POLICE POWER

White Light Corporation vs. City of ManilaG.R. No. 122846. January 20, 2009J. Tinga

Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law and ordinance entitled
AnOrdinance Prohibiting Short-time Admission, Short-time Admission Rates, and Wash-up Schemes
inHotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila. On December
15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed acomplaint for declaratory
relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporaryrestraining order (TRO) with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9 and prayed that the Ordinancebe declared invalid and
unconstitutional.On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and
Sta.Mesa Tourist Development Corporation filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the
RTC.MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff which was also granted by the RTC.On January 14, 1993, the
RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from enforcingthe Ordinance.On October 20,
1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void.The City then filed a petition
for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. However, theSupreme Court referred the same to the
Court of Appeals.The City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
Localgovernment code and the Revised Manila charter.The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of theOrdinance.

Issue: Whether the Ordinance is constitutional

.Held: No, it is not constitutional. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate
theuse of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and the like. These goals,
bythemselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State.
Yetthe desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement.However
well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsicalintrusion into the rights
of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlesslyrestrains the operation of the
businesses of the petitioners as well as restricts the rights of their patron w/o sufficient justification.

Police Power

MMDA vs Trackworks Rail Transit AdvertisingGR 179554December 16, 2009

Facts :Respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising entered intoa contract for advertising with the
Metro Rail Transit Corp. andthereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and otheradvertising
media in different parts of the MRT 3 premises.Sometime in 2001 MMDA requested Trackworks to
dismantle saidbillboards and signages pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009wherein the MMDA
prohibits the posting, installation, and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters,
streamers, in any partof the road, sidewalk, center-island, posts, trees, parks and openspaces.
Trackworks refused the said request and then MMDAproceeded to dismantle the billboards and similar
forms of advertisement. Trackworsk filed a civil case before the Pasig RTC, atemporary restraining order
was issued against MMDA. The MMDAfiled a petition with the Court of Appeals but denied said
petitionand affirmed the order of the RTC. Petition was then filed with theSC which denied the same
and eventually this resolution after apetition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the power under its mandateto cause the dismantling of
respondents’ advertisement materials.

Held: No ,That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other advertizing
media in the MRT3 from MRTCs authority under the BLT agreement to develop commercial premises
in the MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising income therefrom is no longer debatable. Under the
BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which MRTC
would transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the Government.

Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this case,
and until this date, MRTCs entering into the contract for advertising services with Trackworks was a
valid exercise of ownership by the former. In fact, in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc.,[13] this Court expressly recognized
Trackworks right to install the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to said
contract. The latters right should, therefore, be respected

It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks
billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to
dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the
MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc.,[14] Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co.,
Inc.,[15] and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin,[16] the Court had the occasion to
rule that MMDAs powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration.
Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.[17]

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 100152 March 31, 2000
Petitioner: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc.
Respondent: The Honorable Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After
consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed thereto by local optometrists,
respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following conditions: (1) Since it
is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store; (2) It cannot
examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of
optical clinics; (3) It cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been
made by an independent optometrist or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the
public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot advertise optical
lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames; (5) It is allowed to grind
lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist.

On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI lodged a

complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its
business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. On July 19, 1989, the
City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said
date and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.

Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid exercise of
police power, in the grant of business permits

Ruling: Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It
is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised
for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. The authority of city
mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. However, the power to grant or
issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost
observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the law.

In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to petitioner
was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the Court of Appeals that
respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such special conditions in its permit as
the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public respondents and private respondent SOPI are one
in saying that the imposition of said special conditions is well within the authority of the City Mayor as a
valid exercise of police power.

The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature.
The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is
essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the contemplation of the general
welfare clause of the Local Government Code.

What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of
running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of optometry.
The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business permit could be attained
by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to produce a valid certificate of registration as
optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit is issued primarily to
regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit,
regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the
administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the
Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry
 EMMINENT DOMAIN
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs. Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
Petitioner: Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines
Respondent: Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No.
131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They contend that
taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e.,
with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional provision that no
private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.
G.R. No. 78742
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention
because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required
under the above-quoted decree.

Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain

Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain
that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property
condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on
the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which
should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not
compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the
payment of just compensation to the owner.
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is
concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance
with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a
taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The
taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of
the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner
in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power
of eminent domain
 Philippine Press Institute, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No.119694 May 22, 1995

Petitioner: Philippine Press Institute, Inc.
Respondent: Commission on Elections

Facts: On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 which reads in part Sec. 2. Comelec
Space. — The Commission shall procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least
one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as "Comelec Space" from March 6,
1995 in the case of candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence
of said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazine or periodical of said province
or city.
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order, PPI asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that
it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies,
against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.

Issue: Whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain

Ruling: The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not
without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying
compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission,
whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority
to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an
exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution
No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers
from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No.
2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling
publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for
Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain

Landbank of the Philippines

vs Raymunda Martinez
Ponente: Nachura

Facts:
The land owned by Martinez was compulsory acquired by DAR for the purpose of CARP, of which the
LBP offered P1,955,485.60 as just compensation. Convinced that the amount was just and confiscatory,
Martinez rejected it. Thus, PARAD conducted a summary administrative proceedings for the preliminary
determination of the just compensation.

PARAD marked some inconsistencies in the figures and factors used by LBP in its computation, so they
rendered an amount of P12,179,492.50 as just compensation.
LBP however, filed at the RTC-Romblon that the ruling of the DARAB on the just compensation has
become final after the lapse of 15 days. Martinez opposed the motion. Later on, LBP instituted a petition
for certiorari against PARAD, assailing that PARAD gravely abuse its discretion when it issued the order
for the 12m just compensation despite the pending petition in the RTC. CA, finding LBP guilty of forum-
shopping dismissed the petition, Hence, this petition.

Issue:
(1) whether or not petitioner could file its appeal solely through its legal department; (2) whether or not
petitioner committed forum shopping; and (3) whether or not the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) gravely abused his discretion when he issued a writ of execution despite the
pendency of LBP’s petition for fixing of just compensation with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC).

Ruling:
The Court went on to rule that the petition for review on certiorari could not be filed without the Office
of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) entering its appearance as the principal legal counsel of
the bank or without the OGCC giving its conformity to the LBP Legal Department’s filing of the petition.
The Court also found petitioner to have forum-shopped when it moved to quash the PARAD resolutions
and at the same time petitioned for their annulment via certiorari under Rule 65. Most importantly, the
Court ruled that petitioner was not entitled to the issuance of a writ of certiorari by the appellate court
because the Office of the PARAD did not gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook to execute the
September 4, 2002 decision on land valuation. The said adjudicator’s decision attained finality after the
lapse of the 15-day period stated in Rule XIII, Section 11 of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules of Procedure.

On the supposedly conflicting pronouncements in the cited decisions, the Court reiterates its ruling in
this case that the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse
of the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules. The petition for the fixing of just compensation should
therefore, following the law and settled jurisprudence, be filed with the SAC within the said period.
Following settled doctrine, we ruled in this case that the PARAD’s decision had already attained finality
because of LBP’s failure to file the petition for the fixing of just compensation within the 15-day period.

Sunday, February 19, 2017

G.R. No. 165828 NPC v. HEIRS OF SANGKAY 656 SCRA 60
NPC v. HEIRS OF SANGKAY
656 SCRA 60
G.R. No. 165828
August 24, 2011

TOPIC: Eminent Domain; Just Compensation

FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project
to generate electricity for Mindanao. It included the construction of several underground tunnels to be
used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants.

On 1997, Respondents sued NPC for recovery of damages of the property and a prayer for just
compensation. They alleged that the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial
and residential value of their land; and that their land had also become an unsafe place for habitation,
forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer grounds.

ISSUE: Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation

RULING: Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. It has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental
defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the
taking agency.

The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property for an indefinite
period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Hence, respondents are clearly entitled to the payment of
just compensation.

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not
merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. It is settled that the taking of private
property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. This
is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal
beneficial use. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the
rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful
manner, lessening or destroying its value .

FORFOM vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYSG.R. No. 124795 December 10, 2008
FACTS: Forfom is the registered owner of several parcels of land in Laguna. On November 1,1972,
President Marcos approved the Carmona Project which was implemented withthe installation of
railroad facilities and appurtenances. During the construction of said commuterline, several properties
owned by private individuals/corporations were traversed as right-of-waywhich included a 100x128
square-meter portion owned by Forfom.Forfom filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession of Real
Property and/or Damages alleging that PNR, with the aid of military men, and without its consent and
against its will,occupied 100x128 square meters of its property located in San Pedro, Laguna and
installedrailroad and railway facilities and appurtenances. Despite repeated verbal and written
demandsfor the return of the property or for the payment of its price, PNR failed to comply.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Forform can recover possession of its property because PNR failed to file any expropriation
case and just compensation
2. Whether leasing out of portion of the property to third person is beyond the scope of public use.

HELD:
1. NO. The owner of the land, who stands by, without objection, and sees as public railroad constructed
over it, cannot, after the road is completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the
faith of his apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the railroad company.
In such a case, there can only remain to the owner a right of compensation.
2. NO. The public use requisite for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and
evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.
At present, it may be amiss to state that whatever is beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use. The term “public use” has now been held to be synonymous with
“public interest,” “public benefit,” “public welfare,” and “public convenience.” Whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES CANCIO

G.R. No. 170147 January 30, 2009
FACTS:
On January 15, 1979, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18115 which reserved certain parcels of
land of the public domain in Lapu Lapu City in favor of petitioner (then Export Processing Zone Authority
or EPZA) for the establishment of the Mactan Export Processing Zone. However, some of the parcels
covered by the proclamation, including that of respondent spouses Agustin and Imelda Cancio, were
private land. Petitioner offered to purchase respondents’ lot P52,294,000 which respondents rejected.
Petitioner commenced expropriation proceedings for respondents’ property. It sought a writ of
possession for the property for which it was willing to deposit 10% of the offered amount with LBP in
accordance with A.O. No. 50.7. Respondents, however, filed a motion to require petitioner to comply
with RA 8974, specifically Sec 4(a) thereof, which requires that, upon the filing of the complaint for
expropriation, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property an amount
equivalent to 100% of the current zonal valuation thereof for purposes of the issuance of a writ of
possession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 8974 is applicable to this case for purposes of the issuance of the writ of possession.
RULING:
RA 8974 governs this case, not A.O. No. 50 as petitioner insists. RA 8974 applies to instances when the
national government expropriates property for national government infrastructure projects. The
economic zone is a national government project. Also, the complaint for expropriation was filed only on
August 27, 2001 or almost 1 year after the law was approved on November 7, 2000. Thus, there is no
doubt about its applicability to this case.
It is only after the trial court ascertains the provisional amount to be paid that just compensation will be
determined. In establishing the amount of just compensation, the parties may present evidence relative
to the property’s fair market value, as provided under Section 5 of RA 8974.

HON. VICENTE P. EUSEBIO, et al vs. JOVITO M. LUIS, et al

G.R. No. 162474 October 13, 2009
FACTS:
Respondents are owners of a parcel of land taken by the City of Pasig in 1980 which was used as a
municipal road. The Sanggunian of Pasig City passed Resolution No. 15 authorizing payments for said
parcel of land. However, the Appraisal Committee assessed the value of the land only at P150.00 per
meter2. Respondents requested the Appraisal Committee to consider P2,000.00 per square meter as the
value of their land which was rejected.
Respondents filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damages before the RTC praying that the
property be returned to them with payment of reasonable rental for 16 years of use at P500.00 meter2
with legal interest from date of filing of the complaint until full payment, or if said property can no
longer be returned, that petitioners pay just compensation of P7,930,000.00 and rental for 16 years of
use at P500.00 per meter2, both with legal interest from the date of filing of the complaint until full
payment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents’ claim for just compensation has already prescribed
RULING:
Petitioners must be disabused of their belief that respondents’ action for recovery of their property,
which had been taken for public use, or to claim just compensation therefor is already barred by
prescription. In Republic v. CA, the Court emphasized "that where private property is taken by the
Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or
negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe."
Government agencies should not exercise the power of eminent domain with wanton disregard for
property rights as Section 9, Art III of the Constitution provides that "private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation."
Recovery of possession of the property by the landowner can no longer be allowed on the grounds of
estoppel and, more importantly, of public policy which imposes upon the public utility the obligation to
continue its services to the public. The non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to
the return of the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.

Vda. de Ouano vs. Republic

G.R. NO. 168770, 9 FEBRUARY 2011

FACTS:

1. In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA’s predecessor agency pursued a
program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City.
2. As an assurance from the government, there is a promise of reconveyance or repurchase of said
property so long as Lahug ceases its operation or transfer its operation to Mactan – Cebu Airport.
3. Some owners refused to sell, and that the Civil Aeronautics Administration filed a complaint for
the expropriation of said properties for the expansion of the Lahug Airport.
4. The trial court then declared said properties to be used upon the expansion of said projects and
order for just compensation to the land owners, at the same time directed the latter to transfer
certificate or ownership or title in the name of the plaintiff.
5. At the end of 1991, Lahug Airport completely ceased its operation while the Mactan-Cebu
airport opened to accommodate incoming and outgoing commercial flights.
6. This then prompted the land owners to demand for the reconveynace of said properties being
expropriated by the trial court under the power of eminent domain. Hence these two consolidated cases
arise.
7. In G.R. No. 168812 MCIAA is hereby ordered by court to reconvey said properties to the land
owners plus attorney’s fee and cost of suit, while in G.R. No. 168770, the RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioners Oaunos and against the MCIAA for the reconveynace of their properties but was appealed by
the latter and the earlier decision was reversed, the case went up to the CA but the CA affirmed the
reversed decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
• Should MCIAA reconvey the lands to petitioners? YES

HELD:
The notion that the government via expropriation proceedings acquires unrestricted ownership over or
a fee simple title to the covered land is no longer tenable. Expropriated lands should be differentiated
from a piece of land, ownership of which was absolutely transferred by way of an unconditional
purchase and sale contract freely entered by two parties, one without obligation to buy and the other
without the duty to sell. In that case, the fee simple concept really comes into play. There is really no
occasion to apply the “fee simple concept” if the transfer is conditional.

The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its continued
devotion to its public purpose. Once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the
former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion subject of course to the return at the very least of
the just compensation received.

In expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will. The mandatory requirement
of due process ought to be strictly followed such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine
need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or least
reasonably deducible from the complaint.

Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use
that is of “usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit [of the public].” If
the genuine public necessity—the very reason or condition as it were—allowing, at the first instance,
the expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the
government’s retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the
government devotes the property to another public use very much different from the original or
deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct
use by the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to another
citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizen’s own private gain, is offensive to our laws.

The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and in the
process dishonor the judgment of expropriation. A condemnor should commit to use the property
pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another
petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its
private owner, if the latter so desires. Hence, equity and justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of
the litigated lands in question to the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play also
dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian return to MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the
expropriation of their respective properties plus legal interest to be computed from default, which in
this case should run from the time MCIAA complies with the reconveyance obligation.

REPUBLIC VS HEIRS OF BORBON (2015)

26 Jan 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,
vs.
HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 165354; January 12, 2015] Constitutional Law| Eminent Domain|

FACTS:

The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) entered into a private property owned by respondents
Borbon in order to construct and maintain transmission lines for its Power Transmission Project.
NAPOCOR then filed for expropriation of an easement of right of way over a portion of the said
property. However, during the pendency of the appeal, NAPOCOR filed a motion to discontinue the
expropriation proceedings, that the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for
public purpose, that because the public purpose ceased to exist, the proceedings for expropriation
should no longer continue, and the State was now duty-bound to return the property to its owners; and
that the dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings was in accordance of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal.

HELD:
The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but, the
dismissal or discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just and
equitable. Here, NAPOCOR seeks to discontinue the expropriation proceedings on the ground that the
transmission lines constructed on the respondents’ property had already been retired. The retirement of
the transmission lines necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of the element of public use.
Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to discontinue the proceedings and requires the return of the
property to the respondents.

In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to the
respondents, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights
from the time of entry in March 1993 until the time of restoration of the possession by paying actual or
other compensatory damages. The compensation must be based on what they actually lost as a result
and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its use, including the value of the fruit trees,
plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s construction of the transmission lines. Considering that the
dismissal of the expropriation proceedings is a development occurring during the appeal, the Court
treats the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as producing the effect of converting the case into
an action for damages.

DUE PROCESS
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION

G.R. No. L-139465 January 18, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents.

Facts: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Department
of Justice received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent
Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting
documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include:

Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US

Attempt to evade or defeat tax
Fraud by wire, radio, or television
False statement or entries
Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation
and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed.
Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for
him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the following
grounds:

He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in
time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the
relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been
complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a
preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents.
The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition
request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties.

Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge Lantion favored
Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting
further proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar.

Issue/s:

Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation,
however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.

Ruling/s:
No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our
Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the
government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of
binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our
Constitution as part of the law of the land.
GOVERNMENT OF THE USA VS PURGANAN

G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine Department of

Justice, petitioner,

Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.

Facts:
The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a
warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of Mark
Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. Afterwards,
such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings

Discussions:
The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not
apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

Ruling/s: No. The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It
does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the
requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with
the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow.
He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 190529. April 29,
2010]
03
OCT
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented by its Secretary General George
“FGBF George” Duldulao, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent
FACTS:
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered national, regional
or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through its resolution, denying
also the latter’s motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941
(RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency
in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]

Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in
the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among others the
misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner
elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it
became the law in question.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.

(2) Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated.

Civil Law (Statutory Construction)

(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.

RULINGS:

(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot
sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations
or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of
the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically
opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations
clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.

(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated for [it] was given an
opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of [COMELEC resolution]. The essence of due
process, consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative
proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times
and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is
absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. [It is] obvious [that] under the attendant circumstances that
PGBI was not denied due process.

(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. The doctrine of stare
decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established)
is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule
established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be
followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument.

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a particular
case override the great benefits derived by [SC’s] judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the
Court is justified in setting it aside. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the
intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be
prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, [SC] now abandons MINERO and
strike it out from [the] ruling case law.

SUYAN VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 189644 | July 2, 2014

Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall render the
probation order ineffective. As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to observe
full obedience to the terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of
revocation of this privilege.

SERENO, J.

FACTS: SUYAN was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425. He pleaded
guilty to the charge. The trial court sentenced him to suffer the penalty of six years of prision
correctional. He filed his application for probation on the same day. RTC issued a Probation Order
covering a period of six years.
While on probation, he was arrested again on two separate occasions, both for violations of Section 16
of RA 6425. Two separate Informations were filed against him. Because of this, the Chief of the Parole
and Probation Office (ATTY. NAVARRO) recommended the revocation of his probation, citing recidivism.
NAVARRO also pointed out that SUYAN was no longer in a position to comply with the conditions of his
probation, in view of his incarceration.
The RTC ordered the revocation of SUYAN’s probation and directed him to serve his sentence. SUYAN
then interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. He argued that he was not accorded due process.
Finding merit in his petition, the CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
Thus, the RTC conducted a hearing on the Motion to Revoke.

The Parole and Probation Office filed a Violation Report where it stated that probationer SUYAN showed
negative attitude towards rehabilitation and instead continued with his illegal drug activities despite
counseling and warning from the Office. The prosecution likewise filed its Formal Offer of Evidence
where it attached a certification from another court that SUYAN has already served his sentence on the
other drug charges against him. SUYAN filed his Comment but did not dispute the certification.

After hearing, the RTC issued an Order revoking the probation. SUYAN appealed with the CA, but the
same was denied.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the probation was validly revoked.

HELD:
Yes, the probation of SUYAN was validly revoked.
Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has served out his sentence
for another offense while on probation. Consequently, his commission of another offense is a direct
violation of the condition in his Probation Order, and the effects are clearly outlined in Section 11 of the
Probation Law. Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall
render the probation order ineffective.

The Court’s discretion to grant probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society
and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Having the power to grant probation, it follows that
the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate
circumstances.

SUMMARY FORMAT

Q: SUYAN was charged and found guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 or the
“Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972”. SUYAN was sentenced to suffer a prison term of six years. He
immediately filed his application for probation. The RTC issued a Probation Order covering the period of
six years. While SUYAN was on probation, he was arrested on two occasions for drug possession. The
Chief Probation and Parole Officer (ATTY. NAVARRO) filed a Motion to Revoke Probation considering
that SUYAN was a recidivist. Prosecution also submitted a Violation report manifesting the unreformed
attitude of SUYAN and his continued illegal drug activities while on probation. The RTC then revoked the
probation and ordered SUYAN to serve the sentence imposed upon him. Was the revocation of
probation proper?

A: Yes, the probation of SUYAN was validly revoked by the lower court. Petitioner does not deny the fact
that he has been convicted and that he has served out his sentence for another offense while on
probation. Consequently, his commission of another offense is a direct violation of a condition of his
Probation Order. Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall
render the probation order ineffective.
Sec. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order.—A probation order shall take effect upon its issuance, at which
time the court shall inform the offender of the consequences thereof and explain that upon his failure to
comply with any of the conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another offense, he
shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on probation.

As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to observe full obedience to the terms
and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of revocation of this privilege.
Regrettably, petitioner wasted the opportunity granted him by the RTC to remain outside prison bars,
and must now suffer the consequences of his violation. (Suyan v. People, G.R. No. 189644, July 2, 2012)

EMILIO RAMON "E.R." P. EJERCITO vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR "EGAY" S. SAN
LUIS

FACTS:
Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by Edgar
“Egay” San Luis before the COMELEC against Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito, who was a fellow
gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna.
Petition alleged Ejercito distributed orange card to influence voters in his favor; and Ejercito
exceeds the amount of expenditures necessary.
Ejercito proclaimed Governor.
The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice of Conference. Ejercito prayed for
the dismissal of the petition which was improperly filed because it is in reality a complaint for election
offenses, thus, the case should have been filed before the COMELEC Law Department, and if with
probable cause, file with proper court.
The COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the disqualification of Ejercito. The COMELEC En
Banc agreed with the findings of its First Division that San Luis’ petition is an action to disqualify Ejercito.
Ejercito filed before the Court GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION against COMELEC and contends It
violated the right of petitioner due process when it ruled for disqualification of petitioner even it was
not prayed for disqualification. Worse, there is yet no finding of guilt by competent court that he
committed election offense.

ISSUE: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

HELD:
NO. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, is an independent
action that is available only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.44 It is a legal remedy that is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues and
is not meant to correct simple errors of judgment.45 More importantly, it will only prosper if grave
abuse of discretion is alleged and is actually proved to exist.46
Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as would amount to
lack of jurisdiction; it contemplates a situation where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law. x x x.47
Ejercito failed to prove that the COMELEC rendered its assailed Resolution with grave abuse of
discretion.
The COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that the petition filed by San Luis
against Ejercito is not just for prosecution of election offense but for disqualification as well. Ejercito
cannot feign ignorance of the true nature and intent of San Luis’ petition. The title of San Luis’ petition
shows that the case was brought under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which is the
specific rule governing the disqualification of candidates. Moreover, the averments of San Luis’ petition
rely on Section 68 (a) and (c) of the OEC as grounds for its causes of action. Section 68 of the OEC
precisely enumerates the grounds for the disqualification of a candidate for elective position and
provides, as penalty, that the candidate shall be disqualified from continuing as such, or if he or she has
been elected, from holding the office. A similar tenor was expressed in the prayer in the petition filed by
San Luis.
An election offense has both criminal and electoral aspects. The electoral aspect may proceed
independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-versa. The criminal aspect of a disqualification case
determines whether there is probable cause to charge a candidate for an election offense. The
prosecutor is the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which determines whether probable cause
exists. If there is probable cause, the COMELEC, through its Law Department, files the criminal
information before the proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-blown hearing
and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction shall result in the
disqualification of the offender, which may even include disqualification from holding a future public
office. The conduct of preliminary investigation is not required in the resolution of the electoral aspect
of a disqualification case.
The “exclusive power of the COMELEC to conduct a preliminary investigation of all casesinvolving
criminal infractions of the election laws” stated in Par. 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 pertains to
the criminal aspect of a disqualification case. Hence, an erring candidate may be disqualified even
without prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation