A Response to Comrade Logan’s ‘Twenty Points’

[Riley, 26 October 2013]

I have reprinted comrade Logan’s 18 September 2013 document (“Twenty points on the
imperialism discussion”) with comments interspersed:

1. In the very weak state the IBT now finds itself in, our failure to either resolve the argument about
Russian imperialism or to set it aside for the time being threatens to be a critical blow to the
organisation. The silence of many comrades is probably reflective of a sense that the stakes are very
high here.

In the run-up to our 2011 conference where we had agreed not to attempt to resolve the
issue but to air differences there was very little discussion of the question—the three
documents arguing the “non-imperialist [nimp]” position did not get a single comment
from the “imps.” The one document arguing that Russia is imperialist was replied to
immediately—but again no response was forthcoming.

Since 2011 the conference the IEC has conducted an intermittent but substantive
discussion. The results of this were codified in two documents unanimously approved
by the IEC earlier this year—“On Imperialism” (regarding the nature and historical
development of imperialism) as well as “Combined and Uneven Development &
Russian Imperialism Circa WWI.” This represented substantial progress and an
apparent narrowing of outstanding differences to the question of Russia today.

The fact that thus far there have been few comments from non-IEC comrades on these
documents, may be because they are waiting to see how the discussion develops.

2. The debate so far may have clarified the issues in the minds of some of the participants, but I don't
think it has clarified the issues for many.

It is a complicated issue so comrades who recognize its importance for the future of the
IBT may wish to carefully study the documentation, and perhaps do some investigation
of their own, before expressing an opinion. As the discussion proceeds and issues come
into clearer focus, comrades who begin to feel “up to speed” will presumably begin to
participate. Reviewing the IEC- approved documents and subsequent exchanges should
help clarify the issues that remain in dispute.

3. Either a sense of extreme urgency or a sense of the need for great forbearance are quite
understandable. Though I take the position of forbearance, I respect the contrary view of it.

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 We have been having a discussion of sorts for something over five years now and the
range of differences expressed during the discussion at the 2011 conference has been
considerably narrowed by the adoption of two documents by the IEC. I do not think
that a sense of urgency is necessary to undertake a careful and substantial discussion
over the six the months leading up to the next conference. That should be plenty of time
to thoroughly air the pros and cons on both sides and for comrades to come to an
informed decision.

On Tsarist Russia
4. An earlier stage of this discussion involved focussing on whether Russia in the period prior to 1917
was imperialist, with those who argued that Russia now is not imperialist seeking to show that Russia
then was not imperialist. It was clear to us all, I think, that Russia in that period was rather similar in
its place in the world to Russia today. We seem now to have come to agreement that Russia was then
imperialist, but apparently some of us have simultaneously come to the view that the role of Russia in
the world then, and the role of Russia in the world today are very different. In fact Russia today is in
very much the same international role, though actually more of an independent imperialist factor
than it was before the 1917 Revolution.

Those of us who do not consider Russia today to be imperialist were indeed forced to
reevalutate our view of Tsarist Russia—largely because of comrade Decker’s challenge
to account for what Trotsky wrote on the question. We agree that:

“Russia was an imperialist country in 1914—the predatory role played by Russian

finance capital in China, Persia, Manchuria, Mongolia et al was essentially
identical to that of the more developed imperialists.”

—“Combined and Uneven Development & Russian Imperialism Circa

WWI,” adopted by the IEC on 19 April 2013

In their 19 June 2013 response to “Is Russia Imperialist?” Decker and Dorn suggested
that if Tsarist Russia in 1914 was imperialist despite being “far more backward than
modern-day Russia” it “is difficult to see why Russia circa 2013 is not imperialist.” On
15 July 2013 I responded:

“Trotsky and Lenin considered that the massive investment by Russia's

bourgeoisie in adjacent backward countries qualified Russia as imperialist
despite the fact that it remained a predominantly peasant-based society governed
by a feudalist autocracy that posed a major obstacle to domestic capitalist
development. The question we must seek to answer is whether Russian capitalists
today have a similar relationship to the countries of the CIS etc or whether they
are more similar to countries like Brazil, India or Greece whose bourgeoisies have
investments in some more backward countries, but not on a scale that would
qualify them as imperialist.”

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 Comrade Logan does not address the question of whether or not Russian capitalists
have significant investments in less developed countries through which they extract
value. Yet this is the decisive criterion—it is why backward Tsarist Russia qualified as
imperialist. This criterion, originally introduced into our discussion by Murray Smith,
was codified as follows in “On Imperialism”:

“The fact that, over the long term, semi-colonies suffer a net outflow of value to
more ‘developed’ imperialist countries lies at the core of what Marxists designate
as ‘imperialism.’”

Russia circa 1914 was an imperialist power, in the modern Marxist sense, because its
bourgeoisie was exploiting semi-colonies on a significant scale, not because the Tsarist
Empire, like Turkey’s Ottoman Empire, pursued an independent foreign policy and was
a significant factor in global power politics. The fact that Russia pursues a relatively
independent foreign policy does not constitute proof that it is imperialist—Iran today
plays an independent role in global affairs as do Turkey, India, Brazil and China. To
qualify as imperialist the Russian bourgeoisie must be shown to be involved, in a
significant way, in the economic exploitation of less developed countries.

