Republic VS Hon.

Samson- Tatad

G.R. No. 187677 April 17, 2013

Ponente: Sereno, CJ.

FACTS:

On 13 July 2001, petitioner, represented by the Department of Public Works and

Highways (DPWH), filed a Complaint against several defendants, including private
respondents, for the expropriation of several parcels of land affected by the construction
of the EDSA-Quezon Avenue Flyover. During the pendency of the proceedings,
petitioner received a letter dated from the reporting that the subject property was
government land. Petitioner was therefore prompted to file an Amended Complaint
seeking to limit the coverage of the area conforming to the findings, and thereafter filed
a Manifestation and Motion to have the subject property declared or considered of
uncertain ownership or subject to conflicting claims. RTC inter alia admitted the
Amended Complaint and declared the property a subject of conflicting claims. Private
respondents interposed objections, saying that petitioner was barred from presenting
the evidence, as it constituted a collateral attack on the validity of their TCT No. RT-
11603. RTC rendered an order in favour of the private respondents. A subsequent
petition for certiorari was denied in the appellate court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

CAN THE COURT IN THE SAME EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING BE GIVEN

AUTHORITY TO ADJUDICATE ON THE OWNERSHIP OF A PROPERTY?

HELD:

YES. petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert its ownership over the
subject property, but for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to just
compensation. That the court is empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of
ownership of the condemned or sought to be condemned property and adjudge the
rightful owner thereof, in the same expropriation case, is evident from Section 9 of the
Revised Rule 69, which provide inter alia that “court may order any sum or sums
awarded as compensation X X X or the benefit of the persons adjudged in the same
proceeding to be entitled thereto.” (Emphasis Supplied).
In fact, the existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person or persons claiming
ownership of the properties to be expropriated would not preclude the
commencement of the action nor prevent the court from assuming jurisdiction
thereof. The Rules merely require, in such eventuality, that the entity exercising the
right of eminent domain should state in the complaint that the true ownership of the
property cannot be ascertained or specified with accuracy.

If at all, this situation is akin to ejectment cases in which a court is temporarily

authorized to determine ownership, if only to determine who is entitled to possession.
This is not conclusive, and it remains open to challenge through proper actions. The
consequences of Sec. 9, Rule 67 cannot be avoided, as they are due to the intimate
relationship of the issue of ownership with the claim for the expropriation payment.
77.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 185821 June 13, 2013

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. RICARDO D. GONZALEZ, Respondent.

The Facts

Respondent Atty. Ricardo D. Gonzalez is the registered owner of two contiguous

parcels of land devoted to coconut production with an area of 20,210 square meters, or
a total of 3 hectares, located at Barangay Abilan, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte (subject
property). Pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP),
respondent voluntarily offered to sell the subject property to the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) for ₱250,000.00 per hectare on December 9, 1996. 7 Representatives of
petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), the DAR and the Barangay Agrarian
Reform Committee (BARC) conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property the
DAR and the LBP valued the subject property at ₱150,795.51 or at ₱50,265.17 per
hectare. Respondent rejected the valuation but the LBP deposited ₱60,318.20 of the
said sum in cash and ₱90,477.31 thereof in bonds 10 in the name of
respondent.11 Respondent acknowledged the receipt thereof. 12

The RARAD affirmed the valuation made by the DAR and the LBP. Disappointed with
the low valuation, respondent filed before the SAC a petition for just compensation
against the LBP. The SAC held that respondent’s asking price of ₱250,000.00 per
hectare was quite high while LBP’s valuation of ₱50,265.17 per hectare was
considerably low. The SAC opined that ₱143,904.25 per hectare was the fair valuation
of the subject property. The CA affirmed the findings and the ruling of the SAC. The CA
held that DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998 cannot strictly bind the courts which, in the
exercise of their judicial discretion, can make their own computation pursuant to Section
1724 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. The CA found that the SAC actually took into
consideration factors enumerated in said Section 17 in the valuation of the subject
property, and said that the valuation was supported by evidence on record. LBP filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the same in its Resolution 26 dated
December 12, 2008.

Issue:

1) CAN THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARD THE VALUATION FACTORS

UNDER SECTION 17 OF R.A. 6657 AS TRANSLATED INTO A BASIC
FORMULA IN DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 05, SERIES OF 1998, AS
AMENDED, IN FIXING THE JUST COMPENSATION OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY OF THE RESPONDENT?

Our Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function vested in

the RTC acting as a SAC, the judge cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full
consideration the factors specifically identified by law and implementing rules. SACs are
not at liberty to disregard the formula laid down in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998,
because unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to
apply it. Simply put, courts cannot ignore, without violating the agrarian reform law, the
formula provided by the DAR for the determination of just compensation.

77. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 156093, February 2, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain and expropriation of an easement

of right-of-way against respondents as registered owners of the parcels of land sought
to be expropriated. The affected areas were 51.55, 18.25, and 14.625 square meters,
respectively, or a total of 84.425 square meters.

After respondents filed their respective answers to petitioner’s Complaint,

petitioner deposited PhP 5,788.50 to cover the provisional value of the land in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Then, on February 25, 1999,
petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession,
which the trial court granted in its March 9, 1999 Order
 However, the trial court dropped the Dela Cruz spouses and their mortgagee,
Metrobank, as parties-defendants in its May 11, 1999 Order, 6 in view of the Motion to
Intervene filed by respondent/intervenor Virgilio M. Saulog, who claimed ownership of
the land sought to be expropriated from respondents spouses Dela Cruz.The trial court
terminated the pre-trial in so far as respondent Ferrer was concerned, considering that
the sole issue was the amount of just compensation. As to the just compensation for the
property of Saulog, successor-in-interest of the Dela Cruz spouses, the trial court
ordered the latter and petitioner to submit their compromise agreement.

The records show that the commissioners did not afford the parties the
opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor, nor did they conduct hearings before
them. In fact, the commissioners did not issue notices to the parties to attend hearings
nor provide the concerned parties the opportunity to argue their respective causes.

Upon the submission of the commissioners’ report, petitioner was not notified of
the completion or filing of it nor given any opportunity to file its objections to it.

On December 1, 1999, respondent Ferrer filed a motion adopting in toto the

commissioners’ report with respect to the valuation of his property. On December 28,
1999, the trial court consequently issued the Order approving the commissioners’
report, and granted respondent Ferrer’s motion to adopt the subject report.
Subsequently, the just compensation for the disparate properties to be expropriated by
petitioner for its project was uniformly pegged at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter.

The Regional Trial Court fixed the just compensation to be paid by petitioner at
PhP 10,000.00 per square meter.

Unsatisfied with the amount of just compensation, petitioner filed an appeal

before the CA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of RTC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioner was denied due process when it was not allowed to
present evidence on the reasonable value of the expropriated property before the
board of commissioners.

2. Whether or not the valuation of just compensation herein was not based from the
evidence on record and other authentic documents.

RULING:

We find this petition meritorious.

First Issue: Petitioner was deprived of due process when it was not given the
opportunity to present evidence before the commissioners

It is undisputed that the commissioners failed to afford the parties the opportunity
to introduce evidence in their favor, conduct hearings before them, issue notices to the
parties to attend hearings, and provide the opportunity for the parties to argue their
respective causes. It is also undisputed that petitioner was not notified of the completion
or filing of the commissioners’ report, and that petitioner was also not given any
opportunity to file its objections to the said report.

Based on Sections 6, 7, and 8 of Rule 67, it is clear that in addition to the ocular
inspection performed by the two (2) appointed commissioners in this case, they are also
required to conduct a hearing or hearings to determine just compensation; and to
provide the parties the following: (1) notice of the said hearings and the opportunity to
attend them; (2) the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor during the said
hearings; and (3) the opportunity for the parties to argue their respective causes during
the said hearings.

The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the

property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. In the
instant expropriation case, where the principal issue is the determination of just
compensation, a hearing before the commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties
to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. While it is true that the findings
of commissioners may be disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own
estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, that is, where the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, where
they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed
is either grossly inadequate or excessive.

In this case, the fact that no trial or hearing was conducted to afford the parties
the opportunity to present their own evidence should have impelled the trial court to
disregard the commissioners’ findings. The absence of such trial or hearing constitutes
reversible error on the part of the trial court because the parties’ (in particular,
petitioner’s) right to due process was violated.

Second Issue: The legal basis for the determination of just compensation was
insufficient

It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the

taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. 18

We note that in this case, the filing of the complaint for expropriation preceded
the petitioner’s entry into the property.
 Therefore, it is clear that in this case, the sole basis for the determination of just
compensation was the commissioners’ ocular inspection of the properties in question,
as gleaned from the commissioners’ October 5, 1999 report. The trial court’s reliance on
the said report is a serious error considering that the recommended compensation was
highly speculative and had no strong factual moorings. For one, the report did not
indicate the fair market value of the lots occupied by the Orchard Golf and Country
Club, Golden City Subdivision, Arcontica Sports Complex, and other business
establishments cited.

Furthermore, the commissioners’ report itself is flawed considering that its

recommended just compensation was pegged as of October 5, 1999, or the date when
the said report was issued, and not the just compensation as of the date of the filing of
the complaint for expropriation, or as of November 27, 1998.

Clearly, the legal basis for the determination of just compensation in this case is
insufficient as earlier enunciated.

79.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC December 10, 2013

RE: NOMINATION OF ATTY. LYNDA CHAGUILE, IBP IFUGAO PRESIDENT, AS

REPLACEMENT FOR IBP GOVERNOR FOR NORTHERN LUZON, DENIS B.
HABAWEL

x---------------x

A.M. No. 13-05-08-SC

RE: ALLEGED NULLITY OF THE ELECTION OF IBP SOUTHERN LUZON

GOVERNOR VICENTE M. JOYAS AS IBP EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT [FOR
2011-2013]

x---------------x

A.M. No. 13-06-11-SC

RE: LETTER RESQUEST OF THE NATIONAL SECRETARY OF THE IBP RE

PROPOSED OATH TAKING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ELECTED
IBP REGIONAL GOVERNORS AND THE EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT FOR THE
TERM 2013 TO 2015
 RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

This is yet another controversy involving the leadership of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) that could have been resolved at the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’
level but was instead referred to this aking away precious resources that could have
been better applied to resolve other conflicts for the public interest.

The consolidated cases involve two Administrative Matters. The first Administrative
Matter (A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC) arose from a Motion filed by Atty. Marlou B. Ubano, IBP
Governor for Western Visayas. Atty. Ubano sought to invalidate or have this Court
declare as ultra vires the portion of the March 21, 2013 Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors which approved the nomination of Atty. Lynda Chaguile as replacement of
IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel. The second Administrative Matter
arose from another Motion filed by Atty. Ubano who sought to nullify the May 22, 2013
election for IBP Executive Vice President (EVP) and restrain Atty. Vicente M. Joyas from
discharging the duties of IBP EVP/Acting President. In a Resolution dated June 18,
2013, this Court consolidated the second Administrative Matter with the first.

A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC

The first Administrative Matter is an incident arising from: (1) A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC (In the
Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Election in the· Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Atty. Marven B. Daquilanea, Movant-Intervenor; Presidents of IBP Chapter
in Western Visayas Region, Intervenors; IBP Capiz Chapter, Intervenor); and (2) A.C.
No. 8292 (Attys. Marcial M Magsino, Manuel M Maramba, and Nasser Marohomsalic v.
Attys. Rogelio A. Vinluan, Abelardo C. Estrada, Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr., Evergisto S.
Escalon, and Raymund Jorge A. Mercado).

