General Credit

7/20/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 513
VOL. 513, JANUARY 29, 2007 225

General Credit Corporation vs. Alsons Development and
Investment Corporation
*
G.R. No. 154975. January 29, 2007.
GENERAL CREDIT CORPORATION (now PENTA

CAPITAL FINANCE CORPORATION), petitioner, vs.
ALSONS DEVELOPMENT and INVESTMENT
CORPORATION and CCC EQUITY CORPORATION,
respondents.
Actions; Appeals; Court of Appeals; Oral Arguments; Under

the CA Internal Rules, the appellate court may tap any of the three
(3) alternatives therein provided to aid the court in resolving
appealed cases before it—it may rely on available records alone,
require the submission of memoranda or set the case for oral
argument; The appellate court may, at its sound discretion,
dispense with a tedious oral argument exercise.—Petitioner’s
lament about being deprived of procedural due process owing to
the denial of its motion for oral argument is simply specious.
Under the CA Internal Rules, the appellate court may tap any of
the three (3) alternatives therein provided to aid the court in
resolving appealed cases before it. It may rely on available records
alone, require the submission of memoranda or set the case for
oral argument. The option the Internal Rules thus gives the CA
necessarily suggests that the appellate court may, at its sound
discretion, dispense with a tedious oral argument exercise.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
226
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000164b5b17a06fd1084aa003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/19
Same; Same; Well-settled is the rule that issues or grounds not

raised below cannot be resolved on review in higher courts—
springing surprises on the opposing party is antithetical to the
sporting idea of fair play, justice and due process.—Just like the
first, the last three (3) arguments set forth in the petition will not
carry the day for the petitioner. In relation therewith, the Court
notes that these arguments and the issues behind them were not
raised before the trial court. This appellate maneuver cannot be
allowed. For, well-settled is the rule that issues or grounds not
raised below cannot be resolved on review in higher courts.
Springing surprises on the opposing party is antithetical to the
sporting idea of fair play, justice and due process; hence, the
proscription against a party shifting from one theory at the trial
court to a new and different theory in the appellate level. On the
same rationale, points of law, theories, issues not brought to the
attention of the lower court or, in fine, not interposed during the
trial cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Corporation Law; Doctrine of Piercing the Veil of Corporate

Fiction; The first consequence of the doctrine of legal entity of the
separate personality of the corporation is that a corporation may
not be made to answer for acts and liabilities of its stockholders or
those of legal entities to which it may be connected or vice versa.—
A corporation is an artificial being vested by law with a
personality distinct and separate from those of the persons
composing it as well as from that of any other entity to which it
may be related. The first consequence of the doctrine of legal
entity of the separate personality of the corporation is that a
corporation may not be made to answer for acts and liabilities of
its stockholders or those of legal entities to which it may be
connected or vice versa. The notion of separate personality,
however, may be disregarded under the doctrine—“piercing the
veil of corporate fiction”—as in fact the court will often look at the
corporation as a mere collection of individuals or an aggregation
of persons undertaking business as a group, disregarding the
separate juridical personality of the corporation unifying the
group. Another formulation of this doctrine is that when two (2)
business enterprises are owned, conducted and controlled by the
same parties, both law and equity will, when necessary to protect
the rights of third parties, disregard the legal fiction that two
corporations are distinct entities and treat them as identical or
one and the same.
227
VOL. 513, JANUARY 29, 2007 227

Same; Same; Whether the separate personality of the

corporation should be pierced hinges on obtaining facts,
appropriately pleaded or proved.—Whether the separate
personality of the corporation should be pierced hinges on
obtaining facts, appropriately pleaded or proved. However, any
piercing of the corporate veil has to be done with caution, albeit
the Court will not hesitate to disregard the corporate veil when it
is misused or when necessary in the interest of justice. After all,
the concept of corporate entity was not meant to promote unfair
objectives. Authorities are agreed on at least three (3) basic areas
where piercing the veil, with which the law covers and isolates
the corporation from any other legal entity to which it may be
related, is allowed. These are: 1) defeat of public convenience, as
when the corporate fiction is used as vehicle for the evasion of an
existing obligation; 2) fraud cases or when the corporate entity is
used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime; or 3)
alter ego cases, where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a
mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the
corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so
conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency,
conduit or adjunct of another corporation.
Same; Same; The Court agrees with the disposition of the

appellate court on the application of the piercing doctrine to the
transaction subject of the instant case where, per the Court’s count,
the trial court enumerated no less than 20 documented
circumstances and transactions which, taken as a package, indeed
strongly supported the conclusion that a corporation was but an
adjunct, an instrumentality or business conduit of another
corporation.—The Court agrees with the disposition of the
appellate court on the application of the piercing doctrine to the
transaction subject of this case. Per the Court’s count, the trial
court enumerated no less than 20 documented circumstances and
transactions, which, taken as a package, indeed strongly
supported the conclusion that respondent EQUITY was but an
adjunct, an instrumentality or business conduit of petitioner
GCC. This relation, in turn, provides a justifying ground to pierce
petitioner’s corporate existence as to ALSONS’ claim in question.
Foremost of what the trial court referred to as “certain
circumstances” are the commonality of directors, officers and
stockholders and even sharing of office between petitioner GCC
and respondent EQUITY; certain financing and management
arrangements between the two, allowing the petitioner to handle
the funds of the latter; the
228

virtual domination if not control wielded by the petitioner over

the finances, business policies and practices of respondent
EQUITY; and the establishment of respondent EQUITY by the
petitioner to circumvent CB rules.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos
Angeles Law Offices for petitioner.
Edgar A. Pacis Law Office for respondent CCC
Equity Corp.
Manuel D. Yngson, Jr. for respondent Alsons Dev’t.
and Investment Corporation.
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court, petitioner General Credit Corporation, now
known as Penta Capital Finance1 Corporation, seeks 2
to
annul and set aside the Decision and Resolution dated
April 11, 2002 and August 20, 2002, respectively, of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 31801, affirming
the November 8, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City in its Civil Case No. 12707, an action
for a sum of money thereat instituted by the herein
respondent Alsons Development and Investment
Corporation against the petitioner and respondent CCC
Equity Corporation.
The facts:
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and

concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (now a member of
this Court) and Perlita J. Tria Tirona; Rollo, pp. 109 et seq.
2 Id., at pp. 251-252.
229
VOL. 513, JANUARY 29, 2007 229

Shortly after its incorporation in 1957 as a finance and

investment company, petitioner General Credit
Corporation (GCC, for short), then known as Commercial
Credit Corporation (CCC), established CCC franchise 3
companies in different urban centers of the country. In
furtherance of its business, GCC had, as early as 1974,
applied for and was able to secure license from the then
Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines and the Securities
and Exchange Commission
4
(SEC) to engage also in quasi-
banking activities. On the other hand, respondent CCC
Equity Corporation (EQUITY, for brevity) was organized in
November 1994 by GCC for the purpose of, among other
things, taking over the operations and management of the
various franchise companies. At a time material hereto,
respondent Alsons Development and Investment
Corporation (ALSONS, hereinafter) and Conrado, Nicasio,
Editha and Ladislawa, all surnamed Alcantara, and
Alfredo de Borja (hereinafter the Alcantara family, for
convenience), each owned, just like GCC, shares in the
aforesaid GCC franchise companies, e.g., CCC Davao and
CCC Cebu.
In December 1980, ALSONS and the Alcantara family,
for a consideration of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) Pesos,
sold their shareholdings—a total of 101,953 shares, more5
or
less—in the CCC franchise companies to EQUITY. On
January 2, 1981, EQUITY issued ALSONS et al., a “bearer”
promissory note for P2,000,000.00 with a one-year maturity
date, at 18% interest per annum, with provisions6
for
damages and litigation costs in case of default.
Some four years later, the Alcantara family assigned its
rights and interests over the bearer note
7
to ALSONS which
thenceforth became the holder thereof. But even before the
_______________
3 CA Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 116.