5. The observation that the conditions for Russia's imperialist-like role today were created while it
was a degenerated workers state (ie before it was imperialist this time around) do not seem to
advance the discussion. It is always the case that most of the conditions of imperialism are created in
the pre-imperialist history of a given country.

Agreed. The fact that Russia still poses a formidable military counterweight to the
dominant imperialist powers also results from its Soviet inheritance and so does not
constitute evidence that it has become an imperialist power.

On the Leninist theory of imperialism

6. We began our debate on the status of contemporary Russia by discussing a range of factors:
economic development, the presence of finance capital, the independence of the Russian bourgeoisie,
geo-political weight and so on. The comrades who argue against Russia’s imperialist status (most
particularly Tom) tended to push on the question of economic development, reduced even to matter
of organic composition of capital (which itself was used to frame what remained of the other subjects,
e.g. finance capital). So the discussion became a bit narrow, as other comrades (most particularly
Josh) responded by attacking the points on which the other side believed they were strongest. This
was normal and understandable, and in fact quite useful, but the recent trajectory of the debate has
taken us away from other factors that dialectically contribute to the whole picture.

This may be an allusion to the difficulties encountered by Decker and Dorn (19 June
2013) in attempting to prove that Russia’s position in the world economy is

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qualitatively different than non-imperialist Brazil—an issue which is conspicuously
absent in these twenty points. The studies they cited to back up their contentions tended
to refute them—as demonstrated in my 15 July reply. This is perhaps why after three
months there is still no response from the comrades. This may also account for why
comrade Logan takes a different (less concrete aka “empirical”) approach. But proving
that Russia is imperialist means demonstrating that “over the long term, semi-colonies
suffer a net outflow of value” to it, i.e., that their relationship to Putin’s Russia today is
essentially similar to that of Persia and Mongolia’s to Tsarist Russia a century ago.

Over the course of our debate has travelled some distance from its beginning and in the
process we have gained some clarity on the inter-relationship of “economic
development, the presence of finance capital, the independence of the Russian
bourgeoisie, geo-political weight and so on.” Finance capital is the product of the
accumulation of dead labor through a historical process of economic and technological
development. Dismissing the “question of economic development” and the “organic
composition of capital” (i.e., relative levels of technological development and labor
productivity) as “narrowing” the discussion does little to advance things. At its core of
imperialist predation is and always has been about economic exploitation of the weak
and more backward sectors of the world economy by more advanced ones, as the
Fourth Congress of the Comintern observed:

“The progress of indigenous productive forces in the colonies thus comes into
sharp contradiction with the interests of world imperialism, since the essence
of imperialism is its exploitation of the different levels of
development of the productive forces in the different sectors of the
world economy, in order to extract monopoly super-profits.”

—“Theses on the Eastern Question,” emphasis added

We have cited this several times but as yet comrades have neither chosen to agree or
disagree. But the “exploitation of the different levels of development of the productive
forces” is why, for example, Britain, with a population only a tenth the size of India’s,
was able to acquire it as an imperial colony. The recognition of this fundamental truth
is central to the capacity to judge whether a given country is an imperialist power in
the modern, Marxist sense.

On 14 June 2011, at the outset of the IEC discussion, I responded to an inquiry by an

“imp” comrade who had posed seven possible factors to consider when evaluating the
status of a given country:

“its imperial past”

I do not think that the imperial past is an active factor—Portugal is not imperialist today
because it had colonies in the 17th century.

“its membership of an imperialist bloc, the EU”

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 Membership in the EU or NATO etc is also not an important indicator per se—as Estonia,
Poland, etc etc are included

“its actual economic strength”

Actual economic strength—this is the major consideration in my view. This is clearly what
is suggested by the statement that “imperialism means the domination of finance capital”
etc.

“the extent and nature of foreign investment”

This is a derivative of economic strength as a rule. Britain, for example, had a declining
mass of foreign investment through the 20th century, as its economic primacy declined
(and it was forced to liquidate foreign assets to pay for two world wars.

“the existence of a ‘sphere of influence’ secured for the long-term extraction of surplus
value (though perhaps at temporary economic cost)”

This too is a derivative of economic power –and of course military power in extremis. But it
is also not a constant in the history of imperialism and seems a lot less important today
than at points in the past (eg prior to 1945 and the end of colonial empires). In the
contemporary world the US has not been rigidly attempting to enforce the Monroe
Doctrine and Latin America (a classic sphere of influence) is open to investment from
elsewhere. The US and France, for example, are however contending for influence in
central African former French colonies, and the US has (unsuccessfully) invested a trillion
or two in an attempt to seize Iraqi oil.

“the military role played in the world (again to secure long-term advantage)”

From actual economic strength flows military capacity—as for example Germany
demonstrated in the early part of the 20th century, or China today. Conversely declining
economic powers (like post war Britain or the US today) have declining military capacity.

“and competition with other imperialist powers for resources, markets and labour.”

Again this is essentially an expression of economic competition. For most of the post war
period this competition has been managed by the mediation of the American superpower.
Today we are beginning to see more direct forms of competition—as for example French
and German opposition to US seizure of Iraq, but direct competition is still primarily a
matter of commercial activity.

A week later the comrade thanked me for my explanation and agreed that these factors
did indeed derive from relative economic power. This suggested that we were making
substantial progress in our discussion, as did the unanimous adoption of both “On
Imperialism” (which treats the level of technological/economic development as central)

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 and the document on Tsarist imperialism (which poses the extraction of value as the
key factor).

7. There has been some discussion of whether a multi-factoral or a uni-factoral analysis should be
applied in this discussion. I suspect that our predecessors would be amused; they were not much into
factors, or empiricism, or reductionism. To gain some perspective and mental peace I've been reading
a little Labriola, Plekhanov, and Lenin's philosophical notebooks. What impresses me is the centrality
for them of the totality of a phenomenon.

Our predecessors might well find some of our discussion amusing—but we are what we
are and they are unfortunately unavailable for consultation. (Terms like “multi-
factoral/uni-factoral analysis” are indeed so inelegant that should probably be left to
groups like the LRP that specialize in homemade categories.) I incline to the view that
in assessing the reality of Russia today Lenin’s materialist stress on “concrete analysis”
is most likely to move us closest to a correct appreciation of the totality of the
phenomenon.

8. It is notable that conversations rooted in quantitative data about whether a given country was or
was not imperialist do not seem to have occurred among Leninists in Lenin's lifetime. The data in
Lenin’s Imperialism is focussed on how imperialism works, not on proving certain countries to be
imperialist – that is taken for granted. This is doubtless because our predecessors were aware that
establishing the imperialist nature of a country is a matter of qualitative as well as quantitative
analysis. Despite the difficulties with quantitative analysis, it is nevertheless usually fairly clear which
countries are imperialist. It would be difficult to find accounting indicators showing New Zealand, as
one extreme example, to be imperialist, yet it is uncontroversially clear that New Zealand is the little
finger in the Anglophone imperialist fist, and as a result enjoys imperialist conditions of life.

I would not pretend to know much about the political economy of New Zealand. It has
always been characterized as imperialist in our political tradition. Certainly it has
acted as a junior partner of U. S. imperialism for many years, and does appear to have
a level of economic development roughly comparable to North America north (rather
than south) of the Rio Grande. I would presume that NZ capitalists have taken
advantage of regional investment (i.e., exploitation) opportunities in Fiji, Indonesia or
Micronesia, etc., but have not investigated.

It would seem unlikely that no conversations occurred in the Comintern involving

economic data as a means of assessing whether or not a particular country was
imperialist. While it was of course taken for granted that France, Britain, etc. were
imperialist it seems likely that for more borderline cases (like Canada for example)
questions may well have been discussed. The first manifesto published by the Canadian
CP (calling itself the Workers Party) in December 1921 discussed Canada’s shifting
status in relation to British and American imperialism:

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 “The future of Britain’s vast emporium which she fondly calls her empire, is increasingly
more uncertain….Canada’s possible development as an industrialist capitalist power
makes her more and more dependent upon the United States.”

(This was likely written by Maurice Spector, the party’s leading intellectual, who was
eventually elected to the ECCI and shortly thereafter expelled as a Trotskyist.)

In 1926 Trotsky was likely perusing quantitative data in preparing “Europe and
America” when he stumbled upon a reference to Canada as the “northern prolongation”
of the U.S.:

“Canada, without offense to the British crown, is an integral part of the United States. If
you consult the Annual Report of the US Department of Commerce, you will discover
trade with Canada is entered under internal trade; and that Canada is politely and
somewhat evasively referred to as the northern prolongation of the United States without
the blessing of the League of Nations.”

In 1899 Lenin published a book full of quantitative economic data to refute the
Narodnik claim that Russia was not on a capitalist path. Perhaps the comrades will
accept that as a suitable precedent.

There is also Lenin’s Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism which is packed with
economic statistics and tables of data showing foreign investments by different
imperialists, colonial possessions, trade statistics, investments by banks and as well as
profits obtained. It is true that he used this information to illustrate “how imperialism
works, not [for] proving certain countries to be imperialist” because most of the
countries he mentions were clearly imperialist, but that is neither here nor there. If the
“imp” comrades would follow Lenin’s lead and provide us with some “quantitative
data” to show “how [contemporary Russian] imperialism works” I think our discussion
would take a big step forward. Lenin’s characteristic use of concrete evidence to prove
his assertions made his arguments far more convincing, and is an example well worth
emulating.

Finally there is Trotsky’s assessment of Czechoslovakia in 1938, when the question of

whether or not it was imperialist was of great importance to Marxists:

“I believe that Czechoslovakia is a small country and in the event of war her
existence would be directly threatened [my emphasis]. But the difference
between Czechoslovakia and France lies in the fact that France has colonies. It is
an imperialist country. Czechoslovakia has no colonies. But this difference is only
apparent. Czechoslovakia is an imperialist country in every respect. It is a highly
developed country with finance capital in a leading position in a very
concentrated industry, the very important war industry. This is why
Czechoslovakia is a developed capitalist country, but not only that. In
Czechoslovakia we now have a population of about 15 million. It is not a big
country. Under European conditions it is a medium-sized country.”

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 . . .

“I forgot to add that Czechoslovakia is a partner of a world corporation of

imperialist countries. If it doesn't have colonies, it has loans from Britain. These
loans are possible because of Britain's colonies; likewise with military support
from France. It is a link in the imperialist chain.”
—LTWritings, 1937-38, p. 353, 356, quoted in “Is Russia Imperialist,” 3
June 2013

We can surely agree that this qualifies as an assessment “rooted in quantitative data
about whether a given country was or was not imperialist.” We have pointed to this
example on a number of occasions as an example of a Marxist approach to making
such an assessment, yet the “imp” comrades have thus far withheld comment.

Perhaps the reason the Czech example has been persistently ignored is because
Trotsky’s approach applied to contemporary Russia would produce a “non-imperialist”
conclusion. Comrades who do not want to reach that conclusion, but are not
comfortable criticizing Trotsky’s methodology, might feel it is best to say nothing. But
that approach, which at least implicitly concedes the essential political point, does little
to move the discussion forward.

9. We may all agree that a state is imperialist if it benefits in the long run from superprofits
transferred from other countries, but the modes of transfer of superprofits are so varied, sometimes
so complex, and often so indirect, that it is extremely difficult to establish or quantify superprofits.
Foreign Direct Investment flows may be a better indicator (though insufficient and problematic) —
they would seem to rate Russia among the lesser of the clearly imperialist countries.

I think the formulation cited above is more precise: “over the long term, semi-colonies
suffer a net outflow of value to more ‘developed’ imperialist countries,” but the idea is
essentially the same. There are also of course value flows from semi-colonies (and
imperialist ones) to countries which are not themselves imperialist, as noted in “On
Imperialism” draft:

“In some cases client states, like Saudi Arabia or Qatar which sit atop valuable petroleum
assets, are able to obtain a slice of the monopoly prices charged on the world market.
These earnings are very substantial and provide the indigenous rulers with a substantial
degree of political autonomy, yet even these privileged regimes ultimately remain
dependent on imperialist patrons for their survival.”

Tracing value flows is not straightforward, but there are useful indicators as to where
particular countries stand in the global hierarchy. One is whether or not they produce
commodities that are competitive on the world market. Another is the structure of their
foreign investments—in the case of Russia, as documented in the 15 July 2013 response
to Decker/Dorn’s critique, an inordinate amount of nominal foreign direct investment

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 is not really investment, but merely money being moved around for purposes of tax
avoidance and the like.

The presumption of “imp” comrades that Russia is exploiting weaker countries of the
CIS is not supported by the facts, as was pointed out in the same document:

“Not only does most Russian ODFI flow to the ‘developed countries, but what goes to the
CIS was, for a lengthy period, ‘overwhelmingly concentrated’ in one small country
[Belarus] for political reasons—i.e., ‘another South Ossetia.’ This is not finance capital
pursuing superprofits, but a state subsidy to a dependent regime for geopolitical reasons.
I suspect that comrades who view Russia as imperialist may wish to ignore this because of
the importance of the ‘exploitation’ of CIS counties by Russian capitalists in their
scenario. But Marxists have a responsibility to attempt to account for facts that do not fit
a pre-conceived model, and sometimes, if the gap between the model and reality becomes
too great, be prepared to rethink the position.”
Given that there is no evidence that Russian capitalists are exploiting CIS countries to
any significant degree, where does comrade Logan imagine that the value inflows
(varied, indirect, complex or otherwise) originate? How are they generated? What
evidence is there that they even exist? What is well established, according to virtually
all Russian and foreign analysts, is that the vast majority of revenue flowing into
Russia from abroad comes from the sale of primary products—chiefly oil and natural
gas. Do the “imp” comrades know of additional sources of revenue?

10. The argument that Russia is not imperialist because its economy is overwhelmingly dominated by
extractive industry is another form of the argument that imperialism equates to a high level of
industrial technique, or a high organic composition of capital. Now at a certain level of abstraction,
there is a truth in that. Imperialism as an historical world system is in fact associated with a high
organic composition of capital, but at the level of individual countries combined and uneven
development can render some imperialist countries with a relatively low overall organic composition
of capital.

It is not clear what this is meant to suggest. It is well established that apart from raw
materials Russian commodities generally are not competitive on the world market and
that Russia’s foreign revenues chiefly derive from its oil and gas exports. We have yet
to see any evidence that Russian investment in neo-colonial countries is a source of
significant revenue. Why then should Russia be seen as qualitatively different than
other countries with equivalent “relatively low overall organic composition of capital”
which also derive most of their income from the sale of natural resources?

The “imp” comrades prefer to ignore evidence (e.g., in the reply to Decker/Dorn) that
Russia’s position in the global economy is roughly equivalent to that of Brazil. Nor have
they ventured any opinion on the significance of a Bank of Finland study (originally
introduced into the discussion by Decker/Dorn) showing that Russia has been losing
ground over the past decade to other “transition economies” (i.e., the former deformed
workers’ states of the Soviet bloc):

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 “The absence of significant improvements in Russia’s business climate against a
background of positive developments in the institutional environment in other transition
economies is notable as Russian enterprises saw their competitiveness erode vis-à-vis
their peers in these economies. According to the BEEPS [Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Survey] Russia in 2002 looked better on average than 26
other surveyed transition economies in three-fourths of business climate
parameters. By 2005, Russia led in only half of the surveyed parameters. In
2009, it lagged the average in 16 of 18 parameters among the 29 surveyed
countries.” [pp 9-10]

—emphasis added

11. The argument that Russia’s protectionist policies disqualify it as imperialist holds no weight. The
USA has considerable protectionist barriers, particularly in the agricultural sector.

Perhaps the fact that it holds no weight is why it has not been raised thus far in the
discussion by anyone. Imperialist countries and neo-colonial ones have both pursued
protectionist (aka import-substitutionist) policies in the past. As a rule protectionism is
designed to protect relatively backward producers from foreign competition.

12. Likewise the argument that an open banking system is the sine qua non of imperialism is dubious.
Until 1994 not only was branch banking by foreign banks impossible or very difficult in the USA, even
interstate branch banking was illegal. And even currently US citizens and residents may make deposits
only of amounts over $100,000 in a foreign bank branch in the USA.
http://www.ny.frb.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed26.html

The openness of the banking system has also not been a major point of contention to my
knowledge. In “Is Russia Imperialist?” I responded to comrade Decker’s suggestion that
the fact that two Russian banks appeared on the Forbes 500 list indicated “finance
capital” imperialism by pointing out that four Brazilian banks appeared on the same
list. Does comrade Logan have evidence that would indicate that Russia’s banks are in
a different league than Brazil’s? If so please share it with us.

13. One criterion for imperialism—the key criterion—is the rule of finance capital. We are agreed on
this, but whether or not finance capital rules cannot be established by any accounting methods, but
only by qualitative analysis.

14. The argument that there is no finance capital in Russia, or that it is uninfluential is plainly
spurious. While much finance capital in Russia is an aspect of the self-financing extractive
conglomerates, banking finance is also highly significant. In the period of privatising the economy
which followed the Russian counter-revolution there was a burgeoning of banks, with every major
player having their own bank for some time (for the purpose of consolidating smaller parcels of

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capital under their own control). Since then there has been a radical reduction of the number of banks
and an increase in their size and power, and a more complete fusion between banking, industrial and
extractive capital. Finance capital in Russia (like most things in Russia) is largely unsophisticated, but it
is extremely powerful. Putin is its preeminent representative. He is leader of the Russian state for the
purpose of making decisions serving the interests of the topmost layer of Russian finance capital.

During our IEC discussion I made the following comments (14 June 2012) on Russian
“finance capital”:

“The whole point of the definition of imperialism in the TP which we all agreed to endorse
is that it is ‘the domination of finance capital.’ To have Russia as an imperialist with such
a definition Russian finance capital will have to be shown to be a real (rather than
notional) phenomenon. I think that may prove very difficult to demonstrate.”

. . .

“The state exercises a great deal of control and provides most of the funding (as is true in
most of the economy it seems). As a rule I think that it would not be accurate to suggest
that Russian banks pool the excess capital generated by domestic enterprises and direct it
from the saturated home market to more profitable opportunities abroad. There seem, by
all accounts, to be no shortage of investment opportunities at home--even if the
corruption and nepotism etc. make investments unwise in many cases. Russia is
chronically short of investment by most accounts and has been trying to attract finance
capital from abroad.

“So I think that we need to look more closely at whether or not the Russian economy can
be described as dominated by ‘finance capital’ or if it is something a bit more akin to ‘late
industrializing’ countries where the state has to substitute for the role played by the
indigenous bourgeoisie in the more classic model.”

I remind comrades of a challenge presented in my 3 June document and repeated in the

15 July 2013 reply to Decker/Dorn:

“…it is clear that neither Russia nor Brazil is currently a globally significant center of
finance capital. In this case of Russia this is highlighted by a recent NYTimes report that
Warsaw, not Moscow, is emerging as the regional stock exchange for the countries of the
former Soviet Bloc (see Appendix “G” of “Is Russia Imperialist?”). Fitting this within the
framework of “Russian Finance Capital” would seem to present a formidable challenge.”

This challenge cannot be met by simply asserting that finance capital exists in Russia—
we must all back up our positions with real world evidence. It does not advance the
discussion to presume as fact what needs to be proven. If indeed they have significant
evidence of Russian finance capital the “imp” comrades should share it with us. So far
we have seen none. Meanwhile the ascendance of Warsaw over Moscow as the regional
financial center in the former Soviet bloc speaks volumes:

“In the absence of any evidence to the contrary this simple fact would seem, on its face, to
be a ‘good reason’ to think that Russia is not imperialist in the finance capital sense.”

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On Russia’s role in the world
15. Our understanding of imperialism leads us to expect a world characterised by disputes between
imperialists, with disputes between imperial powers and non-imperial powers being local, and
generally relatively short-lived.

I am not sure that the evidence supports such an expectation. Disputes between
imperialists in the American Century have tended to be muted and often relatively
short lived. American resentment at Franco-German refusal to participate in the 2003
Iraq adventure (which led the U.S. Congress to rebrand French fries “Freedom fries”)
had largely evaporated by 2011 when France took a leading role in the assault on
Libya. U.S. antipathy for Iran’s Islamic Republic on the other hand has lasted more
than three decades. The CIA organized its first coup in Syria in 1949 but never
succeeded in establishing a viable client regime there and has remained relatively
hostile to the Baathist dictatorship for decades. While tactics vary, there has for many
decades clearly been an ongoing strategic project to reverse the Cuban and Chinese
revolutions with particular animosity directed at the North Korean regime.

