands would accumulate
annually the products thereof,
obtaining or getting from the annual
produce five percent thereof for his
administration and the fees
corresponding to the twenty masses
with prayers that the parish priest
would celebrate for each year,
depositing the balance of the income
of the devise in the bank in the name
of this bequest.
From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it
may be deduced that the testator intended to
devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative
who would become a priest, who was forbidden
to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if
he discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or
having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated, and who would be obligated to
say annually twenty masses with prayers for the
repose of the souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest
of Victoria would administer the ricelands only in
two situations: one, during the interval of time
that no nearest male relative of the testator was
studying for the priesthood and two, in case the
testator's nephew became a priest and he was
excommunicated.
What is not clear is the duration of
"el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario ac
ondicionado", or how long after the testator's
death would it be determined that he had a
nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical
vocation. It is that patent ambiguity that has
brought about the controversy between the parish
priest of Victoria and the testator's legal heirs.
Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the
time when the nearest male relative who would
study for the priesthood should be
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determined. Did the testator contemplate only
his nearest male relative at the time of his
death? Or did he have in mind any of his nearest
male relatives at anytime after his death?
We hold that the said bequest refers to the
testator's nearest male relative living at the time
of his death and not to any indefinite time
thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit,
the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the
moment the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper" (Art.
1025, Civil Code).
The said testamentary provisions should be
sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe
them as referring to the testator's nearest male
relative at anytime after his death would render
the provisions difficult to apply and create
uncertainty as to the disposition of his
estate. That could not have been his intention.
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest legal
heirs were his three sisters or second-degree
relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and
Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously, when the testator
specified his nearest male relative, he must
have had in mind his nephew or a son of his
sister, who would be his third-degree relative, or
possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not
prognosticate the exact date of his death or state
with certitude what category of nearest male
relative would be living at the time of his death, he
could not specify that his nearest male relative
would be his nephew or grandnephews (the sons
of his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the
term "nearest male relative".
It is contended by the legal heirs that the said
devise was in reality intended for
Ramon Quiambao, the testator's nephew and
godchild, who was the son of his sister,
Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that contention, the
legal heirs presented in the lower court the
affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal
grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed
that after Father Rigor's death, her own
son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the
devise, although he was studying for the
priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary, because
she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had
intended that devise for his nearest male

relative belonging to the Rigor family (pp. 105-
114, Record on Appeal).
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own
grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, was not the
one contemplated in Father Rigor's will and
that Edgardo's father told her that he was not
consulted by the parish priest of Victoria before
the latter filed his second motion for
reconsideration which was based on the ground
that the testator's grandnephew, Edgardo, was
studying for the priesthood at the San Jose
Seminary.
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture
that Edgardo ceased to be a seminarian in
1961. For that reason, the legal
heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that the
probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands to
the parish priest of Victoria had no more leg to
stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief).
Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is
tantamount to evidence aliunde as to the
testator's intention and which is hearsay, has no
probative value. Our opinion that the said
bequest refers to the testator's nephew who was
living at the time of his death, when his
succession was opened and
the successional rights to his estate
became vested, rests on a judicious and
unbiased reading of the terms of the will.
Had the testator intended that the
"cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que
estudie la carrera eclesiastica" would include
indefinitely anyone of his nearest male
relatives born after his death, he could have so
specified in his will. He must have known that
such a broad provision would suspend for an
unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his
bequest.
What then did the testator mean by
"el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario ac
ondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he
was referring to a situation whereby his nephew
living at the time of his death, who would like to
become a priest, was still in grade school or in
high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that
case, the parish priest of Victoriawould
administer the ricelands before the nephew
5
entered the seminary. But the moment the
testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he
would be entitled to enjoy and administer
the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In
that event, the trusteeship would be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will, the inquiry
would be whether at the time Father Rigor died in
1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the
priesthood or who had manifested his desire to
follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is
categorically answered in paragraph 4 of
appellant priest's petitions of February 19,
1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally
alleged therein that "no nearest male relative of
the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied
for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on
Appeal).
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any
nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable
conclusion is that the bequest in question was
ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the
administration of the ricelands by the parish
priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the will, was
likewise inoperative.
The appellant in contending that a public
charitable trust was constituted by the testator in
his favor assumes that he was a trustee or a
substitute devisee. That contention is
untenable. A reading of the testamentary
provisions regarding the disputed bequest does
not support the view that the parish priest
of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in
the event that the testator was not survived by a
nephew who became a priest.
It should be underscored that the parish priest
of Victoria could become a trustee only when the
testator's nephew living at the time of his death,
who desired to become a priest, had not yet
entered the seminary or, having been ordained a
priest, he was excommunicated. Those two
contingencies did not arise, and could not have
arisen, in this case because no nephew of the
testator manifested any intention to enter the
seminary or ever became a priest.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case
is covered by article 888 of the old Civil Code,
now article 956, which provides that if "the

bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it
shall be merged into the estate, except in cases
of substitution and those in which the right of
accretion exists"
(“el legado x x x por qualquier causa,
no tenga efecto, se refundira en la masa de
la herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y d
erecho de acrecer").
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the
old Civil Code, now article 960(2), which provides
that legal succession takes place when the will
"does not dispose of all that belongs to the
testator". There being no substitution nor
accretion as to the said ricelands, the same
should be distributed among the testator's legal
heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no
disposition as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die
partly testate and partly testate, or that there may
be mixed succession. The old rule as to the
indivisibility of the testator's will is no longer
valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take
effect, there will be intestate succession as to the
property covered by the said legacy
(Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).
We find no merit in the appeal. The Appellate
Court's decision is affirmed. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140975, December 08, 2000
OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, PETITIONER,
VS. PASTORA PIEDAD, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
6
On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia
Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special
Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the Matter of
the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of
Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the Regional
Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City.
Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of
the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed
the finality of the order of the trial court awarding
the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad
contending that the proceedings were tainted with
procedural infirmities, including an incomplete
publication of the notice of hearing, lack of
personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and
irregularity in the disbursements of allowances
and withdrawals by the administrator of the
estate. The trial court denied the motion,
prompting petitioner to raise her case to the Court
of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of
the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought
up on appeal only involved pure questions of
law. Finding merit in that argument, the appellate
court dismissed the appeal, citing Section 2(c) of
Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure which would require all appeals
involving nothing else but questions of law to be
raised before the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45
thereof and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the
Court.
In a well-written resolution, the Court of Appeals
belabored the distinctions between questions of
law and questions of fact, thus:
"There is a question of law in a given case when
the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts, and there is a
question of fact when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts. There is question of fact when the query
necessarily invites calibration of the whole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of
witnesses, existence and relevance of specific
surrounding circumstances, and their relation to
each other and to the whole and the probabilities
of the situation."[1]
Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, speaking for the
appellate court, ratiocinated that whether or not
the RTC erred in denying the intervention
considering (1) that the intervenor-appellant had
a prima facie interest over the case, (2) that the

jurisdiction over the person of the proper parties
was not acquired in view of the deficient
publication or notice of hearing, and (3) that the
proceedings had yet to be closed and terminated,
were issues which did not qualify as "questions of
fact" as to place the appeal within the jurisdiction
of the appellate court; thus:
"The issues are evidently pure questions of law
because their resolution are based on facts not in
dispute. Admitted are the facts that intervenor-
appellant is a collateral relative within the fifth
degree of Augusto H. Piedad; that she is the
daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H. Piedad;
that as such, intervenor-appellant seek to inherit
from the estate of Augusto H. Piedad; that the
notice of hearing was published for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation; that there was no order of closure of
proceedings that has been issued by the intestate
court; and that the intestate court has already
issued an order for the transfer of the remaining
estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-
appellee.
"These facts are undisputed.
"In this case, there is no doubt nor difference that
arise as to the truth or falsehood on alleged
facts. The question as to whether intervenor-
appellant as a collateral relative within the fifth
civil degree, has legal interest in the intestate
proceeding which would justify her intervention;
the question as to whether the publication of
notice of hearing made in this case is defective
which would amount to lack of jurisdiction over
the persons of the parties and the question as to
whether the proceedings has already been
terminated when the intestate court issued the
order of transfer of the estate of Augusto H.
Piedad to petitioner-appellee, in spite the
absence of an order of closure of the intestate
court, all call for the application and interpretation
of the proper law. There is doubt as to what law
is applicable on a certain undisputed state of
facts.
"The resolution of the issues raised does not
require the review of the evidence, nor the
credibility of witnesses presented, nor the
existence and relevance of specific surrounding
circumstances. Resolution on the issues may be
had even without going to examination of facts on
record."[2]
7
Still unsatisfied, petitioner contested the
resolution of the appellate court in the instant
petition for review on certiorari.
The Court finds no reversible error in the ruling of
the appellate court. But let us set aside the
alleged procedural decrepitude and take on the
basic substantive issue. Specifically, can
petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil
degree, inherit alongside respondent, a collateral
relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated,
does the rule of proximity in intestate succession
find application among collateral relatives?
Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct
descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the
maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree
relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the
daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a
fifth-degree relative of the decedent.
The various provisions of the Civil Code on
succession embody an almost complete set of
law to govern, either by will or by operation of law,
the transmission of property, rights and
obligations of a person upon his death. Each
article is construed in congruity with, rather than
in isolation of, the system set out by the Code.
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the
relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and
excludes the more distant ones except when and
to the extent that the right of representation can
apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code
provides:
"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative
nearest in degree excludes the more distant
ones, saving the right of representation when
it properly takes place.
"Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in
equal shares, subject to the provisions of article
1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half
blood, and of article 987, paragraph 2, concerning
division between the paternal and maternal lines."
By right of representation, a more distant blood
relative of a decedent is, by operation of law,
"raised to the same place and degree" of
relationship as that of a closer blood relative of
the same decedent. The representative thereby
steps into the shoes of the person he represents
and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the
person to whose estate the person represented
would have succeeded.

"ART. 970. Representation is a right created
by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would
have if he were living or if he could have
inherited."
"ART. 971. The representative is called to the
succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one
whom the person represented would have
succeeded."
In the direct line, right of representation is proper
only in the descending, never in the ascending,
line. In the collateral line, the right of
representation may only take place in favor of the
children of brothers or sisters of the decedent
when such children survive with their uncles or
aunts.
"ART. 972. The right of representation takes
place in the direct descending line, but never
in the ascending.
"In the collateral line, it takes place only in
favor of the children of brothers or sisters,
whether they be of the full or half blood."
"ART. 974. Whenever there is succession by
representation, the division of the estate shall be
made per stirpes, in such manner that the
representative or representatives shall not inherit
more than what the person they represent would
inherit, if he were living or could inherit."
"ART. 975. When children of one or more
brothers or sisters of the deceased survive,
they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their
uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive,
they shall inherit in equal portions."
The right of representation does not apply to
"other collateral relatives within the fifth civil
degree" (to which group both petitioner and
respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of
preference following, firstly, the legitimate
children and descendants, secondly, the
legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the
illegitimate children and
descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse,
and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and
8
nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral
relatives, except only in the case of nephews and
nieces of the decedent concurring with their
uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed
in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an
absolute rule. In determining the degree of
relationship of the collateral relatives to the
decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives
direction.
"Article 966. x x x
"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the
common ancestor and then descent is made to
the person with whom the computation is to be
made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed
from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the
brother of his father, four from his first cousin and
so forth."
Accordingly -
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil
degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes
petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from
succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the
decedent.
The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of
the Civil Code -
"Article 1009. Should there be neither brothers
nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters, the
other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate.
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of
lines or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood."
"Article 1010. The right to inherit ab
intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree
of relationship in the collateral line." -
invoked by petitioner do not at all support her
cause. The law means only that among the other
collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of
succession), no preference or distinction shall
be observed "by reason of relationship by the
whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit
alongside a paternal uncle, and a first cousin of
the full blood can inherit equally with a first cousin
of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a
third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the
decedent, being in the fourth-degree of

relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority
in succession to a fifth-degree relative.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is
DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-40789, February 27, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V.
ROSALES. IRENEA C. ROSALES,
PETITIONER, VS. FORTUNATO ROSALES,
MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES,
MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES AND ANTONIO
ROSALES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu the question
raised is whether the widow whose husband
predeceased his mother can inherit from the
latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on
February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a
resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was
survived by her husband Fortunato T. Rosales
and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes
and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio
Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a
child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow
Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The
estate of the deceased has an estimated gross
value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes
instituted the proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the
trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes
administratrix of the said estate.
9
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial
court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972
declaring the following individuals the legal heirs
of the deceased and prescribing their respective
share of the estate —
Fortunato T. Rosales (husband), ¼;
Magna R. Acebes (daughter), ¼;
Macikequerox Rosales, ¼' and
Antonio Rosales (son), ¼.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court
in its Order dated February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales
insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late
Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming
that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law
together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration
of the aforementioned Orders. The trial court
denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for
Our resolution. First — is a widow (surviving
spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-
law? Second — are the Orders of the trial court
which excluded the widow from getting a share of
the estate in question final as against the said
widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2)
groups, namely, those who inherit by their own
right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation.[1] Restated, an intestate heir can
only inherit either by his own right, as in the order
of intestate succession provided for in the Civil
Code[2], or by the right of representation provided
for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant
provisions of the Civil Code are:
"Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall
always inherit from him in their own right, dividing
the inheritance in equal shares."
"Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and
descendants of other children who are dead,

survive, the former shall inherit in their own right,
and the latter by right of representation."
"Art. 982. The grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should
have died, leaving several heirs, the portion
pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter
in equal portions.”
"Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives
with legitimate children or their descendants and
illegitimate children or their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower
shall be entitled to the same share as that of a
legitimate child."
There is no provision in the Civil Code which
states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire
Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her
to inherit from her mother-in-law either by her own
right or by the right of representation. The
provisions of the Code which relate to the order
of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014)
enumerate with meticulous exactitude the
intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the
final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of
a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an
intestate heir of the deceased all the more
confirms Our observation. If the legislature
intended to make the surviving spouse an
intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have
so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in
accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of
the Civil Code which provides that:
"Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with
respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate
parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and
natural children by legal fiction;
10
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in
article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and
5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2;
neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation
must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of
the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from
them in the manner and to the extent established
by this Code."
The aforesaid provision of law[3] refers to the
estate of the deceased spouse in which case the
surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a
compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate
of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third
person as regards the estate of the parent-in-
law. We had occasion to make this observation
in Lachenal v. Salas[4], to wit:
"We hold that the title to the fishing boat should
be determined in Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the
intestate proceeding) because it affects the
lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the
decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to
his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless
a third person with respect to his estate. xxx."
(Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of
the Civil Code aforecited does not support
petitioner’s claim. A careful examination of the
said Article confirms that the estate contemplated
therein is the estate of the deceased
spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of
the intestate estate proceedings in this case is
that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the
mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the
estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox
Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the
right of representation as provided by Article 981
of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of
representation is explained by Articles 970 and
971 of the Civil Code, viz —
 11

"Art. 970. Representation is a right created by

fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative
is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the G.R. No. L-37365, November 29, 1977
latter would have if he were living or if he could
have inherited.
GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, ET AL.,
"Art. 971. The representative is called to the PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. GERONIMO
succession by the law and not by the person ALMANZA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS,
represented. The representative does not FLORENTINO CARTENA, DEFENDANT-
succeed the person represented but the one APPELLANT.
whom the person represented would have
succeeded." (Emphasis supplied.) DECISION

Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox GUERRERO, J.:

Rosales is called to succession by law because
of his blood relationship. He does not succeed
his father, Carterio Rosales (the person
represented) who predeceased his grandmother,
Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father
would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert This is an appeal certified to this Court by the
the same right of representation as she has no Court of Appeals[1] in accordance with the
filiation by blood with her mother-in-law. provisions of Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, since the only
Petitioner however contends that at the time of issue raised is the correct application of the law
the death of her husband Corterio Rosales he and jurisprudence on the matter which is purely a
had an inchoate or contingent right to the legal question.
properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory
heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband The following findings of fact by the Court of First
was extinguished by his death that is why it is Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City in Civil
their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded Case No. SP-265, and adopted by the Court of
from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He Appeals, show that:
did not succeed from his deceased father,
Carterio Rosales.
"Simeon Bagsic was married to Sise-
On the basis of the foregoing observations and nanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859 (Exh. "D"). Of
conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon this marriage there were born three children
the second question posed by the petitioner. namely: Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit
G), Igmedia Bagsic (Exhibit F), and
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We Ignacio Bagsic (Exhibit
so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an intestate H). Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her
heir of his or her parent-in-law. husband Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885 Simeon Bagsic re-
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the married Silvestra Glorioso (Exhibit "E"). Of this
Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with second marriage were born two
costs against the petitioner. Let this case be children, Felipa Bagsic (Exhibit J) and
remanded to the trial court for further Maura Bagsic(Exhibit I). Simeon Bagsic died
proceedings. sometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C)
SO ORDERED. leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only
heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19,
1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the
plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and
Petra Tolentino.