On March 27, 2013, Atty. Marlou B. Ubano, IBP Governor for Western Visayas, filed a
Motion (Original Motion) in relation to A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC. Atty. Ubano sought to
invalidate or have this Court declare as ultra vires the portion of the March 21, 2013
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors which approved the nomination of Atty. Lynda
Chaguile as the replacement of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel. In
this Original Motion, Atty. Ubano noted that on December 4, 2012, this Court approved
an amendment to Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws which considers as ipso
facto resigned from his or her post any official of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
who files a Certificate of Candidacy for any elective public office. Under the amended
By-Laws, the resignation takes effect on the starting date of the official campaign
period.1 Atty. Ubano alleged that the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B.
Habawel, filed a Certificate of Candidacy to run for the position of Provincial Governor of
the Province of Ifugao on or before October 5, 2012, and that on or before December
21, 2012, IBP President, Roan Libarios, filed a Certificate of Substitution to run as a
substitute congressional candidate for the First District of Agusan del Norte. 2
Atty. Ubano further alleged that "[i]n light of the impending ipso facto resignation of Pres.
Libarios on 30 March 2013,"3 the IBP Board of Governors agreed to constitute a five (5)-
member Executive Committee (Ex Com) to "prevent hiatus in the leadership of the
IBP."4 The Executive Committee was "tasked to temporarily administer the affairs of the
IBP without prejudice to the outcome of the Honorable Court’s resolution of the pending
incident."5 Atty. Ubano also alleged that Atty. Habawel nominated Atty. Lynda Chaguile,
IBP Ifugao Chapter President, as his successor to the position of IBP Governor for
Northern Luzon.6 Atty. Ubano claimed that Atty. Libarios began "dictating the tenor of the
IBP [Board of Governors] Resolution about the creation of Ex Com" 7 and, without prior
deliberation and voting, declared that the Board of Governors approved the succession
of Atty. Chaguile as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon. Atty. Ubano, together with two (2)
other IBP Governors, allegedly objected. However, when the matter was put to a vote,
the other governors, Atty. Habawel included, approved Atty. Chaguile’s replacement of
Atty. Habawel as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon.8

In this Original Motion, Atty. Ubano challenged the IBP Board of Governor’s approval of
Atty. Chaguile’s succession as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon on two grounds: First,
there was, as yet, no vacancy. Atty. Habawel was himself present at the meeting where
his replacement was named. There was, therefore, no need to name a
replacement.9Second, the right to elect the successor of a resigned IBP Governor is
vested, not in the IBP Board of Governors, but in the delegates of the concerned region;
thus, the IBP Board of Governors’ approval of the nominee to succeed Atty. Habawel is
ultra vires.10In support of this second ground, Atty. Ubano cited the third paragraph of
Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws: Sec. 44. Removal of members. x x x x x x[x] In case of
any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the region
shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to
which the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion
of the term.11 In a Resolution dated April 2, 2013, this Court resolved to treat this
Original Motion as an Administrative Matter separate from A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC and A.C.
No. 8292. It was re-docketed as A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC. This Court required the IBP
Board of Governors to file its Comment. In its Comment, the IBP Board of Governors
assailed the first ground raised by Atty. Ubano by saying that it was not necessary for a
position to be absolutely vacant before a successor may be appointed or elected. 12 As
for the second ground, the IBP Board of Governors argued that it has been the
"tradition"13 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that "where the unexpired term is
only for a very short period of time, it is usually the Board of Governors which appoint
[sic]a replacement or an officer in charge to serve the unexpired term." 14 The IBP Board
of Governors cited seven (7) precedents attesting to this "tradition":

1. On January 24, 1979, the IBP Board of Governors "unanimously resolved to

designate Jose F. Lim, Vice President of the IBP Samar Chapter, [as]acting
Governor and ex-oficio Vice President for Eastern Visayas in view of the absence
of Gov. Juan G. Figueroa."15

2.On June 1, 1984, the IBP Board of Governors approved the replacements of
two (2) governors who resigned to run in the Batasang Pambansa elections:
 a. The President of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter, Reynaldo A. Cortes,
was elected by the IBP Board of Governors to replace Gov. Honorato
Aquino who himself nominated Cortes;

b."The President of the IBP Southern Leyte Chapter, Porfirio P. Siaynco,

was elected by the Board to replace Gov. Cirilo Montejo." 16

3. On January 27, 1989, the IBP Board of Governors "elected Nancy Sison
Roxas, Treasurer of the House of Delegates, as Governor for Central Luzon" in
lieu of Cesar L. Paras, who passed away.17

4. On October 7, 1991, Governor for Eastern Mindanao, Teodoro Palma Gil, who
was previously appointed as a Regional Trial Court (RTC) judge, recommended
that Teodoro Nano, Jr., President of the IBP Davao Oriental Chapter, be his
replacement.18 On November 8, 1991, Nano was eventually elected by the IBP
Board of Governors as Governor for Eastern Mindanao. 19

5. On September 26, 1998, the IBP "Board of Governors confirmed the

designation of Teofilo S. Pilando, Jr. as Governor for Northern Luzon, to serve
the unexpired portion of the term of Gov. Roy S. Pilando, who ran for public
office."20

6. On September 12, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors "resolved to appoint

acting Governor Rogelio Velarde as regular Governor of Southern Luzon Region
after learning of the death of the regular Governor, Josefina S. Angara." 21

7. On August 17, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors "appointed Abelardo C.

Estrada as OIC for IBP Northern Luzon [in lieu of] Silvestre H. Bello who was
facing a disqualification case as Governor of IBP Northern Luzon." 22

In his Reply, Atty. Ubano questioned the IBP Board of Governors’ claim that it is not
necessary for a position to be absolutely vacant before a successor may be appointed
or elected. Citing the third paragraph of Section 44of the IBP By-Laws’ use of the word
"vacancy" (i.e., "any vacancy in the office of Governor") and "resignation" (i.e., "resigned
governor"), Atty. Ubano claimed that the text of the By-Laws is "abundantly clear and
unequivocal that there must be first a "vacancy" or a prior resignation before the
delegates of the Region can lawfully elect a successor x x x." 23

Atty. Ubano likewise challenged the precedents cited by the IBP Board of Governors
and claimed that no such tradition of appointing the successor of a resigned governor
existed.24 He pointed out that prior to its amendment in March 2, 1993, the IBP By-Laws
had allowed the IBP Board of Governors to elect, and not appoint, "a successor ofa
resigned Governor."25 However, the amended By-Laws now require that a successor be
elected by the delegates of the concerned region. 26 Even if it were true that the IBP
Board of Governors had a tradition of appointing the successor of a resigned governor,
the tradition cannot be validated in view of the first paragraph of Article 7 of the Civil
Code which reads:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. 27

Meanwhile, on April 23, 2013, Atty. Ubano filed another Motion (Urgent Motion to
Defer/Restrain Performance of Duties as Successor Governor of IBP Northern Luzon
Region) seeking to prevent Atty. Chaguile from exercising the functions of IBP Governor
for Northern Luzon.

This Court also received on May 16, 2013 an undated Resolution purportedly signed by
delegates of the IBP Northern Luzon Region. The signatories called for an election on
May 18, 2013 to name Atty. Habawel’s successor.

On May 20, 2013, these same signatories filed before this Court their Opposition to Atty.
Chaguile’s nomination. As with the second ground cited by Atty. Ubano in his Original
Motion, this Opposition was anchored on the third paragraph of Section 44 of the IBP
By-Laws.

Also on May 20, 2013, Atty. Ubano filed a "Motion for Leave to File Reply with Very
Urgent Motion to Restrain Atty. Chaguile from Voting in the EVP Election on 22 May
2013."28 Attached to the Motion was his "Reply with Very Urgent Motion to Restrain Atty.
Chaguile from Voting in the EVP Election on 22 May 2013." 29 Atty. Ubano also sent a
letter to Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo "pray[ing] and beg[ging] the
indulgence of the Honorable Court to immediately restrain Atty. Lynda Chaguile from
voting in the IBP [Executive Vice President]Election to be held on 22 May2013." 30

In a Resolution dated June 4, 2013, this Court required the IBP Board of Governors to
file its Comment on Atty. Ubano’s (1) Urgent Motion to Defer/Restrain Performance of
Duties as Successor Governor of IBP Northern Luzon Region; (2) Motion for Leave to
File Reply; and (3) Reply. It also required the IBP Board of Governors to comment on
the Opposition filed by the signatories purporting to be the delegates of the IBP
Northern Luzon Region.

On July 8, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors filed a Compliance (i.e., Comment in
Compliance) with this Court’s June 4, 2013 Resolution.

With respect to Atty. Ubano’s Urgent Motion to Defer/Restrain Performance of Duties as

Successor Governor of IBP Northern Luzon Region, the IBP Board of Governors
pointed out that Atty. Chaguile’s term expired on June 30, 2013. 31

As to the Opposition filed by signatories purporting to be the delegates of the IBP

Northern Luzon Region, the IBP Board of Governors alleged that the term of the House
of Delegates of Northern Luzon for 2011 to 2013 expired on March 31, 2013. As such,
the Opposition signed by the purported delegates was ultra vires, and therefore, null
and void.32 The IBP Board of Governors pointed out that "[t]he issue about the eligibility
of Atty. Lynda Chaguile as replacement Governor for Atty. Denis B. Habawel was
traversed over in the Comment x x x dated April 24, 2013." 33

A.M. No. 13-05-08-SC

The second Administrative Matter assails the conduct of the May 22, 2013 election of
the IBP Executive Vice President (EVP). In this election, Atty. Vicente M. Joy as was
elected IBP Governor for Southern Luzon.

On May 31, 2013,Atty. Ubano filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion to (1) nullify the May 22,
2013 IBP Executive Vice President election and (2) restrain Atty. Vicente M. Joyas from
discharging the duties of EVP/Acting President. This Motion was docketed as A.M. No.
13-05-08-SC. In this Court’s Resolution dated June 18, 2013, this Administrative Matter
was consolidated with A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC(the first Administrative Matter).

Atty. Ubano sought to nullify the May 22, 2013 election on two (2) grounds:

First, he claimed that the IBP election of the EVP was marred by inordinate haste, grave
irregularities, patent hostility, manifest bias and prejudice, as well as the presiding
officer’s absolute lack of independence. 34

Second, he claimed that the election violated Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws which
requires that the EVP be elected by a vote of at least five (5) Governors. Atty. Ubano
emphasized that Atty. Chaguile’s vote in favor of Atty. Joyas was invalid, as Atty.
Chaguile’s appointment as governor was itself ultra vires, and therefore,void ab initio.

Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, as amended pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated
April 11, 2013 in A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC and A.C. No. 8292, now reads:

Sec. 47. Election of National President Executive Vice President. –The Integrated Bar of
the Philippines shall have a President, an Executive Vice President, and nine (9)
regional Governors. The Governors shall be ex-officio Vice President for their respective
regions.

The Board of Governors shall elect the President and Executive Vice President from
among themselves each by a vote of at least five (5) Governors. Upon expiration of the
term of the President, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed as
President.

In the Compliance that the IBP Board of Governors filed in A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC, it
addressed Atty. Ubano’s allegations as follows:

1. On the conduct of the election

 a. The Report on the Conduct of Election filed by the Regional Trial Court -
Pasig Executive Judge (and Supreme Court Designated
Observer)35 indicates that Atty. Ubano’s objection to the appointment of the
presiding officer was thoroughly discussed and properly put to a
vote.36 Further, there is no factual basis for claiming that the presiding
officer was not independent. Atty. Ubano was also noted to have been
allowed the most number of interventions and the longest time spent for
deliberations.37

b. Atty. Ubano was properly ruled out of order when he moved that the
elections be moved to a later date and when he objected to the
participation of Atty. Chaguile.38

2. On the supposed invalidity of Atty. Chaguile’s vote, the IBP Board of

Governors pointed out that, as of the time of the election, there was no basis for
invalidating the vote.39

Stripped of technical maneuverings and legal histrionics, we are called to rule upon the
validity of Atty. Lynda Chaguile’s appointment as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon in
lieu of Atty. Denis B. Habawel. The resolution of this matter is decisive of the validity of
her acts as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon — including her participation in the
election of the IBP EVP.

Likewise, we are asked to review the conduct of the election for the IBP EVP. We must
determine whether the election was attended by irregularities, biases, and prejudice that
would invalidate its results.

We note that certain issues raised in several Motions filed as part of the first
Administrative Matter have been rendered moot and academic.

In the first Administrative Matter, Atty. Ubano sought to (1) declare as ultra vires or as
invalid the portion of the IBP Board of Governors Omnibus Resolution dated March 21,
2013 which approved the nomination of Atty. Chaguile as IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon in lieu of Atty. Denis Habawel and (2) restrain Atty. Chaguile from exercising the
functions of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, among which was voting in the May 22,
2013 election for IBP EVP.Also in the first Administrative Matter, several signatories
purporting to be the delegates of the IBP Northern Luzon Region opposed Atty.
Chaguile’s nomination on substantially the same grounds as Atty. Ubano.

As pointed out by the IBP Board of Governorsin its Compliance, "the term of Atty. Lynda
Chaguile as Governor for Northern Luzon expired on June 30, 2013." 40 A new Governor
for Northern Luzon, Atty. Oliver Cachapero, was elected. 41 As Atty. Chaguile is no longer
serving as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, the matter of ousting or restraining Atty.
Chaguile from exercising the functions of such office is no longer an available relief.

As we have explained in Pormento v. Estrada:42

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not
empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles
or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it.
In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.

An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy

because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in
dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention
unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the
court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent
events.43

However, we recognize that the validity of Atty. Chaguile’s appointment as Governor for
Northern Luzon affects the validity of her actions as the occupant of thisoffice, especially
her participation in the IBP Board of Governors’ election of the IBP EVP, which is the
subject of the second Administrative Matter.

Atty. Ubano cited two grounds as bases for claiming that the IBP Board of Governors
improperly approved Atty. Chaguile’s succession as Governor for Northern Luzon. First,
there was no vacancy at the time of Atty. Chaguile’s designation. Atty. Habawel was
then still Governor for Northern Luzon, and there was no need to name a replacement
yet. Second, the IBP Board of Governors acted ultra vires or beyond its competence
considering that the third paragraph of Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws vests the right to
elect the successor of a resigned IBP governor inthe delegates of the concerned region
and not in the IBP Board of Governors.

On the first ground, we sustain the position of the IBP Board of Governors.

Indeed, it is not only erroneous but also absurd to insist that a vacancy must actually
and literally exist at the precise moment that a successor to an office is identified.
Where a vacancy is anticipated with reasonable certainty—as when a term is ending or
the effectivity of a resignation or a retirement is forthcoming—it is but reasonable that
those who are in a position to designate a replacement act promptly. New officials are
elected before the end of an incumbent’s term; replacements are recruited (and even
trained) ahead of an anticipated resignation or retirement. This is necessary to ensure
the smooth and effective functioning of an office. Between prompt and lackadaisical
action, the former is preferable. It is immaterial that there is an identified successor-in-
waiting so long as there are no simultaneous occupants of an office. On the second
ground, the third paragraph of Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws clearly provides that "the
delegates from the region shall by majority, elect a successor from among the members
of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member." There is no ambiguity in
this text. We are surprised that the IBP—an institution expected to uphold the rule of law
—has chosen to rely on "tradition" to validate its action. The IBP Board of Governors
arrogated unto itself a power which is vested in the delegates of the concerned IBP
region. This arrogation is a manifest violation of the clear and unmistakable terms of the
IBP’s By-Laws. We cannot countenance this. No amount of previous practice or
"tradition" can validate such a patently erroneous action. It is, therefore, lear that Atty.
Chaguile’s designation as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon is tainted with irregularity,
and therefore, invalid.

Nevertheless, following the adoption of the IBP Board of Governors Omnibus

Resolution dated March 21, 2013at the time Atty. Ubano filed the Original Motion and up
until June 30, 2013 when her "term x x x expired," 44 Atty. Chaguile acted as and
performed the functions of the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon. This is
an accomplished fact which no amount of legal abstraction can undo. It is in this
context, with the backdrop of this consummated truth,that we rule on the Administrative
Matters before us. Given these circumstances, we hold that Atty. Chaguile took on the
role of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon in a de facto capacity.

De facto means "in point of fact."45 To speak of something as being de factois,thus,to

say that it is "[a]ctual [or] existing in fact" 46 as opposed to "[e]xisting by right or according
to law,"47 that is, de jure. Being factual though not being founded on right or law, de facto
is,therefore, "illegitimate but in effect."48

The concept of a de facto officer was explained in Civil Service Commission v. Joson,
Jr.:49

The broad definition of what constitutes an officer de facto was formulated by Lord Holt
in Parker v. Kent, and reiterated by Lord Ellenborough and full King’s Bench in 1865
in Rex v. Bedford Level, "One who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes
and yet is not a good officer in point of law." A de facto officer is one who is in
possession of the office and discharging its duties under color of authority. By color of
authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or
informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.50(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

A de facto officer is distinguished form a de jure officer, as follows:

The difference between the basis of the authority of a de jure officer and that of a de
facto officer is that one rests on right, the other on reputation. It may be likened to the
difference between character and reputation. One is the truth of a man, the other is
what is thought of him.51

Moreover, as against a mere usurper, "[i]t is the color of authority, not the color of title
that distinguishes an officer de facto from a usurper."52 Thus, a mere usurper is one
"who takes possession of [an] office and undertakes to act officially without any color of
right or authority, either actual or apparent." 53 A usurper is no officer at all.54

The expanse of the de facto doctrine was established early in the development of our
jurisprudence. In Luna v. Rodriguez,55 the doctrine was established to contemplate
situations where the duties of the office were exercised: (a) Without a known
appointment or election, but under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as
were calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action,
supposing him to be the officer he assumes to be; (b) under color of a known or valid
appointment or election, where the officer has failed to conform to some precedent
requirement or condition, for example, a failure to take the oath or give a bond, or
similar defect; (c) under color of a known election or appointment, void because the
officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or
appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such
ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public; and (d) under color of
an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the
same is adjudged to be such.56 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

This coverage, affirmed and reiterated in subsequent jurisprudence, 57 unequivocally

includes officers whose election is void because the body that elected (or otherwise
designated) them lacked the capacity to do so. This is precisely the situation in this
case: The power to elect an IBP Governor is lodged in the delegates of the concerned
region, not in the IBP Board of Governors; yet the IBP Board of Governors approved
Atty. Chaguile’s nomination as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon.

To be a de facto officer, all of the following elements must be present:

1) There must be a de jure office;

2) There must be color of right orgeneral acquiescence by the public; and

3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good

faith.58 (Underscoring supplied)

In the present case, there is no dispute that a de jure office—that of IBP Governor for
Northern Luzon—exists.

Neither is there any dispute that Atty. Chaguile took possession of and performed the
functions of such office. In fact, the Motions submitted as part of the first Administrative
Matter were precisely intended to put a stop to her performance of these functions.
Likewise, Atty. Chaguile took possession of and performed the functions of the IBP
Governor for Northern Luzon through a process, albeit "irregular or informal, so that
[she] is not a mere volunteer,"59that is, not through her own actions but through those of
the IBP Board of Governors. Thus, she did so under "color of authority," as defined in
settled jurisprudence (e.g., Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr.,60 Dimaandal v.
Commission on Audit,61 and Dennis A.B. Funa v. Acting Secretary of Justice Alberto C.
Agra 62).

The IBP Board of Governors’ approval was secured through a process that it
characterized as a "tradition," allowing it to appoint a replacement for an officer who
vacates his or her office shortly before his or her term expires. It cited seven (7) cases,
spanning a period of more than twenty-six (26) years, in which this tradition was
exercised. Of these, three (3) occurred after the March 2, 1993 amendment of the IBP
By-Laws which requires that a successor governor be elected by the delegates of the
concerned region. Thus, the "tradition" persisted even after the amended By-Laws had
vested the power to elect a replacement in the delegates of the concerned region.

Being in violation of the IBP By-Laws (as amended on March 2, 1993), this supposed
tradition cannot earn our imprimatur. Be that as it may, in all of the occasions cited by
the IBP Board of Governors, the authority of replacement governors was derived from a
process, which, though irregular, enabled them to act as and be accepted as governors.
It was with this backdrop that Atty. Chaguile herself was designated as IBP Governor for
Northern Luzon. Illumined by this context, thecolor of authority or right under which Atty.
Chaguile became IBP Governor for Northern Luzon is all the more stark.

This same color of authority or right negates any insinuation that Atty. Chaguile
assumed office out of her own design or contrivance; that is, that she did so in bad faith.
She precisely relied on established practice, now established as invalid but
nevertheless historically accepted. Atty. Ubano alleged that then IBP President Roan
Libarios imposed upon the IBP Board of Governors the approval of Atty. Chaguile’s
nomination; that Atty. Habawel wrongly participated in the vote to approve Atty.
Chaguile’s nomination; and that the IBP Board of Governors itself violated the IBP By-
Laws. Yet, he failed to allege that Atty. Chaguile was her self a party to any scheme or
artifice that might have been designed so that she would be able to secure the IBP
Governorship for Northern Luzon. Furthermore, no evidence was presented to show
that there was coercion imposed on the other governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

We note that on May 16, 2013,signatories claiming to be delegates of the IBP Northern
Luzon Region submitted to this Court a copy of an undated Resolution calling for an
election to name Atty. Denis B. Habawel’s successor as IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon. We also note that on May 20, 2013, the same individuals submitted their
Opposition to Atty. Chaguile’s nomination as Atty. Habawel’s replacement. On the basis
of this, there appears to be a ground for arguing that there was no "general
acquiescence by the public"63 to Atty. Chaguile’s having replaced Atty. Habawel.

The second requisite for being a de facto officer, as spelled out in Tuandav.
Sandiganbayan,64 reads: "There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the
public."65 Clearly, the requisite is stated in the alternative. Color of right also suffices. We
have already discussed how Atty. Chaguile took on the role of IBP Governor for
Northern Luzon with color of right (or authority).

We fail to see how the action of six(6) individuals66sustains the assertion that the public
never acquiesced to Atty. Chaguile’s having replaced Atty. Habawel. The requisite
speaks of "general acquiescence." To be "general" is not to be "absolute." It is to speak
of a commonality that exists for the most partbut not necessarily entirely. It admits of
exceptions. That there are those who count themselves as objectors merely attests to
their existence. It does not, in and of itself, repudiate that which may generally exist.
Thus,to equate the action of a handful ofactive objectors with the utter lack of "general
acquiescence" would be non sequitur.

Granting that these six(6) individuals are in fact the legitimate delegates of the IBP
Northern Luzon Region and even if we disregard their sheer number, they still fail to
represent or embody the "public." They are direct participants, having been the
individuals whose right to elect the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon was supposedly
undermined. Precisely, their being direct participants –meaning, persons whose
supposed rights were violated –makes them actual parties to the controversy. That they
themselves chose to file an Opposition and submit themselves to this Court’s
adjudication of this case evidences their own acknowledgement of this.

The de facto doctrine was devised to benefit the public. On the validity of actions made
by de facto officers, it is settled that "the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for
all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are
interested therein are concerned."67 This is premised on the reality that "[t]hird persons x
x x cannot always investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important office. They
have aright to assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are legally such." 68

The third party affected by the nature of the assumption into office by Atty. Chaguile is
the mass of lawyers belonging to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Again, the whole
legal profession becomes witness to how the selection of its leaders has practically
become annual intramurals of both political and legal controversy. In our April 11, 2013
Resolution in A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC and A.C. No. 8292, we observed that this has brought
about disenchantment within the ranks of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. In truth,
many suspect that these elections are contests between exclusive groups that
maneuver to find allies year in and year out to control the helm of this mandatory
lawyers’ organization.

The disposition we give to this case is also partly to quiet these conflicts and to deny
any reward to further legal controversy. After all, in our April 11, 2013 Resolution in A.M.
No. 09-5-2-SC and A.C. No. 8292, we created a permanent Committee for IBP Affairs
"to primarily attend to the problems and needs of a very important professional body
and to make recommendation for its improvement and strengthening." 69

Should that initiative still fail, this Court should seriously review the present modality of
the Integrated Bar. Instead of individual membership, a more functional alternative might
be organizational membership. This means that voluntary organizations such as the
Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), the Alternative Law Groups (ALG), the Philippine
Bar Association (PBA), the U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle (WILOCI), and other
organizations can coalesce and nominate leaders to comprise a council. Thus, every
lawyer will have a mature choice to determine which of these organizations best
represents his or her interests. This harmonizes better with their right to free
association.
All considered, the circumstances under which Atty. Chaguile’s nomination was
approved and under which Atty. Chaguile subsequently assumed the role of IBP
Governor for Northern Luzon are sufficient to induce a generalbelief that she was
properly the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon and that her actions in this office were
properly invoked.

Having said these, we agree with a point raised by Atty. Ubano. As with statutes, the IBP
By-Laws’ "violation or non-observance [ought] not be excused by disuse, or custom, or
practice to the contrary."70 We do not validate the IBP Board of Governors’ erroneous
practice. To reiterate our earlier words: "We cannot countenance this. No amount of
previous practice or "tradition" can validate such a patently erroneous action."

Nonetheless, even as we decry the IBP Board of Governor’s reliance on "tradition," we

do not lose sight of the fact, palpable and immutable, that Atty. Chaguile has so acted
as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon. Thankfully, our legal system has an established
means through which we are able to avert the "chaos that would result from multiple
and repetitious [challenges to] every action taken by [an] official whose claim to office
could be open to question."71 It is strictly in view of this that we make a determination
that Atty. Chaguile was the de facto IBP Governor for Northern Luzon.We are not
validating a wrong; we are merely addressing an exigency.

Having established that Atty. Chaguile was the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon in a de
facto capacity, we turn to the validity of her actions as a de facto officer.

To reiterate, one that is de facto is "illegitimate but in effect." 72 Thus, it is settled that "the
acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer,
in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned." 73 This
is necessary so as to protect the sanctity of their dealings with those relying on their
ostensible authority:"[t]hird persons x x x cannot always investigate the right of one
assuming to hold an important office. They have a right to assume that officials
apparently qualified and in office are legally such." 74

Accordingly, we hold that all official actions of Atty. Chaguile as de facto IBP Governor
for Northern Luzon must be deemed valid, binding, and effective, as though she were
the officer validly appointed and qualified for the office. It follows that her participation
and vote in the election for IBP EVP held on May 22, 2013 are in order.

We now proceed to the points raised by Atty. Ubano assailing the conduct of the May
22, 2013 election for the IBP EVP.

The Report on the Conduct of Election prepared by this Court’s designated observer,
Executive Judge Danilo S. Cruz, reveals that Atty. Ubano’s objections were properly and
thoroughly discussed. He was given a considerable length of time to air and argue his
points. It was only after thorough discussions that Atty. Ubano’s Motion to postpone the
elections—which he insisted on raising even when the body was in the process of
nominating candidates for the position of EVP—was declared out of order. 75 Atty. Ubano
himself was then nominated for IBP EVP. 76 He accepted his nomination subject to the
resolution of his Motion for Reconsideration in A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC and A.C. No. 8292,
as well as the resolution of the first Administrative Matter. 77

Before the members of the IBP Board of Governors placed their votes, Atty. Ubano had
sought to have Atty. Chaguile’s ballot segregated and sealed pending the resolution of
his Motion for Reconsideration in A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC and A.C. No. 8292, as well as the
resolution of the first Administrative Matter. His Motion was denied. 78 Votes were then
cast, followed by tally and canvassing. After the votes had been tallied, Atty. Vicente M.
Joyas received five (5) votes while Atty. Ubano received four(4) votes. The Certificate of
Election was then prepared, certified by the presiding officer and noted by this Court’s
observer.79

Atty. Ubano was accorded more than an ample opportunity to arguehis position. More
importantly, his position was amply considered by the body. Another IBP governor, IBP
Greater Manila Governor Dominic C.M. Solis, even initially supported Atty. Ubano’s
insistence that the election be postponed, but Atty. Solis subsequently withdrew
hissupport.80

In his Urgent Omnibus Motion which gave rise to the second Administrative Matter, Atty.
Ubano made an issue out of Atty. Vicente M. Joyas’ having designated IBP National
Secretary Nasser A. Marohomsalic as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
considering that Atty.Joyas supposedly lacked the authority to do so. Atty. Ubano made
much of Atty. Joyas’ status as IBP Governor for Southern Luzon. Atty. Ubano, however,
lost sight of the fact that Atty. Joyas was likewise the Chairman of the IBP Executive
Committee.

The Report on the Conduct of Election prepared by Executive Judge Danilo S. Cruz
recalls the pertinent events as follows:

The election was scheduled at 11 A.M. Chairman Joyas called the meeting to order
at11:05 A.M. National Secretary Marohomsalic certified that all members of the Board
were notified of the election schedule and that with the presence of five (5) members of
the Board,81 there was a quorum. The Chairman placed on record that the undersigned
Court Observer was in attendance.

Chairman Joyas said the meeting was for the purpose of electing the EVP for 2011-
2013 and designated the COMELEC for the election, thus: Secretary Marohomsalic as
Chairman, Atty. Rosario T. Setlas-Reyes, as second member, and IBP Head Executive
Assistant Aurora G. Geronimo as third member and recorder of the proceedings.
Chairman Joyas then relinquished the Chair to COMELEC Chairman Nasser A.
Marohomsalic.82

Atty. Ubano’s own description of the circumstances leading to the creation of the
Executive Committee states:
In light of the impending ipso facto resignation of Pres. Libarios on 30 March 2013
which is the start of the official campaign period, the IBP [Board of Governors]discussed
a mechanism to prevent hiatus [sic]in the leadership of the IBP. After debate and
deliberation, it was agreed to constitute a five (5)[-] member Executive Committee ("Ex
Com") tasked to temporarily administer the affairs of the IBP x x x. 83

From Atty. Ubano’s description of the Executive Committee’s function, it is evident that
its principal purpose is to ensure that the functions of the IBP National President shall
continue to be performed despite IBP National President Roan Libarios’ resignation.
Conformably with the Omnibus Resolution creating the Executive Committee, Atty.
Vicente M. Joyas was designated as the Executive Committee Chairman. It is pursuant
to this designation and the Executive Committee’s general function that Atty. Joyas
designated the Commission on Elections for the election of the IBP EVP.

Further, Section 50 (d) of the IBP By-Laws provides:

(d) Secretary: The Secretary shall attend all meetings of the Board of Governors, and
keep a record of all the proceedings thereof; prepare and maintain a register of all
members of the Integrated Bar; notify national officers as well as members of national
committees of their election or appointment; cause to be prepared the necessary official
ballots for the election of Governors; and perform such other duties as are assigned to
him by these By-Laws, by the President and by the Board of Governors.(Underscoring
supplied)

As IBP National Secretary, Atty. Marohomsalic may, therefore, properly perform such
other duties assigned to him by the IBP National President. Thus, Atty. Vicente M.
Joyas, acting for the IBP Executive Committee(in his capacity as its Chairman) and
pursuant to the Executive Committee’s purpose of ensuring that the functions of the IBP
National President shall continue to be performed, was in a position to designate the
IBP National Secretary to perform a duty other than those explicitly articulated in the IBP
By-Laws. As regards this case, that duty was to be the duty of the Chairman of the
Commission on Elections. In turn, it was in his capacity as Commission on Elections
Chairman that Atty. Marohomsalic presided over the conduct of the election.

In sum, we fail to see how the election could have been tainted with the presiding
officer’s absolute lack of independence, manifest bias and prejudice, patent hostility,
and inordinate haste.84 We find no reason to invalidate the election.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines has long been beset by leadership
crises.1âwphi1 Our April 11, 2013 Resolution in A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC and A.C. No. 8292
—the same cases from which the subject matter of this Resolution arose—chronicled
the long, acrimonious history of the leadership of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. It
is, at the very least, strange that the Integrated Bar has suffered these episodes while
other lawyers’ organizations have not. Again, it is worth while to consider if there are
other means of integrating the members of the Bar— alternative ways that might enable
the Integrated Bar to satisfy its objectives more effectively, democratize its leadership,
and minimize its need to seek the intervention of this Court.

The leadership of our Integrated Bar must find a better way of resolving its conflicts
other than elevating these matters to this Court. It cannot fail to show maturity in
resolving its own conflicts. It behooves the members of the legal profession to avoid
being solitigious that they lose sightof the primordial public interests that must be upheld
in every case and conflict that is raised to the level of this Court.

Otherwise, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines will continue to alienate its mass
membership through political contestations that may be viewed as parochial intramurals
from which only a few lawyers benefit. It will be generations of leaders who model
needless litigation and wasted time and energy. This is not what an integrated bar of a
noble profession should be.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Declare dated March 27, 2013 as Ultra Vires or Invalid the
Urgent Motion to Defer/Restrain Performance of Duties as Successor Governor of IBP
Northern Luzon Regiondated April 22, 2013and the Very Urgent Motion to Restrain Atty.
Chaguile from Voting in the EVP Election on May22, 2013 dated May 20, 2013filed by
Atty. Marlou B. Ubano are DENIED for being moot and academic.

We DECLARE that Atty. Lynda Chaguilewas indeed a de factoofficer during her tenure
as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon and that her acts as de factoofficer—includingher
having voted in the May 22, 2013 electionfor the Executive Vice President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines—are valid, binding,and effective. The Urgent
Omnibus Motion to (1) Nullify the EVP Election on May 22, 2013 and (2) Restrain Gov.
Vicente M. Joyas of Southern Luzon Region from Discharging the Duties of EVP/Acting
President until the Final Resolution of the Issues is DENIED.

80.natividad vs mariano.

The Case

Before us are three consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court filed by members of the Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Association (ARBA).1 G.R. No. 164660 and G.R. No. 164779 were filed against
Kingsville Construction & Development Corporation (Kingsville) and Johnson
Ong.2 G.R. No. 163598 was tiled against Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI).

G.R. No. 164660 and G.R. No. 164779 question the resolution of the Sixteenth
Division3 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 82322, which granted Kingsville's
and Ong's petition for certiorari, and its order denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. G.R. No. 163598, on the other hand, questions the decision of the
Sixth Division4 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 70717, which granted FEPI's
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, and its resolution
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
 FACTS

Respondents Kingsville and FEPI are the owner and developer, respectively, of Forest
Hills Residential Estates Phase I in Brgy. San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of
75.85978 hectares. The land subject of these cases is a portion thereof, described as
Lot No. "E," covered by TCT No. 164298, in the names of Raul Boncan, et al. and
having an area of 136, 501 square meters.5 Respondent Ong is the President of
Kingsville.6

In March 1996, ARBA, as represented by its president, together with its

members,7 (hereafter referred to as "petitioners") filed before the Office of the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) Region IV a complaint for maintenance of peaceful
possession with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
(TRO) against respondents.8 Petitioners alleged that they are the actual
occupants/farmers of the land. Between the 1950s and the 1980s, they entered the
premises, established residence, and cleared and cultivated the same by virtue of the
Green Revolution Program9 of former President Ferdinand Marcos. On March 6, 1996,
however, petitioners claimed that respondents caused the bulldozing and leveling of the
mountains in the area and the dumping of earth in the creek.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction. They argued that jurisdiction lies with the civil courts and not with the
DARAB because petitioners are squatters and not agricultural tenants. Since the land is
titled and declared for taxation purposes, the assertion of petitioners that they have
been in possession of it between the 1950s and 1980s indicated bad faith. Respondents
insisted that nobody installed petitioners as tenants in the land, as in fact, there was no
claim in their complaint that there was a tenancy relationship between them and
respondents, nor with the previous owners of the land. 10cralawrednad

Respondents also argued that the land is within the Lungsod Silangan Townsite, which,
under Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, is a townsite reservation outside the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) pursuant to
Presidential Proclamations No. 1283 and 1635. 11cralawrednad

Regional Adjudicator Fe Arche-Manalang denied respondents' motion to dismiss in an

order dated September 11, 1997.12 She held that the grounds cited by respondents in
their motion to dismiss, pertaining to the status of complainants as mere squatters and
to the jurisdiction of the DARAB, were evidentiary in nature better resolved with the
substantive issues of the case.

Respondents moved tor reconsideration, which the succeeding Regional Adjudicator,

Conchita Minas, granted via an order dated September 8, 1998. 13 Regional Adjudicator
Minas held petitioners with their admission that the land is located within the area
reserved as Townsite of Lungsod Silangan by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No.
1637. She also cited Natalia Realty Inc. v. DAR,14 which has held that land located
within the Lungsod Silangan Townsite has been converted to residential use. The land
not being agricultural, Regional Adjudicator Minas held that the DARAB did not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioners' complaint.

Petitioners appealed before the DARAB (DARAB Case No. 7829). On January 11,
2001, the DARAB in a decision held that the land is classified as agricultural, as borne
out by the records and the certification of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO)
of the Municipality of Antipolo. The DARAB further held that as actual farmworkers who
began occupying and cultivating the land between the 1950s and 1980s, petitioners
deserve to peacefully maintain their possession as qualified beneficiaries under Section
22 of CARP. The dispute between the parties, being agrarian, was therefore within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB.15cralawrednad

The DARAB also declared that while the land ts included in the reserved townsite, not
every inch of it is reserved tor the construction of houses. A holistic approach must be
taken, in that a townsite would also necessarily include areas classified as "commercial,
residential, forestal [sic], educational, parks and agricultural." The DARAB reversed the
Order of the PARAD and directed respondents to maintain petitioners in peaceful
possession and cultivation of the land and to cease from further developing the same. It
also directed the MARO of Antipolo, Rizal to place the land under the coverage of the
CARP and to issue the corresponding Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to
petitioners.16 The fallo of the DARAB's decision reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated September 8, 1998 is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. New judgment is rendered:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Directing Respondents-Appellees and/or any of their representatives or agents acting

in their behalf to maintain Complainants-Appellants in peaceful possession and
cultivation of subject landholding.

2. Directing Respondents-Appellees to cease from further introducing bulldozing or

development activities on the subject landholding; and

3. Directing the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Antipolo, Rizal to place
the subject landholding under the coverage of the CARP and to issue the corresponding
CLOA to Complainants-Appellants as prescribed by R.A. 6657 and the rules and
regulations of the DAR.

SO ORDERED.17

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which the DARAB denied in a resolution
dated April 23, 2002. The DARAB ruled that even granting that the land is covered by
the Department of Justice Opinion No. 181 as part of the Lungsod Silangan Townsite
and therefore beyond the coverage of CARP, respondents must still comply with the
requirement for conversion provided by law. There is no automatic conversion of an
agricultural to non-agricultural uses absent such exemption or conversion order issued
by DAR.18cralawrednad

On May 31, 2002, respondent FEPI appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, in
a petition docketed as CA G.R. No. 70717. FEPI prayed for: (1) the reversal of the
decision of the DARAB dated January 11, 2001 and its resolution dated April 23, 2002
and (2) dismissal of petitioners' complaint before the RARAD. 19cralawrednad

On June 2, 2002, respondents Kingsville and Ong filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 71055. Kingsville and Ong also prayed
for the reversal of the decision of the DARAB dated January 11, 2001 and its resolution
dated April 23, 2002, and the consequent dismissal of petitioners' complaint before the
RARAD.20cralawrednad

On June 20, 2002, the Special Seventh Division * of the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for being a wrong mode of appeal and for having a defective verification and
certification against forum-shopping. The Court of Appeals also ruled that even if it
would treat the petition as one under Rule 43, which was the correct mode of appeal, it
would still warrant a dismissal for having been filed out of time. 21 The Court of Appeals
also denied Kingsville's and Ong's motion for reconsideration in a resolution issued on
August 1, 2002.22cralawrednad

On appeal before us (G.R. No.155118), we ordered the dismissal of CA G.R. SP No.

71055. Our order attained finality on February 5, 2003. 23cralawrednad

On October 22, 2003, the Court of Appeals Sixth Division in CA G.R. No. 70717
rendered a decision reversing the DARAB's decision and resolution and reinstating the
RARAD's order dismissing petitioners' complaint. The Court of Appeals ruled that Letter
of Instruction No. 625 issued on November 9, 1977 in relation to Presidential
Proclamation No. 1637, already reclassified the land as residential. It cited Natalia
Realty, Inc. v. DAR, where we found that Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside
20, 132 hectares of land in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban,
Rizal to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis. These areas were designated
as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite in which the land is located. The Court of Appeals
also ruled that petitioners are not bonafide tenants of the subject property as there was
neither consent from the landowner nor evidence of sharing of harvests. 24cralawrednad

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that FEPI's rights over the land
are merely derived from and dependent on Kingsville's, which is its owner. FEPI's rights
cannot therefore rise higher than the stream, and as such, the final ruling in CA G.R. SP
No. 71055 against Kingsville should also bind FEPI. 25cralawredcralawrednad

On May 6, 2004, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion for

reconsideration.26cralawrednad
Meanwhile, in view of the finality of G.R. No. 155118, petitioners filed a motion for
execution before the DARAB, which the Board granted. 27 Respondents then filed
separate motions for reconsideration, arguing that the decision of the DARAB sought to
be executed has not yet attained finality and has, in fact, been reversed and set aside in
CA G.R. No. 70717. With the reversal of the DARAB's decision, there was nothing left to
execute. FEPI, in particular, insisted that the favorable decision in CA G.R. No. 70717 is
also applicable to Kingsville, whose interest is so interwoven with and inseparable from
FEPI's.28cralawrednad

The DARAB denied the twin motions of respondents in a resolution dated February 6,
2004. The Board cited the proviso in Section 1, Rule XIV of the DARAB New Rules of
Procedure which states that notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
decision of the Board appealed from shall be immediately executory pursuant to Section
50 of RA No. 6657.29 Thus, on February 17, 2004, the DARAB issued a writ of
execution ordering the regional sheriff of the DARAB-Region IV to carry out the decision
of the Board dated January 11, 2001.30cralawrednad

FEPI thereafter filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 70717. FEPI
argued that the impending execution of the DARAB's January II, 200 I Decision is
manifestly illegal, considering that it has already been reversed and set aside by the
Court of Appeals. FEPI emphasized that the cited proviso in the DARAB's Rules of
Procedure pertains to executions pending appeal and does not apply where an appeal
from the Board's decision has already been resolved and reversed. 31cralawrednad

Granting FEPI's motion, the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 70717 issued a TRO
effective for sixty (60) days, enjoining the DARAB from implementing and enforcing its
January 11, 2001 decision in DARAB Case No. 7829. The Court of Appeals ruled that
unless restrained, the DARAB will include the subject land for CARP coverage despite
the Court of Appeals' express finding in its October 22, 2003 decision that said land has
already been declared and legally classified as residential. 32 The Court of Appeals
stated:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It appearing that the petitioner will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury from the
DARAB's immediate enforcement and execution of its Decision dated January 11, 2001
and in order that the above-entitled case may not be rendered moot and academic,
a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER effective for SIXTY (60) days is hereby
issued, enjoining the DARAB from implementing and enforcing its Decision dated
January 11, 2001 in the said DARAB Case No. 7829 (Reg. Case No. IV-RI-015-
96).33cralawrednad

xxx

Thereafter, in view of the impending expiration of the TRO, FEPI filed an urgent motion
before the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 70717 to resolve its application for writ of
preliminary injunction.34 On May 6, 2004, the Court of Appeals, as already adverted to
above, issued a resolution denying petitioners' motion tor reconsideration. It also went
on to say:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

With the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, the resolution of the petitioner's
urgent motion for application for writ of preliminary injunction which was filed pending
resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, is no longer necessary.

SO ORDERED.35

On March 14, 2004, Kingsville filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
(CA G.R. No. 82322) seeking to annul and set aside the writ of execution issued by the
DARAB and its January 11, 2001 decision and April 23, 2002 resolution reversing the
dismissal of the Regional Adjudicator and denying Kingsville's motion for
reconsideration, respectively:16cralawrednad

On June 10, 2004, the Court of Appeals granted the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit because it is not
an agrarian dispute, there being no tenancy relationship between petitioners and
respondents. Citing Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR,37 the Court of Appeals also ruled that
the inclusion of the land within the Lungsod Silangan Townsite meant that the areas
therein have been effectively converted from agricultural to non-agricultural and
reclassified into residential. Though some areas remain undeveloped, these are still
residential or commercial lands by reason of the conversion prior to June 15, 1998
when the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) took effect. Hence, the subject
property is outside the ambit of CARP. The Court of Appeals concluded that the DARAB
erred in taking cognizance of the case. In view of the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case, its decision is void and the principle on res judicata does
not apply.38cralawrednad

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision of the Court of
Appeals, which was also denied in a resolution dated July 29, 2004. The Court of
Appeals ruled that there are established principles and case law holding that the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari is always available to address situations where a
judgment rendered by a court bereft of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
had attained finality, though the remedy of appeal was lost through error in the choice of
remedies and other procedural lapses. 39cralawrednad

Hence, these consolidated petitions filed by members of ARBA.

ISSUES

The issues raised by the consolidated petitions can be summarized as

follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I. Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case between the parties.

A. Whether or not a tenancy relationship existed between the parties.

B. Whether or not a conversion order from DAR is still necessary,
notwithstanding the exemption granted over a land from the
coverage of CARP.
C. Whether or not the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
No. 70717 was improper.

II. Whether or not the dismissal of CA G.R. No. 71055 constitutes res
judicata.

III. Whether or not respondents are guilty of forum-shopping in instituting CA

G.R. 70717, CA G.R. 71055 and CA G.R. No. 82322.
A. Whether or not the Court of Appeals Sixth Division was duty bound
to dismiss the petition in CA G.R. No. 70717 after having been
informed of the pendency of CA G.R. No. 71055.
B. Whether or not FEPI and Kingsville can raise different appeals
independently.

OUR RULING

On the issue of res judicata anti jurisdiction of the DARAB

Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 82322 for entertaining the petition
filed by respondent Kingsville on the ground that the latter is re-litigating the same
issues raised in CA G.R. No. 71055. CA G.R. No. 71055 was dismissed because
Kingsville availed of a wrong remedy via Rule 65 instead of Rule 43, and because of a
defective verification. Petitioners, citing Bernarte v. Court of Appeals,40 contend that
while this dismissal is grounded on procedural flaws, the same is an adjudication on the
merits constituting res judicata.

Relatedly, petitioners argue that because of the dismissal of CA G.R. No. 71055,
respondents have lost their right to appeal the decision of the DARAB. As such, said
decision has become final and conclusive between the parties.
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit. 41cralawrednad

The elements of res judicata, which must all exist for the principle to apply, are as
follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must
be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (4) there must be, between the first and the second
action, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action. 42cralawrednad

We find, however, that answering the question of whether or not the filing of CA G.R.
No. 82322 is barred by res judicata will necessarily touch upon the pivotal question of
whether or not the DARAB, in the first place, has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case between the parties. We rule that it does not. Thus, the principle of res
judicata finds no application in this case.

The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited under the law. It was created under Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 129-A to assume powers and functions with respect to the adjudication
of agrarian reform cases under E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A. 43 Sections 1 and 2,
Rule II of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, which was adopted and promulgated on
May 30, 1994 and came into effect on June 21, 1994, identify the extent of the
DARAB's, the RARAD's and the PARAD's jurisdiction, as they
read:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. - The Board
shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine
and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos.
228, 229 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389,
Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations. x x x

SECTION 2. Jurisdiction of the Regional and Provincial Adjudicator. - The RARAD and
the PARAD shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board to hear, determine
and adjudicate all agrarian cases and disputes, and incidents in connection therewith,
arising within their assigned territorial jurisdiction. 44

The jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is only limited to cases involving agrarian
disputes, including incidents arising from the implementation of agrarian laws. Section 3
(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute in this
wise:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxx
(d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining. changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of
lands acquired under R.A. 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership
from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. 45

In order for the DARAB and the RARAD to have jurisdiction over the case, therefore, a
tenurial arrangement or tenancy relationship between the parties must exist. In
determining tenancy relations between the parties, it is a question of whether or not a
party is a de jure tenant. The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and
(6) there is sharing of harvests. All these requisites are necessary to create a tenancy
relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant,
cultivator, or a planter, a de jure tenant. Unless a person establishes his status as a de
jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform
Program of the government under existing tenancy laws. 46cralawrednad

Petitioners' complaint before the RARAD shows that its material allegations fail to state
a tenurial arrangement or tenancy relationship between the parties. The complaint
reads in part:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Comes, now complainants by counsels and unto this Honorable Adjudicator most
respectfully states [sic]:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxx

3. That the subject landholding is an agricultural land as evidenced by Certification from

the Municipal Agricultural Officer (MAO) of Antipolo, Rizal, which is marked as Annex
"A" and made an integral part of this complaint;

4. That the complainants are the actual occupants/tillers and or farmers of a certain
agricultural landholding consisting an area of 73 hectares more or less, located at Sitio
Inalsan and Sitio Tagumpay, Brgy. Bagong Nayon, Antipolo, Rizal, which is now being
bulldozed and developed by the respondents, causing grave and irreparable damgge
[sic] on all the improvements introduced by herein complainants;

5. That complainants entered the premises of said land to which they caused the
clearing out of the area and cultivation of the same since 1950s and others 1980s by
virtue of General Order No. 34 (Green Revolution Program) during President Marcos
regime;

6. That complainants through laborious efforts have introduced various improvements

on the said land such as fruit bearing trees and rootcrops, [sic] and had in fact
established their permanent residence on the same, x x x;

7. That in the morning of March 6, 1996 the once peaceful possession and cultivation of
herein complainants has been disturbed when some unidentified persons have caused
the bulldozing and levelling [sic] the mountain and dumping bulldozed earth, x x x,
which caused irreparable damage and destruction of about 80% of the existing fruit
trees thereon and other root crops. disregarding completely their peaceful possession
and cultivation x x x;

xxx

16. That due to the unlawful act of the respondent, herein complainants were greatly
deprived of their rightful share in the fruits of their labor as well as to a just share in the
fruits of the land they had been tilling as enunciated under Section 4 on Agrarian and
Natural Resources Reform, Art. XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

xxx

WHEREFORE. it is most respectfully prayed that after due hearing, a Preliminary

Injunction and or Temporary Restraining order be issued and forthwith to restrain the
respondents from doing the act herein complained of, and aftger (sic] trial said
injunction be made permanent with cost and such further orders that are just and
equitable in the premises.47cralawrednad

xxx

While petitioners alleged themselves as the occupants and tillers of the subject land,
they did not allege that they have a tenurial arrangement or tenancy relationship either
with the respondents or with the registered landowners, and not even with anyone
purporting to be the landowner. Petitioners invoke General Order No. 34 as their license
to enter and cultivate the subject land. The fact remains, however, that under General
Order No. 34, utilization of empty or idle lots by an adjoining resident or individual may
only be made with the express consent of the owner, if he is in the area, or his implied
consent, if he cannot be located. Petitioners neither alleged that the respondents or
landowners consented to their cultivation of the subject land for agricultural production,
either expressly or impliedly; nor was there an allegation of any arrangement as to how
the harvests shall be shared between them. The conclusion then is that petitioners were
not the tenants of the respondents.

True, in its decision, the DARAB held:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In as much as [sic] Complainants-Appellants have been occupying/cultivating the
subject landholding since the 1950's [sic] and 1980's [sic] to the present, they deserve
to be peacefully maintained and continue tilling the subject agricultural landholding as
qualified beneficiaries pursuant to Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6657, the 1988
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. As held in the case of Heirs of Segundo Manuel,
represented by Magdalena de Manuel, et al. vs. Hon. Judge Marcial L. Fernandez, et
al,. GR. No. 93743, promulgated on June 29, 1992, the Hon. Supreme Court held that
"even non-tenant [sic] cannot anymore be ejected and has to be retained in his
possession and cultivation of the lands as tiller until after the DAR has determined
whether said tiller has rights thereof under the CARP relative to the land he is tilling." 48

Nevertheless, that petitioners may have been actual occupants or tillers of the land,
which may make them potential CARP beneficiaries, does not give rise to a tenancy
relationship. As we held in Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation v.
Gutierrez, et al.:49cralawrednad

Neither the findings of the courts a quo nor the records themselves show any factual
determination of the third, fourth, and sixth requisites, namely, consent between the
parties to the relationship, the purpose of the relationship, which is agricultural
production, and sharing of harvests. The factual findings of the courts a quo at best only
point to the following: 1) respondents have been in possession of the land in question
for more than one year before the complaint for ejectment was filed; 2) the land in
question is subject to the compulsory acquisition scheme under existing agrarian reform
laws; 3) the respondents are farmers-tillers of the land; and 4) they are "potential CARP
beneficiaries." Regrettably, these factual findings fall short to convince this Court of any
tenancy relationship, and, hence, the DARAB does not have jurisdiction over the
present case. Jurisdiction lies with the regular courts.

Even if the respondents are indeed "potential CARP beneficiaries" as they so claim, it
does not follow that a tenancy relationship arises. Section 22 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,
provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sec. 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. - The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed
as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence
thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of
priority:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;

(b) regular farmworkers; (c) seasonal farmworkers; (d) other farmworkers;

(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;

(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and

(g) others directly working on the land.

xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions that "agricultural lessees and share tenants"
comprise only one class of qualified beneficiaries. The petitioner is correct in pointing
out that even those who do not enjoy a tenancy relationship with the landowner can
become qualified beneficiaries.

Moreover, the DARAB overstepped its jurisdictional boundaries when it declared

petitioners as qualified beneficiaries under CARP. In Lercana v. Jalandoni,50 we ruled
that the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly
the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter exclusively cognizable by the
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and beyond the jurisdiction of the
DARAB.51cralawrednad

More importantly, there is no tenancy relationship or agrarian dispute between the

parties because the subject land is not agricultural. It has ceased to be so under
Presidential Proclamation No. 1637. The Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 82322 and
CA G.R. 70717 and the DARAB found that the land is included within the Lungsod
Silangan Townsite by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, which took effect on
April 18, 1977, thereby reclassifying said land from agricultural to residential. The
interpretation of the DARAB is that the inclusion of land in the townsite reservation does
not mean that it can be used for residential purposes only.

However, the case of Natalia Realty, Inc., v. DAR,52 has long held that lots included in
the Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation were intended exclusively for residential
use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the
Lungsod Silangan Reservation by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1637.

Contrary to the DARAB's conclusion, therefore, a conversion or exemption clearance

from the DAR would be superfluous. In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform,53 we
explained:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It is different, however, when through Presidential Proclamations public agricultural

lands have been reserved in whole or in part for public use or purpose, i.e., public
school etc., because in such a case, conversion is no longer necessary. As held
in Republic v. Estonilo,54 only a positive act of the President is needed to segregate or
reserve a piece of land of the public domain for a public purpose. As such, reservation
of public agricultural lands for public use or purpose in effect converted the same to
such use without undergoing any conversion process and that they must be actually,
directly and exclusively used for such public purpose for which they have been
reserved, otherwise, they will be segregated from the reservations and transferred to
the DAR for distribution to qualified beneficiaries under the CARP. 55 More so, public
agricultural lands already reserved for public use or purpose no longer form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. 56 Hence,
they are outside the coverage of the CARP and it logically follows that they are also
beyond the conversion authority of the DAR.

At any rate, the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 82322 has found that as early as
January 1992, respondents have already been granted an exemption clearance by DAR
Undersecretary Renato B. Padilla. This clearance was granted on the basis of
certifications issued by the Lungsod Silangan Program Office and the ocular inspection
conducted by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). The ocular
inspection of the HLURB confirmed that respondents' landholding is within the
commercial zone of the said townsite reservation and within the General Area for Urban
Use per the Land Use Plan of the Lungsod Silangan. It further confirmed that
respondents' landholding is part of the Municipality of Antipolo's Zoning Ordinance No.
2, which was duly supported by Resolution No. 4 of the Sangguniang Bayan dated
February 11, 1982. Thus, the Municipality of Antipolo and the HLURB issued a
Development Permit57 and a License to Sell58, respectively, in favor of
respondents.59cralawrednad

Clearly, apart from Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, the zoning ordinance issued by
the Municipality of Antipolo, and approved by the Sangguniang Bayan and the HLURB,
also effectively reclassified and converted the subject land to non-agricultural. The
zoning ordinance was approved in 1982, way before the CARL took effect. We have
repeatedly ruled that lands already classified as commercial, industrial or residential
before the effectivity of the CARL, or June 15, 1988, are outside its coverage, and that
an order or approval from DAR converting the subject land from agricultural to
residential is no longer necessary.60 Only land classifications or reclassifications which
occur from June 15, 1988 onwards require conversion clearance from the
DAR.61cralawrednad

Prescinding from the foregoing, the DARAB does not have jurisdiction over the case
and its dismissal by the RARAD was correct. Consequently, DARAB's January 11, 2001
decision is null and void, including the writ of execution it issued on February 17, 2004.
The rule is that where there is want of jurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment is
rendered null and void. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no
rights are divested, from which no right can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars
any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out are void. It is not
a decision in contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become executory. It also
follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason
of res judicata.62cralawrednad

Our decision in G.R. No. 155118 may have long attained finality and may have, in effect,
rendered the DARAB decision final and executory. But again, considering the lack of
jurisdiction of the DARAB, we hold that the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 82322 did
not err in reopening and ruling on the merits of the case.

In Natividad v. Mariano. et al.,63 we held that the DARAB and the Court of Appeals did
not err in reopening and ruling on the merits of the case because the PARAD effectively
and gravely abused its discretion and acted without jurisdiction in denying the petition
for relief from judgment. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We cannot blame Ernesto for insisting that the PARAD decision can no longer be
altered. The doctrine of immutability of final judgments, grounded on the fundamental
principle of public policy and sound practice, is well settled. Indeed, once a decision has
attained finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified
in any respect, whether the modification is to be made by the court that rendered it or by
the highest court of the land. The doctrine holds true even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. The judgment of courts and the award of
quasi-judicial agencies must, on some definite date fixed by law, become final even at
the risk of occasional errors. The only accepted exceptions to this general rule are the
correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable.

This doctrine of immutability of judgments notwithstanding, we are not persuaded that

the DARAB and the CA erred in reopening, and ruling on the merits of the case. The
broader interests of justice and equity demand that we set aside procedural rules as
they are, after all, intended to promote rather than defeat substantial justice. If the rigid
and pedantic application of procedural norms would frustrate rather than promote
justice, the Court always has the power to suspend the rules or except a particular case
from its operation, particularly if defects of jurisdiction appear to be present. This is the
precise situation that we presently find before this Court.

The DARAB's actions outside its jurisdiction cannot produce legal effects and cannot
likewise be justified by the principle of immutability of final judgment. 64cralawrednad

We are also prepared to vacate our ruling in G.R. No. 155118. In Heirs of Maura So v.
Obliosca, et al.,65we departed from our minute resolution issued previously in a different
petition because it effectively rendered final and executory an erroneous order of a trial
court. We explained then:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In Collantes v. Court of Appeals,66 the Court offered three options to solve a case of
conflicting decisions: the first is tor the parties to assert their claims anew, the second is
to determine which judgment came first, and the third is to determine which of the
judgments had been rendered by a court of last resort. In that case, the Court applied
the first option and resolved the conflicting issues anew.
Instead of resorting to the first offered solution as in Collantes, which would entail
disregarding all the three final and executory decisions, we find it more equitable to
apply the criteria mentioned in the second and third solutions, and thus, maintain the
finality of one of the conflicting judgments. The principal criterion under the second
option is the time when the decision was rendered and became final and executory,
such that earlier decisions should be sustained over the current ones since final and
executory decisions vest rights in the winning party. The major criterion under the third
solution is a determination of which court or tribunal rendered the decision. Decisions of
this Court should be accorded more respect than those made by the lower courts.

The application of these criteria points to the preservation of the Decision of this Court
in G.R. Nos. 92871 and 92860 dated August 2, 1991, and its Resolution in G.R. No.
110661 dated December 1, 1993. Both judgments were rendered long before the
Minute Resolution in G.R. No. 118050 was issued on March 1, 1995. In tact, the August
2, 1991 Decision was executed already - respondents were divested of their title over
the property and a new title, TCT No. T-68370, was issued in the name of Maura So on
July 24, 1992. Further, while all three judgments actually reached this Court, only
the two previous judgments extensively discussed the respective cases on the
merits. The third judgment (in G.R. No. 118050) was a Minute Resolution,
dismissing the petition for review on certiorari of the RTC Resolution in the legal
redemption case for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned resolution
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion and for being the wrong remedy. In a
manner of speaking, therefore, the third final and executory judgment was
substantially a decision of the trial court.

xxx

The matter is again before this Court, and this time, it behooves the Court to set things
right in order to prevent a grave injustice from being committed against Maura So who
had, tor 15 years since the first decision was executed, already considered herself to be
the owner of the property. The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of
judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final
judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality. (Emphasis Ours)

On the issue of forum-shopping

Petitioners argue that respondents are guilty of forum shopping when, in instituting their
respective petitions before the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 71055 and CA G.R. No.
82322, respondents did not inform the courts of the pendency of each petition and of CA
G.R. No. 70717.

We note that CA G.R. No. 70717 and CA G.R. No. 71055 were filed merely days apart
by FEPI and Kingsville, together with Ong, respectively. CA G.R. No. 70717 was filed on
May 31, 2002, while CA G.R. No. 71055 was filed on June 2, 2002. Yet, the supposed
verification and certification against forum shopping in CA G.R. No. 71055, which was
incorporated in the body of the pleading, did not mention the existence of CA G.R. No.
70717.67 FEPI, on its part, was also duty bound to inform the Court of Appeals of
Kingsville's petition. They cannot feign ignorance of each other's petition when they filed
their own because they were co-respondents in the original complaint and had been
represented by the same counsel m the proceedings before the RARAD and the
DARAB.

On the other hand, CA G.R. No. 82322 was filed on March 14, 2004, during the
pendency of CA G.R. No. 70717 and after CA G.R. No. 71055 was dismissed.
Nevertheless, the certification in CA G.R. No. 82322 did not mention CA G.R. No. 70717
or CA G.R. No. 71055.68 Kingsville cannot also feign ignorance of its own petition in CA
G.R. No. 71055 when it filed CA G.R. No. 82322.

We hold that respondents' certifications against forum-shopping are inaccurate because

they do not disclose the pendency and/or filing of the other petitions that raise the same
issues and assail the similar decision and order of the DARAB. Respondents also
obviously sought different fora when they filed similar petitions before the Court of
Appeals separately.

Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on
the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some
other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court,
then in another.69cralawrednad

Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) by filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been
resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) by filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case
having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) by
filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers
(splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis
pendentia or res judicata).70cralawrednad

More particularly, the elements of forum-shopping are: (a) identity of parties or at least
such parties that represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; (c) identity of
the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.71cralawrednad

Applying the foregoing elements in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No.
70717 was in error in finding no violation of forum shopping on the ground that the
respondents are separate entities with separate interests who may pursue remedies
independently. The rule against forum shopping does not require absolute identity of
parties; substantial identity of parties is sufficient. 72 There is substantial identity of
parties where there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a
party in the second case.73 It is beyond quibbling that respondents do have a common
interest in the present case.

In Silahis International Hotel, Inc. v. The National Labor Relations Commission, et

al.,74 we reiterated our consistent rule that a party should not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in two different forums. Although most of the cases that we have
ruled upon regarding forum shopping involved petitions in the courts and administrative
agencies, the rule prohibiting it applies equally to multiple petitions in the same tribunal
or agency. We concluded that by filing another petition involving the same essential
facts and circumstances in the same agency, i.e. where respondents filed their appeal
and injunction case separately in the NLRC, respondents approached two different fora
in order to increase their chances obtaining a favorable decision or action. We affirmed
that this practice cannot be tolerated and should be condemned.

Nevertheless, just like in Silahis International Hotel, Inc., though we find the action taken
by the respondents ill-advised, this does not mean that the erroneous decision of the
DARAB should be sanctioned and the present petitions dismissed. Despite our
proscription against forum shopping, the respondents should be allowed to have
recourse to the processes of law and to seek relief from the decision of the DARAB as
this allowance will better serve the ends of justice.

In Barranco, v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems,75 we also had the

occasion to relax the rule against forum shopping on the basis of a valid justification.
Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The appellate court however correctly ruled that petitioner is guilty of torum shopping.
Petitioner deliberately sought another forum, i.e.. the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
to grant her relief after this Court dismissed her petition questioning the jurisdiction of
COSLAP. What petitioner should have done after COSLAP dismissed the motion to
dismiss and after this Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for late filing, was to wait
for the final verdict of COSLAP and to appeal therefrom, instead of seeking recourse
from the trial court through a petition to enjoin the enforcement of COSLAP's writ of
demolition and the order denying the repudiation of the amicable settlement.

The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply
disregarded for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of
technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance
with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to
reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties' right to an
opportunity to be heard.

In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 76 the Court restated the reasons which may provide
justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules, such as: (a)
matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (t) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Thus, any procedural lapse that may have been committed by the petitioner should not
deter us from resolving the merits of the instant case considering that the dismissal of
the present appeal would unlawfully deprive the petitioner of her possessorial right over
Lot No. 1611-D-3.

We find that the merits of respondents' case and the lack of jurisdiction of the DARAB
over the subject matter of the case between the parties are special and compelling
reasons that warrant the suspension of our rules against forum-shopping. This is not to
say, however, that we acquiesce to the neglectful omissions of respondents' counsels.
They, who have been charged with the knowledge of the law and with the duty of
assisting in the administration of justice, are sternly reminded to be more circumspect in
their professional concerns. We will not hesitate to impose severe penalties should they
commit similar acts in the future.

Finally, petitioners' contention that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed CA G.R.
No. 70717 upon being informed of the filing of CA G.R. No. 71055 and its subsequent
dismissal deserves scant consideration. We note that when the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. No. 701771 was informed by petitioners about CA G.R. No. 71055, the latter was
already dismissed on technical grounds. Had it still been pending at that time, the ideal
solution would have been to consolidate the two petitions, as was done here. The
dismissal of CA G.R. No. 71055, however, did not oblige the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. No. 707 I 7 to likewise dismiss the same, considering that it was filed first in time
and was the correct mode of appeal. We explained in Cruz, et al. v. Court qf Appeals, et
al.:77cralawrednad

With regard to the second assigned error, petitioners maintain that in view of its
dismissal of the injunction case then pending before the Regional Trial Court on the
ground of forum shopping, the Court of Appeals should have also dismissed the
unlawful detainer case before the Metropolitan Trial Court as there was no factual nor
legal basis to retain one and dismiss the other, or to be "selective" as to which of the
two actions involving the same parties, the same causes of action or issues and the
same reliefs, it should dismiss. In other words, it is petitioners' submission that on the
basis of its finding of forum-shopping, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed both
the injunction case and the ejectment case.

The issue of who between the petitioners and respondents spouses could
exercise the right of possession and/or ownership over subject property stems
from an actual controversy brought for resolution by the court. The court is called
upon to decide an issue which proceeds from a justiciable controversy. The
dismiss of both cases, as petitioners would want the Court of Appeals to do,
would result in the court's abdication of its judicial function of resolving
controversies which are ripe for adjudication.

Litis pendentia, res judicata and forum shopping arc all based on the policy against
multiplicity of suits. Forum shopping is sanctioned under Supreme Court Revised
Circular No. 28-91 (now Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Civil Procedure per
amendments of July 1997) Moreover, forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other.

To determine which action should be dismissed given the pendency of two actions,
relevant considerations such as the following arc taken into account: (1) the date of
filing, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2)
whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the latter action
or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the action
is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties. (Emphasis
Ours)

Nevertheless, we hold that Kingsville, as the owner of Forest Hills Residential Estates
Phase I, is an indispensable party without whom no final determination can be had of
the action. It should have been joined as petitioner in CA G.R. No. 70717 either by FEPI
or by the Court of Appeals at its own initiative. We rectify this defect now on the principle
that the omission to include Kingsville "is a mere technical defect which can be cured at
any stage of the proceedings even after judgment"; and that, particularly in the case of
indispensable parties, since their presence and participation is essential to the very life
of the action, for without them no judgment may be rendered, amendments of the
complaint in order to implead them should be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact
even after rendition of judgment by this Court, where it appears that the complaint
otherwise indicates their identity and character as such indispensable
parties."78cralawrednad

On CA G.R. No. 82322, we hold that in view of our earlier findings that the DARAB has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case between the parties, the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. No. 82322 did not err in taking cognizance of the petition despite
respondents' violation on forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DENIED. The assailed decisions
and resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 70717 and CA G.R. No. 82322
are affirmed.

SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
 81. FIRST DIVISION

THE ESTATE OF DON FILEMON Y. G.R. No. 158642

SOTTO, represented by its duly
designated Administrator, SIXTO Present:
SOTTO PAHANG, JR.,
Petitioner, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
- versus - AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
MATILDE S. PALICTE, substituted by
her heirs, VIDYA
PALICTE BRIOL, JUSTICIA PALICTE
JUMAMIL, PATRICIA PALICTE PEREZ,
FIDES PALICTE, PLARIDEL PATRICIO
PALICTE, CHRISTIAN MERITO P.
ALEGADO, KRISHNAMURTI P.
ALEGADO, and KRISTOFFER P.
ALEGADO, and the HON. AGAPITO L.
HONTANOSAS, JR., Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 16,
Respondents. Promulgated:

September 22, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review [1] of the Orders dated 20 December 2002 and 2 June 2003
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 16, in SP. PROC. No. 2706-R.
The Facts
The late Filemon Y. Sotto (Filemon) had four children, namely, Marcelo Sotto
(Marcelo), Pascuala Sotto Pahang (Pascuala), Miguel Barcelona (Miguel),
and Matilde S. Palicte(Matilde). Marcelo was the administrator of the estate
of Filemon (estate).
In June 1967, Pilar Teves and the other heirs of Carmen Rallos, the wife of Filemon,
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 16, a complaint against the
estate for the recovery of properties which Filemon inherited from his wife. The
complaint also prayed for payment of damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. R-10027.Judgment was rendered in favor of Pilar Teves and the other heirs of
Carmen Rallos. The judgment included an award for damages in the amount
of P233,963.65. To satisfy the judgment on damages, six parcels of land and two
residential houses from the estate were levied upon and eventually sold at a public
auction on 5 July 1979. Within the period for redemption, Matilde, as one of the heirs
of Filemon, redeemed four lots, namely, Lot Nos. 1049, 1051, 1052, and 2179-C
(subject properties). On 9 July 1980, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff executed a Deed of
Redemption, which was approved by the Clerk of
Court. Meanwhile, Pascuala redeemed one of the two residential houses
which waslocated in Lahug, Cebu City.

On 24 July 1980, Matilde filed with the trial court a motion to transfer to her name the
titles to the subject properties. However, the trial court denied the motion and declared
the Deed of Redemption null and void. The trial court held that although Matilde is one
of the declared heirs in SP. PROC. No. 2706-R, she does not qualify as a successor-in-
interest who may redeem the subject properties. Matilde filed a petition for review
with this Court. On 21 September 1987, this Court in Palicte v. Ramolete and
Sotto[2] granted the petition and reversed the trial courts order declaring the Deed of
Redemption null and void. This Court gave the other heirs a period of six months to join
as co-redemptioners in the redemption made by Matilde before the motion to transfer
titles to Matildes name may be granted.

The other heirs failed to join as co-redemptioners within the six-month period granted.
Thus, on 5 October 1989, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 16, issued an
Order in Civil Case No. R-10027 granting Matildes motion and directing the Register of
Deeds to register the Deed of Redemption and issue new certificates of title for the
subject properties in the name of Matilde.[3]

On 25 November 1992, Pascuala signed a document, renouncing her rights over the
subject properties covered by the Deed of Redemption. However, on 23 September
1996, Pascuala filed a Complaint for Nullification of Waiver of Rights before
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-19338. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground
of laches. Pascuala filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 44660, which wasdismissed on 21 November 1997. Pascuala filed a
petition for review with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 131722, which was denied on 4
February 1998 for failure to pay docket fees and because the certification against forum
shopping was merely signed by Pascualas counsel.[4]
In November 1998, the heirs of Miguel filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 16, a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 5 October 1989 in Civil
Case No. R-10027, praying that the order be set aside in order to include them as co-
redemptioners of the subject properties redeemed by Matilde. The trial court denied the
motion in an Order dated 25 April 2000 on the grounds of laches and res judicata. The
heirs of Miguel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60225. On 10 January 2002, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the trial courts order. The heirs of
Miguel filed a petition for certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 154585, which
was dismissed on 23 September 2002 for failure to file petition within the period fixed
and to show that the appellate courts judgment was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

Meanwhile, on 10 September 1999, the heirs of Marcelo and the heirs of Miguel filed
against Matilde an action for partition of the subject properties docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-24293, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 20. The heirs
of Pascuala did not join the complaint. On 15 November 1999, the trial court dismissed
the case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68239 dismissed the
appeal on 29 November 2002, holding that the case was barred by prior judgment. [5]

This case originated from the motion filed by the estate, represented by the estates
administrator in SP. PROC. No. 2706-R, entitled Intestate Estate of the Deceased
Don FilemonSotto, to require Matilde to turn over and account for the subject properties
in her possession which were allegedly owned by the estate. On 23 July 2002, the
probate court, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 16, issued an
[6]
Order granting the estates motion to require Matilde to turn over the subject properties
to the estate. The probate court ruled that while the redemption of the subject properties
was made under the name of Matilde, it was the estate which provided the funds to
redeem the properties. The probate court held that Matilde redeemed the subject
properties in behalf of all the heirs of Filemon. Citing Article 1455 [7] of the Civil Code, the
probate court held that as trustee of the subject properties, Matilde should return and
account for the subject properties to the estate. Matilde filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the probate court granted in its 20 December 2002 Order.[8] The
estate moved for reconsideration, which the probate court denied in its 2 June
2003 Order.[9] The estate then filed with this Court a petition for review, seeking to set
aside the orders dated 20 December 2002 and 2 June 2003 issued by the probate
court.

The Probate Courts Ruling

In setting aside its Order dated 23 July 2002, the probate court explained:

The Court takes judicial notice of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68239 promulgated on November 29, 2002 and which
involves the same four (4) parcels of land subject matter of the questioned
Order of July 23, 2002. The said CA decision favored Matilde G. Palicte.

xxx

According to the Court of Appeals, any action contesting the rights

of Matilde Palicte to the subject properties is barred by prior judgment
namely: the judgment of the Supreme Court in CA-G.R. No. 55076 which
is an offshoot of Civil Case No. R-10027 as well as the judgment in CA-
G.R. No. 44660 and G.R. No. 131722. All these judgments have affirmed
the rights of MatildePalicte to the subject properties.

xxx

This Court agrees with the observation that one and the same cause of
action shall not be twice litigated. Moreover, the trial court should respect
the orders or decisions of the Appellate Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order dated July 23, 2002 is

hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the motion to
require Matilde S. Palicte to turn over subject properties to the estate
of Filemon Sotto filed by the estate, thru counsel, is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.[10]
 The Issues
The estate raises the following issues:

1. Whether the decision of this Court, in G.R. No. 55076

is res judicata to the issues raised in the motion for accounting or
surrender of properties filed by petitioner in the probate court; and

2. Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals, in the case

docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 68239, where petitioner is not a party, and
which decision is still the subject of a pending motion for
reconsideration by the losing party, constitutes res judicata to the
issues raised in the motion for accounting or surrender of
properties filed by petitioner in the probate court. [11]

The Ruling of the Court

We find the petition without merit. We hold that the present case is barred by prior
judgments. The principle of res judicata in the concept of bar by prior judgment is
provided under Section 47(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus:

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments and final orders. The effect of a judgment or
final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or a final order against a specific thing, or in

respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a
deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition
or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the
will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person;
however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall
only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
x xx (Emphasis supplied)
Res judicata or bar by prior judgment means that when a right or fact had already been
judicially tried on the merits and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the
final judgment or order shall be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim,
demand or cause of action. [12] Res judicata promotes the public policy and sound
practice that stability should be accorded to final judgments and orders; otherwise, there
will be no end to litigation. [13] Thus, even at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of
courts should become final at some definite time fixed by law and that parties should
not be allowed to litigate the same issues over again. [14]

The requisites[15] for res judicata or bar by prior judgment are:

(1) The former judgment or order must be final;

(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
subject matter, and cause of action.

All the elements of res judicata are present in this case. The estates motion in the
probate court, to require Matilde to turn over to the estate the subject properties,
involved the same properties which were the subject matter of previous judgments and
final order.

In G.R. No. L-55076, where Matilde was the petitioner and Marcelo, the administrator of
the estate, was one of the respondents, this Court upheld the validity
of Matildesredemption of the subject properties and gave the other heirs a period of six
months to join as co-redemptioners. After the period lapsed and the other heirs failed to
join as co-redemptioners, the trial court in Civil Case No. R-10027 issued an Order
directing the Register of Deeds to issue new certificates of title for the subject properties
in Matildesname.

In Civil Case No. CEB-19338 for Nullification of Waiver of Rights, filed

by Pascuala against Matilde, the trial court dismissed the complaint involving the
subject properties, holding that Pascuala was guilty of laches and could no longer claim
her right as co-redemptioner. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 44660 and by this Court in G.R. No. 131722.

In Civil Case No. R-10027, the trial court denied the motion of the heirs of Miguel to
include them as co-redemptioners of the subject properties on the grounds
of laches and resjudicata. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 60225 and by this Court in G.R. No. 154585.

In Civil Case No. CEB-24293, the trial court dismissed the action for partition over the
subject properties filed by the heirs of Marcelo and Miguel against Matilde on the
ground of res judicata. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68239 and is pending appeal in this Court.

All these judgments and order upholding Matildes exclusive ownership of the subject
properties became final and executory except the action for partition which is still
pending in this Court. The judgments were on the merits and rendered by courts having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.

There is substantial identity of parties considering that the present case and the
previous cases involve the heirs of Filemon. There is identity of parties not only when
the parties in the cases are the same, but also between those in privity with
them, such as between their successors-in-interest. [16] Absolute identity of parties is not
required, and where a shared identity of interest is shown by the identity of relief sought
by one person in a prior case and the second person in a subsequent case, such was
deemed sufficient.[17]

There is identity of causes of action since the issues raised in all the cases essentially
involve the claim of ownership over the subject properties. Even if the forms or natures
of the actions are different, there is still identity of causes of action when the same facts
or evidence support and establish the causes of action in the case at bar and in the
previous cases.[18]

Hence, the probate court was correct in setting aside the motion to require Matilde to
turn over the subject properties to the estate considering that Matildes title and
ownership over the subject properties have already been upheld in previous final
decisions and order. This Court will not countenance the estates ploy to countermand
the previous decisions sustaining Matildes right over the subject properties. A party
cannot evade the application of the principle of res judicata by the mere expediency of
varying the form of action or the relief sought, or adopting a different method of
presenting the issue, or by pleading justifiable circumstances. [19]
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Orders dated 20 December
2002 and 2 June 2003 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 16, in
SP. PROC. No. 2706-R. Costs against petitioner.
82. ABRIGO vs. FLORES
G.R. No. 160786; June 17, 2013; BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: Involved in the suit is a lot with an area of 402 square meters situated in the
Municipality of Alaminos, Laguna and inherited by both Francisco (Faylona) and Gaudencia
(Faylona) from their deceased parents. The lot is declared for taxation purposes which Gaudencia
managed to secure in her name alone to the exclusion of Francisco and the latter’s widow and
children. It appears that after Francisco’s death, his widow and Gaudencia entered into an
extrajudicial partition whereby the western half of the same lot was assigned to Francisco’s heirs
while the eastern half thereof to Gaudencia. There was, however, no actual ground partition of
the lot up to and after Gaudencia’s death. It thus result that both the heirs of Francisco and
Gaudencia owned in common the land in dispute, which co-ownership was recognized by
Gaudencia herself during her lifetime, whose heirs, being in actual possession of the entire area,
encroached and built improvements on portions of the western half. In the case of the petitioners,
a small portion of their residence, their garage and poultry pens extended to the western half.

In the RTC at San Pablo City, the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona, among
whom are the private respondents, desiring to terminate their co-ownership with the heirs of
Gaudencia, filed their complaint for judicial partition in this case. The RTC rendered judgment
for the private respondents by ordering the partition of the land in dispute in such a way that
the western half thereof shall pertain to the heirs of Francisco while the eastern half, to the heirs
of Gaudencia whose heirs were further required to pay rentals to the plaintiffs for their use and
occupancy of portions on the western half.

The heirs of Gaudencia, petitioners included, went on appeal to this Court (SC). And this Court
affirmed the appealed judgment of the CA, minus the award for rentals. With no further appellate
proceedings having been taken by the petitioners and their other co-heirs, an Entry of Judgment
was issued by this Court.

Thereafter, the heirs of Francisco filed with the CA a motion for execution to enforce and
implement its decision as modified by this Court. Pending action thereon and pursuant to the
parties’ agreement to engage the services of a geodetic engineer to survey and subdivide the land
in question, the CA issued an order appointing Engr. Domingo Donato "to cause the survey and
subdivision of the land in question and to make his report thereon within thirty (30) days from
receipt hereof."

The CA took note of the report submitted by Engr. Donato. In the same order, however, the court
likewise directed the defendants, more specifically the herein petitioners, to remove, within the
period specified therein, all their improvements which encroached on the western half. They are
given 2 months within which to remove their garage, a small portion of their residence which
was extended to a portion of the property of the plaintiffs as well as the chicken pens thereon and
to show proof of compliance herewith. Petitioners again prayed the respondent court for a final
extension of sixty (60) days within which to comply with the order. Petitioners alleged that they
"are about to conclude an arrangement with the plaintiffs and just need ample time to finalize the
same." Private respondents interposed an opposition, therein stating that the alleged arrangement
alluded to by the petitioners did not yield any positive result. The CA denied petitioners’ motion
for extension of time to remove their improvements and issued a writ of execution.

Sheriff Baliwag served the writ on the petitioners, giving the latter a period twenty (20) days
from notice within which to remove their structures which occupied portions of private
respondents’ property. The implementing sheriff returned the writ "PARTIALLY SATISFIED",
with the information that petitioners failed to remove that portion of their residence as well as
their garage and poultry fence on the western half of the property.

Private respondents then filed with the CA a Motion for Issuance of Special Order of Demolition.
Before the CA could act on private respondents’ aforementioned motion for demolition,
petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Resolution on Motion for Demolition, this time alleging that
they have become one of the co-owners of the western half to the extent of 53.75 square meters
thereof, purportedly because one of the successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona – Jimmy
Flores – who was co-plaintiff of the private respondents in the case, sold to them his share in the
western half.

In the herein first assailed order, the CA denied petitioners’ motion to defer resolution of private
respondents’ motion for a special order of demolition and directed the issuance of an alias writ of
execution. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, thereunder insisting that being now
one of the co-owners of the western half, there is need to defer action of the motion for
demolition until the parties in the co-ownership of said half shall have decided in a formal
partition which portion thereof belongs to each of them.

A timely opposition to the motion for reconsideration was filed by the private respondents,
thereunder arguing that the alleged Deed of Sale and supposedly executed by Jimmy Flores was
merely falsified by the latter because one of the Floreses, Marites Flores, did not actually
participate in the execution thereof, adding that the same document which seeks to bind them
(private respondents) as nonparticipating third parties, cannot be used as evidence against them
for the reason that the deed is not registered. An alias writ of execution was again issued. Again,
petitioners failed and refused to comply.

Petitioners instituted a special civil action for certiorari in the CA against respondents and the
RTC, alleging that the RTC had gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the order denying their motion to defer resolution on the motion for
demolition, and the order denying their motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners contended that the sale to them by respondent Jimmy Flores, one of the successors-in-
interest of Francisco Faylona, of his 1/4 share in the western portion of the 402-square meter lot
had meanwhile made them co-owners of the western portion, and constituted a supervening
event occurring after the finality of the November 20, 1989 decision that rendered the execution
inequitable as to them.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari upon finding that the RTC did not gravely abuse its
discretion. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition, but the CA
denied their motion.

ISSUE: WON the sale by respondent Jimmy Flores of his 1/4 share in the western portion of the
402-square meter lot constituted a supervening event that rendered the execution of the final
judgment against petitioners inequitable.

RULING: NO. The contention of petitioners that the sale by Jimmy Flores to them of his 1/4
share in the western portion of the 402-square meter lot under the deed of sale dated March 4,
1998 was a supervening event that rendered the execution inequitable is devoid of merit.

Although it is true that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a
final and immutable judgment, one of which is a supervening event, such circumstance did not
obtain herein. To accept their contention would be to reopen the final and immutable judgment in
order to further partition the western portion thereby adjudicated to the heirs and successors-in-
interest of Francisco Faylona for the purpose of segregating the ¼ portion supposedly subject of
the sale by Jimmy Flores. The reopening would be legally impermissible, considering that the
November 20, 1989 decision, as modified by the CA, could no longer be altered, amended or
modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification was meant to correct what was
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law and regardless of what court, be it the
highest Court of the land, rendered it. This is pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of a final
judgment, which may be relaxed only to serve the ends of substantial justice in order to consider
certain circumstances like: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) the cause not being entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the doctrine; (e)
the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; or (f) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension.

Petitioners could not import into the action for partition of the property in litis their demand for
the segregration of the 1/4 share of Jimmy Flores. Instead, their correct course of action was to
initiate in the proper court a proceeding for partition of the western portion based on the
supposed sale to them by Jimmy Flores.

We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an exception to the execution
as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter
already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein
as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable. A supervening event consists of facts
that transpire after the judgment became final and executory, or of new circumstances that
develop after the judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of
prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet in existence at that time. In that
event, the interested party may properly seek the stay of execution or the quashal of the writ of
execution, or he may move the court to modify or alter the judgment in order to harmonize it
with justice and the supervening event. The party who alleges a supervening event to stay the
execution should necessarily establish the facts by competent evidence; otherwise, it would
become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and immutable judgment.
Here, however, the sale by Jimmy Flores of his supposed 1/4 share in the western portion of the
property in litis, assuming it to be true, did not modify or alter the judgment regarding the
partition of the property in litis. It was also regarded with suspicion by the CA because
petitioners had not adduced evidence of the transaction in the face of respondents, including
Jimmy Flores, having denied the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale itself.

The issuance of the special order of demolition would also not constitute an abuse of discretion,
least of all grave. Such issuance would certainly be the necessary and logical consequence of the
execution of the final and immutable decision. According to Section 10( d) of Rule 39, Rules of
Court, when the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted
by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said
improvements except upon special order of the court issued upon motion of the judgment obligee
after due hearing and after the judgment obligor or his agent has failed to remove the
improvements within a reasonable time fixed by the court. With the special order being designed
to carry out the final judgment of the RTC for the delivery of the western portion of the property
in litis to their respective owners, the CA's dismissal of the petition for certiorari could only be
upheld.

It irritates the Court to know that petitioners have delayed for nearly 17 years now the full
implementation of the final and immutable decision of November 20, 1989, as modified by the
CA. It is high time, then, that the Court puts a firm stop to the long delay in order to finally
enable the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona as the winning parties to
deservedly enjoy the fruits of the judgment in their favor.