16. We understand the subordination of those disputes in the period of the deformed workers states,
but that period is now twenty years past, and the United States maintains a strong hegemony among
most imperialist players. It is almost as if some kind of super-imperialism has, after all, come to pass.
But that hegemony does not extend to Russia.

American hegemony is declining in much of the world, as we noted in “U.S. Empire In

Decline,” 1917 No. 31. The tensions between the U.S. and the remaining deformed
workers states remain a major axis of global geopolitics—witness the recent talk of an
Asian “pivot” by the Obama administration which is clearly aimed chiefly at China, as
well as North Korea. The survival of the Cuban Revolution remains a sore point for the
U.S., which has recently been aggravated by the shift of previously politically reliable
neo-colonial clients in the direction of a friendlier posture toward Cuba. Cuba’s role in
stabilizing the Chavez regime in Venezuela, which helped encourage the growth of
similar left populist currents in Bolivia and elsewhere, was also not welcomed by
Washington.

17. The polarity between the USA and Russia is the central feature of international politics today, and
promises to be so for some time. The truth of it is that Russia competes with US imperialism as no
other country does. The role that Russia played recently in brokering a deal over Syrian chemical
weapons indicates that very clearly. The attempt to relegate Russia in world affairs to the status of
Brazil or India flies in the face of reality.

Russia does have special status globally due to its nuclear inheritance from the Soviet
Union. But I think we can agree that this is not sufficient to qualify it as an imperialist

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 power in the Marxist sense. Russia’s role in Syria is also derived from the Soviet period.
While Brazil does not wield comparable influence internationally, it is a major political
factor in Latin America. Brazil’s aspirations to play a larger global role were evident in
May 2010 when, with Turkey, it announced a tentative deal over Iran‘s uranium
stockpiles designed to block a new round of UN sanctions. While the U.S. immediately
spiked the proposal, the fact that it occurred indicates the appetites of the BRIC
countries and their equivalents to play a larger role in global events than non-
imperialist countries ever have in the past.
It does not seem accurate to characterize the polarity between the U.S. and Russia as
“central“ to global politics today, although it is certainly one important axis. The
struggle for U.S. hegemony in the Middle East is not centrally a struggle with Russia
but rather Iran. So too the U.S. “Asian pivot“ which is clearly aimed at China. The main
“competition“ between the U.S. and Russia involves American attempts to carry out
“color revolutions“ against pro-Moscow governments in the former Soviet “near
abroad“ and setting up “anti-missile“ (i.e., preemptive-strike enabling) sites on Russia’s
frontiers.
The struggle between Russia and the U.S. over supplying energy to the EU goes back to
the Soviet period when America unsuccessfully attempted to block the construction of
pipelines to ship Soviet oil to Germany. German imperialism retains an interest in
accessing gas and oil directly from Russia and its allies without having to pay off
American oil corporations. The Berlin-Moscow relationship is a factor in the current
Syrian conflict, the outcome of which is likely to determine whether natural gas from
the Persian gulf is routed to the EU via a Gazprom-supported Iran-Iraq-Syria route or
from Qatar through Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria with the participation of U.S.
firms.
18. A very high proportion of United States imperialist war efforts since the Second World War, and
certainly since the fall of the Soviet Union, has been about acquiring and manipulating for its own
benefit the largest possible share of world energy supplies. Besides a generalised fight for world
domination, the fight for energy is the accepted central objective of US imperialism—and also Russian
imperialism. (Neither, incidentally, has a substantial influence on the world price of hydrocarbon
fuels.)
The fight for control of energy resources is certainly a critical element of global politics.
But while the major imperialist powers have long been involved in this struggle, the
fact that a country is a participant is not sufficient to qualify it as imperialist. Hugo
Chavez’s willingness to supply the Cuban deformed workers’ state with oil played a role
in the latter’s survival. The “fight for energy” was also the central motivation for
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, but, contrary to various liberals and
anarchists, Marxists did not view the seizure of Kuwait’s oilfields as evidence of “Iraqi
imperialism.”

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19. If in fact Russia is not imperialist, then our anti-imperialism is fated to mostly be anti-
Americanism. If that is the case, so be it. But it would be a reality in which we would find difficulty
transcending a rather crude programme.

The Marxist program for social liberation can be presented crudely (“Peace! Land!
Bread!”) or with great subtlety. The critical question is to correctly analyze reality and
provide the working class and oppressed with the path forward. Whether or not Russia
one day becomes an imperialist power in its own right (or Poland or Brazil do) the
Marxist duty to tell the truth to the working class will not change. There is no more
reason to expect that those who oppose U.S. imperialist predations around the world
are fated to “mostly” engage in anti-Americanism in future than we have in the past.

Our political current’s opposition to U.S. imperialist aggression from Vietnam in the
1960s to Libya in 2011 has been consistent in its revolutionary internationalism and
never shaded into anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism is the anti-imperialism of
fools, and a fetter for the oppressed. It is a tool for demagogues to destroy class
consciousness and manipulate the workers’ movement. It would be profoundly
pessimistic to accept that Marxists are fated to embrace it, regardless of Russia’s
status.

20. The Syrian conflict had the makings of a US-Russia proxy war, though it never rose to that level,
and the organisation as a whole was able to accept a common position: defeatist on both sides of the
civil war, and Assad regime defencist in the event of a US-led attack. Comrades must consider the
programmatic meaning of our characterisation of Russia. In the event of a war between the US and
Russia (abstracting from the question of each power’s alliances), do comrades suppose it would be in
the interest of the international working class to raise the call “Defend Russia Against US
Imperialism”, given everything we know about the role Russia plays in the global capitalist system?

CGsB

A serious military conflict between Russia and the U.S. would, presumably, be likely to
go nuclear rather quickly. The likelihood of “Mutual Assured Destruction” has
prevented it since the end of the Cold War, as it did for its duration. At some future
point this could change if the gap created by the relative backwardness of Russian
technology becomes large enough. Russia’s involvement in the Middle East is largely an
inheritance from the USSR, as is its nuclear capacity. At this point the integration of
Russia as part of the hinterland of European (and perhaps American and Japanese)
imperialism seems more likely than a full scale military conflict.

Russian integration into the world market seems likely to have similar consequences to
those experienced by Poland, Ukraine, Yugoslavia and other deformed workers’ states
whose industrial, political and social infrastructure were roughly equivalent. This

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prospect is sketched in some of the materials cited by cdes. Decker/Dorn, as noted in
my 15 July 2013 reply:

“The ‘World Investment Report 2012,’ (p57) also cited by Decker and Dorn makes a
similar projection that accession to the WTO will ‘boost foreign investors’ confidence and
improve the overall investment environment’ although ‘in the manufacturing sector,
domestic and foreign investors will most likely consolidate as the landscape becomes
more competitive.’ The term ‘consolidate’ is of course a euphemism for what the EU
report referred to as the process of ‘creative destruction’ of existing non-competitive
Russian firms as integration proceeds.

“The sunny projection in the EU report that integration into the WTO will involve the
‘creative destruction’ of much of actually-existing Russian capitalism derives from the
authors’ view that, ‘on the whole, Russia is not competitive, in both industrial and
services exports’” (p26).

During the IEC discussion I responded to a 12 June 2012 query from an “imp” comrade
on the programmatic implications of a possible military conflict arising from events in
Syria:

“It did occur to me that we might be in a position of having to comment on Russian

participation. If Putin puts in Russian troops the world takes a big step toward the brink
(particularly as Obama cannot afford to appear weak in election year.) Putin may do so as
he is mightily aggrieved at the insistence of the US in treating him as an enemy to be
encircled with anti ‘Iranian’ missile installations that are clearly aimed at neutralizing
Russia’s nuclear deterrent. This makes it clear that Russia has no effective ‘diplomatic’
means of getting the US to recognize its sphere of influence etc.

“I think that the agreement on ‘What Is Imperialism’ reached last year should represent
an important step forward for us in relation to this whole puzzle--one which may not be
fully appreciated or realized as yet. I was already thinking that it would be good to write
up as a ‘canned copy’ article for 1917, to accompany a piece on why it is important to
defend Syria in the event of imperialist attack.

“This agreement should give us a yardstick, for example, to determine whether we

consider Portugal or Greece to be imperialist, as I pointed out when I recirculated it in
response to this question a few weeks ago. It should also allow us to assess the
relationship between Syria and Russia--is it like the relationship between the U.S. and
Iraq or Russia and Ossetia. In the one case we have one position in the other another.”

The comrade requested that I spell out my analogy more clearly, which I did in an
email dated 14 June 2012:

“The Ossetians (Southern division) are friendly to Russia (like the Albanians were
friendly first to Stalin and then Mao as a counterweight to Tito). Russia is not there as an
exploiting finance capitalist power seeking to gain superprofits but as a patron/protector.
As they would have sort have liked to have been when their Serb ally/client was being
attacked by NATO but did not dare (Russia under Yeltsin being both much weaker and
more US linked.) The fact that Ossetia is on Russia’s border and Syria and Serbia are not
is also of course neither here nor there.

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The comrade responded by asking what position I would advocate in the event that
U.S./British/French troops supporting rebels in Syria came into conflict with Assad
forces supported by Russia military units. I replied:

“Well I think that both Iran (a non imperialist) and British imperialist SAS forces are
already on the ground. If their numbers were to increase substantially (say x1000) our
attitude would not change--ie we would be for defense of Assad regime v imperialism. If
the Russians were to send a significant number of troops (highly unlikely) to prevent a US
client state being established which, if it came to pass, would immediately dominate
Lebanon, checkmate Hezbollah and tighten the noose around Iran that would not
necessarily be a bad thing. IF they were to do so, instead of trying to secure their own
interests as a semi-ally, semi-opponent of the US-led bloc, capable of arranging an inside
coup or some such I do not think that the world would be a worse place (i.e, Syria would
not fall under the economic control of Russia which would seek to plunder it as the US
planned for Iraq. Nor would it be a platform for a renewed attempt to conquer the Mid
East oil wells via ‘regime change’ in Iran. It would be an attempt to preserve the status
quo (including a port on the Mediterranean for the Russian navy) and block a move by
the US in the Great Game for domination of the EuroAsian heartland (which Russia sees
as including a lot of its own turf as well of course as Iran).

“I think that Assad would be ANXIOUS to have Russian paratroopers land in Damascus
at this point as it would solidify his regime. This would contrast with, for example, the
way that Saddam Hussein or the Taliban viewed the arrival of NATO forces. The
difference is in what they would be there to do. I do not think that the motivation of the
Russians would be equivalent to that of the US and its proxies, so I do not see why we
would have the same attitude to them.

“A hypothetical Russian intervention would be essentially defensive in character--an

attempt to preserve the Assad regime. So we should not look at Syria as becoming a ‘spoil
of war,’ in such an event. The status quo would be maintained and the Zionist/US Syria-
Iran project would have a set back. If Assad wins he would redouble his repression
presumably and kill a lot of dissident civilians etc, which we would of course oppose.”

In a subsequent (17 June 2012) communication I added:

“Russia is attempting bloc the imperialist take-down of its Syrian ally, it is not attempting
to take over Syria nor impose a regime more to its liking nor secure transit lines for oil
nor anything else except to maintain the status quo in the region which is an important
security concern for Russia (including preventing Iran becoming a US protectorate as it
was under the Shah). Russia is not particularly fond of Assad and has signaled that he can
go, but what it does not want is a NATO-led color revolution that ends up putting in a
regime that will be more or less a US puppet (as was attempted but has essentially failed
in both Iraq and Afghanistan.) If Russian troops go into Syria in the next week or so to
reinforce the regime (which is what is actually posed and is an unlikely situation but
possible) I do not see why we should oppose that. They will not be going in for the same
reason as French or US troops, which of course we would oppose, but rather for the same
reason as the Iranians. It would certainly not be evidence of Russian ‘imperialism’ in my
view. It seems clear to me that if there is no significant finance capital there is no
imperialism in the Marxist sense of the term, and that is pretty clearly what our ‘What Is
Imperialism’ statement says as I read it.”

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Four days later (21 June 2012) I responded to a follow-up inquiry on our attitude to a
possible Russian-U.S. conflict growing out of the Syrian civil war:

“I think we can agree that the question of why a country engages in a military conflict is
important. Russia is clearly still a Great Power but only militarily. It is seeking to present
an obstacle to US steamrolling first Syria and then Iran (because it fears it could be next).
But it is not attempting to seize the material wealth of the Middle East, which is at bottom
what motivates the policy of the US and its allies. It is of course interested in controlling
pipelines and winning influence in the region and if successful it would certainly be
interested in attempting to wring any economic advantage it could--but it is too weak
economically to do so on a significant scale (as I understand the situation).

“If there were a hypothetical direct military conflict with Russia v US, in my view, we
should not automatically have a position--it depends on what it is over. In the case of
semi-colonial Argentina v imperialist Britain we did not have a side. Usually we would of
course, but it is not quite automatic. In any case, in my view, there is almost certainly not
going to be a military conflict because a) the Russians do not want one because they know
they cannot win (whereas they can make trouble at one remove and are ultimately
protected as long as the Soviet era nukes are viable or potentially so which is likely to be
for some time) and b) the Americans fear that it could spin out of control and it might go
nuclear and a victory in that at this point would leave the world, including the US, in such
a devastated condition that it would not be worth it. Instead the US pursues its own more
aggressive policy at one remove via ‘color revolutions’ and ‘humanitarian’ rescues to
remove regimes that are too independent.

“The central project seems aimed to increasingly tighten the encirclement of Russia,
which along with Iran and China, is one of a handful of disobedient ‘rogue’ states (all of
whom could potentially turn on each other but none of whom have any reason to trust the
US) The establishment of the SCO (a hypothetical counterweight to NATO in the abstract
but in reality a negligible strategic factor) is an expression of a desire to remain
independent players.

“The ‘missile shield’ on Russian borders and the refusal to accept Russia as a subordinate
ally/partner (which is the status Putin and Yeltsin have both been seeking) suggests a
long term project of domination. But there is no prospect of that being operational
militarily in the foreseeable future I do not think. In the meantime I am inclined to view
Russian support to Assad as not equivalent to CIA support to the SNA et al. chiefly
because I think that the objectives are different.

“IF on investigation we find that there evidence of serious intervention by Russian capital
in the direction of subordinating Syria for the purpose of pumping value out of it and/or
the rest of the region (which is the case we can agree with the US and its allies) I would
have to change my view. Of course in a surrogate battle between SNA and Assad we have
no side, but NATO intervention/no-fly would give us one (as in Libya). Any conceivable
level of Russian support to the regime would not change that I would not think.

“‘What is Imperialism’ is an accurate description of the standard Marxist analysis in my

view. It is the domination of finance capital--a characteristic of ‘advanced’ capitalist
development. Whether and to what extent this characterizes Russia is how we can

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 determine how to categorize Russia. I am completely open to discovering the structure of
Russian capitalism is something other than what I currently understand and that the
foreign investment in Syria and elsewhere are in line with a Marxist understanding of the
operation of finance capital. It is, in my view, entirely an empirical question.”

There was no response and no further questions.

—Riley, 26 October 2013

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