4 Id.
5 Via ten (10) identical Deeds of Sales of Shares of Stock; Rollo, pp. 316
et seq.
6 Id., at p. 335.
7 CA Decision, p. 3, citing Exh. “K”; Rollo, p. 111.
230

execution of the assignment deal aforestated, letters of

demand for interest payment were already sent to
EQUITY, through its President, Wilfredo Labayen, who
pleaded inability to pay the stipulated interest, EQUITY no
longer then having assets or property to settle its
obligation nor being extended financial support by GCC.
What happened next, as narrated in the assailed
Decision of the CA, may be summarized, as follows:
“1. On January 14, 1986, before the RTC of Makati,

ALSONS, having failed to collect on the bearer note
aforementioned,
8
filed a complaint for a sum of
money against EQUITY and GCC. The case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 12707, was eventually
raffled to Branch 58 of the court. As stated in par. 4
of the complaint, GCC is being impleaded as party-
defendant for any judgment ALSONS might secure
against EQUITY and, under the doctrine of piercing
the veil of corporate fiction, against GCC, EQUITY
having been organized as a tool and mere conduit of
GCC.
2. Answering with a cross-claim against GCC,
EQUITY stated by way of special and affirmative
defenses that it (EQUITY):
a) was purposely organized by GCC for the latter to

avoid CB Rules and Regulations on DOSRI
(Directors, Officers, Stockholders and Related
Interest) limitations, and that it acted merely as
intermediary or bridge for loan transactions and
other dealings of GCC to its franchises and the
investing public; and
b) is solely dependent upon GCC for its funding
requirements, to settle, among others, equity
purchases made by investors on the franchises;
hence, GCC is solely and directly liable to ALSONS,
the former having failed to provide …EQUITY the
necessary funds to meet its obligations to ALSONS.
3. GCC filed its ANSWER to Cross-claim, stressing

that it is a distinct and separate entity from
EQUITY and alleging, in essence that the business
relationships with each other were always at arm’s
length. And following the denial of its motion to

dismiss ALSONS’
_______________
8 Annex “A,” Petition, Rollo, pp. 69 et seq.
231
VOL. 513, JANUARY 29, 2007 231

complaint, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and

want of cause of action, GCC filed its Answer
thereto and set up affirmative defenses with
counterclaim for exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees.”
Issues having been joined, trial ensued. Presented by

ALSONS, but testifying as adverse witnesses, were CB and
GCC officers. Among other things, ALSONS’ evidence,
which included the EQUITY-issued “bearer” promissory
note marked as Exhibit “K” and over sixty (60) 9
other
marked and subsequently admitted documents, were to
the effect that five (5) incorporators, each contributing
P100,000.00 as the initial paid up capital of the company,
organized EQUITY to manage, as it did manage, various
GCC franchises through management contracts. Before
EQUITY’s incorporation, however, GCC was already into
the financing business as it was in fact managing and
operating various CCC franchises. Presented in evidence,
too, was the September 29, 1982 letter-reply of one G.
Villanueva, then GCC President, to EQUITY President
Wilfredo Labayen, bearing on the sale of EQUITY shares to
third parties, part of the proceeds of which the Alcantaras
wanted applied to liquidate the promissory note in
question. In said letter, Mr. Villanueva explained that the
GCC Board denied the Alcantaras’ request to be paid out of
such proceeds, but nonetheless authorized EQUITY to pay
them interest out of EQUITY’s 10 operation income, in
preference over what was due GCC.
Albeit EQUITY presented its president, it opted to adopt
the testimony of some of ALSONS’ witnesses, inclusive of
the documentary exhibits testified to by each of them, as its
evidence.
For its part, GCC called only Wilfredo Labayen to
testify. It stuck to its underlying defense of separateness
and presented documentary evidence detailing the

organizational structures of both GCC and EQUITY. And
in a bid to negate the notion
_______________
9 RTC Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 339.

10 Id., at pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 98-99.
232

that it was conducting its business illegally, GCC presented

CB and SEC-issued licenses authoring it to engage in
financing and quasi-banking activities. It also adduced
evidence to prove that it was never a party to any of the
actionable documents ALSONS and its predecessors-in-
interest had in their possession and that the November 27,
1985 deed of assignment of rights over the promissory note
was unenforceable.
Eventually, the trial court, on its finding that EQUITY
was but an instrumentality or adjunct of GCC and
considering the legal consequences and implications of such
relationship, came out with its decision on November 8,
1990, rendering judgment for ALSONS, to wit:
“WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is

hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff [ALSONS] and against the
defendants [EQUITY and GCC] who are hereby ordered, jointly
and severally, to pay plaintiff:
1. the principal sum of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00)

together with the interest due thereon at the rate of
eighteen percent (18%) annually computed from Jan. 2,
1981 until the obligation is fully paid;
2. liquidated damages due thereon equivalent to three
percent (3%) monthly computed from January 2, 1982
until the obligation is fully paid;
3. attorney’s fees in an amount equivalent to twenty four
percent (24%) of the total obligation due; and
4. the costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.” (Words in brackets added.)
Therefrom, GCC went on appeal to the CA where its

appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 31801,
ascribing to the trial court the commission of the following
errors:
“1. In holding that there is a “Parent-Subsidiary”

corporate relationship between EQUITY and GCC;
2. In not holding that EQUITY and GCC are distinct
and separate corporate entities;
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VOL. 513, JANUARY 29, 2007 233

3. In applying the doctrine of “Piercing the Veil of

Corporate Fiction” in the case at bar; and
4. In not holding ALSONS in estoppel to question the
corporate personality of EQUITY.”
On April 11, 2002,11 the appellate court rendered the herein

assailed Decision, affirming that of the trial court, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati in Civil Case No. 12707 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.”
In time, GCC moved for reconsideration followed by a

motion for oral argument, but both motions were denied by
the CA12
in its equally assailed Resolution of August 20,
2002.
Hence, GCC’s present recourse anchored on the
following arguments, issues and/or submissions:
“1. The motion for oral argument with motion for

reconsideration and its supplement were
perfunctorily denied by the CA without justifiable
basis;
2. There is absolutely no basis for piercing the veil of
corporate fiction;
3. Respondent Alsons is not a real party-in-interest as
the promissory note payable to bearer subject of the
collection suit is but a simulated document and/or
refers to another party. Moreover, the subject
promissory note is not admissible in evidence
because it has not been duly authenticated and it is

an altered document;
4. The fact of full payment stated in the ten (10) deeds
of sale of the shares of stock is conclusive on the
sellers, and by the patrol evidence rule, the alleged
fact of its non-payment cannot be introduced in
evidenced; and
5. The counter-claim filed by GCC against Alsons
should be granted in the interest of justice.”
_______________
11 Supra note 1.
12 Supra note 2.
234

The petition and the arguments and/or issues holding it

together are without merit. The desired reversal of the
assailed decision and resolution of the appellate court is
accordingly DENIED.
Instead of raising distinctly formulated questions of law,
as is expected of one seeking a review under
13
Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court of a final CA judgment, petitioner GCC
starts off by voicing disappointment over the “perfunctory”
denial by the CA of its twin motions for reconsideration
and oral argument. Petitioner, to be sure, cannot plausibly
expect a reversal action premised on the cursory way its
motions were denied, if such indeed were the case. Such
manner of denial, while perhaps far from ideal, is not even
a recognized ground for appeal by certiorari, unless a
denial of due process ensues, which is not the case here.
And lest it be overlooked, the CA prefaced its assailed
denial resolution with the clause: “[F]inding no reversible
error committed to warrant the modification and/or reversal
of the April 11, 2002 Decision,” suggesting that the
appellate court gave the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration the attention it deserved. At the very least,
the petitioner was duly apprised of the reasons why
reconsideration could not be favorably considered. An
extended resolution was not really necessary to dispose of
the motion for reconsideration in question.
Petitioner’s lament about being deprived of procedural

due process owing to the denial of its motion for oral
argument is simply specious. Under the CA Internal Rules,
the appellate court may tap any of the three (3)
alternatives therein provided to aid the court in resolving
appealed cases before it. It may rely on available records
alone, require the submission of memoranda or set the case
for oral argument. The option the
_______________
13 Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.—A party

desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment … of the [CA] …
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth.
235
VOL. 513, JANUARY 29, 2007 235

Internal Rules thus gives the CA necessarily suggests that

the appellate court may, at its sound discretion, dispense
with a tedious oral argument exercise. Rule VI, Section 6 of
the 2002 Internal Rules of the CA, provides:
“SEC. 6. Judicial Action on Certain Petitions.—(a) In

petitions for review, after the receipt of the respondent’s comment
on the petition, … the Court [of Appeals] may dismiss the petition
if it finds the same to be patently without merit …, otherwise, it
shall give due course to it.
x x x x x x x x x
If the petition is given due course, the Court may consider the
case submitted for decision or require the parties to submit their
memorandum or set the case for oral argument. x x x. After the
oral argument or upon submission of the memoranda … the case
shall be deemed submitted for decision.”
In the case at bench, records reveal that the appellate

court, in line with the prescription of its own rules,
required the parties to just submit, as they did, their
respective memoranda to properly ventilate their separate
causes. Under this scenario, the petitioner cannot be
validly heard, having been deprived of due process.
Just like the first, the last three (3) arguments set forth
in the petition will not carry the day for the petitioner. In
relation therewith, the Court notes that these arguments

and the issues behind them were not raised before the trial
court. This appellate maneuver cannot be allowed. For,
well-settled is the rule that issues or grounds not raised14
below cannot be resolved on review in higher courts.
Springing surprises on the opposing party is antithetical to
the sporting idea of fair play, justice and due process;
hence, the proscription against a party shifting from one
theory at the trial court to a new and different theory in
the appellate level. On the same rationale, points of law,
theories, issues not brought to the attention of
_______________
14 Magellan Capital Management Corp. v. Zosa, G.R. No. 129916,

March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 157, citing cases.
236

the lower court or, in fine, not interposed during

15
the trial
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
There are, to be sure, exceptions to the rule respecting
what may be raised for the first time on appeal. Lack of
jurisdiction over
16
when the issues raised present a matter of
public policy comes immediately to mind. None of the
wellrecognized exceptions obtain in this case, however.
Lest it be overlooked vis-à-vis the same last three
arguments thus pressed, both the trial court and the CA,
based on the evidence adduced, adjudged the petitioner and
respondent EQUITY jointly and severally liable to pay
what respondent ALSONS is entitled to under the “bearer”
promissory note. The judgment argues against the notion of
the note being simulated or altered or that respondent
ALSONS has no standing to sue on the note, not being the
payee of the “bearer” note. For, the declaration of liability
not only presupposes the duly established authenticity and
due execution of the promissory note over which ALSONS,
as the holder in due course thereof, has interest, but also
the untenability of the petitioner’s counterclaim for
attorney’s fees and exemplary damages against ALSONS.
At bottom, the petitioner predicated such counter-claim on
the postulate that respondent ALSONS had no cause of
action, the supposed promissory note being, according to
the petitioner, either a simulated or an altered document.
In net effect, the definitive conclusion of the appellate

court—affirmatory of that of the trial court—was that the
bearer promissory note (Exh. “K”) was a genuine and
authentic instrument payable to the holder thereof. This
factual determination, as a matter of long and sound
appellate prac-
_______________
15 Union Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134068, June 25, 2001, 359
SCRA 480; Villaranda v. Villaranda, G.R. No. 153447, February 23, 2004,
423 SCRA 571.
16 Del Rosario v. Bonga, G.R. No. 136308, January 23, 2001, 350 SCRA
101.
237
VOL. 513, JANUARY 29, 2007 237

tice, deserves great weight and shall not be disturbed

17
on
appeal, save for the most compelling reasons, such as
when that determination is clearly without evidentiary
support or18 when grave abuse of discretion has been
committed. This is as it should be since the Court, in
petitions for review of CA decisions under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, usually limits its inquiry only to questions
of law. Stated otherwise, it is not the function of the Court
to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence or
premises
19
supportive of the factual holdings of lower
courts.
As nothing in the record indicates any of the exceptions
adverted to above, the factual conclusion of the CA that the
P2 Million promissory note in question was authentic and
was issued at the first instance to respondent ALSONS and
the Alcantara family for the amount stated on its face,
must be affirmed. It should be stressed in this regard that
even the issuing entity, i.e., respondent EQUITY, never
challenged the genuineness and due execution of the note.
This brings us to the remaining but core issue tendered
in this case and aptly raised by the petitioner, to wit:
whether there is absolutely no basis for piercing GCC’s veil
of corporate identity.
A corporation is an artificial being vested by law with a
personality distinct
20
and separate from those of the persons
composing it as well as from that of any other entity to
_______________
17 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116372, January 18, 2001, 349
SCRA 45.
18 Floro v. Llenado, G.R. No. 75723, June 2, 1995, 244 SCRA 713, citing
Remalante v. Tibe, 158 SCRA 145 (1988) Benguet Exploration, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. 117434, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 445.
19 PT& T v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152057, September 29, 2003,
412 SCRA 263.
20 Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 124715, January 24, 2000, 323 SCRA
102.
238

21
which it may be related. The first consequence of the
doctrine of legal entity of the separate personality of the
corporation is that a corporation may not be made to
answer for acts and liabilities of its stockholders or those22 of
legal entities to which it may be connected or vice versa.
The notion of separate personality, however, may be
disregarded under the doctrine—“piercing the veil of
corporate fiction”—as in fact the court will often look at the
corporation as a mere collection of individuals or an
aggregation of persons undertaking business as a group,
disregarding the separate juridical personality of the
corporation unifying the group. Another formulation of this
doctrine is that when two (2) business enterprises are
owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both
law and equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of
third parties, disregard the legal fiction that two
corporations are distinct entities
23
and treat them as
identical or one and the same.
Whether the separate personality of the corporation
should be pierced hinges on obtaining facts, appropriately
pleaded or proved. However, any piercing of the corporate
veil has to be done with caution, albeit the Court will not
hesitate to disregard the corporate veil when 24
it is misused
or when necessary in the interest of justice. After all, the
concept of corporate entity was not meant to promote
unfair objectives.
Authorities are agreed on at least three (3) basic areas
where piercing the veil, with which the law covers and
isolates the corporation from any other legal entity to
which it
_______________
21 Reynoso IV v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 116124-25, November 22,

2000, 345 SCRA 335, citing Yu v. National Labor Relations Commission,
245 SCRA 134 (1995).
22 Panay, Inc. v. Clave, L-56076, September 21, 1983, 124 SCRA 638.
23 PHIVIDEC v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85266, January 30, 1990,
181 SCRA 669, citing Abney v. Belmont Country Club Properties, Inc., 279
Pac., 829.
24 Reynoso IV v. Court of Appeals, supra.
239
VOL. 513, JANUARY 29, 2007 239

25
may be related,
26
is allowed. These are: 1) defeat of public
convenience, as when the corporate fiction is27 used as
vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation; 2) fraud
cases or when the corporate entity is used 28
to justify a
wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime; or 3) alter ego
cases, where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a
mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the
corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs
are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality,
29
agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation.
The CA found valid grounds to pierce the corporate veil
of petitioner GCC, there being justifiable basis for such
action. When the appellate court spoke of a justifying
factor, the reference was to what the trial court said in its
decision, namely: the existence of “certain circumstances
[which], taken together, gave rise to the ineluctable
conclusion that … [respondent] EQUITY is but an
instrumentality or adjunct of [petitioner] GCC.”
The Court agrees with the disposition of the appellate
court on the application of the piercing doctrine to the
transaction subject of this case. Per the Court’s count, the
trial court enumerated no less than 20 documented
circumstances and transactions, which, taken as a package,
indeed strongly supported the conclusion that respondent
EQUITY was but an adjunct, an instrumentality or
business conduit of petitioner GCC. This relation, in turn,
provides a justifying ground to pierce petitioner’s corporate
existence as to ALSONS’ claim in question. Foremost of
what the trial court
_______________
25 Villanueva, Commercial Law Review, 2004 ed., p. 576.

26 Traders Royal Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 93397, March 3, 1997,
269 SCRA 15.
27 Ibid., citing First Phil. International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 252
SCRA 259.
28 Koppel (Phil.), Inc. v. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496 (1946).
29 Ibid.; Umali v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89561, September 13,
1990, 189 SCRA 529.
240

referred to as “certain circumstances” are the commonality

of directors, officers and stockholders and even sharing of
office between petitioner GCC and respondent EQUITY;
certain financing and management arrangements between
the two, allowing the petitioner to handle the funds of the
latter; the virtual domination if not control wielded by the
petitioner over the finances, business policies and practices
of respondent EQUITY; and the establishment of
respondent EQUITY by the petitioner to circumvent CB
rules. For a perspective, the following are some relevant
excerpts from the trial court’s decision setting forth in some
detail the tipping circumstances adverted to therein:
“It must be noted that as characterized by their business

relationship, [respondent] EQUITY and [petitioner] GCC had
common directors and/or officers as well as stockholders. This is
revealed by the proceedings recorded in SEC Case No. 25-81
entitled “Avelina Ramoso, et al. vs. GCC, et al., where it was
established, thru the testimony of EQUITY’s own President …
that more than 90% of the stockholders of … EQUITY were also
stockholders of … GCC ….. Disclosed likewise is the fact that
when [EQUITY’s President] Labayen sold the shareholdings of
EQUITY in said franchise companies, practically the entire
proceeds thereof were surrendered to GCC, and not received by
EQUITY (EXHIBIT “RR”) x x x.
It was likewise shown by a preponderance of evidence that not
only had …GCC financed … EQUITY and that the latter was
heavily indebted to the former but EQUITY was, in fact, a wholly
owned subsidiary of …GCC. Thus, as affirmed by EQUITY’s
President, … the funds invested by EQUITY in the CCC
franchise companies actually came from CCC Phils. or
GCC (Exhibit “Y-5”)…. that, as disclosed by the Auditor’s report
for 1982, past due receivables alone of GCC exceeded
P101,000,000.00 mostly to GCC affiliates especially CCC

EQUITY. …; that [CB’s] Report of Examination dated July 14,
1977 shows that … EQUITY which has a paid-up capital of only
P500,000.00 was the biggest borrower of GCC with a total loan of
P6.70 Million ….
x x x x x x x x x
It has likewise been amply substantiated by [respondent
ALSONS’] evidence that not only did … GCC cause the
incorporation of
241
VOL. 513, JANUARY 29, 2007 241

… EQUITY, but, the latter had grossly inadequate capital for the
pursuit of its line of business to the extent that its business
affairs were considered as GCC’s own business endeavors. x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
ALSONS has likewise shown … that the bonuses of the officers
and directors of … EQUITY was based on its total financial
performance together with all its affiliates… both firms were
sharing one and the same office when both were still operational
… and that the directors and executives of … EQUITY never
acted independently … but took their orders from …
GCC….
The evidence has also indubitably established that …
EQUITY was organized by … GCC for the purpose of
circumventing [CB] rules and regulations and the Anti-
Usury Law. Thus, as disclosed by the Advance Report … on the
result of Central Bank’s Operations Examination conducted on …
GCC as of March 31, 1977 (EXHIBITS “FFF” etc.), the latter
violated [CB] rules and regulations by: (a) using as a conduit its
non-quasi bank affiliates …. (b) issuing without recourse facilities
to enable GCC to extend credit to affiliates like … EQUITY which
go beyond the single borrower’s limit without the need of showing
outstanding balance in the book of accounts.” (Emphasis over
words in brackets added.)
It bears to stress at this point that the facts and the

inferences drawn therefrom, upon which the two (2) courts
below applied the piercing doctrine, stand, for the most
part, undisputed. Among these is, to reiterate, the matter
of EQUITY having been incorporated to serve, as it did
serve, as an instrumentality or adjunct of GCC. With the
view we take of this case, GCC did not adduce any
evidence, let alone rebut the testimonies and documents
presented by ALSONS, to establish the prevailing
circumstances adverted to that provided the justifying

occasion to pierce the veil of corporate fiction between GCC
and EQUITY. We quote the trial court:
“Verily, indeed, as the relationships binding herein [respondent

EQUITY and petitioner GCC] have been that of “parentsubsidiary
corporations” the foregoing principles and doctrines find suitable
applicability in the case at bar; and, it having been satisfactorily
and indubitably shown that the said relationships had been
242

used to perform certain functions not characterized with

legitimacy, this Court … feels amply justified to “pierce the veil of
corporate entity” and disregard the separate existence of the
percent (sic) and subsidiary the latter having been so
controlled by the parent that its separate identity is
hardly discernible thus becoming a mere instrumentality
or alter ego of the former. Consequently, as the parent
corporation, [petitioner] GCC maybe (sic) held responsible for the
acts and contracts of its subsidiary—[respondent] EQUITY—most
especially if the latter (who had anyhow acknowledged its liability
to ALSONS) maybe (sic) without sufficient property with which to
settle its obligations. For, after all, GCC was the entity which
initiated and benefited immensely from the fraudulent scheme
perpetrated in violation of the law.” (Words in parenthesis in the
original; emphasis and bracketed words added).
Given the foregoing considerations, it behooves the

petitioner, as a matter of law and equity, to assume the
legitimate financial obligation of a cash-strapped
subsidiary corporation which it virtually controlled to such
a degree that the latter became its instrument or agent.
The facts, as found by the courts a quo, and the applicable
law call for this kind of disposition. Or else, the Court
would be allowing the wrong use of the fiction of corporate
veil.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the
appealed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are accordingly AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Corona and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, appealed decision and resolution

affirmed.
Notes.—An entreaty for a favorable disposition of a case

not made directly through pleadings and oral arguments
before the courts do not persuade the court—judges are
ruled only by their forsworn duty to give justice where
justice is
243
VOL. 513, JANUARY 29, 2007 243

Yujuico vs. Quiambao
due. (Polytechnic University of the Philippines vs. Court of

Appeals, 368 SCRA 691 [2001])
There is no rule of procedure, whether in Rule 52 or
elsewhere, which restricts the resolution of a case to the
issues taken up in the oral arguments. (Justice Carpio-
Morales, dissenting opinion in La Bugal-B’laan Tribal
Association, Inc. vs. Ramos, 445 SCRA 1 [2004])
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7/20/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 513

VOL. 513, JANUARY 29, 2007 225

GENERAL CREDIT CORPORATION (now PENTA

Actions; Appeals; Court of Appeals; Oral Arguments; Under

226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

General Credit Corporation vs. Alsons Development and

Same; Same; Well-settled is the rule that issues or grounds not

Corporation Law; Doctrine of Piercing the Veil of Corporate

VOL. 513, JANUARY 29, 2007 227

General Credit Corporation vs. Alsons Development and

Same; Same; Whether the separate personality of the

Same; Same; The Court agrees with the disposition of the

228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

General Credit Corporation vs. Alsons Development and

virtual domination if not control wielded by the petitioner over

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

1 Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and

VOL. 513, JANUARY 29, 2007 229

Shortly after its incorporation in 1957 as a finance and

3 CA Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 116.

230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

execution of the assignment deal aforestated, letters of

“1. On January 14, 1986, before the RTC of Makati,

a) was purposely organized by GCC for the latter to

3. GCC filed its ANSWER to Cross-claim, stressing

length. And following the denial of its motion to

8 Annex “A,” Petition, Rollo, pp. 69 et seq.

VOL. 513, JANUARY 29, 2007 231

complaint, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and

Issues having been joined, trial ensued. Presented by

and presented documentary evidence detailing the

9 RTC Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 339.

232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

that it was conducting its business illegally, GCC presented

“WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is

1. the principal sum of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00)

IT IS SO ORDERED.” (Words in brackets added.)

Therefrom, GCC went on appeal to the CA where its

“1. In holding that there is a “Parent-Subsidiary”

VOL. 513, JANUARY 29, 2007 233

3. In applying the doctrine of “Piercing the Veil of

On April 11, 2002,11 the appellate court rendered the herein

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional

In time, GCC moved for reconsideration followed by a

“1. The motion for oral argument with motion for

because it has not been duly authenticated and it is

234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The petition and the arguments and/or issues holding it

Petitioner’s lament about being deprived of procedural

13 Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.—A party

VOL. 513, JANUARY 29, 2007 235

Internal Rules thus gives the CA necessarily suggests that

“SEC. 6. Judicial Action on Certain Petitions.—(a) In

In the case at bench, records reveal that the appellate

relation therewith, the Court notes that these arguments

14 Magellan Capital Management Corp. v. Zosa, G.R. No. 129916,

236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the lower court or, in fine, not interposed during

In net effect, the definitive conclusion of the appellate

VOL. 513, JANUARY 29, 2007 237

tice, deserves great weight and shall not be disturbed

238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED