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SECOND DIVISION of the property whereat stands a Caltex gasoline station and a two-storey residential house

which was being occupied by a certain Amado Sanao.


EDITHA S. SANTUYO,
Complainant, According to the complainant, the respondent sheriff failed to completely carry out the March
- versus - 8, 2004 order of the trial court even after repeated follow-ups and despite his having withdrawn
HERBERTO R. BENITO, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Naga City, from the court the following amounts:
Respondent.
P5,000.00 for the pakyaw labor to haul, carry/transport effects, for cost of hired jeepneys
A.M. No. P-05-1997 and other miscellaneous expenses, including respondents meals;
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1963-P)
Present: P16,300.00 for payment of two (2) days of labor of fifteen (15) persons and five (5) security
personnel fencing off the gasoline station and safeguarding the same; and
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, P36,000.00 for the 3-day labor costs of thirty (30) persons ejecting the people inside the
CORONA, house and bringing out their belongings.
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Complainant accuses respondent of charging unreasonable and exhorbitant sheriffs fees thru
Promulgated: padded and imaginary charges. Going into details, complainant averred that the P5,000.00 for
the pakyaw labor was spent by the respondent in serving the writ of possession on a certain
August 3, 2006 Raul Santos, former owner of the subject premises who was neither its actual or present
possessor nor the operator of the gasoline station thereat. Complainant claimed that instead
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x of performing what the writ commanded him to do, the respondent, on his own volition and
without any travel order from or prior notice to the court nor to her, traveled from Naga City
to Manila, stayed in an undisclosed hotel for two (2) days in Manila, incurred expenses for his
RESOLUTION meals and transportation, and thereafter conveniently lost all the receipts and other
documents supporting his travel. To the complainant, the respondents out-of-town trip was
GARCIA, J.: unnecessary, and actually a mere scheme resorted to by him to justify his taking of her money.

This administrative case stemmed from a VERIFIED COMPLAINT[1] dated June 14, 2004, filed Complainant added that despite having withdrawn from the court the amount of P16,300.00
by complainant Editha S. Santuyo, charging the respondent, Sheriff IV Herberto R. Benito of the which was to be used as payment for the 2-day labor cost of the fifteen (15) workers and five
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 27, with Gross Neglect of Duty, Dishonesty, and (5) security personnel, the respondent sheriff still failed to turn over the premises to her, and
Gross Misconduct. that during the supposed execution, there were less than ten (10) people to execute the writ,
thereby compelling her to hire three (3) additional carpenters and blue guards to assist in the
Complainant is the attorney-in-fact of one of the plaintiffs in two separate actions for process.
annulment of sale, Civil Cases No. 90-2218 and No. 90-1506, of the RTC of Naga City, Branch
27. Worse, so complainant claims, the respondent spent P36,000.00 for an independent labor
In both cases, complainant obtained for her principals a favorable ruling from the Court of contractor who supplied the ejectment team, but accomplished nothing. She assails such
Appeals (CA) in whose decision, of November 29, 1999, nullified the sale of the property subject arrangement because the labor contractor is not accountable to the court, aside from the fact
of the suits and ordered the plaintiffs therein to be placed in the material possession thereof. that no other detail was given by her as to how the said amount was spent. She alleged that
The CA decision was ultimately affirmed by this Court and judgment was entered on June 5, when she went to the premises on the second and third days of the scheduled execution, she
2001. A writ of execution[2] was issued on March 13, 2002, followed by a writ of possession[3] did not see a shadow of the supposed thirty-man ejectment team.
on March 10, 2003.
Summing up, complainant averred that she was thrice robbed by the respondent in the total
On March 8, 2004, or after the lapse of one year from the issuance of the possesory writ, the amount of P57,300.00, and insisted that the alleged accounting and liquidation made by the
trial court issued an order directing the respondent sheriff to continue and complete the respondent were merely fabricated to conceal his misappropriation of funds.
execution process and to place the complainant in possession of the 1,200-square meter area
In his comment,[4] the respondent sheriff claims that on March 14, 2003, at 9:30 a.m., he As aptly observed by the Court Administrator in his February 28, 2005 Report/
received from the court the amount of P5,000.00 to cover the sheriffs incidental expenses. He Recommendation,[7] respondents explanations for the delay are suspicious and at best
allegedly told the complainant that he could not officially turn over the premises subject of the sketchy:
writ of possession because the writ was not yet served on defendant Raul Santos. He even
explained to the complainant that he could not leave for Manila without a travel order, and One, respondent reasoned that he could not implement at once the writ of possession without
that his schedule for the whole month of March 2003 was already full. While admitting receipt first serving a copy of the same to defendant Raul Santos who lives in Manila. This is sophistry
of the amount of P5,000.00, respondent alleged that he spent the money for his expenses in and is belied by the circumstances viz:
serving the writ of possession to defendant Raul Santos.
His manifestation to the court dated 7 March 2003 already asked for amount to execute
According to him, he actually left for Manila in the evening of March 14, 2003 but was able to the writ of possession. Why ask for funds to implement the ejectment when he knew he could
serve the writ of possession to the widow of Raul Santos only on March 16, 2003. not yet carry out the same and what he actually needed were funds meant for another
purpose?;
Plodding on, respondent claims that he made due manifestations to the court for each of his
expected expenses which were all duly approved by the court through orders directing the There was no travel order for his supposed travel to Manila;
complainant to deposit the necessary amounts with the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Respondent insists that he rendered a liquidation and/or accounting to the court. As regards His deviation from the standard procedure was unjustified, and he did not even have the
the amount of P36,000.00, respondent asserted that the same was actually paid to Mr. Rodolfo prudence to notify the court or immediately made his report about it as mandated by the Rules;
Segovia, the person who provided the ejectment team. On July 7, 2003, he issued a Notice to
Vacate against Mr. Amado Sanao and the occupants of the property, and on July 10, 2003, he He submitted his liquidation report thereon only after more than one year, or on 22 March
made a letter-request for police assistance. 2004, with only an affidavit, also executed that same date, alleging that he lost all the receipts
and documents evidencing his travel. Said affidavit does not even mention the Hotel where he
Further, respondent explains that in the morning of July 14, 2003, the ejectment team forced stayed or other details of his meal expenses;
open the steel gate of the house with steel cutter and forcibly ejected the people inside the
house including their personal belongings.[5] Even after he allegedly received a temporary His own evidence discloses that his schedule for the month of March 2003 is already full,
restraining order (TRO) at 4:00 p.m. of the same day, he went ahead with the ejectment process with travel order for each day;
because the TRO handed to him was a mere photocopy thereof, and stopped only the next day
upon his receipt of the certified true copy of the TRO, adding that he even made a query to the To prove his travel to Manila, all that respondent has is his self-serving assertion. Even his
court relative to the TRO. He submitted his sheriffs reports on December 4, 2003 and April 12, claim that he actually served the writ of possession to the widow of Raul Santos, who allegedly
2004. acknowledged receipt but refused to sign, is suspect since the widow herself confided that her
family no longer has claims over the property.
In her REPLY TO THE COMMENT /ANSWER OF RESPONDENT,[6] the complainant denied the
imputation that it was thru her constant prodding that respondent left for Manila to serve the
writ of possession to Raul Santos. She belied respondents allegation that as of April 1, 2003, Two, his subsequent manifestation for sheriffs expenses --- albeit basically for the same
the subject premises had been officially turned over to her, and refuted the claim that there purpose as the first --- more than tripled the amount in the first manifestation. Three, there
was actual ejectment on July 14, 2003 which was supposedly overtaken by a TRO the next day. was no basis to pay the independent contractor in full since the task contracted was actually
To her, it would have taken not less than two hours for the ejectment team of allegedly thirty halted. Four, complainant has steadfastly remitted the proper amount as sheriff expenses. This
(30) people to enter the premises and eject the few boarders who still occupied the two-storey notwithstanding, and despite a long period of time, respondent still failed to execute the writs
house of about eighty (80) square meters in floor area. to completion. Five, Respondents query to the court of appeals relative to the TRO is but
another scheme to indirectly justify the delay. It was made only on 22 September 2003, or long
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant administrative complaint sprung from a decision after the TRO ceased to be effective, and only after complainants counsel had written
that had long become final and executory. The judgment sought to be executed was entered respondent exhorting him to fulfill his bounden duty. Moreover, the TRO apparently
way back on June 5, 2001, while the writ of execution and writ of possession were issued on erroneously named him as an employee of Branch 62, not of Branch 27, besides the fact that
March 13, 2002 and March 10, 2003, respectively. The undue delay in the implementation of the same bears a different case number from the case pending in his branch. If indeed
the subject writs was even highlighted by the fact that the trial court had to issue an order on respondent doubted the TRO, why did he wait for it to lapse before raising the query?
March 8, 2004, directing the respondent sheriff to continue and complete the execution Respondent only submitted his report on the implementation of the writ of possession on 4
process. December 2003, and on 12 April 2004, in patent disregard of his reportorial duty under Rules
of Court. The presiding Judge had to issue an order dated 8 March 2004 directing respondent
to continue and complete the execution of the writs in the subject cases. This not only shows
the delay, but it also brings to fore the fact that respondent only made the liquidation reports [1] Rollo, pp. 1-8.
including his affidavit of loss, on 22 March 2004, or only after the issuance of the said order. [2] Id. at 37.
[3] Id. at 49-50.
Not only was there an unreasonable delay in the implementation of the writs of execution and [4] Id. at 31-36.
possession. Respondent also failed to satisfactorily justify the items for the expenses he [5] Id. at 35.
allegedly incurred in connection therewith. [6] Id. at 115-119.
[7] Id. at 120-124.
In Smith Bell and Co. v. Saur,[8] the Court has made it clear that the duty of sheriffs to promptly [8] Adm. Matter No. P-1142, March 31, 1980, 96 SCRA 667.
execute a writ is mandatory and ministerial. Sheriffs have no discretion on whether or not to [9] Teresa T. Gonzales La and Co., Inc. v. Sheriff Jadi T. Hatab, A.M. No. P-99-1337, April 5, 2000,
implement it. There is no need for the litigants to follow-up its implementation. 329 SCRA 646.
[10] Neeland v. Villanueva, A.M. No. P-99-1316, October 29, 1999, 317 SCRA 652.
Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice. They are tasked to execute final
judgments of the courts. If not enforced, such judgments become empty victories for the
prevailing party. As agents of the law, sheriffs are called upon to discharge their duties with due
care and utmost diligence. In serving court writs and processes and in implementing court
orders, sheriffs cannot afford to err without affecting the integrity of their office and the
efficient administration of justice.[9]

The conduct and behavior of every one connected with an office charged with the dispensation
of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowest clerk, are circumscribed with the heavy burden
of responsibility. Their conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum but above all, beyond suspicion.[10]

Here, the respondent sheriff was clearly remiss in performing his ministerial duty of
implementing promptly and expeditiously the possessory writ issued by the court. He was
likewise tardy in the submission of his report relative thereto.

Accordingly, the Court finds the respondent guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, an offense which, under Section 23 (t) of the Civil Service Law, carries the penalty
of suspension for six (6) months and one day to one (1) year, for the first offense.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Sheriff Herberto Benito, is hereby adjudged GUILTY of conduct


prejudicial to the best interest of the service and is SUSPENDED for a period of SIX MONTHS
without pay, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
FIRST DIVISION became a radio correspondent for Balita ng Bayan in DZXL (now RMN news) whereas Rivero
became the anchor of the same radio program.

ARTURO C. SAMPANA, In 1998, complainant established and became the Editor-in-Chief of NEWS PEN, a national
Complainant, weekly newspaper. It was owned by Fernando Gaddi (Gaddi), the brother of complainants late
friend, Efren Gaddi. While they were organizing the NEWS PEN, Gaddi inquired from
- versus - complainant if he knows of any person who had access to then Senator Tessie Aquino-Oreta
(Oreta), who, at that time, was the newly designated Chairperson of the Senate Committee on
Education. Gaddi needed Oretas favorable recommendation for his proposed textbook supply
ATTY. EDGARDO J. ANGARA and ATTY. DEMAREE J.B. RAVAL, contract with the Department of Education and Culture. Complainant recommended Rivero,
Respondents. who was then a Senate reporter, to Gaddi. Eventually, complainant and Rivero agreed to work
for the favorable recommendation by Oreta of Gaddis P200,000,000.00 textbook supply
A.C. No. 5839 contract. Gaddi agreed to give complainant and Rivero the amount of P1,000,000.00 and
P2,000,000.00, respectively, if they succeeded in persuading Oreta to recommend Gaddi for
Present: the said textbook supply contract. They also agreed that the P2,000,000.00 share of Rivero will
be further shared with a staff member of Oreta named Jane Cruz (Jane), who later on also
PANGANIBAN, C.J. became the wife of Rivero. At this point, Rivero became the Contributing Editor of NEWS PEN.
Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, On various dates in 1998 and after securing Oretas favorable recommendation, Gaddi delivered
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, to Rivero a check in the amount of P500,000.00, and cash worth P800,000.00, as partial
CALLEJO, SR., and payment of his obligations to Rivero and complainant. Rivero, who was supposed to turn over
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. to complainant the latters share in the amount of P500,000.00, failed to do so, claiming that he
gave the said amount to Oreta. According to Rivero, Oreta needed the money for her then ailing
Promulgated: mother, Doa Aurora. However, complainant found out later that the said amount was given by
Rivero to his wife, Jane. Thinking that he was double-crossed, complainant broke ties with
August 22, 2006 Rivero. In April 1999, complainant and Rivero reconciled during their meeting at the office of
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x then Senator Blas Ople.

DECISION In July 2001, Rivero appeared on television to expose the alleged misuse of Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) funds. Thereafter, Rivero called complainant on his cellular phone
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: and told him Art, na-set up ako dito. Tulungan mo ako may papuputukin akong kwento para
makabawi ako. Malaking tao ang matatamaan dito, kasama na si Obet [Pagdanganan].[6]
Before Us is a Complaint[1] for the disbarment of incumbent Senator Edgardo J. Angara Complainant agreed to help Rivero but he reminded him that Pagdanganan had a pending libel
(respondent Angara) and Atty. Demaree J.B. Raval (respondent Raval), filed by Arturo C. case against complainant and LUZON PEN in connection with the Barasoain Church Project
Sampana with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines scam story published in the same newspaper. Rivero, however, assured complainant that the
(IBP). Complainant alleges that respondents committed various offenses amounting to gross libel case will not be affected since Pagdanganan had already executed an affidavit of
misconduct, violation of their oath as lawyers, and the Code of Professional Responsibility by desistance therein.
instructing, inducing, cajoling, and instigating the complainant in perpetrating falsehoods and
in committing unlawful acts.[2] Subsequently, Rivero again called complainant and told him to implicate First Gentleman
Miguel Arroyo (Mike Arroyo), Senator Joker Arroyo, Ernesto Herrera and Senator Juan Flavier
In his Affidavit dated 31 October 2001,[3] complainant Arturo C. Sampana, a journalist by in connection with some irregularities. Rivero assured complainant that there is nothing to
profession, alleged that he first met Robert Rivero (Rivero) in 1995 while they were worry about since the matter will eventually be settled and that once he joined him in
campaigning for the election of Ed Morales (Morales) as Provincial Board Member of the 1st implicating Mike Arroyo to some irregularities, the latter will be forced to compromise with
Congressional District of Bulacan. In 1996, complainant, together with Rivero and Morales, them for a large amount of money. Complainant, who was also a writer/correspondent in
established the LUZON PEN, a provincial community newspaper in Bulacan, which was partly Manila Times, The Daily Tribune (Tribune), and BANAT newspapers, told Rivero that he could
financed by Florencio Rey Parena (Parena).[4] The latter then was being linked to alleged drug not write this controversy in Manila Times. In reply, Rivero suggested that he just write the
lord, Alfredo Tiongco (Tiongco).[5] After LUZON PEN had closed down in 1997, complainant same in Tribune and BANAT.
Sometime in the second week of August 2001, Rivero called complainant and told him developments. Complainant also heard respondent Raval and Rivero discussing the draft of the
Tulungan natin si Lacson [Senator Panfilo Lacson]. May papuputukin tayo babanatan ko si Mike supposed privilege speech of Senator Aquilino Pimentel with regard to the PCSO scam, and
Arroyo, pagkatapos tirahin mo naman sina Corpuz [Lt. Col. Victor Corpuz], at gamitin mo ang which involved Mike Arroyo.
nalalaman mo sa Tiongco-Parena case. Magkakapera tayo ng malaki dito, susuportahan tayo
ng grupo ni Angara [respondent Angara] at Lacson.[7] Rivero also informed complainant that Thereafter, respondent Raval, together with Lamorena and Virgino, assisted complainant in
the group of respondent Angara and Lacson would give them P1,000,000.00 plus other benefits writing his affidavit by means of a laptop computer owned by Lamorena. At this point,
including the printing and marketing of complainants book-in-progress. Further, Rivero told respondent Raval instructed him to concoct and include the following statement in his affidavit:
complainant Makakabawi ka rin sa akin, doon sa hindi ko naibigay sa iyo noon. Pare, yung asawa
ko si Jane nasa staff ni Lacson, kaya pasuk na pasuk tayo, may pera at suporta pa. Marami pang During the period that I was under protective custody and even after that, I met Lt. Col. Corpuz
tatamaan dito sina Senators Joker and Flavier at ex-senator Herrera at ex-governor Obet.[8] several times in the premises of ISAFP.[13]

Thereafter, Rivero instructed complainant to meet him and the group of respondent Angara
and Senator Panfilo Lacson (Lacson) on 22 August 2001 at the parking lot of Westin Philippine Complainant, at first, hesitated to include the same therein, claiming that he never really saw,
Plaza (WPP) in Pasay City. Complainant was informed by Rivero that he will execute an affidavit much less met with Corpus during the time he was under protective custody of ISAFP in 1997.
against Col. Victor Corpus (Corpus), the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Nevertheless, complainant agreed to include the same in his affidavit. Respondent Raval also
Philippines (ISAFP), and Senator Joker Arroyo on the above-mentioned date. Rivero also told induced him to state therein that ISAFP Generals Calimlim, Libarnes and Lastimoso were the
complainant to prepare in advance a written statement to be used at the Senate Committee persons named by Tiongco who had persuaded him to turn state witness against Lacson. Again,
hearings on Lacsons involvement in drug trafficking. complainant acceded. Later on, respondent Raval told complainant Eto pa, para may impact
kay Mike Arroyo, sabihin mo na in-approach ni Mike Arroyo si Parena para huwag nang isali si
On 22 August 2001, at about nine in the morning, complainant met Rivero and Raymond Burgos GMA sa listahan ng mga sangkot kay Tiongco.[14] Rivero intervened and said Oo para pareho
(Burgos), a publicist of Lacson and respondent Angara, at the parking lot of WPP. From the tayo.[15] This time, however, complainant refused arguing that this would be easy to disprove,
parking lot, they proceeded to the lobby of the business center thereof where they met and that the two above-stated additions are enough.
respondent Raval and two ABELLO CONCEPCION REGALA & CRUZ (more commonly known as
ACCRA Law Office) lawyer-assistants namely, Atty. Johnas M. Lamorena (Lamorena) and Atty. Unfazed, respondent Raval persuaded complainant to attack Senator Joker Arroyo in his
John P. Virgino (Virgino). Rivero introduced complainant to respondent Raval by saying Ito ang affidavit by stating that the latter gave Rivero P160,000.00, in order to buy his silence. He also
kasama natin gigiba kay Corpuz.[9] Afterwards, respondent Raval explained to complainant that told complainant to state therein that Senator Robert Barbers, who was at that time the
he will execute an affidavit which will destroy the credibility of Corpus and ISAFP since the two Chairman of the Committee on Senate inquiry on drug trade, kidnapping for ransom and money
were implicating Lacson to some illegal activities. He also divulged to complainant that Rivero laundering, which was investigating Lacson, was responsible for the release of suspected drug
will execute an affidavit which will implicate Mike Arroyo and several others to some illegal lord, Lawrence Hwang. According to respondent Raval, this expos would greatly affect the
activities. Moreover, he disclosed to complainant that they will be presented to testify before equilibrium of Barbers as regards the investigation of Lacson. Complainant, however, refused
separate Senate hearings. to include these statements in his affidavit.

After finishing his written statement, complainant submitted it to respondent Raval. The latter Still undismayed, respondent Raval induced complainant to include therein the name of
made a remark that while the same is okay, he needed to add some statements to produce the Senator Vicente Sotto III (Sotto) as among those wrongly implicated by ISAFP in Parenas
desired impact, and fully destroy the reputation of Corpus and ISAFP.[10] When complainant affidavit. Complainant refused saying that Sotto was a known close friend of Tiongco.
hesitated thereon, Rivero approached him and said Pare, ok lang yan, ako nga, ang daming Nevertheless, upon respondent Ravals insistence, complainant relented and said, Bahala
ipinadagdag si Mario (respondent Raval).[11] Complainant noticed that Rivero was holding a kayo.[16]
paper which appears to be an affidavit. Rivero told him that it is an affidavit against Mike
Arroyo. Subsequently, respondent Raval, together with Lamorena and Virgino, took complainant to the
Senate office of respondent Angara. While they were walking in the lobby of the Senate,
Later, respondent Raval called respondent Angara on his cellular phone and relayed the respondent Raval met some of his colleagues therein and stated Malaki nagastos ko pero ok
contents of the written statement of complainant. At the end of the conversation, respondent lang, may resulta naman. Matutuwa si Boss.[17] Upon reaching the office of respondent
Raval said Sir, ok ito, pero may kailangan akong idagdag para may impact kay Corpuz at Joker. Angara, complainant saw respondent Angara standing near the door of an inner room.
Ok ba Sir? Ngayon na?[12] Subsequently, respondent Raval informed complainant that Respondent Raval walked directly to respondent Angara and chatted with him. He also showed
respondent Angara had already given the go signal to prepare and finalize his affidavit with the to respondent Angara the complainants draft affidavit. Afterwards, respondent Raval pointed
necessary additions, and that the affidavit must be shown to him once it is finalized. At this to complainant as if to confirm the latters presence to respondent Angara. At this point,
juncture, complainant heard Burgos talking to his boss on the phone, informing him of the respondent Angara smiled and waved his hand at complainant. Subsequently, complainant,
together with respondent Raval, Lamorena and Virgino, went to the Senate lounge to take their using the sequestered JGP for the benefit of his clients in his public relations firm. Complainant
lunch. After ordering their food, respondent Raval excused himself saying that he will meet succeeded in obtaining a copy of Berbanos appointment papers. Thus, Rivero directed
respondent Angara at the Session Hall. Later, respondent Raval returned and directed complainant to turn over the said papers to Burgos, who, in turn, will give him the amount of
complainant to sign his affidavit. After complainant had signed his affidavit, respondent Raval P50,000.00. Shortly thereafter, Burgos called complainant and instructed the latter to meet him
took possession of the same and told complainant that he will go back to his office to have the on 14 October 2001 in Columbia Cyber Caf located at the 4th floor of the SM Megamall between
same notarized. Upon his return with a companion, respondent Raval gave complainant a copy 4:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon.
of his notarized affidavit. The unidentified companion of respondent Raval gave complainant
an envelope containing P10,000.00 and said Boss, heto panggastos mo. Bahala na si Robert On 14 October 2001, complainant, together with a colleague named Jun Acot, went to the
(Rivero) at Raymond (Burgos) sa iba pang kasunod.[18] Respondent Raval shook the hand of venue of the meeting. Complainant submitted therein Berbanos appointment papers to
complainant, gave him his cellular phone number and left. Later that evening, Rivero called Burgos. When complainant inquired with Burgos about the P50,000.00 mentioned by Rivero,
complainant and inquired what happened. Complainant replied that respondent Angara had Burgos told him that Rivero did not give him any money. According to Burgos, Rivero told him
paid him P10,000.00. Then, Rivero told complainant Standby ka lang, mayroon pang to inform complainant that the said amount will be delivered to the latter in the future. Burgos,
darating.[19] then, instructed complainant to research the background of Chito Arabejo, a Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation officer, who was reported to have arrested a Spanish national in
Sometime in the first week of September 2001, Burgos called complainant and told the latter possession of a huge sum of money in United States dollars. Burgos explained that the
to call Rivero on his new cellular phone number. When complainant called Rivero, the latter complainants next assignment was to write in BANAT and Tribune that these dollars were
told him to expect a call from Ninez Cacho Olivarez (Olivarez) of the Tribune. A few days later, supposedly part of the pay-off which Mike Arroyo allegedly received from a controversial
Olivarez called complainant and told the latter to proceed to her office in Tribune located at telecommunications franchise deal.
T.M. Kalaw corner A. Mabini Street, Manila.
When complainant called Rivero and demanded the amount of money they agreed upon,
On 6 September 2001, at about 10:30 in the morning, complainant went to the office of Olivarez Rivero was surprised and asked him Wala bang ibinibigay si Raymond (Burgos)?[22] On 22
and was interviewed therein by Benjamin Pulta (Pulta) with regard to the 1997 ISAFP operation October 2001, an article in BANAT came out exposing the appointment of Berbano by Ang.
on Tiongco and Parena. Pultas article entitled Corpuz following 1997 ISAFP script[20] appeared
in the 7 September 2001 issue of the Tribune. The article was based on Pultas interview with On 12 November 2001, complainant filed a complaint for the disbarment of respondents
complainant and the latters affidavit previously executed with respondent Raval. Angara and Raval with the IBP on the ground that the two have instructed, induced, cajoled,
and instigated him to include false statements in his affidavit dated 22 August 2001 in their
Thereafter, Rivero called complainant and told him that he was being hit by Orlan Mauricio and attempt to destroy or discredit Corpuz, the ISAFP, and other public officials. Complainant
Pagdanganan on Channel 9. He also informed complainant that the group of respondent Angara claimed therein that the aforesaid acts of respondents Angara and Raval constituted a violation
and Lacson wanted him to write something against presidential son, Mikey Arroyo, in BANAT of the Code of Professional Responsibility under the Rules of Court and that these rendered
and Tribune. Subsequently, complainant called his former colleague in Inquirer newspaper and them unfit to practice law.
now Editor-in-Chief of BANAT tabloid, Jun Alano (Alano). He informed Alano that Mikey Arroyo
was a close friend and protector of alleged drug lord, Parena. Further, Mikey Arroyo even held In his Answer dated 28 November 2001,[23] respondent Angara denied having instructed,
a shooting for the telenovela in Parenas videoke bar DIOSA now CLASSMATES. Complainant induced, cajoled or instigated the complainant to include false statements in his Affidavit dated
claimed that this fact, which appeared in BANATs issue on 8 October 2001, was based on 22 August 2001.
information relayed to him by Rivero over the telephone. However, complainant later
confirmed that Mikey Arroyo did not really know Parena. He claimed that on 12 November 2001, he read a column by Jarius Bondoc (Bondoc) in the
Philippine Star entitled, Induced to hack at Joker, Corpus; that it was only upon reading the said
Subsequently, Rivero informed complainant that the group of respondent Angara and Lacson column that he came to know of the complainant and the latters Complaint, and Affidavit dated
wanted him to link Mike Arroyo in the controversy involving the renovation of the Barasoain 22 August 2001 and 31 October 2001; that upon sensing that a demolition job was being
Church. Complainant relented. Thus, on 13 October 2001, the headline on BANAT reads: Big undertaken against him, he immediately sent a letter dated 14 November 2001 to Bondoc,
Mike, Sabit Din Sa Barasoain Scam.[21] Complainant also wrote the same story on the same informing the latter of the fabrications contained in the complainants Affidavit dated 22 August
date in Tribune. 2001; that respondent Raval is a consultant in his office in the Senate; that respondent Raval is
also a Special Counsel for the Committee on the Revision of Codes and Laws in the Senate; that
Still unsatisfied, Rivero told complainant to hit Dante Ang (Ang). Rivero instructed complainant respondent Raval is free to engage in private practice of law in his spare time; that by reason
to secure a copy of the appointment papers of Teodoro Berbano (Berbano) as a highly paid of concern over the complainants allegations in Bondocs column, he inquired from respondent
consultant of Angs Public Relations firm, Dante Ang and Associates. Berbano was the President Raval about the matter contained therein; and that at this point, he was approached by his
of the sequestered Journal Group of Publications (JGP). The plan was to show that Ang was
colleague, Sotto, who explained to him that he engaged the services of respondent Raval in
helping complainant execute the Affidavit dated 22 August 2001. Respondent Raval also asseverated that the statements contained in the complainants Affidavit
dated 22 August 2001 were principally based on, if not totally identical to, the two-page
Respondent Angara also stated that respondent Raval is allowed under the law to engage in document presented to him by complainant and the answers he gave in response to his
private practice, and that he has no control or supervision over the same; that respondent questions; that the taking of the affidavit was done in the usual and regular course, and he did
Ravals engagement by Sotto to assist the complainant in executing the Affidavit dated 22 not coerce nor pressure complainant to give statements against his will; that from the Business
August 2001 was not relayed to him; and that Sotto had, in fact, executed an Affidavit stating Center of WPP, they proceeded to the Senate Lounge where they took their lunch and had the
that: Affidavit dated 22 August 2001 notarized; that later on, Sotto joined them for lunch at the
Lounge; that he and complainant gave the notarized Affidavit dated 22 August 2001 to Sotto;
9. Senator Edgardo J. Angara has no knowledge of, much less participation in, the that after Sotto had left to proceed to the Senate Session Hall, he and his two assistants left the
preparation of the affidavit of Mr. Sampana; neither does Senator Lacson; I never discussed the Senate Lounge to resume their duties in assisting respondent Angara in the plenary
matter with anyone of them until Atty. Raval requested me, after the column of Mr. Jarius deliberations of the Senate; and that complainant had thanked them and left afterwards.
Bondoc came out in the Philippine Star on November 12, 2001, to clarify with them the matter
of my engagement of the services of Atty. Raval for the taking of the affidavit of Mr. Sampana. Respondent Raval claimed that Lamorena and Virgino are not, and have never been, connected
with the ACCRA Law Office and that they did not represent themselves to complainant as
10. Mr. Sampana offered to help and execute an affidavit; I accepted his offer, and there lawyers from the ACCRA Law Office; that the allegations of complainant about respondent
was no pressure exerted by me, by Atty. Raval or by anyone to admit to anything that Mr. Angaras knowledge or participation in the preparation of the Affidavit dated 22 August 2001
Sampana did not disclose or admit of his own personal knowledge. are baseless and totally untrue; that respondent Angara was completely ignorant of what he
had done to heed the request of Sotto; and that the allegation of complainant that he was
11. I am executing this affidavit in connection with the disbarment case filed by Mr. instructed, induced, cajoled, and instigated through monetary and/or other considerations to
Sampana with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines against Senator Angara and Atty. Raval, to make false statements under oath, resulting in the execution of his Affidavit dated 22 August
prove the untruthfulness and lack of basis of the allegation of Mr. Sampana that he was 2001, is baseless and totally untrue.
instructed, induced, cajoled and instigated through monetary and other considerations to
execute his affidavit of August 22, 2001.[24] CBD Commissioner Dennis B. Funa (Funa) was in charge of the hearing of the complaint. After
an exchange of pleadings and the filing of their respective Position Papers[27] by the parties,
Funa finally rendered his Report and Recommendation dated 25 June 2002.[28] Funa
Furthermore, respondent Angara posited that he does not personally know and has never met recommended that the case against respondent Angara be dismissed for insufficiency of
complainant, and that he has no knowledge or involvement in the preparation and execution evidence. On the other hand, he found respondent Raval guilty of violating the Code of
of complainants Affidavit dated 22 August 2001; and that the repeated mention of his name Professional Responsibility and, thus, should be given the penalty of two years suspension. On
and references to the law firm he founded strongly demonstrate complainants design to smear 3 August 2002, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) issued a Resolution,[29] reversing and
his good name and reputation. modifying the Report and Recommendation dated 25 June 2002, and dismissing the case
against respondents Angara and Raval for lack of basis. On 2 September 2002, the Board,
Likewise, respondent Raval, in his Affidavit dated 26 November 2001,[25] and Answer dated 27 through Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, submitted a copy of its Resolution dated
November 2001,[26] denied having instructed, induced, cajoled and instigated complainant to 3 August 2002 as well as the records of the instant case to this Court, pursuant to Rule 139-B
include false statements in his Affidavit dated 22 August 2001. of the 1997 Rules of Court.[30]

He explained that he is a Consultant to the Senate Office of respondent Angara with an On 21 October 2002, complainant filed a Petition for Review[31] assailing the Resolution of the
additional assignment as Special Counsel to the Senate Committee on Constitutional Board dated 3 August 2002 and praying that the same be reversed and set aside by this Court.
Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws; that he had the permission of respondent Angara Thereafter, on 20 November 2002 this Court issued a Resolution[32] which noted the
to engage in the private practice of law; that on 22 August 2001, Sotto requested him to Resolution of IBP-CBD dated 3 August 2002. On 13 January 2003, this Court, pursuant to the
interview and to take the affidavit of a possible witness at the Business Center of WPP; that to Petition for Review of complainant dated 21 October 2001, issued a Resolution[33] requiring
facilitate the taking of affidavit, he asked complainant therein if he had already prepared respondents Angara and Raval to file their comments thereon. In compliance therewith,
anything in writing regarding the disclosures he wanted to make; that complainant presented respondents Angara and Raval filed their separate Comment[34] on 10 March 2003.
a two-page typewritten document with the latters handwritten corrections; and that he posed Subsequently, on 24 May 2004, complainant filed his Consolidated Reply[35] thereon.
questions to complainant and the latter freely and voluntarily gave answers while the formers
two lawyer-assistants, Lamorena and Virgino, dutifully and faithfully encoded the complainants Complainant, in his Petition for Review dated 21 October 2001, raise the following arguments
statement which constitutes his Affidavit dated 22 August 2001. for our consideration
I.
Sir/Madam:
THE HONORABLE BOARD MANIFESTLY ERRED AND HAS DEPARTED FROM THE USUAL COURSE
OF ADJUDICATORY PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT RENDERED THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION NO. XV- Please take notice that on August 3, 2002 a resolution was passed by the Board of Governors
2002-455 REVERSING AND MODIFYING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DATED 25 JUNE of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in the above-entitled case the original of which is now
2002 OF THE HONORABLE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER CONSIDERING THAT: on file in this office, quote:

A) The Honorable Board did not State The Facts And The Reasons On Which It Based RESOLUTION NO. XV-2002-455
Its Resolution To Reverse And Modify The Report And Recommendation Dated 25 June 2002; CBD Case No. 01-899
And Arturo C. Sampana vs.
Atty. Edgardo J. Angara and
B) The Undisputed Facts And Circumstances Of The Instant Case Clearly Establishes Atty. Demaree B. Raval
The Culpability Of Respondent Atty. Raval.
RESOLVED to REVERSE and MODIFY, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
II. Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as
Annex A; and, after a careful review, study and discussions, the case against Respondents is
THE HONORABLE BOARD AND THE HONORABLE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER MANIFESTLY hereby DISMISSED for lack of basis.
ERRED AND HAS DEPARTED FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF ADJUDICATORY PROCEEDINGS
WHEN THEY FAILED TO HOLD RESPONDENT ATTY. ANGARA LIABLE FOR ACTING IN CONSPIRACY
WITH RESPONDENT ATTY. RAVAL, NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONCLUSIVE DETERMINATION JAIME M. VIBAR
MADE BY THE HONORABLE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER IN THE REPORT AND National Secretary
RECOMMENDATION DATED 25 JUNE 2002, THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE PETITIONER WERE
PRESENTED WITH CANDOR AND HIS SWORN STATEMENTS WERE STRAIGHTFORWARD.[36] N.B. President Teofilo S. Pilando, Jr. inhibits himself from discussion of the above-entitled case
in as much as he personally knows the respondents, and in-fact, appointed Atty. Raval as
Commissioner of the Bar Discipline. Be it noted that President Pilando steps out of the Board
Complainant asserts that the Board failed to comply with Rule 139-B, Section 12, paragraph (a), Room and did not participate on the proceedings.[37]
of the Rules of Court, when it issued the one-page Resolution dated 3 August 2002 without
clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the reasons on which it is based. Thus,
according to him, such resolution must be reversed and set aside by this Court. The Boards Resolution dated 3 August 2002[38] has sufficiently and substantially complied with
the requirements of the law. A perusal of the assailed resolution would show that the Report
The contention is without merit. and Recommendation of Commissioner Funa was made an integral part therein. In fact, it was
attached thereto and referred to as Annex A. This simply implies that the facts, issues, and
Rule 139-B, Section 12, paragraph (a), of the Rules, in Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys evidences in the same report were incorporated by reference in the same resolution. It is
states the procedure in the review by the Board of the report of the investigator/commissioner, significant to note that this procedure is a usual and regular course in the issuance of resolution
and the manner by which its decision is to be rendered, to wit: and decision by the Board upon review of the report of Investigating Commissioner. This is
judicially recognized and accepted. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that there is nothing
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a) Every case heard by an investigator that prevents the Board from adopting by reference the said report. Under Rule 139-B, Section
shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to 12, paragraph (a), of the Rules, the investigation and report of the Commissioner is always
it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in subject to review by the Board of Governors. Simply put, the findings of the Investigating
writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It Commissioner are merely recommendatory and it is the Board of Governors that will decide
shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of whether to affirm or reject, in whole or in part, the report of the Commissioner.
the Board following the submittal of the Investigators report.
Moreover, it is stated in such resolution that the Board made a careful review, study and
discussion of the instant case before dismissing the same. As indicated therein, the reason given
The assailed Resolution of the Board dated 3 August 2002 reads: by the Board in dismissing the instant case is lack of basis. Further, a note therein mentioned
that the Boards President Teofilo S. Pilando, Jr. (Pilando), had inhibited himself from the
NOTICE OF RESOLUTION discussion of the complaint and report in as much as he personally knows respondents Angara
and Raval, and, in fact, appointed respondent Raval as Commissioner of the Bar Discipline. It
was also noted therein that Pilando stepped out of the Board Room and did not participate in 13. Robert again later called me up and told me to meet him and the group of Senators
the proceedings. Such circumstance shows that the Board conducted a proceeding wherein it Angara and Lacson onAugust 22, 2001 at the parking lot of Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City.
deliberated and discussed the instant complaint before issuing the assailed resolution. Based xxx
on the foregoing, the resolution in dispute has established the facts and reason on which it is
based. Hence, contrary to complainants claim, the same resolution is legal and effective. 14. x x x There, Robert told me that the lawyers of Senator Angara will be arriving. Soon enough,
Atty. Demaree Raval, and two lawyers-assistants, whom he referred to as Jhonas Lamorena
We shall now proceed to discuss and determine the allegations of complainant against (cell phone no. 0917-537-5871) and John Virgino and who identified themselves as ACCRA
respondents Raval and Angara, respectively. lawyers, arrived. x x x

Complainant claims that respondent Raval induced him to include false allegations in his xxxx
Affidavit dated 22 August 2001. According to him, such act constitutes a violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and, thus, warrants the imposition of the penalty of disbarment 19. After the call, Atty. Raval told me that Senator Angara had already given the go ahead to
or suspension against respondent Raval. prepare my affidavit with whatever necessary additions and that I was supposed to be brought
to him after we had finalized my affidavit.
We disagree.
xxxx
According to respondent Raval, complainant was merely referred to him by then Senator Sotto,
and he did nothing more but to assist complainant in executing an affidavit on the alleged 24. x x x Atty. Raval then pointed at me as if to confirm my presence to the Senator. Senator
involvement of some senators and other politicians in drug trafficking and other illegal Angara smiled and waved at me. x x x[43] (Italics supplied.)
activities. The statements in the affidavit were made by complainant freely and voluntarily.

The veracity of the foregoing claim of respondent Raval is attested to and supported by the It can be gleaned from the foregoing that much of complainants allegations against respondent
affidavits[39] on record of Sotto, who referred complainant to respondent Raval, and of Angara relied on what had been told to him by Rivero and respondent Raval. No personal
Lamorena and Vergino, who assisted respondent Raval in taking down the statements of the conversation, acquaintance or meeting ever took place between complainant and respondent
complainant and preparing his affidavit. On the other hand, the allegations of complainant Angara. Moreover, assuming that respondent Angara did give the go ahead to prepare
against respondent Raval is supported only by his own affidavit dated 31 October 2001.[40] complainants affidavit, there was no competent evidence to show that respondent Angara had
Rivero, whom complainant has referred to as his companion during the meeting with any part in the inclusion of false statements in the complainants 22 August 2001 Affidavit. Also,
respondent Raval, is not shown to have executed any affidavit which supports the allegations the reference to Angara-Lacson group does not refer to respondent Angara himself. Obviously,
of complainant against respondent Raval. Furthermore, it appears from the complainants the smiling and waving of hand of respondent Angara to complainant does not in any way
Affidavit dated 31 October 2001 that he admitted being involved in some shady deals wherein indicate that he conspired with respondent Raval in inducing complainant to make false
he agreed to hit or implicate some personalities and politicians in illegal activities in exchange allegations. It can be observed that complainant based his conspiracy theory on respondent
for a lump sum of money.[41] This, to our mind, casts doubt on the credibility of complainant Angaras professional association with respondent Raval. This is not, however, sufficient to
and his statements in the instant case. support complainants averment of conspiracy. As we stated earlier, the culpability of Raval was
not established. Moreover, mere companionship does not establish conspiracy.[44]
Complainant argues that respondent Angara acted in conspiracy with respondent Raval in
inducing him to include false statements in his Affidavit dated 22 August 2001. Thus, according It is well-settled that conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and as convincingly as the
to him, the penalty of disbarment or suspension should also be imposed against respondent commission of the offense itself.[45] Evidently, complainant failed to establish the existence of
Angara.[42] conspiracy between respondents Raval and Angara.

We are not persuaded. The power to disbar or suspend a lawyer should be used with utmost caution and only for
serious reasons so as not to unjustly deprive him of his means of livelihood and distinct
In his Affidavit dated 31 October 2001, complainant alleged the following as his bases for reputation in the society. It must be exercised only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
implicating respondent Angara with respondent Raval, to wit: affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. In disbarment
proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving his case against respondent. In the
12. Robert told me that the Angara-Lacson group would give me P1 million, plus other case of Angeles v. Figueroa[46] we held:
benefits including the printing and marketing of my book-in-progress. x x x
It is settled that the power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most WE CONCUR:
weighty reasons. The burden of proof rests on the complainant and the case against the
respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Thus, the adage ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
that he who asserts, not who denies, must prove. Chief Justice
Chairperson
Indeed, complainants are the ones who bear the burden of showing through satisfactory
evidence the bases of their complaint. As explained by this Court in Boyboy vs. Yabut, Jr. [A.C. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
No. 5225, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA 622]: Associate Justice Associate Justice

. . . [A] mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous
with guilt. There must always be sufficient evidence to support the charge. This brings to the ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
fore the application of the age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his Associate Justice
allegations [R]espondent is not under obligation to prove his negative averment, much less to
disprove what has not been proved by complainants. Thus, we have consistently held that if
the complainant/plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to
show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the [1] Rollo, pp. 1-9.
respondent/defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. [2] Id. at 7.
[3] Id. at 12-21.
The reason for this rule is that: [4] Florencio Parena was a former Bulacan policeman and publisher of Luzon Pen. The
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) investigated him and his
The profession of an attorney is acquired after long and laborious study. It is a lifetime alleged business associate and suspected drug lord, Alfredo Tiongco, as regards their
profession. By years of patience, zeal and ability, the attorney may be able to amass involvement in drug trafficking, bribery of several politicians including some senators, and other
considerable means to support himself and his family, besides the honor and prestige that illegal activities. In 1997, a Senate inquiry was conducted to determine the allegations that
accompany his office and profession. To deprive him of such honored station in life which would some senators then were receiving protection money from drug trafficking operators.
result in irreparable injury must require proof of the highest degree While courts will not [5] Alfredo Tiongco is a businessman engaged in brokerage, trucking, trading and restaurant
hesitate to mete out proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who fail to live up to their operations. The ISAFP questioned him and his alleged business associate, Florencio Parena,
sworn duties they will, on the other hand, protect them from the unjust accusations of with regard to their involvement in drug trafficking and bribery of several government officials,
dissatisfied litigants. The success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost entirely on his including some senators, for the protection of his illegal activities. In 1997, a Senate inquiry was
reputation. Anything which will harm his good name is to be deplored. Private persons, and conducted to determine the allegations that some senators then were receiving protection
particularly disgruntled opponents, may not, therefore, be permitted to use the courts as money from drug trafficking operators.
vehicles through which to vent their rancor on members of the Bar. [6] Rollo, p. 13.
[7] Id. at 14.
[8] Id.
Indeed, complainant in the instant case failed to establish with clear and convincing evidence [9] Id. at 15.
the culpability of respondents Raval and Angara. [10] Id.
[11] Id.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. [12] Id.
[13] Id. at 16.
SO ORDERED. [14] Id. at 17.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id. at 18.
[18] Id.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO [19] Id.
Associate Justice [20] Id. at 19.
[21] Id. at 20.
[22] Id. at 21.
[23] Id. at 43-54.
[24] Id at 69-70.
[25] Id. at 65-66.
[26] Id. at 60-64.
[27] Id. at 119-134, 136-153, 186-194.
[28] Id. at 199-226.
[29] Id. at 198.
[30] Id. at 197.
[31] Id at 228-259.
[32] Id. at 227.
[33] Id. at 356.
[34] Id. at 368-385 and 386-399.
[35] Id. at 414-423.
[36] Id. at 237-238.
[37] Id. at 198.
[38] Id.
[39] Id. at 69-73.
[40] Id. at 12-21.
[41] Id. at 14 and 18.
[42] Id. at 2.
[43] Id. at 16-18.
[44] People of the Philippines v. Furugganan, G.R. Nos. 90191-96, 28 January 1991, 193 SCRA
471, 481, citing People v. Sosing, 197 Phil. 344, 353 (1982).
[45] Pecho v. People, 331 Phil. 1, 17 (1996), citing Perez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 76203-04,
6 December 1989, 180 SCRA 9, 14.
[46] A.C. No. 5050, 20 September 2005, 470 SCRA 186, 195-196.
EN BANC Guillermo Purganan. On 4 October 1994, said second marriage was subsequently annulled for
being bigamous.

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL (SLU-LHS) FACULTY and STAFF, On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent deliberately subscribed and
Complainant, notarized certain legal documents on different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of
respondents notarial commission on 31 December 1987. A Certification[1] dated 25 May 1999
- versus - was issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, to the effect that
respondent had not applied for commission as Notary Public for and in the City of Baguio for
ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ, the period 1988 to 1997. Respondent performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by the
Respondent. following documents:

A.C. No. 6010 1. Affidavit of Ownership[2] dated 8 March 1991, executed by Fernando T. Acosta,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
Promulgated:
2. Affidavit[3] dated 26 September 1992, executed by Maria Cortez Atos, subscribed
August 28, 2006 and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

x--------------------------------------------------x 3. Affidavit[4] dated 14 January 1992, executed by Fanolex James A. Menos, subscribed
and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

DECISION 4. Affidavit[5] dated 23 December 1993, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos, subscribed


and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: 5. Absolute Date of Sale[6] dated 23 June 1993, executed by Danilo Gonzales in favor
of Senecio C. Marzan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis University-
Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, 6. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties[7] dated 5 March 1994, executed by
predicated on the following grounds: Evelyn C. Canullas and Pastora C. Tacadena, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

1) Gross Misconduct: 7. Sworn Statement[8] dated 31 May 1994, executed by Felimon B. Rimorin, subscribed
From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending criminal case for child abuse and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutors Office of
Baguio City; a pending administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents 8. Deed of Sale[9] dated 17 August 1994, executed by Woodrow Apurado in favor of
before an Investigating Board created by SLU for his alleged unprofessional and unethical acts Jacinto Batara, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
of misappropriating money supposedly for the teachers; and the pending labor case filed by
SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction 9. Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties[10] dated 1 June 1994, executed by
of salary by respondent. Ponciano V. Abalos and Arsenio C. Sibayan, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

2) Grossly Immoral Conduct: 10. Absolute Deed of Sale[11] dated 23 March 1995, executed by Eleanor D.Meridor in
In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage; and favor of Leonardo N. Benter, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

3) Malpractice: 11. Deed of Absolute Sale[12] dated 20 December 1996, executed by Mandapat in favor
In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission. of Mario R. Mabalot, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera on 31 May 1982 12. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties[13] dated 17 April 1996, executed by
at Tuba, Benguet, before the then Honorable Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. He thereafter Villiam C. Ambong and Romeo L. Quiming, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
contracted a subsequent marriage with one Mary Jane Pascua, before the Honorable Judge
13. Conditional Deed of Sale[14] dated 27 February 1997, executed by Aurelia Demot RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Cados in favor of Jose Ma. A. Pangilinan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz; Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex A and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
14. Memorandum of Agreement[15] dated 19 July 1996, executed by JARCO represented evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent
by Mr. Johnny Teope and AZTEC Construction represented by Mr. George Cham, notarized by contracted a second marriage without taking appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage
Rolando Dela Cruz. annulled, Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year and for notarizing legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of his notarial
commission Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for another one
Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child abuse, illegal (1) year, for a total of two (2) years Suspension from the practice of law.[18]
deduction of salary and others which are still pending before the St. Louis University (SLU),
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Prosecutors Office. He did not discuss
anything about the allegations of immorality in contracting a second marriage and malpractice This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken, except as to
in notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission. the penalty contained therein.

After the filing of comment, We referred[16] the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege
(IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation. bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference. conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior, and
he can be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after
The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is just a reiteration of their opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege
allegations in their complaint. or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend, based
on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities
Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage despite the existence of his of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an
first marriage, and the subsequent nullification of the former. He also admitted having attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to
notarized certain documents during the period when his notarial commission had already be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and, thus,
expired. However, he offered some extenuating defenses such as good faith, lack of malice and to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish
noble intentions in doing the complained acts. an attorney. Elaborating on this, we said on Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting,[19] that the Bar should
maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer
After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed submitted for resolution. brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to his clients. A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act
On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and recommended which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity,
that: honesty and integrity of the legal profession. Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred
or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these
administratively penalized for the following acts: being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or
private capacity.
a. For contracting a second marriage without taking the appropriate legal steps to have the first
marriage annulled first, he be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, and Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards
among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the
b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of his notarial lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his
commission, he be suspended from the practice of law for another one (1) year or for a total of personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.[20] Thus, not
two (2) years.[17] only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect
unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any
time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.[21]
On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, approved and adopted the
recommendation of Commissioner Pacheco, thus: One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. Possession of such moral character as requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege
of law practice must be continuous. Otherwise, membership in the bar may be terminated
when a lawyer ceases to have good moral conduct.[22] However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider respondents act as
grossly immoral. This finds support in the following recommendation and observation of the
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita Rivera contracted IBP Investigator and IBP Board of Governors, thus:
marriage on 31 May 1982 before Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. In less than a year, they parted
ways owing to their irreconcilable differences without seeking judicial recourse. The union bore The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to flaunt the law and the
no offspring. After their separation in-fact, respondent never knew the whereabouts of Teresita high moral standard of the legal profession, to wit:
Rivera since he had lost all forms of communication with her. Seven years thereafter,
respondent became attracted to one Mary Jane Pascua, who was also a faculty member of SLU- a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost seven
LHS. There is also no dispute over the fact that in 1989, respondent married Mary Jane Pascua (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman;
in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, Branch 68. Respondent even admitted this
fact. When the second marriage was entered into, respondents prior marriage with Teresita b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife, whom he
Rivera was still subsisting, no action having been initiated before the court to obtain a judicial described to be very intelligent person;
declaration of nullity or annulment of respondents prior marriage to Teresita Rivera or a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of Teresita Rivera. c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;

Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous second d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife;
marriage in 1989, having been admitted to the Bar in 1985. As such, he cannot feign ignorance
of the mandate of the law that before a second marriage may be validly contracted, the first e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother and
and subsisting marriage must first be annulled by the appropriate court. The second marriage child went to Australia;
was annulled only on 4 October 1994 before the RTC of Benguet, Branch 9, or about five years
after respondent contracted his second marriage. The annulment of respondents second f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.[26]
marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. Firstly, as earlier emphasized,
the annulment came after the respondents second bigamous marriage. Secondly, as we held in
In re: Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal In the case of Terre v. Terre,[27] respondent was disbarred because his moral character was
but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal deeply flawed as shown by the following circumstances, viz: he convinced the complainant that
of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio and that she was legally single and
an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then neither will the free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage,
judgment of annulment of respondents second marriage also exonerate him from a respondent went through law school while being supported by complainant, with some
wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of assistance from respondents parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten
evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against members of the Bar is met, then liability complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and without
attaches.[23] the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely to a hospital.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground for In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[28] respondent was also disbarred for his grossly immoral
disbarment. acts such as: first, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children; second, he lured an
innocent young woman into marrying him; third, he mispresented himself as a bachelor so he
The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, vis-- could contract marriage in a foreign land; and fourth, he availed himself of complainants
vis, grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or resources by securing a plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry the latters
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable daughter. He did this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity
members of the community and what is grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt and false to assure complainant that everything is legal.
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[24]
Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent himself
Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to warrant his acknowledged and declared his abject apology for his misstep. He was humble enough to offer
disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him no defense save for his love and declaration of his commitment to his wife and child.
as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while the Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon him to be
first marriage was still in place, is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.[25] unduly harsh. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-
as an officer of the Court. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of
accomplish the end desired.[29] In line with this philosophy, we find that a penalty of two years salary by respondent, need not be discussed, as they are still pending before the proper forums.
suspension is more appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the At such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.
IBP is too light and not commensurate to the act committed by respondent.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral conduct, in
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during the years 1988- disregard of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
1997 after his commission as notary public had expired, respondent humbly admitted having of law for a period of two (2) years, and another two (2) years for notarizing documents despite
notarized certain documents despite his knowledge that he no longer had authority to do so. the expiration of his commission or a total of four (4) years of suspension.
He, however, alleged that he received no payment in notarizing said documents.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court
It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. Administrator, as well as the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal
On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are records of the respondent.
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts
the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its SO ORDERED.
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for
this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
of conveyance would be undermined.[30] Associate Justice

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a [1] Rollo, p. 5.
mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents [2] Id. at 6.
[3] Id. at 7-8
without the requisite commission to do so as reprehensible, constituting as it does not only [4] Id. at 9.
malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public documents.[31] [5] Id. at 10.
[6] Id. at 11.
[7] Id. at 12.
The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member [8] Id. at 13.
of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the [9] Id. at 14.
offender may be subjected to disciplinary action or one, performing a notarial act without such [10] Id. at 15.
[11] Id. at 16.
commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial [12] Id. at 17.
Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all [13] Id. at 18.
legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly [14] Id. at 19-21.
[15] Id. at 22-23.
proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the [16] Id. at 309.
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, [17] Id. at 477.
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By acting as a notary public without the proper [18] Id. at 472.
[19] 338 Phil. 912, 916-917 (1997).
commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs [20] In re: Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 581
every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. [21] Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, A.C. No. 4256, 13 February 2004, 422 SCRA 527, 532.
[22] Royong v. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865, 878 (1963).
[23] Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, 15 September 2004, 438 SCRA 306, 317.
In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,[32] a lawyer was suspended for one year when he [24] See Reyes v. Wong, A.C. No. 547, 29 January 1975, 63 SCRA 667, 673.
notarized five documents after his commission as Notary Public had expired, to wit: a complaint [25] Villasanta v. Peralta, 101 Phil 313, 314 (1957).
for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale, and a contract to sell. Guided by [26] Rollo, p. 476.
[27] Adm. Case. No. 2349, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 6, 12.
the pronouncement in said case, we find that a suspension of two (2) years is justified under [28] Adm. Case No. 2474, 15 September 2004, 438 SCRA 306, 315.
the circumstances. Herein respondent notarized a total of fourteen (14) documents[33] [29] Tboli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. v. Atty. Solilapsi, 442 Phil. 499, 515 (2002).
without the requisite notarial commission. [30] Arrieta v. Llosa, 346 Phil. 932, 937 (1997).
[31] Buensuceso v. Barrera, A.C. No. 3727, 11 December 1992, 216 SCRA 309, 312.
[32] Id.
Other charges constituting respondents misconduct such as the pending criminal case for child [33] Supra notes 2-15.
abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutors
Office of Baguio City; the pending administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and
The complaint was referred[3] to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
FIRST DIVISION report and recommendation. On September 21, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner
submitted his report finding respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provide:
LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO, A.C. No. 6317
Complainant, Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Present:
Rule 9.02 A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), not licensed to practice law, except:
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez, a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latters
Callejo, Sr., and death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to the persons
Chico-Nazario, JJ. specified in the agreement; or
ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO,
Respondent. Promulgated: b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or

August 31, 2006 c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing arrangement.

DECISION In finding the respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Investigating Commissioner opined that:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must be established by
convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the
On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint[1] was filed by complainant Luzviminda C. exercise by the Supreme Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act
Lijauco against respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and done as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated. x x x.
conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to
him despite receipt of payment representing attorneys fees. In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent that the Php70,000.00
legal fees is purely and solely for the recovery of the Php180,000.00 savings account of
According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent sometime in January complainant subsequent acts and events say otherwise, to wit:
2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank,
Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed 1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00 savings deposit is too
house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and high;
registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the 2.) Respondent actively acted as complainants lawyer to effectuate the compromise
issuance of a writ of possession then pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, agreement.
Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.
By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other individuals as commission/referral
Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the hearing for fees respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
the issuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect her interests in the Compromise provides that a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with
Agreement which she subsequently entered into to end LRC Case No. B-2610.[2] persons not licensed to practice law. Worst, by luring complainant to participate in a
compromise agreement with a false and misleading assurance that complainant can still
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he received recover after Three (3) years her foreclosed property respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1
from complainant was payment for legal services for the recovery of the deposit with Planters of the Code of Professional Responsibility which says a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
Development Bank and did not include LRC Case No. B-2610 pending before the Regional Trial dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[4]
Court of Bian, Laguna.
The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended: Respondents admission[14] that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a referral
fee does not release him from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for
WHEREFORE, finding respondent responsible for aforestated violations to protect the public legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases.[15]
and the legal profession from his kind, it is recommended that he be suspended for Six (6)
months with a stern warning that similar acts in the future will be severely dealt with.[5] Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the investigating office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5)
commissioner.[6] violation of the lawyers oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court;
and 7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority.
We agree with the findings of the IBP.
In Santos v. Lazaro[16] and Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,[17] we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possessed and Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal ethics. When a lawyer takes a clients
continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. The failure to
all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair exercise that degree of vigilance and attention makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust
dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the
their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in legal profession, the courts and society.
the Code of Professional Responsibility.[7]
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his clients case. Once he agrees to
Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct[8] handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty,
and are mandated to serve their clients with competence and diligence.[9] They shall not he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer should accept only as much cases as he
neglect a legal matter entrusted to them, and this negligence in connection therewith shall can efficiently handle in order to sufficiently protect his clients interests. It is not enough that
render them liable.[10] a lawyer possesses the qualification to handle the legal matter; he must also give adequate
attention to his legal work. Utmost fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees to take the
Respondents claim that the attorneys fee pertains only to the recovery of complainants cudgels for his clients cause.[18]
savings deposit from Planters Development Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he
acted as complainants counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement between the In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six months is
latter and the bank relative to LRC Case No. B-2610. Respondent admitted that he explained warranted. In addition, he is directed to return to complainant the amount he received by
the contents of the agreement to complainant before the latter affixed her signature. way of legal fees pursuant to existing jurisprudence.[19]
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal
assistance in the recovery of the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and
shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.[11] 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for six (6) months effective from notice, and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will
Respondents disregard for his clients interests is evident in the iniquitous stipulations in the be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to RETURN, within thirty (30) days from
compromise agreement where the complainant conceded the validity of the foreclosure of notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this
her property; that the redemption period has already expired thus consolidating ownership in Court proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.
the bank, and that she releases her claims against it.[12] As found by the Investigating
Commissioner, complainant agreed to these concessions because respondent misled her to Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as
believe that she could still redeem the property after three years from the foreclosure. The well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and
duty of a lawyer to safeguard his clients interests commences from his retainer until his guidance.
discharge from the case or the final disposition of the subject matter of litigation. Acceptance
of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of SO ORDERED.
fidelity to the clients cause. The canons of the legal profession require that once an attorney
agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost
devotion.[13] CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 2-4.


[2] Position Paper for Complainant, id. at 49.
[3] Id. at 42.
[4] Id. at 106-107.
[5] Id, at 107.
[6] Id. at 102.
[7] Garcia v. Bala, A.C. No. 5039, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 85, 91.
[8] Rule 1.01.
[9] Canon 18.
[10] Rule 18.03.
[11] Canon 20.
[12] Rollo, pp. 37-39.
[13] Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association v. Dioneda, A.C. No. 5162, March
20, 2003, 399 SCRA 296, 303.
[14] Rollo, p. 90.
[15] Rule 9.02.
[16] 445 Phil. 1, 5 (2003).
[17] A.C. No. 5655, April 22, 2005, 456 SCRA 508, 514.
[18] Abiero v. Juanino A.C. No. 5302, February 18, 2005, 452 SCRA 1, 10.
[19] Garcia v. Bala, supra note 7 at 95-96; Ferrer v. Tebelin, A.C. No. 6590, June 27, 2005, 461
SCRA 207, 217; Macarilay v. Seria, A.C. No. 6591, May 4, 2005, 458 SCRA 12, 26; Dalisay v.
Mauricio, supra at 515-516.
August 31, 2006
THIRD DIVISION

ATTY. LEON L. ASA and ATTY. JOSE A. OLIVEROS, x--------------------------------------------------x


Complainants,
DECISION
-versus-
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ATTY. GINGER ANNE CASTILLO,
Respondents.
Subject of the present Decision are four administrative cases, docketed by the Integrated Bar
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x of the Philippines (IBP) as Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Case Nos. 03-1076,03-1108,03-
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO, 1109, and 03-1125.
Complainant,
-versus- I. CBD Case No. 03-1076

ATTY. JOSE A. OLIVEROS, In 1996, Atty. Pablito M. Castillo (Castillo), then an associate of the Laurel Law Offices of
Respondent. which Attorneys Leon L. Asa (Asa) and Jose A. Oliveros (Oliveros) are partners, endorsed to
the law firm a guardianship case, Special Proceeding No. 5222, In re: Guardianship of the
x-----------------------x Minors Honeylyn, Alexandra and Jerill Nonan, which was pending before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59. Castillo appeared as counsel of record for the therein
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO, petitioner, Dr. Salvador H. Laurel, guardian ad litem of the minors Nonan who appear to have
Complainant, inherited a sizeable amount of US dollars.

-versus- A misunderstanding later occurred between Asa and Castillo as regards their sharing in the
attorneys fees in the guardianship case.
ATTY. LEON L. ASA,
Respondent. On page 6 of a pleading entitled Reply to Petitioner-Guardians Comment/Opposition,[1] ETC.
dated July 19, 2002 filed before Branch 59 of the Angeles RTC and signed by Castillos
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x daughter Ginger Anne Castillo (Ginger Anne) as counsel for Castillo who filed a Notice Ad
Cautelam, it was alleged that, inter alia, Asa wants to be paid an additional $75,000.00 for his
ATTY. LEON L. ASA, services in providing coffee and opening doors whenever there is a conference at the Laurel
Complainant, Law Offices.[2]

-versus- Finding the above statement of Castillo and Ginger Anne to be a brazen falsehood concocted
to besmirch Asas reputation, Asa and Oliveros filed before IBP an administrative complaint[3]
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO, against Castillo and Ginger Anne, for gross violation of the lawyers oath and the Code of
Respondent. Professional Responsibility. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1076.
A.C. No. 6501
(CBD Case Nos. 03-1076, 03-1108, 03-1109, 03-1125) In their complaint, Asa and Oliveros also charged Castillo with machinations and deceit arising
from the following alleged incidents:
Present:
In a conference held at the Laurel Law Offices prior to January 20, 2000 attended by Dr.
Promulgated: Laurel, the Nonan minors counsel abroad Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III (Cassiday), Asa and
Castillo, it was agreed that the amount to be received by Dr. Laurel in trust for the Nonan
heirs would be deposited at the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), St. Francis
Square Branch, Pasig City under Dollar Savings Account No. 8-250-00043-0. Castillo, however, Moreover, the Castillos declared that the deposit of the Nonan funds at the UCPB was not
proposed that the funds be deposited instead at the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), he attended with malice or bad faith, nor was it intended to benefit them as the funds could only
explaining that he knew an employee there who could facilitate the transaction. Dr. Laurel be withdrawn by Dr. Laurel who had exclusive access to all the information pertaining to the
rejected this proposition and instead instructed Castillo to file the appropriate motion to have interest and benefits accruing thereto.
the funds deposited at the RCBC.[4]
As regards the assailed June 25, 2001 Reply to Answer filed with the Makati RTC in Civil Case
Without showing to Dr. Laurel the motion he was instructed to prepare, Castillo filed the No. 01-506, the Castillos asserted that Castillo had no control nor influence over the voluntary
same with the Angeles trial court. Dr. Laurel subsequently received a copy of a March 2, 2000 and spontaneous testimony of retired Justice Kalalo in his favor during the proceedings
RTC Order[5] signed by the then trial Judge Eliezer R. De los Santos granting his motion and adverted to.[12]
accordingly directing that the funds to be held in trust for the Nonan children be deposited at
the Trust Department of the UCPB Head Office. Dr. Laurel, Cassiday and Asa thus filed with II. CBD Case No. 03-1108
the Angeles City trial court an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration[6] of the March 2, 2000
Angeles RTC Order in order to have the funds deposited at the RCBC transferred to the RTC, Castillo subsequently filed a complaint[13] against Oliveros before the IBP, docketed as CBD
as previously agreed upon. This motion was granted. Case No. 03-1108, for gross violation of lawyers oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Still in the same complaint, Asa and Oliveros alleged that in a Reply to Answer[7] dated June
25, 2001 filed by Castillo with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 145 in Civil Case No. 01-506, Castillo alleged that: (1) Oliveros assisted Cassiday in embezzling US $950,000 representing
Atty. P.M. Castillo v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Lorenzo V. Tan and Angelica S. Hernandez, the share adjudicated to the Nonan heirs; (2) in conspiracy with Dr. Laurel and a certain Atty.
Castillo again committed a clear falsehood when he therein stated that: Douglas Cushnie, Oliveros resorted to forum shopping to undermine and defeat the
jurisdiction of the Philippine court in the guardianship proceedings; (3) Oliveros, along with
On the other hand, retired Justice Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals who personally knew Asa, Dr. Laurel and Cassiday, perpetuated other acts of fraud in the guardianship proceedings;
the plaintiff [Castillo] was also profuse in extolling his academic credentials and and (4) Oliveros, together with Asa, deliberately and maliciously filed a groundless
accomplishments as a Trial lawyer as follows: administrative complaint against him and Ginger Anne.

Q: Do you know the claimant Atty. P.M. Castillo? In his Answer[14] to the Complaint in CBD Case No. 03-1108, Oliveros, decrying the
allegations against him as patently false, baseless and malicious, claimed that the complaint
A: Yes sir, because we were both active Senior Trial lawyers of the Laurel Law Offices,[8] was Castillos way of retaliating against him for having joined Asa in filing the administrative
(Underscoring supplied), complaint against him and Ginger Anne (CBD Case No. 03-1076).

III. CBD Case No. 03-1109


he knowing that retired Justice Kalalo had never been at any time a lawyer at the Laurel Law
Offices. In support of this allegation, they appended to the complaint a certified true copy of Castillo also filed an administrative complaint[15] against Asa before the IBP, charging him
the Service Record[9] of Justice Kalalo which does not show that he was ever connected with with embezzlement, dishonesty, betrayal of trust, grave abuse of confidence and violation of
the Laurel Law Office. the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The case was docketed as CBD
Case No. 03-1109.
In their Answer[10] to the complaint, Castillo and Ginger Anne declared:
Castillo alleged that (1) Asa, Cassiday and Dr. Laurel scandalously mismanaged the estate of
There is nothing wrong or objectionable to the statement that Asas services in the the Nonan heirs, the bulk of which they indiscriminately pocketed; (2) Asa and Oliveros filed a
guardianship case consisted in providing coffee and opening doors whenever there was a groundless administrative complaint against him and Ginger Anne to compel him to withdraw
conference at the Laurel Law Offices, as this was in fact the truth, the comportment being his claim for attorneys fees against Dr. Laurel and his bid to replace the latter as guardian of
strictly in accordance with long cherished Filipino hospitality, and he [Castillo] would have the Nonan heirs; (3) despite an Agreement[16] dated February 16, 2000 between him and Asa
done the same with his own visitors.[11] In any event, they claim that the assailed factual that the latter would receive only 25% of whatever he (Castillo) would receive as attorneys
narration was material and relevant to Castillos question why Asa was given the lions share of fees, Asa secretly pocketed the amounts of $24,500 and $160,500 from the guardianship case
attorneys fees when he had not rendered any known material service which redounded to on April 18, 2000; (4) Asa refused to account for and turn over the amount of $130,000 in
the benefit of the Nonan children. attorneys fees which belonged to him (Castillo); and (5) Asa embarked on a scheme to force
him into resigning as counsel for Dr. Laurel to enable them to exercise absolute control over
the guardianship case and appropriate for themselves the attorneys fees allocated for him.
In his Answer to the Complaint[17] in CBD Case No. 03-1109, Asa alleged as follows: It was in By Report and Recommendation[22] of February 27, 2004, the IBP CBD, through
fact Castillo who reneged on their February 16, 2000 Agreement as the latter had earlier Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, recommended the dismissal of the consolidated
bluntly told him that he changed his mind and that he would not give him (Asa) any share in cases in this wise.
the attorneys fees he would receive from the guardianship case, Castillo reasoning that he
was the therein counsel of record and had endorsed the case to the Laurel Law Offices. He From the facts and evidence presented, what have been shown by the counsels are mutual
thus reported the matter to Dr. Laurel and informed him that he would likewise not give bickerings, unjustified recriminations and offensive personalities between brother lawyers
Castillos share in the attorneys fees he [Asa] might receive because [Castillo] has no word of which detract from the dignity of the legal profession and do not deserve the attention of the
honor.[18] Commission. The voluminous case record contains but personal peculiarities and
idiosyncrasies hurled by the counsels against each other which constitute highly
As regards the $24,500 that he allegedly secretly pocketed, Asa explained that several days unprofessional conduct. A great part of mans comfort, as well as of his success at the bar,
prior to April 18, 2000, Dr. Laurel and Atty. Cassiday fixed the attorneys fees of both Castillo depends upon his relations with his professional brethren. With them he is in daily necessary
and Asa at $100,000 each, based on the amount to be paid by the four heirs or $25,000 per intercourse, and he must have their respect and confidence, if he wishes to sail along in
heir. When the first heir Merceditas Feliciano (Merceditas) paid $1,150,000 on April 18, 2000, smooth waters. Hence, the parties are advised to conduct themselves honorably, fairly and
he deposited $24,500 of this amount in his and his wifes joint Dollar Account No. 247-702- candidly toward each other and try to maintain the dignity of the legal profession.[23]
9275 at the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Ortigas Branch as his share in the attorneys fees, (Underscoring supplied)
while he opened a new account in the name of Dr. Laurel to which he deposited the amount
of $160,500.
By Resolution[24] of April 16, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved
Asa went on to declare that Castillo received his own $25,000 plus interest amounting to the February 27, 2004 Report and Recommendation and dismissed the consolidated cases for
$25,023.13 representing full payment of his attorneys fees from Merceditas, as evidenced by lack of merit.
a Receipt[19] dated May 2, 2000 signed by Castillo.
The records of the cases were then forwarded for final action to this Court.
Continuing, Asa declared that of the $160,500 belonging to Dr. Laurel, $100,000 represented
partial payment for his consenting to be the guardian ad litem of the Nonan heirs and $60,000 Asa filed with this Court an August 2, 2004 a Motion for Reconsideration[25] in CBD Case No.
represented reimbursement for expenses incurred over several years by Dr. Laurel, the total 03-1125. He too, together with Oliveros, filed on August 3, 2004 a Motion for
of which was placed temporarily on April 18, 2000 in his (Asas) Dollar Account No. 8-250- Reconsideration[26] in CBD Case No. 03-1076.
00047-3 in RCBC. Dr. Laurel, however, withdrew $160,000.00 the following day from RCBC
and placed it in his own Dollar Time Deposit Account for which $500.00 was spent for the Castillo likewise filed with this Court a Consolidated Omnibus Motion for Partial
purpose. A Certification[20] to this effect, issued by RCBC Ortigas Business Center Manager Reconsideration[27] dated August 9, 2004 in CBD Case No. 03-1108 and CBD Case No. 03-
Dolores L. Del Valle, was appended to Asas Answer. 1109.

Finally, Asa declared that Castillos claim for $130,000 in attorneys fees is baseless and On January 12, 2005, Asa filed his Comment[28] on Castillos Consolidated Omnibus Motion
unconscionable, and that Castillo filed the complaint merely to harass him in retaliation for for Partial Reconsideration in CBD Case No. 03-1109 while also Oliveros filed his Comment on
the complaint he and Oliveros priorly filed against him and Ginger Anne. the same motion on February 28, 2005.

IV. CBD Case No. 03-1125 On March 16, 2005, Castillo filed his Consolidated Reply to the Comments of Asa and Oliveros,
with Omnibus Motion to Appoint a Commissioner.[29]
On August 25, 2003, Asa filed yet another administrative complaint,[21] against Castillo
before the IBP, for disbarment/suspension, docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1125, charging him THIS COURTS RULING
with deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, immoral conduct, violation of the lawyers
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of his baseless, malicious and In his questioned Reply to Petitioner-Guardians Comment/Opposition, Castillos statement
derogatory allegations in CBD Case No. 03-1109 which were founded on deceit and deliberate reads:
falsehood, and of promoting a groundless, false and unlawful suit.
x x x Atty. Leon Asa wants to be paid an additional $75,000.00 for his services in providing
coffee and opening the doors whenever there is a conference at the Laurel Law Offices. He
IBP REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: also conveniently provides himself with the Nonan expediente to give assistance to the
parties during their so-called conferences. Worse, his express reluctance to appear before this and all of the adjudicated heirs with UCPB and the March 14, 2000 RTC Order directing the
Honorable Court was repeatedly announced by Atty. Jose Oliveros because of his so-called deposit of the settlement proceeds with the RCBC.
failing health x x x[30]
A perusal of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated March 8, 2000 signed by Dr. Laurel,
however, fails to establish any wrongdoing on the part of Castillo in having filed the Motion to
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall conduct deposit the funds at UCPB. It simply stated that:
himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule 8.01 of the same Canon mandates that a Considering the present raging controversy arising from the P50 Billion coconut levy funds,
lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or the stability of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Head Office at Makati, may be
otherwise improper. seriously affected x x x

That a member of the bar is enjoined to observe honorable, candid and courteous dealing The Petitioner-Guardian can best protect the deposits of the Nonan children if the proceeds
with other lawyers[31] and employ respectful and restrained language is in keeping with the of the settlement will be deposited with a solvent and more conservative bank like the RIZAL
dignity of the legal profession.[32] It is through a scrupulous preference for respectful COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION (RCBC) x x x[37]
language that a lawyer best demonstrates his observance or respect due to the courts and
judicial officers.[33]
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly
In the case at bar, Castillo and Ginger Annes choice of words manifestly falls short of this preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. Moreover, an
criterion. Their disparaging statements in the pleading referred to above belie their proffered administrative case against a lawyer must show the dubious character of the act done as well
good intention and exceed the bounds of civility and propriety. as the motivation thereof.[38] In the case at bar, Asa and Oliveros failed to present clear and
preponderant evidence to show that Castillo willfully and deliberately resorted to deceit and
Castillos claim that the statement about Asas services is relevant and pertinent to the claim falsehood in filing the Motion to have the funds deposited at UCPB.
for attorneys fees and was, for all legal intents and purposes, a privileged communication[34]
deserves short shrift. Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings Respecting Castillos June 25, 2001 Reply to Answer in the Makati RTC Civil Case No. 01-506,
constitutes unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action, even if the publication he therein alleged:
thereof is privileged.[35]
On the other hand, retired Justice Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals who personally knew
x x x this Court will not be inhibited from exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who the plaintiff, was also profuse in extolling his academic credentials and accomplishments as a
misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of them as members of the Bar. Indeed, Trial lawyer, as follows:
the rule of absolute privileged communication absolves beforehand the lawyer from civil and
criminal liability based on the statements made in the pleadings. But like the member of the Q: Do you know the claimant Atty. P.M. Castillo?
legislature who enjoys immunity from civil and criminal liability arising from any speech or
debate delivered in the Batasan or in any committee thereof, but nevertheless remains A: Yes sir, because we were both active Senior Trial lawyers at the Laurel Law Offices.
subject to the disciplinary authority of the legislature for said speech or debate, a lawyer
equally remains subject to this Courts supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in the Q: How could you characterize and rate the trial competency, performance and expertise of
observance of his duty as a member of the legal profession.[36] (Underscoring supplied) Atty. P.M. Castillo?

A: He is highly competent, low key, aggressive and very brilliant in the conduct of trial, as well
Castillo and Ginger Anne are thus admonished to exercise greater care and circumspection in as, in the formulation of courtroom strategies. His pleadings are also very well written, direct
the preparation of their pleadings and refrain from using offensive or otherwise improper to the point, convincing, scholarly and exhaustive. To be sure, he is one of the popular trial
language. lawyers of our firm (The Laurel Law Offices), not only because he came from an exclusive
school, but also because of his scholastic records at Ateneo de Manila was also impressive.
In support of Asa and Oliveros allegation that Castillo employed deceit and falsehood in That is why he was taken in by former VP Salvador H. Laurel even before the release of the
attempting to change the depositary bank for the funds to be held in trust by Dr. Laurel for 1964 bar where he was also No. 2 among the Ateneo bar candidates for the year. He was No.
the Nonan heirs, they presented the March 2, 2000 RTC Order directing Dr. Laurel and his 15 among the bar topnotchers. This is not to mention his impressive and highly (sic) batting
principal counsel Castillo to deposit the balance of the proceeds of the settlement with any average of winning about 80% to 90% of his load cases and work. He was also one of the busy
lawyers of our office, until he went on private practice and excelled as one of the more 160,500.00) as initial transaction. We further certify that on April 19, 2000, there was a debit
successful and respected trial practitioners.[39] (Underscoring supplied) made for said account in the amount of US Dollars: One Hundred Sixty Thousand (USD:
160,000.00) and that same amount was placed in the Dollar Time Deposit Account of Salvador
H. Laurel. Mr. Leon Asa left the amount of USD: Five Hundred in his account to serve as the
To Asa, by the foregoing allegation, Castillo committed clear falsehood for Justice Kalalo had maintaining balance requirement. Subject Dollar Savings Account had closed already,[47]
never been a lawyer at any time at the Laurel Law Offices.

Castillo explained, however, that he can only say that he has no control, nor influence on the and Dr. Laurel Partial Inventory, Account and Report of Guardian[48] dated February 13, 2002
voluntary and spontaneous declaration and testimony of Retired Justice Felipe Kalalo of the filed with the Angeles City RTC, Branch 59 in Sp. Proc. No. 5222 stating that:
Court of Appeals in his favor during the highly adversarial proceedings.[40]
3. On April 18, 2000, Guardian Ad Litem Salvador H. Laurel and his Principal Foreign Legal
Castillos explanation does not impress, however. The records show that the above-quoted Counsel, Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III received by way of settlement from one of the duly
statements attributed by Castillo to Justice Kalalo were lifted from an unsigned and adjudicated heirs of Larry Lee Hillblom, Mercedita Feliciano, by and through her Guardian Ad
unsubscribed affidavit entitled Question and Answer Format in Lieu of Direct Testimony of Litem, Milagros Feliciano, the amount of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND US
Justice Felipe Kalalo[41] dated January 21, 1993. This affidavit was earlier filed by Castillo with DOLLARS (US$1,150,000.00) which was deposited with the Rizal Commercial Banking
the Pasig RTC, Branch 154 in connection with his claim for attorneys fees in Civil Cases Nos. Corporation (RCBC), St. Francis Square Branch, Ortigas Center, Pasig City under Dollar Savings
43049 and 56637 which affidavit was subsequently withdrawn,[42] however, as it was Account No. 8-250-000430-ABA. Routing No. RCBC PH MM in the name of Salvador H. Laurel,
unsigned and unsubscribed. in trust for Honeylyn, Alexandra and Jeril Nonan, in compliance with the Order of this
Honorable Court dated April 26, 2000;
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the courts. Rule 10.01 of said Canon specifically commands that a 4. Pursuant to the above-stated Orders of this Honorable Court, the Guardian Ad Litem and
member of the bar shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III disbursed the following amounts for the purposes indicated:
shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Rule 10.02 of the same Canon
provides that a member of the bar shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents A. ATTORNEYS FEES & OTHER NECESSARY LEGAL EXPENSES:
of a paper or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
xxxx
And Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court directs that a lawyer must employ such
means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or (7) Partial payment of the fee of Salvador H. Laurel for consenting to be the guardian ad litem
any judicial officer by any artifice or false statement of fact or law.[43] of the Nonan children and accepting all responsibilities attached to said position
.US$100,000.00
Complete candor or honesty is thus expected from lawyers, particularly when they appear
and plead before the courts.[44] They have an obligation to the court as well as to the (8) Reimbursement to Salvador H. Laurel for expenses incurred during the last six (6) years for
opposing party to make only truthful statements in their pleadings.[45] The burden cast on airfare, car rentals, overseas calls, and representation and other incidental expenses while in
the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by the various states in the United States in order to pursue the claim of the Nonan children
counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations against the Hillblom estate .US$60,000.00
submitted could easily be imagined.[46]
x x x x[49] (Underscoring supplied),
In light of the above findings reflecting Castillos administrative culpability, his charge against
Asa and Oliveros of filing groundless disbarment cases against him and Ginger Anne
necessarily fails. validate Asas explanation that the amount of $160,500 belonged to Dr. Laurel but was merely
temporarily placed in his (Asas) account.
As regards Castillos claim that Asa secretly pocketed $24,500 and $160,500, the undated
certification issued by RCBC Branch Operation Head Dolores del Valle reading: The Partial Inventory, Account and Report of Guardian shows that $12,500 was received by
Asa as attorneys fees for assisting Dr. Laurel and Castillo from 1996 to 2000.[50] Confirming
This is to certify that on April 18, 2000, Mr. Leon L. Asa opened a Dollar Savings Account at such disbursement is a Receipt[51] dated April 18, 2000 signed by Asa. The remaining $12,500
our Business Center. A credit was made to his assigned Dollar Savings Account Number 8-250- of the $25,000 attorneys fees of Asa per heir (as priorly agreed upon by Dr. Laurel and
00047-3 in the amount of US Dollars: One Hundred Sixty Thousand Five Hundred (USD:
Cassiday) were remitted by Asa to the Laurel Law Offices as Official Receipt No. 1766[52] the same or similar offense in the future would call for the imposition of a more severe
issued by the treasurer/cashier of the Laurel Law Offices dated April 19, 2000 shows: penalty. This Court thus imposes upon him a penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for a period of One (1) year.
RECEIVED from Atty. Leon L. Asa the sum of Twelve thousand five hundred US Dollars WHEREFORE, the administrative cases filed against Atty. Leon L. Asa and Atty. Jose A. Oliveros
US$12,500.00 as fifty percent (50%) share of LLO [Laurel Law Offices] in attorneys fees of are DISMISSED.
US$25,000 of Atty. Asa in SP Proc. 5222 of RTC Angeles City, Br. 59.
Cash.US$12,500- Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo is found GUILTY of breach of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby admonished to refrain from using offensive and improper
By: Sgd. language in her pleadings.
Treasurer/Cashier
Atty. Pablito M. Castillo is likewise found GUILTY of breach of Canons 8, as well as Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
On Asas alleged unjust refusal to turn over Castillos attorneys fees: It appears that Asa and period of One (1) Year, effective upon receipt of this Decision.
Castillo each received $25,000 as attorneys fees but pursuant to their February 2000
Agreement, the aggregate amount of $50,000 would be divided between them, and Castillo Let copies of this Decision be entered in the respective personal records of Atty. Ginger Anne
would receive 75% thereof or $37,500, while Asa would receive 25% or $12,500. The records Castillo and of Atty. Pablito M. Castillo in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let copies too be
show that Asa kept only $12,500 for himself, he having remitted, as reflected above, the furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
remaining $12,500 to the Laurel Law Offices.
SO ORDERED.
Dr. Laurel eventually gave Castillo $10,000 out of the $12,500 which Asa remitted to the
Laurel Law Offices, as reflected in the Partial Inventory, Account and Report of Guardian.[53]
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Respecting Castillos claim that, in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Asa and Associate Justice
Oliveros embarked on another sinister strategy to spite, insult and provoke him to ostracize
him and make him feel unwanted to continue as [Dr. Laurels] lawyer in furtherance of their [1] Rollo, pp. 16-28.
conspiracy to force him into resignation for them to replace him and have absolute control [2] Id. at 21.
over the guardianship case, the funds of the estate and the attorneys fees, the same is [3] Id. at 1-15.
unsubstantiated, hence, deserves no further consideration. [4] Id. at 7-8.
[5] Id. at 122-123.
As to Castillos charge against Asa and Oliveros of embezzlement due to alleged scandalous [6] Id. at 375-378.
mismanagement of the estate of the Nonan heirs, premised on the October 13, 2003 RTC [7] Id. at 126-135.
Order[54] in SP No. 5222, this Court finds the evidence presented insufficient to warrant the [8] Id. at 128.
imposition of sanctions against them. [9] Id. at 136.
[10] Id. at 173-205.
Finally, on Castillos Omnibus Motion to Appoint a Commissioner, the matters raised [11] Id. at 184.
therein[55] being entirely inappropriate, to say the least, for consideration in these [12] Id. at 188.
administrative proceedings, the same is denied. [13] Id. at 1077-1088.
[14] Id. at 1094-1114.
A final word. The spectacle of members of the bar being engaged in bickering and [15] Id. at 456-469.
recrimination is far from edifying. Mutual bickerings and unjustified recriminations between [16] Id. at 472.
brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any [17] Id. at 478-513.
sympathy from this Court.[56] Personal colloquies between counsels which promote [18] Id. at 488.
unseemly wrangling should thus be carefully avoided.[57] [19] Id. at 541.
[20] Id. at 527.
It appears that Castillo had previously been suspended for Six (6) Months by this Court in CBD [21] Id. at 1173-1224.
Case No. 176, Bongalonta v. Castillo,[58] for committing falsehood in violation of his lawyers [22] Id. at 687-698.
oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He was then warned that commission of [23] Id. at 697-698.
[24] Id. at 685-686. Partner and Assisting Counsel
[25] Id. at 739-753. to the Guardian Dr. Salvador H. Laurel
[26] Id. at 719-737. [52] Rollo, p. 543.
[27] Id. at 700-712. [53] Id. at 530.
[28] Id. at 807-878. [54] Id. at 713-718.
[29] Id. at 1025-1047. [55] (1) to investigate and determine the liability of Angeles City RTC judges, prosecutors and
[30] Id. at 21. lawyers who facilitated the escape of Benjamin Cassiday III from the Philippines, despite the
[31] Ricafort v. Bansil, A.C. No. 6298, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 194, 201 (2004) (citation existence of a hold departure order and the pendency of the embezzlement case against him
omitted). involving the estate funds of $950,000; (2) to rein and keep in tow the different RTC judges of
[32] Buenaseda v. Flavier, G.R. No. 106719, September 21, 1993, 226 SCRA 645, 656 (citation Angeles City to observe strict fidelity to their oath and to attend with dispatch the welfare and
omitted). well being of the Nonan children by appointing a respectable and credible guardian and in
[33] Lubiano v. Gordolla, A.C. No. 2343, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 459, 461. disposing the various long pending incidents of the guardianship case; (3) to rescue the Nonan
[34] Rollo, p. 360. children who have no house and lot of their own despite their enormous wealth and whose
[35] Tolentino v. Baylosis, 110 Phil. 1010, 1016 (1961). health and welfare are also being neglected and taken for granted by the newly appointed
[36] Supra note 33 at 462-463 (citations omitted). guardian and the guardianship court, (4) to compel the substitution of the heirs of the late
[37] Rollo, pp. 375-376. guardian to guarantee the restitution of the missing estate funds and (5) to compel the new
[38] Rudecon Management Corporation v. Camacho, A.C. No. 6403, August 31, 2004, 437 guardian to post a bond and repatriate expeditiously the remaining estate funds of
SCRA 202, 208 (citation omitted). $1,541,122.57 to the Philippines to enable the guardianship court to control and exercise
[39] Rollo, p. 128. jurisdiction over the same.
[40] Id. at 188. [56] Atty. Reyes v. Atty. Chiong, Jr., 453 Phil. 100, 106 (2003) (citations omitted), People v.
[41] Id. at 262-269. Atty. Sesbreno, 215 Phil. 411, 418 (1984) (citation omitted), Narido v. Atty. Linsangan, 157
[42] Id. at 272-273. Phil. 87, 91 (1974).
[43] Bautista v. Gonzales, A.M. No. 1625, February 12, 1990, 182 SCRA 151, 163. [57] Canon 17, Canons of Professional Ethics.
[44] Silva Vda. de Fajardo v. Bugaring, A.C. No. 5113, October 7, 2004, 440 SCRA 160, 171-172. [58] 310 Phil. 320 (1995).
[45] Tolentino v. Judge Cabral, 385 Phil. 631, 652 (2000).
[46] Muoz v. People, 152 Phil. 570, 575-576 (1973).
[47] Rollo, p. 527.
[48] Id. at 528-536.
[49] Id. at 529-531.
[50] Id. at 530.
[51] Pasig City, Metro Manila
18 April 2000

RECEIPT

US$12,500.00
Received from Dr. Salvador H. Laurel, Guardian Ad Litem for the Nonan Heirs, and Atty.
Benjamin Cassiday III, Principal Foreign Legal Counsel for the said Guardian, the amount of
TWELVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED US DOLLARS (US$12,500.00) as full payment of my
attorneys fees corresponding to the settlement agreement entered into with one of the four
heirs, Mercedita Feliciano through her Guardian Ad Litem Milagros Feliciano, relative to
Special Proceedings No. 5222 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59 entitled In
Re: Guardianship of the Minors Honelyn, Alexandra and Jeril, all surnamed Nonan, Salvador H.
Laurel, Petitioner.

Sgd.
LEON L.ASA
THIRD DIVISION As two student-suspects in the killing, Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, were at the
time in the office of Col. Bentain, Atty. Dizon requested to take them into his custody. Atty.
ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON, Marichu Lambino, Legal Counsel of UP Diliman, who repaired to the Office of Col. Bentain,
Complainant, advised against Atty. Dizons move, however, he not being armed with a warrant for their arrest.

- versus - Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor for students Rosario Torres-Yu, who also repaired to
the office of the colonel, joined Atty. Lambino in opposing the turn-over of the suspects to Atty.
ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO, Dizon, despite the latters claim that under its Charter the NBI was authorized to make
Respondent. warrantless arrests.
x-----------------------------------------x
The suspects lawyer, one Atty. Villamor, later also showed up at the office of Col. Bentain and
ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO, after what appeared to be a heated discussion between Atty. Dizon and the UP officials, the
Complainant, students were allowed to go back to their dormitories, with Atty. Villamor undertaking to
accompany them to the NBI the following morning.
-versus-
The two student-suspects were eventually indicted in court.
ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON,
Respondent. Hence, spawned the filing of a complaint by Atty. Dizon against Atty. Lambino before the
A.C. No. 6968 Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, docketed as CBD Case No. 346.
Present:
Atty. Dizon had earlier filed a criminal complaint also against Atty. Lambino, together with
QUISUMBING, Chairperson, Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and Col. Bentain, before the Ombudsman,
CARPIO, for violation of P.D. 1829 which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and
CARPIO MORALES, prosecution of criminal offenses.
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ. Atty. Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03; Canon 6, Rules 6.01
Promulgated: and 6.02; and Canon 8, Rule 8.01, docketed as CBD Case No. 373.

August 9, 2006 The administrative cases were, on motion of Atty. Lambino, consolidated. Before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), the issues were defined as follows:
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
1. Whether the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the suspected students to the
DECISION group of Atty. Dizon constitutes violation of Code of Professional Responsibility.

CARPIO MORALES, J.: 2. Whether the act of Atty. Dizon in trying to arrest the student-suspects constitutes
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The killing during a rumble on December 8, 1994 of University of the Philippines (UP) graduating
student Dennis Venturina, the chairperson of the UP College of Public Administration Student
Council, drew the then Chancellor of UP Diliman Roger Posadas to seek the assistance of the By Report and Recommendation submitted to the Board of Governors of the IBP on June 20,
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). 2005, CBD Investigating Commissioner Siegfrid B. Mison recommended the dismissal of the
complaint against Atty. Lambino in light of a finding that she acted within her official duties as
Acting on the request of Chancellor Posadas, Atty. Orlando Dizon, then Chief of the Special she safeguarded the rights of the students in accordance with the schools substitute parental
Operations Group (SOG) of the NBI, together with his men, repaired to the Office of Col. authority and within the bounds of the law as the NBI agents had no warrants of arrest.
Eduardo Bentain, head of the UP Security Force on December 12, 1994.
With respect to the complaint against Atty. Dizon, the Commissioner recommended to By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students without a warrant, Atty. Dizon
reprimand him for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility in recklessly tr[ying] to violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
arrest the suspects without warrant.
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution of October 22, 2005, adopted and approved the PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Commissioners Report. The IBP thereupon transferred to this Court its Notice of Resolution,
together with the records of the cases which this Court noted by Resolution of February 1, 2006. xxxx

As earlier stated, the issue against Atty. Lambino is whether she violated the Canons of Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
Professional Ethics in refusing to turn over the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon. lessening confidence in the legal system. (Emphasis supplied).

When the complaint of Atty. Dizon before the Ombudsman against Chancellor Posadas, Vice
Chancellor Torres-Yu and Atty. Lambino was elevated on Certiorari and Prohibition, this Court WHEREFORE, CBD Case No. 346 against Atty. Marichu C. Lambino is DISMISSED.
addressing in the negative the two issues raised therein, to wit:
Atty. Orlando V. Dizon is, in CBD Case No. 373, found guilty of violation of Canon 1 of Rule 1.02
(1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly made of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition
without a warrant; and (2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioner for of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
violation of P.D. No. 1829. x x x,[1]
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the National Bureau of
Investigation, and the Department of Justice.
held that the objection of the said UP officials to the arrest of the students cannot be construed
as a violation of P.D. No. 1829, Sec. 1 (c) without rendering it unconstitutional,[2] they having SO ORDERED.
a right to prevent the arrest [of the students] at the time because their attempted arrest was
illegal.[3] CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Indeed, Atty. Lambino was legally justified in advising against the turn over of the suspects to
Atty. Dizon, there being no basis for him to effect a warrantless arrest. Atty. Dizons
administrative complaint against her must then be dismissed. [1] Posadas v. Ombudsman, 395 Phil. 601, 609-610 (2000).
[2] Id. at 617.
Respecting the complaint against Atty. Dizon, this Court, also in Posadas v. Ombudsman, held [3] Ibid.
that [f]or the failure of the NBI agents to comply with the constitutional and procedural [4] Id. at 613.
requirements, . . . their attempt to arrest [the two student-suspects] without a warrant was [5] Republic Act 157, Section 1(a) and (b).
illegal.[4] [6] Id. at Section 5.

In the main, Atty. Dizon invoked Section 1 (a) of Republic Act 157 (The NBI Charter) which
empowers the NBI to undertake investigations of crimes and other offenses against the laws of
the Philippines, upon its own initiative and as public interest may require[5] and to make
arrests. The invocation does not impress. Said section does not grant the NBI the power to
make warrantless arrests. The NBI Charter clearly qualifies the power to make arrests to be in
accordance with existing laws and rules.

Members of the investigation staff of the Bureau of Investigation shall be peace officers, and
as such have the following powers:

(a) To make arrests, searches and seizures in accordance with existing laws and rules.[6]

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
SECOND DIVISION a. to DENY the petition of Mrs. Erlinda K. Ilusorio for the transfer of all the Ilusorio cases
and/or BCC cases from RTC[-]Baguio City to any RTC, preferably in Metro Manila, for lack of
IN RE: TRANSFER OF VENUE A.M. No. 03-6-349-RTC merit; and
OF ALL ILUSORIO CASES
FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL b. to DESIGNATE Judge Clifton Ganay of RTC, Branch 31, Agoo, La Union to try and decide all
COURT OF BAGUIO CITY TO cases involving the Ilusorio family and [BCC] where the judges of the RTC-Baguio [City] have
METRO MANILA issued orders of inhibition.

x---------------------x
Thereafter, BCC sought clarification of the foregoing designation. It wanted to know whether
IN RE: INHIBITION OF ALL A.M. No. 03-07-376-RTC the Court was ordering the automatic transfer of the cases involving it to Judge Ganay if the
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT judge trying the case had inhibited himself, even if not all the judges of the aforesaid court had
JUDGES OF BAGUIO CITY Present: done the same.
FROM HEARING CIVIL CASE
NO. 5216-R AND CRIMINAL PUNO, J., Chairperson, To dispel the confusion, we issued a resolution on March 8, 2004 amending paragraph (b) of
CASE NO. 20521-R SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, the dispositive portion of the July 14, 2003 resolution to read as follows:
CORONA,
AZCUNA and [T]o designate Judge Clifton Ganay of Regional Trial Court, Agoo, La Union, Branch 31 to try and
GARCIA, JJ. decide all cases involving the Ilusorio family and [BCC] which are Civil Case Nos. 5104-R, 1067-
R, 5289-R, 4928-R, 5039-R, 1012-R, 4750-R, and 4537-R where all the judges of the Regional
Promulgated: Trial Court, Baguio have issued orders of inhibition.

August 22, 2006


Still in a quandary, BCC filed another motion, this time for clarification[6] of the March 8, 2004
x--------------------------------------------------x resolution.

RESOLUTION On the other hand, Ma. Erlinda Ilusorio-Bildner, Sylvia K. Ilusorio and Maximo K. Ilusorio filed
CORONA, J.: their own motion to correct the March 8, 2004 resolution.[7] They prayed for the exclusion of
S.P. No. 1067-R entitled In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Potenciano T. Ilusorio from
the cases listed in the resolution inasmuch as Judge Clarence Villanueva[8] opted to continue
For resolution of this Court are (1) a motion for further clarification[1] filed by Baguio Country presiding over the case.
Club Corporation (BCC) and (2) a motion to correct resolution[2] filed by Ma. Erlinda Ilusorio-
Bildner, Sylvia K. Ilusorio and Maximo K. Ilusorio. The subject of the foregoing motions is the On BCCs motion (for clarification), the Court quotes with approval the memorandum of the
March 8, 2004 resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 03-6-349-RTC which in turn amended a Court Administrator dated January 19, 2004:
(previous) resolution dated July 14, 2003.
Prior to July 14, 2003, Erlinda K. Ilusorio requested[3] the transfer of venue of all Ilusorio [T]here is no automatic transfer of cases of the Ilusorio family or of [BCC] case[s] to Judge
cases[4] from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City to any RTC, preferably in Metro Ganay. As stated in the resolution, the request of Mrs. Erlinda K. Ilusorio to have the venue of
Manila.[5] cases transferred was that the petitioner has not exhausted all the available remedies under
the law. If she believes that some of the judges in Baguio City are impartial and she has evidence
On July 14, 2003, the Court denied her request for lack of merit. Instead, the Court designated to prove the same, she can ask for their inhibition. Hence, a case goes to Judge Ganay if all the
Judge Clifton Ganay of RTC, Branch 31, Agoo, La Union to try and decide all cases involving the judges of the Regional Trial Court shall inhibit from trying the case. Otherwise stated, a judge
Ilusorio family and BCC if the judges of the Baguio City RTC had declined to hear them. The of RTC [-] Baguio City cannot immediately transfer the case to Judge Ganay until all of them
dispositive portion of the resolution read: shall have recused themselves from hearing such case/s.

[T]he Court Resolved:


As for the Bildner groups motion (for correction of our March 8, 2004 resolution), we deny the
same for the reason stated below.
Chairperson
The enumeration of cases in the dispositive portion of the amended (March 8, 2004) resolution
of the Court was merely for the purpose of specifying the cases covered by A.M. No. 03-6-349- ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
RTC so as to avoid any confusion that could cloud the resolution of this matter.[9] Nowhere in Associate Justice Associate Justice
the resolution was it stated that the cases listed there were to be transferred automatically to
Judge Ganay.

Paragraph (b) of the dispositive portion, as amended, meant that the listed cases would be CANCIO C. GARCIA
transferred to Judge Ganay if and only if all judges of the Baguio City RTC inhibited from hearing Associate Justice
them. The designation of Judge Ganay was intended to be a last resort, to take effect only in
the extreme event that all judges of the aforementioned court declined to hear and decide the
cases specified. It was not the intention of this Court to indiscriminately dump all cases on Judge [1] Dated April 29, 2004.
Ganays lap. His designation becomes operative only if all the Baguio RTC judges refuse to take [2] Dated June 18, 2004.
part in these cases.[10] [3] This request was conveyed in two letters dated June 25, 2002 and September 11, 2002,
respectively.
Moreover, the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court provides: [4] There are eight Ilusorio cases pending before the RTC of Baguio City: Civil Case Nos. 5104-
R, 1067-R, 5289-R, 4928-R, 5039-R, 1012-R, 4750-R, and 4537-R.
xxx xxx xxx [5] Report of the Office of the Court Administrator dated June 5, 2003.
In any case where the Judge concerned is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits himself, the records [6] Supra note 1.
shall be returned to the Executive Judge and the case shall be included in the regular raffle for [7] Supra note 2.
re-assignment.[11] [8] Judge Villanueva was dismissed from the service for immorality in the Courts resolution in
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1927, Judge Ruben C. Ayson v. RTC Judges of Baguio City promulgated on June
26, 2006.
The interpretation of the Bildner groups counsel is therefore erroneous and way out of line. [9] Supra.
There is no need to amend the resolution dated March 8, 2004 and exclude S.P. No. 1067-R [10] Supra.
from the cases listed therein. [11] Volume 1, Chapter IV, Section E, Paragraph 1.1.3.5 (b), p. 218.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to DENY the motions for further clarification and to
correct resolution.

Paragraph (b) of the resolution dated July 14, 2003, as amended by the March 8, 2004
resolution, is hereby reiterated.

Judge Clifton Ganay of Regional Trial Court, Agoo, La Union, Branch 31 is designated to try and
decide all cases involving the Ilusorio family and Baguio Country Club which are Civil Case Nos.
5104-R, 1067-R, 5289-R, 4928-R, 5039-R, 1012-R, 4750-R, and 4537-R where all the judges of
the Regional Trial Court, Baguio [City] have issued orders of inhibition.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
3. Atty. Paa disclosed the receipt of the P450,000 to complainant and to Atty. Ma. Paz
EN BANC Besonaya (Atty. Besonaya), a court attorney from the office of Court of Appeals Justice Mariano
C. Del Castillo, during a get-together at Cafe Breton in Malate, Manila in October 2002.

ATTY. VICTORIANO S. MURING, JR., Complainant, 4. On 29 October 2002, while complainant and Calayag were together in the office, Calayag
A.M. No. CA-05-19-P admitted to complainant receipt of the P450,000.

Present: 5. Soon after, Atty. Paa sent complainant threatening text messages, pressuring him to
prevent Atty. Besonaya from informing Justice Barrios about the pay-off. Atty. Gatcho and
- versus - Calayag also subjected complainant to verbal abuse for the same purpose.

ATTY. MANUEL T. GATCHO, 6. On 5 December 2002, complainant arrived in his office to find Atty. Paa in the visitors room.
Court Attorney V, Atty. Paa was there to show Justice Abesamis the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) in an
NELPA LOTA-CALAYAG, adoption case where complainant appeared as counsel while employed as court attorney.
Executive Assistant V,
and ATTY. EDNA S. PAA, 7. Justice Abesamis directed complainant not to divulge to anyone what he had heard about
Respondents. the pay-off story, to refrain from talking to Atty. Besonaya, and to cooperate with Atty. Gatcho.
On 19 February 2003, two days after complainant reported to Justice Abesamis the verbal
Promulgated: abuse he received from Atty. Gatcho and Calayag, Justice Abesamis informed complainant that
he was to be removed from the office effective immediately.

August 31, 2006 8. On 19 February 2003, complainant sought an audience with then Acting Presiding Justice
of the Court of Appeals (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Cancio Garcia (Justice Garcia).
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x After hearing complainants story, Justice Garcia prevailed on him to unearth/expose the pay-
off in the highest interest of the court and of the entire judiciary as an institution.[2]

DECISION
On 18 March 2003, we resolved to act on the complaint and require respondents to submit
CARPIO, J.: their respective Comments.

Calayag filed her Comment on 16 June 2003, wherein she assailed complainants allegations as
The Case hearsay. She claimed that:

The truth of the matter is that on October 31, 2002, I talked to Atty. Muring and inquired from
On 28 February 2003, Atty. Victoriano S. Muring, Jr. (complainant) filed a Complaint-Affidavit[1] him whether I have offended him in some way. This is due to the fact that Atty. Muring and
before this Court against respondents Atty. Manuel T. Gatcho (Atty. Gatcho), Nelpa Lota- Atty. Besonaya have been spreading rumors about me, my children, and my husband (purely
Calayag (Calayag), and Atty. Edna S. Paa (Atty. Paa), charging that: personal). Atty. Murings reply was that it was Atty. Paa who told him about these rumors, after
which Atty. Muring apologized. x x x
1. Atty. Gatcho and Calayag, complainants co-employees at the office of Court of Appeals
Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (Justice Abesamis, now retired), demanded and received from xxxx
Atty. Paa P450,000 to facilitate a favorable decision from Court of Appeals Justice Roberto
Barrios (Justice Barrios) in a case then handled by Atty. Paa for her employer. With respect to the allegations x x x regarding the event which transpired on December 5, 2002,
the same are likewise contrary to the true events which occurred. On December 5, 2002, the
2. Atty. Gatcho and Calayag also demanded P150,000 from Atty. Paa and her employer in staff of Justice Abesamis requested for a conference, together with Atty. Muring, to discuss
exchange for a favorable decision from Supreme Court Justice Jose A. R. Melo (Justice Melo, matters regarding our respective official functions. The conference was mainly due to the fact
now retired). that Atty. Muring has been complaining that the staff refused to help him in preparing the
synopsis of a certain case.
regarding her going to the office of Justice Abesamis in the afternoon of x x x December 5,
xxxx 2002. [Atty. Paa] told me that she pushed and shoved [complainant] x x x.[8]

[Atty. Paa] was at the office on that date and time purposely to confront Atty. Muring regarding 2. Annex B, the Affidavit of Atty. Besonaya dated 12 July 2003, attesting to her presence at
his claim that the former has been spreading rumors against me.[3] Cafe Breton that day in October 2002 when Atty. Paas statements on the alleged pay-off were
supposedly made. Atty. Besonaya affirmed complainants entire story, thus:

In his Comment dated 12 June 2003, Atty. Gatcho vehemently denied complainants 2. In the late afternoon/early evening [sometime in October 2002], I obliged to meet [Atty.
accusations. Atty. Gatcho surmised that [complainant] may have thought that I wanted him Paa]. We met at the guardhouse of the main entrance of the Court of Appeals. We then
terminated, thus: proceeded to the nearby Peking Wok Restaurant along Engracia St., Manila to take our
dinner. During the said dinner, nothing much was heard from [Atty. Paa]. x x x
I helped [Atty. Paa] obtain a copy of an already promulgated decision from the Reporters Office,
which gesture, I honestly believe, is not violative of any existing rule or regulation governing a 3. From Peking Wok Restaurant, [Atty. Paa] and I proceeded to Cafe Breton in Malate,
government employee. Manila where [complainant would] follow. When [complainant] later arrived, the
conversation veered towards [Atty. Gatcho and Calayag] x x x. [Atty. Paa] asked [complainant]
xxxx how he was getting along with [Atty. Gatcho and Calayag]. I could not recall the exact words x
x x but can recall [complainant] having said x x x to the effect that he was getting along with
In [complainants] affidavit, he would not believe that I wanted a confrontation with him x x x. them well so far. Thereafter, [Atty. Paa] blurted out to [complainant], Basta, mag-ingat ka kay
As the [Officer-in-Charge], it was my responsibility to make sure that everything goes well in [Calayag at Atty. Gatcho]. Si [Calayag], very manipulative yan. Scheming pa. [Atty. Paa] went
the office. x x x on to tell about [Calayags] x x x bad habits and poor academic performance even way back in
college. Both [Atty. Paa] and [Calayag were] classmates and friends even in their pre-law
xxxx years x x x. Much as I wanted to discourage [Atty. Paa] from character assassinating (sic)
[Calayag], but (sic) she was unstoppable.
[Complainant] did not want to talk about his work habit in the office. My only concern that time
was how to improve our output in doing research for Justice Abesamis.[4] x x x 4. To our surprise, [Atty. Paa] blurted out, Humingi nga sa akin ng P450,000 yang dalawang
yan sa kaso dati ni Tanchi kay Barrios!, referring [to Atty. Gatcho and Calayag]. Upon hearing
In her Affidavit dated 13 May 2003, Atty. Paa denied altogether the statements imputed to her those words, I madly reacted, Tarantado ka Edna, totoo ba yan?! Sasabihin ko yan kay Barrios.
by complainant. Though Atty. Paa acknowledged her closeness with complainant and Atty. Alam mong close kay Tatay yon! [Atty. Paa] retorted, Gusto mo tawagan mo pa si Mr. Estrella!
Besonaya, she alleged that relations among them gradually turned sour due to frequent
bickering between complainant and Atty. Besonaya on the one hand, and Atty. Gatcho and
Calayag on the other.[5] Atty. Paa admitted that she sent the threatening text messages to 5. [Atty. Paa] further said that [Atty. Gatcho and Calayag] volunteered and claimed to her
complainant, but only because complainant was creating intrigues among us friends.[6] that they could arrange and/or facilitate a favorable decision from Justice Barrios. That, as she
could not handle anymore [Atty. Gatcho and Calayags] demands as regards the case, she told
Complainant filed his Reply to Comments[7] on 17 July 2003. To contradict Atty. Gatcho and them to call and speak with Mr. Peter Tanchi, Sr, instead. [Atty. Paa] said that both [Atty.
Calayags insinuations that complainants poor performance in the office caused his removal, Gatcho and Calayag] ended up calling and speaking with Mr. Estrella and Mr. Tanchi, Sr.
complainant attached a copy of his performance appraisal for the second semester of 2002,
wherein he received a very satisfactory rating. 6. I felt very upset after [Atty. Paas] declaration. I could not believe that [Calayag and Atty.
Gatcho] were involved in a case fixing and dared to have supposedly fixed a case with a
Complainant also attached the following affidavits to his Reply: Justice whom I know personally and professionally x x x to be a man of unquestionable
integrity and independence. I could not believe that the likes of [Atty. Gatcho and Calayag]
1. Annex A, the Affidavit of Atty. Donna B. Pascual (Atty. Pascual) dated 3 July 2003, would go to the extent of demanding and accepting money from a litigant, at the expense of
attesting that (a) sometime in November 2002, [Atty. Paa] called me several times requesting Justice Barrioss good name and put in disrepute the latters integrity, that of the Court of
me to dissuade [Atty. Besonaya] from reporting to Justice Barrios of the Court of Appeals a Appeals, and the entire judiciary as an institution.
pay-off back in the year 2000, that involved her (Atty. Paa), [Calayag], and a certain Nuel
(Atty. Gatcho), regarding a case then pending with the office of Justice Barrios; and (b) Again, 7. Still, [Atty. Paa] continued her story. She said that after the P450,000 pay-off, [Atty.
on December 6, 2002, [Atty. Paa] called me. This time, she related to me the circumstances Gatcho and Calayag] again demanded P150,000 from her after the Supreme Court issued a
Minute Resolution dismissing the petition for review on certiorari in another case she was
handling with the same Mr. Tanchi, Sr.s company. According to Atty. Paa, [Atty. Gatcho and
Calayag] represented that [Atty. Gatcho], who allegedly [could] go in and out of the Office of That x x x it was not advisable for [Atty. Paa] then to formally speak of the pay-off prior to
Justice Melo, was responsible for the favorable resolution dismissing the petition. x x x [Atty. November 7, 2000, as it [would] prejudice and hamper the ongoing negotiation between her
Paa] said that after verification later, she discovered that the said case was actually resolved and the Tanchi Group for compromise/settlement, the tentative date of which according to
by Justice Panganiban [and] not Justice Melo contrary to the representation of [Atty. Gatcho [Atty. Paa] was November 6, 2002. x x x
and Calayag]. Allegedly, Mr. Tanchi, Sr. refused to give in to [Atty. Gatcho and Calayags]
demand for P150,000 but offered to give P10,000 as token instead. According to [Atty. Paa], xxxx
[Atty. Gatcho] through [Calayag] refused to receive the P10,000 token. [Atty. Paa] also said
that the P150,000 demand of [Atty. Gatcho and Calayag] primarily caused her falling apart
with Mr. Tanchi, Sr. and the rest of her employers, that eventually led to her resignation as Around 4:27 in the afternoon of [October 28, 2002], I called [Atty. Paa] through her cellular
the in-house counsel of the Tanchi Group of Companies x x x.[9] phone x x x.

xxxx [Atty. Paa] spoke in a complete turnaround. She told me that she pity (sic) [Calayag] as she has
Atty. Besonaya further disclosed that Atty. Paa went to her house several days after their been sick lately x x x. She also said that the pay-off transaction between her, [Atty. Gatcho],
meeting at Cafe Breton. There, Atty. Paa made the following revelations: and [Calayag] should not be taken as an issue against anyone, after all, she is a practicing lawyer
who would sometimes resort to such means to win her case.
That the P450,000 cash demanded by [Atty. Gatcho and Calayag] was delivered [to] the Office
of Justice Abesamis, Centennial Building of the Court of Appeals, by Mr. Estrella accompanied My last words to her was, Oh, you have a sudden change of heart?! Bakit takot ka na kay [Atty.
by [Atty. Paa], and received thereat by both [Atty. Gatcho and Calayag] one afternoon, Gatcho] ngayon? She answered back, Paz, kasi if it would involve their (Atty. Gatcho and
sometime prior to the promulgation of the decision x x x. Calayags) career, they may harm you back. x x x

That the decision in CA-G.R. Sp. No. 49363, entitled Credito Asiatic, Inc., et al. v. DARAB, et al. From then on, I cut all communications with [Atty. Paa]. x x x[10]
penned by Justice Barrios was promulgated on March 15, 2000, which case she said was the
subject of a Petition for Review on Certiorari pending with the Supreme Court x x x.
On 26 August 2003, this Court resolved to refer the matter to Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam
That in the afternoon of March 15, 2000, [Atty. Paa] was x x x at the Office of Justice Abesamis, (Justice Sundiam) of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.[11]
waiting for the advance copy of the decision from the Division Clerk of Court to be furnished by
[Atty. Gatcho and Calayag].
Findings of the Investigating Justice
That before the close of office hours that same day, [Calayag] handed to her an advance copy
of the decision. [Calayag] represented that she was given the advance copy of the decision by Justice Sundiam conducted hearings on the case from 16 October 2003 to 25 May 2004. All of
the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Caroline Peralta. x x x the parties appeared except for Atty. Paa, who was then in the United Kingdom. Atty. Paa
submitted a Rejoinder/Comment (Comment)[12] executed before Consul-General Mario de
xxxx Leon of the Philippine Embassy in London. In her Comment, Atty. Paa reiterated her defense
that this case is all about intrigues and malicious accusations borne out of extreme anger due
That the amount of P10,000 which Mr. Tanchi, Sr. obliged to give to [Atty. Gatcho and Calayag] to the dismissal from office by [complainant] x x x.[13]
was delivered to [Calayag] one Sunday in September 2000 just across De La Salle University
outside Henrys, Taft Avenue, Manila, during the 2000 Bar Examinations, and contained in a On 19 April 2005, Justice Sundiam submitted his Report and Recommendation (Report). Justice
white letter envelope. The amount, however, was refused by [Calayag for] being insufficient Sundiam concluded that the evidence adduced by complainant, as supported by the
and way below the P150,000 demanded. testimonies of Atty. Pascual and Atty. Besonaya, depicted a more convincing story in contrast
to the denials made by Atty. Gatcho and Calayag. On the other hand, Justice Sundiam found
Respondent [Atty. Paa] also confirmed that she was referring to the same white letter envelope Atty. Paa to be a victim of circumstances because it appeared that she did not solicit the help
the contents of which she showed me one Sunday afternoon during the September 2000 Bar of [Atty.] Gatcho and Calayag and/or offered a bribe to or through them, but it was Atty. Gatcho
Examinations, containing P1,000-peso denominations, to be the same envelope that [Calayag] and Calayag who represented that they could facilitate the issuance of a favorable decision x x
declined to receive earlier that afternoon. x.[14]

xxxx
With both Atty. Gatcho and Calayag already resigned from the Court of Appeals, Justice but the fact was admitted to him by [Calayag] and related to him by [Atty. Paa] in the presence
Sundiam recommended that whatever benefits [they] may be entitled arising from their of [Atty. Besonaya].
previous employment x x x be forfeited and that they be forever barred from employment in
any government agency.[15] Atty. Paa, however, may be absolved of any liability or may be As to whether Justice Barrios rendered a favorable decision in the case of [Atty. Paas] client,
admonished.[16] Tanchi, [complainant] would initially testify that he did not know, x x x later on he would state
that he is confused and that there was a favorable decision as stated in the Comment of [Atty.]
Paa x x x and finally, would state that he had the distinct impression that there was a favorable
The Issues decision.[20]
Worse, complainant could not even vouch for the integrity of Atty. Paas information, as he was
The issues in this case are: not certain if Atty. Paa personally dealt with Atty. Gatcho and Calayag in the alleged
transactions:
1. Whether Atty. Gatcho and Calayag demanded and received P450,000 from Atty. Paa or her
employer to facilitate a favorable decision in a case before the office of Court of Appeals Justice ATTY. CORDOVA:
Roberto Barrios.
You know for a fact that [Atty. Gatcho and Calayag] indeed received the amount of P150,000
2. Whether Atty. Gatcho and Calayag demanded P150,000 from Atty. Paa or her employer, from the employer of Atty. Paa?
with the representation that they could facilitate a favorable decision in a case before the office
of Supreme Court Justice Jose A.R. Melo.[17] COMPLAINANT:

That was the story of [Atty.] Paa. That was the story that they did not receive P150,000. but
The Courts Ruling they demanded P150,000 but only the P10,000 was volunteered by Tanchi.

xxxx
We cannot sustain the findings of the Investigating Justice.
Q: Was Atty. Paa there when [Calayag] and Atty. Gatcho demanded this P150,000 from the
Complaint not supported by substantial evidence employer of Atty. Paa?
A: That was the story of [Atty.] Paa that they demanded P150,000 for the favorable resolution.
We have repeatedly held that the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in
administrative cases is substantial evidence, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind Q: So you do not know if Atty. Paa was indeed there when these two respondents demanded
may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[18] Mere allegation is not evidence and is not this P150,000?
equivalent to proof.[19]
xxxx
A thorough examination of the records shows that complainants case is founded mainly on
statements uttered by Atty. Paa to complainant and to Atty. Besonaya. Complainant and Atty. A: That I dont know, Your Honor.[21]
Besonaya had no personal knowledge of the alleged pay-off. As noted in the Report,
complainant himself admitted this lack of personal knowledge:
Complainant claims that Atty. Paa threatened him to keep silent about the pay-off, otherwise
Well to note, however, are the following admissions by [complainant] during his cross- she would show Justice Abesamis the TSN of the adoption case where complainant appeared
examination (TSN, November 10, 2003): that [Atty. Paa] told him about the pay-off by merely as counsel while employed as a court attorney. Complainant submits as evidence several text
mentioning kaso ni Tanchi; that he was not present when the alleged P450,000 was allegedly messages sent from Atty. Paas cellular phone to his.[22] To our mind, the messages may be
given to [Atty. Gatcho] and Calayag; that he was not present during the alleged pay-off; that he proof that complainant and Atty. Paa were in a bitter disagreement, but not necessarily under
was not present when [Atty. Gatcho] and Calayag demanded the P150,000 from the employer the circumstances of blackmail described by complainant. This theory of blackmail leaves one
of [Atty. Paa] anent the case with Justice Melo; that it was the story of [Atty. Paa] that [Atty. wondering why Atty. Paa eventually decided to give Justice Abesamis a copy of the TSN, when
Gatcho] and Calayag did not receive the P150,000 because they (Tanchi employer of [Atty. Paa]) by such act, Atty. Paa instead gave complainant a reason to retaliate, thus:
volunteered only P10,000; that he does not know what happened to the case pending with JUSTICE SUNDIAM:
Justice Melo; that he did not actually see [Atty. Gatcho] and Calayag receive the P450,000 x x x
Now, since [you had] not yet told Justice Abesamis about the pay- off why did she, Atty. Paa, Thus, upon learning of his termination, complainant decided to seek an audience with Justice
give the TSN ahead to Justice Abesamis? Garcia, but only so that Justice Garcia could somehow intervene on [his] behalf that instead
[he] would be allowed to resign instead of being terminated x x x. Complainant feared the
xxxx forfeiture of the monetary value of [his] leave credits if terminated for cause.[25]

COMPLAINANT: Finally, complainant failed to adduce evidence that Atty. Gatcho obtained a copy of the decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 49363, on the day of its promulgation, for an unlawful reason.
I cannot speak for Atty. Paa. But all I can say is that, [Atty.] Paa took it against me. x x x that
there was failure on my part to dissuade Atty. Besonaya. But as to her other motive in giving Testimony of Atty. Pascual and Atty. Besonaya
the TSN to Justice Abesamis, I cannot speak for her.[23] fail to bolster complainants allegations

It further appears that complainant himself was not convinced of the solidness of his case. The affidavit of Atty. Pascual states that Atty. Paa sought her help to dissuade Atty. Besonaya
Asked during cross-examination if he entertained the thought of informing the concerned from reporting the pay-off to Justice Barrios. Contrary to the contents of her affidavit, Atty.
incumbent justices of the pay-off, complainants answers revealed his own uncertainty: Pascual testified on cross-examination that Atty. Paa made no further requests from her other
than to mend a rift between her and Atty. Besonaya:[26]
JUSTICE SUNDIAM:
ATTY. PEREZ:
So, in short, it never occurred to you to see these two Justices. Please answer the question?
And how upset was Atty. Besonaya?
COMPLAINANT:
[ATTY.] PASCUAL:
Actually Your Honor, I was afraid to do such an action.
I have no idea, Sir, because it was only relayed to me by Atty. Paa when she was asking me to
Q: You were afraid to do it? patch up her friendship with Atty. Besonaya.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
ATTY. PEREZ:
Q: And what did Atty. Paa tell you?
Why were you afraid to do it? A: She mentioned about [Atty. Besonaya] getting upset about alleged pay-off with Justice
Barrios. She also mentioned the names of Malou and Noel which, that name Noel, I did not
A: You know I might even be (pause) Justice Barrios, for one, may ask me, who is my source or even know. So, I simply did not pay attention to that because its a (pause) all the while I thought
what is my source. So, it would be hard on my part to start up a controversy without proof. it was a simple quarrel among friends.

Q: What proof do you have now if you didnt have any proof Mr. Witness, what proof do you Q: So, at first you didnt believe. Yes or No?
have now to start a whole, big, controversy? A: If I did not believe the story?
A: We are just starting so, I think in the process, I think there will be pieces of evidence to be
presented that I hope would prove the allegations of my complaint. Q: What [Atty. Paa] told you?
A: From the level of voice of Atty. Paa, I could sense that there was really a rift between her
and Atty. Besonaya, but regarding pay- off, I did not bother myself with that pay-off. [27]
Q: So you are not yet through with your data gathering, yes or no?
A: What do you mean by data gathering? Q: Madam Witness, you stated a while ago that Atty. Paa called you only for the purpose of
asking your help in patching up her differences with Atty. Besonaya, is that correct?
Q: With your gathering of pieces of evidence? A: Are you referring to that particular day?
A: I will be presenting witnesses on my behalf. x x x[24]
ATTY. PEREZ:

Yes.
Q: Now when Atty. Paa showed you the white envelope as you stated, did Atty. Paa tell you
[ATTY.] PASCUAL: anything else aside from that?
A: No Sir, she only confirmed it during our second meeting in our house already, last October
Yes, sir. already.

Q: Now, in your affidavit, paragraph 4 While I called [Atty. Besonaya] and informed her about Q: What did she confirm during that second meeting?
[Atty. Paas] request, I made no effort to dissuade her. What do you mean by this? A: That the money actually was the P10,000, the P10,000 was refused to be receive (sic) by
A: I made no effort to dissuade her? [Calayag] then, Sir, on September 2000.[31]

ATTY. PEREZ: Atty. Besonayas narration of the events does not prove that the money in the envelope was
tendered to Calayag pursuant to a pay-off arrangement. Neither does it prove that Calayag
Yes. refused to accept the envelope because, as relayed by Atty. Paa to Atty. Besonaya, the amount
contained therein was not acceptable to Calayag.
A: I made no effort to talk to [Atty. Besonaya] regarding- (pause) dissuading her from exposing
about that pay-off. Atty. Paa is administratively liable

Q: Why, Madam Witness, was there a request for you to dissuade Atty. Besonaya from The accusations against Atty. Gatcho and Calayag regarding a pay-off may not have been fully
reporting the alleged pay-off? substantiated, but it is clear to the Court that Atty. Paas reckless statements and actions about
A: Request from whom, Sir. an alleged pay-off in the judiciary sparked this entire controversy. Complainant, Atty. Pascual,
and Atty. Besonaya all pointed to Atty. Paa as their source of information on the alleged pay-
Q: From Atty. Paa or whoever? off. It would be difficult to ascribe to them any evil motive in accusing Atty. Paa, as she herself
A: She did not ask me to dissuade [Atty. Besonaya].[28] admitted their close relationship based on long-term friendships. The respective testimonies of
complainant and Atty. Besonaya regarding the events that transpired in Cafe Breton
While admitting that she had no personal knowledge of the pay-off, Atty. Besonaya insists that correspond perfectly. In the face of these evidence, Atty. Paas claim that complainant was
she witnessed Atty. Paa hand over the envelope containing P10,000 to Calayag, which envelope merely creating intrigues among the parties rings hollow.
Calayag refused to receive.[29] However, she did not hear the conversation between Atty. Paa
and Calayag[30] and only learned about the matter of the envelope when Atty. Paa visited her If lawyers commit a misconduct that would put their moral character in serious doubt, then the
house sometime in October 2000. Again, we find that Atty. Paas statements serve as the sole court is justified in suspending or removing them from the office of attorney.[32] The evidence
basis for Atty. Besonayas allegations: in this case shows failure on the part of Atty. Paa to comply with the exacting standards of good
moral character required of members of the Bar. Atty. Paas reckless statements on alleged
ATTY. PEREZ: schemes of corruption serve only to tarnish the image of the legal profession and of public
Now in Paragraph 11.7 of your statement, the second Paragraph of 11.7 you stated that office.
respondent [Atty. Paa] also confirmed that she was referring to the same white envelope the
contents of which she showed me one Sunday afternoon during the September 2000 Bar
Examinations, containing P1,000-peso denominations, to be the same, can you tell this Court Atty. Gatcho filed petitions for commission
how [Atty.] Paa showed you that envelope? as notary public while employed as court attorney

BESONAYA: In the course of the hearings, complainant presented copies of petitions filed by Atty. Gatcho
for commission as notary public in the cities of Mandaluyong and Makati, dated 3 April 2000
Because after that Bar Operations around mga past 5 oclock [Calayag] declined to receive and 7 February 2003, respectively. Atty. Gatcho asserts that he filed the petitions only because
earlier the envelope that afternoon we proceeded to Tapa King Restaurant along Estrada corner he was planning to engage in private practice upon separation from government service.[33]
Taft Avenue, I was waiting for a friend there and I think that time she was waiting for her These petitions do not form part of the records.
brother and she joked about it, I can recall she said that ayaw nila ikain na lang natin. And
showing to me the white envelope, Sir, with the money. Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Executive Department permits employees of government
offices to engage directly in any private business, vocation or profession x x x outside office
xxxx hours.[34] However, we declared in an En Banc resolution dated 1 October 1987 that
x x x [the memorandum circular] x x x [is] not applicable to officials or employees of the courts the Judiciary, we also ADMONISH Atty. Manuel T. Gatcho, Court Attorney V. They are STERNLY
considering the express prohibition in the Rules of Court and the nature of their work which WARNED that repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe
requires them to serve with the highest degree of efficiency and responsibility, in order to sanction.
maintain public confidence in the Judiciary.[35]
We DISMISS the administrative complaint against Nelpa Lota-Calayag, Executive Assistant V, for
Atty. Gatcho should have known that as a government lawyer, he was prohibited from engaging lack of merit.
in notarial practice, or in any form of private legal practice for that matter. Atty. Gatcho cannot
now feign ignorance or good faith, as he did not seek to exculpate himself by providing an Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
explanation for his error. Atty. Gatchos filing of the petition for commission, while not an actual personal records of Paa, Muring, and Gatcho, as attorneys; the Integrated Bar of the
engagement in the practice of law, appears as a furtive attempt to evade the prohibition. Philippines; and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.

Complainant engaged in unauthorized private practice SO ORDERED.

While complainant must have intended to assume the role of whistle-blower in filing this case,
we cannot disregard complainants admission that he appeared in court as counsel and received ANTONIO T. CARPIO
P2,000 in appearance fees when he was employed as court attorney.[36] Appearing in court on Associate Justice
behalf of a party litigant falls within the scope of the phrase practice of law. We held in
Cayetano v. Monsod that
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-16.
To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the [2] Id. at 232-234.
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which [3] Id. at 50-51.
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.[37] [4] Id. at 67-69.
[5] Id. at 54-55.
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, engaging in the private [6] Id. at 56.
practice of profession, when unauthorized, is classified as a light offense punishable by [7] Id. at 83-98.
reprimand.[38] [8] Id. at 90-91.
[9] Id. at 101-110.
[10] Id. at 104-107.
Resignation or removal not a bar [11] Id. at 203.
to a finding of administrative liability [12] Id. at 189-198.
[13] Id. at 189.
[14] Report, p. 20.
The fact that complainant and Atty. Gatcho are no longer employed at the Court of Appeals, [15] Id. at 21.
and claim to have shifted to private practice, does not preclude the Court from making a [16] Id.
pronouncement as to their administrative liability for acts committed by them while in [17] Id. at 3-4.
government service. Cessation from office of a respondent by resignation or retirement does [18] Navarro v. Cerezo, A.M. No. P-05-1962, 17 February 2005, 451 SCRA 626, 629.
not warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint filed while he or she was still in the [19] Id.
service nor does it render the administrative case moot and academic.[39] The complaint in [20] Report, pp. 6-7.
this case was filed on 28 February 2003, before Atty. Gatcho resigned. The jurisdiction that the [21] TSN, 10 November 2003, pp. 44-46.
Court acquired at the time of the filing of the complaint is retained until the case is finally [22] Rollo, pp. 6-7.
resolved. However, while they deserve a more severe penalty, like suspension from office, they [23] TSN, 13 November 2003, pp. 29-32.
can only now be admonished since they are no longer in the service. [24] TSN, 10 November 2003, pp. 121-122.
[25] TSN, 13 November 2003, p. 59.
WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Edna S. Paa guilty of gross misconduct and accordingly SUSPEND her [26] TSN, 19 November 2003, pp. 74-75.
from the practice of law for three (3) months effective upon finality of this Decision. For [27] Id. at 75-76, 78-79.
engaging in the unauthorized private practice of law, we ADMONISH Atty. Victoriano S. Muring, [28] Id. at 81.
Jr., Court Attorney IV. For filing a petition for commission as notary public while employed in [29] TSN, 5 December 2003, p. 81.
[30] Id. at 96.
[31] Id. at 73-74.
[32] In re Sotto, 38 Phil. 532 (1918).
[33] TSN, 12 May 2004, pp. 29-30.
[34] Memorandum Circular No. 17 dated 4 September 1986 issued by the Executive
Department pursuant to Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules.
[35] Administrative Circular No. 5 issued by Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan on 4 October 1988.
Supreme Court Circulars, Part I, p. 117.
[36] TSN, 10 November 2003, pp. 64-69.
[37] G.R. No. 100113, 03 September 1991, 201 SCRA 210, 214.
[38] Section 52, Rule IV. Resolution No. 991936 of the Civil Service Commission, effective 26
September 1999.
[39] Baquerfo v. Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974, 6 April 2005, 455 SCRA 13.
in May 1997 and, until the filing of the present complaint, respondent judge had yet to officially
promulgate his decision on the matter.
SECOND DIVISION
Complainant likewise contended that while the case was pending, respondent judge went to
ALBERTO GUINTO, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1399 his office and borrowed P5,000. Complainant was, at the time, the chief of security of
Complainant, (formerly OCA IPI No. 99-813-MTJ) Pampanga Sugar Development Co. After he gave the money to respondent judge, the latter
promised to resolve the election protest case immediately.
Present:
Complainant further alleged that respondent judge, with a female companion, again went to
PUNO, J., Chairperson, his office and asked him out to lunch. Complainant paid for their lunch, including the food that
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, respondent judge ordered for take-out.
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and Sometime during the first week of December 1998, respondent judge once more went to his
GARCIA, JJ. office and asked for a sack of sugar and, just a few days before Christmas, for two more sacks.

JUDGE RODRIGO R. FLORES In August 1999, respondent judge released a decision adverse to complainant. Guinto
and Court Interpreter, confronted Judge Flores who told him it was released without his knowledge. Respondent judge
CANDELARIA MANGULABNAN, claimed that respondent Candelaria Mangulabnan inserted the decision among the piles of
MTCC, Branch 2, City of San documents that he signed. He claimed he did not notice that it was one of those documents.
Fernando, Pampanga,
Respondents. On the issue of delay in the resolution of the election protest case, respondent judge averred
Promulgated: that he constituted a revision committee soon after the issues were joined to hasten the
recount of the ballots. The committee, however, failed to convene due to recurring floods in
August 10, 2006 their area. The ballots were also soaked wet by the flood and the committee had to wait for
them to dry before it could resume its meetings. Respondent judge added that a mandamus
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x case filed against him by Manalastas also took much of his time so he failed to resolve the case
within the reglementary period.[4]
RESOLUTION
Respondent Mangulabnan, on the other hand, denied that she surreptitiously inserted the
CORONA, J.: decision among the documents Judge Flores signed. According to her, Judge Flores voluntarily
and knowingly signed the decision and in fact instructed her to release a photocopy of the
decision to protestee Manalastas counsel.[5]
In a sworn complaint dated October 7, 1999, complainant Alberto Guinto charged Candelaria
Mangulabnan, Court Interpreter of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC),[1] Branch 2, of San The complaints were referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for investigation,
Fernando, Pampanga, of grave misconduct and violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt report and recommendation. On November 28, 2001, the OCA submitted its report and
Practices Act),[2] in connection with an election protest case, docketed as Election Protest No. recommendation.[6] This Court, in a resolution[7] dated February 13, 2002, adopted the
97-04, entitled Alberto Guinto v. Dario Manalastas. recommendation of OCA to consolidate the complaints and refer them to the executive judge
of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, for proper investigation, report and
In another sworn complaint dated October 14, 1999, Guinto accused Judge Rodrigo R. Flores of recommendation.
the same court of failure to render a decision[3] within the 90-day required period in an election
protest case and for violation of RA 3019. After several hearings, Judge Adelaida Ala-Medina, the investigating officer, submitted her
report to the Court on May 20, 2003.[8] In the report, she stated that during her investigation,
In both complaints, Guinto alleged that he was a party to an election case raffled to respondent respondent judge never once refuted the charges against him. Neither did he deny or attempt
judge. He was a candidate for barangay chairperson in the 1997 barangay elections in which he to offer any explanation. Surprisingly, complainant also submitted an affidavit[9] recalling his
lost to Manalastas. He averred that Judge Flores and Manalastas connived to delay the accusations against respondents. He allegedly committed a mistake in filing the administrative
resolution of the case for monetary consideration. He claimed that the election case was filed cases against them. At this instance, respondent judge then sought the dismissal of the
complaint against him.
A judge should impress upon the public that legal issues are resolved based solely on the facts
The investigating officer, however, found evidence that respondent Mangulabnan acted as and the laws applicable. Being at the forefront of the judicial system, respondent judge should
Judge Flores conduit in soliciting money from the litigants. She maintained though that she was have avoided impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in his behavior[12] so as not to
only tasked by Judge Flores to pick up the P20,000 he borrowed from protestee Manalastas. In corrode the peoples respect for the law and judicial institutions.
the same investigation, Manalastas counsel confirmed that his client gave Judge Flores that
amount through Mangulabnan. Respondent judge degraded his office when he took freebies from complainant. The public
holds judges in high esteem due to the integrity and probity that qualify them for the job. It
The investigating officer stated in her report: was thus highly improper for respondent judge to take free meals and goods from complainant.
By his conduct, he put the whole bench in disrepute.
xxx xxx xxx Under the amendments to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,[13] the actuation of respondent
judge qualified as serious misconduct punishable by a fine of P20,000 to P40,000 to dismissal
Mangulabnan should have been aware that respondent judge, in asking money from litigants, from the service, forfeiture of all or part of ones benefits and disqualification from appointment
was engaging in an illicit activity and she was being made a party thereto. She facilitated the to any public office.
transfer of the money between the parties by acting as conduit, thereby protecting the parties
from suspicion and concealing the misdeed. She is well aware that the mission assigned to her On the issue of delay, we rule respondent judge to be guilty as charged. When the complaint
by Judge Flores was unlawful but she still undertook the task willingly. That she did not desist against him was filed on October 14, 1999, he had yet to resolve the election protest case. That
from taking part therein, or report the matter promptly to the authorities, constitutes grave was more than two years from the time the election case was raffled to his sala.
misconduct. xxx It is thus recommended that, for her part, in respondent judges corrupt
scheme, respondent Mangulabnan be dismissed from service, with forfeiture of all her benefits Under the same amendment,[14] failure to resolve a case within the reglementary period
except leave credits. provided by law is classified as a less serious charge. The penalty is suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one or more than three months, or a fine of
xxx xxx xxx more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.

In the light of all the circumstances surrounding this case, notwithstanding the recantation of Judge Flores was already dismissed from the service in Velez v. Judge Flores.[15] We therefore
the complaint, the undersigned is convinced that Judge Flores is guilty of serious misconduct, impose on him a fine of P40,000 for serious misconduct and another P10,000 for delay in the
which are corrupt acts inspired by an intent to violate the law or persistent disregard of well- resolution of Election Protest No. 97-04.
known legal rules. Extorting money from a party litigant, whose case is pending before ones
court is serious misconduct by a judge. This is what Judge Flores did in this case. He took With respect to respondent Mangulabnan, we find that she, indeed, acted as a conduit in the
Php20,000.00 from party-litigant Manalastas [prostestee] and Php5,000.00 from complainant. solicitation of money from the litigants. While she claimed that she did so only under the
Though Judge Flores insists that the money he received from Manalastas was only a loan, as if instruction of respondent judge, we believe, however, that respondent Mangulabnan was not
this would make a difference. Receiving a loan from a litigant that a judge has no intention of at all ignorant of what respondent judge had asked her to do. She knew it was illegal for Judge
paying is still serious misconduct by the judge. Flores to borrow money from litigants who had pending cases in his sala. She was aware that it
was wrong yet she still allowed herself to be a part of respondent judges immoral activities.
xxx xxx xxx
Her complicity notwithstanding, the penalty of dismissal from the service is too harsh
xxx. Inasmuch as respondent judge had already been dismissed from the service in the case of considering that this appears to be her first offense.
Velez vs. Judge Flores, A.M. No. OCA-IPI-00-901-MTJ, it is recommended that he instead be
fined in the amount of Php40,000, in accordance with said Rule 140.[10] (emphasis supplied) It is the sacred duty of everyone charged with the dispensation of justice, from the judge to the
lowliest clerk, to maintain the courts good name and standing as true temples of justice.
We agree with the foregoing findings. Respondent judges conduct of borrowing money from Circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility, their conduct must not only be
litigants in his sala was highly improper and warrants extreme sanction from this Court. His characterized with propriety and decorum but, above all else, beyond suspicion.[16]
insistence that the money he got from Manalastas was merely a loan taxes our credulity. In a
recent case,[11] we ruled that receiving money from litigants unavoidably creates the WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Rodrigo Flores is hereby found GUILTY of serious misconduct
impression that litigants can facilitate the favorable resolution of cases pending before the and delay in the resolution of Election Protest No. 97-04, and is ordered to pay a total of
courts. P50,000 as FINE. Respondent Candelaria Mangulabnan is likewise found GUILTY of serious
misconduct and is hereby suspended for a period of one (1) year, with a stern warning that the
commission of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Ombudsman and the Department of
Justice for the investigation of respondents, Judge Rodrigo Flores and Candelaria Mangulabnan,
for violation of RA 3019.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

[1] Presently the Municipal Trial Court in Cities.


[2] OCA IPI No. 01-0138-P.
[3] OCA IPI No. 99-813-MTJ.
[4] Dario Manalastas, the protestee in the election protest case, filed a petition for prohibition
and mandamus against respondent Judge Flores following the alleged unauthorized release of
the decision in said election case.
[5] Comment dated December 15, 1999, rollo, pp. 379-380.
[6] Id., p. 345.
[7] Id., p. 349.
[8] Id., pp. 487-492.
[9] Id., pp. 443-444.
[10] Id., pp. 490-492. (Citations omitted)
[11] Saraza v. Tam, A.M. No. P-04-1896, 12 January 2005, 448 SCRA 57.
[12] Canon 4, Section 1, New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
[13] A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC (Re: Amendment of the Rules of Court on the Discipline of Judges and
Justices).
[14] Id.
[15] 445 Phil. 54 (2003).
[16] Basco v. Gregorio, 315 Phil. 681 (1995).
THIRD DIVISION (d) SUSPEND Judge Luisito T. Adaoag pending final outcome of the criminal proceedings against
him considering the evidence is prima facie strong or until further orders from this Court; and

ROLANDO GASPAR, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1565 x x x x [4]


Complainant, [Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1545-MTJ]
Present: Complainant next contends that even while under suspension, respondent judge rendered a
Decision[5] on 25 November 2003 in the election case holding that Anastacio Bonifacio was the
QUISUMBING, J., duly elected Punong Barangay of Pance, Ramos, Tarlac. In said decision, respondent judge
- versus - Chairperson, further ordered complainant to vacate the position and deliver the same to Bonifacio in a
CARPIO, peaceful manner.[6]
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and Complainant maintains that respondent judge should be held liable for criminal and
JUDGE LUISITO T. ADAOAG, VELASCO, JR., JJ. administrative charges for rendering the decision while under suspension.[7]
Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Gerona, Tarlac, In his Comment[8] dated 29 March 2004, respondent judge claims that he rendered the
Respondent. Promulgated: decision in the election case in good faith. He argues that the Courts use of the word or in its
Resolution dated 4 August 2003 indicates two alternatives with regard to the period of his
August 16, 2006 suspension.[9] Under the first alternative, he believed that his suspension had been lifted with
the dismissal of the criminal action against him,[10] thus enabling him to render the decision in
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x the election case. Under the second alternative, he believed that the Court must issue a
resolution or order further suspending him even after the dismissal of the criminal complaint.
In the absence of this, he resumed his functions as presiding judge.[11]
RESOLUTION
Respondent judge further narrates that in a missive[12] dated 13 October 2003, addressed to
Tinga, J.: the First Division of the Court, he requested clarification on the status of his suspension in view
of the dismissal of the criminal action. In response, the Court reiterated respondent judges
This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Rolando Gaspar (Gaspar) against Judge suspension until further orders. Henceforth, respondent Judge discontinued his judicial
Luisito T. Adaoag of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Gerona-Ramos-Pura, Tarlac, for functions.[13]
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its Report dated 19 July 2004 submitted that
In a Complaint-Affidavit[1] dated 29 January 2004, complainant alleges that he was the elected respondent judge violated Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct when he failed to
and duly proclaimed chairman of Barangay Pance, Ramos, Tarlac during the 15 July 2002 accord respect and obedience to the Courts Resolution dated 4 August 2003.[14] The OCA
elections. However, an election protest was filed against him by Anastacio Bonifacio before the stated that respondent judge cannot feign good faith as the dismissal of the criminal action is
MCTC of Gerona-Ramos-Pura, Tarlac where respondent judge presides. The election case provisional and would thus not result in the automatic lifting of his suspension.[15] The order
entitled Anastacio Bonifacio v. Rolando Gaspar, was docketed as Election Case No. 02-07.[2] of the Ombudsman dismissing the case against respondent judge was clearly without prejudice
to the outcome of the administrative investigation by this Court upon the referral of the case
While the election case was pending, respondent Judge was suspended by the First Division of to the latter. Such dismissal, as the OCA correctly noted, was not by reason of the absence of
the Court in a Resolution[3] dated 4 August 2003, which reads in part: probable cause against respondent judge, but in deference to the Supreme Courts authority
over its employees.[16]
Administrative Matter No. MTJ-03-1503 (National Bureau of Investigation vs. Acting Presiding
Judge Luisito T. Adaoag, MCTC, Gerona-Ramos-Pura, Tarlac) [Formerly Administrative Matter The OCA also noted the fact that he had rendered the decision in the election case before he
OCA IPI No. 03-1436-MTJ (Re: Report of the National Bureau of Investigation [NBI] on the received the Courts response to his letter dated 13 October 2003. The OCA opined that if
entrapment set up against Acting Presiding Judge Luisito T. Adaoag, MCTC, Gerona-Ramos- respondent judge indeed was in good faith, he should have prudently awaited the Courts
Pura, Tarlac)]. The Court Resolves to: pronouncement on the status of his suspension before promulgating the decision.[17] The OCA
recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
xxxx (P10,000.00) with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will
be dealt with more severely.[18]
In this regard, respondent judge fell short of showing such adherence. Respondent judge
The Court in a Resolution[19] dated 3 April 2006, referred the instant case to the Executive instead openly defied the Courts order which should have been implemented without delay.
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City for investigation, report and recommendation. He continued his judicial functions and even rendered the decision in the election case in 25
November 2003 despite knowledge of his suspension ordered by the Court in the Resolution
Executive Judge Arsenio P. Adriano, in an undated report,[20] found that respondent judge dated 4 August 2003. He cannot hide behind the defense of good faith and misinterpretation
wilfully violated the Courts Resolution suspending the latter until further orders from the of the edict as circumstances noted by the Executive Judge show that he was fully aware of his
Court.[21] The Executive Judge observed that respondent judges interpretation of the Courts suspension. And in fact, per our ruling in Alday, the defense of misapprehension will not even
Resolution proceeds from an erroneous reasoning. Notably, the Ombudsmans order of work to excuse him from liability.
dismissal was issued on 17 June 2003 and was approved by Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo on
15 July 2003. It was precisely this dismissal order which precipitated the Court to issue its In Lumapas v. Judge Tamin,[28] we ruled that [i]ndifference or defiance to the Courts orders or
Resolution dated 4 August 2003. Respondent judge thus could not credibly reason that his resolutions may be punished with dismissal, suspension, or fine as warranted by the
suspension order was lifted with the dismissal of the criminal action against him.[22] circumstances.[29] In view of the fact that respondent judge had already been suspended
indefinitely, the Court is moved to temper justice with mercy and is inclined to adopt the OCAs
The Executive Judge moreover found it imprudent for respondent judge to have rendered the recommendation that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P10,000.00.
decision in the election case without awaiting the Courts response to his query on the status of
his suspension. Further, respondent judge was proven to have received his payslip for 1 to 15 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Luisito T. Adaoag of MCTC, Gerona,
October 2003 with the notation suspended per memo 8/4/03. The fact that he did not receive Tarlac, is hereby FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
his salary after the issuance of the Courts Resolution clearly evidenced his continued of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
suspension.[23]
SO ORDERED.
The Executive Judge recommended that respondent judge be adjudged guilty of grave
misconduct and suffer the penalty of three (3) months suspension without pay, in lieu of
dismissal, considering that this is the latters first administrative offense.[24]
DANTE O. TINGA
We agree with the findings of the Executive Judge except as to the recommended penalty. We Associate Justice
adopt instead the penalty recommended by the OCA.

WE CONCUR:

It is an imperative for judges to comply with resolutions issued by the Court. By promulgating LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
a decision in the election case whilst under suspension per resolution of the Court dated 4 Associate Justice
August 2003, indeed respondent judge miserably failed to render such obeisance to the Courts Chairperson
mandate.
Judges should respect the orders and decisions of higher tribunals, much more so this Court ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
from which all other courts should take their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court Associate Justice Associate Justice
should not be construed as a mere request and should not be complied with partially,
inadequately or selectively.[25]
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
As we have aptly held in Dr. Alday v. Judge Cruz, Jr.,[26] to wit: Associate Justice

Directives issued by this Court are not to be treated lightly, certainly not on the pretext that
one has misapprehended the meaning of said directives. Effective and efficient administration
of justice demands nothing than a faithful adherence to the rules and orders laid down by this [1]Rollo, pp. 1-30, with annexes.
Court x x x[27]
[2]Id. at 1, 46.
[3]Id. at 4-6. [23]Id. at 111.

[4]Id. at 5. [24]Id. at 112.

[5]Id. at 7-28. [25]Fernandez v. Hamoy, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1821, 12 August 2004, 436 SCRA 186, 193.

[6]Id. at 28. [26]426 Phil. 385 (2002).

[7]Id. at 2-3. [27]Id. at 390.

[8]Id. at 32-34. See also note 4. [28]452 Phil. 972 (2003).

[9]Id. at 32. [29]Id. at 984.

[10]Respondent judge was referring to the Order dated 17 June 2003 of the Office of the
Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-03-0346-F, containing the recommendation that the criminal case
against respondent judge be dismissed and the record of the case referred to this Court, which
recommendation, however, was modified by then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, upon the
recommendation of Asst. Ombudsman Pelagio A. Apostol, to the effect that the dismissal is
provisional and without prejudice to the administrative investigation by this Court. Id. at 35-43,
42.

[11]Id. at 33.

[12]Id. at 44-45.

[13]Id. at 33, 48.

[14]Id. at 48-49.

[15]Id. at 49.

[16]Id. at 49-50.

[17]Id. at 50.

[18]Id.

[19]Id. at 107.

[20]Id. at 108-112.

[21]Id. at 111.

[22]Id. at 110.
SECOND DIVISION The complaint was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for investigation,
report and recommendation. In its report dated July 3, 2003,[4] the OCA found that respondent
LETICIA S.A. RESURRECCION, A.M. No. P-04-1783 sheriff acted beyond the scope of his office when he prepared the demand letter. The OCA
Complainant, (formerly OCA IPI No. 02-1519-P) declared that respondent had no business giving counsel to parties and preparing demand
letters, which was often done in anticipation of litigation. According to the OCA, the job rightly
Present: pertained only to persons or professionals engaged in the private practice of law. Thus, the OCA
found respondent guilty of conduct unbecoming of his office, a light offense, and
PUNO, J., Chairperson, recommended:
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA, [T]hat the present administrative complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter
AZCUNA and and that respondent sheriff, Rustico I. Ibuna, Jr., be REPRIMANDED for conduct unbecoming his
GARCIA, JJ. office with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be
dealt with more severely.[5]
RUSTICO I. IBUNA, JR., Sheriff IV,
Regional Trial Court, Binangonan,
Rizal, We disagree.
Respondent. Promulgated:

August 7, 2006 Respondents act constituted misconduct which was not a light offense. Indeed, respondent
sheriff went way beyond the scope of his authority when he prepared the demand letter and
x--------------------------------------------x served it personally on complainant. The preparation of a demand letter is not one of the
sheriffs duties and functions set forth in the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court,
particularly Chapter VI, Section D (2.5.1):
RESOLUTION
2.1.5.1 Serves and/or executes all writs and processes of the Courts and other agencies, both
CORONA, J.: local or foreign;

2.1.5.2 Keeps custody of attached properties or goods;


In an affidavit-complaint dated November 19, 2002, Leticia S.A. Resurreccion charged
respondent Rustico I. Ibuna, Jr., sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, with 2.1.5.3 Maintains his own record books on writs of execution, writs of attachment, writs of
violation of RA 6713.[1] replevin, writs of injunction, and all other processes executed by him;

Resurreccion alleged that she purchased from one Liberty Aralar bighead carp fingerlings worth 2.1.5.4 Submits periodic reports to the Clerk of Court;
P450,000 which she paid in full. On November 8, 2002, respondent sheriff wrote, for and in
behalf of Aralar, a letter demanding payment of about P250,000 that complainant allegedly still 2.1.5.5 Does related tasks and performs other duties that may be assigned by the Executive
owed Aralar. Complainant claimed that Ibuna used his office to harass her. Judge and/or Clerk of Court.

Respondent denied the allegations against him. He denied harassing complainant but admitted
preparing the letter and personally serving it on her. He explained that Aralar sought his What respondent did was definitely not included in the foregoing enumeration. Worse, he used
assistance on the matter and he helped her without getting anything in return. He pointed out his position to advance the interests of one person over that of another by acting as counsel
that, instead of being condemned for what he did, he should be commended for an exemplary and collecting agent for Aralar. He was oblivious to the fact that the misunderstanding between
act. Aralar and complainant could have reached the court of which he was an employee. The
integrity of the court could have thus been compromised.
Quoting the provisions of RA 6713, Section 5 (d)[2] and Section 4 (e),[3] he claimed that public
officials and employees must attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of The silliness of respondents defense that he was merely extending free public assistance to
their office and must, at all times, act promptly and expeditiously. He added that in his 19 years Aralar stretches our patience to the limit. His invocation of RA 6713 was completely wrong,
of government service, this was the first time he was slapped with an administrative complaint. considering that these provisions referred to services offered by the office and alluded to public
officials and employees exercising their duties within the ambit of their authority. Here, what Incentives and Rewards for Exemplary Service, Enumerating Prohibited Acts and Transactions
respondent did was neither a service of his office nor done within the ambit of his authority. and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof and for Other Purposes.
[2] Duties of Public Officials.
Respondent proudly heralds his 19 years of unblemished government service yet is totally [3] Norms of Conduct of Public Officer.
ignorant of the fact that, as a public official, he ought to have conducted himself in a manner [4] Rollo, pp. 22-24.
that was beyond suspicion and reproach. By preparing the demand letter which he served [5] Id., p. 24.
personally and in a harassing manner on complainant, respondent compromised the integrity
of his office and brought it to disrepute.

WHEREFORE, Rustico I. Ibuna, Jr., sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, is hereby
found guilty of simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of his office and is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that the commission of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

[1] An Act Establishing a Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, to Uphold the Time-Honored Principle of Public Office Being a Public Trust, Granting
EN BANC
Subsequently, the court learned that the judgment debtor had already paid P3,000 to
respondent sheriff, as evidenced by hand-written receipts issued by respondent sheriff.[2] But
JUDGE ELEUTERIA respondent sheriff did not turn over said amount to the plaintiff. Complainant judge issued an
BADOLES-ALGODON, order[3] dated 28 February 2003, citing respondent sheriff for contempt and recommending
Complainant, his suspension and dismissal for gross neglect of duty and dishonesty. Complainant judge also
A.M. No. P-04-1818 ordered respondent sheriff to immediately turn over the amount to plaintiff.

Present: 2. In Civil Case No. C-Jun-405 entitled Anflo Motor Corporation v. Spouses Rogelio and Cecille
- versus - Bucais (Anflo Motors case) for collection, the court issued the writ of execution on 22 December
2000. On 11 February 2003, plaintiffs counsel wrote a letter[4] to respondent sheriff because
RENE D. ZALDIVAR, the writ had remained unsatisfied. Complainant judge issued a memorandum[5] directing
Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cagayan de Oro City, respondent sheriff to immediately enforce the writ and to explain within 72 hours why no
Respondent. administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him.

Promulgated: 3. In Criminal Case Nos. M-337 and M-338, entitled People v. Balbino Privaldos (Privaldos case)
for violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22, the court issued the writ of execution on September
2001. On February 2003, private respondents counsel manifested[6] that the judgment had
August 3, 2006 remained unsatisfied, with respondent sheriff filing only one report dated 3 September 2002.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement dated 31 March 2003
required respondent sheriff to comment on the letter-complaint.

DECISION In his comment dated 30 May 2003, respondent sheriff admitted that 416 writs were assigned
to him but denied that he had only made returns for 187 writs. He alleged that he had already
implemented some of the writs and had submitted them to the court. He surmised that they
PER CURIAM: were not attached to the records of the case, for which he is not responsible, not being the
person in charge of record keeping.[7] He also stated that some of the writs issued were to be
This is an administrative complaint against Sheriff III Rene D. Zaldivar (respondent sheriff) of implemented outside of his jurisdiction.[8]
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Cagayan de Oro City, for gross neglect of
duty and dishonesty. On the cases cited by complainant judge, respondent sheriff offered the following explanations:

In her letter-complaint dated 24 February 2003, complainant Judge Eleuteria Badoles-Algodon 1. On the Northern Mindanao case, respondent sheriff stated that he had the right to receive
(complainant judge), Presiding Judge of the MTCC, Branch 2, Cagayan de Oro City, alleged that partial or full payment after serving the writ.[9]
she received complaints against respondent sheriff for being negligent, remiss and unmindful
of his duties and responsibilities. Complainant judge also stated that based on to the records of 2. On the Anflo Motors case and in reply to complainant judges memorandum, respondent
the court, respondent sheriff had received 416 writs of various kinds but had only made returns sheriff claimed that he had already taken action. However, the auction sale was postponed
for 187 writs. because plaintiff failed to submit his initial bid.[10]

Complainant judge cited three cases to illustrate respondent sheriffs offenses: 3. On the Privaldos case, respondent sheriff admitted that the writ was not implemented
because the accused had no real or personal property in his name and the accused no longer
1. In Civil Case No. C-DEC-1135 entitled Northern Mindanao Sales Corporation v. Roger Mole resides at his given address.[11]
(Northern Mindanao case) for sum of money, the court issued the writ of execution on 19 July
2002 and assigned the writ to respondent sheriff. On 14 February 2003, complainant judge The OCA referred the matter to Judge Edgardo T. Lloren (Judge Lloren), Executive Judge,
received a motion[1] requiring respondent sheriff to explain why he should not be cited for Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, for investigation, report and recommendation.
indirect contempt for his failure to implement the writ and for failure to file the monthly sheriffs
report.
In his 2nd Indorsement dated 6 June 2003, Judge Lloren reported that he conducted an xxxx
investigation on 30 May 2003. Complainant judge presented her evidence ex-parte because Recommendations: With respect to allegations number one and two, necessary administrative
respondent sheriff failed to appear despite proper notice.[12] Judge Lloren recommended the and criminal proceedings should be instituted since the evidence against Sheriff Zaldivar are
filing of administrative and criminal charges against respondent sheriff. He stated in his 2nd documented and he failed to present contrary evidence to that effect.[13]
Indorsement that:
In its Report dated 15 April 2004 (Report), the OCA recommended that respondent sheriff be
First allegation: Sheriff Zaldivar has so many unserved writs of executions and no returns were dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, with
made. Perusal to Zaldivars answer letter dated February 12, 2003, he admitted that 416 writs prejudice to re-employment in the government or any of its agencies, including government-
were issued, but he was able to make only 187 returns, because they were issued outside his owned or controlled corporations. The OCAs Report reads:
territorial jurisdiction. However, he was not able to make clear statements about the specific
case number[s] and the places to be served. In the first allegation, respondent should be held liable for gross misconduct for failure to make
the returns of 229 writs issued by the court.
Second allegation: That Sheriff Zaldivar had served some of the writs but failed to turnover [sic]
the proceeds to the judgment creditors, failed to undertake proper returns of the writs and In the second allegation, respondent should be held liable for dishonesty and violation of the
made false returns. Revised Penal Code for misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of another, money,
goods or any personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission or for
(1) In the case of People vs. Galaritta under Criminal Case No. 97-01-167 to 97-01-175, Sheriff administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
Zaldivar made a return on October 3, 2002, wherein he stated that the accused was out of the same x x x (Article 315(b), RPC).[14]
[c]ountry, therefore, [the] writ was unsatisfied (Annex A, report). However, when an alias writ
was served by another sheriff (Drefus G. Acenas), it was shown that subject amount was already As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that, except for the Northern Mindanao case, the cases
received earlier by Sheriff Zaldivar (Annex B, report) and shown in the receipts signed by discussed in Judge Llorens report and, subsequently, in the OCAs report, were different from
Zaldivar, dated June 18, 2001 in the amount of P20,000.00 (Annex B-1, report); another receipt the cases mentioned in the letter-complaint. Four new cases were presented before Judge
in the amount of P20,000.00 (Annex B-2, report); another receipt dated June 26, 2002 in the Lloren and the two other original cases were not pursued by complainant judge.
amount of P20,000.00 (Annex B-3, report); and another receipt dated November 19, 2002 in
the amount of P13,331.00 (Annex B-4, report). This is highly improper because it deprived respondent sheriff of his right to due process. The
OCAs argument that respondent sheriffs failure to appear despite proper notice is tantamount
(2) In the case of Tri-Star Paints Center, et [al.] vs. Porferio Borromeo, Jr., Civil Case No. 99- to a waiver of his rights[15] cannot be upheld. Respondent sheriff may have chosen not to
AUG-627, a [m]otion by [p]laintiffs counsel praying for disciplinary action against Sheriff appear during the investigation because he felt that he already satisfactorily answered the
Zaldivar for failure to turn over [to] the plaintiff the amount collected from the defendant charges against him. Respondent sheriff was, therefore, not informed that there were new
(Annexes C, C-1, C-2, report) as shown in the receipts (Annexes D, D-1, D-2 and D-3, report) in charges against him. Respondent sheriff was not given the opportunity to answer these new
the total amount of P48,000.00. charges or to confront complainant judge on her new accusations or to present evidence in his
favor. Therefore, the Court will only discuss the allegation that respondent sheriff failed to
(3) In the case of Virgo Appliance Corp. vs. Judith Jaurique, Civil Case No. C1-APR-266, an [e]x- execute and make returns for 229 writs and the three cases mentioned in the letter-complaint.
parte [m]otion was filed by [p]laintiffs counsel, praying for [a] possible administrative charge On the four other cases, the OCA should conduct further investigations to determine
against Sheriff Zaldivar for his failure to account and turn over to the plaintiff the sum of respondent sheriffs administrative liability.
P2,500.00 that he collected from the defendant (Annexes E, E-1, and E-2, report). One of the sheriffs principal functions is to serve or execute writs and processes addressed or
assigned to him by the court. The sheriff is also tasked to prepare and submit returns of his
(4) In the case of Northern Mindanao Sales Corp. vs. Rober[t] Mole, Civil Case No. C-DEC-1135, proceedings.[16]
it was shown that Sheriff Zaldivar received the amount of P3,000.00 from defendant Mole but
he again failed to turn over the proceeds to the plaintiff (Annexes F and F-1, report). In this case, respondent sheriff is charged with the failure to implement and file returns for 229
writs. Respondent sheriff denies this charge. Complainant judge, in her letter-complaint, stated
(5) On May 20, 2003, Eduardo D. Adviento, Branch Manager of Philacor Credit Corporation, that copies of the writs would be made available anytime upon proper investigation by the
wrote a letter to Judge Algodon, (Annex G) wherein [the] former received a Notice of Auction Court.[17] However, the Court notes that complainant judge failed to present copies of the
Sale involving one unit refrigerator that was recovered from its creditor in Civil Case No. 99 June writs, nor was a list of these writs prepared and submitted in evidence during Judge Llorens
501, however, on the date of the auction sale on April 30, 2003, Sheriff Zaldivar did not appear investigation.
and the subject unit could not be located.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial sheriffs gross neglect and gross inefficiency in the performance of his official duties.[28] His lack
evidence, the allegations in the complaint.[18] Mere allegation is not evidence[19] and it is not of diligence and zeal is truly deplorable.
equivalent to proof.[20] There is nothing in the records to indicate that respondent sheriff failed
to execute and file returns for 229 writs. Since complainant judge failed to substantiate this In the Northern Mindanao case, respondent sheriff received a total of P3,000 from the
allegation, the Court cannot hold respondent sheriff liable. judgment debtor, which respondent sheriff failed to turn over to the judgment creditor.[29]
Respondent sheriff claimed that he had a right to receive partial or full payment after serving
On the three cases mentioned in the letter-complaint, the records show that respondent sheriff the writ. The hand-written receipts issued by respondent sheriff indicate that the money was a
failed, without justifiable reasons, to implement the writs of execution. Respondent sheriff partial deposit,[30] another partial payment,[31] and another partial deposit[32] for the
manifested his undue disregard of his duties and functions as sheriff.[21] The Court has judgment debt by the judgment debtor.
repeatedly stressed the need for circumspect and proper behavior on the part of the sheriff
upon whom the execution of a final judgment depends. Execution is the fruit and end of the Section 9(a), Rule 39 of the Rules provides:
suit and is aptly called the life of the law.[22] A judgment, if left unexecuted because of the
inefficiency, negligence, misconduct or ignorance of the law of those charged with their SEC. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced.
execution, delays the administration of justice, renders the decision inutile[23] and becomes
an empty victory for the prevailing party.[24] (a) Immediate payment on demand. The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for
money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount
On the issue of filing of returns on these three cases, respondent sheriff was silent on the stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The judgment obligor shall pay in cash,
matter. He did not deny that no returns were filed, nor did he give any explanation for his failure certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable
to file the returns. Silence is admission if there was a chance to deny, especially if it constitutes to the latter, the amount of the judgment debt under proper receipt directly to the judgment
one of the principal charges against him.[25] obligee or his authorized representative if present at the time of payment. The lawful fees shall
be handed under proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn over the said amount
Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) provides: within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ.

SEC. 14. Return of writ of execution. The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive payment, the
issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff. The latter shall
cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall turn over all the amounts coming into his possession within the same day to the clerk of court
report to the court and state the reasons therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during that issued the writ, or if the same is not practicable, deposit said amounts to a fiduciary
which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court account in the nearest government depository bank of the Regional Trial Court of the locality.
every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, (Emphasis supplied)
or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the
proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof furnished the parties.
(Emphasis supplied) In this case, the judgment debtor entrusted the money to respondent sheriff for the specific
purpose of satisfying the judgment debt. Respondent sheriffs receipt of the money in his official
capacity and his failure to turn over the amount to the judgment creditor or the clerk of court
The Rules clearly provide that it is mandatory for sheriffs to execute and make a return on the is an act of misappropriation of funds amounting to dishonesty.[33] His failure to issue official
writ of execution within 30 days from receipt of the writ and every 30 days thereafter until it is receipts for the amount is also a violation of the General Auditing and Accounting Rules.[34]
satisfied in full or its effectivity expires. Even if the writs are unsatisfied or only partially Likewise, the records of the case reveal that respondent sheriff did not file a Sheriffs Return
satisfied, sheriffs must still file the reports so that the court, as well as the litigants, may be relative to the writs implementation and his receipt of the money.
informed of the proceedings undertaken to implement the writ.[26] Periodic reporting also
provides the court insights on the efficiency of court processes after promulgation of judgment. Under the Civil Service Rules, if the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges, the
Over-all, the purpose of periodic reporting is to ensure the speedy execution of decisions.[27] penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest
will be considered aggravating circumstances.[35] Dishonesty, a grave offense punishable by
In this case, respondent sheriff failed to comply with the rules on periodic reporting. His reports, dismissal on the first offense,[36] is the most serious charge of which respondent sheriff is
if any, were submitted sporadically. The court and the judgment creditors were not regularly found guilty. Gross neglect of duty and gross inefficiency will be considered aggravating
informed of the actions taken to satisfy the judgment. The long delay in the execution of the circumstances. Hence, dismissal from service is the appropriate penalty to be imposed on
judgments and the failure to accomplish the required periodic reports demonstrate respondent respondent sheriff.
In Punzalan-Santos vs. Arquiza, we said:
[16] I The 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court 205.
At the grassroots of our judicial machinery, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are indispensably in [17] Rollo, p. 2.
close contact with the litigants; hence, their conduct should be geared towards maintaining the [18] Manguerra v. Judge Arriesgado, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1854, 8 June 2004, 431 SCRA 161.
prestige and integrity of the court, for the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in [19] Martinez v. NLRC, 339 Phil. 176 (1997).
the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to [20] Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116181, 6 January 1997, 266 SCRA
the least and lowest of its personnel; hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and 136.
everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a temple of justice. [21] Tan v. Herras, A.M. No. P-90-404, 11 March 1991, 195 SCRA 1.
Respondents behavior erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the administration of [22] PAL v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 49188, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 557.
justice. He no longer deserves to stay in the service any longer.[37] [23] Portes v. Tepace, A.M. No. P-97-1235, 30 January 1997, 267 SCRA 185.
[24] Jumio v. Egay-Eviota, A.M. No. P-92-746, 29 March 1994, 231 SCRA 551.
[25] Perez v. Suller, 320 Phil. 1 (1995).
WHEREFORE, we FIND respondent Rene D. Zaldivar, Sheriff III of the Municipal Trial Court in [26] Concerned Citizen v. Torio, 433 Phil. 649 (2002).
Cities, Branch 2, Cagayan de Oro City, GUILTY of dishonesty, aggravated by gross neglect of duty [27] Benitez v. Acosta, A.M. No. P-01-1473, 27 March 2001, 355 SCRA 380.
and gross inefficiency for which we DISMISS him from the service, with forfeiture of all [28] Aquino v. Martin , A.M. No. P-03-1703, 18 September 2003, 411 SCRA 242.
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any [29] Rollo, pp. 7-9. Respondent sheriff issued three receipts for P1,000 dated 30 October 2002,
branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled 7 December 2002 and 13 January 2003.
corporations. We ORDER respondent Sheriff Zaldivar to turn over the amount of P3,000 to the [30] Id. at 6.
clerk of court within ten days from finality of this Decision. [31] Id. at 8.
[32] Id. at 9.
The Office of the Court Administrator is also DIRECTED to investigate the other charges against [33] Jerez v. Paninsuro, 363 Phil. 522 (1999).
respondent sheriff. [34] Supra.
[35] Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Section 55, Rule IV.
SO ORDERED. [36] Id., Section 52 (A) (1), Rule IV.
[37] 314 Phil. 460, 472 (1995).

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 5 and 7.


[2] Id. at 6, 8-9. Three receipts for P1,000 dated 30 October 2002, 7 December 2002 and 13
January 2003.
[3] Id. at 38.
[4] Id. at 11.
[5] Id. at 10.
[6] Id. at 12-13.
[7] Id. at 16.
[8] Id. at 17.
[9] Id. at 16.
[10] Id. at 18.
[11] Id. at 19.
[12] Id. at 20.

[13] Id. at 20-21.


[14] Report, pp. 3-4.
[15] Id. at 4.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court In the Memorandum dated September 2, 2002, then Deputy Court Administrator Christopher
Manila O. Lock found, on the bases of the confiscated logbook and the DTRs, the following:

1. Loida Moralejo (Moralejo), Officer-in-Charge (OIC), NEVER logged-in or out to document


FIRST DIVISION her attendance. Her logbook entries since January 2001 up to date of audit on April 23, 2002
do not reflect her signature or initial. She claimed exemption from complying with the
regulation upon the consent of Judge Nabong. For the Year 2002 (January-March), Ms.
Re: Audit Report on Attendance A.M. No. P-04-1838 Moralejo submitted her DTR to OCA ELD with one hundred percent (100%) attendance and
of Court Personnel of [Formerly A.M. No. 03-11-641-RTC] declared tardiness in a total of eighteen (18) minutes for the months of February and March.
Regional Trial Court,
Branch 32, Manila, Present: 2. Heidwig Marie O. Balicanta (Balicanta), Clerk III, NEVER logged-in or out to document her
attendance. She never logged-in since her employment with the court since August 2001 to the
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson, date of audit. Her signature/initial is not found in the confiscated logbook. However, she
YNARES-SANTIAGO, submitted DTRs showing complete attendance for CY 2002 with no late/undertime.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and 3. Elma Dabbay (Dabbay), Court Stenographer, failed to log-in on January 2, 3 and 4 March
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. 4, 25 and 26 and yet reported in her DTR to have been present during those times.

Promulgated: 4. Virginia Peralta (Peralta), Court Stenographer, failed to log-in on January 2, 3, 4 and 7 and
August 31, 2006 yet reported in her submitted DTR to have been present in those days.

x--------------------------------------------------x 5. Paquito del Rosario (del Rosario), Court Aide, failed to log-in on January 2, 3, 10, 18, 21, 24
and 25 and yet submitted DTR showing he was present in those times.

RESOLUTION 6. Andresito Robles (Andresito), Process Server, failed to log-in on January 14, February 1 and
March 6 and yet reported in his DTR to having been present in those days.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. 7. Guillermo dela Cruz, failed to log-in on January 2, 2002 but reported in his DTR to have
been present on said date.

Before us is an administrative case against the following court personnel, namely: Loida 8. Nenita Robles (Nenita), failed to log-in on March 5, 8, 13, 14, 15 and 22 but declared in her
Moralejo, Officer-in-Charge; Heidwig Marie O, Balicanta, Clerk III; Elma Dabbay, Court DTR that she was on leave with pay. [1]
Stenographer III; Virginia Peralta, Court Stenographer; Paquito del Rosario, Court Aide;
Andresito Robles, Process Server; and Guillermo dela Cruz, Court Stenographer III, all assigned In the same Memorandum, DCA Lock directed the above-mentioned court personnel to explain
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, Manila presided over by Judge Juan C. Nabong, Jr. their failure to log-in their attendance in the attendance logbook and their subsequent
for violation in the observance of the use of the daily attendance logbook and the subsequent reporting to OCA ELD of having been present during the days they failed to log-in. Further, DCA
submission of their Daily Time Record (DTR) to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Lock requested Judge Nabong to submit his explanation on his failure to properly supervise the
Employees Leave Division (ELD). implementation of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations on attendance as implemented by
An audit of the attendance of court personnel of RTC, Branch 32, Manila was conducted on Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 4 and for his inability to detect that the DTR (CS Form 48) of
April 23, 2002. The said audit was triggered when then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) some of his personnel which he had signed and submitted to OCA ELD did not truthfully reflect
Christopher O. Lock called at the said court on the said day for an official business at about 9:00 the entries in the attendance logbook.
a.m. and only the process server, Andresito Robles, was around. During the audit, the team got
hold of the court personnel attendance logbook and observed that some of the court personnel On June 13, 2002, respondent Guillermo dela Cruz died, thus the issue against him had become
arrived very late in the morning on the said day. The audit team found out that there was a moot and academic.
possible violation committed by the court personnel of RTC, Branch 32, Manila of the rules
pertaining to the use of the daily attendance logbook and submission of DTRs.
Since Nenita declared in her DTR that she was on leave with pay, her explanation is no longer Considering the prevailing circumstances of this case vis--vis the submitted daily time record
necessary. (DTR) not based on existing logbook/bundy clock entry, the same is without factual or legal
basis, hence, as submitted, the DTR could not be considered the official report of attendance.
On October 1, 2002, the OCA received the respective explanations[2] of Peralta, Dabbay, Such a report, therefore, is a falsity. The Audit Report of Deputy Court Administrator
Andresito and del Rosario. They admitted that they did not comply with MC No. 4 implementing Christopher Lock further notes that there is a great disparity between the dates the seven
the Civil Service Rules on attendance but averred that the same was done in good faith and personnel failed to log-in during the months of January to March 2002 and the daily time record
honest mistake. In like manner, Moralejo explained that her shortcomings were slip-ups and submitted to OCA, Leave Division.
were not deliberate nor abuse of her position. She asserted that she was under the impression
that as OIC, she was not subject to the same daily logging-in and out rules of other employees. Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other
She begged pardon if she had wrongly interpreted the rules and the same was not intentional. Pertinent Civil Service Laws promulgated by the Civil Service [Laws promulgated by the Civil
Lastly, Balicanta reasoned that she started training as Clerk III in Branch 32, Manila last May Service] Commission on December 27, 1991, provides the following:
2001, under a work-no-pay scenario and was appointed only in August 2001. Her failure to log-
in was an unintentional mistake as she was used to log-in straight to her DTR. Sec. 23. Administrative offenses with its corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less
grave, and light, depending on the gravity of its nature and effects of said acts on the
In the Agenda Report dated March 22, 2004,[3] the OCA submitted other relevant information government service.
together with its evaluation and recommendation, to wit:
The following are grave offenses with its corresponding penalties:
OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION: Verification with the Docket and Clearance Division, Legal
Office, OCA shows that all six (6) personnel, except for OIC Loida Moralejo, have no pending (a) Dishonesty (1st Offense, Dismissal)
administrative cases. Ms. Moralejo was charged for Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of (b) Falsification of official document (1st Offense Dismissal)
the Service by Ms. Carmencita dela Cruz which case was docketed as OCA IPI No. 03-1787-P xxx
and filed on 7 October 2003.
Under the above-cited law, all the respondents whose daily time records are evidently
EVALUATION: This Office is convinced that all of the seven (7) [sic] personnel of RTC, Branch 32 unrepresentative of the truth, should be punished with dismissal, although it is their first
are culpable. Indeed, they admitted, in one way or another, their wrongdoing when they offense.
averred, inter alia, in their Explanation to Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Locks
Memorandum dated 2 September 2002 that: However, as enunciated in OCA vs. Liza Maria Sirios, et al., A.M. No. P-02-1659, 28 August 2003,
we do not hastily inflict an extreme penalty upon an erring employee, especially so in cases
Our omission or negligence to log in and out in those particular dates are inexcusable but it was where there exist mitigating circumstances which could alleviate his or her culpability. Here,
not done intentionally. Our actions in filling up our Daily Time Record were done in good faith we note that all the six employees readily acknowledged their offenses, sought pardon and
because we were really present in those questioned dates, the fact that our DTRs were initialed vowed to rectify their conceived errors. They beg for the kind indulgence of the Court
by our Officer-in-Charge and signed by the Presiding Judge. considering that the perceived offenses were unintentional and, therefore, done in good faith.
x x x We respectfully pray that this Explanation be given merit and consideration and plea for They likewise invoked their dedication to their duty. Furthermore, a perusal of their service
Your Honors Compassion and Generosity in evaluating our inexcusable negligence in not records shows that this is their first administrative offense. Except for Ms. Moralejo, who has a
complying with Memorandum Circular No. 4, dated June 15, 1973. pending case for Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, all of them have no
record. But it bears stressing that good faith, under the case at bar, is not a valid defense.
xxxx
On the other hand, this is also the first offense of Ms. Moralejo insofar as violation of Strict
As an Acting Clerk of Court, Ms. Moralejo, is presumed to know her duties, functions, and Observance of Working Hours is concerned. But she, in like manner, also acknowledged her
responsibilities. She could not hide under the pretext of her wrong impression that as Officer- offense, offered her most sincere apology and vowed to reform her ways. It is also noteworthy
in-Charge, she is exempt from registering her attendance in the logbook. Memorandum Circular that she being a Clerk of Court only in an acting capacity the same extenuating factors warrant
No. 4 dated 15 June 1973 is very clear that the time appearing in Form 48 (Daily Time Records) the reduction of her imposable penalty. Moreover, we cannot escape the fact that if all of these
should tally with the time recorded in the registry book. Therefore, her excuse is not valid. Being personnel would be severely penalized the official transactions of the court might be
a ranking officer of the said court, she should have set good example to her co-employees and jeopardized and the administration of justice delayed. Hence, we must impose the penalty
should always be abreast of recent laws and jurisprudence. Ignorance of such basic and according to the corresponding degree of culpability each one has committed.
elementary rules does not exempt her from administrative liability.
Since Ms. Moralejo is a ranking official of all the seven personnel, we are of the view that a to 9, 2005. That aside from attending his regular court's daily hearing, he promotes coffee
stiffer penalty of a FINE equivalent to three (3) months salary is proper. Ms. Balicanta, on the conferences, conducts ocular inspections and accomplishes reports. Moreover, he claims that
other hand, for equally failing to log-in during the period of January to March 2002 should be for nearly one-and-half years, he was the pairing judge of retired RTC Judge Leonardo P. Reyes,
FINED equivalent to one (1) month salary. While Mr. Del Rosario who failed to log-in on 2, 3, Branch 31, Manila, a heinous crime/drugs court, devoting three afternoons a week in said court.
10, 18, 21, 24 and 25 January should be FINED for P2,000.00. As to Ms. Dabbay, we find the
penalty of a FINE amounting to P1,000.00 to be proper. Whereas, Ms. Peralta and Mr. Robles Anent the failure of his staff to use the attendance logbook for logging-in their attendance,
should be reprimanded for their failure to observe compliance with Memorandum Circular No. Judge Nabong acknowledges that while it is true that some of his staff overlooked or failed to
4. time in and out in the office logbook the same was neither intentional nor habitual. He claims
that if any one of his staff will be late or absent (except on emergency reasons), he was always
As regards Mr. Guillermo dela Cruz, we agree with Deputy Court Administrator Christopher informed in advance. Moreover, he directs his staff to file an application for leave and/or reflect
Lock's observation that the issue has become moot and academic because of his death. in their DTR whether they are late and/or absent. He prayed that the explanation be given due
course and that the audit report be reconsidered with his commitment and that of his staff of
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court are faithful compliance with the said Circular and all Circulars/Directive(s) emanating from the OCA
our recommendations that the case be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative case and that: or the Supreme Court in the future.

1. Ms. Loida Moralejo be FINED equivalent to three (3) months salary; The explanation of Judge Nabong was referred to OCA for evaluation, report and
2. Ms. Heidwig Marie Balicanta be FINED equivalent to her one (1) month salary; recommendation. Judge Nabong retired on June 1, 2005.
3. Mr. Paquito del Rosario be FINED for P2,000.00;
4. Ms. Elma Dabbay be FINED for P1,000.00; The OCA submitted its evaluation/recommendation in a Memorandum dated June 3, 2005, to
5. Mr. Andresito Robles and Ms. Virginia Peralta be ADMONISHED, with a WARNING against wit:
herein respondents that a commission of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with
severely; Evalulation/Recommendation
6. All respondents are WARNED that the commission of a similar offense in the future will xxx
met heavier penalties;
7. The issue against Mr. Guillermo dela Cruz be considered MOOT and ACADEMIC; and A resolution or directive of the Supreme Court, or in its stead the Office of the Court
8. Judge Juan C. Nabong, Jr. be REPRIMANDED for failure to properly supervise proper Administrator should not be construed as a mere request. It should be complied with promptly
implementation of the Civil Service Rules and Regulation on attendance as implemented by and completely. Judge Nabong should not have taken the directive of DCA Lock lightly and
Memorandum Circular No. 4. should have promptly complied therewith. His admission of his seeming obliviousness to
comply with DCA Lock's Memorandum, is an indication that he indeed did not give much
In his letter dated September 1, 2004, respondent judge requested a period of ten days from attention to DCA Lock's directive. His illness was very recent and happened almost two years
September 6, 2004 to file his comment and requested for the copy of the Memorandum of DCA later than the 2 September 2002 Memorandum of DCA Lock, hence it cannot be considered as
Lock dated September 2, 2002. a veritable excuse for him to overlook compliance thereto.

In the Resolution of October 4, 2004, the Court granted Judge Nabong's request and required Likewise, his justification that his inadvertent delay in complying with DCA Lock's directive was
him to show cause for his failure to comply with the September 2, 2002 Memorandum of DCA due to his full workload and his failure to get a copy of the directive cannot be given weight. He
Lock. could have easily sought for an extension of time to file his compliance or immediately asked
for a copy of DCA Lock's Memorandum if he really had the intention to abide hereto. However,
In his Explanation dated February 24, 2005[4] Judge Nabong admits his seeming obliviousness it took more than two (2) years and another resolution from the Court for Judge Nabong to
(a miserable, but not intentional honest inadvertence) in complying with the directive of DCA comply with DCA Lock's directive.
Lock in the Memorandum dated September 2, 2002. He reasoned that a copy of the pertinent
Civil Service Rules and Regulations on Attendance, as implemented by Supreme Court MC No. If not insubordination, Judge Nabong's seeming obliviousness in complying with DCA Lock's
4, was not attached to the Resolution of the Court and that he was only able to locate a copy directive constitutes disrespect for the Court's lawful directive bordering on willful contumacy.
through one of his staff.
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Judge Juan C. Nabong, Jr. be
He explained that his letter-compliance was inadvertently delayed due to his failing health. He ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for his failure to
avers that he was hospitalized at the Florida Hospital in Orlando on January 7 to 9, 2004, at San promptly comply with the directive of the Office of the Court Administrator.[5]
Juan Medical Center on June 12 to 14, 2004 and at the Manila Doctors Hospital on February 4
However, he cannot escape liability in making light of our directive and that of the OCA. Records
In a letter dated July 26, 2005,[6] the court personnel manifest their willingness to submit the show that the directive of the OCA was issued on September 2, 2002 yet. Although Judge
matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed and prayed that in the spirit of compassion Nabong requested for an extension of time to file his comment, it was done only on September
and consideration for human fragilities, to consider their explanations sufficient. 1, 2004, exactly 2 years after the issuance of the first directive. He actually submitted his
comment on February 24, 2005 a year after the Court issued a show cause resolution on August
We approve and adopt the findings of the OCA with modifications as to the recommended 9, 2004. His alleged sickness occurred on January 7-9, 2004, June 12-14, 2004 and February 4-
penalties. 9, 2005 with an interval of five months and seven months which to our mind is more than
enough time to comply with the Court directive. Further, as the OCA noted, his illness occurred
Under Section 23,[7] Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, respondents almost two years after the directive was issued by it in 2002.
whose DTR are evidently unrepresentative of the truth, should be punished with dismissal,
although it is their first offense. However, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Sirios,[8] we We find respondent's explanation unacceptable. While he may have been suffering from
held that we do not hastily inflict such an extreme penalty of dismissal upon an erring serious ailments, as evidenced by the medical certificates he attached to his explanation, it does
employee, especially so in cases where there exist mitigating circumstances which could not serve as a valid excuse for not giving due attention to the directives of the OCA and the
alleviate his or her culpability. Although unintentional mistake and good faith are not valid Court. We agree with the OCA that respondent judge must be held administratively liable for
defenses, the fact that respondents readily acknowledged their transgression, sought pardon his unjustified delay to explain his failure to properly supervise proper implementation of the
and vowed to rectify their errors, and the fact that this is their first administrative offense, Civil Service Rules and Regulations on attendance as implemented by MC No. 4.
militate the reduction of the imposable penalty of dismissal from the service to lighter
penalties. As enunciated in Imbang v. Del Rosario,[14] the office of the judge requires him to obey all the
lawful orders of his superiors. It is gross misconduct, even outright disrespect for the Court, for
In Reyes-Domingo v. Morales,[9] the branch clerk of court who was found guilty of dishonesty respondent judge to exhibit indifference to the resolution requiring him to comment on the
in not reflecting the correct time in his DTR was merely imposed a penalty of fine of P5,000.00. accusations in the complaint thoroughly and substantially. After all, a resolution of the Supreme
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Villaflor,[10] the clerk of court who made untruthful Court should not be construed as a mere request, and should be complied with promptly and
entries in the log book was imposed a penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00. In Office of completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in
the Court Administrator v. Saa,[11] the clerk of court of the MCTC of Camarines Norte made it character, but also disrespect for the Court's lawful order and directive.
appear in his DTR that he was present in office, when all the while he was attending hearings
of his own case in Quezon City was fined P5,000.00. In Re: Alleged Tampering of the Daily Time In Soria v. Villegas,[15] it was held that a judge who deliberately and continuously fails and
Records (DTR) of Sherry B. Cervantes, Court Stenographer III, Branch 18, Regional Trial Court, refuses to comply with the resolution of this Court is guilty of gross misconduct and
Manila,[12] the stenographer was found guilty of dishonesty for tampering her DTR and fined insubordination.
the amount of P5,000.00.
Judges are subject to human limitations.[16] It is not lost upon us that the respondent suffered
With the foregoing pronouncements, we deem the same applicable to the present case which from serious ailments and was hospitalized therefor. However, while these circumstances will
will serve to mitigate the penalty imposable on respondents OIC Moralejo and Stenographer not exculpate him from administrative liability, they may be considered as mitigating
Dabbay who should be fined the amount of P5,000.00 each. Considering that Stenographer circumstances.[17] As recommended by the OCA, he should be fined the amount of P1,000.00.
Peralta is likewise guilty of not logging-in, she should also be fined in the amount of P5,000.00.
Clerk III Balicanta who did not log-in for eight months should also be fined the amount of WHEREFORE, the following respondents are found guilty of Dishonesty and they are meted the
P5,000.00. following penalties:

For equitable reasons, by reason of the nature of their positions, Court Aide del Rosario and 1. Loida Moralejo is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00;
Process Server Robles should be fined the amount of P2,000.00 each.
2. Elma Dabbay is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00;
Anent respondent judges retirement on June 1, 2005, it has been settled that the Court is not
ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative matter by the mere fact that the respondent 3. Virginia Peralta is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00;
public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of respondents case.[13]
4. Heidwig Marie Balicanta is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00;
As to the administrative liability of Judge Nabong, he would have been admonished for not
being stricter with his subordinates in the observance of the rules on the use of the logbook. 5. Paquito del Rosario is FINED in the amount of P2,000.00; and
6. Andresito Robles is FINED in the amount of P2,000.00. [5] Id. at 148.
[6] Id. at 153.
All the above respondents are STERNLY WARNED that the commission of the same or similar [7] Sec. 23. Administrative offenses with its corresponding penalties are classified into grave,
offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely. less grave, and light, depending on the gravity of its nature and effects of said acts on the
government service.
For failing to promptly comply with the directives of the Office of the Court Administrator and The following are grave offenses with its corresponding penalties:
of this Court, Judge Juan C. Nabong, Jr. is FINED in the amount of P1,000.00 to be deducted (a) Dishonesty (1st Offense, Dismissal)
from his retirement benefits. (b) Falsification of official document (1st Offense, Dismissal)
[8] 457 Phil. 42, 48 (2003).
The cases against Nenita Robles and the deceased Guillermo dela Cruz are DISMISSED. [9] 396 Phil. 150, 165-166 (2000).
[10] A.M. No. P-05-1991, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 240.
SO ORDERED. [11] 457 Phil. 25 (2003).
[12] A.M. No. 03-8-463-RTC, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 572.
[13] Aquino, Jr. v. Miranda, A.M. No. P-01-1453, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 230, 239; Boiser v.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Aguirre, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1886, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 430, 436.
Associate Justice [14] A.M. No. 03-1515-MTJ, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 79, 83; Josep v. Abarquez, A.M. No.
MTJ-96-1096, September 10, 1996, 261 SCRA 629.
[15] A.M. No. RTJ-03-1812, November 19, 2003, 416 SCRA 187, 190 citing Alonto-Frayna v.
Astih, A.M. No. SDC-98-3, December 16, 1998, 300 SCRA 199.
WE CONCUR: [16] Misajon v. Feranil, A.M. No. P-02-1565, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 315.
[17] Re: Judicial Audit Report Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Br. 17, Kidapawan City,
A.M. No. 02-8-471-RTC, March 14, 2003, 399 SCRA 55.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 14-15.


[2] Id. at 8-13.
[3] Id. at 64-72.
[4] Id. at 78-80.
SECOND DIVISION
1. That while serving as the Acting Presiding Judge of MeTC, Manila, Branch 17, he requested
the detail of his branch clerk of court, Atty. Morales, to the OCC, MeTC, Manila. Later, he
JUDGE CRISPIN B. BRAVO, A.M. No. P-05-1950 recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) the immediate dismissal of Atty.
Complainant, (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1898-P) Morales from the service for corrupt practices;

2. That since he made the recommendation, he observed Atty. Morales to have acted
- versus - discourteously and disrespectful toward him. He relates that whenever he greets court
employees with a "good morning ladies and gentlemen" after every flag raising ceremony, as
was his usual practice, he noticed Atty. Morales mimicking him in a squeaky comical voice,
ATTY. MIGUEL C. MORALES, obviously to make fun of him;
Branch Clerk of Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 17 (now detailed 3. That in the morning of March 22, 2004, before the start of the flag raising rite at the old
with OCC), Manila, MWSS Building in Arroceros, Manila he caught Atty. Morales about to do his mocking imitating
Respondent. act, prompting him to tell the latter "tumigil ka"; that he then ordered one of the security
x---------------------------------------------x guards to arrest Atty. Morales preparatory to charging him with unjust vexation;

ATTY. MIGUEL C. MORALES, A.M. No. MTJ-1612 4. That so as not to exacerbate an embarrassing situation, he waited for the flag raising
Complainant, (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1571-MTJ) ceremony to end before apologizing to the crowd for the incident, only to witness Atty. Morales
responding with a shout: "sa akin hindi ka mag-aapology(sic)[1]
Present:
5. That he ignored Atty. Morales outburst and instead instructed the Officer-in-Charge of the
- versus - PUNO, J., Chairperson, SALVADOR-GUTIERREZ, security guards to call the Manila City Hall Police Detachment, which immediately dispatched
CORONA, PO3 Pacifico Wong and PO2 Jose Rancho; that he briefed both police officers regarding the flag-
JUDGE CRISPIN B. BRAVO, AZCUNA, and raising ceremony incident and about the preceding exchange of charges and counter-charges
Presiding Judge, Metropolitan GARCIA, JJ. filed with the OCA
Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila,
Respondent. Promulgated: 6. That no arrest was effected on that day owing to the intervention of MeTC Executive Judge
Myra G. Fernandez and 2nd Vice Executive Judge Tingaraan Guiling who instructed the police
August 30, 2006 officers to maintain the status quo; and
x------------------------------------------------x
7. That Atty. Morales sympathizers circulated a manifesto[2] on that same day denouncing
his act as a judge and soliciting support for Atty. Morales from the Union of the Clerks of Court
RESOLUTION of the MeTC, Manila; that of the twenty-nine union members, only three supported Atty.
Morales, one of the three, Atty. Eusebio Yarra, even pointing to the provocative act of Atty.
GARCIA, J.: Morales as the root cause of the incident adverted to.

At his end, Atty. Morales avers in his counter-complaint that Judge Bravo failed to behave with
These consolidated administrative cases which are in the nature of a charge and countercharge due restraint when the judge ordered his arrest. As Atty. Morales argued, unjust vexation is
sprang from the same incident. In A.M. No. P-05-1950, Judge Crispin B. Bravo, Presiding Judge, covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, adding that unjust vexation is not a continuing
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 16, charges his former branch clerk of court, offense and, ergo, a warrantless arrest could not be effected therefor, let alone by the
Atty. Miguel C. Morales, now detailed with the Office of the Clerk of Court, MeTC, Manila, with responding police officers who have no personal knowledge, as it were, of the alleged crime.
grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public officer. In A.M. No. MTJ-1612, on the other
hand, Atty. Morales charges Judge Bravo with grave abuse of authority, slander, harassment, Upon the Office of the Court Administrators (OCAs) recommendation, both cases were re-
grave ignorance of the law, inefficiency and grave/serious misconduct. docketed as a regular administrative matter.

In his complaint in A.M. No. P-05-1950, Judge Bravo alleged, in gist, the following:
Pursuant to a Resolution of the Court dated December 6, 2004, both parties submitted separate We feel, however, that Judge Bravos actuation in the premises does not amount to grave abuse
manifestations in which they indicated their willingness to submit their respective charges for of authority, as urged by Atty. Morales. Provoked as the judge was by Atty. Morales insulting
resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Pursuant too to another Resolution of conduct, the judge, like any other normal person, must have been carried away by his emotion.
September 28, 2005, the Court, upon due motion, ordered the consolidation of A.M. No. MTJ- Even then, his conduct as a judge is not totally excusable. To paraphrase what we said earlier,
1612 with A.M. No. P-05-1950. a judge, even in the face of boorish behavior from those he deals with, ought to conduct himself
in a manner befitting a gentleman and a high officer of the court.
In its report, the OCA recommended that Judge Bravo be reprimanded for abuse of authority
and Atty. Morales be fined in the amount of P2,000.00 for conduct unbecoming a government The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of the fact that all but three members of the MeTC Clerk
officer. of Court circle refused to rally behind Atty. Morales in his tiff with Judge Bravo, indicating
doubtless that the cumulative effect of his provocative remarks and actions against the judge
We find the recommendations of the OCA and the premises holding them together to be well- were what triggered the unfortunate March 22, 2004 incident.
taken.
The foregoing notwithstanding, some form of sanction should still be imposed on Judge Bravo,
At bottom is the sad spectacle of two officials of the judiciary wasting the precious hours of the reacting as he did in a manner disproportionate to what Atty. Morales had done, however
Court, including theirs, that could have otherwise been devoted to a more salutary productive wrong they might have been. There being no showing, however, that Judge Bravo had been
judicial pursuit rather than on petty wrangling that has no place in the judicial system. They previously charged with and found guilty of the same or similar administrative offense, a
ought to be reminded that the nature and responsibilities of the men and women in the reprimand with a warning appears proper.
judiciary, as defined in different canons of conduct, are neither mere rhetorical words nor
idealistic sentiments but working standards and attainable goals to be matched with actual We likewise agree with the OCAs finding on Atty. Morales guilt for conduct unbecoming a
deeds.[3] The Court has repeatedly stressed that court employees, from the presiding judge to government employee. His insulting act of mimicking the judge, in the presence of other court
the lowliest clerk, being public servants charged with dispensing justice, should always act with employees, a gesture calculated to ridicule, is a behavior unexpected of one in the judicial
a high degree of professionalism and responsibility, if not maturity. Their conduct must not only service. The ideal is for a court employee to be well-mannered, civil, and considerate in his
be characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be in accordance with law and court actuations, more particularly with respect to his relation to the presiding judge he is assigned
regulations. They should avoid any act or conduct that would or tend to diminish public trust under. Here, Atty. Morales' acts went against the principles of public service and such
and confidence in the courts. Indeed, those connected with the dispensation of justice bear a unpleasant kind of behavior must not be tolerated if we are to demand the highest degree of
heavy burden of responsibility. [4] excellence and professionalism among public employees and to preserve the integrity and
dignity of our courts of justice. He failed to live up to the norms of conduct demanded of his
An examination of the records of these consolidated cases reveals an undeniable pervasive position.
atmosphere of animosity between Judge Bravo and Atty. Morales as evidenced by a number of
administrative cases filed by one against the other. In fact, there are six additional We take this opportunity to remind both Judge Bravo and Atty. Morales that government
administrative cases filed by Atty. Morales against Judge Bravo,[5] while there are three more service is people-oriented. Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice; civility is never a
administrative cases filed by the latter against the former.[6] With the strained relations sign of weakness and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. Impatience and
between the two, it was not inconceivable for Atty. Morales to make fun of Judge Bravo in front rudeness have no place in the government service in which personnel are enjoined to act with
of court employees by mimicking the latter, making the greeting in a squeaky comical voice, self-restraint and civility at all times.[7]
and for Judge Bravo to retaliate instantaneously by ordering the arrest of his erring subordinate
even before a criminal suit is instituted. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court resolves to:

On the charge that Judge Bravo abused his authority, the Court agrees with the inculpatory (a) REPRIMAND Judge Crispin B. Bravo, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
findings of the OCA. Judge Bravo indeed overstepped the bounds of his authority when he Branch 16, Manila, for abuse of authority;
ordered the arrest of Atty. Morales on the basis of a mere intent to sue the latter later for unjust
vexation. Being a dispenser of justice, it behooves Judge Bravo to observe the same rules of (b) Impose a FINE on Atty. Miguel C. Morales of the Office of the Clerk of Court,
due process in dealing with his subordinates. He should have confined himself to filing an Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, in the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) for conduct
administrative complaint or a criminal one and let the wheels of justice run its course. To be unbecoming a public officer.
sure, Judge Bravo's actuation was unbecoming a judge who, needless to stress, is expected to
exercise proper restraint and civility in dealing even with insolent subordinates.
Both are hereby STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

(ON LEAVE)
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

[1] Rollo of A.M. No. P-05-1950, p. 2.


[2] Id. at 4-5.
[3] Sy v. Norberte, 391 Phil. 657, 664(2000), citing Marasigan v. Buena, 348 Phil. 1, 10 (1998).
[4] A.M. No. 03-3-179-RTC, January 26, 2005, 449 SCRA 278, 283, withholding of the Salary and
Benefits of Michael A. Latiza, Court Aide, RTC-Br. 14, Cebu City.
[5] 1) OCA IPI No. 02-1335-MTJ for grave coercion, grave threat, allowing court employee to
make decision, falsification of DTR, grave misconduct, inefficiency.
2) OCA IPI No. 03-1373-MTJ for libel, grave misconduct.
3) OCA IPI No. 03-1374-MTJ for falsifying minutes of the proceedings.
4) OCA IPI No. 03-1384-MTJ for neglect to act of official request.
5) OCA IPI No. 03-1385-MTJ for falsification of DTR.
6) OCA IPI No. 04-1525-MTJ for malversation, infidelity in the custody of court records,
dereliction of duties, grave misconduct.
[6] 1) OCA IPI No. 03-1561-P.
2) OCA IPI No. 04-1848-P.
3) OCA IPI No. 04-1875-P.
[7] Jacinto v. Vallarta, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1541, March 10, 2005, 453 SCRA 83, 94.
SECOND DIVISION According to the complainant, the respondent sheriff failed to completely carry out the March
8, 2004 order of the trial court even after repeated follow-ups and despite his having withdrawn
EDITHA S. SANTUYO, from the court the following amounts:
Complainant,
P5,000.00 for the pakyaw labor to haul, carry/transport effects, for cost of hired jeepneys
- versus - and other miscellaneous expenses, including respondents meals;

P16,300.00 for payment of two (2) days of labor of fifteen (15) persons and five (5) security
HERBERTO R. BENITO, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Naga City, personnel fencing off the gasoline station and safeguarding the same; and
Respondent.
P36,000.00 for the 3-day labor costs of thirty (30) persons ejecting the people inside the
A.M. No. P-05-1997 house and bringing out their belongings.
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1963-P)

Promulgated: Complainant accuses respondent of charging unreasonable and exhorbitant sheriffs fees thru
padded and imaginary charges. Going into details, complainant averred that the P5,000.00 for
August 3, 2006 the pakyaw labor was spent by the respondent in serving the writ of possession on a certain
Raul Santos, former owner of the subject premises who was neither its actual or present
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x possessor nor the operator of the gasoline station thereat. Complainant claimed that instead
of performing what the writ commanded him to do, the respondent, on his own volition and
without any travel order from or prior notice to the court nor to her, traveled from Naga City
RESOLUTION to Manila, stayed in an undisclosed hotel for two (2) days in Manila, incurred expenses for his
meals and transportation, and thereafter conveniently lost all the receipts and other
GARCIA, J.: documents supporting his travel. To the complainant, the respondents out-of-town trip was
unnecessary, and actually a mere scheme resorted to by him to justify his taking of her money.

This administrative case stemmed from a VERIFIED COMPLAINT[1] dated June 14, 2004, filed Complainant added that despite having withdrawn from the court the amount of P16,300.00
by complainant Editha S. Santuyo, charging the respondent, Sheriff IV Herberto R. Benito of the which was to be used as payment for the 2-day labor cost of the fifteen (15) workers and five
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 27, with Gross Neglect of Duty, Dishonesty, and (5) security personnel, the respondent sheriff still failed to turn over the premises to her, and
Gross Misconduct. that during the supposed execution, there were less than ten (10) people to execute the writ,
thereby compelling her to hire three (3) additional carpenters and blue guards to assist in the
Complainant is the attorney-in-fact of one of the plaintiffs in two separate actions for process.
annulment of sale, Civil Cases No. 90-2218 and No. 90-1506, of the RTC of Naga City, Branch
27. Worse, so complainant claims, the respondent spent P36,000.00 for an independent labor
In both cases, complainant obtained for her principals a favorable ruling from the Court of contractor who supplied the ejectment team, but accomplished nothing. She assails such
Appeals (CA) in whose decision, of November 29, 1999, nullified the sale of the property subject arrangement because the labor contractor is not accountable to the court, aside from the fact
of the suits and ordered the plaintiffs therein to be placed in the material possession thereof. that no other detail was given by her as to how the said amount was spent. She alleged that
The CA decision was ultimately affirmed by this Court and judgment was entered on June 5, when she went to the premises on the second and third days of the scheduled execution, she
2001. A writ of execution[2] was issued on March 13, 2002, followed by a writ of possession[3] did not see a shadow of the supposed thirty-man ejectment team.
on March 10, 2003.
Summing up, complainant averred that she was thrice robbed by the respondent in the total
On March 8, 2004, or after the lapse of one year from the issuance of the possesory writ, the amount of P57,300.00, and insisted that the alleged accounting and liquidation made by the
trial court issued an order directing the respondent sheriff to continue and complete the respondent were merely fabricated to conceal his misappropriation of funds.
execution process and to place the complainant in possession of the 1,200-square meter area
of the property whereat stands a Caltex gasoline station and a two-storey residential house In his comment,[4] the respondent sheriff claims that on March 14, 2003, at 9:30 a.m., he
which was being occupied by a certain Amado Sanao. received from the court the amount of P5,000.00 to cover the sheriffs incidental expenses. He
allegedly told the complainant that he could not officially turn over the premises subject of the
writ of possession because the writ was not yet served on defendant Raul Santos. He even
explained to the complainant that he could not leave for Manila without a travel order, and One, respondent reasoned that he could not implement at once the writ of possession without
that his schedule for the whole month of March 2003 was already full. While admitting receipt first serving a copy of the same to defendant Raul Santos who lives in Manila. This is sophistry
of the amount of P5,000.00, respondent alleged that he spent the money for his expenses in and is belied by the circumstances viz:
serving the writ of possession to defendant Raul Santos.
His manifestation to the court dated 7 March 2003 already asked for amount to execute
According to him, he actually left for Manila in the evening of March 14, 2003 but was able to the writ of possession. Why ask for funds to implement the ejectment when he knew he could
serve the writ of possession to the widow of Raul Santos only on March 16, 2003. not yet carry out the same and what he actually needed were funds meant for another
purpose?;
Plodding on, respondent claims that he made due manifestations to the court for each of his
expected expenses which were all duly approved by the court through orders directing the There was no travel order for his supposed travel to Manila;
complainant to deposit the necessary amounts with the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Respondent insists that he rendered a liquidation and/or accounting to the court. As regards His deviation from the standard procedure was unjustified, and he did not even have the
the amount of P36,000.00, respondent asserted that the same was actually paid to Mr. Rodolfo prudence to notify the court or immediately made his report about it as mandated by the Rules;
Segovia, the person who provided the ejectment team. On July 7, 2003, he issued a Notice to
Vacate against Mr. Amado Sanao and the occupants of the property, and on July 10, 2003, he He submitted his liquidation report thereon only after more than one year, or on 22 March
made a letter-request for police assistance. 2004, with only an affidavit, also executed that same date, alleging that he lost all the receipts
and documents evidencing his travel. Said affidavit does not even mention the Hotel where he
Further, respondent explains that in the morning of July 14, 2003, the ejectment team forced stayed or other details of his meal expenses;
open the steel gate of the house with steel cutter and forcibly ejected the people inside the
house including their personal belongings.[5] Even after he allegedly received a temporary His own evidence discloses that his schedule for the month of March 2003 is already full,
restraining order (TRO) at 4:00 p.m. of the same day, he went ahead with the ejectment process with travel order for each day;
because the TRO handed to him was a mere photocopy thereof, and stopped only the next day
upon his receipt of the certified true copy of the TRO, adding that he even made a query to the To prove his travel to Manila, all that respondent has is his self-serving assertion. Even his
court relative to the TRO. He submitted his sheriffs reports on December 4, 2003 and April 12, claim that he actually served the writ of possession to the widow of Raul Santos, who allegedly
2004. acknowledged receipt but refused to sign, is suspect since the widow herself confided that her
family no longer has claims over the property.
In her REPLY TO THE COMMENT /ANSWER OF RESPONDENT,[6] the complainant denied the
imputation that it was thru her constant prodding that respondent left for Manila to serve the
writ of possession to Raul Santos. She belied respondents allegation that as of April 1, 2003, Two, his subsequent manifestation for sheriffs expenses --- albeit basically for the same
the subject premises had been officially turned over to her, and refuted the claim that there purpose as the first --- more than tripled the amount in the first manifestation. Three, there
was actual ejectment on July 14, 2003 which was supposedly overtaken by a TRO the next day. was no basis to pay the independent contractor in full since the task contracted was actually
To her, it would have taken not less than two hours for the ejectment team of allegedly thirty halted. Four, complainant has steadfastly remitted the proper amount as sheriff expenses. This
(30) people to enter the premises and eject the few boarders who still occupied the two-storey notwithstanding, and despite a long period of time, respondent still failed to execute the writs
house of about eighty (80) square meters in floor area. to completion. Five, Respondents query to the court of appeals relative to the TRO is but
another scheme to indirectly justify the delay. It was made only on 22 September 2003, or long
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant administrative complaint sprung from a after the TRO ceased to be effective, and only after complainants counsel had written
decision that had long become final and executory. The judgment sought to be executed was respondent exhorting him to fulfill his bounden duty. Moreover, the TRO apparently
entered way back on June 5, 2001, while the writ of execution and writ of possession were erroneously named him as an employee of Branch 62, not of Branch 27, besides the fact that
issued on March 13, 2002 and March 10, 2003, respectively. The undue delay in the the same bears a different case number from the case pending in his branch. If indeed
implementation of the subject writs was even highlighted by the fact that the trial court had respondent doubted the TRO, why did he wait for it to lapse before raising the query?
to issue an order on March 8, 2004, directing the respondent sheriff to continue and Respondent only submitted his report on the implementation of the writ of possession on 4
complete the execution process. December 2003, and on 12 April 2004, in patent disregard of his reportorial duty under Rules
of Court. The presiding Judge had to issue an order dated 8 March 2004 directing respondent
As aptly observed by the Court Administrator in his February 28, 2005 Report/ to continue and complete the execution of the writs in the subject cases. This not only shows
Recommendation,[7] respondents explanations for the delay are suspicious and at best the delay, but it also brings to fore the fact that respondent only made the liquidation reports
sketchy: including his affidavit of loss, on 22 March 2004, or only after the issuance of the said order.
[6] Id. at 115-119.
Not only was there an unreasonable delay in the implementation of the writs of execution and [7] Id. at 120-124.
possession. Respondent also failed to satisfactorily justify the items for the expenses he [8] Adm. Matter No. P-1142, March 31, 1980, 96 SCRA 667.
allegedly incurred in connection therewith. [9] Teresa T. Gonzales La and Co., Inc. v. Sheriff Jadi T. Hatab, A.M. No. P-99-1337, April 5, 2000,
329 SCRA 646.
In Smith Bell and Co. v. Saur,[8] the Court has made it clear that the duty of sheriffs to promptly [10] Neeland v. Villanueva, A.M. No. P-99-1316, October 29, 1999, 317 SCRA 652.
execute a writ is mandatory and ministerial. Sheriffs have no discretion on whether or not to
implement it. There is no need for the litigants to follow-up its implementation.

Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice. They are tasked to execute final
judgments of the courts. If not enforced, such judgments become empty victories for the
prevailing party. As agents of the law, sheriffs are called upon to discharge their duties with due
care and utmost diligence. In serving court writs and processes and in implementing court
orders, sheriffs cannot afford to err without affecting the integrity of their office and the
efficient administration of justice.[9]

The conduct and behavior of every one connected with an office charged with the dispensation
of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowest clerk, are circumscribed with the heavy burden
of responsibility. Their conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum but above all, beyond suspicion.[10]

Here, the respondent sheriff was clearly remiss in performing his ministerial duty of
implementing promptly and expeditiously the possessory writ issued by the court. He was
likewise tardy in the submission of his report relative thereto.

Accordingly, the Court finds the respondent guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, an offense which, under Section 23 (t) of the Civil Service Law, carries the penalty
of suspension for six (6) months and one day to one (1) year, for the first offense.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Sheriff Herberto Benito, is hereby adjudged GUILTY of conduct


prejudicial to the best interest of the service and is SUSPENDED for a period of SIX MONTHS
without pay, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 1-8.


[2] Id. at 37.
[3] Id. at 49-50.
[4] Id. at 31-36.
[5] Id. at 35.
WHEREFORE, let a writ of possession issue in favor of the Philippine National Bank and the
THIRD DIVISION mortgagors Rufino Austria and Estela Austria and all persons claiming rights under them and
those acting under their direction and control are ordered to vacate the premises identified as
RUTH A. COLLADO, Lot 3544 situated in Dagupan City, covered by and embraced by TCT No. 69390 of the Register
Complainant, of Deeds of Dagupan City.[5]
A.M. No. P-05-2073 Respondent Sheriff served the writ of possession on the occupants of the lot. All except one
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2144-P) failed to vacate. Thus, upon PNBs motion, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of
demolition. The Clerk of Court then issued the writ commanding respondent to remove and
- versus - demolish all structures and any other improvements found [on said lot].[6]
On November 9, 2004, respondent served the writ of demolition on the remaining occupants
Present: of Lot No. 3544.
On November 16, 2004, respondent arrived at the premises with 20 men. To aid in the
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, execution, PNB caused a relocation survey to be conducted to ascertain the boundaries of the
CARPIO, property. It was discovered that a portion of the concrete fence of complainant, who owned an
CARPIO MORALES, adjoining lot, as well as a portion of her brothers house, encroached on Lot No. 3544.
TINGA, and Respondent then demolished those structures found on Lot No. 3544, over the objections of
VELASCO, JR., JJ. complainant who insisted that the lot on which her fence and her brothers house stood were
still part of her own lot, Lot No. 3557.
ADONIS L. SEVIDAL, SHERIFF IV, RTC, BR. 44, DAGUPAN CITY, Complainant now claims that respondent exceeded and violated his authority by maliciously
Respondent. and unlawfully causing the demolition of her concrete fence that was allegedly well within her
Promulgated: own lot. She also claims that respondent destroyed and ransacked her brothers house, which
was likewise within her lot, and coerced him to leave under threat that otherwise something
August 29, 2006 bad would happen to him. She stresses that neither she nor her brother were parties in S.P. No.
2003-0132-D and laments the denial to them of due process.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x In his comment, filed upon order of the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent maintains
RESOLUTION that he properly executed the writ of demolition. He avers that he merely implemented the
QUISUMBING, J.: writ of demolition which commanded him to remove and demolish all structures and any other
Before us is the administrative complaint[1] of Ruth A. Collado charging Sheriff Adonis L. improvements found [on Lot No. 3544]. Thus, it was his duty to demolish a part of complainants
Sevidal[2] with serious misconduct and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and fence because it encroached on said lot. He further denies ever touching the house of
Corrupt Practices Act. complainants brother, much less ransacking it, and asserts that he never threatened anybody.
The factual antecedents of the complaint are as follows: He also denies that complainant was denied due process. He points out that complainants
In May 1994, the spouses Rufino and Estela Austria mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank children, who were actual occupants of her property, filed a motion to intervene in S.P. No.
(PNB) a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3544 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title 2003-0132-D and then actually intervened in said proceedings.[7]
(TCT) No. 61509 of the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City. When the spouses Austria failed to In a memorandum dated August 2, 2005, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,
comply with the terms and conditions of the mortgage, PNB foreclosed the mortgage found respondent liable and recommended to this Court that a fine of P5,000 be imposed on
extrajudicially. By virtue of the special power of attorney attached in the deed of mortgage in him.[8]
favor of PNB, Sheriff Vinez A. Hortaleza of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City sold Lot No.
3544 at a public auction. PNB was the highest bidder at the auction conducted on May 13, 1996, We find no reason to disagree with said findings and recommendation of the Court
and a certificate of sale was issued to it. Administrator.
Ownership of the lot was consolidated on PNB upon the expiration of the redemption period The decision in S.P. No. 2003-0132-D which respondent was executing, was directed only
on February 4, 1998. TCT No. 61509 was cancelled and TCT No. 69390 was issued in PNBs against the mortgagors Rufino Austria and Estela Austria and all persons claiming rights under
name.[3] them and those acting under their direction and control.[9] The writ of possession, issued to
On July 30, 2003, PNB filed with Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44, an ex parte implement the decision, was likewise only against said persons. Even the writ of demolition
petition docketed as S.P. No. 2003-0132-D for the issuance of a writ of possession. The trial reiterated that the court had commanded said persons to vacate the properties. Complainant
court, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 3135,[4] as amended, ordered the issuance of a and her brother, however, were occupying a portion of Lot No. 3544 adversely to the spouses
writ of possession on October 1, 2003. The trial court decreed, Austria. Complainant claimed that the lot on which her fence and a portion of her brothers
house stood were still part of her lot, Lot No. 3557, which adjoined Lot No. 3544. Thus, both
complainant and her brother were clearly not claiming rights under the spouses Austria nor
acting in their direction and control. Neither were they parties to S.P. No. 2003-0132-D. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Being a sheriff specifically entrusted with the proper execution of judgments, respondent Associate Justice
should have known that the writs were not enforceable against complainants. Respondent
should know that the writ of demolition was issued to implement the decision in S.P. No. 2003-
0132-D. As the officer charged with the execution of judgment, he is enjoined to ensure that
only that portion of a decision ordained or decreed in the dispositive part should be subject of [1] Rollo, pp. 1-3.
execution.[10] Thus, we find no merit in respondents argument that he properly enforced the [2] Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44.
directive in the writ of demolition since the writ directed him to demolish all improvements on [3] Rollo, p. 11.
Lot No. 3544. [4] AN ACT TO REGULATE THE SALE OF PROPERTY UNDER SPECIAL POWERS INSERTED IN OR
That the directive to demolish was couched in such general terms as to imply that it was ANNEXED TO REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES.
applicable to all improvements regardless of ownership is of no moment. In the enforcement [5] Supra note 3 at 16.
of judgments and writs, a sheriff must know what is inherently right and wrong and is bound to [6] Id. at 22-23.
act with prudence and caution.[11] Respondent is called to exercise due care and reasonable [7] Id. at 5-8.
skill in the performance of his duties. The writ of execution having been issued to implement a [8] Id. at 32-34.
decision, respondent should have read the directive in light of the dispositive portion of the [9] Id. at 16.
decision he was executing, not apart from it. Precisely, the writ of demolition contained a [10] Cunanan v. Cruz, A.M. No. R-89-P, November 24, 1989, 167 SCRA 674, 677.
restatement of the dispositive portion to guide respondent in the implementation of the writ. [11] Malbas v. Blanco, A.M. No. P-99-1350, December 12, 2001, 372 SCRA 118, 126.
Indeed, the records show that respondent was cavalier in implementing the writ of demolition, [12] Rollo, p. 18.
albeit without malice, bad faith or corrupt motives. Recall that PNB caused the relocation [13] A.M. No. P-04-1832 (Formerly OCA-IPI No. 03-1572-P), February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 134.
survey to be conducted only on November 16, 2004. Before that time, it was not known that a
portion of complainants fence, as well as a portion of her brothers house, encroached on Lot
No. 3544. Hence, respondent never sent complainant or her brother a notice of the writ of
possession as shown by respondents own return.[12] Demand on them to vacate the property
was made by respondent only after the encroachment was discovered. Yet, respondent
immediately caused the demolition of their properties on the strength of a decision and a writ
that before that day, they never knew about.
The appropriate course of action for respondent, given complainants objections and the lack of
notice of the writs of possession and demolition to her and her brother, should have been to
inform the judge of the situation by way of a partial Sheriffs return and wait for instructions on
the proper procedure to be observed. This respondent failed to do.
In Gadil v. Cordova,[13] we held that the respondent sheriff therein was liable for simple
misconduct for a similar failure. In that case, the respondent sheriff enforced a writ of execution
obtained pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended, (1) despite the assertion of the complainant
that the writ was not enforceable against her as she was not in privity with the debtor or
mortgagor, and (2) without bringing the objection to the attention of the issuing judge.
Respondent herein is similarly liable.
His reliance on a motion to intervene which complainants children supposedly filed in S.P. No.
2003-0132-D, is unmeritorious and therefore cannot exonerate him. Complainant was not one
of the intervenors and neither is there any indication that the movants were related to
complainant or acting in her behalf. There is even no indication that complainant participated
in S.P. No. 2003-0132-D.
WHEREFORE, respondent Sheriff Adonis L. Sevidal is found LIABLE for simple misconduct and is
hereby ORDERED to pay a FINE of P5,000.00, WITH A WARNING that commission of the same
or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
Martillano alleges that Sheriff Arimado received from him the amount of P2,500.00 upon the
FRANCISCO D. MARTILLANO, A.M. No. P-06-2134 latters representation that he will assist them in settling I.S. No. 04-0531. Sheriff Arimado
Complainant, [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2180-P] allegedly told Martillano that he was able to persuade and convince Prosecutor Sison not to
prosecute the case in exchange for Martillanos admission of his guilt and payment of a fine of
Present: P2,500.00. However, in an Order dated September 24, 2004, Martillano learned that the case
was dismissed for lack of probable cause and not because he paid the appropriate fine.[3]
- versus - QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson, In his Compliance[4] dated November 26, 2004, which he adopts[5] as his comment to the
CARPIO, present case, Sheriff Arimado avers that it was Martillanos wife and two (2) companions who
CARPIO MORALES sought his help in looking for counsel to assist them in the case against Martillano. Martillanos
TINGA, and wife allegedly left with him the amount of P2,500.00 as advance payment for said counsel. The
SHERIFF MANUEL L. ARIMADO, VELASCO, JJ. following day, however, Martillanos wife returned to inform him that they no longer needed
Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, counsel as the case had already been dismissed. Sheriff Arimado told the supposed counsel
Legaspi City, about the new development but the latter replied that a case would still be filed with the
Respondent. Promulgated: Municipal Trial Court in Cities because the penalty imposable is only fine. Sheriff Arimado claims
that he relayed this message to Martillano. He adds that his only intention was to extend
August 9, 2006 assistance to Martillano and that he would return the money to the latter upon retrieval.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x The case was referred to Hon. Romeo S. Daas, Executive Judge, RTC of Legaspi City, for
investigation, report and recommendation.[6]

RESOLUTION After due proceedings in which both parties were heard, the case was submitted for
resolution.[7] Executive Judge Avelino V. Rodenas, Jr. issued a Resolution[8] dated June 13,
Tinga, J.: 2006, finding that although Sheriff Arimado is liable for simple misconduct, the case has been
rendered moot and academic because of Martillanos lack of interest in pursuing the case.
However, since Sheriff Arimado admits that he received money from Martillano, Judge Rodenas
Francisco Martillano (Martillano) is the respondent in I.S. No. 04-0531 for violation of Section recommends that Sheriff Arimado be reprimanded.
3(b) in relation to Sections 2(g) and 4 of Republic Act No. 9287, filed against him by a certain
Emerito Zamora with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Legaspi City. During the preliminary It should be stated at the outset that Martillanos lack of interest in pursuing this case does not
investigation of the case, Martillano submitted a Counter Affidavit[1] in which he alleged as a affect the Courts jurisdiction, under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, to investigate and
defense that his liability for the offense had already been settled by his payment of a fine in the decide complaints against erring employees of the judiciary.
amount of P2,500.00 which he handed to respondent Sheriff Manuel Arimado (Sheriff
Arimado). Finding probable cause against Martillano, Assistant City Prosecutor Solon Sison The fact that Sheriff Arimado received P2,500.00 from Martillanos wife[9] is not in dispute. The
(Prosecutor Sison) recommended the filing of an Information against him. Prosecutor Sison, only variance in the testimonies of the parties is that while Martillano claims that the money
however, advised Martillano to initiate the appropriate action against certain individuals who was given to Sheriff Arimado supposedly to pay for the fine imposed against Martillano, Sheriff
may have exercised on him deceit, or otherwise inflicted on him financial loss.[2] Arimado claims that it was intended for the lawyer whose services he was supposed to procure
to assist Martillano.
The Information against Martillano was docketed as Criminal Case No. 110479 in the sala of
Judge Henry Basilia (Judge Basilia) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legaspi City, Branch 3. This difference, however, is irrelevant because Sheriff Arimado was unauthorized to receive
Taking Prosecutor Sisons advise, Judge Basilia referred the matter to Sheriff Arimados money from a litigant for whatever purpose especially since he was the sheriff in the sala of
immediate superior, Judge Edgar Armes (Judge Armes), who required Sheriff Arimado to Judge Armes before whom Martillanos case was then pending. Sheriff Arimados act is a
comment on the allegations of Martillano. Upon Sheriff Arimados compliance, Judge Armes misconduct defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the
returned to Judge Basilia his First Indorsement. The latter, in turn, forwarded the matter to the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for the possible institution of an administrative case the cause.[10]
against Sheriff Arimado. Thus, with his Counter Affidavit filed in I.S. No. 4-0531, Martillano
stands as the complainant in the instant administrative case.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Duque,[11] we held respondent liable for simple
misconduct in view of the absence of evidence that she was moved by bad faith, dishonesty or PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
hatred when she received the amount of P120,000.00 from a litigant without authority. Associate Justice
Likewise, the Executive Judge did not mention and we do not glean any dishonest or fraudulent
motive in Sheriff Arimados action.

Sec. 52(B)(2) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service penalizes simple
misconduct with suspension ranging from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for
the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. This is not Sheriff Arimados first offense.
He admits that he was previously suspended in two (2) administrative cases filed against [1]Rollo, pp. 7-8.
him.[12]
[2]Id. at 6.
However, in view of the fact that Sheriff Arimado was not motivated by any evil intention and
had already returned the P2,500.00 which he received from Martillano,[13] we are moved by [3]It appears that after the case was dismissed for lack of probable cause, the City Prosecutors
compassion not to dismiss Sheriff Arimado but merely to suspend him again without pay for Office re-entertained the case on the basis of additional allegations and evidence against
two (2) months. This suspension comes with a reminder to everyone in the judiciary to act with Martillano. Martillano then filed the Counter Affidavit which was made the basis of this
utmost circumspection for any misbehavior, whether true or only perceived, on the part of administrative case.
court personnel would most certainly reflect never too kindly on the judiciary.[14]
[4]Rollo, p. 11.

[5]Id. at 22; Manifestation dated June 17, 2005.

WHEREFORE, Sheriff IV Manuel D. Arimado of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Legaspi City, [6]Id. at 27; Resolution dated March 6, 2006.
is found GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for which he is SUSPENDED without pay for two (2)
months. [7]Id. at 31; Order dated May 22, 2006.

SO ORDERED. [8]Id. at 33-34.

[9]TSN, May 22, 2006, p. 6. Martillano and his wife testified that it was the latter who gave
DANTE O. TINGA Sheriff Arimado the amount of P2,500.00.
Associate Justice
[10]Office of the Court Administrator v. Duque, A.M. P-05-1958, February 7, 2005, 450 SCRA
527, 532 citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Octavio A. Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-
WE CONCUR: 03-1151, August 20, 2004, 437 SCRA 81.

[11]Id.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice [12]TSN, May 22, 2006, p. 12.
Chairperson
[13]Sheriff Arimado handed to Martillano the amount of P2,500.00 during the hearing
conducted by the Executive Judge.

[14]Racca v. Baculi, A.M. No. P-02-1627, August 7, 2003, 408 SCRA 465.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
FIRST DIVISION
As a result of the incident, complainant issued a memorandum to respondent reminding the
latter that the Bodega is for official use and should be open during office hours. Respondent
MARIA RAQUEL R. BAJAR, A.M. No. P-06-2151 refused to receive the said memorandum. Later, that same afternoon, respondent went to
Records Officer III, Archives complainants office and berated the latter in the presence of her staff with the following:
Section, Office of the Clerk of Court, Present:
Regional Trial Court, Manila, Wala kang karapatang mag-issue ng memo! Ikaw nga nagpaparlor ka during office hours,
Complainant, Panganiban, CJ, gagawa[-]gawa ka ng memo, mali-mali naman ang English mo, bakit ikaw di mo madisiplina ang
Chairperson, iba diyan! May inggit ka kasi sa akin, hindi ka bagay maging boss!
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, [O]n the morning of 1 July 2003, complainant and the respondent were summoned to the Office
- versus - CALLEJO, SR., and of the Clerk of Court. In the presence of Atty. Buendia, respondent badmouthed the
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ complainant with the following utterances:

VICTORIANO P. BATERISNA, Wala kang karapatang mag-issue ng memorandum! Kailan ka ba naging Chief? Di mo ba alam
Records Officer II, Archives na ang Chief lang dito sa office ay si Atty. Buendia? Wala ka kasing pinag-aralan kay[a] mali-mali
Section, Office of the Clerk of Court, ang ginagawa mo! Ano? Gusto mo personalan tayo ha? Gusto mo? Alam mo ba maam (referring
Regional Trial Court, Manila, Promulgated: to Atty. Buendia) ipinagsasabi niya na bulok ang jeep [ninyo] sa probinsiya at nanghihiram ka
Respondent. August 28, 2006 ng alahas at hindi agad ibinabalik! Naku, maam wag kayo magtiwala diyan, traydor ang babaeng
iyan! Kaya si Ann sa akin nagtitiwala, sa akin nagcoconfide dahil traydor yang kaibigan! Hindi
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x mo ba alam na lahat ng kaopisina natin sa labas ay galit sa iyo? Napakahayop mo talaga! Hayop
ka talaga!

DECISION Respondent also warned that he would take the necessary action against complainant if the
latter will not withdraw the memorandum from the formers 201 file. Respondent then sent a
letter to complainant denying using the room for other purposes and in the same letter,
PANGANIBAN, CJ: accused complainant of utilizing the same room for her physical fitness and beauty.

Judicial employees must always abide by the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Complainant filed a criminal complaint against the respondent but she later on desisted which
Officers and Employees. They are expected to be living examples of uprightness and decorum, led to the dismissal of the case. She, however, pursued the instant administrative case before
not only in the performance of their duties, but also in their dealings with other people. the Office of the Court Administrator.

The Case and the Facts Rico Marabut, Process Server of the OCC-RTC, Manila, testified that he served complainants
memorandum to the respondent. The respondent refused to receive the memorandum and
This case finds it origin from a Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed by Maria Raquel R. Bajar, Records said Sobra naman siya, akala mo kung sino siya, bababa [na lang] ako sa kanya.
Officer III, against Victoriano P. Baterisna, Records Officer II, both of the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Complainant charged respondent with Mr. Marabut was instructed by complainant to have the memorandum received at their
insubordination, disrespect and conduct unbecoming an officer.[2] Receiving Section and to furnish their Clerk of Court of a copy thereof and another copy in
respondents 201 file. When he returned to their office, he found respondent waiting for the
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) summarized the facts of the case in its February complainant. When complainant arrived, respondent confronted her on the memorandum and
13, 2006 Report,[3] as follows: uttered in a loud voice, hindi ka bagay maging boss.

x x x [O]n 30 June 2003 at around 1:30 in the afternoon, complainant Maria Raquel R. Bajar, Jerlyn Balbas of the Archives Section declared that on the afternoon of 30 June 2003,
Records Officer III, Archives Section, RTC-OCC, Manila and Mr. Joel Loja went to the Bodega respondent came to their office looking for the complainant. When complainant arrived,
room of the Archives and Notarial Section of RTC-Manila to verify Mr. Lojas complaint that said respondent confronted her, saying among others, hindi ka bagay maging boss in a loud and
room/office was locked from the inside. After knocking repeatedly, the door was opened and high-pitched voice. Thereafter, respondent left the room.
they saw respondent Victoriano P. Baterisna in the company of other RTC employees.
Respondent Victoriano Baterisna, on the other hand, explained that on 30 June 2003, he The OCA was correct in observing that respondent had not successfully disputed the charge
attended the raffle of cases which terminated at around 12:30 p.m. While having a late lunch, against him. His explanation contained mere denials and a countercharge against complainant.
he did not notice that complainant checked their door which was closed at that time. Instead More important, respondent admitted his brash behavior in dealing with her.
of personally calling his attention on the matter, complainant served him with a memorandum.
In his letter dated November 4, 2003,[8] respondent apologized to complainant, categorically
On 1 July 2003, respondent sought an audience with the complainant before the Clerk of Court admitting that he was not able to control [his] temper during that time when [they] were
to settle the matter. Atty. Buendia prodded them to settle their differences but they had an summoned by their Chief, Atty. Jennifer H. dela Cruz-Buendia.[9] In that same letter, he also
exchange of words instead. Respondent requested the complainant to withdraw her acknowledged having uttered the words complained of.[10] He later rationalized those
memorandum, but complainant refused. utterances by claiming that they were due to his sudden outburst during that time.

Respondent claimed that he was not angry and was not speaking at the top of his voice when The discourteous and disrespectful behavior was likewise admitted in respondents written
he confronted the complainant. He said that complainant perceived respondents utterances apologies to Clerk of Court Jennifer H. dela Cruz-Buenda[11] and again to complainant on
differently due to personal bias. Respondent reiterated that this administrative case is a mere November 10, 2003.[12] The clerk of court later admitted being aghast at the way the parties
duplication of the charges filed against him by the complainant before the Office of the City had revealed their hidden personalities.[13]
Prosecutor of Manila which was dismissed on 10 December 2003.
Having admitted to his rude behavior, respondent cannot now be heard denying any of the
Respondent admitted writing letters on several occasions admitting the utterances he made. allegations hurled against him by complainant. Declarations of parties as to a relevant fact may
He likewise admitted authorship of the letter addressed to the Clerk of Court and the letter be given in evidence against them.[14] Moreover, both the investigating judge[15] and the OCA
addressed to the complainant wherein he berated the latter. Respondent nevertheless found that respondent had indeed exhibited the acts complained of.
maintained that the misunderstanding between him and the complainant is personal and not
related to their respective duties.[4] Often have we stressed that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice are circumscribed with a heavy burden of
responsibility.[16] The actions of employees must at all times be characterized by propriety and
Findings and Recommendation of the OCA decorum. The Constitution mandates that all public officers and employees should serve with
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.[17] Indeed, a public office is a public trust.[18]
The OCA opined that respondent had not successfully disputed the charge against him. It found The people -- not just the judiciary -- expect the best from all judicial employees, who must be
that by uttering unsavory remarks against complainant in front of other employees, and later paradigms in the administration of justice.[19]
in the presence of the clerk of court, respondent was not only discourteous but also
disrespectful.[5] His act displayed conduct unbecoming a court employee. Fighting between court employees during office hours is a disgraceful behavior reflecting
adversely on the good image of the judiciary. It displays a cavalier attitude towards the
Further, the OCA found that the rude and hostile behavior exhibited by respondent affected seriousness and dignity with which court business should be treated. Shouting at one another
public service. Such improper behavior displayed by respondent during office hours exhibit[ed] in the workplace and during office hours is arrant discourtesy and disrespect not only towards
not only a paucity of professionalism at the workplace, but also great disrespect for the court co-workers, but to the court as well.[20]
itself.[6]
Thus, the OCA recommended that 1) the present case be re-docketed as a regular High-strung and belligerent behavior has no place in government service, in which the
administrative matter; 2) respondent be suspended for one month and one day for gross personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times, even when confronted
discourtesy in the course of official duty; and 3) he be warned that a repetition of the same or with rudeness and insolence.[21] Such conduct is exacted from them, so that they will earn and
similar acts in the future would be dealt with more severely.[7] keep the publics respect for and confidence in the judicial service. This standard is applied with
respect to court employees dealings not only with the public, but also with their co-workers in
The Courts Ruling the service.[22] Conduct violative of this standard quickly and surely corrodes respect for the
courts.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
All judicial employees must refrain from the use of abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing or
Respondents Administrative Liability otherwise improper language.[23] They are expected to accord due respect, not only to their
superiors, but also to all others.[24] Their every act and word should be characterized by
prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity.[25]
Respondents behavior was totally unbecoming a member of the judicial service and cannot be W E C O N C U R:
countenanced. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Employees CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
requires public employees to respect at all times the rights of others and to refrain from acts Associate Justice Associate Justice
contrary to good morals and good customs.[26] Indeed, it is the policy of the State to promote ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
a high standard of ethics in the public service.[27] Associate Justice Associate Justice

What is even more displeasing to the Court is the continued aggressive attitude of respondent [1] Rollo, pp. 1-2.
even before his superior, the clerk of court. The very reason for the audience with her was to [2] Complaint-Affidavit dated July 23, 2003, p. 2; rollo, p. 2
settle amicably any differences between complainant and respondent. Yet, as aptly put by the [3] Rollo, unnumbered. Signed by Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now an
clerk of court, she was aghast at how the meeting turned out.[28] Thus, she expressed her utter associate justice of this Court).
disappointment in his actuations. Based on the events that happened in this case and the [4] OCA Report dated February 13, 2006, pp. 1-3; rollo, unnumbered.
spiteful words uttered, we share in the disappointment of the clerk of court. [5] Id. at 4; id., unnumbered.
[6] Id.
Respondent then argues that, had complainant been true to her intentions in her Affidavit of [7] Id. at 4-5; id., unnumbered.
Desistance[29] in the criminal Complaint for Libel and Grave Slander, then even this [8] Rollo, p. 129.
administrative Complaint should have been dismissed and terminated.[30] In effect, he faults [9] Id.
her for desisting in the criminal case, while continuing with this administrative case. [10] Id.
[11] Id. at 128.
We will not even begin to speculate on her motives in continuing with this administrative [12] Id. at 130.
charge. Simply, before this Court is a charge of gross discourtesy. Even if complainant desisted [13] Memorandum dated July 15, 2003, p. 1; rollo, p. 124.
from continuing with this administrative case, this Court can still continue taking cognizance of [14] Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 26.
the administrative charge. The withdrawal or desistance of a complainant from pursuing an [15] Report and Recommendation of Executive Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr. dated September
administrative complaint does not divest the Court of its disciplinary authority over court 27, 2005; rollo, unnumbered.
personnel.[31] [16] Cervantes v. Cardeo, 462 SCRA 324, June 30, 2005; Soliman, Jr. v. Soriano, 410 SCRA 225,
September 2, 2003.
Employees of the judiciary should be living examples of uprightness not only in the performance [17] Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 1
of their official duties, but also in their personal and private dealings with other people, so as [18] Id.
to preserve at all times the good name and standing of courts in the community.[32] Any [19] Ibay v. Lim, 340 SCRA 107, September 11, 2000.
scandalous behavior or act that may erode the peoples high esteem for the judiciary [20] Cervantes v. Cardeo, supra; Aquino v. Israel, 426 SCRA 266, March 25, 2004; Quiroz v.
unbecomes an employee.[33] Orfila, 272 SCRA 324, May 7, 1997.
[21] Cervantes v. Cardeo, supra; Aquino v. Israel, supra; Paiste v. Mamenta, Jr., 412 SCRA 403,
Under the Civil Service Rules, gross discourtesy in the performance of official duties is a less October 1, 2003.
grave offense punishable with suspension from one month and one day to six months.[34] [22] Cervantes v. Cardeo, supra; Aquino v. Israel, supra; Quiroz v. Orfila, supra.
Thus, OCAs recommended penalty falls within the range allowed by the Rules. [23] Cabanatan v. Molina, 370 SCRA 16, November 21, 2001; Caguioa v. Flora, 360 SCRA 12,
June 28, 2001.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Victoriano P. Baterisna, Records Officer II of the Office of the Clerk [24] Id.
of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is hereby SUSPENDED for one month and one [25] Id.
day for gross discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, with a stern warning that the [26] Republic Act No. 6713 (1989), Sec. 4(c).
commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. [27] Republic Act No. 6713 (1989), Sec. 2.
[28] Supra note 13.
SO ORDERED. [29] Rollo, p. 131.
[30] Id. at 155.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN [31] Tan v. Dela Cruz, Jr., 439 SCRA 555, September 30, 2004; Aquino v. Israel, supra; Casanova,
Chief Justice Jr. v. Cajayon, 400 SCRA 472, April 3, 2003.
Chairperson, First Division [32] Santelices v. Samar, 373 SCRA 78, January 15, 2002.
[33] Pablejan v. Calleja, AM No P-06-2102, January 24, 2006.
[34] Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule IV, Sec. 52 (B)(3).
executory, plaintiff moved for execution which was granted by the trial court through the
FIRST DIVISION issuance of a Joint Writ of Execution[4] dated August 1, 2000; that, on September 21, 2004,
plaintiff moved for the issuance of a Writ of Demolition which was likewise granted by the trial
court in an Order[5] dated July 7, 2005 followed by the issuance of a Writ of Demolition[6]
ORIEL G. GONZALES, A.M. No. P-06-2194 dated July 8, 2005; that defendants filed a joint motion[7] to set aside the Order dated July 7,
Acting in his own behalf and in [OCA-IPI No. 05-2342-RTJ] 2005; that during the hearing on the said motion on July 21, 2005, the trial court issued an
behalf of his co-heirs to the Estate Order[8] directing the sheriff to defer the implementation of the Writ of Demolition dated July
of the late POLICARPIO (PIO) 8, 2005 until after the court has acted on all the pending incidents of the case; and, that, on
GONZALES joined by the tenants in July 22, 2005, respondent in collusion with plaintiffs counsel, Atty. Rico Bolangaita, proceeded
Civil Cases Nos. 288-MN to 294-MN, with the demolition of the subject properties in violation of the said Order and despite the
Branch 74, RTC, Malabon City, entreaties from complainant for respondent to respect the trial courts Order. Complainant
Complainants, Present: prays that respondent be dismissed from service.

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), In his Comment[9] dated September 26, 2005, respondent asserts that the demolition of the
- versus - Ynares-Santiago, structures on the subject properties was ministerial on his part in order to implement the Joint
Austria-Martinez, Decision dated October 5, 1990 and the Joint Writ of Execution dated August 1, 2000; that the
Callejo, Sr., and demolition was done only after the defendants failed to comply with the two Notices to Vacate
Chico-Nazario, JJ. served upon them; and that the complaint is an obvious attempt to re-litigate the issues that
ARNALDO V. CABIGAO, has been passed upon by the trial court.
Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Promulgated:
Branch 74, Malabon City, On October 27, 2005, respondent filed a Supplemental Comment[10] where he averred that
Respondent. August 31, 2006 the trial court, in an Order[11] dated September 27, 2005, denied defendants joint motion to
set aside the Order dated July 7, 2005 (which granted the motion for the issuance of the writ
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x of demolition) for lack of merit.

DECISION On June 6, 2006, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its Report[12] finding
respondent liable for disobeying the lawful order of the trial court which directed him to defer
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: the implementation of the writ of demolition. It found that while respondent had the duty to
execute the writ according to its mandate, he likewise had the obligation to desist from
implementing the same in light of the trial courts order to defer the implementation of the writ.
In a sworn compliant[1] dated August 19, 2005, complainant Oriel G. Gonzales (complainant) Thus, it recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P2,000.00 for said misconduct
charged Hon. Emmanuel D. Laurea, Presiding Judge of Branch 169 and Pairing Judge of Branch with a warning that a repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
74, Regional Trial Court, Malabon City with grave abuse of authority and violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, and Arnaldo V. Cabigao, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch We agree with the findings of the OCA.
74, Malabon City with grave abuse of authority relative to Civil Case Nos. 288-MN to 294-MN
entitled Susana Realty, Inc. vs. Mauro V. Dionisio, et al. for Recovery of Possession. It is not disputed that on July 21, 2005, the trial court issued an Order directing the sheriff to
defer the implementation of the Writ of Demolition dated July 8, 2005. However, the following
On July 5, 2006, we issued a Resolution[2] dismissing the charge against Judge Laurea for day or on July 22, 2005, respondent proceeded with the demolition of the subject properties,
insufficiency of evidence and directing the re-docketing of the complaint against Sheriff Cabigao despite the pleas of complainant and other occupants of the subject properties that the court
as a regular administrative matter. Hence, the instant administrative case. has issued an Order which directed the sheriff to defer the implementation of the Writ of
Demolition.
Complainant alleges that he is one of the heirs of Pio Gonzales who was one of the defendants
in Civil Case Nos. 288-MN to 294-MN for Recovery of Possession; that he is representing the In his defense, respondent lamely denies having been confronted by the complainant and other
other heirs of Pio Gonzales and the other defendants in said civil case in the present complaint; occupants of the subject properties with the said Order. We find respondents claim
that, on October 5, 1990, a Joint Decision[3] was rendered in the said civil case in favor of the unbelievable. Under such circumstances, respondent should have at least checked the veracity
plaintiff, Susana Realty, Inc., which ordered the defendants to vacate the subject properties of the Order to defer the implementation of the Writ of Demolition before proceeding with the
and remove the structures that they built thereon; that after the judgment became final and demolition of the subject properties.
[3] Id. at 116-123.
Time and again, we have stressed that sheriffs and their deputies are officers of the court and [4] Id. at 133-135.
agents of the law. As such, they should discharge their duties with utmost care and diligence, [5] Id. at 128-132.
particularly in implementing orders and processes of the court. For hardly can they err without [6] Id. at 126-127.
affecting the efficiency of the process by which justice is administered. Sheriffs and their [7] Id. at 78-85.
deputies are the front-line representatives of the justice system, and if, through their lack of [8] Id. at 109.
care and diligence in implementing judicial writs, they lose the trust reposed on them, they [9] Id. at 112-115.
inevitably diminish likewise the faith of the people in the judiciary.[13] Thus, for having acted [10] Id. at 158.
in contravention of the trial courts Order directing him to defer the implementation of the Writ [11] Id. at 159-160.
of Demolition, respondent is liable for simple misconduct. [12] Id. at 161-166.
[13] Amor v. Leyva, A.M. No. P-02-1536, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 236, 241-242.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arnaldo V. Cabigao, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 74,
Malabon City, is found GUILTY of simple misconduct and is ORDERED to pay a FINE of Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction
will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 1-52.


[2] Id. at 167-168.
EN BANC for the 16-17 April 2004 conference at Camiguin Island. Complainant was ordered by
respondent to attach in the payroll a copy of OCA Circular No. 28-2003 to justify the formers
request. Upon its approval, respondent directed all personnel to affix their signatures in the
payroll to make it appear that they have received the money, when in fact, no money was
FELICIDAD D. PALABRICA, A.M. No. P-06-2205 received. Except for complainant and Sol Santocildes, the rest of the personnel of RTC, Branch
Complainant, (Formerly OCA-IPI No. 05-2250-P) 11 were able to leave for Camiguin. However, they used their own money to defray all expenses
for travel.
Present:
2. No meeting or seminar was conducted. The court personnel merely enjoyed themselves by
PANGANIBAN, C.J., eating and swimming. When the OCA required then Acting Judge Francisco Rojas the minutes
PUNO, of the JST meeting and the court performance inventory for January to December 2004 and
- versus - QUISUMBING, January to March 2005, Judge Rojas merely submitted documents from June 2004 to June 2005.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, The purported JST meeting in Camiguin Island on April 2004 was not included.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO, 3. On 9 July 2004, respondent requested financial assistance from the IBP, Misamis Oriental
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Chapter in the amount of P5,000.00 for the purchase of curtains for the court. The amount
ATTY. CECILIA T. FAELNAR, CORONA, spent in Camiguin could have been used for the purchase of the curtain if only respondent were
Clerk of Court VI, RTC, Branch 11 CARPIO MORALES, honest in dispensing her duties as an accountable officer of the court.
M. Fortich, Bukidnon, CALLEJO, SR.,
Respondent. AZCUNA, 4. On 5 August 2004, respondent solicited a note to the Office of the Mayor of Manolo Fortich
TINGA, for the meals of Supreme Court (SC) auditors at the Del Monte Clubhouse. The SC auditors
CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, and declined the offer. Instead of returning the note, respondent, together with companions, went
VELASCO, JR., JJ. to the Clubhouse the following day and used the same. In the attendance sheet,[2] respondent
falsely and deliberately made it appear that the team of SC Auditors came with respondent to
Promulgated: have lunch at the Clubhouse.

August 3, 2006 5. On 20 August 2004, respondent again requested financial assistance from the Mayor of
Manolo Fortich for reimbursement of the expenses incurred in the construction of the record
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x shelves. Complainant was, however, told by respondent that the money for such
DECISION reimbursement would be taken from the proceeds of the honorarium of Judge Rojas for May
2004.
Per Curiam:
6. On 5 October 2004, the signature of Judge Rojas was forged by respondent in her Certificate
An Affidavit-Complaint[1] dated 19 July 2005 was filed before the Office of the Court of Service.[3]
Administrator (OCA) by Felicidad D. Palabrica (complainant) accusing Atty. Cecilia T. Faelnar
(respondent) of violating the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, dishonesty, grave 7. On 2 March 2005, respondent requested financial assistance from the LGU for the meals and
misconduct, falsification of official document, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the snacks of the SC auditors on 3-4 March 2005. Respondent affixed her signature above the name
service and/or violating the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and of Judge Rojas, who at the time was holding office at Branch 41. Respondent made it appear in
Employees, violating the lawyers oath, and acts contrary to legal and judicial ethics. the Training Design that the management audit and JST were scheduled for two (2) days, but
Complainant is the court stenographer of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, Manolo as a matter of fact, only one (1) day was spent.
Fortich, Bukidnon, while respondent holds the position of Clerk of Court VI, of the same office.
In its 1st Indorsement dated 9 August 2005, OCA required respondent to comment on the
Complainant alleges the following: administrative complaint.

1. On 14 April 2004, respondent took advantage of the vacancy of the Office of the Presiding Vigorously denying the allegations of complainant, respondent, in her Comment,[4] addresses
Judge by requesting the local government unit (LGU) of Manolo Fortich for the release of the issues in seriatim:
P8,000.00 trust fund to be used by the Judicial Service Team (JST) of RTC, Branch 11 personnel
1. On the issue of the JST meeting in Camiguin, respondent claims that based on the payroll,[5] respondents mere act of solicitation from the IBP is proscribed by the Supreme Court, especially
the amount of P8,000.00 was duly received by the RTC, Branch 11 personnel. They were used when the President of the IBP of Misamis Oriental has pending cases before RTC, Branch 11.
to cover expenses for board and lodging, transportation and other miscellaneous expenses for
the RTC personnel. While there was no formal agenda made, there was a consultation Complainant insists that respondent committed falsification for causing the release of Judge
conducted on 17 April 2004 before the staff went swimming. Thus, the allegation by Rojas honorarium on May 2004 knowing that Judge Rojas assumed the position only in June
complainant that there was no seminar or meeting held is false. It was complainant herself who 2004. Respondent likewise committed forgery in the Certificate of Service. She should have
prepared all the necessary papers and attachments for the JST meeting. Respondent was only indicated that she was signing the certificate for and in behalf of Judge Rojas, instead of simply
made to sign the papers. The late submission of the minutes of the JST meeting and court affixing the judges signature.
performance inventory is justified on the ground that when the RTC personnel went to
Camiguin for its JST meeting, Judge Rojas had not yet assumed the Acting Presiding Judge In her Rejoinder,[9] respondent stresses that she did not use her official position to secure
position until June 2004. unwarranted benefits. She clarified that not a single centavo out of the said financial
assistance/donations went to her pocket, as the same redounded to the benefit of the court,
2. Regarding the issue on solicitation by respondent from the IBP President, the amount of its personnel, litigants, lawyers and the public in general.
P5,000.00 was a donation from the IBP for the cost of the curtains pursuant to a letter request
prepared by respondent in behalf of RTC, Branch 11. In complainants Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit,[10] she reiterates her claim that the donation made
by the IBP President is irregular and respondent should have exercised extreme caution in
3. Respondent used her personal funds for the construction of the record shelves. The P3000.00 asking donations to avoid a negative impression from the public and to insulate the court from
honorarium of Judge Rojas did not cover the cost of the construction of these shelves. any criticism.
Consequently, respondent requested the reimbursement of the expenses she incurred, which
the LGU granted upon presentation of the necessary papers and official receipts. On 15 November 2005, respondent filed a manifestation with motion to submit the case for
early resolution.
4. No note was solicited for the meals at the Del Monte Clubhouse. Respondent offered meals
to the auditors on another date and at a different restaurant. But her offer was not accepted The OCA submitted its Report[11] finding respondent guilty of violations of OCA Circular No.
by the auditors. The court personnel were provided free meals by the Office of the Mayor after 28-2003, Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
participating in the cleanliness drive sometime in August 2004. for Public Officials and Employees, and for dishonesty.

5. Respondent requested P5,000.00 anticipating that the audit would last for two (2) days. The OCA held that respondent violated the provisions of OCA Circular No. 28-2003. Instead of
intended JST conference on 4 March 2005 was cancelled upon suggestion of complainant to holding an enhancement program, the RTC, Branch 11 personnel purely had relaxation and
hold the meeting on 3 March 2005 to save time and maximize the use of the LGU van. Judge recreation in Camiguin. There were no minutes of the alleged staff development program
Roxas could not attend the meeting and instead put respondent in charge of everything. submitted to the Court Management Office (CMO), as required by the OCA circular. Thus,
Respondent attached a certification[6] from Judge Rojas to substantiate her allegations that respondents act of soliciting the amount of P8,000.00 from the LGU is tantamount to violation
she was authorized to seek financial assistance from the LGU. of Section 1, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. She used her official position
to secure unwarranted benefits for herself and her co-employees.
6. The signing of the name of Judge Rojas by respondent in the certificate of service was
authorized by the former and it was done in order to beat the deadline set by OCAD in the Respondent violated Section 1, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel when she
submission of attendance reports. In fact this had been the practice with respect to other spent public funds on 3 March 2004 at Cagayan de Oro City and for using the solicited note at
orders, whereby the text of the orders are read to be him over the cellular phone and the orders Del Monte Clubhouse.
were signed later by the judge.
The OCA also found respondent guilty of dishonesty for writing the names and affixing the
7. The ulterior motive of complainant in filing the case is to avenge respondents filing on 14 July signatures the SC auditors in the attendance sheet dated 6 August 2006.
2005[7] of several counts of administrative cases for dishonesty against complainant and her
niece. There was, however, no violation committed when respondent asked for financial assistance
for the courts curtain and for reimbursement of expenses in the construction of record shelves.
In her Reply-Affidavit,[8] complainant emphasizes that while she was the one who prepared
the documents relative to the JST meeting in Camiguin, she only did so upon respondents With respect to the charge of forgery, there was no evidence that respondent was not
instructions. Furthermore, the trip was not legal for there was no advice from the Supreme authorized to sign the name of Judge Rojas in her certificate of service. Judge Rojas did not
Court to conduct such meeting and to solicit funds from the LGU. According to complainant,
question the authenticity of his signature appearing in said certificates. OCA recommended that meals and snacks of the Supreme Court auditors violates Section 1, Canon 1 of the Code of
respondent be suspended for six (6) months. Conduct for Court Personnel. Respondent, together with her staff, used the solicited note at
Del Monte Clubhouse instead of returning it to the LGU after the SC auditors declined her
Time and again, court personnel who are occupying responsible positions in the administration invitation for lunch. The conduct exhibited by respondent falls short of the standard prescribed
of justice are reminded to adhere to the highest standard of morality and decency to preserve by the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.
the honor and dignity of the judiciary. The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel was
promulgated to enable the Court to exercise disciplinary authority over court personnel. We cannot however concur with OCAs dismissal of the charge of forgery against respondent.
Respondent has admitted signing the name of Judge Rojas, not only in her Certificate of Service
Section 1, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel expressly prohibits court but also in some court orders. In that regard, respondent notes that it has been the practice in
personnel from using their official position to secure unwarranted benefits, privileges or said court that [o]ther orders were in fact allowed to be signed in his signature after reading to
exemption for themselves or for others. The evidence on record, as found by OCA, shows that him the text of the order over his cellular phone, and in the afternoon of that same day, the
respondent clearly violated this provision when she used the JST Conference as a good reason original copy of the order will be brought to him for his signature.[13] Respondents categorical
to request the LGU for the release of the P8,000.00 trust fund. The OCA based its observation admission is sufficient to establish a case of forgery against complainant. The argument of
from the following facts, namely: (1) the pictures taken in Camiguin showed the court personnel respondent that she was authorized by Judge Rojas to sign his name is immaterial to forgery.
enjoying their outing but no photo was taken or presented which would prove that they had a We find it alarming that Judge Rojas consented to this act. In the case of Gonzales-Austria v.
consultation or meeting before they went swimming; (2) respondent did not submit her Abaya,[14] the Court, adopting the recommendation of then Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M.
supposed action plan based on her findings made during the staff development program; and Herrera, held thus:
(3) respondent failed to comply with OCA Circular No. 28-2003, which requires that the JST shall
hold its meeting on the last working day of the month and the minutes of said meeting be As a lawyer and branch clerk of court, she ought to know that under no circumstances is her
submitted to the CMO, OCA within ten (10) days from the date of the meeting. act of signing the name of the judge permissible. She could have probably released the order
with the statement that it is 'upon orders of the judge' or 'by authority of the judge' but she
We do not see how respondent could equate such activity to staff development and could not under any circumstance make it appear as she did in this case that the Judge signed
improvement of judicial service to the public when all she and her staff did was to eat and swim. the order when in fact he did not x x x.
It can be gleaned that only the court personnel of RTC, Branch 11, including respondent,
benefited from the P8,000.00 trust fund, which was utilized for their own recreation. xxxx
Respondents act falls under the prohibition under Section 1, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel. x x x Nor could her void act in signing the name of the judge be validly ratified by the latter.
Judge Abaya himself is bereft of any power to authorize the clerk of court to sign his name in
Assuming arguendo that indeed, there was a JST meeting conducted in Camiguin, respondent his official capacity in a matter pending adjudication before him. The issuance of the order in
should have been aware of the parameters for organizing the JST, as set by OCA question is strictly judicial and is exclusively vested in the judge which is beyond his authority
to delegate.

Circular No. 28-2003,[12] particularly the submission of the minutes of the JST meeting. Complainants act of signing the name of Judge Rojas is likewise tantamount to dishonesty.
Respondent cannot escape responsibility by contending that Judge Rojas assumed office only
on June 2004, while the JST meeting was conducted on April 2004. Respondent took the At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that the conduct required of court personnel, from the
initiative to organize the JST meeting, even without a presiding judge. She should have at least presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with
submitted a copy of the minutes, as well as the Court Performance Inventory, to the CMO to the heavy burden of responsibility so as to be free from any suspicion that may taint the
observe transparency. judiciary.[15] This Court shall not tolerate acts that would tend to diminish the integrity of the
judiciary.
Respondent also violated Section 4(a) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees which requires all government resources and powers of their In sum, we find respondent guilty of (1) falsely writing the names of SC auditors with
respective offices to be employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, corresponding signatures in the attendance sheet; (2) forging the signature of Judge Rojas in
particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues. the certificate of service; (3) failure to comply with OCA Circular No. 28-2003 regarding the
holding of the JST meeting; and (4) using the solicited note from the LGU to cover the meals of
The act of respondent in falsely writing the names of the SC auditors in the attendance sheet the RTC personnel. The first two acts mentioned above constitute acts of dishonesty that merit
with signatures to make it appear that they had lunch at the Del Monte Clubhouse constitutes dismissal from service, pursuant to Section 52(A)(1) of the Revised Rules on Administrative
dishonesty. Similarly, respondents solicitation of a note from the LGU to allegedly cover the Cases in the Civil Service.
CANCIO C. GARCIA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all salaries and Associate Justice Associate Justice
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the Government
service, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED. [1]Rollo, pp. 1-5.

WE CONCUR: [2]Rollo, p. 18.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN [3]Id. at 19.


Chief Justice
[4]Id. at 28-48.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice [5]Id. at 12.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING [6]Id. at 50.


Associate Justice
[7]Id. at 74-82.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice [8]Id. at 86-92.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ [9]Id. at 93-98.


Associate Justice
[10]Id. at 102-108.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice [11]Id. at 161-173.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ [12]Id. at 8. It states:


Associate Justice
The JST shall hold regular monthly meetings on the last working day of the month and minutes
RENATO C. CORONA of the meeting shall be submitted to the Court Management Office, Office of the Court
Associate Justice Administrator within ten (10) days from the date of the meeting.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES During the meeting, the JST shall as a group accomplish the Court Performance Inventory form
Associate Justice from every quarter x x x x

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. x x x The accomplished form shall be submitted to the [CMO, OCA] within ten (10) days from
Associate Justice the date of the monthly meeting at the end of every quarter.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA [13]Id. at 43.


Associate Justice
[14]A.M. No. R-705-RTJ, 23 August 1989, 176 SCRA 634, 648-649.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice [15]Pamintuan vs. Ente-Alcantara, A.M. No. P-04-1912, 17 December 2004, 497 SCRA 277 citing
Song vs. Llegue, A.M. No. CA-02-34, 14 January 2004, 419 SCRA 276, 284.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
THIRD DIVISION Dela Pea alleges that during his tenure as a member of the board of CAMPCO, Huelma had
influenced and instigated the latters relatives to claim certain portions of the fishpond covered
ALBERT S. DELA PEA, A.M. No. P-06-2218 by an existing fishpond lease agreement, acquired by CAMPCO from one Joel H. Tan, leading to
Complainant, (Formerly OCA-IPI No. 05-2082-P) the dispute adverted to. After this dispute became litigable, Dela Pea claims that Huelma, using
Present: the courts time and office resources, caused the preparation and filing of criminal cases against
the officers and workers of CAMPCO.
- versus - QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson, One of the criminal cases filed was Criminal Case No. 2436 entitled People of the Philippines v.
CARPIO, Emmanuel A. Almeda and Albert Dela Pea, for the crime of malicious mischief, raffled to the
CARPIO MORALES, MCTC branch where Huelma was assigned.
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ. Dela Pea alleges that while Huelma was in the performance of his official duties, as officer-in-
ILUMINADO R. HUELMA, charge of the said court, he took advantage of his position by preparing the Order[4] dated 21
Interpreter, MCTC, Cantilan- May 2004 for the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the corresponding warrant itself,
Carrascal, Surigao del Sur, Promulgated: denominated as Order of Arrest[5] of even date, and thereafter misleading Presiding Judge
Respondent. Jesusa E. Garcia-Perez (Judge Perez) to sign the two orders despite the fact that the charge was
August 15, 2006 covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.[6]

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
After Judge Perez signed the warrant of arrest, Huelma allegedly delivered in person the
warrant to the police, resulting in the apprehension of Dela Pea and his co-accused in public
R E S O L U T I ON view. Dela Pea claims to have suffered humiliation as a result.

Tinga, J.: On 16 July 2004, when Dela Peas case was called for preliminary investigation, Judge Perez was
allegedly stunned to learn that she was misled by Huelma in signing the Order dated 21 May
2004 and the corresponding warrant of arrest. In the same hearing, Judge Perez issued three
In administrative cases, the complainant must prove the allegations propounded against the orders: (1) an order lifting the warrant of arrest,[7] (2) an order directing the branch clerk of
respondent with preponderance of evidence.[1] Otherwise, the complaint will not prosper as court to exclusively hold the records of the case against dela Pea,[8] and (3) an order directing
the respondent enjoys the presumption of regularity in the exercise of duties and the the stenographic reporters to immediately transcribe the records of the proceedings of the
presumption of innocence. criminal case.[9]

In his Comment,[10] Huelma denied having instigated his relatives to file criminal charges
against Dela Pea and his co-accused. Huelma instead declared that it was CAMPCO and its
Before us is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Albert S. Dela Pea (Dela Pea) officers who usurped, grabbed and illegally occupied the fishpond which his relatives were
against Iluminado R. Huelma (Huelma), Court Interpreter, 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court possessing. In fact, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) declared the land occupied by
(MCTC), Cantilan, Surigao del Sur for grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest CAMPCO as land reform areas under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the
of the service. government and awarded the disputed areas to Huelma and his relatives as farmer-
beneficiaries.[11]
The facts are as follows:
In its evaluation, report and recommendation[12] dated 16 August 2005, the Office of the Court
A land dispute arose between complainant, as a member of the board of Carcanmadcarlan Agri- Administrator (OCA) recommended that the instant complaint be referred to the executive
based Multi-purpose Cooperative (CAMPCO), on one hand, and respondents family, on the judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao del Sur for investigation, report and
other. Said dispute was the subject of at least two land cases before the Department of Agrarian recommendation. The Court, in a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, referred the
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)[2] and the Bureau of Forestry and Agricultural Resources administrative case to Judge Ermelindo G. Andal (Judge Andal), Executive Judge of RTC, Tandag,
(BFAR).[3] Surigao del Sur.
The records disclose that on 25 November 2005, Judge Perez filed before the Court a Comment Judge to sign or it is the Hon. Court who orders the subordianate (sic) to prepare the order of
in compliance with the Courts Resolution dated 25 July 2005. In her Comment,[13] Judge Perez Arrest before she sign the Warrant of Arrest?
admitted and assumed full responsibility over the erroneous issuance of the Order dated 21
May 2004 and the corresponding warrant of arrest. She denied any insinuation that she was Prosecutor Cuartero: My question your honor is this if it is the usual practice of this Presiding
misled by Huelma into signing the same. She admitted that while the issuance was an honest Judge that a prepared Order of Warrant of Arrest is brought before the Presiding Judge and
mistake, it was nonetheless a serious inadvertence. She thus offered her deep and sincere [t]he Presiding Judge to sign immediately the Warrant of Arrest or it is the Presiding Judge who
apologies to Dela Pea and his co-accused, noting that she immediately issued an order quashing order[s] her subordinate to prepare the order of Warrant of Arrest and thereafter sign the
the warrant of arrest when the matter was brought to her attention. Warrant of Arrest?

After due investigation, Judge Andal submitted his findings and recommended its dismissal. He xxx
reasoned that:
Court: It is done by them and this Presiding Judge considering that she is busy in her four (4)
A reading, however, of the transcript of the proceedings during the initial hearing of Criminal Courts they prepare the order, the Presiding Judge will verify and verify.
Case No. 2435 before the MCTC, Cantilan-Carrascal, Surigao del Sur, on July 16, 2004, shows
that while respondent was categorical in denying having prepared the Order directing the xxx
issuance of the Warrant of Arrest (Exhibit E), he vacillated when repeatedly questioned by the
defense counsel, Atty. Gerardo Maglinte, whether he prepared the Warrant of Arrest (Exhibit Prosecutor Cuartero: Im asking that question because this Presiding Judge [is] handling several
F), ultimately admitting it but claiming that he did so upon order of the Acting Presiding Judge Courts and handling voluminous cases because I am afraid your honor that a prepared Order
(Exhibits J, J-1 to J-21). Accordingly, the Undersigned is convinced that, indeed, respondent had of Warrant of Arrest is brought before the table of the Judge because she is busy and the
a hand in the preparation of the Warrant of Arrest. The Undersigned, however, is not convinced numerous courts that she is handling that such incident may occur so that the Judge may just
that respondent, on his own, personally prepared the Order directing the issuance of the assign for the Warrant of Arrest.
Warrant of Arrest, first, because the phraseology appears not of the standard form but most
likely the language of the Acting Presiding Judge and, second, instead of following the Court: Before this presiding judge sign[s] the Warrant of Arrest I will go over the record if there
recommendation of the Prosecutor for the amount of bail, P6,000.00, the Court fixed a much is a preliminary examination and if there is an order of the Court, never automatic[,] this Pres.
smaller amount, P2,000.00. If as claimed respondent was personally interested in the Case and Judge sign[s] the Warrant of Arrest.[15]
wanted to prejudice the herein Complainant, he would have indicated in the Order (Exhibit E)
the much bigger amount of bail as recommended by the Prosecutor. Normally, fixing the Judge Perezs above-cited declaration in open court was further affirmed in her Comment where
amount of bail is personally determined by the presiding judge. This is apparent in Exhibit E. Of she categorically stated that she was never influenced by Huelma to sign the assailed order and
course, her Honor, Judge Jesusa E. Garcial Perez, in Paragraph 2 of her letter, dated November warrant. No evidence on record, certainly none submitted by Dela Pea, contradicts Judge
25, 2005, addressed to the Honorable Third Division of the Supreme Court, denied any Perezs averments. Her pertinent statements read:
insinuation or suggestion that (she) was influenced or misled by anyone much less respondent
Huelma into signing the Order and Warrant of Arrest of the Accused in Criminal Case No. 2435.x
x x [14]
1. I admit and take full responsibility over the fiasco brought about my erroneous
The findings and recommendation of Judge Andal are well-taken, as the instant administrative issuance of the Order as well as the Warrant of Arrest against complainant Almeda and his co-
complaint is clearly devoid of merit. accused dela Pea in Criminal Case No. 2435 pending with the 1st MCTC of Cantilan, Surigao del
Sur, where I serve as its Acting Presiding Judge;

Noteworthy is that fact that Judge Perez took full responsibility for the erroneous issuance of 2. I deny and dispel any insinuation or suggestion that I was influenced or misled by anyone
the order and warrant, acknowledging that they were both prepared and issued upon her much less by respondent Huelma into signing the Order and warrant of arrest of the accused
directive and on her discretion. This was reflected in the transcript and stenographic notes in Criminal Case No. 2435. The issuance of the Order and Arrest warrant against the accused in
dated 16 July 2004. the aforesaid case is purely an honest mistake but admittedly a serious inadvertence on my
part and for which I offer my deep and sincere apologies to the accused for the humiliation and
Prosecutor Cuartero: Your honor please, may I be allowed to ask this Hon. Court your honor in embarrassment as a consequence of their arrest. The same however, has already been rectified
relation to this incident because it seems to me your honor it is the usual practice of this when the matter was brought to my attention whereby I immediately issued the corresponding
Presiding Judge to have the order of Warrant of Arrest prepared by her subordinate and the order quashing the warrant of arrest and voiding the order of its issuance x x x.[16]
The extent of Huelmas participation in the arrest of dela Pea and his co-accused, if at all, was DANTE O. TINGA
established as to his preparation of the Order dated 21 May 2004 and the warrant of arrest. Associate Justice
Yet even that fact which Huelma admitted to[17] can be reconciled with Judge Perezs
acknowledgement of authority and control over MCTC, Cantilan, Surigao del Sur. Full WE CONCUR:
responsibility over the wrongful issuance of the Order and the accompanying warrant of arrest LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
fell squarely on Judge Perez, a fact she was candid enough to own up to. Associate Justice
Chairperson
Huelma also submitted the Daily Time Record (DTR) of MCTC Branch Clerk of Court Mrs. Belen
L. Guillen (Guillen) to prove that the latter, who acted as officer-in-charge in the absence of ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Judge Perez, was present during the time the order and warrant were issued on 21 May 2004. Associate Justice Associate Justice
Contrary to Guillens representation in the 16 July 2004 hearing that she was on sick leave at
the time the order and warrant were prepared, her DTR showed that she reported for work PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
from 3 May to 21 May 2004, excluding Saturdays and Sundays. Guillen only took a leave of Associate Justice
absence from 24 May to 28 May 2004 or after the issuance of the order and warrant. Thus, [1]Occida v. Malnegro, A.M. No. P-05-1961, 17 February 2005, 451 SCRA 613.
Guillen having reported for work prior to the time of the issuance of the order and warrant, it
is safe to assume that Huelma was not the officer-in-charge when the order and warrant were [2]DARAB Case No. SDS-13-1673 for Nullification of CLOA No. 00207356 entitled CAMPCO v.
issued. This fact was unrebutted by Dela Pea. Joey Joseph Flores, et al.

However, the foregoing matter appears irrelevant as Huelma himself admitted in open court [3]BFAR Case for Annulment of FLA No. 3782 and/or Disapproval of FLA No. 1767-1768 entitled
that he prepared the Order dated 21 May 2004 upon the instructions of Judge Perez. Fortunato T. Huelma, et al. v. CAMPCO/Joey H. Tan.
Nonetheless, this
[4]Rollo, p. 20. The Order states:

admission of Huelma by itself does not establish any culpability on his part. Judge Perez has Considering that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor have (sic) already conducted the
assumed responsibility for the wrong issuance issuance of the Order dated 21 May 2004 and preliminary and clarificatory investigation of this case and as a matter of fact there was an order
the corresponding warrant of arrest. by the said Office to submit their counter-affidavit which after evaluation of the evidences (sic)
presented by the prosecution, the said Office finds and so hold[s] that there is a sufficient
Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent ground to engender a well founded belief that the offense has been committed by the two
committed the act complained of rests on the complainant. The complainant must be able to accused who are probably guilty thereof and this Court hereby adopt[s] the finding of probable
show this by substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept cause by the Provincial Prosecutor.
as adequate to support a conclusion. Otherwise, the complaint must be dismissed.[18]
WHEREFORE, let a Warrant of Arrest be issued to Emmanuel A. Almeda and Albert De La Pea,
From the foregoing discussions, the Court sees that Dela Pea in his complaint relied on too fixing the bail bond in the amount of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) Pesos each for their
many assumptions unsupported by evidence. He contends that Huelma used the courts time provisional liberty.
and resources to further his personal cause in a land dispute but no evidence to prove it were
ever presented. Even the allegation that Huelma personally delivered the order and warrant to SO ORDERED.
the police was not substantiated.
[5]Id. at 21.
The Court believes that complainant, in this case, did not discharge the required burden of
proof to establish his allegations. [6]Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative complaint against Iluminado R. Huelma, Arrest of Accused.The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear
Court Interpreter III, MCTC, Cantilan-Carrascal, Surigao del Sur, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of whenever required. Release of the person arrested shall either be on bail or on recognizance
merit. by a responsible citizen acceptable to the court.

SO ORDERED. [7]Rollo, p. 26.


[8]Id. at 27.

[9]Id. at 28.

[10] Id. at 36-44. The Comment was designated as Counter-Affidavit.

[11]Id. at 37-38.

[12]Id. at 45-47.

[13]Id. at 98-100.

[14]Report of Investigation and Transcript of the Proceedings, 1st Indorsement dated 23 June
2006, p. 4.

[15]Rollo, pp. 78-80.

[16]Id. at 98.

[17]Id. at 71-72.

[18]Adajar v. Develos, A.M. No. P-05-2056, 18 November 2005, 475 SCRA 361, 376-377.
opportunity to present its lone witness, account officer Louie Landayan, who testified on direct,
cross and re-direct examinations.[3] Equitable PCI Bank asked that it be allowed to file a
THIRD DIVISION memorandum until September 3, 2004, or the Friday immediately preceding the expiration of
the TRO which was set to expire the coming Sunday. Respondent denied the request. Then, on
EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC., September 1, 2004, respondent granted the preliminary injunction against the bank. Pre-trial
Complainant, conference was set on October 21, 2004.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2001
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2234-RTJ) Meantime, because of the case, other banks began cutting Camdens credit line. No longer able
- versus - to carry on with its import business, Camden sought to speed up the case. On September 6,
2004, Camden moved that the pre-trial conference be reset to an earlier date. Respondent
JUDGE CELSO D. LAVIA, Presiding Judge of Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of PASIG CITY, found Camdens reasons meritorious and granted the motion. The pre-trial conference was thus
Present: moved to September 23, 2004.[4]
Eight days before the pre-trial, however, Atty. Allan Christopher Agati, counsel for Equitable PCI
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, Bank, manifested to the court that he would be out of town on said date. He asked for a
CARPIO, resetting, which respondent granted on September 23, 2004. Pre-trial conference was moved
CARPIO MORALES, to October 5, 7 and 21, 2004.
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ. Atty. Agati was unable to attend on October 5, 2004, as he had manifested. Respondent thus
rescheduled the pre-trial to October 14, 2004 but cancelled the other two previously set dates.
Promulgated: Later, respondent also denied the motion to reconsider the grant of preliminary injunction.[5]

August 16, 2006 On October 14, 2004, the pre-trial conference was held. Equitable PCI Bank moved that the
Respondent. case be referred to mediation, as required by A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, since both parties had
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x manifested in their pre-trial briefs their willingness to compromise. Camden opposed the
RESOLUTION motion arguing that referral to mediation was futile and dilatory because the parties had taken
QUISUMBING, J.: irreconcilable positions. Camden cited that while it claimed that all its debts had been fully paid,
For our resolution is the complaint of Equitable PCI Bank charging respondent Judge Celso D. the bank insisted that Camden still owed hundreds of millions. Camden also stressed that the
Lavia, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, with gross misconduct, bank had filed a criminal case for violation of the trust receipts law against Camdens president,
conduct unbecoming a judge and member of the bar, gross ignorance of the law and procedure, thus making amicable settlement of the dispute highly unlikely.[6]
and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and order.
Finding amicable settlement through mediation impossible, respondent continued with the
This case stems from what complainant Equitable PCI Bank alleges is visible bias by respondent pre-trial and finished it on the same day despite the banks objections. By agreement of the
in favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 70098 and 68287, and hostility against the bank. parties, who both committed to present only one witness each, reception of evidence for
However, since respondents acts in Civil Case No. 68287 are also subject of another pending Camden was set on October 28, 2004 and November 5, 2004 for Equitable PCI Bank.[7]
administrative matter,[1] we limit this resolution to Civil Case No. 70098 only.
Equitable PCI Bank then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari to assail the
Civil Case No. 70098, entitled Camden Industries, Inc. v. Equitable PCI Bank, was for specific order granting the preliminary injunction, the denial of the motion for reconsideration, as well
performance, accounting, and damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining as the denial of its motion to refer the case to mediation.
order and preliminary injunction. Camden sought to enjoin Equitable PCI Bank from unjustly
foreclosing the mortgage on the residential house and lot of Camdens president and from The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87030, was eventually dismissed and the dismissal
taking any further action to collect from Camden on the basis of certain trust receipt affirmed by this Court.[8] Meanwhile, however, Equitable PCI Bank sought to defer the
transactions, which Camden alleged were already fully paid. Camden also prayed that the bank proceedings at the trial court. Atty. Agati filed a motion to defer proceeding shortly before the
be ordered to render a full accounting of all payments made through debit memos and hearings scheduled on October 28, 2004, then insisted that he be heard on his arguments
deductions from its savings account.[2] although said motion, having been filed only that morning, was not set for hearing. Because
there was no temporary restraining order from the Court of Appeals, respondent denied the
On August 16, 2004, respondent issued a temporary restraining order. He heard Camdens motion in open court.[9]
application for preliminary injunction on August 31, 2004. He gave Equitable PCI Bank
Aggrieved, Atty. Agati manifested that Equitable PCI Bank will no longer participate in the motion for reconsideration.[18] Then, on March 30, 2005, respondent rendered a decision in
hearings. He nonetheless attempted to explain further his motion, but before he could, a bomb Civil Case No. 70098 against Equitable PCI Bank.[19]
threat was reported. Respondent thus simply reiterated the denial and immediately ordered a
short recess.[10] When the proceedings resumed later that morning, Atty. Agati was no longer Equitable PCI Bank timely filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial asking that it be
in the premises. Respondent then ordered the sheriff to find Atty. Agati but to no avail.[11] allowed to present evidence. Later, Equitable PCI Bank also brought the trial courts decision to
the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
Thus, respondent allowed Camdens lone witness to testify on direct examination. Upon 89370.[20] In the meantime, respondent issued a special order on April 15, 2005, granting
Camdens motion, and pursuant to the One-Day Examination of Witness Rule,[12] respondent execution pending appeal over the opposition of Equitable PCI Bank.[21]
declared Equitable PCI Bank to have waived its right to cross-examination. After that, Camden
offered orally and ex parte its additional documentary exhibit. Respondent admitted the Equitable PCI Bank now alleges in the instant complaint that respondent railroaded the case in
exhibit, then ordered that trial continue for the reception of evidence for Equitable PCI Bank Camdens favor, in obvious hostility against Equitable PCI Bank.
on November 5, 2004, as previously set.[13] Equitable PCI Bank did not seek reconsideration of Equitable PCI Bank avers that respondent is liable for grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming
the order declaring it to have waived its right to cross-examine Camdens witness. a judge and a member of the bar, gross ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment or order since (1) respondent allegedly gave Equitable PCI Bank only 15 minutes to
Instead, Equitable PCI Bank changed counsels. Atty. Winston Esguerra entered his appearance adduce its evidence during the hearing on Camdens application for preliminary injunction; (2)
on November 4, 2004, as the banks new counsel. He moved that the hearing be reset to respondent denied its request to submit a memorandum to support its opposition to the
December 3, 2004, because of a previously scheduled hearing in another court and to give him application; (3) respondent granted Camdens motion to set the pre-trial conference at an
time to study the case.[14] earlier date than the previous date set, despite Atty. Agatis manifestation that he would not be
available at said earlier date; (4) respondent refused to refer the case to mediation in violation
It does not appear that a formal order was issued acting on the motion for postponement, but of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC and despite the statement of the parties in their briefs that they are
no hearing was conducted on November 5, 2004 since respondent was on leave. The Branch open to an amicable settlement of the case; (5) respondent refused to suspend the proceedings
Clerk of Court on the same date promptly issued notices to the parties that the hearing had notwithstanding the pendency of a petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals questioning
been moved to November 11, 2004.[15] Said notice was received by Atty. Esguerra on his refusal to refer the case to mediation; (6) he allowed Camden to present evidence ex parte
November 9, 2004. and to offer its evidence orally in one trial date notwithstanding the bomb threat on that day;
(7) he gave Equitable PCI Bank only one trial date; (8) he denied Atty. Esguerras request for
Meantime, Equitable PCI Bank believed that it could no longer expect a fair judgment from time to study the case; (9) he hastily set the November 11, 2004 hearing despite the pending
respondent. It filed a motion for voluntary inhibition on November 8, followed by a motion for inhibition and motion by Atty. Esguerra to move the presentation of evidence for
supplemental motion on November 9, 2004. Equitable PCI Bank to December 3, 2004; (10) he took advantage of the absence of the banks
counsel during the November 11, 2004 hearing to declare Equitable PCI Bank to have waived
On November 11, 2004, hearing for the reception of evidence for Equitable PCI Bank was its right to present evidence; (11) he refused to inhibit himself; and (12) he acted with undue
conducted. Equitable PCI Banks new counsel was absent despite notice. Thus, Camden moved haste to decide the case.[22]
that Equitable PCI Bank be deemed to have waived its right to present evidence. Respondent
granted the motion and ordered the parties to submit their memoranda within 30 days.[16] Complainant prays that respondent be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all his
Equitable PCI Bank, however, never filed any. Neither did Equitable PCI Bank move for a retirement benefits and further, that he be disbarred.
reconsideration of the order declaring it to have waived its right to present evidence.
In his Comment, respondent claims that Equitable PCI Banks two counsels, Attys. Agati and
On November 12, 2004, respondent heard the motion and supplemental motion for inhibition. Esguerra, maliciously filed the case to block the early release of his retirement benefits and
It appeared that the main motion for inhibition complied with the 3-day notice rule, but cover for their professional incompetence which caused Equitable PCI Bank to lose its case.[23]
Camden had not filed any opposition nor comment. Hence, respondent deemed said motion
submitted for decision. It also appeared that Camden only received the supplemental motion He urges this Court to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the complaint is insufficient in form
with two days advance notice. Thus, respondent gave Camden ten days to comment on the and substance. Attys. Agati and Esguerra, according to him, were not properly authorized to
motion, over the objection of Equitable PCI Bank, which insisted that Camden nonetheless be file the case. The Board Resolution providing a standing authority to certain bank officials to file
deemed to have waived its right to be heard on the motion for failing to appear.[17] cases on behalf of the bank was allegedly insufficient because it was too broad and did not
specifically authorize either of them to file the instant complaint. Also, the complaint contained
On January 21, 2005, respondent denied Equitable PCI Banks motion and supplemental motion no certification against forum shopping and the verification was signed by only one of them.[24]
for inhibition. Equitable PCI Bank sought reversal of the order, but respondent denied the
Respondent adds that the instant complaint is premature and that the issues involved are sub may be said to have opened, or closed.[33] For obviously, if subsequent developments prove
judice. He stresses that Equitable PCI Bank has filed with the Pasig RTC a motion for the judge's challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at
reconsideration or new trial and has likewise assailed the decision in a petition for certiorari at all.[34]
the Court of Appeals.[25]
Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces
On June 8, 2005, Equitable PCI Bank filed a supplemental complaint to which respondent filed or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, or the fear of criminal, civil or
a comment. In said supplemental complaint, Equitable PCI Bank adds that respondent has administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the
likewise railroaded execution.[26] Respondent counters that execution pending appeal was performance of their duties and functions.[35]
justified even over the opposition of Equitable PCI Bank because of the merit of the motion as
well as Equitable PCI Banks failure to present any evidence, cross-examine Camdens witness Moreover, aside from the availability of judicial remedies and the fact that the issues involved
during trial, and file the required memorandum.[27] here are still sub judice, Equitable PCI Bank has failed to substantiate its charge of bias and
partiality or bad faith by respondent. Equitable PCI Bank has relied mainly on surmises and
On December 12, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator found respondent liable for gross conjectures, its incorrect recall of procedural rules, on allegations that are unsupported and
misconduct and recommended a fine of P30,000 as penalty. sometimes even belied by the records, and on the mere fact that the orders were adverse to
As herein elucidated, we are unable to agree with OCAs finding and recommendation. it. Bias and partiality can never be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred obligation
of judges whose oaths of office require them to administer justice without respect to person
From the records of the case, as well as the parties respective allegations, it is evident that the and to do equal right to the poor and the rich.[36] The Court has to be shown acts or conduct
acts being complained of relate to the validity of the proceedings before respondent as well as of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the
to the propriety of respondents orders in Civil Case No. 70098. Some of those assailed acts, stigma of being biased and partial.[37] Similarly, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply
particularly those relating to the grant of preliminary injunction as well as the refusal to refer because the judgment or order is adverse to a party, contrary to the finding of the Office of the
to mediation, have already been found proper and correct both by the Court of Appeals and by Court Administrator. There being absolutely no evidence to the contrary, the presumption that
this Court.[28] There is thus no cause to proceed administratively against respondent as regards the respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail.[38]
those acts.[29]
Well to reiterate, while this Court will never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or omission
The propriety of the other acts occurring after the pre-trial, which include the order holding that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the peoples faith in the
Equitable PCI Bank to have waived its right to cross-examine Camdens witness and to present judiciary, neither will it hesitate to shield those under its employ from unfounded suits that
evidence, as well as the order granting execution pending appeal, for their part, could best be only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.[39]
resolved by availing of the judicial remedies provided for under the Rules of Court and not by
way of an administrative complaint. WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Indeed, we have held that the filing of an administrative complaint against a judge is not an SO ORDERED.
appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless it appears that the assailed order Associate Justice
or decision is tainted with bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty.[30] WE CONCUR:

In Bello III v. Diaz,[31] we reiterated that disciplinary proceedings against judges do not
complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Administrative complaints against judges cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial Associate Justice
remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by their erroneous orders or judgments.[32] An inquiry
into their administrative liability arising from judicial acts may be made only after other CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
available remedies have been settled with finality. Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the Associate Justice
corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
the persons of the judges concerned, whether of criminal, civil or administrative nature. It is Associate Justice
only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have
spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability
[32] Hilado v. Reyes, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1910 (Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 03-1904-RTJ), April 15,
2005, 456 SCRA 146, 162.
[1] Rollo, p. 819. [33] Flores v. Abesamis, A.M. No. SC-96-1, July 10, 1997, 275 SCRA 302, 316.
[2] Id. at 26-29, 33-36. [34] Visitacion v. Libre, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1918 (Formerly OCA-I.P.I.-03-1834-RTJ), June 8, 2005,
[3] Id. at 735, 810-811. 459 SCRA 398, 407; De Guzman v. Pamintuan, supra note 29.
[4] Id. at 54-55. [35] Supra note 33.
[5] Id. at 70-72. [36] Dimo Realty & Development, Inc. v. Dimaculangan, G.R. No. 130991, March 11, 2004, 425
[6] Id. at 454-464. SCRA 376, 384.
[7] Id. at 468, 470-473. [37] Rondina v. Bello, Jr., A.M. No. CA-05-43 (A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 04-72-CA-J), July 8, 2005, 463
[8] Id. at 361-362. SCRA 1, 14; Hilado v. Reyes, supra note 32, at 163; Tan v. Adre, supra note 30.
[9] Id. at 521-523. [38] See Urgent Appeal/Petition for Immediate Suspension & Dismissal of Judge Emilio B.
[10] Id. Legaspi, RTC, Iloilo City, Br. 22, A.M. No. 01-1-15-RTC, July 10, 2003, 405 SCRA 514, 518.
[11] Id. at 342. [39] Elefant v. Inting, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1938 (OCA-I.P.I. No. 04-2034-RTJ), July 15, 2005, 463
[12] A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC RE: PROPOSED RULE ON GUIDELINES TO BE OBSERVED BY TRIAL SCRA 457, 461.
COURT JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT IN THE CONDUCT OF PRE-TRIAL AND USE OF
DEPOSITION-DISCOVERY MEASURES
Par. 5(i) . . . The One-Day Examination of Witness Rule, that is, a witness has to be fully examined
in one (1) day only, shall be strictly adhered to subject to the courts discretion during trial on
whether or not to extend the direct and/or cross-examination for justifiable reasons. On the
last hearing day allotted for each party, he is required to make his formal offer of evidence after
the presentation of his last witness and the opposing party is required to immediately interpose
his objection thereto. Thereafter, the Judge shall make the ruling on the offer of evidence in
open court. However, the judge has the discretion to allow the offer of evidence in writing in
conformity with Section 35, Rule 132;
[13] Rollo, pp. 9, 145.
[14] Id. at 170-172.
[15] Id. at 177.
[16] Id. at 146.
[17] Id. at 564-565.
[18] Id. at 363-367.
[19] Id. at 598-607.
[20] Id. at 343.
[21] Id. at 734-739.
[22] Id. at 21-22.
[23] Id. at 341-342.
[24] Id. at 341.
[25] Id. at 344-345, 347.
[26] Id. at 706-712.
[27] Id. at 753.
[28] Id. at 361-361.
[29] De Guzman v. Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1736, June 26, 2003, 405 SCRA 22, 26.
[30] Claro v. Efondo, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1585 (Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 03-1505-MTJ), March
31, 2005, 454 SCRA 218, 226; Tan v. Adre, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1898 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-2037-
RTJ), January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 145, 152.
[31] A.M. No. MTJ-00-1311 (Formerly AM-OCA-IPI-97-460-MTJ), October 3, 2003, 412 SCRA
573, 578.
of the case against Apura to the Cebu City Prosecutors Office for preliminary investigation, and
THIRD DIVISION ordered Apuras release from custody on a bail of P20,000. Respondents said Order reads:

IMELDA S. ENRIQUEZ, Accused-movant Anthony John Apura alleged in his Motion to Dismiss that his arrest was illegal
Petitioner, because he [went] to the police station upon invitation but immediately thereafter he was
- versus - placed under custody of the police. His arrest does not fall under a warrantless arrest nor it is
within the purview of hot pursuit concept, considering that the subject incident happened on
JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR. July 19, 2003 and he was placed under arrest on August 2, 2003.
Respondent.
The Court believes that there is lack of preliminary investigation on the part of accused Anthony
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2011 John Apura. The warrant of arrest issued on July 24, 2003 on the basis of the original
[formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-2083-RTJ] information filed on July 24, 2003 cannot be made as valid basis for the arrest of the accused
. Anthony John Apura on August 2, 2003. The court notes that accused Anthony John Apura is
Promulgated: not the certain Junjun mentioned in the original Information.
August 7, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x What appalled the Court is the manner by which the accused was placed under custody. The
actuation wherein a person is invited to the police station for investigation and to place said
DECISION person under detention when his appearance therein was only to explain his side thereof, is
foreboding.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
WHEREFORE, short of declaring the arrest of movant illegal, and acting on the Motion to
The facts that gave rise to the filing of the present administrative case, as culled from the rollo, Dismiss, remand this case to the Cebu City Prosecution Office for Prosecutor Jesus Feliciano to
follow: conduct preliminary investigation on Anthony John Apura and said accused is ordered released
from custody, being admitted to bail in the amount of PhP 20,000.000 in cash, pending
Following the death in Cebu City of one Mark James Enriquez on July 21, 2003, Cebu City preliminary investigation, pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 112.
Prosecutor Jesus P. Feliciano filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu on July 23, 2003
an Information[1] charging Sherwin Que a.k.a. Bungol, a certain Junjun, and nine Does with Furnish parties and counsels copy of this Order and Prosecutor Feliciano, who is directed to
Murder. submit his preliminary investigation report sixty (60) days from today.[5] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Warrants for the arrest[2] of Sherwin Que a.k.a. Bungol, John Doe, Peter Doe, Paul Doe, Richard
Doe, Arnold Doe, Dexter Doe, James Doe, Robert Doe, and Arthur Doe were thereupon issued
by the Executive Judge of the Cebu RTC. Hence, arose the present administrative complaint filed on September 7, 2004 by petitioner
Imelda S. Enriquez, the mother of the deceased Mark James Enriquez, against respondent for
On the invitation[3] of the 7th Regional Criminal Investigation and Detection Group Unit knowingly rendering an unjust order and gross ignorance of the law and procedure for ordering
(CIDGU) at Camp Sotero Cabahug in Cebu City, Anthony John Apura (Apura), accompanied by the release of Apura on bail without first conducting a hearing for the purpose.
his father, repaired to said office on August 1, 2003.
To the complaint, respondent gives the following comment:
An Inquest Investigation of Apura was conducted on August 2, 2003, a Saturday, by a prosecutor
who recommended the impleading of Apura as co-accused in the case. A warrant for Apuras Respondent judge was trying to check the abuse committed by the State through its law
arrest was on even date issued by Judge Apolinario Taypin, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the enforcement agency upon the rights of an accused person guaranteed to him by no less than
Cebu RTC, who was on duty that day.[4] Apura was immediately arrested and detained. the Constitution. The inquest proceedings which followed . . . the invitation was [sic] highly
irregular. The prosecutors knew this fact, which is why, during the hearing on the Motion to
Apura assailed the legality of his arrest via a Motion to Dismiss the Information, which he filed Dismiss, they agreed for [sic] the remand of the record for preliminary investigation.
on August 5, 2003 before Branch 24 of the Cebu RTC to which the case was raffled.
Had he granted the Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the trial court did not acquire
By Order of August 13, 2003, Branch 24 Presiding Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., herein jurisdiction over the person of Apura because of the illegal arrest, accused would be released
respondent, believ[ing] that there [wa]s lack of preliminary investigation, ordered the remand just the same. Yet, to strike a balance of the possible abuse on the rights of accused and the
effort of the police at prosecution of crimes, respondent did not categorically declare the arrest Indeed, a preliminary investigation should have been conducted before the filing of the
illegal but allowed the accused to post cash bail bond with an accompanying hold-departure Amended Information. A preliminary investigation is a proceeding distinct from an inquest. A
order. At least, to get hold of the accused while preliminary investigation is conducted.[6] preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.[13] An inquest is a summary inquiry
conducted by a prosecutor for the purpose of determining whether the warrantless arrest of a
By Report dated October 4, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), finding that person was based on probable cause.[14]
respondent violated Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reading:
Where the penalty prescribed by law for an offense is at least four years, two months and one
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not day of imprisonment without regard to the fine, a preliminary investigation must be conducted
bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion before the filing of a complaint or information for such offense.[15] The conduct of an inquest
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, investigation does not fulfill the requirement for the conduct of a preliminary investigation
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution, before the filing of an information or complaint involving any such offenses, except when the
accused was lawfully arrested without a warrant.[16]

recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P21,000 for gross ignorance of the In the case at bar, the accused was not even arrested. He repaired to the CIDGU on its invitation.
law.[7] He should thus have been subjected to a preliminary investigation, not a mere inquest
investigation.[17]
By Resolution[8] dated December 14, 2005, this Court ordered the parties to manifest whether
they are submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted, An Amended Information was subsequently filed, however, upon which a Warrant of Arrest
within ten days from notice. Respondent responded in the affirmative in a Manifestation[9] was issued against Apura by Judge Taypin. By so issuing a warrant, Judge Taypin is presumed to
received on January 27, 2006 to which he attached additional papers in support of his case. On have , before issuing the warrant, previously regularly discharged his duty to personally
petitioners part, she also responded in the affirmative by Manifestation[10] received on determine the existence of probable cause against the accused, as mandated by Section 6 of
January 31, 2006. Rule 112, which provides:

An application to bail from Murder, for which Apura was indicted on August 2, 2003 when it SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days
was a capital offense,[11] now punishable by reclusion perpetua, calls for a hearing, as called from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
for under Section 8 of Rule 114 reading: resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case
if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
SEC. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested
person who is in custody of the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when
perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on
guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
otherwise unable to testify. (Italics in the original),
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

in order to determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.[12] At all events, the absence of a preliminary investigation did not justify Apuras release, the
defect not having nullified the information and the warrant of arrest against him. Thus this
In the case at bar, respondent ordered Apura to be released on bail, without conducting a prior Court held in Larranaga v. CA:[18]
hearing.
We hold, therefore, that petitioners detention at the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center is
The lack of preliminary investigation, in light of the finding that Apura was not lawfully arrested legal in view of the information and the warrant of arrest against him. The absence of a
without warrant, he having gone to the CIDGU in response to its invitation, did not justify preliminary investigation will not justify petitioners release because such defect did not nullify
respondents disregard of the mandatory procedure governing the grant of bail. the information and the warrant of arrest against him. We ruled in Sanciangco, Jr. v. People:[19]
The absence of preliminary investigations does not affect the courts jurisdiction over the case.
Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there
were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information, should Associate Justice
conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be
conducted. (Citation omitted)
[1] Rollo, pp. 47-48.
[2] Id. at 49.
In fine, respondents release on bail of Apura, without priorly conducting a hearing for the [3] Id. at 2, 55.
purpose, betrays his gross ignorance of the law, it being settled that where the law involved is [4] Id. at 236.
simple and elementary, lack of observance thereof constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[20] [5] Id. at 32.
[6] Id. at 154.
Gross ignorance of the law may be punished with dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or [7] Id. at 248-251.
part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or [8] Id. at 252.
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; [9] Id. at 253-265.
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not [10] Id. at 266.
exceeding six (6) months; or a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40.000.[21] [11] Vide Revised Penal Code, Article 248.
[12] Basco v. Rapatalo, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335, March 5, 1997, 269 SCRA 220, 226.
This Court, however, appreciates as mitigating in respondents favor his issuance of a hold- [13] Rules of Court, Rule 112, Section 1.
departure order against the accused.[22] It is in this light that it reduces the recommended [14] Bautista, Basic Criminal Procedure, Rex Bookstore, Inc.: Manila, Philippines, 2003, at 39.
penalty of fine to P15,000. [15] Supra note 13.
[16] Vide Rules of Court, Rule 112, Section 7; Larranaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130644,
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., is found guilty of gross ignorance of October 27, 1997, 281 SCRA 254, at 258.
the law and is FINED Fifteen Thousand (P15,000) Pesos, with warning that a repetition of the [17] Vide Larannaga v. Court of Appeals, supra.
same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely. [18] 351 Phil. 75, 90 (1998).
[19] G.R. No. L-72830, March 24, 1987, 149 SCRA 1, 3-4.
SO ORDERED. [20] Jamora v. Bersales, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1529, December 16, 2004, 447 SCRA 20, 32.
[21] A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, Sections 8 (9) and 11.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES [22] Supra note 1 at 33-34.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
FIRST DIVISION with the provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended (effective
December 1, 2000).

IGNACIO E. MAYLAS, JR., A.M. No. RTJ-06-2012 SO ORDERED.


Complainant, [OCA-IPI No. 04-2106-RTJ]
In his Comment, respondent judge alleged that the assailed Order was issued after careful
Present: evaluation of the information and relevant pieces of evidence; that he was merely exercising
his adjudicative functions so he cannot be administratively charged; that the complaint did not
- versus - Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), impute malice or bad faith on his part; that the filing of the complaint is premature because
Ynares-Santiago, judicial remedies are available.
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and In the Report dated June 19, 2006, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that while
Chico-Nazario, JJ. the Order of the respondent was reversed by the Court of Appeals, the same could not be the
JUDGE MANUEL L. SESE, basis for administrative sanction. Respondent should not be disciplined on account of an error
Regional Trial Court of Promulgated: of judgment which is judicial in nature, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption. The
Masbate City, Branch 45, OCA thus recommended that the instant administrative case be dismissed for lack of merit.
Respondent. August 4, 2006
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
Plainly, the error attributed to respondent judge pertains to the exercise of his adjudicative
RESOLUTION functions. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty and corruption, the acts of
a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: liability civil, criminal or administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous as
long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance,
bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. Settled is
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge Manuel L. Sese of the Regional Trial Court the rule that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot
of Masbate City, Branch 45, was charged by complainant Ignacio E. Maylas, Jr. with gross be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through
ignorance of the law, incompetence, violation and willful disregard of the Rules of Court in judicial remedies.[2]
connection with Criminal Case No. 10911 entitled People v. PSI Jeremias A. Sanchez and SPOI
Emilio G. Quime. Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court mandates that, in a motion to quash, the court shall
not consider any ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over
Complainant alleged that the accused in Criminal Case No. 10911 filed a Motion to Quash on the offense charged. In Criminal Case No. 10911, respondent judge erred when he considered
the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense. However, on October 14, 2003, a ground not raised by the accused. As found by the Court of Appeals, the error in issuing the
respondent judge granted the motion to quash not on the ground alleged by the accused but assailed Order dated October 14, 2003 is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. However,
on lack of probable cause. grave abuse of discretion alone is not a ground for disciplinary proceedings. The filing of an
administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for the correction of actions of a judge
The motion for reconsideration filed by the public prosecutor was denied by the respondent perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy
judge; hence, a petition for certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals which was docketed exists,[3] thus:
as CA-G.R. SP No. 82283. On August 30, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[1] the
dispositive portion of which reads: [T]he law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by
a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or
writ prayed for accordingly GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated October 14, 2003 and admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or
December 3, 2003 dismissing Criminal Case No. 10911 and denying the motion for legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final
reconsideration filed by the public prosecutor, respectively, are hereby both ANNULLED and order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or
SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 10911 is hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court of irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious,
Masbate City, Branch 45 is hereby DIRECTED to continue with the proceedings in accordance despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue,
as the case may be. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions
against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial
remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial
remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-
requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, [1] Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies Edgardo F. Sundiam and Japar B. Dimaampao.
have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an [2] Planas v. Reyes, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1905, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 146, 155.
inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.[4] [3] Barbers v. Laguio, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1568, February 15, 2001, 351 SCRA 606, 618.
[4] Flores v. Abesamis, A.M. No. SC-96-1, July 10, 1997, 275 SCRA 302, 316.
Even granting that respondent judge erred in the issuance of the assailed Order, he could not [5] Planas v. Reyes, supra at 159.
be held administratively liable considering that there is no proof that such error of judgment
was tainted with bias or partiality, fraud, dishonesty, bad faith, deliberate intent to do an
injustice, or gross ignorance. To merit disciplinary action, the error or mistake must be gross or
patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith. In the absence of a showing to the contrary,
defective or erroneous decision or order is presumed to have been issued in good faith.[5] As
noted by the OCA, the complaint did not impute malice or bad faith on the part of respondent
judge hence, he is presumed to have acted in good faith. Moreover, in his Comment,
respondent claimed that he issued the assailed Order after a careful examination of the records
of the case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant administrative case against Judge Manuel L.
Sese of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate City, Branch 45, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice
FIRST DIVISION in Civil Case No. 23-569 by ordering the partition of the subject property between him and
Querubin.

LEONARDO L. RIVERA, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2013 In the Report dated May 30, 2006, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) noted that the
Complainant, [OCA-IPI No. 06-2509-RTJ] complaint did not comply with the requirements set forth under Section 1, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court and that Rivera failed to establish the charges as he only made bare allegations
Present: without adducing evidence in support thereof. Hence, the OCA found that there is no necessity
for the respondents to comment on the complaint and thus recommended that the instant
- versus - Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), administrative case be dismissed for lack of merit.
Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez, We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ. Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides:
JUDGE BERNABE B. MENDOZA,
CLERK OF COURT VI JONATHAN SECTION 1. How instituted. - Proceedings for the discipline of Judges of regular and special
FLORO D. DELA CRUZ and courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu
SHERIFF IV RIZALDE V. SEVERINO, propio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons
all of the Regional Trial Court of Promulgated: who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may
Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of
Respondents. August 4, 2006 indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the
acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law,
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct. (Emphasis supplied)

RESOLUTION
Likewise, the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service require that the
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: complaint against all civil servants, like respondents Clerk of Court Dela Cruz and Sheriff
Severino, be written in a clear, simple and concise language and in a systematic manner,
otherwise the same will be dismissed.[2]
In a letter dated October 28, 2005, complainant Leonardo L. Rivera charged respondents Judge
Bernabe B. Mendoza, Clerk of Court VI Jonathan Floro D. Dela Cruz and Sheriff IV Rizalde V. In the instant case, complainant alleged that Judge Mendoza is biased in favor of Querubin
Severino, all of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, with Manifest Bias and when he did not give credence to the latters nationality and when he issued a writ of execution
Partiality relative to Civil Case No. 23-569 entitled Sps. Leonardo and Francisca Rivera v. Dolores in Civil Case No. 23-569 despite lack of a final and executory judgment. As regards respondents
Ll. Querubin. Clerk of Court Dela Cruz and Sheriff Severino, we find that there is no allegation as to their
alleged infractions.
Rivera alleged that Judge Mendoza issued a writ of execution despite lack of final and executory
judgment and that he was biased in favor of Querubin who was an Australian citizen. We agree with the observation of the OCA that complainant failed to allege specific acts or to
present proof that would show that respondent judge indeed failed to consider the nationality
On November 18, 2005, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.[1] informed Rivera of Querubin or how it affected the outcome of Civil Case No. 23-569. Anent the issuance of the
that his complaint could not be acted upon for failure to state clearly and concisely the acts and writ of execution, complainant likewise failed to prove the status of Civil Case No. 23-569 or
omissions constituting the alleged violations of the respondents. Moreover, the complaint was the fact that there was yet no final and executory judgment thereon. As regards respondents
not written in clear, simple and concise language as to apprise the respondents of the nature clerk of court and sheriff, there was no averment as to their participation in the alleged
of the charge against them and to enable them to prepare their defense. Rivera was thus infraction. Clearly, complainant failed to comply with the requirements laid down in Section 1,
directed to comply with the foregoing requirements. Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and Section 8, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service.
However, in a letter dated December 21, 2005, Rivera merely stated that respondents did not
give credence to the nationality of Querubin. Moreover, he prayed for this Court to intercede It is likewise well-settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that
respondents committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant.[3] In the instant case,
we find that the charge of manifest bias and partiality is bereft of factual or legal basis hence, V. Severino, all of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, is DISMISSED for lack of
the same must be dismissed. Bare allegations of bias and partiality are not enough in the merit.
absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will
undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or SO ORDERED.
favor. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality.
Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
to the palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or order itself.[4] Associate Justice

Even assuming that respondent judge erred in failing to consider the nationality of Querubin in
deciding Civil Case No. 23-569, or in issuing the writ of execution without a final and executory WE CONCUR:
judgment, complainants remedy is not through this administrative complaint. It has been held
that the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for the correction of ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient Chief Justice
judicial remedy exists,[5] thus: Chairperson

[T]he law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or Associate Justice Associate Justice
irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or
admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final Associate Justice
order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or
irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, [1] Now an Associate Justice of this Court.
despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of [2] UNIFORM RULES ON ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IN THE CIVIL SERVICE, Rule II, Sec. 8 reads:
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue,
as the case may be. Complaint. A complaint against a civil service official or employee shall not be given due course
unless it is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. However, in cases
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions initiated by the proper disciplining authority, the complaint need not be under oath.
against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial
remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial No anonymous complaint shall be entertained unless there is obvious truth or merit to the
remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre- allegations therein or supported by documentary or direct evidence, in which case the person
requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, complained of may be required to comment.
whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies
have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an The complaint should be written in a clear, simple and concise language and in a systematic
inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.[6] manner as to apprise the civil servant concerned of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him and to enable him to intelligently prepare his defense or answer.
Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions, and fails to
substantiate his claim, as in this case, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack The complaint shall contain the following:
of merit.[7] This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon erring
employees and members of the bench. At the same time, however, the Court should not a. full name and address of the complainant;
hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote b. full name and address of the person complained of as well as his position and office of
the orderly administration of justice. This Court will not be the instrument to destroy the employment;
reputation of any member of the bench or any of its employees by pronouncing guilt on mere c. a narration of the relevant and material facts which shows the acts or omissions allegedly
speculation.[8] committed by the civil servant;
d. certified true copies of documentary evidence and affidavits of his witnesses, if any; and
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant administrative case against respondents e. certification or statement of non-forum shopping.
Judge Bernabe B. Mendoza, Clerk of Court VI Jonathan Floro D. Dela Cruz and Sheriff IV Rizalde
In the absence of any one of the aforementioned requirements, the complaint shall be
dismissed.
[3] Barcena v. Gingoyon, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1794, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 65, 74.
[4] Elefant v. Inting, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1938, July 15, 2005, 463 SCRA 457, 460, citing Mamerto
Maniquiz Foundation, Inc. v. Pizarro, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1750, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 140.
[5] Barbers v. Laguio, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1568, February 15, 2001, 351 SCRA 606, 618.
[6] Flores v. Abesamis, A.M. No. SC-96-1, July 10, 1997, 275 SCRA 302, 316.
[7] Planas v. Reyes, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1905, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 146, 161.
[8] Id.
1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.000)
PESOS for seven of the 13 charges against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460;

EN BANC 2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 73, Malabon City and consider him SEPARATED from the service due to a medically
disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office,
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, effective immediately;
Petitioner,
-versus- 3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. back salaries, allowances and
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., other economic benefits corresponding to three (3) years;
Respondent.
4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for
x----------------------x LACK OF MERIT; and
Re: RESOLUTION DATED 11 MAY 1999 OF JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.
x----------------------x 5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 of Judge
LUZ ARRIEGO, Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for MOOTNESS.
Petitioner,
- versus -
Judge Floro filed three[1] Partial Motions for Reconsideration grounded on the following:

JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., I.


Respondent. The Intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution (1 Record 443, 495-6, and 1 Journal 237 of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, specifically, the Constitutional Conventions Mr.
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 Concepcion & Fr. Bernas, S.J.) is: The power to determine the incapacity of judges to discharge
the duties of their office is part of the overall administrative authority of the Supreme Court
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC over all its members and all the members of the judiciary. It can only declare the incapacity of
a judge (under Sec. 11, Art. VIII, Constitution) by creating a panel of impartial (private) doctors-
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 specialists in the field.
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 99-512-RTJ)
Ms. Francianina G. Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Psychologist
VELASCO, JR., JJ. Ms. Beatriz O. Cruz, Dr. Celeste P. Vista, M.D. (Psychiatrist and Medical Officer IV), and Supreme
Court Senior Chief Staff Officer, general practitioner and government physician Dr. Rosa J.
Mendoza, M.D. who conducted the mental tests on Judge Floro (on December 15, 2000) are
Promulgated: absolutely disqualified by the Constitutional provision; and their March 7, 2001
psychological/psychiatric evaluation reports are NULL and VOID ab initio/inadmissible for any
x-----------------------------------------------x legal purpose.

II.
RESOLUTION Without the complainant, OCAs presenting the 6 mental health professionals --- Dr. Cecilia
Villegas and Ms. Melinda Grio, 1995 and Dr. Celeste Vista, Ms. Beatriz Cruz, (I.Q. 68 of Judge
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Floro) Ms. Francianina G. Sanzhez, 1998, 2001, and general physician Dr. Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D.
--- their questioned (evaluation) report on Judge Floro, aside from being grossly incomplete and
On 31 March 2006, the Court en banc rendered a Decision in these consolidated cases, the inadequate, is HEARSAY evidence.
dispositive portion of which states:
Judge Floro is entitled to cross-examine said mental health professional who made the report.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to: Without such examination, he would be deprived of the right to confront and examine the
witnesses against him.
unfitness to sit as Judge be DISMISSED for lack of merit; b) Judge Floro be fully REINSTATED;
The Investigator (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirezs repeated denials of (1) Judge Floros Continuing and c) concomitantly, Judge Floro be declared entitled to back wages, back salaries, allowances
Trial Objections and (2) December 5, 2000, September 28, October 9, 2001 & February 21, 2002 and other economic benefits, LESS the amounts Judge Floro already received by virtue of
Omnibus Motions to a) put on the witness stand, to confront and to determine their paragraph 3 of the Decision in this case.
qualifications as experts b) to cross-examine and c) to disqualify or inhibit, the said 6 mental
health professionals, violated the cardinal primary rights of Judge Floro (Ang Tibay vs. CIR) to Incidentally, in one of the pleadings dated 30 May 2006 filed by Judge Floro, he informed the
administrative, substantive and constitutional due process of law; it is no less than denial of Court that he has already received the amount of P1,180,325.80 pursuant to the Decision dated
justice; such denial suffices to cast on the investigation, official acts and the mental reports the 31 March 2006.
impress of nullity.
The Partial Motions for Reconsideration, as well as the supplements thereto, are DENIED as
III. Judge Floro has not shown any compelling reason that would warrant the reconsideration he
Judge Floros cardinal primary rights --- 2. the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; seeks.
3. the decision must have something to support itself; 4. the evidence must be substantial 5.
the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing --- were flagrantly In denying said motions, neither the etiology of Judge Floros belief in dwendes nor the validity
violated by the Investigator (Ret.) Justice Ramirezs March 7, 2001 Partial Confidential Report: of such belief is being passed upon. We reiterate that judges are expected to be guided by the
it blatantly discarded, excluded, and failed to consider the testimonies and opinions of all his rule of law and to resolve cases before them with judicial detachment. The acceptance by the
ordinary witnesses. public of the legitimacy of the judicial process and the binding effect of court decisions is mostly
dependent on the judges adherence to such judicial behavior.
Under Sec. 50 (c), Rule 130, Rules on Evidence, Judge Floros ordinary witnesses proved by
unrebutted, clear, convincing and straightforward testimonies/opinions (excluded by J. The psychological finding of mental unfitness (made not only by the psychiatrists of the
Ramirezs Report and Conclusions) his medical and mental capacity/fitness to sit as RTC Judge. Supreme Court Clinic but by Judge Floros own doctors during the hearing of his cases), when
taken together with Judge Floros claimed dalliance with dwendes, poses a serious challenge to
III.A. such required judicial detachment and impartiality and would eventually erode the publics
Under Sec. 50 (c), Rule 130, Rules on Evidence, Judge Floros ordinary witnesses --- a) RTC acceptance of the judiciary as the rational guardian of the law, if not make it an object of
Malabon Court Officers --- Fiscal Pacifico Flores, Fiscal Neptali Aliposa, PAO Lawyer Erwin ridicule.
Gallevo, Legal Researcher Aina Talag Pascual and NCR/RTC Judge Edmundo T. Acuna (former
Malabon Fiscal), Atty. Arsenio Reyes (Malabon Lawyer), and b) Judge Floros His insistence on the existence of dwendes, among other beliefs, conflicts with the prevailing
neighbors/townmates Jocelyn Fernandez, Belen Gomez, Asuncion Borjal, Jovita Estrella, Dr. expectations concerning judicial behavior and manifests a mental state that should lay to rest
Ma. Nieves Celeste, M.D., & Danilo Cuarto --- proved by unrebutted, clear, convincing and any doubts about his valid removal from office for lack of the judicial temperament required of
straightforward testimonies/opinions (excluded by J. Ramirezs Report and Conclusions) his all those in the Bench.
medical and mental capacity/fitness to sit as RTC Judge.
In fine, Judge Floro himself has confirmed that he is incapable of discharging the duties of a
Their opinions refuted, traversed and nullified the lies, fabrications and falsehood offered by judge free from extrajudicial influences and that he falls short of the fundamental requirements
the OCAs witness Judge Aquino, Jr., inter alia. of competence and objectivity expected of all judges.

III.B. WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Floros Partial Motions for Reconsideration as well as
Judge Floros cardinal primary rights --- 2. the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; the Supplements thereto are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY there being no merits. No other
3. the decision must have something to support itself; 4. the evidence must be substantial 5. pleading, however denominated, shall henceforth be entertained by this Court.
the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing --- were flagrantly
violated by the investigator (Ret.) Justice Ramirezs March 7, 2001 Partial Confidential Report: SO ORDERED.
it blatantly discarded, excluded, and failed to consider the expert testimony and opinion of Mr.
JAIME T. LICAUCO, a parapsychologist and Visiting Faculty Member of the Rosebridge Graduate
School of Intergrative PSYCHOLOGY in Concord, California.[2]
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Then, on 30 June 2006, Judge Floro filed a Verified Third Supplement dated 23 June 2006
essentially praying that a) the instant administrative complaint against Judge Floro for mental

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