Perpetua Bagsic died on July 7, 1945 (Exhibit
A). Surviving her are her heirs, the
plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicom
ong, Salome Bicomong, and GervacioBicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage,
Maura Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952 leaving
no heir as her husband died ahead of
her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the
second marriage, died also leaving her husband
Geronimo Almanza and her
daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months
before the present suit was filed or on July 23,
1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her
husband, the defendant
herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and
her father Geronimo Almanza."
(Rollo, pp. 2-3)
The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case
No. SP-265 concerns the one-half undivided
share of Maura Bagsic in the following described
five (5) parcels of land which she inherited from
her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso, to wit:
"A. A parcel of land in Bo. San Ignacio, City
of San Pablo, planted with 38 fruit bearing
coconut trees, with an area of 1,071 sq.
m. Bounded on the N. by German Gariñgan; on
the E. by Juan Aliagas; on the S.
by Bernandino Alina; and on the W. by
Feliciana Glorioso. Covered by Tax No. 12713
for the year 1948 in the name
of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31232,
assessed at P170.00 in the name of defendant
Geronimo Almanza;
B. A parcel of land, also situated in Bo. San
Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with fruit
bearing coconut trees, with an area of 9,455 sq.
m. Bounded on the N. by PaulinoGajuco; on the
E. by Felisa Gaviño and German Gariñgan; on
the S. by Esteban Calayag; and on the W.
by Laureano Ambion. Covered by Tax No.
12714 for the year 1948 in the name of defendant
Geronimo Almanza;
C. A parcel of land situated in same Bo. San
Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with 376 fruit
bearing coconut trees and having an area of
11,739 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by
Jacinto Alvero, Anacleto Glorioso and Bernandin
o Alina; on the E. by Bernandino Alina; on the S.
by Rosendo Banaad,
Jacinto Alvero and Casayan River; and on the W.
by Anacleto Glorioso. Covered by Tax No.
12715 for the year 1948 in the name
of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31234,
12
assessed at P2,720.00 in the name of defendant
Geronimo Almanza;
D. A residential lot, situated
at P. Alcantara Street, Int., City of San Pablo,
with an area of 153 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by
heirs of Pedro Calampiano; on the E.
by Petronilo Cartago; on the S. by Ignacio Yerro;
and on the W. by Melecio Cabrera. Covered by
Tax No. 17653 for the year 1948 in the name
of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 21452,
assessed at P610.00 in the name
of Cristeta Almanza; and
E. A parcel of coconut land, situated at
Bo. Buenavista, Candelaria, Quezon, planted
with 300 coconut trees fruit bearing. Area -
24,990 sq. m. Bounded on the N. (Ilaya) by heirs
of Pedro de Gala; on the E. by Julian Garcia; on
the S. (Ibaba) by Julian Garcia; and on the W.
by Taguan River. Covered by Tax No. 21452,
assessed at P910.00."
(Record on Appeal, pp. 4-6)
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on
December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the Bicomongs,
children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos,
children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c)
Francisca Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in
the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San
Pablo City against the defendants
Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Manese for the
recovery of their lawful shares in the properties
left by Maura Bagsic.
After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-
described properties passed on
to Cristeta Almanza who took charge of the
administration of the same. Thereupon, the
plaintiffs approached her and requested for the
partition of their aunt's properties. However, they
were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to
divide the properties yet as the expenses for the
last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet
been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of
the same, the plaintiffs brought out the subject
again sometime in 1959 only. This
time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as
the debts, accordingly, had already been
paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division
of the properties having been effected, thereby
leaving the possession and administration of the
same to the defendants.
After trial, the court rendered judgment,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs who are hereby declared to
be entitled to ten twenty-fourth (10/24) share on
the five parcels of land in dispute. The
defendant Engracio Manese and the heirs of the
deceased Geronimo Almanza, who are
represented in the instant case by the
administrator FlorentinoCartena, are hereby
required to pay the plaintiffs from July 23, 1959
the sum of P625.00 per annum until the ten-
twenty fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of
land are delivered to the plaintiffs, with legal
interest from the time this decision shall have
become final.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
City of San Pablo, September 21, 1962.
(SGD) JOSE G. BAUTISTA
Judge"
Record on Appeal, p. 47
From the aforesaid decision of the trial
court, Florentino Cartena, the substitute
defendant for Geronimo Almanza, appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The other
defendant, EngracioManese, did not appeal and
execution was issued with respect to the parcels
of land in his possession, that is, those described
under Letters D and E in the complaint. Hence,
the subject matter of the case on appeal was
limited to the one-half undivided portion of only
three of the five parcels of land described under
letters A, B and C in the complaint which
defendant Cartena admitted to be only in his
possession.[2]
On appeal, defendant-
appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of
Arts. 995, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code,
applied by the trial court in allowing plaintiffs-
appellees to succeed to the properties left by
Maura Bagsic were not the applicable
provisions. He asserts that in the course of the
trial of the case in the lower court, plaintiffs
requested defendants to admit
that Felipa Bagsic, the sole sister of full blood of
Maura Bagsic, died on May 9, 1955. Since
Maura Bagsic died on April 14,
1952, Felipa succeeded to Maura's estate. In
support thereof, he cites Art. 1004 of the New
Civil Code which provides that "should the only
survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood,
they shall inherit in equal shares," and he
concludes with the rule that the relatives nearest
in degree excludes the more distant ones. (Art.
962, New Civil Code)
13
On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that
the date of death of Felipa Bagsic was not raised
as an issue in the trial court. It was even the
subject of stipulation of the parties as clearly
shown in the transcript of the stenographic notes
that Felipa Bagsic died on May 9, 1945.[3]
The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the
case have been duly established in the trial court
and that the only issue left for determination is a
purely legal question involving the correct
application of the law and jurisprudence on the
matter, hence the appellate court certified this
case to Us.
We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and
1008 of the New Civil Code are applicable to the
admitted facts of the case at bar. These Articles
provide:
"Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers
or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall
inherit from the latter by representation, if they
survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they
alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."
"Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full
blood survive together with brothers and sisters
of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a
share double that of the latter."
"Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the
half blood shall succeed per capita or per stripes,
in accordance with the rules laid down for
brothers and sisters of the full blood."
In the absence of descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Article
1003 of the New Civil Code provides that
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased. It appearing that
Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue,
and her husband and all her ascendants had died
ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving
collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her
sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her
brother and two (2) sisters of half blood, in
accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the
New Civil Code.
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned
nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their
own right. In Abellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-
Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, 1965, 14 SCRA
986, this Court held that "nephews and nieces
alone do not inherit by right of representation (that

is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or
sisters of the deceased."
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes
no qualification as to whether the nephews or
nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and
without preference as to whether their
relationship to the deceased is by whole or half
blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the
deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and
nieces of half blood. The only difference in their
right of succession is provided in Art. 1008,
N.C.C., in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil
Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle
the sole niece of full blood to a share double that
of the nephews and nieces of half blood. Such
distinction between whole and half blood
relationships with the deceased has been
recognized in Dionisia Padura, et al.
vs. Melania Baldovino, et al., No. L-
11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil.
1065 (unreported) and in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-
22402, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 610.
The contention of the appellant that
Maura Bagsic should be succeeded
by Felipa Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the
exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half blood
citing Art. 1004, N.C.C., is unmeritorious and
erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual
assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in
1955, which as indicated here before, is not true
as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she
predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.
We find the judgment of the trial court to be in
consonance with law and jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is
hereby affirmed.
G. R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965
14
VICENTE B. TEOFICO, PETITIONER AND
APPELLANT, VS. ANA DEL VAL CHAN, ETC.,
OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died
on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving
properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will
written in Spanish which she executed at her
residence in No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila.
She affixed her signature at the bottom of the
will and on the left margin of each and every
page thereof in the presence
of PilarBorja, Pilar G. Sanchez, and
Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their
signatures below the attestation clause and on
the left margin of each and every page of the will
in the presence of the testatrix and of each
other. Said will was acknowledged before Notary
Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix her
witnesses.
In said will the testatrix made the following
preliminary statement: that she was possessed
of the full use of her mental faculties; that she
was free from illegal pressure or influence of any
kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from
any influence of fear or threat; that she freely
and spontaneously executed said will and that
she had neither ascendants nor descendants of
any kind such that she could freely dispose of all
her estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in
the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene
A. Teofico, married to the testatrix's niece
named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the
testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in
the Calvo building, while the naked ownership
thereof she left in equal parts to her
grandchildren who are the legitimate children of
said spouses. The testatrix also instituted
Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir
to all the remainder of her properties not
otherwise disposed of in the will.

On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a
petition for the probate of the will before the
Court of First Instance of Manila which was set
for hearing on September 3, 1955 after the
requisite publication and service to all parties
concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted
child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of
the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural
child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the
same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an
opposition to the probate of the will alleging the
following grounds: (1) said will was not executed
as required by law; (2) the testatrix was
physically and mentally incapable to execute the
will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will
was executed under duress, threat or influence
of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the
opposition alleging that the oppositor had no
legal personality to intervene. The probate court,
after due hearing, allowed theoppositor to
intervene as an adopted child of
Francisca Mortera, and on June 17, 1959,
the oppositor amended her opposition by
alleging the additional ground that the will is
inoperative as to the share of Dr.
Rene Teotico because the latter was the
physician who took care of the testatrix during
her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence,
the probate court rendered its decision
on November 10, 1960 admitting the will to
probate but declaring the disposition made in
favor of Dr. Rene Teofico void with the
statement that the portion to be vacated by the
annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by
way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teofico, together with the universal
heir Josefin a Mortera, filed a motion for
reconsideration, of that part of the decision
which declares the portion of the estate to be
vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr.
Rene Teofico as passing to the legal heirs, while
the oppositor filed also a motion for
reconsideration of the portion of the judgment
which decrees the probate of the will. On his
part, Dr. Rene Teofico requested leave to
intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration
15
with regard to that portion of the decision which
nullified the legacy made in his favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted
to having been denied, both petitioner
and Oppositor appealed from the decision, the
former from that portion which nullifies the
legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teofico and declares
the vacated portion as subject of succession in
favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that
portion which admits the will to probate. And in
this instance both petitioner
and oppositor assign several errors which,
stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down
to the following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val
Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?;
(2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to
probate?; and (3) Did the probate court commit
an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will and in determining who
should inherit the portion to be vacated by the
nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr.
Rene Teofico?
These issues will be discussed separately.
1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a
person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest in the
estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it either as executor or as a claimant
of the estate (Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua,
et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an
interested party has been defined as one who
would be benefited by the estate such as an heir
or one who has a claim against the estate like a
creditor (Idem.). On the other hand,
in Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, et al., L-
17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:
"According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of
Court, a petition for letters of administration must
be filed by an 'interested person. 'An interested
party has been defined in this connection as one
who would be benefited by the estate, such as
an heir, or one who has a claim against the
estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of
Julio Magbanua 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well
settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as
well as special proceedings, the Interest'
required in order that a person may be a party
thereto must be material and direct, and not
merely indirect or

contingent. (Trillana vs Crisostomo, G. R. No. L-
3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70
Phil. 311)."
The question now may be asked:
Has Oppositor any interest in any of the
provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would
she acquire any right to the estate in the event
that the will is denied probate?
Under the terms of the will, Oppositor has no
right to intervene because she has no interest in
the estate either as heir, executor, or
administrator, nor does she have any claim to
any property affected by the will, because it
nowhere appears therein any provision
designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of
any portion of the estate. She has also no
interest in the will either as administratrix or
executrix. Neither has she any claim against any
portion of the estate because she is not a co-
owner thereof, and while she previously had an
interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta,
she had already disposed of it long before the
execution of the will.
In the supposition that the will is denied probate,
would the Oppositor acquire any interest in any
portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She
would acquire such right only if she were a legal
heir of the deceased, but she is not under our
Civil Code. It is true that Oppositor claims to be
an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera,
a deceased brother of the deceased, and also
an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a
deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim
cannot give her any comfort for, even if it be
true, the law does not give her any right to
succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of
both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And
this is so because being an illegitimate child she
is prohibited by law from succeeding to the
legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus,
Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An
illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; x x x." And
the philosophy behind this provision is well
expressed in Grey vs. Fabie, 68 Phil., 128, as
follows:
Between the natural child and the legitimate
relatives of the father or mother who
16
acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of
succession. They cannot be called relatives and
they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a
blood tie, but the law docs not recognize it. In
this, article 943 is based upon the reality" of the
facts and upon the presumptive will of the
interested parties; the natural child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by
the natural Child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn sees in the natural child nothing
but the product of sin, a Palpable evidence of a
blemish upon the family. Every relation is
ordinarily broken in life; the law does not more
them recognize this truth, by avoiding further
grounds of resentment.' (7 Manresa, 3d ed., p.
110.)"
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from
the fact that she is an adopted child of
Francisca Mortera because under our law the
relationship established by adoption is limited
solely to the adopter and the adopted does not
extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or
of the adopted child except only as expressly
provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is
created between the adopted and the collaterals
of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the
adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the
relatives of the adopter.
"The relationship established by the adoption,
however, is limited to the adopting parent, and
does not extend to his other relatives, except as
expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted
child cannot be considered as a relative of the
ascendants and collaterals of the adopting
parents, nor of the legitimate children which they
may have after the adoption, except that the law
imposes certain impediments to marriage by
reason of adoption. Neither are the children of
the adopted considered as descendants of the
adopter. The relationship created is exclusively
between the adopter and the adopted, and do
not extend to the relatives of either." (Tolentino,
Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. (652)
"Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter
and adopted, and does not extend to other
members of the family of either; but the adopted
is prohibited to marry the children of the adopter
to avoid scandal." (An Outline of Philippines Civil

law by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and Ricardo
C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa,
Comments and Cases on Civil law, 1955, Vol. 1,
pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the Oppositor has no right to
intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir
in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling
of the court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is
whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to
probate. Oppositor claims that the same should
not have been admitted not only because it was
not properly attested to but also because it was
procured thru pressure and influence and the
testatrix affixed her signature by mistake
believing that it contained her true intent.
The claim that the will was not properly attested
to is contradicted by the evidence of record. In
this respect it is fit that we state briefly the
declarations of the instrumental witnesses.
Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was In
perfect state of health at the time she executed
the will for she carried her conversation with her
intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately
above the attestation clause and on each and
every page thereof at the left-hand margin in the
presence of the three instrumental witnesses
and the notary public; that it was the testatrix
herself who asked her and the other witnesses
to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first
one to sign and later she gave the will to the
witnesses who read and signed it.
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the
testatrix since 1945; that it was the testatrix
herself who asked her to be a witness to the will;
that the testatrix was the first one to sign and
she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign
and afterwards she gave it to the notary public;
that on the day of the execution of the will the
testatrix was in the best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was
asked by the testatrix to be one of the witnesses
to the will; that he read and understood the
attestation clause before he signed the
17
document, and that all the witnesses spoke
either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said
that the instrumental witnesses and the testatrix
signed the will at the same time and place and
identified their signatures.
This evidence which has not been successfully
refuted proves conclusively that the will was,
duly executed because it was signed by the
testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the
notary public in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper
pressure and influence is also belied by the
evidence. On this Point the court a quo made
the following observation:
"The circumstance that the testatrix was then
living under the same roof with Dr.
Rene Teofico is no proof adequate in law to
sustain the conclusion that there was improper
pressure and undue influence. Nor is the alleged
fact of isolation of the testatrix from
the oppositor and her witnesses, for their
supposed failure to see personally the testatrix,
attributable to the vehemence of Dr.
Rene Teofico to exclude visitors, took place
years after the execution of the will on May 17,
1951. Although those facts may have some
weight to support the theory of the Oppositor, yet
they must perforce yield to the weightier fact that
nothing could have prevented the testatrix, had
she really wanted to, from subsequently
revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact reflect
and express her own testamentary dispositions.
For, as testified to by the Oppositorand her
witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at
the Escolta, in Quiapo and in Sta. Cruz, Manila,
walking and accompanied by no one. In fact, on
different occasions, each of them was able to
talk with her."
We have examined the evidence on the matter
and we are fully in accord with the foregoing
observation. Moreover, the mere claim that
Josefina Mortera and her husband
Rene Teafico had the opportunity to exert
pressure on the testatrix simply because she
lived in their house several years prior to the
execution of the will and that she was old and
suffering from hypertension in that she was
virtually isolated from her friends for several
years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove

what the instrumental witnesses had testified
that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with
full consciousness of the solemnity of the
occasion executed the will under consideration.
The exercise of improper pressure and undue
influence must be supported by substantial
evidence and must be of a kind that would
overpower and subjugate the mind of the
testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make
her express the will of another rather than her
own (Coso vs. Deza, 42 Phil., 696). The burden
is on the person challenging the will that such
influence was exerted at the time of its
execution, a matter which here was not done, for
the evidence presented not only is sufficient but
was disproved by the testimony of the
instrumental witnesses.
3. The question of whether the probate court
could determine the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of a will has been decided by this
Court in a long line of decisions among which
the following may be cited:
"Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of
the provision of the will cannot be entertained in
Probate proceeding because its only purpose is
merely to determine if the will has been
executed in accordance with the requirements of
the law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58 O.G., p. 220)
"x x x The authentication of a will decides no
other questions than such as touch upon the
capacity of the testator and the compliance with
those requisites or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the
validity or efficiency of the provisions; these may
be impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication. The questions
relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will
has been authenticated. x x x
"From the fact that the legalization of a will does
not validate the provisions therein contained, it
does not follow that such provisions lack of
efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the
law recognizes when they are not impugned by
anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental
doctrine that the will of the testator is the law
governing the interested parties, and must be
punctually complied with in so far as it is not
18
contrary to the law or to public morals."
(Montefiano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil., pp. 676, 679-
680)
"To establish conclusively as against everyone,
and once for all, the facts that a will was
executed with the formalities required by law and
that the testator was in a condition to make a
will, is the only purpose of the proceedings
under the new code for the probate of a
will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such
proceedings determines and can determine
nothing more. In them the court has no power to
pass upon the validity of any provisions made in
the will. It can not decide, for example, that a
certain legacy is void and another one
valid." Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426,
428)
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the
pronouncement by the court a quo declaring
invalid the legacy made Dr. Rene Teofico in the
will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been
made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another
reason why said pronouncement should be set
aside is that the legatee was not given an
opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy
for he was not allowed to intervene in this
proceeding. As a corollary, the other
pronouncements, touching on the disposition of
the estate in favor of some relatives of the
deceased should also be set aside for the same
reason.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion
of the decision which declares that the will in
question has been duly executed and admitted
the same to probate, the rest of the decision is
hereby set aside. This case is ordered
remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1992

MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-
MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO,
REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES AND JUANA C.
BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA
SAYSON, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND,
CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND
DORIBEL SAYSON, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private
respondents and their capacity to inherit from
their alleged parents and grandparents. The
petitioners deny them that right, asserting it for
themselves to the exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children,
namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios
and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952,
and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had
married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972.
His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981.
Their properties were left in the possession of
Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed
Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista,
Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and
accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No.
1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of
Albay. The action was resisted by Delia,
Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged
successional rights to the disputed estate as the
decedents' lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel
filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's
four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil
Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of
Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the
defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit,
19
that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted
children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter
of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were
entitled to inherit. Teodoro's share in his parents'
estate by right of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein
private respondents on the basis of practically the
same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his
decision dated May 26, 1986,[1] that Delia and
Edmundo were the legally adopted children of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the
decree of adoption dated March 9,
1967.[2] Doribel was their legitimate daughter as
evidenced by her birth certificate dated February
27, 1967.[3] Consequently, the three children
were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by
right of representation.
In his decision dated September 30,
1986,[4] Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed Civil
Case. No. 1030, holding that the defendants,
being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel
as established by the aforementioned evidence,
excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of
Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its
own decision dated February 28, 1989,[5] the
respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R.
No. 11541), the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-
G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision
is MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson
are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of
the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela
Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for
review by certiorari. Reversal of the respondent
court is sought on the ground that it disregarded
the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the
pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared
the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.

The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and
Edmundo were not legally adopted because
Doribel had already been born on February 27,
1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on
March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified
her parents from adopting. The pertinent
provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming
among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who
have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or natural children by legal
fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that
Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one
Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for
guardianship of the child that she was her natural
mother.[6]
The inconsistency of this position is immediately
apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the
adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground
that Teodoro and Isabel already, had a legitimate
daughter at the time but in the same breath try to
demolish this argument by denying that Doribel
was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of
timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the
decree of adoption, years after it became final
and executory. That was way back in
1967.[7]Assuming that the petitioners were proper
parties, what they should have done was
seasonably appeal the decree of adoption,
pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified
Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and
Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have
done this earlier, before the decree of adoption
was issued. They did not, although Mauricio
claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on, February 27, 1967, or
about TEN (10) days before the issuance of the
Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have
notified the court about the fact of birth of
DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or
perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for
the revocation or rescission of the adoption
(although the birth of a child is not one of those
provided by law for the revocation or rescission of
20
an adoption). The court is of the considered
opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA
and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding
and binding to the present, the same not having
been revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot
be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on
the finding inter alia that the adopting parents
were not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the
petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of
the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in
their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding
frontally addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite
jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or
not, cannot be questioned in a collateral
proceeding, for a presumption arises in such
cases where the validity of the judgment is thus
attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts
were proven (Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec.
350, pp. 719-720). (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso,[8] this Court
declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2
American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption,
Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the
necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the
party attacking it; it cannot be considered void
merely because the fact needed to show statutory
compliance is obscure. While a judicial
determination of some particular fact, such as the
abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption,
may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to
enter the order of adoption, this does not make it
essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree
that the fact be determined upon proper
evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the
truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction,
and the determination must stand until reversed
on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally
attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of
adopted children would always be uncertain,

since the evidence might not be the same at all
investigations, and might be regarded with
different effect by different tribunals, and the
adoption might be held by one court to have been
valid, while another court would hold it to have
been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold
that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by
the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's
birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence.
It is one of the prescribed means of recognition
under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172
of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners
stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima
facie evidence[9] of filiation and may be refuted by
contrary evidence. However, such evidence is
lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when
Doribel was born to Edita Abila was
understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an
interested party. The affidavit of Abila[10]denying
her earlier statement in the petition for the
guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let
alone the fact that it was never offered in
evidence in the lower courts. Even without it,
however, the birth certificate must be upheld in
line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals,[11] where we
ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public
documents must be sustained in the absence of
strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity
or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge
must fail is the impropriety of the present
proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy
cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition
and accounting but in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code x
x x does not have this purely evidential character.
It serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually
fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,
and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties, and within the
period limited by law.
21
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested
by way of defense or as a collateral issue in
another action for a different purpose. x x
x.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we
hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and
Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the
exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the
deceased couple, conformably to the following
Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their
descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age,
and even if they should come from different
marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the
adopting parents in the same manner as a
legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a
person's love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents
and thereafter spreads among his collateral
relatives. It is also supposed that one of his
purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them
eventually to his children as a token of his love for
them and as a provision for their continued care
even after he is gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we
stress first the following pertinent provisions of
the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by
fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative
is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the
latter would have if he were living or if he could
have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the
succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one
whom the person represented would have
succeeded.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and
descendants of other children who are dead,
survive, the former shall inherit in their own right,
and the latter by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter
of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to
represent her deceased father in the distribution
of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under
Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the
share her father would have directly inherited had
he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of
her grandparents’ other children.[13]
But a different conclusion must be reached in the
case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom in the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true
that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same rights as the
latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the
adoption is between only the adopting parents
and the adopted child and does not extend to the
blood relatives of either party.[14]
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia
and Edmundo as the adopted children and
Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive
heirs and are under no obligation to share the
estate of their parents with the petitioners. The
Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding
that only Doribel has the right of representation in
the inheritance of her grandparents’ intestate
estate, the other private respondents being only
the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioners.
G.R. No. 109963, October 13, 1999
22
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES: RICARDO
TEVES, ARCADIA TEVES, TOM AS ZAMORA,
FELICIA TEVES, HELEN TEVES, ALFREDO
OSMEÑA, ROBERTO TEVES, JOAQUIN
TEVES, III, PETER TEVES, MILDRED TEVES,
WILSON MABILOG, LEONILO PATIGAYON,
EDUARDO PATIGAYON, ALEXANDER
PATIGAYON, ALDRIN PATIGAYON, NOEL
PATIGAYON, VICTOR PATIGAYON, MA.
TEVES PATERNO OCHOTORENA, EXEQUILA
TEVES, EMILIO JO, EMILIANA TEVES,
MILAGROS TEVES, EDSEL PINILI, VICENTE
TEVES, EMILIANA ISO, ALBERTO TEVES,
ERLINDA TEVES, DIOSDADO TEVES,
VICTORIA TEVES AND VIVENCIO NARCISO,
PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
HEIRS OF ASUNCION IT-IT NAMELY: ELISA
IT-IT, SUSANA IT-IT, NORBERTO IT-IT, ISA-
AC IT-IT, JR., JAIME IT-IT, FELICITAS IT-IT,
TERESITA IT-IT, ANTONIO NODADO,
CORAZON IT-IT, JIMMY LERO, DANILO IT-IT,
EDITA GAMORA, PACITA VAILOCES, CRIS
VAILOCES, CECILIA CIMAFRANCA AND
CECILIA FLOR CIMAFRANCA,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for review
on certiorari assailing the decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals which was promulgated on August 18,
1992 affirming the July 11, 1991 decision[2] of
Branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Oriental in favor of defendants-appellees.
The facts, as culled from the pleadings of the
parties herein and the decision of the lower
courts, are as follows:
Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves had
nine children, namely Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro,
Andres, Asuncion, Gorgonio, Cresenciano,
Arcadia and Maria. Andres, however,
predeceased both his parents and died without
issue. After Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin
Teves died, intestate and without debts, in 1943
and 1953, respectively, their children executed
extrajudicial settlements purporting to adjudicate
unto themselves the ownership over two parcels
of land belonging to their deceased parents and

to alienate their shares thereto in favor of their
sister Asuncion Teves. The validity of these
settlements executed pursuant to section 1 of
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the primary issue
in the present case.
On May 9, 1984, plaintiffs-appellants Ricardo and
Arcadia Teves filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court of Negros Oriental for the partition and
reconveyance of two parcels of land located in
Dumaguete, designated as Lots 769-A and 6409,
against the heirs of Asuncion Teves. The
complaint was subsequently amended to include
Maria Teves and the heirs of Teotimo, Felicia,
Pedro, and Gorgonio Teves as plaintiffs and the
spouses Lucresio Baylosis and Pacita Nocete,
and Cecilia Cimafranca-Gamos and Cecilia Flor
Cimafranca as defendants.[3] Plaintiffs-appellants
alleged that defendants-appellees, without any
justifiable reason, refused to partition the said
parcels of land and to convey to plaintiffs their
rightful shares.[4]
Lot 769, covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 4682-A,[5] is registered in the names of
Urbana Cimafranca, one-fourth (1/4) share,
Marcelina Cimafranca, the wife of Joaquin Teves,
one-fourth (1/4) share, Domingo Villahermosa,
one-eighth (1/8) share, Antero Villahermosa, one-
eighth (1/8) share, Cecilia Cimafranca, one-
eighth (1/8) share and Julio Cimafranca, one-
eighth (1/8) share. The present controversy
involves only Marcelina Cimafranca’s one-fourth
(1/4) share in the land, designated as Lot 769-A.
On June 13, 1956, Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro,
Asuncion, Gorgonio and Arcadia Teves executed
a document entitled "Settlement of Estate and
Sale,"[6] adjudicating unto themselves, in equal
shares, Lot 769-A and conveying their shares,
interests and participations over the same in favor
of Asuncion Teves for the consideration of
P425.00. A similar deed denominated
"Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale"[7] was signed
by Maria Teves on April 21, 1959. Under such
deed, Maria conveys her own share over Lot 769-
A in favor of Asuncion Teves for the consideration
of P80.00. The two settlements were denounced
by the plaintiffs as spurious. The trial court
summarized the claims of the plaintiffs, viz –
…Maria Teves Ochotorena herself, denied
having executed this Extrajudicial Settlement and
23
Sale over her share or interest in Lot 769 claiming
that her signature in said document is a forgery.
She disowns her signature declaring that as a
married woman she always signs a document in
her husband’s family name. Further, she declared
that on the date she purportedly signed said
document in Dumaguete City before the notary
public, she was in her home in Katipunan,
Zamboanga del Norte.
On Exhibit "G" which is likewise offered as Exhibit
"3" for the defendants, plaintiffs hold that said
document is spurious claiming that the signatures
of Pedro Teves, Felicia Teves and Gorgonio
Teves are all forgeries. To support this allegation,
Helen T. Osmena, daughter of Felicia Teves and
Erlinda Teves, daughter of Gorgonio Teves were
presented as witnesses. Being allegedly familiar
with the style and character of the handwriting of
their parents these witnesses declared
unequivocally that the signatures of their parents
appearing on the document are forgeries.
In sum, plaintiffs argue that these fraudulent
documents which defendants rely in claiming
ownership to the disputed properties are all
nullities and have no force in law and could not
be used as basis for any legal title. Consequently,
in their view, they are entitled to the reliefs
demanded particularly, to their respective shares
of the disputed properties.[8]
The other property in dispute is Lot 6409 which
was originally covered by OCT No. 9091[9] and
was registered in the name of Joaquin Teves and
his two sisters, Matea and Candida Teves.
However, Matea and Candida died without issue,
causing the entire property to pass to Joaquin
Teves. On December 14, 1971, Lot 6409 was
adjudicated and divided in equal shares in a
"Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement &
Sale"[10] executed by Joaquin Teves’ children -
Asuncion, Teotimo, Felisia, Gorgonio, Arcadia
and Maria Teves. In the same deed, the shares
of these same heirs in Lot 6409 were sold to
Asuncion Teves for P100.00. Asuncion Teves
took possession of the land and acquired
title[11] over the same on March 22, 1972. After
her death in 1981, her children, defendants-
appellees It-it herein, extrajudicially settled
Asuncion Teves’ property, adjudicating unto
themselves Lot 6409.[12] On July 20, 1983 a new
transfer certificate of title[13] was issued in the
names of Asuncion Teves’ children, namely Elisa,

Susana, Norberto, Isaac, Jaime, Felicitas,
Teresita, Corazon, and Danilo, all surnamed It-it.
On July 2, 1984, the It-its sold Lot 6409 to
defendants-appellees Lucrecio Baylosis, Sr. and
Pacita Nocete-Baylosis for P20,000.00[14] and a
transfer certificate of title[15]was issued in the
name of the Baylosis couple.
Plaintiffs-appellants claim that the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale covering Lot 6409
is also spurious. Their arguments were discussed
in the trial court’s decision as follows -
Presented as Exhibit "D" and "1" for both the
plaintiffs and defendants respectively, is a
document denominated as "Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale" executed on December 4,
1971 by and among the heirs of Joaquin Teves
and Marcelina Cimafranca. This document which
gave birth to TCT No. 5761 over Lot 6409
registered in the name of Asuncion Teves It-it is
questioned by the plaintiffs as spurious for the
following reasons:
1. Erasure of the word "quitclaim" is
superimposed with the word "sale" in handwriting.
2. The consideration of "One peso" stated in the
document is intercalated with the word "hundred"
in handwriting.
3. The signature of Maria Teves Ochotorena,
Pedro Teves and Felicia Teves are forgeries.
4. The thumbmark imposed on the name of
Gorgonio Teves does not actually belong to
Gorgonio Teves who was an educated man and
skilled in writing according to his daughter.
Aside from these defects which would make said
document null and void, Arcadia Teves who is
one of the living sisters of the mother of the
principal defendants although confirming the
authenticity of her signature averred that in reality
no consideration was ever given to her and that
her impression of the said document was that she
was only giving her consent to sell her share of
the land.
24
Plaintiffs likewise contend that as regards the
share of Ricardo Teves, son of Crescenciano
Teves who predeceased Joaquin and Marcelina,
it was not at all affected in that extrajudicial
settlement and sale since neither Crescenciano
Teves nor his son Ricardo Teves participated in
its execution.
xxx xxx
xxx
Likewise, plaintiffs offered TCT No. 5761 for Lot
6409 registered in the name of Asuncion Teves
It-it as Exhibit "B" as proof that said property was
later titled in trust for all the heirs of Joaquin
Teves and which was used later as basis in
effecting a deed of sale in favor of co-defendant
Lucresio Baylosis. In this light, the plaintiffs argue
that the sale of said property is a nullity for it was
not only attended with bad faith on the part of both
the vendor and the vendee but primarily the
vendor had no right at all to part with said property
which is legally owned by others.[16]
In answer to plaintiffs-appellants’ charges of
fraud, defendants-appellees maintained that the
assailed documents were executed with all the
formalities required by law and are therefore
binding and legally effective as bases for
acquiring ownership or legal title over the lots in
question. Furthermore, it is contended that
plaintiffs-appellants have slept on their rights and
should now be deemed to have abandoned such
rights.[17]
The trial court ruled in favor of defendants-
appellees and rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint with costs against plaintiffs-appellants.
As regards Lot 6409, the court declared that the
Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale executed by the
heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca
was duly executed with all the formalities required
by law, thus, validly conveying Lot 6409 in favor
of Asuncion Teves. Moreover, it stated that, even
granting the truth of the imputed infirmities in the
deed, the right of plaintiffs-appellants to bring an
action for partition and reconveyance was already
barred by prescription. An action for the
annulment of a partition must be brought within
four years from the discovery of the fraud, while
an action for the reconveyance of land based
upon an implied or constructive trust prescribes
after ten years from the registration of the deed or

from the issuance of the title. The complaint in this
case was filed on May 9, 1984, exactly 12 years,
1 month and 17 days after the issuance of the
transfer certificate of title in the name of Asuncion
Teves on March 22, 1972. Thus, ownership over
Lot 6409 rightfully belonged to defendants-
appellees It-it.
Moreover, the trial court held that the extrajudicial
settlements over both Lots 6409 and 769, having
been prepared and acknowledged before a
notary public, are public documents, vested with
public interest, the sanctity of which deserves to
be upheld unless overwhelmed by clear and
convincing evidence. The evidence presented by
the plaintiffs to support their charges of forgery
was considered by the court insufficient to rebut
the legal presumption of validity accorded to such
documents.[18]
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s
decision affirming the validity of the extrajudicial
statements, with a slight modification. It disposed
of the case, thus -
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
modification in that herein defendant-appellees
are hereby ORDERED to partition Lot 769-A and
deliver to plaintiff-appellant Ricardo Teves one-
eight (sic) (1/8) portion thereof corresponding to
the share of his deceased father Cresenciano
Teves. No costs.
The appellate court said that plaintiffs-appellants’
biased and interested testimonial evidence
consisting of mere denials of their signatures in
the disputed instruments is insufficient to prove
the alleged forgery and to overcome the
evidentiary force of the notarial documents. It also
ruled that the plaintiffs-appellants’ claim over Lot
6409 was barred by prescription after the lapse of
ten years from the issuance of title in favor of
Asuncion Teves, while their claim over Lot 769-A
is barred by laches since more than 25 years has
intervened between the sale to Asuncion Teves
and the filing of the present case in 1984.
The appellate court noted that the conveyance of
Lot 769-A in favor of Asuncion Teves did not
affect the share of Cresenciano Teves as he was
not a signatory to the settlements. It also found
25
that Ricardo Teves, Cresenciano’s heir, is in
possession of a portion of Lot 769-A and that
defendants-appellees do no not claim ownership
over such portion. Thus, the defendants-
appellees It-it were ordered to partition and
convey to Ricardo Teves his one-eighth share
over Lot 769-A.
As regards the extrajudicial settlement involving
Lot 6409, although it was found by the appellate
court that Cresenciano Teves was also not a
signatory thereto, it held that it could not order the
reconveyance of the latter’s share in such land in
favor of his heir Ricardo Teves because
Cresenciano had predeceased Joaqin Teves.
Moreover, Ricardo Teves, by a deed simply
denominated as “Agreement” executed on
September 13, 1955 wherein he was represented
by his mother, authorized the heirs of Joaquin
Teves to sell his share in Lot 6409.[19]
Plaintiffs-appellants assailed the appellate court’s
decision upon the following grounds -
I. IN CONSIDERING RICARDO TEVES AS
BOUND BY THE SIGNATURE OF HIS
MOTHER, INSPITE OF DEATH OF
CRESENCIANO TEVES IN 1944; AND UNDER
THE OLD CIVIL CODE THE SPOUSE CANNOT
INHERIT EXCEPT THE USUFRUCT;
II. IN UPHOLDING SWEEPINGLY THE
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF
NOTARIZED DEED, DESPITE CLEAR,
CONVINCING, SUBSTANTIAL AND
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT MARIA
OCHOTORENA WAS IN MINDANAO; THE
NOTARY PULIC DID NOT KNOW MARIA
OCHOTORENA AND THE SIGNATURES OF
THE OTHER HEIRS IN THE QUESTIONED
DOCUMENT ARE BELIED BY COMPARISON
WITH THE GENUINE SIGNATURE IN EXH. “E”;
III. IN VALIDATING THE ONE PESO
CONSIDERATION, INSPITE OF NO OTHER
VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, THE
SUPERIMPOSED P100 WAS UNILATERALLY
INSERTED, SHOWING FICTITIOUS AND
SIMULATED CONSIDERATION; AND

IV. PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT START FROM
A VOID CONTRACT.[20]
We affirm that the extrajudicial settlements
executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves and
Marcelina Cimafranca are legally valid and
binding.
The extrajudicial settlement of a decedent’s
estate is authorized by section 1 of Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, which provides in pertinent part
that -
If the decedent left no will and no debts and the
heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented
by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration, divide
the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of
the register of deeds, ...
xxx xxx
xxx
Thus, for a partition pursuant to section 1 of Rule
74 to be valid, the following conditions must
concur: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the
decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left,
all had been paid; (3) the heirs are all of age, or if
they are minors, the latter are represented by
their judicial guardian or legal representatives; (4)
the partition was made by means of a public
instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register
of Deeds.[21]
We uphold, finding no cogent reason to reverse,
the trial and appellate courts’ factual finding that
the evidence presented by plaintiffs-appellants is
insufficient to overcome the evidentiary value of
the extrajudicial settlements. The deeds are
public documents and it has been held by this
Court that a public document executed with all the
legal formalities is entitled to a presumption of
truth as to the recitals contained therein.[22] In
order to overthrow a certificate of a notary public
to the effect that the grantor executed a certain
document and acknowledged the fact of its
execution before him, mere preponderance of
evidence will not suffice. Rather, the evidence
must be so clear, strong and convincing as to
26
exclude all reasonable dispute as to the falsity of
the certificate. When the evidence is conflicting,
the certificate will be upheld.[23] The appellate
court’s ruling that the evidence presented by
plaintiffs-appellants does not constitute the clear,
strong, and convincing evidence necessary to
overcome the positive value of the extrajudicial
settlements executed by the parties, all of which
are public documents, being essentially a finding
of fact, is entitled to great respect by the appellate
court and should not be disturbed on appeal.[24]
It is noted that the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement & Sale covering Lot 6409 purports to
divide Joaquin Teves’ estate among only six of
his heirs, namely Asuncion, Teotimo, Felisia,
Gorgonio, Arcadia and Maria Teves.[25] It does
not mention nor bear the signatures of either
Pedro or Cresenciano Teves although they are
both intestate heirs of Joaquin Teves and as
such, are entitled to a proportionate share of the
decedent’s estate. Contrary to the ruling of the
appellate court, the fact that Cresenciano
predeceased Joaquin Teves does not mean that
he or, more accurately, his heirs, lose the right to
share in the partition of the property for this is a
proper case for representation, wherein the
representative is raised to the place and degree
of the person represented and acquires the rights
which the latter would have if he were living.[26]
However, notwithstanding their non-inclusion in
the settlement, the action which Pedro and
Cresenciano might have brought for the
reconveyance of their shares in the property has
already prescribed. An action for reconveyance
based upon an implied trust pursuant to article
1456 of the Civil Code prescribes in ten years
from the registration of the deed or from the
issuance of the title.[27] Asuncion Teves acquired
title over Lot 6409 in 1972, but the present case
was only filed by plaintiffs-appellants in 1984,
which is more than 10 years from the issuance of
title.[28]
The division of Lot 769-A, on the other hand, was
embodied in two deeds. The first extrajudicial
settlement was entered into by Teotimo, Felicia,
Pedro, Gorgonio, Arcadia and Asuncion Teves in
1956[29] , while the second deed was executed in
1959 by Maria Teves.[30] Cresenciano was not a
signatory to either settlement. However, in
contrast to the extrajudicial settlement covering
Lot 6409, the two extrajudicial settlements

involving Lot 769-A do not purport to exclude
Cresenciano from his participation in Lot 769-A or
to cede his share therein in favor of Asuncion.
The settlement clearly adjudicated the property in
equal shares in favor of the eight heirs of
Marcelina Cimafranca. Moreover, the deeds were
intended to convey to Asuncion Teves only the
shares of those heirs who affixed their signatures
in the two documents. The pertinent portions of
the extrajudicial settlement executed in 1956, of
which substantively identical provisions are
included in the 1959 deed, provide -
xxx xxx
xxx
5. That by virtue of the right of succession the
eight heirs above mentioned inherit and
adjudicate unto themselves in equal shares Lot
No. 769-A and our title thereto is evidenced by
the O.C. of Title No. 4682-A of the Land Records
of Negros Oriental.
THAT FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the
sum of FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE
(P425.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency which we
have received from ASUNCION TEVES; WE,
Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Gorgonio and Arcadia,
all surnamed Teves, do hereby sell, transfer and
convey unto Asuncion Teves, married to Isaac
Itit, Filipino, of legal age and resident of and with
postal address in the City of Dumaguete, all our
shares, interests and participations over Lot 769-
A of the subdivision plan, Psd, being a portion of
Lot No. 769 of the Cadastral Survey of
Dumaguete, her heirs, successors and assigns,
together with all the improvements thereon.
xxx xxx
xxx
It has even been admitted by both parties that
Ricardo Teves is in possession of an
undetermined portion of Lot 769-A and
defendants-appellees It-it do not claim ownership
over his share in the land.[31] Thus, contrary to the
appellate court’s ruling, there is no basis for an
action for reconveyance of Ricardo Teves’ share
since, in the first place, there has been no
conveyance. Ricardo Teves is entitled to the
ownership and possession of one-eighth of Lot
769-A.
27
Neither does Ricardo Teves have a right to
demand partition of Lot 769-A because the two
extrajudicial settlements have already effectively
partitioned such property. Every act which is
intended to put an end to indivision among co-
heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
partition, although it should purport to be a sale,
an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction.[32] The extrajudicial settlements
executed in 1956 and 1959 adjudicated Lot 769-
A in equal shares unto the eight heirs of Marcelina
Cimafranca. Such a partition, which was legally
made, confers upon each heir the exclusive
ownership of the property adjudicated to
him.[33] Although Cresenciano, Ricardo’s
predecessor-in-interest, was not a signatory to
the extrajudicial settlements, the partition of Lot
769-A among the heirs was made in accordance
with their intestate shares under the law.[34]
With regards to the requisite of registration of
extrajudicial settlements, it is noted that the
extrajudicial settlements covering Lot 769-A were
never registered. However, in the case of Vda. de
Reyes vs. CA,[35] the Court, interpreting section 1
of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, upheld the
validity of an oral partition of the decedent’s
estate and declared that the non-registration of
an extrajudicial settlement does not affect its
intrinsic validity. It was held in this case that –
[t]he requirement that a partition be put in a public
document and registered has for its purpose the
protection of creditors and at the same time the
protection of the heirs themselves against tardy
claims. The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice to others. It follows then that
the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with
the prescribed formalities does not come into play
when there are no creditors or the rights of
creditors are not affected. Where no such rights
are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an
estate to enter into an agreement for distribution
in a manner and upon a plan different from those
provided by law.
Thus, despite its non-registration, the
extrajudicial settlements involving Lot 769-A are
legally effective and binding among the heirs of
Marcelina Cimafranca since their mother had no
creditors at the time of her death.

Except for the portion of Lot 769-A occupied by
Ricardo Teves, both parcels of land have been
and continue to be in the possession of Asuncion
Teves and her successors-in-interest.[36] Despite
this, no explanation was offered by plaintiffs-
appellants as to why they instituted the present
action questioning the extrajudicial settlements
only in 1984, which is more than 25 years after
the assailed conveyance of Lot 769-A and more
than 10 years after the issuance of a transfer
certificate of title over Lot 6409, both in favor of
Asuncion Teves. Such tardiness indubitably
constitutes laches, which is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.[37] Thus, even assuming that
plaintiffs-appellants had a defensible cause of
action, they are barred from pursuing the same
by reason of their long and inexcusable inaction.
An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a
well-entrenched doctrine that the law does not
relieve a party from the effects of a contract,
entered into with all the required formalities and
with full awareness of what he was doing, simply
because the contract turned out to be a foolish or
unwise investment.[38] Therefore, although
plaintiffs-appellants may regret having alienated
their hereditary shares in favor of their sister
Asuncion, they must now be considered bound by
their own contractual acts.
WHEREFORE, the August 18, 1992 decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. No
pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183053, June 15, 2010
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO-
SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III,
28
PETITIONER, VS. ISABEL COJUANGCO-
SUNTAY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Unlike Pope Alexander VI[1] who, faced with the
impasse between Spain and Portugal, deftly and
literally divided the exploration, or more
appropriately, the riches of the New World by
issuing the Inter Caetera,[2] we are confronted
with the difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of
another family imbroglio over the estate of a
decedent.[3]
This is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 74949,[4] reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-
95.[5]
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr.
Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In
1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay
(Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and
Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was
survived by her husband, Federico, and several
grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio
A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay.
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel
Cojuangco, and they begot three children,
namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita;
and Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay.
Emilio I's marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was
subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had
two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita
Suntay Tañedo (Nenita), by two different women,
Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos,
respectively.
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was
reared ever since he was a mere baby, nine
months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina

and was an acknowledged natural child of Emilio
I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of
Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the
spouses Federico and Cristina.
As previously adverted to, the marriage between
Emilio I and Isabel was annulled.[6] Consequently,
respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio
II, lived with their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon
City, separately from their father and paternal
grandparents.
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I,
Federico filed a petition for visitation rights over
his grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita,
and Emilio II. Although the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court in Quezon City granted the
petition and allowed Federico one hour of
visitation monthly, initially reduced to thirty
minutes, it was altogether stopped because of a
manifestation filed by respondent Isabel,
articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits
of her grandparents.
Significantly, Federico, after the death of his
spouse, Cristina, or on September 27, 1993,
adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III
and Nenita.[7]
On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor, containing the following allegations:
[A]t the time of [the decedent's] death, [she] was
a resident of the Municipality of Hagonoy,
Province of Bulacan; that the [decedent] left an
estate of real and personal properties, with a
probable gross value of P29,000,000.00; that the
names, ages and residences of the surviving
heirs of the [decedent] are: (1) Federico C.
Suntay, 89 years old, surviving spouse and a
resident of x x x; (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, 36
years old, legitimate granddaughter and a
resident of x x x; (3) Margarita Cojuangco-Suntay,
39 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a
resident of x x x; and (4) Emilio Cojuangco-
Suntay, 35 years old, legitimate grandson and a
resident of x x x; and that as far as [respondent]
knew, the decedent left no debts or obligation at
the time of her death.[8]
Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his
grandchild, respondent Isabel, Federico filed his
opposition on December 21, 1995, alleging,
among others, that:
29
[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is
capable of administering her estate and he
should be the one appointed as its administrator;
that as part owner of the mass of conjugal
properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded
legal preference in the administration thereof; that
Isabel and her family had been alienated from
their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years;
that the enumeration of heirs in the petition was
incomplete as it did not mention the other children
of his son[,] namely: Emilio III and Nenita S.
Tañedo; that he is better situated to protect the
integrity of the estate of Cristina as even before
the death of his wife[,] he was already the one
who managed their conjugal properties; that the
probable value of the estate as stated in the
petition was grossly overstated (sic); and that
Isabel's allegation that some of the properties are
in the hands of usurpers is untrue.[9]
Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to
settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a
Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating
his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the
decedent's estate on his behalf, in the event he
would be adjudged as the one with a better right
to the letters of administration.
Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio III's
Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his
interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed
his Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially
echoed the allegations in his grandfather's
opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead,
Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to
administer and manage the estate of the
decedent, Cristina. Additionally, Emilio III averred
his own qualifications that: "[he] is presently
engaged in aquaculture and banking; he was
trained by the decedent to work in his early age
by involving him in the activities of the Emilio
Aguinaldo Foundation which was established in
1979 in memory of her grandmother's father; the
significant work experiences outside the family
group are included in his curriculum vitae; he was
employed by the oppositor [Federico] after his
graduation in college with management degree at
F.C.E. Corporations and Hagonoy Rural Bank; x
x x."[10]
In the course of the proceedings, on November
13, 2000, Federico died.
After the testimonies of both parties' witnesses
were heard and evidence on their respective
allegations were adduced, the trial court rendered

a decision on November 9, 2001, appointing
herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of
decedent Cristina's intestate estate, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-
]Suntay is DENIED and the Opposition[-]in[-
]Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay,
III is hereby appointed administrator of the estate
of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who
shall enter upon the execution of his trust upon
the filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00,
conditioned as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a
true and complete inventory;
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and
discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on the
same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one
(1) year, and at any other time when required by
the court, and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let
Letters of Administration be issued in his favor.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the
CA, which reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration
issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as
administratrix of the intestate estate of the
decedent, Cristina, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
assailed decision dated November 9, 2001 of
Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the letters of administration
issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III,
if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner
Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby appointed
administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be
issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) Pesos.
No pronouncement as to costs.
30
SO ORDERED.[12]
The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having
been denied, he appeals by certiorari to this
Court, raising the following issues:
A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE UNDER
SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF
COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE
CIVIL CODE APPLIES; and
B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE
HEREIN PETITIONER WAS REARED BY THE
DECEDENT AND HER SPOUSE SINCE
INFANCY, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO BAR HIM
FROM BEING APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE.[13]
In ruling against the petition of herein respondent,
the RTC ratiocinated, thus:
Evidence objectively assessed and carefully
evaluated, both testimonial and documentary, the
court opines that it is to the best interest of the
estate of the decedent and all claimants thereto,
that the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay III, be
appointed administrator of the estate in the
above-entitled special proceedings.
Based on the evidence and demeanor of the
parties in court, [respondent's immediate] family
and that of the decedent are apparently
estranged. The root cause of which, is not for this
court to ascertain nor is this the right time and the
proper forum to dwell upon. What matters most at
this time is the welfare of the estate of the
decedent in the light of such unfortunate and
bitter estrangement.
The Court honestly believes that to appoint the
petitioner would go against the wishes of the
decedent who raised [Emilio III] from infancy in
her home in Baguio City as her own child.
Certainly, it would go against the wishes of the
surviving spouse x x x who nominated [Emilio III]
for appointment as administrator.
As between [respondent] and the oppositor
[Federico], the latter is accorded preference as
the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a), Rule 78,
Rules of Court. On the basis of such preference,
he vigorously opposed the appointment of the
petitioner and instead nominated [Emilio III], his
grandchild and adopted child. Such nomination,

absent any valid and justifiable reason, should
not be imperiously set aside and insouciantly
ignored, even after the oppositor [Federico] has
passed away, in order to give effect to the order
of preference mandated by law. Moreover, from
the viewpoint of the estate, the nomination of
[Emilio III] appear[s] intrinsically meritorious. For
the benefit of the estate and its claimants,
creditors, as well as heirs, the administrator
should be one who is prepared, academically and
by experience, for the demands and
responsibilities of the position. While
[respondent], a practicing physician, is not
unqualified, it is clear to the court that when it
comes to management of real estate and the
processing and payment of debts, [Emilio III], a
businessman with an established track record as
a manager has a decided edge and therefore, is
in a position to better handle the preservation of
the estate.[14]
In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio
III's status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and,
thus, barred from representing his deceased
father in the estate of the latter's legitimate
mother, the decedent. On the whole, the CA
pronounced that Emilio III, who was merely
nominated by Federico, and which nomination
hinged upon the latter's appointment as
administrator of the decedent's estate, cannot be
appointed as the administrator of the decedent's
estate for the following reasons:[15]
1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject
to a suspensive condition, i.e., Federico's
appointment as administrator of the
estate, he being the surviving spouse of
Cristina, the decedent. The death of
Federico before his appointment as
administrator of Cristina's estate
rendered his nomination of Emilio III
inoperative;
2. As between the legitimate offspring
(respondent) and illegitimate offspring
(Emilio III) of decedent's son, Emilio I,
respondent is preferred, being the "next
of kin" referred to by Section 6, Rule 78
of the Rules of Court, and entitled to
share in the distribution of Cristina's
estate as an heir;
3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that
Article 992[16] of the Civil Code bars the
31
illegitimate child from inheriting ab
intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother. Thus,
Emilio III, who is barred from inheriting
from his grandmother, cannot be
preferred over respondent in the
administration of the estate of their
grandmother, the decedent; and
4. Contrary to the RTC's finding,
respondent is as much competent as
Emilio III to administer and manage the
subject estate for she possesses none of
the disqualifications specified in Section
1,[17]
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as
between Emilio III and respondent, is better
qualified to act as administrator of the decedent's
estate.
We cannot subscribe to the appellate court's
ruling excluding Emilio III in the administration of
the decedent's undivided estate. Mistakenly, the
CA glosses over several undisputed facts and
circumstances:
1. The underlying philosophy of our law on
intestate succession is to give preference
to the wishes and presumed will of the
decedent, absent a valid and effective
will;
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil
Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar
rule,[18] is quite the opposite scenario in
the facts obtaining herein for the actual
relationship between Federico and
Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on
the other, was akin to the normal
relationship of legitimate relatives;
3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the
decedent, Cristina, and her husband,
Federico, who both acknowledged him
as their grandchild;
4. Federico claimed half of the properties
included in the estate of the decedent,
Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal
partnership of gains during the

subsistence of their marriage;
5. Cristina's properties forming part of her
estate are still commingled with that of
her husband, Federico, because her
share in the conjugal partnership, albeit
terminated upon her death, remains
undetermined and unliquidated; and
6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of
Federico, entitled to share in the
distribution of the latter's estate as a
direct heir, one degree from Federico, not
simply representing his deceased
illegitimate father, Emilio I.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA
erred in excluding Emilio III from the
administration of the decedent's estate. As
Federico's adopted son, Emilio III's interest in the
estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this
Court as the interest therein of respondent,
considering that the CA even declared that "under
the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse,
would have the right of succession over a portion
of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside
from his share in the conjugal partnership."
Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a
strained legal reasoning - Emilio III's nomination
was subject to a suspensive condition and
rendered inoperative by reason of Federico's
death - wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the
order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of
administration granted. - If no executor is named
in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond,
or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of
the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
32
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person,
it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and
willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
However, the order of preference is not absolute
for it depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances of each case.[19] Jurisprudence
has long held that the selection of an
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the
trial court.[20] In the main, the attendant facts and
circumstances of this case necessitate, at the
least, a joint administration by both respondent
and Emilio III of their grandmother's, Cristina's,
estate.
In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals,[21] we
upheld the appointment by the trial court of a co-
administration between the decedent's son and
the decedent's brother, who was likewise a
creditor of the decedent's estate. In the same
vein, we declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa
v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de
Damian[22] that:
[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the
principal consideration is the interest in the estate
of the one to be appointed. The order of
preference does not rule out the appointment of
co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties
or factions be represented in the management of
the estates, a situation which obtains here.
Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to
the succession other putative heirs, including
another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and
Federico, Nenita Tañedo, but who was likewise
adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of
respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all,
considering the conflicting claims of the putative
heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership
of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their
respective estates, we are impelled to move in
only one direction, i.e., joint administration of the
subject estate.
One final note. Counsel for petitioner
meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil
Code, the successional bar between the
legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent,

does not apply in this instance where facts
indubitably demonstrate the contrary - Emilio III,
an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was
actually treated by the decedent and her husband
as their own son, reared from infancy, educated
and trained in their businesses, and eventually
legally adopted by decedent's husband, the
original oppositor to respondent's petition for
letters of administration.
We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of
a conflict and a lacuna in the law concerning the
bone of contention that is Article 992 of the Civil
Code, beginning with the eminent Justice J.B.L.
Reyes:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of
representation was admitted only within the
legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of
that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can
not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father and mother.
The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently
adhered to this principle since it reproduced
Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art.
992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent
articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the
hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass
to his own descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from
representing him in the intestate succession of
the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate
child can now do so. This difference being
indefensible and unwarranted, in the future
revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make
a choice and decide either that the illegitimate
issue enjoys in all cases the right of
representation, in which case Art. 992 must be
suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article
and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution
would be more in accord with an enlightened
attitude vis-à-vis illegitimate children.[23]
Manresa explains the basis for the rules on
intestate succession:
The law [of intestacy] is founded... on the
presumed will of the deceased... Love, it is said,
first descends, then ascends, and, finally,
spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the
descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the
collaterals, always preferring those closer in
degree to those of remoter degrees, on the
assumption that the deceased would have done
so had he manifested his last will... Lastly, in
33
default of anyone called to succession or bound
to the decedent by ties of blood or affection, it is
in accordance with his presumed will that his
property be given to charitable or educational
institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of
humanity.[24]
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case
accurately reflect the basis of intestate
succession, i.e., love first descends, for the
decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between
her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren.
Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact,
legally raised the status of Emilio III from an
illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child.
The peculiar circumstances of this case,
painstakingly pointed out by counsel for
petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in
Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist
animosity and antagonism between legitimate
and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial
restraint impels us to refrain from making a final
declaration of heirship and distributing the
presumptive shares of the parties in the estates
of Cristina and Federico, considering that the
question on who will administer the properties of
the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata[25] on the
same issue remains good law:
[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court
is premature, although the evidence sufficiently
shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased.
The estate had hardly been judicially opened, and
the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage
of distribution of the estate which must come after
the inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not
depart from the foregoing admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is
made. - x x x. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares
to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment
of the obligations above mentioned has been
made or provided for, unless the distributees, or
any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by
 34

the court, conditioned for the payment of said special administratrix of the properties of the
obligations within such time as the court directs. deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a
No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who
Letters of Administration over the estate of together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue only legitimate children of the spouses
to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their
payment by each of a bond to be set by the union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, who died during infancy; 3)
Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M- that SimonaPamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow
95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, of Pascual Santero and the mother of
Bulacan is likewise directed to make a Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the
determination and to declare the heirs of only legitimate son of his
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to parents Pascual Santero and SimonaPamuti Vd
the actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, a. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in
and all other persons with legal interest in the 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Si-
subject estate. It is further directed to settle the mona Santero in 1976' 6) that Pablo Santero, at
estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay the time of his death was survived by his
with dispatch. No costs. mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural
children to wit: four minor children
SO ORDERED. with Anselma Diaz and two minor children
with Felixberta Pacursa.

Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December

G.R. No. 66574, June 17, 1987
1, 1976[1] and December 9,
[2]
1976 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole
legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda.
ANSELMA DIAZ, GUARDIAN OF VICTOR, de Santero.
RODRIGO, ANSELMINA AND MIGUEL, ALL
SURNAMED SANTERO, PETITIONERS, AND
FELIXBERTA PACURSA, GUARDIAN OF Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated
FEDERICO SANTERO, ET AL., VS. cases filed to wit:
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND
FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, RESPONDENTS.
"a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 - is the Petition for for the
DECISION Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of
Pablo Santero;
"b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 - is the Petition for the
PARAS, J.: Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate
of Pascual Santero;
"c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 - is the Petition for
Guardianship over the properties of an
Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero;
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January "e) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 - is the Petition for
23, 1976 with the Court of First Instance Settlement of the Intestate Estate
of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."
Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp.
late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero", praying Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, was allowed to
among other things, that the corresponding intervene in the intestate estates of
letters of Administration be issued in her favor Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of
and that she be appointed as the Court dated August 24, 1977.
 35

Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her I. The Decision erred in ignoring the
minor children, filed her "Opposition and Motion right to intestate succession of
to Exclude Felisa Pamuti-Jardin dated March 13, petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct
1980, from further taking part or intervening in the descending line (Art. 978) and/or
settlement of the intestate estate natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 988)
of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in and prefering a niece, who is a collateral relative
the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and (Art. 1003);
Pablo Santero. II. The Decision erred in denying the
right of representation of the natural
grandchildren Santero to represent their father
Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor Pablo Santero in the succession to the intestate
children, filed thru counsel, her Manifestation estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda.
of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and de Santero (Art. 982);
Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed III. The Decision erred in mistaking
by Anselma Diaz. the intestate estate of the
grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as
the estate of "legitimate child or relative" of
On May 20, 1980,
Pablo Santero, her son and father of the peti-
Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order
tioners grandchildren Santero;
excluding Felisa Jardin "from further taking part
IV. The Decision erred in ruling that
or intervening in the settlement of the intestate
petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is
estate of Simona PamutiVda. de Santero, as well
a niece and therefore a collateral relative
as in the intestate estates
of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero excludes the
of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and
natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who
declared her to be, not an heir of the
are her
deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."[3]
direct descendants and/or grand children;
V. The Decision erred in applying Art.
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990 are the
by the trial court in its order dated November 1, applicable provisions of law on intestate
1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the succession; and
Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. VI. The Decision erred in considering
69814-R. A decision[4] was rendered by the the orders of December 1 and December 9,
Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1976 which are provisional and interlocutory as
1983 (reversing the decision of the trial court) final and executory.
the dispositive portion of which reads - The real issue in this case may be briefly stated
as follows- who are the legal heirs
of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero- her
"WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren
not consistent with the facts and law applicable, (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
the same is hereby set aside and another one
entered sustaining the Orders of December 1 and
9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate
of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and
ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the issue here is whether oppositors-
the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate
the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." children of Pablo Santero could inherit
"Costs against the oppositors-appellees." from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of
The Motion for Reconsideration filed representation of their father Pablo Santero who
by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) was is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda.
denied by the same respondent court in its order de Santero.
dated February 17, 1984 hence, the present
petition for Review with the following:
Now then what is the appropriate law on the
matter? Petitioners contend in their pleadings
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the
applicable law on the case. They contend that

said provision of the New Civil Code modifies the
rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes
the right of representation (Art. 970) to
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate
and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied
illegitimate children the right to represent their
deceased parents and inherit from their deceased
grandparents, but that Rule was expressly
changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil
Code which expressly grants the illegitimate
children the right to represent their deceased
father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their
grandmother, (Simona Pamuti)"[5]
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the
hereditary conflict refers solely to the intestate
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is
the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the
applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the
Civil Code which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an
illegitimate child. On the other hand,
the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a
barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely
a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of
blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purposes of Art. 992. Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child
nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence
of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further
grounds of resentment.[6]
36
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their
father Pablo Santero in the succession of the
latter to the intestate estate of his legitimate
mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,
because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992
of the New Civil Code.
In answer to the erroneous contention of
petitioners that Article 941 of the Spanish Civil
Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil
Code, We are reproducing herewith the
Reflections of the illustrious Hon. Justice Jose
B.L. Reyes which also finds full support from
other civilists, to wit:
"In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of
representation was admitted only within the
legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of
that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can
not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father and
mother. The Civil Code of
the Philippines apparently adhered to this
principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the
Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine
inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995
and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion
of the illegitimate child to pass to his own des-
cendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So
that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue
of a legitimate child from representing him in the
intestate succession of the grandparent, the
illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do
so. This difference being indefensible and
unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil
Code we shall have to make a choice and decide
either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases
the right of representation, in which case Art. 992
must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain
said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The
first solution would be more in accord with an
enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate
children. (Reflections on the Reform of
Hereditary succession, JOURNAL of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quater,
1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New
Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother"
includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the
word "relative" includes all the kindred of the
person spoken of.[7] The record shows that from
the commencement of this case the only parties
who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the

late Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six
minor natural or illegitimate children of
Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are
barred by the provisions of Article 992, the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not
commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-
Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the
intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero.
Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Inter-
mediate Appellate Court erred in ruling that the
Orders of the Court a quo dated December 1,
1976 and December 9, 1976 are final
and executory. Such contention is without
merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order
dated December 1, 1976 held that
the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled
to intervene and hence not allowed to intervene
in the proceedings for the declaration of
the heirship in the intestate estate
of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Subse-
quently, Judge Jose Raval issued an Order,
dated December 9, 1976, which
declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said
Orders were never made the subjects of either a
motion for reconsideration or a perfected
appeal. Hence, said orders which long became
final and executory are already removed from the
power of jurisdiction of the lower court to decide
anew. The only power retained by the lower
court, after a judgment has become final
and executory is to order its execution. The
respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling
that the Order of the Court a quo dated May 30,
1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin as intestate
heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero "is clearly a total reversal of an Order
which has become final and executory, hence
null and void."
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby
DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84240, March 25, 1992
37
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL AND HERMES S.
PASCUAL, PETITIONERS, VS. ESPERANZA
C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C.
PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C.
PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C.
PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR.,
INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T.
PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES
PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES,
VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-
FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL,
GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, AND THE
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL
S. PADOLINA OF BR. 162, RTC, PASIG,
METRO MANILA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which
seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the decision
of the Court of Appeals[1] dated April 29, 1988 in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S.
Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C.
Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose
Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C.
Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which
dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the
decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution
dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion
for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed
Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of
the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full
blood brother of the decedent Don Andres
Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October
12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate,
acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious
children and was survived by the following:
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving
spouse;
 38

(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a oppositors, that they are not among the known
brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit: heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista (Rollo, p. 102).
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned
Erlinda C. Pascual heirs entered into a COMPROMISE
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr. AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of
(c) Children of Pedro Pascual, brother of the the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and
half blood of the deceased, to wit: Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of
Avelino Pascual such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
"This Compromise Agreement shall be without
Virginia Pascual-Ner
prejudice to the continuation of the above-entitled
Nona Pascual-Fernando
proceedings until the final determination thereof
Octavio Pascual
by the court, or by another compromise
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio
Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the
Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased,
deceased, Don Andres Pascual." (Rollo, p. 108)
to wit:
The said Compromise Agreement had been
Olivia S. Pascual
entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of
Hermes S. Pascual
the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of
Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the
the half blood of the deceased and represented
intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their
by the following:
uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
Dominga M. Pascual
Mamerta P. Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp.
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of
Dominga P. San Diego Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp.
Nelia P. Marquez 116-130).
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47) On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court,
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina
of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the issued an order, the dispositive portion of which
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of reads:
Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No.
7554, for administration of the intestate estate of
her late husband (Rollo, p. 47). "WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court
resolves as it is hereby resolved to Deny this
motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia
On December 18, 1973, Adela Soldevilla de and Hermes Pascual" (Rollo, p. 136).
Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed
Petition for Letters of Administration, where she their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-
expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes 526), and such motion was denied.
Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres
Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
Petitioners appealed their case to the Court of
Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo,
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de p. 15).
Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that of
her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger
full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres On April 29, 1988, the respondent Court of
Pascual, to belie the statement made by the Appeals rendered its decision the dispositive part
of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Costs against the petitioners.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 38)
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of
said decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of
Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
After all the requirements had been filed, the case
was given due course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar
is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude
recognized natural children from the inheritance
of the deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall
squarely within the purview of Article 992 and of
the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA
645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural
children, their illegitimacy is not due to the
subsistence of a prior marriage when such
children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate"
children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly
construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo,
p. 419).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain
that herein petitioners are within the prohibition of
Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid
down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the Civil Code,
provides:
"An illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child."
39
The issue in the case at bar, had already been
laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court
ruled that:
"Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or
iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate
child and the legitimate children and relatives of
the father or mother of said legitimate child. They
may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992.
Between the legitimate family and illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the
legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child
nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence
of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further
grounds of resentment."
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners
are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar,
respondent IAC did not err in holding that
petitioners herein cannot represent their father
Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to
the intestate estate of the decedent Andres
Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that
Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989 of
the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes)
to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate
of Don Andres Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in
Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the
successional rights of illegitimate children, which
squarely answers the questions raised by the
petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
"Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of
successional rights of illegitimate children, which
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon
 40

their death. The descendants (of these Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of be conceded, the same as a general rule, should
the right of representation may be legitimate or be strictly but reasonably construed: they extend
illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not only so far as their language fairly warrants, and
overlook the fact that the persons to be all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
represented are themselves illegitimate. The general provivions rather than the exception.
three named provisions are very clear on this Thus, where a general rule is established by
matter. The right of representation is not available statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add
to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A. 145
in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It SCRA 654 [1986]).
may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the
illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is
entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both
Article 982, which provides that ‘the natural and spurious.
grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit
by right of representation.' Such a conclusion is
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all
erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by
illegitimate children are generally placed under
an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his
one category, which undoubtedly settles the
father or mother, a situation which would set at
issue as to whether or not aknowledged natural
naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is
children should be treated differently, in the
inapplicable to the instant case because Article
negative.
992 prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between
the illegitimate child and the legitimate children It may be said that the law may be harsh but that
and relatives of the father or mother. It may not is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).
be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule
and Article 992 the exception.
"The rules laid down in Article 982 that PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is
'grandchildren and other descendants shall DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
inherit by right of representation' and in Article decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
902 that the rights of illegitimate children x x x are dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
transmitted upon their death to their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate
are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article SO ORDERED.
992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no
right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother."
(Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice G.R. No. L-22469, October 23, 1978
Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v.
Intermediate Apellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp.
431-432; [1990]). TOMAS CORPUS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the VS. ADMINISTRATOR AND/OR EXECUTOR
petitioner may be more humane but it is also an OF THE ESTATE OF TEODORO R. YANGCO,
elementary rule in statutory construction that RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE
when the words and phrases of the statute are A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L. CORPUS,
clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be ENRIQUE J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG,
determined from the language employed and the SOLEDAD ASPRER AND CIPRIANO
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it NAVARRO, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759
[1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the DECISION
probable intent of the legislature apart from the
words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]).
When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of AQUINO, J.:
interpretation. It must be applied regardless of
who may be affected, even if the law may be
harsh or onerous. (Nepumoceno, et al. v. FC, 110

Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20,
1939 at the age of seventy-seven years. His will
dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court
of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding
No. 54863. The decree of probate was affirmed
in this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs.
Yangco, 73 Phil. 527. The complete text of the will
is quoted in that decision.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his
death, his nearest relatives were (1) his brother,
Luis R. Yangco, (2) his sister, Paz Yangco, the
wife of Miguel Ossorio, (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose
A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children
of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana
(Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother
Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at
Palauig, Zambales.
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael
Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of
Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael
Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with
Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the
aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a
project of partition dated November 26, 1945 was
submitted by the administrator and the legatees
named in the will. That project of partition was
opposed by the estate of Luis R. Yangco whose
counsel contended that an intestacy should be
declared because the will does not contain an
institution of heir. It was also opposed by Atty.
Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita
Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro.
Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty.
Cruz appeared as her counsel.
Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the
proposed partition was not in conformity with the
will because the testator intended that the estate
should be "conserved'’ and not physically
partitioned. Atty. Cruz prayed "que declare que el
finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus
bienes y negocios y que ha lugar a sucesion
intestada con respecto a los mismos, y que
señale un dia en esta causa para la recepcion de
pruebas previa a la declaracion de quienes son
los herederos legales o abintestato del difunto".
The probate court in its order of December 26,
1946 approved the project of partition. It held that
in certain clauses of the will the testator intended
41
to conserve his properties not in the sense of
disposing of them after his death but for the
purpose of preventing that "tales bienes fuesen
malgastados o desfilparrados por los legatarios"
and that if the testator intended a perpetual
prohibition against alienation, that condition
would be regarded "como no puesta o no
existente". It concluded that "no hay motivos
legales o morales para que la sucesion de Don
Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada intestada."
(See Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which
cites article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code as
prohibiting perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs.
Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 546.)
From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de
Castro, Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the
estate of Luis R. Yangco appealed to this Court
(L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed in this
Court's resolutions of October 10 and 31, 1947
after the legatees and the appellants entered into
compromise agreements. In the compromise
dated October 7, 1947 the legatees agreed to pay
P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V.
Corpus, the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heirs
of Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant Tomas
Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the
sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R.
Yangco entered into a similar compromise
agreement. As the resolutions dismissing the
appeals became final and executory on October
14 and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment
were made on those dates.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas
Corpus signed a receipt dated October 24, 1947
wherein he acknowledged that he received from
the Yangco estate the sum of two thousand
pesos (P2,000) "as settlement in full of my share
of the compromise agreement as per
understanding with Judge Roman Cruz, our
attorney in this case" (Exh. D or 17).
On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed
an agreement for the settlement and physical
partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court
approved that agreement and noted that the 1945
project of partition was pro tanto modified. That
did not set at rest the controversy over the
Yangco estate.

On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole
heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an action in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to recover her
supposed share in Yangco's intestate estate. He
alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in
Yangco's will imposing perpetual prohibitions
upon alienation rendered it void under article 785
of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is
invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate
should be distributed according to the rules on
intestacy.
The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956
dismissed the action on the grounds of res
judicata and laches. It held that the intrinsic
validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its
order dated December 26, 1946 in Special
Proceeding No. 54863 approving the project of
partition for the testator's estate.
Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals
which in its resolution dated January 23, 1964 in
CA-G. R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this
Court because it involves real property valued at
more than fifty thousand pesos (Sec. 17[5],
Judiciary Law before it was amended by Republic
Act No. 2613).
Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the
trial court erred in holding (1) that Teodoro R.
Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will had
been duly legalized, and (3) that plaintiff's action
is barred by res judicata and laches.
In the disposition of this appeal, it is not
necessary to resolve whether Yangco's will had
been duly legalized and whether the action of
Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata and
laches. The appeal may be resolved by
determining whether Juanita Corpus, the mother
of appellant Tomas Corpus, was a legal heir of
Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to
recover his mother's supposed intestate share in
Yangco's estate?
To answer that question, it is necessary to
ascertain Yangco's filiation. The trial court found
that Yangco's "a su muerte tambien le sobre
vivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco,
hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre
natural Luis R. Yangco". The basis of the trial
court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was
42
an acknowledged natural child and not a
legitimate child was the statement in the will of his
father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907,
that Teodoro and his three other children were his
acknowledged natural children. His exact words
are:
"Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos
naturales reconocidos, llamados Teodoro Paz,
Luisa y Luis, los cuales son mis unicos herederos
forzosos." (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro
Yangco).
That will was attested by Rafael del Pan,
Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus and Florencio
Gonzales Diez.
Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of
the will of Luis R. Yangco, identified as Exhibit 1
herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit
20, as found in the record on appeal in Special
Proceeding No. 54863. He contends that it should
not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy
found in section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of
Court and over the statement of Samuel W. Stagg
in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that Luis
Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture
with Victoria Obin, implying that he had a first
marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, the
mother of Teodoro.
These contentions have no merit. The
authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as
reproduced in Exhibit 1 herein and as copied from
Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the probate of
Teodoro R. Yangco's will, is incontestable. The
said will is part of a public or official judicial
record.
On the other hand, the children of Ramona
Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to be
legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken
place between Ramona and Tomas. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is disputably
presumed "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage"; "that a child
born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce,
absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate",
and "that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits

of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and [cc], Rule 131, Rules
of Court).
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged
natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita
Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus,
himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant
Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the
recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his
mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in
Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal
heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal
succession between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives. The trial court did not err in dismissing
the complaint of Tomas Corpus.
Article 943 of the old Civil Code provides that "el
hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen derecho a
suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes
legitimos del padre o madre que lo haya
reconocido, ni ellos al hijo natural ni al
legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all successory
reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and
illegitimate relatives" (6 Sanchez Roman, Civil
Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs.
Aguas, 63 Phil. 279, 287. See 16 Scaevola,
Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6).
Appellant Corpus concedes that if Teodoro R.
Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas Corpus)
would have no legal personality to intervene in
the distribution of Yangco's estate (p. 8,
appellant's brief).
The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992
of the Civil Code which provides that "an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child".
That rule is based on the theory that the
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by
the legitimate family while the legitimate family is,
in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law
does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to
avoid further grounds of resentment (7 Manresa,
Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185-6).
43
Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil
Code, "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated
child should die without issue, either legitimate or
acknowledged, the father or mother who
acknowledged such child shall succeed to its
entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are
alive, they shall inherit from it share and share
alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural
and legitimated children shall be succeeded by
their natural brothers and sisters in accordance
with the rules established for legitimate brothers
and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half
brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate,
had no right to succeed to his estate under the
rules of intestacy.
Following the rule in article 992, formerly article
943, it was held that the legitimate relatives of the
mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child
(Cacho vs. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13
SCRA 693. See De Guzman vs. Sevilla, 47 Phil.
991).
Where the testatrix, Rosario Fabie, was the
legitimate daughter of Jose Fabie, the two
acknowledged natural children of her uncle,
Ramon Fabie, her father's brother, were held not
to be her legal heirs (Grey vs. Fabie, 68 Phil.
123).
By reason of that same rule, the natural child
cannot represent his natural father in the
succession to the estate of the legitimate
grandparent (Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil.
585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Allarde
vs. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909). The natural daughter
cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased
uncle, a legitimate brother of her natural mother
(Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's judgment is
affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 51263, February 28, 1983

CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, PETITIONER,
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES,
JAMES BRACEWELL AND RURAL BANK OF
PARAÑAQUE, INC., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 43476-R,
promulgated on February 21, 1979, reversing the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
favor of petitioner:
"(a) Declaring plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo as
the great grandson and heir of deceased
FRANCISCA REYES, entitled to one-half share
in the estate of said deceased, jointly with
defendant Maria Cailles;
"(b) Declaring the properties, subject of this
complaint, to be the properties of the deceased
FRANCISCA REYES and not of defendants
Maria Cailles and James Bracewell;
"(c) Declaring null and void any sale of these
properties by defendant Maria Cailles in so far as
the share of Cresenciano Leonardo are affected;
"(d) Ordering the partition within 30 days from the
finality of this decision, of the properties subject
of this litigation, between defendant Maria Cailles
and plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo, share and
share alike;
"(e) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and
James Bracewell, within 30 days from the finality
of this decision, to render an accounting of the
fruits of the properties, and 30 days thereafter to
pay to plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo his one-half
share thereof with interest of 6% per annum;
"(f) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James
Bracewell to pay jointly and severally plaintiff
Cresenciano Leonardo the amount of P2,000.00
as attorney's fees;
"(g) Ordering defendants to pay the costs; and
44
"(h) Dismissing defendants' counterclaim."[1]
From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes
who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived
by two (2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles,
and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her
daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased
her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while
Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano
Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late
Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership
of properties, sum of money and accounting in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment
(1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the
deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half
share in the estate of said deceased jointly with
defendant, private respondent herein, Maria
Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by said
Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint,
partitioned between him and defendant Maria
Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all the
income derived from said properties from the time
defendants took possession thereof until said
accounting shall have been made, delivering to
him his share therein with legal interest.
Answering the complaint, private respondent
Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over
the subject properties and alleged that petitioner
is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by
right of representation. For his part, the other
defendant, private respondent James Bracewell,
claimed that said properties are now his by virtue
of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria
Cailles had subsequently executed in his favor.
These properties were allegedly mortgaged to
respondent Rural Bank of Parañaque, Inc.
sometime in September 1963.
After hearing on the merits, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which was earlier quoted,
finding the evidence of the private respondent
insufficient to prove ownership of the properties in
suit. From said judgment, private respondents
appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as
already stated, reversed the decision of the trial
court, thereby dismissing petitioner's complaint.
Reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court, this petition for review was filed
on the following assignment of errors:

I Francisca Reyes, he had some proprietary right
"RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION ARE
THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
II
"RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED
HIS FILIATION.
III
"RESPONDENT COURT ERRED HOLDING
THAT PETITIONER, AS THE GREAT
GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA REYES, HAS NO
LEGAL RIGHT TO INHERIT BY
REPRESENTATION."
To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the
subject properties to be the exclusive properties
of the private respondents.
"There being two properties in this case both will
be discussed separately, as each has its own
distinct factual setting. The first was bought in
1908 by Maria Cailles under a deed of sale (Exh.
'60'), which describes it as follows:
'. . . radicada en la calle Desposorio de este dicho
Municipio dentro de los limites y linderos
siquientes: Por la derecha a la entrada el solar de
Teodorico Reyes por la izquierda el solar de
Maria Calesa (Cailles) arriba citada por la
espalda la via ferrea del Railroad Co., y la frente
la dicha calle Desposorio'
"After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid
the realty taxes starting from 1918 up to 1948.
Thereafter as she and her son Narciso Bracewell,
left for Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes managed
the property and paid the realty tax of the land.
However, for unexplained reasons, she paid and
declared the same in her own name. Because of
this, plaintiff decided to run after this property,
erroneously thinking that as the great grandson of
45
over the same.
"The second parcel on the other hand, was
purchased by Maria Cailles in 1917 under a deed
of sale (Exh. '3') which describes the property as
follows:
'. . . una parcela de terreno destinado al beneficio
de la sal, que linda por Norte con la linea Ferrea
y Salinar de Narciso Mayuga, por Este con los de
Narciso Mayuga y Domingo Lozada, por Sur con
los de Domingo Lozada y Fruto Silverio y por
Oeste con el de Fruto Silverio y Linea Ferrea, de
una extension superficial de 1229.00 metros
cuadrados.'
"After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles
likewise paid the realty tax in 1917 and continued
paying the same up to 1948. Thereafter when she
and her son, Narciso Bracewell, established their
residence in Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes
administered the property and like in the first
case, declared in 1949 the property in her own
name. Thinking that the property is the property
of Francisca Reyes, plaintiff filed the instant
complaint, claiming a portion thereof as the same
allegedly represents the share of his father.
"As earlier stated, the court a quo decided the
case in favor of the plaintiff principally because
defendants' evidence do not sufficiently show that
the 2 properties which they bought in 1908 and
1917, are the same as the properties sought by
the plaintiff.
"Carefully going over the evidence, We believe
that the trial judge misinterpreted the evidence as
to the identification of the lands in question.
"To begin with, the deed of sale (Exh. '60’) of
1908 clearly states that the land sold to Maria
Cailles is 'en la calle Desposorio' in Las Piñas,
Rizal which was bounded by adjoining lands
owned by persons living at the time, including the
railroad track of the Manila Railroad Co. ('la via
ferrea del Railroad Co.’).
"With the exception of the area which was not
disclosed in the deed, the description fits the land
now being sought by the plaintiff, as this property

is also located in Desposorio St. and is bounded
by the M.R.R. Co.
"With these natural boundaries, there is indeed
an assurance that the property described in the
deed and in the tax declaration is one and the
same property.
"The change of owners of the adjoining lands is
immaterial since several decades have already
passed between the deed and the declaration
and 'during that period, many changes of abode
would likely have occurred.'
"Besides, it is a fact that defendants have only
one property in Desposorio St. and they have
paid the realty taxes of this property from May 29,
1914 up to May 28, 1948. Hence, there is no
reason to doubt that this property is the same, if
not identical to the property in Desposorio St.
which is now being sought after by the plaintiff.
"With respect to the other parcel which Maria
Cailles bought from Tranquilino Mateo in 1917, it
is true that there is no similar boundaries to be
relied upon. It is however undeniable that after
declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles began
paying the realty taxes thereon on July 24, 1917
until 1948." (Reference to Exhibits omitted.)[2]
Petitioner takes issue with the appellate court on
the above findings of fact, forgetting that since the
present petition is one for review on certiorari,
only questions of law may be raised. It is a well-
established rule laid down by this Court in
numerous cases that findings of facts by the
Court of Appeals are generally, final and
conclusive upon this Court. The exceptions are:
(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same are contrary
to the submission of both appellant and
appellee.[3] None of the above exceptions,
however, exists in the case at bar, hence, there is
no reason to disturb the findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals.
46
Anent the second assignment of error, the Court
of Appeals made the following findings:
"Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that
he is the son of Sotero Leonardo, the son of one
of the daughters (Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes.
He further alleges that since Pascuala
predeceased Francisca Reyes, and that his
father, Sotero, who subsequently died in 1944,
survived Francisca Reyes, plaintiff can
consequently succeed to the estate of Francisca
Reyes by right of representation.
"In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in
evidence his alleged birth certificate showing that
his father is Sotero Leonardo, married to Socorro
Timbol, his alleged mother.
"Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on
the proper evaluation of this vital evidence, We
have minutely scrutinized the same, looking for
that vital link connecting him to the family tree of
the deceased Francisca Reyes. However, this
piece of evidence does not in any way lend
credence to his tale.
"This is because the name of the child described
in the birth certificate is not that of the plaintiff but
a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on
September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and
Socorro Timbol. Other than his bare allegation,
plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence
showing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in
the birth certificate is no other than he himself.
Thus, even without taking time and space to go
into further details, We may safely conclude that
plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is a
fundamental requisite in this action where he is
claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in
question."[4]
That is likewise a factual finding which may not be
disturbed in this petition for review in the absence
of a clear showing that said finding is not
supported by substantial evidence, or that there
was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
court making the finding of fact.
Referring to the third assignment of error, even if
it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero
Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of

representation, claim a share of the estate left by
the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that,
as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was
born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that
when he was born on September 13, 1938, his
alleged putative father and mother were not yet
married, and what is more, his alleged father's
first marriage was still subsisting. At most,
petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has
no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father, like the
deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil
Code of the Philippines.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals sought to be reviewed in this petition is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141634, February 05, 2001
HEIRS OF SPOUSES REMEDIOS R.
SANDEJAS AND ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS
SR. -- ROBERTO R. SANDEJAS, ANTONIO R.
SANDEJAS, CRISTINA SANDEJAS
MORELAND, BENJAMIN R. SANDEJAS,
REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS; AND HEIRS OF
SIXTO S. SANDEJAS II, RAMON R.
SANDEJAS, TERESITA R. SANDEJAS, AND
ELIODORO R. SANDEJAS JR., ALL
REPRESENTED BY ROBERTO R.
SANDEJAS, PETITIONERS, VS. ALEX A.
LINA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
47
A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that
it is subject to probate court approval. The
transaction remains binding on the seller-heir, but
not on the other heirs who have not given their
consent to it. In settling the estate of the
deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of
its recognized powers. Such matters include
selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering
realty belonging to the estate. Rule 89, Section 8
of the Rules of Court, deals with the conveyance
of real property contracted by the decedent while
still alive. In contrast with Sections 2 and 4 of the
same Rule, the said provision does not limit to the
executor or administrator the right to file the
application for authority to sell, mortgage or
otherwise encumber realty under administration.
The standing to pursue such course of action
before the probate court inures to any person who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
or to be entitled to the avails of the suit.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set
aside the Decision[1] dated April 16, 1999 and the
Resolution[2] dated January 12, 2000, both
promulgated by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
CV No. 49491. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision reads as follows:[3]
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, [w]e hereby
MODIFY the [O]rder of the lower court dated
January 13, 1995, approving the Receipt of
Earnest Money With Promise to Buy and Sell
dated June 7, 1982, only to the three-fifth (3/5)
portion of the disputed lots covering the share of
[A]dministrator Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. [in] the
property. The intervenor is hereby directed to pay
appellant the balance of the purchase price of the
three-fifth (3/5) portion of the property within thirty
(30) days from receipt of this [O]rder and x x x the
administrator [is directed] to execute the
necessary and proper deeds of conveyance in
favor of appellee within thirty (30) days
thereafter."
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration
of the foregoing disposition.
The Facts
The facts of the case, as narrated by the Court of
Appeals (CA), are as follows:[4]
"On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr.
filed a petition (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-
15601, pp. 8-10) in the lower court praying that

letters of administration be issued in his favor for
the settlement of the estate of his wife,
REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS, who died on April 17,
1955. On July 1, 1981, Letters of Administration
[were issued by the lower court appointing
Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. as administrator of the
estate of the late Remedios Sandejas (Record,
SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 16). Likewise on the
same date, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. took his oath
as administrator (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-
15601, p. 17). x x x.
"On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila
City Hall was burned and among the records
burned were the records of Branch XI of the Court
of First Instance of Manila. As a result,
[A]dministrator Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a
[M]otion for [R]econstitution of the records of the
case on February 9, 1983 (Record, SP. Proc. No.
R-83-15601, pp. 1-5). On February 16, 1983, the
lower court in its [O]rder granted the said motion
(Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 28-29).
"On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for
motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention
was filed by [M]ovant Alex A. Lina alleging among
others that on June 7, 1982, movant and
[A]dministrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas, in his
capacity as seller, bound and obligated himself,
his heirs, administrators, and assigns, to sell
forever and absolutely and in their entirety the
following parcels of land which formed part of the
estate of the late Remedios R. Sandejas, to wit:
1. `A parcel of land (Lot No. 22 Block No. 45
of the subdivision plan Psd-21121, being
a portion of Block 45 described on plan
Psd-19508, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2029),
situated in the Municipality of Makati,
province of Rizal, containing an area of
TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY (270)
SQUARE METERS, more or less, with
TCT No. 13465;
2. `A parcel of land (Lot No. 21 Block No. 45
of the subdivision plan Psd-21141, being
a portion of Block 45 described on plan
Psd-19508 G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2029),
situated in the Municipality of Makati,
Province of Rizal, containing an area of
TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY (270)
SQUARE METERS, more or less, with
TCT No. 13464;'
48
3. `A parcel of land (Lot No. 5 Block No. 45
of the subdivision plan Psd-21141, being
a portion of Block 45 described on plan
Psd-19508 G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2029),
situated in the Municipality of Makati,
Province of Rizal, containing an area of
TWO HUNDRED EIGHT (208) SQUARE
METERS, more or less, with TCT No.
13468;'
4. `A parcel of land (Lot No. 6, Block No. 45
of the subdivision plan Psd-21141, being
a portion of Block 45 described on plan
Psd-19508 G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2029),
situated in the Municipality of Makati,
Province of Rizal, containing an area of
TWO HUNDRED EIGHT (208) SQUARE
METERS, more or less, with TCT No.
13468;'
"The [R]eceipt of the [E]arnest [M]oney with
[P]romise to [S]ell and to [B]uy is hereunder
quoted, to wit:
`Received today from MR. ALEX A. LINA the sum
of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, per Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Company Chec[k]
No. 319913 dated today for P100,000.00, x x x as
additional earnest money for the following:
xxxxxxxxx
all registered with the Registry of Deeds of the
[P]rovince of Rizal (Makati Branch Office) in the
name of SELLER `ELIODORO SANDEJAS,
Filipino Citizen, of legal age, married to Remedios
Reyes de Sandejas;' and which undersigned, as
SELLER, binds and obligates himself, his heirs,
administrators and assigns, to sell forever and
absolutely in their entirety (all of the four (4)
parcels of land above described, which are
contiguous to each other as to form one big lot) to
said Mr. Alex A. Lina, who has agreed to buy all
of them, also binding on his heirs, administrators
and assigns, for the consideration of ONE
MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, upon such reasonable terms of
payment as may be agreed upon by them. The
parties have, however, agreed on the following
terms and conditions:
 49

`1.

`4. to the P70,000.00 earnest money already

The P100,000.00 herein received is in addition
received by SELLER from BUYER, all of which shall form part of, and shall be deducted
from, the purchase price of P1,000,000.00, once the deed of absolute [sale] shall be
executed;
In the event the deed of absolute sale shall not proc
due to SELLER'S fault, or for causes of which th
himself to personally return to Mr. Alex A. Lina th
THOUSAND ([P]170,000.00) PESOS in earnest
`2. SELLER, plus fourteen (14%) percentum intere
considered as liens of said parcels of land, or at least
As a consideration separate and distinct from the price, undersigned SELLER also
acknowledges receipt from Mr. Alex A. Lina of the sum of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, per Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company Check No. 319912
dated today and payable to SELLER for P1,000.00;

`5.

`3. Whether indicated or not, all of above terms and c

administrators, and assigns of both the SELLE
SANDEJAS, SR.) and BUYER (MR. ALEX A. LIN
pp. 52-54)

"On July 17, 1984, the lower court issued an

Considering that Mrs. Remedios Reyes de[O]rder Sandejas is already
granting deceased and
the intervention as there
of Alex is a
A. Lina
pending intestate proceedings for the settlement
(Record,of SP.her estate
Proc. No.(Spec. Proc. p.
R-83-15601, No. 138393,
167).
Manila CFI, Branch XI), wherein SELLER was appointed as administrator of said Estate,
and as SELLER, in his capacity as administrator
"On of said Estate,
January has informed
7, 1985, BUYER that
the counsel for
he (SELLER) already filed a [M]otion with the Court for authority to sell the above parcels
[A]dministrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas filed a
[M]anifestation alleging among others that the
of land to herein BUYER, but which has been delayed due to the burning of the records of
administrator, Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas, died
said Spec. Pro. No. 138398, which recordssometime
are presently under reconstitution,
in November 1984 in Canadathe andparties
said
shall have at least ninety (90) days from receipt
counsel is still waiting for official word on theinfact
of the Order authorizing SELLER, his
capacity as administrator, to sell all THE ABOVE
of the deathDESCRIBED PARCELS
of the administrator. OFalleged,
He also LAND
TO HEREIN BUYER (but extendible foramong another period
others thatofthe
ninety (90)ofdays
matter the upon
claim the
of
Intervenor Alex A. Lina becomes a money
request of either of the parties upon the other), within which to execute the deed of absolute claim
to be filed in the estate of the late Mr. Eliodoro P.
sale covering all above parcels of land; Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p.
220). On February 15, 1985, the lower court
issued an [O]rder directing, among others, that
the counsel for the four (4) heirs and other heirs
of Teresita R. Sandejas to move for the
appointment of [a] new administrator within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of this [O]rder (Record, SP.
Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 227). In the same
manner, on November 4, 1985, the lower court
again issued an order, the content of which reads:

`On October 2, 1985, all the heirs, Sixto, Roberto,
Antonio, Benjamin all surnamed Sandejas were
ordered to move for the appointment of [a] new
administrator. On October 16, 1985, the same
heirs were given a period of fifteen (15) days from
said date within which to move for the
appointment of the new administrator.
Compliance was set for October 30, 1985, no
appearance for the aforenamed heirs. The
aforenamed heirs are hereby ordered to show
cause within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
Order why this Petition for Settlement of Estate
should not be dismissed for lack of interest and
failure to comply with a lawful order of this Court.
`SO ORDERED.' (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-
15601, p. 273)
"On November 22, 1985, Alex A. Lina as
petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila an Omnibus Pleading for (1) petition for
letters of administration [and] (2) to consolidate
instant case with SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601 RTC-
Branch XI-Manila, docketed therein as SP. Proc.
No. 85-33707 entitled `IN RE: INTESTATE
ESTATE OF ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS, SR.,
ALEX A. LINA PETITIONER", [for letters of
administration] (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707,
pp. 1-7). On November 29, 1985, Branch XXXVI
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued an
[O]rder consolidating SP. Proc. No. 85-33707,
with SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601 (Record, SP.
Proc. No.85-33707, p. 13). Likewise, on
December 13, 1985, the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XI, issued an [O]rder stating that
`this Court has no objection to the consolidation
of Special Proceedings No. 85-331707, now
pending before Branch XXXVI of this Court, with
the present proceedings now pending before this
Branch' (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p.
279).
"On January 15, 1986, Intervenor Alex A. Lina
filed [a] Motion for his appointment as a new
administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios
R. Sandejas on the following reasons:
`5.01. FIRST, as of this date, [i]ntervenor has not
received any motion on the part of the heirs Sixto,
Antonio, Roberto and Benjamin, all surnamed
Sandejas, for the appointment of a new
[a]dministrator in place of their father, Mr.
Eliodoro P. Sandejas, Sr.;
`5.02. SECOND, since Sp. Proc. 85-33707,
wherein the [p]etitioner is herein Intervenor Alex
A. Lina and the instant Sp. PROC. R-83-15601,
in effect are already consolidated, then the
50
appointment of Mr. Alex Lina as [a]dministrator of
the Intestate Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas in
instant Sp. Proc. R-83-15601, would be beneficial
to the heirs and also to the Intervenor;
`5.03. THIRD, of course, Mr. Alex A. Lina would
be willing to give way at anytime to any
[a]dministrator who may be proposed by the heirs
of the deceased Remedios R. Sandejas, so long
as such [a]dministrator is qualified.' (Record, SP.
Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 281-283)
"On May 15, 1986, the lower court issued an
order granting the [M]otion of Alex A. Lina as the
new [a]dministrator of the Intestate Estate of
Remedios R. Sandejas in this proceedings.
(Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 288-290)
"On August 28, 1986, heirs Sixto, Roberto,
Antonio and Benjamin, all surnamed Sandejas,
and heirs [sic] filed a [M]otion for
[R]econsideration and the appointment of another
administrator Mr. Sixto Sandejas, in lieu of
[I]ntervenor Alex A. Lina stating among others
that it [was] only lately that Mr. Sixto Sandejas, a
son and heir, expressed his willingness to act as
a new administrator of the intestate estate of his
mother, Remedios R. Sandejas (Record, SP.
Proc. No. 85-33707, pp. 29-31). On October 2,
1986, Intervenor Alex A. Lina filed his
[M]anifestation and [C]ounter [M]otion alleging
that he ha[d] no objection to the appointment of
Sixto Sandejas as [a]dministrator of the [i]ntestate
[e]state of his mother Remedios R. Sandejas (Sp.
Proc. No. 85-15601), provided that Sixto
Sandejas be also appointed as administrator of
the [i]ntestate [e]state of his father, Eliodoro P.
Sandejas, Sr. (Spec. Proc. No. 85-33707), which
two (2) cases have been consolidated (Record,
SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, pp. 34-36). On March
30, 1987, the lower court granted the said
[M]otion and substituted Alex Lina with Sixto
Sandejas as petitioner in the said [P]etitions
(Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, p.52). After the
payment of the administrator's bond (Record, SP.
Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 348-349) and approval
thereof by the court (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-
15601, p. 361), Administrator Sixto Sandejas on
January 16, 1989 took his oath as administrator
of the estate of the deceased Remedios R.
Sandejas and Eliodoro P. Sandejas (Record, SP.
Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 367) and was likewise
issued Letters of Administration on the same day
(Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 366).
"On November 29, 1993, Intervenor filed [an]
Omnibus Motion (a) to approve the deed of

conditional sale executed between Plaintiff-in-
Intervention Alex A. Lina and Elidioro [sic]
Sandejas, Sr. on June 7, 1982; (b) to compel the
heirs of Remedios Sandejas and Eliodoro
Sandejas, Sr. thru their administrator, to execute
a deed of absolute sale in favor of [I]ntervenor
Alex A. Lina pursuant to said conditional deed of
sale (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 554-
561) to which the administrator filed a [M]otion to
[D]ismiss and/or [O]pposition to said omnibus
motion on December 13, 1993 (Record, SP. Proc.
No. 83-15601, pp. 591-603).
"On January 13, 1995, the lower court rendered
the questioned order granting intervenor's
[M]otion for the [A]pproval of the Receipt of
Earnest Money with promise to buy between
Plaintiff-in-Intervention Alex A. Lina and Eliodoro
Sandejas, Sr. dated June 7, 1982 (Record, SP.
Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 652-654). x x x."
The Order of the intestate court[5] disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, [i]ntervenor's motion for the
approval of the Receipt Of Earnest Money With
Promise To Sell And To Buy dated June 7, 1982,
is granted. The [i]ntervenor is directed to pay the
balance of the purchase price amounting to
P729,000.00 within thirty (30) days from receipt
of this Order and the Administrator is directed to
execute within thirty (30) days thereafter the
necessary and proper deeds of conveyancing."[6]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the
contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and
respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a
perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the
ownership of the four lots was to remain in the
intestate estate of Remedios Sandejas until the
approval of the sale was obtained from the
settlement court. That approval was a positive
suspensive condition, the nonfulfillment of which
was not tantamount to a breach. It was simply an
event that prevented the obligation from maturing
or becoming effective. If the condition did not
happen, the obligation would not arise or come
into existence.
The CA held that Section 1, Rule 89[7] of the
Rules of Court was inapplicable, because the lack
of written notice to the other heirs showed the lack
of consent of those heirs other than Eliodoro
Sandejas Sr. For this reason, bad faith was
imputed to him, for no one is allowed to enjoy a
claim arising from one's own wrongdoing. Thus,
Eliodoro Sr. was bound, as a matter of justice and
51
good faith, to comply with his contractual
commitments as an owner and heir. When he
entered into the agreement with respondent, he
bound his conjugal and successional shares in
the property.
Hence, this Petition.[8]
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the
following issues for our resolution:
"a) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. is
legally obligated to convey title to the property
referred to in the subject document which was
found to be in the nature of a contract to sell -
where the suspensive condition set forth therein
[i.e.] court approval, was not complied with;
"b) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. was
guilty of bad faith despite the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals that the respondent [bore] the
burden of proving that a motion for authority to
sell ha[d] been filed in court;
"c) Whether or not the undivided shares of
Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. in the subject property
is three-fifth (3/5) and the administrator of the
latter should execute deeds of conveyance
therefor within thirty days from receipt of the
balance of the purchase price from the
respondent; and
"d) Whether or not the respondent's petition-in-
intervention was converted to a money claim and
whether the [trial court] acting as a probate court
could approve the sale and compel the petitioners
to execute [a] deed of conveyance even for the
share alone of Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr."[9]
In brief, the Petition poses the main issue of
whether the CA erred in modifying the trial court's
Decision and in obligating petitioners to sell 3/5 of
the disputed properties to respondent, even if the
suspensive condition had not been fulfilled. It also
raises the following collateral issues: (1) the
settlement court's jurisdiction; (2) respondent-
intervenor's standing to file an application for the
approval of the sale of realty in the settlement
case, (3) the decedent's bad faith, and (4) the
computation of the decedent's share in the realty
under administration.
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is partially meritorious.

Main Issue:
Obligation With a Suspensive Condition
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in ordering the
conveyance of the disputed 3/5 of the parcels of
land, despite the nonfulfillment of the suspensive
condition -- court approval of the sale -- as
contained in the "Receipt of Earnest Money with
Promise to Sell and to Buy" (also referred to as
the "Receipt"). Instead, they assert that because
this condition had not been satisfied, their
obligation to deliver the disputed parcels of land
was converted into a money claim.
We disagree. Petitioners admit that the
agreement between the deceased Eliodoro
Sandejas Sr. and respondent was a contract to
sell. Not exactly. In a contract to sell, the payment
of the purchase price is a positive suspensive
condition. The vendor's obligation to convey the
title does not become effective in case of failure
to pay.[10]
On the other hand, the agreement between
Eliodoro Sr. and respondent is subject to a
suspensive condition -- the procurement of a
court approval, not full payment. There was no
reservation of ownership in the agreement. In
accordance with paragraph 1 of the Receipt,
petitioners were supposed to deed the disputed
lots over to respondent. This they could do upon
the court's approval, even before full payment.
Hence, their contract was a conditional sale,
rather than a contract to sell as determined by the
CA.
When a contract is subject to a suspensive
condition, its birth or effectivity can take place
only if and when the condition happens or is
fulfilled.[11] Thus, the intestate court's grant of the
Motion for Approval of the sale filed by
respondent resulted in petitioners' obligation to
execute the Deed of Sale of the disputed lots in
his favor. The condition having been satisfied, the
contract was perfected. Henceforth, the parties
were bound to fulfill what they had expressly
agreed upon.
Court approval is required in any disposition of
the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of
Court. Reference to judicial approval, however,
cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of
heirs to dispose of their own pro indiviso shares
in the co-heirship or co-ownership.[12] In other
words, they can sell their rights, interests or
participation in the property under administration.
52
A stipulation requiring court approval does not
affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as
regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the
property may be taken out of custodia legis, but
only with the court's permission.[13] It would seem
that the suspensive condition in the present
conditional sale was imposed only for this reason.
Thus, we are not persuaded by petitioners'
argument that the obligation was converted into a
mere monetary claim. Paragraph 4 of the
Receipt, which petitioners rely on, refers to a
situation wherein the sale has not materialized. In
such a case, the seller is bound to return to the
buyer the earnest money paid plus interest at
fourteen percent per annum. But the sale was
approved by the intestate court; hence,
the proviso does not apply.
Because petitioners did not consent to the sale of
their ideal shares in the disputed lots, the CA
correctly limited the scope of the Receipt to
the pro-indiviso share of Eliodoro Sr. Thus, it
correctly modified the intestate court's ruling by
excluding their shares from the ambit of the
transaction.
First Collateral Issue:
Jurisdiction of Settlement Court
Petitioners also fault the CA Decision by
arguing, inter alia, (a) jurisdiction over ordinary
civil action seeking not merely to enforce a sale
but to compel performance of a contract falls
upon a civil court, not upon an intestate court; and
(b) that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows the executor
or administrator, and no one else, to file an
application for approval of a sale of the property
under administration.
Citing Gil v. Cancio[14] and Acebedo v.
[15]
Abesamis, petitioners contend that the CA
erred in clothing the settlement court with the
jurisdiction to approve the sale and to compel
petitioners to execute the Deed of Sale. They
allege factual differences between these cases
and the instant case, as follows: in Gil, the sale of
the realty in administration was a clear and an
unequivocal agreement for the support of the
widow and the adopted child of the decedent; and
in Acebedo, a clear sale had been made, and all
the heirs consented to the disposition of their
shares in the realty in administration.
We are not persuaded. We hold that Section 8 of
Rule 89 allows this action to proceed. The factual

differences alleged by petitioners have no
bearing on the intestate court's jurisdiction over
the approval of the subject conditional sale.
Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to
the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and
the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased
persons, including the appointment and the
removal of administrators and executors (Rules
78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and
collateral to the exercise of a probate court's
recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or
otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the
estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are
intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner,
so that the benefits that may flow from such
settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the
heirs and the beneficiaries.[16]
In the present case, the Motion for Approval was
meant to settle the decedent's obligation to
respondent; hence, that obligation clearly falls
under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To
require respondent to file a separate action -- on
whether petitioners should convey the title to
Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty -- will
unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the
intestate estates of the deceased spouses.
The suspensive condition did not reduce the
conditional sale between Eliodoro Sr. and
respondent to one that was "not a definite, clear
and absolute document of sale," as contended by
petitioners. Upon the occurrence of the condition,
the conditional sale became a reciprocally
demandable obligation that is binding upon the
parties.[17] That Acebedo also involved
conditional sale of real property[18] proves that the
existence of the suspensive condition did not
remove that property from the jurisdiction of the
intestate court.
Second Collateral Issue:
Intervenor's Standing
Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only
the executor or administrator is authorized to
apply for the approval of a sale of realty under
administration. Hence, the settlement court
allegedly erred in entertaining and granting
respondent's Motion for Approval.
We read no such limitation. Section 8, Rule 89 of
the Rules of Court, provides:
"SEC. 8. When court may authorize conveyance
of realty which deceased contracted to convey.
Notice. Effect of deed.--Where the deceased was
53
in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to
deed real property, or an interest therein, the
court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on
application for that purpose, authorize the
executor or administrator to convey such property
according to such contract, or with such
modifications as are agreed upon by the parties
and approved by the court; and if the contract is
to convey real property to the executor or
administrator, the clerk of the court shall execute
the deed. x x x."
This provision should be differentiated from
Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, specifically
requiring only the executor or administrator to file
the application for authority to sell, mortgage or
otherwise encumber real estate for the purpose
of paying debts, expenses and legacies (Section
2);[19] or for authority to sell real or personal estate
beneficial to the heirs, devisees or legatees and
other interested persons, although such authority
is not necessary to pay debts, legacies or
expenses of administration (Section
4).[20] Section 8 mentions only an application to
authorize the conveyance of realty under a
contract that the deceased entered into while still
alive. While this Rule does not specify who should
file the application, it stands to reason that the
proper party must be one who is to be benefited
or injured by the judgment, or one who is to be
entitled to the avails of the suit.[21]
Third Collateral Issue:
Bad Faith
Petitioners assert that Eliodoro Sr. was not in bad
a faith, because (a) he informed respondent of the
need to secure court approval prior to the sale of
the lots, and (2) he did not promise that he could
obtain the approval.
We agree. Eliodoro Sr. did not misrepresent
these lots to respondent as his own properties to
which he alone had a title in fee simple. The fact
that he failed to obtain the approval of the
conditional sale did not automatically imply bad
faith on his part. The CA held him in bad faith only
for the purpose of binding him to the conditional
sale. This was unnecessary because his being
bound to it is, as already shown, beyond cavil.
Fourth Collateral Issue:
Computation of Eliodoro's Share
Petitioners aver that the CA's computation of
Eliodoro Sr.'s share in the disputed parcels of
land was erroneous because, as the conjugal
 54

partner of Remedios, he owned one half of these

lots plus a further one tenth of the remaining half, DECISION
in his capacity as a one of her legal heirs. Hence,
Eliodoro's share should be 11/20 of the entire
property. Respondent poses no objection to this VITUG, J.:
computation.[22]

On the other hand, the CA held that, at the very

least, the conditional sale should cover the one
half (1/2) pro indiviso conjugal share of Eliodoro
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died
plus his one tenth (1/10) hereditary share as one
intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an
of the ten legal heirs of the decedent, or a total of
estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was
three fifths (3/5) of the lots in administration.[23]
survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta
Calisterio.
Petitioners' computation is correct. The CA
computed Eliodoro's share as an heir based on
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta
one tenth of the entire disputed property. It should
who had previously been married to James
be based only on the remaining half, after
William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan
deducting the conjugal share.[24]
City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace
on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta
The proper determination of the seller-heir's
were married eleven years later, or on 08 May
shares requires further explanation. Succession
1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a
laws and jurisprudence require that when a
court declaration that James was presumptively
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband
dead.
or the wife, the decedent's entire estate - under
the concept of conjugal properties of gains -- must
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia
be divided equally, with one half going to the
Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of
surviving spouse and the other half to the heirs of
Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court
the deceased.[25] After the settlement of the debts
("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition
and obligations, the remaining half of the estate
entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the
is then distributed to the legal heirs, legatees and
Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos,
devices. We assume, however, that this
Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter
preliminary determination of the decedent's
alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico
estate has already been taken into account by the
Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and
parties, since the only issue raised in this case is
respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being
whether Eliodoro's share is 11/20 or 3/5 of the
allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void.
disputed lots.
She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas,
Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond, of
WHEREFORE, the Petition is
the estate of the deceased and that the
hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The appealed
inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the
Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED with
obligations of the estate would have been settled.
the MODIFICATION that respondent is entitled to
only a pro-indiviso share equivalent to 11/20 of
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition.
the disputed lots.
Marietta stated that her first marriage with James
Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's
SO ORDERED.
absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for
more than eleven years before she contracted
her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending
to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she
G.R. No. 136467, April 06, 2000
sought priority in the administration of the estate
of the decedent.
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an
PETITIONER, VS. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr.,
RESPONDENT. and respondent Marietta administrator and

administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate
of Teodorico.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed
down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia; it
adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
finding for the petitioner and against the oppositor
whereby herein petitioner, Antonia Armas y
Calisterio, is declared as the sole heir of the
estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos."[1]
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of
the trial court to the Court of Appeals, formulating
that-
"1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions
of the Family Code in the instant case despite the
fact that the controversy arose when the New
Civil Code was the law in force.
"2. The trial court erred in holding that the
marriage between oppositor-appellant and the
deceased Teodorico Calisterio is bigamous for
failure of the former to secure a decree of the
presumptive death of her first spouse.
"3. The trial court erred in not holding that the
property situated at No. 32 Batangas Street, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, is the conjugal
property of the oppositor-appellant and the
deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
"4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-
appellant is not a legal heir of deceased
Teodorico Calisterio.
"5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters
of administration should be granted solely in favor
of oppositor-appellant."[2]
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through
Mr. Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.,
promulgated its now assailed decision, thus:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
Decision appealed from is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE, and a new one entered declaring as
follows:
"(a)
Marietta Calisterio's marriage to TeodoricoCivil
55
"(b)
The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street,
belong to the conjugal partnership property wi
partnership to pay the value of the land to Teodori
"(c)
Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsor
husband's estate, and Teodorico's sister, herein peti
to the other half;
"(d)
The trial court is ordered to determine the compe
administrator of Teodorico's estate, and if so fou
appointed as such; otherwise, to determine who
competent and willing to become the administrator
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
prompting her to interpose the present appeal.
Petitioner asseverates:
"It is respectfully submitted that the decision of
the Court of Appeals reversing and setting aside
the decision of the trial court is not in accord with
the law or with the applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court."[4]
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the
validity of the marriage between the deceased
Teodorico and respondent Marietta, that, in turn,
would be determinative of her right as a surviving
spouse.
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico
and respondent Marietta was solemnized on 08
May 1958. The law in force at that time was the
remains
Code,valid;
not the Family Code which took effect
only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family
Code[5] itself limited its retroactive governance
only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.

Verily, the applicable specific provision in the
instant controversy is Article 83 of the New Civil
Code which provides:
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted
by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than
such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
or
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news
of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee,
though he has been absent for less than seven
years, is generally considered as dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present at the
time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or
if the absentee is presumed dead according to
articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted
shall be valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a competent court."
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent
marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior
marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph
(2) of the law gives exceptions from the above
rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in
the three exceptional cases therein provided, to
be held valid, the spouse present (not the
absentee spouse) so contracting the later
marriage must have done so in good faith.[6] Bad
faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of wrong - it
partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a
known duty through some motive of interest or ill
will.[7] The Court does not find these
circumstances to be here extant.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee
spouse is not necessary[8] as long as the
prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally
noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional
cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83,
to be deemed valid "until declared null and void
by a competent court." It follows that the burden
of proof would be, in these cases, on the party
assailing the second marriage.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order
that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following
conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse
of the contracting party must have been absent
56
for four consecutive years, or two years where
there is danger of death under the circumstances
stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time
of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is
already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule,
a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present
can institute a summary proceeding in court to
ask for that declaration. The last condition is
consistent and in consonance with the
requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent
marriages as so provided in Article 41[9], in
relation to Article 40,[10] of the Family Code.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that
respondent Marietta's first husband, James
William Bounds, had been absent or had
disappeared for more than eleven years before
she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with
the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second
marriage, having been contracted during the
regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed
valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of James
Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta,
no evidence having been adduced to indicate
another property regime between the spouses,
pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution
with the death of Teodorico, the property should
rightly be divided in two equal portions -- one
portion going to the surviving spouse and the
other portion to the estate of the deceased
spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a
surviving spouse over the net estate[11] of the
deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers
and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by
right of representation), is one-half of the
inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews
and nieces, being entitled to the other half.
Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed
by right of representation in the presence of
uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand,
nephews and nieces can succeed in their own
right which is to say that brothers or sisters
exclude nephews and nieces except only in
representation by the latter of their parents who
predecease or are incapacitated to succeed. The
appellate court has thus erred in granting, in
paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of its
judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's
children, along with their own mother Antonia who
herself is invoking successional rights over the
estate of her deceased brother.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Coin
of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51574 is
AFFIRMED except insofar only as it decreed in
paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion thereof
that the children of petitioner are likewise entitled,
along with her, to the other half of the inheritance,
in lieu of which, it is hereby DECLARED that said
one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains
solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her own
children. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO
SANTILLON, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT,
VS. PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U.
MIRANDA AND ROSARIO CORRALES,
OPPOSITORS AND APPELLEES.
DECISION
BENGZON, C.J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, specifying the
respective shares of tho principal parties herein in
the intestate estate of Pedro Santallion.
On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without
testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his residence,
leaving one son Claro, and his wife, Perfecta
Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired
several parcels of land located in that province.
About four years after his death, Claro Santillon
filed a petition for letters of administration.
Opposition to said petition was entered by the
widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito
U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following
grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the
petition were all conjugal, except three parcels
which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her
exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by
virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her
57
undivided share in most of the properties
enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito
and Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate
was not necessary, there being a case for
partition pending; and (d) that if administration
was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta
Miranda and not the petitioner was better
qualified for the post. It appears that
subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was
appointed administratrix of the estate.
On March 22, 1961, the court appointed
commissioners to draft within sixty days, a project
of partition and distribution of all the properties of
the deceased Pedro Santillon.
On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare
Share of Heirs" and to resolve the conflicting
claims of the parties with respect to their
respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892
of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after
deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties as the
conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2
must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for
him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand,
claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was
entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code, to
another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words,
Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while
Pexfecta claimed 1/2. .
After due notice and hearing, the court, on June
28, 1961/ issued an order, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
"In view of the foregoing considerations it is
hereby ruled and ordered that in the intestate
succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the
surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit
ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the remaining one-
half (1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro
Santillon. This is after deducting the share ' of the
widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties. * *
*."
From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has
appealed to this Court. Two questions of law are
involved. The first, raised in Perfecta's Motion to
Dismiss Appeal, is whether the order of the lower
court is appealable. And the second, raised in
appellant's lone assignment of error, is: How shall

the estate of a person who dies intestate be
divided when the only survivors are the spouse
and one legitimate child?
THE FIRST ISSUE:—It is clear that the order of
the' lower court is final and therefore appealable
to this Court.
Under Rule 109, sec. 1, a person may appeal in
special proceedings from an order of the Court of
First Instance where such order determines * * *
"the distributive share of the estate to which such
person is entitled."
THE SECOND ISSUE:—Petitioner rests his claim
to 3/4 of his father's estate on Art. 892, of the New
Civil Code which provides that:
"If only the legitimate child or descendant of the
deceased survives, the widow or widower shall
be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate.
* * *."
As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says
Claro Perfecta, on the other hand, cites Art. 996
which provides:
"If a widow or widower and legitimate children or
descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in
the succession the same share as that of each of
the children."
Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the
article is unjust and inequitable to the extent that
it grants the widow the same share as that of the
children in intestate succession, whereas in
testate, she is given 1/4 and the only child 1/2.
Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand,
contends that Art. 996 should control, regardless
of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision
on intestate succession involving a surviving
spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as in
statutory construction, the plural word "children"
includes the singular, "child".
Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the
chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas
Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or
58
Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is
obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to
support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art.
892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving
spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of
children in testate succession. While it may
indicate the intent of the law with respect to the
ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get
when they concur with each other, it does not fix
the amount of shares that such child and spouse
are entitlted to when intestacy occurs. Because if
the latter happens, the pertinent provision on
intestate succession shall apply; i. e. Art. 996.
Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem
to support Claro's contention; at least, his
objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm
the half and half idea of the Pangasinan court.
This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the
New Civil Code's chapter in legal or intestate
succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996.
Our colleague Mr. Justice J-B. L. Reyes,
professor of Civil Law, is quoted as having
expressed the opinion that under this article,
when the widow survives with only one legitimate
child, they share the estate in equal parts[1].
Senator Tolentino in his commentaries writes as
follows:
"One child Surviving.—If there is only one
legitimate child surviving with the spouse, since
they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to
the child and the other half goes to the surviving
spouse. Although the Jaw refers to "children or
descendants," the rule in statutory construction
that the plural can be understood to include the
singular is applicable in his case." (Tolentino, Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)
The theory of those holding otherwise, seems to
be premised on these propositions: (a) Art. 996
speaks of "children," therefore it does not apply
when there is only one "child"; consequently Art.
892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a
process of judicial construction and analogy; (b)
Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because whereas in
testate succession, the widow is assigned one-
fourth only (Art. 892), she would get 1/2 in
intestate.

A. Children:—It is a maxim of statutory
construction that words in plural include the
singular.[2] So Art. 996 could or should be read
(and so applied) : "if the widow or widower and a
legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has
the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we
refuse to apply the article to this case on the
ground that "child" is not included in "children",
the consequences would be tremendous,
because "children" will not include "child" in the
following articles:
Art. 887.—The following are compulsory heirs:
(1") legitimate children and descendants * * *
ART. 888.—The legitime of legitimate children
and descendants consists of one-half of the
hereditary estate * * *.
ART. 896.—Illegitimate children who may survive
* * * are entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary
estate * * *. (See also Art. 901.).
In fact, those who say, "children" in Art. 996 does
not include "child" seem to be inconsistent when
they argue from the premise that "in testate
succession the only legitimate child gets one-
half and the widow, one-fourth." The
inconsistency is clear, because the only
legitimate child gets one-half under Art. 888,
which speaks of "children", not "child". So if
"children" in Art. 888 includes "child", the same
meaning should be given to Art. 996.
B. Unfairness of Art. 996.—Such position, more
clearly stated is this: In testate succession, where
there is only one child of the marriage, the child
gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-
fourth. But in intestate, if Art. 996 is applied now,
the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower
one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist.
On this point, it is not correct to assume that
in testate succession the widow or widower
"gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-
half—if the testator so wishes. So, the law
virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide
(by testament) whether his or her only child shall
get more than his or her survivor.
59
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical
inference from the circumstance that whereas
Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which
Art. 996 was taken, contained twoparagraphs
governing two contingencies, the first, where the
widow or widower survives with legitimate
children (general rule), and the second, where the
widow or widower survives with only one child
(exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the
second situation, thereby indicating the
legislator's desire to promulgate just one general
rule applicable to both situations.
The resultant division may be unfair as some
writers explain,—and this we are not called upon
to discuss—but it is the clear mandate of the
statute, which we are bound to enforce.
The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in
this instance.
G.R. No. L-37903, March 30, 1977
GERTRUDES L. DEL ROSARIO, PETITIONER,
VS. DOROTEA O. CONANAN AND MARILOU
DEL ROSARIO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J.:
Review of the order of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal dated June 21, 1973, dismissing
petitioner's petition for settlement and partition of
estate.
On November 13, 1972, petitioner filed with the
court below the above-said petition, subject of
which is the estate left by her late son, Felix

L. del Rosario, who died in a plane crash
on September 12, 1969 at Antipolo, Rizal (Partial
Joint Stipulation of Facts, p. 2, petition, p. 6, rec.).
On March 17, 1973, respondents filed their
opposition.
On April 26, 1973, the court a quo, pursuant to a
verbal agreement forged between the parties,
issued an order requiring them to come up with a
joint stipulation of facts (p. 9, rec.).
On May 19, 1973, the parties submitted the
following stipulation of facts:
"OPPOSITOR admits that petitioner is the
legitimate mother of the late FELIX
L. DEL ROSARIO.
"PETITIONER admits that oppositor DOROTEA
OTERA DEL ROSARIO is the legitimate surviving
wife of the deceased FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO.
"PETITIONER admits that MARILOU
DEL ROSARIO, is the legally adopted child of the
late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO and DOROTEA
DEL ROSARIO CONANAN.
"THAT THE PARTIES admit that the late FELIX
L. DEL ROSARIO died last September 12, 1969
at Antipolo, Rizal in a plane crash and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.
"That the only surviving nearest
relatives of deceased FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO
are the petitioner and oppositors DOROTEA O.
CONANAN and MARILOU DEL ROSARIO.
"Parties admit to pay their respective counsel in
the amount to be determined by the court.
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court that on the basis of the facts
stipulated, the Court declare the heirs of the
deceased" (pp. 9-10, rec.).
On June 21, 1973, the lower court issued the
challenged order, pertinent portions of which
read:
"A perusal of the petition shows that the instant
case was filed under the provisions of Section 2,
Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
reads as follows:
'Whenever the gross value of the estate of a
deceased person, whether he died testate or
intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos,
and that fact is made to appear to the Court of
First Instance having jurisdiction of the estate by
60
the petition of an interested person and upon
hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1)
month nor more than three (3) months from the
date of the last publication of a notice which shall
be published once a week for three (3) con-
secutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province, and after such other
notice to interested persons as the court may
direct, the court may proceed summarily, without
the appointment of an executor or administrator,
and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance
of the will, if any there is, to determine who are
the persons legally entitled to participate in the
estate, and to apportion and divide it among them
after the payment of such debts of the estate as
the court shall then find to be due; and such
persons, in their own right, if they are of lawful age
and legal capacity, or by their guardians or
trustees legally appointed and qualified, if
otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive
and enter into the possession of the portions of
the estate so awarded to them respectively. The
court shall make such order as may be just
respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all
orders and judgment made or rendered in the
course thereof shall be recorded in the office of
the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it
involves real estate, shall be recorded in the
proper registrar's office.
"While it may be true that a petition for summary
settlement is allowed under
the aforequoted provision of the rules, the same
rule specifically limits the action to estates the
gross value of which does not exceed
P10,000.00. The instant petition, however,
clearly alleges that the value of the real properties
alone left by the deceased Felix del Rosario
amounts to P33,000.00 which is obviously over
and above the value of the estate allowed under
the rules. The action taken by the petitioner
(cannot be) construed as one filed under an
intestate proceeding as the requirements
provided by law for the same has not been
complied with. Based on the foregoing
observation alone, the petition must perforce be
dismissed.
"But granting arguendo that this Court may
consider the petition as an exercise (of) the
powers of a probate Court in determining and
declaring the heirs of the deceased as prayed for
in the aforequoted partial joint stipulation of facts,
the law on intestate succession is clear that an
adopted child concurring with the surviving

spouse of the adopter excludes the legitimate
ascendants from succession. x x x x x.
"The contention of the petitioner that Article 343
is applicable in the instant case finds no basis for
the said article is applicable in cases where there
are no other concurring intestate heirs of the
adopted child. x x x x x.
"Based on the foregoing, therefore, the petitioner
not being included as intestate heir of the
deceased cannot be considered as a co-owner of
or have any right over the properties sought to be
partitioned and under the provisions of Section 1,
Rule 69 in relation to Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court, such action must
be commenced or instituted by the party in
interest.
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings,
the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition without
pronouncement as to costs" (pp. 10-12, rec.).
On July 10, 1973, petitioner filed a notice of
appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond (see
respondents' comments, p. 18, rec.).
I
WE rule that on purely jurisdictional
consideration, the instant petition should be
dismissed.
Indeed, in a litany of precedents dating as far
back as the 1938 case
of Utulo vs. Pasiono Vda. de Garcia (66 Phil.
302) and reaffirmed in Asuncion and Castro vs.
De la Cruz (No. L-7855, November 23, 1955, 97
Phil. 910) and Gutierrez vs. Cruz (G.R. No. L-
21027, July 20, 1968, 24 SCRA 69), WE
uniformly held that for the court to acquire
jurisdiction in a petition for summary settlement of
estate under the rules, the requirement that the
amount of the estate involved should not exceed
P10,000.00 (P6,000.00 under the old rules) is
jurisdictional.
In the instant case, both parties jointly affirmed
that the value of the realty left by the deceased
Felix del Rosario is in the aggregate amount of
P33,000.00 which, as the court a quocorrectly
found, is obviously "over and above the value
allowed under the rules."
II
61
However, by virtue of the transcendental
implications of the holding of the court a quo, in
the sense that once wholly sustained, said
holding would preclude petitioner from re-filing
the proper action - a consequence which, on the
grounds of equity and fair play, WE cannot allow
to befall on petitioner - WE deem it essential, for
the guidance of the parties, especially herein
petitioner, to point out the demerits of the
appealed verdict.
A couple of important issues are posed for our
consideration, to wit:
1. Which of the following articles of the New Civil
Code will apply, Article 343 on the one hand, or
Articles 341, 978 and 979 on the other; and
2. Whether the material data rule enunciated by
Rule 41, Section 6 of the New Rules of Court
should be followed, ex cathedra, in the present
case.
A
The lower court found the following provisions of
the New Civil Code germane to the instant case:
"Art. 341. The adoption shall:
“(1) Give to the adopted person the same rights
and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the
adopter;
“(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents
by nature;
“(3) Make the adopted person a legal heir of the
adopter;
“(4) Entitle the adopted person to use the
adopter's surname."
"Art. 978. Succession pertains, in the first place,
to the descending direct line."
"Art. 979. Legitimate children and their
descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age,
and even if they should come from different
marriages."
WE opine that the governing provision is the
hereinafter quoted Article 343 of the New Civil
Code, in relation to Articles 893 and 1000 of said
law, which directs that:

"Art. 343. If the adopter is survived by legitimate
parents or ascendants and by an adopted person,
the latter shall not have more successional rights
than an acknowledged natural child."
Article 343 of the New Civil Code is qualification
to Article 341 which gives an adopted child the
same rights and duties as though he were a
legitimate child. The reason for this is that:
"(I)t is unjust to exclude the adopter's parents
from the inheritance in favor of an adopted
person" (Report of the Code Commissioner, p.
92).
It is most unfair to accord
more successional rights to the adopted, who is
only related artificially by fiction of law to the
deceased, than those who are naturally related to
him by blood in the direct ascending line.
The applicability of Article 343 does not exclude
the surviving parent of the deceased adopter, not
only because a contrary view would defeat the
intent of the framers of the law, but also because
in intestate succession, where legitimate parents
or ascendants concur with the
surviving spouse of the deceased, the latter does
not necessarily exclude the former from the
inheritance. This is affirmed by Article 893 of the
New Civil Code which states:
"If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants,
but leaves legitimate ascendants, the surviving
spouse shall have a right to one-fourth (only) of
the hereditary estate.
"This fourth shall be taken from the free portion."
Article 343 does not require that the concurring
heirs should be the adopted child and the
legitimate parents or ascendants only. The
language of the law is clear, and a contrary view
cannot be presumed.
It is, thus, OUR view that Article 343 should be
made to apply, consonant with the cardinal rule in
statutory construction that all the provisions of
the New Civil Code must be reconciled and
given effect.
Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving with
legitimate parents of the deceased adopter, has
the same successional rights as an
acknowledged natural child, which is
comprehended in the term "illegitimate
62
children". Consequently, the respective shares
of the surviving spouse, ascendant and adopted
child should be determined by Article 1000 of the
New Civil Code, which reads:
"Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the
surviving spouse and illegitimate children are left,
the ascendants shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance, and the other half shall be divided
between the surviving spouse and the illegitimate
children so that such widow or widower shall have
one-fourth of the estate, the illegitimate children
the other fourth."
B
Anent the other issue, respondents, in their
comment of June 29, 1973, emphasize that the
petitioner's record on appeal violates the material
data rule in that
"It does not state when the notice of appeal and
appeal bond were filed with the lower court in
disregard of the requirement of Section 6, Rule 41
of the Rules of Court that the record on appeal
must contain such data as will show that the
appeal was perfected on time."
Recent jurisprudence has construed liberally the
material data rule, whenever circumstances and
substantial justice warrant.
The cases of Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals,
No. L-36629, September 28, 1973 (53 SCRA
228) and Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals (No. L-
29719, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 216, 220)
are particularly in point.
In Villanueva, WE held:
"The deviation from the rigid rule adopted in
the case of Government of the Philippines vs.
Antonio, et al., G.R. No. L-23736, October 19,
1965, is due to our realization that after all what
is of vital importance in the requirement of
Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is that
the Record on Appeal shall show that the appeal
was really perfected within
the reglementary period. If it could be
ascertained from the record of the case that the
appeal was perfected within
the reglementary period, although such fact did
 63

not evidently appear on the face of the record on

appeal, the defect or deficiency is not fatal.
"If the appellate court is convinced that the appeal
was perfected on time, it should not throw out
but assume jurisdiction over it. After all, that
procedural requirement is only intended to
enable the appellate court to determine if the
appeal is still within its jurisdiction and nothing
more" (Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA
220, underscoring supplied).
From the docket and process slip of this case, it
is shown that the date of notice of the Court of
First Instance decision is July 3, 1973 and that the
expiry date to file petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court is December 14, 1973. Petitioner
filed her notice of appeal, appeal bond and
record on appeal on July 10, 1973 - or still very
much within the reglementary period to perfect
an appeal. And although this is not mentioned in
the record on appeal, it is, nevertheless, a fact of
record, the veracity of which this COURT does
not doubt.

Perforce, there being substantial

compliance with the requirement of the Rules of
Court, WE resolve this issue in favor of petitioner.

The liberal interpretation of the material data rule

aimed at serving the ends of substantial
justice has found amplification in the recent cases
of Pimentel, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-
39423 and L-39684, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA
475; Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, Tomas Carag, et al., L-40495, October
21, 1975, 67 SCRA 322, 328-332; and Manuel R.
Luna vs. Court of Appeals, Capati, et al., L-
37123, October 30, 1975, 67 SCRA 503, 506.

WHEREFORE, THE INSTANT PETITION IS

HEREBY DISMISSED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE
TO PETITIONER'S FILING THE APPROPRIATE
ACTION IN A COMPETENT COURT. NO
COSTS.

SO ORDERED.