American Philosophical Quarterly

Volume 34, Number 3, July 1997

WHY IT IS BETTER NEVER TO

COME INTO EXISTENCE

David Benatar

I years of frailty. We all face death.1 We

infrequently contemplate the harms that

A here is a common assumption in the await any new-born child: pain, disappoint?
literature about
future possible people that, ment, anxiety, grief and death. For any
all things being equal, one does no wrong child we cannot what form
given predict
by bringing into existence people whose these harms will take or how severe
they
lives will be good on balance. This as? sure
willbe, but we can be that at least
sumption rests on another, namely that some of them will occur. (Only the prema?
into existence (with decent
being brought turely deceased are spared some but not
life prospects) is a benefit (even though the last.) None of this befalls the non?
not being born is not a harm). All this is existent. existers suffer harm.
Only
assumed without argument. I wish to ar?
Of course I have not told the whole story.
gue that the underlying assumption is Not only bad things but also good things
erroneous. Being brought into existence is
happen only to those who exist. Pleasures,
not a benefit but always a harm. Many
joys, and satisfaction can be had only by
people will find this deeply unsettling existers. Thus, the cheerful will say, we
claim to be counter-intuitive and will wish must the of life
weigh up pleasures against
to dismiss it. For this reason, I propose the evils. As long as the former outweigh
not only to defend the claim, but also to the latter, the life is worth living. Coming
suggest why people might be resistant to it.
into being with such a life is, on this view,
a benefit.
II
However, this conclusion does not fol?
As a matter of empirical fact, bad things low. This is because there is a crucial

happen to all of us. No life is without hard? difference between harms and benefits

ship. It is easy to think of themillions who which makes the advantages of existence
live a life of poverty or of those who live over non-existence2 hollow but the disad?
much of their lives with some disability. vantages real. Consider pains and pleasures
Some of us are lucky enough to be spared as exemplars of harms and benefits. It is
these fates, but most of us who do none? uncontroversial to say that:
theless suffer ill-health at some stage 1) the presence of pain is bad
during our lives. Often the suffering is ex?
even if it is only in our final and that
cruciating,
days. Some are condemned by nature to 2) the presence of pleasure is good.

345

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346 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

However, such a symmetrical evaluation However, even of those who do think

does not apply to the absence of pain and that we have positive duties only a few

pleasure, for: also think that amongst these is a duty

the absence of pain is good, even if that to bring happy people into existence. For
3)
this reason, my explanation is preferable
good is not enjoyed by anyone,
to the alternative.
whereas
A secondsupport for my claim about the
4) the absence of pleasure is not bad unless between
asymmetry 3) and 4) is that,
there is somebody for whom this ab? whereas it seems strange to give as a rea?
sence is a deprivation.
son for having a child that the child one

My view about the asymmetry between has will thereby be benefited, sometimes
3) and 4) is widely shared. A number of we do avoid bringing a child into exist?
reasons can be advanced to support this. ence because of the potential child's
First, this view is the best explanation for interests. If having children were done for
the commonly held view that while there the purpose of thereby benefiting those
is a duty to avoid bringing suffering people children, then there would be greater moral
into existence, is no duty to bring
there reason for at least many people to have

happy people into being. In other words, more children. In contrast to this, our con?
the reason why we think that there is a duty cern for the welfare of potential children
not to bring suffering people into existence who would suffer is taken to be a sound
is that the presence of this suffering would basis for deciding not to have the child. If
be bad (for the sufferers) and the absence absent pleasures were bad
irrespective of
of the suffering is good (even though there whether they were bad
for anybody, then
is nobody to enjoy the absence of suffer? having children for their own sakes would

ing). In contrast to this, we think that there not seem odd. And if it were not the case
is no duty to bring happy people into ex? that absent pains are good even where they
istence because, while their pleasure would are not good for anybody, then we could
be good, its absence would not be bad not say that it would be good to avoid

(given that there would be nobody who bringing suffering children into existence.
would be deprived of it). Finally, support for my claim can be
It might be objected that there is an al? drawn from a related asymmetry, this time
ternative explanation for the view about our in our retrospective judgments. Bringing
duties, one that does not ap? people into existence as well as failing to
procreational
peal to my claim about the asymmetry bring people can be regret?
into existence
between 3) and 4). Itmight be suggested ted. However, only bringing people into
that the reason why we have a duty to avoid existence can be regretted for the sake of

bringing suffering people into being, but the person whose existence was
contingent
not a duty to bring happy people into ex? on our decision. Onemight grieve about
istence, is that we have negative duties to not having had children, but not because
avoid harm, but no corresponding positive the children which one could have had have
duties to bring about happiness. Judgments been deprived of existence. Remorse about
about our procreational duties are thus like not having children is remorse for ourselves,

judgments about all other duties. Now for sorrow about having missed child-bearing
those who deny that we have any positive and child-rearing experiences. However, we
duties, this would indeed be an alternative do regret having brought into existence a

explanation to the one I have provided. child with an unhappy life, and we regret

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 WHY IS ITBETTERNEVER TO COME INTOEXISTENCE / 347

it for the child'ssake, even if also for our and one (B) in which X never exists. This,
own sakes. The reason why we do not la? along with the views already mentioned,
ment our failure to bring somebody into can be represented diagramatically:
existence is because absent pleasures are
not bad. Scenario A Scenario B
I realize that the judgments that underlie (X exists) (X never exists)
this asymmetry are not universally shared.
? 1) 3)
For example, positive utilitarians who
are interested not only in minimizing pain Presence of Pain Absence of Pain

but also in maximizing pleasure

? would (Bad) <t? (Good)
tend to lament the absence of additional
' 4)
Presence Absence
possible pleasure even if there were no?
of Pleasure of Pleasure
of that pleasure. On their
body deprived
(Good) <t> (Not Bad)
view there is a duty to bring people into
existence if that would increase
utility.
Usually this would as a duty
be manifest It is uncontroversially the case that 1) is
to bring happy people into existence. How? bad and 2) is good. However, in accordance
ever, under certain circumstances the duty with the intuitions mentioned above, 3) is
could be to bring a suffering person into good even though there is nobody to en?

being if that would lead to a net increase joy the good, but 4) is not bad because
of happiness, by benefiting others. This there is nobody who is deprived of the
is not to say that all positive utilitarians absent pleasures.
must reject the view about the asymmetry Drawing on my earlier defense of the
of 3) and 4). Positive utilitarians who are asymmetry, we should note that alternative

sympathetic to the asymmetry could draw ways of evaluating 3) and 4), according to
a distinction between (i) promoting the which a symmetry between pain and plea?
happiness of people (that exist, or will ex? sure is preserved, must fail, at least if
ist independently of one's choices) and common important judgments are to be
(ii) increasing happiness by making preserved. The first option is:
people. They could then, consistent with
positive utiliarianism, judge only (i) to be
a requirement of morality. This is the pref?
erable version of positive utilitarianism. If l)Bad 3) Good
one took (ii) also to be a requirement of
morality, then one would be regarding per?
sons merely as means to the production 2) Good 4) Bad
of happiness.
If my arguments so far are sound, then
the view about
the asymmetry between
pain and pleasure is widespread and the Here, to preserve symmetry, the absence
dissenters few. My argument will proceed of pleasure (4) has been termed "bad." This
by showing how, given this common view, judgment is too strong because if the ab?
it follows that it is better never to come sence of pleasure in scenario B is "bad"
into existence. rather than "not bad" then we should have
To show this, it is necessary to compare to regret that X did not come into existence.
two scenarios, one (A) in which X exists But we do not think that it is regrettable.

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The second way to effect a symmetrical determine the relative advantages and
evaluation of pleasure and pain is: disadvantages of coming into existence and
never coming to be, we need to compare
1)with 3), and 2) with 4). In the first com?
parison we see that non-existence is
l)Bad 3) Not Bad preferable to existence. The advantage is a
real one. In the second comparison, how?
ever, the pleasures of the existent, although
are not a real over non
2) Good 4) Not Good good, advantage
existence, because the absence of pleasures
is not bad. For the good to be a real advan?
tage over non-existence, it would have to
To preserve symmetry in this case, the
be the case that its absence were bad. To
absence of pain (3) has been termed "not
illustrate this, consider an analogy which,
bad" rather than "good," and the absence
because it involves the comparison of two
of pleasure (4) has been termed "not good"
existent people is unlike the comparison
rather than "not bad." On one interpreta?
between existence and non-existence in this
tion, "not bad" is equivalent to "good" and
"not good" is equivalent to "bad." But this way, but which nonetheless may be instruc?
tive. S is prone to regular bouts of illness.
is not the interpretation which is operative
Fortunately for him, he is also so consti?
in this matrix, for if it were, it would not
tuted that he recovers quickly. H lacks the
differ from, and would have the same short?
capacity for quick recovery, but he never
comings as, the previous matrix. "Not bad"
means "not bad, but not good either." This gets sick. It is bad for S that he gets sick
a suffering and it is good for him that he recovers
is too weak. Avoiding bringing
It is good that H never gets sick,
child into existence is more than merely quickly.
"not bad." It is good. Judging the absence but it is not bad that he lacks the capacity
to be "not good" is also too to heal speedily. The
capacity for quick
of pleasure
weak in that not say enough.
it does Of recovery, although a good for S, is not a
course is not what real advantage over H. This is because the
the absence of pleasure
we would call good. However, the impor? absence of that capacity is not bad for H

tant question, when the absence of pleasure (and H is not worse off than he would have

involves no deprivation for anybody, is been had he had the recuperative powers
whether it is also "not bad" or whether it of S). S is not better off than H in any way,

is "bad." The answer is that it is "not good, even though S is better off than he himself
but not bad either" rather than "not good, would have been had he lacked the capac?
but bad." Because "not bad" is a more com? ity for rapid recovery.
evaluationthan "not good," that is the We can ascertain the relative advantages
plete
one I prefer. However, even those who wish and disadvantages of existence and non
to stick with "not good" will not thereby existence in another way, still in my
succeed in restoring a symmetry. If pain is original matrix, but by comparing (2) with
bad and pleasure is good, but the absence of (3) and (4) with (1). There are benefits both
to existing and non-existing. It is good that
pain is good and the absence of pleasure not
then there is no symmetry between existers enjoy their pleasures. It is also
good,
pleasure and pain. good that pains are avoided through non
Having rejected alternative evalua? existence. However, that is only part of the
tions, I return to my original diagram. To picture. Because there is nothing bad about

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 WHY IS ITBETTERNEVER TO COME INTOEXISTENCE / 349

never coming into existence, but there is existence is logically distinct from my view
something bad about coming into exist? about how great a harm existence is. One
ence, all things considered non-existence can endorse the first view and yet deny that
is preferable. the harm is great. Similarly, if one thinks
that the harm of existence is not great, one
Ill cannot infer from that that existence is pref?
erable to non-existence.
One of the realizations emergeswhich
We tend to forget how great the harms
from some of the reflections so far is that
are that we all suffer. There is a strong ten?
the cost-benefit analysis of the cheerful ?
dency to consider how well our lives go
whereby one weighs up (1) the pleasures
relative to others. If we live longer and with
of life against (2) the evils ? is unconvinc?
less ill-health and greater comfort than oth?
ing as a comparison between the desirability
of existence and never The ers, we count ourselves lucky. And so we
existing. analy?
should. At the same time, however, we
sis of the cheerful is mistaken because it
should not lose
sight of how serious
the
involves making the wrong comparison. If
harms we all suffer are. That people do tend
we want to determine whether non-existence
to lose sight of this is one important psy?
is preferable to existence, or vice versa,
chological reason why many feel resistance
then we must compare the left- and the
to my conclusion that coming into exist?
right-hand sides of the diagram, which rep?
ence is not a benefit. Many people have
resent the alternative scenarios in which X
exists and in which X does not exist. Com? very little difficulty seeing why relatively
poor quality lives may not be a benefit.
paring the upper and the lower quadrants
on the left, tells us something quite differ? They would have far less difficulty ex?
ent; namely, how good or bad a life X's is. tending this judgment to all lives, if they
saw how great the harms are that
Understanding this difference makes it really
clear existence holds no ad? all people suffer.
that, although
over non-existence, some lives Take death
for example, because it is
vantages
have advantages over others. Not all cases something that we all face. We consider a
of coming into existence are equally dis? death at forty as tragic, but tend to be pretty
The more the positive casual about a death at ninety. Clearly, the
advantageous.
features of a life outweigh the negative latter person's life is far preferable to the

ones, the better the life, and so the less former's (all other things being equal), but
existence is. But so that does not detract from the intrinsic harm
disadvantageous
of a death at ninety. Imagine how different
long as there are some negative aspects,
the life is not preferable to never having our evaluation would be of a death at ninety
come into existence. if people commonly lived to one hundred
Following from this, there is a difference and twenty years. By contrast, there was a
between saying that it is better not to come time when people rarely lived until their
into existence and saying how great a harm fifties. I take it that at that time living un?
it is to come into existence. So far I have til forty was not regarded as such a

argued only for the first claim. The mag? tragedy.3 It becomes clear how flexible our
nitude of the harm of existence varies from common evaluations are about which
person to person, but Iwant to suggest now deaths are serious harms. My view is that
that the harm is very substantial for every? all deaths are serious harms, ceteris pari
body. However, itmust be stressed that the bus. How great the harm is relative to
view that it is better never to come into others or to the current norm (which itself

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 350 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL
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is determined by the life-span of others) (scenario B, inmy schema) in which X does

can vary, but there is a serious intrinsic not exist. Such a comparison is possible.

tragedy in any death. That we are born des? Note that when I say that non-existence
tined to die is a serious harm. is "better than," "preferable to" or "has an
Not all share this view of death. One advantage over" existence, I am not com?

opposing perspective would see death as mitted to saying that it is better, preferable,
to pre-conception non-existence. or advantageous for the non-existent. The
equivalent
Those who have this outlook will that non-existent are not, and so things cannot
deny
death is a harm. They may even seek to literally be better for them or to their ad?
suggest that my view suffers contradiction vantage. I say that non-existence
When is
in that I think non-existence preferable to preferable, that judgment is made in terms
existence, but then see the cessation of ex? of the interests of the person who would
istence as a harm. If coming into existence or has otherwise come to exist. The claim
is a harm, how can going out of existence is that for any person (whether possible or
also be a harm? The answer is this. actual), the alternative scenario of never
Whereas pre-conception or
non-existence existing is better.5 It is because the evalua?
the non-existence of possible people who tion is always made in terms of the person
never become actual is not something that would (or does) exist (that is, the per?
which happens to anybody, death (the ces? son in scenario A) that my view is not what
sation of existence) is something that has been called "impersonalist,"6 even
to somebody. It happens to the though the comparison is with a state of
happens
person who dies. Whereas
Epicurus is cor? affairs (scenario B) and not with the state
rect that where death is, I am not and where of a person.7
I am, death is not, it does not follow that I
V
have no reason to regard my death as a
harm. It is, after all, the termination of me
That existence is a harm may be a hard
and that prospect is something that I can
conclusion to swallow. Most people do not
regret intensely. are happy
regret their very existence. Many
IV
to have come into being because they en?
joy their lives. But these appraisals are
One important objection to the compari? mistaken for precisely the reasons I have
son I have made between X's coming into outlined. fact that one enjoys one's life
The
existence and X's not coming into exist? does not make one's existence better than
ence is that it is not possible to compare non-existence, because if one had not come
existence and non-existence. It is said that into existence there would have been no?
non-existence is not any state in which body to have missed the joy of leading that
somebody can be and so it is not possible life and so the absence of joy would not be
for it to be better or worse than existence. bad. Notice by contrast, that itmakes sense
Others have to this ob? to regret having come into existence be?
already
responded
Forexample, Joel Feinberg has cause one does not enjoy one's life. In this
jection.
noted4 that comparing the existence of X case, if one had not come into existence
with the non-existence of X is not to com? then no being would have suffered the life

pare two possible conditions or states of one leads. That is good, even though there
X. Rather it is to compare the existence would be nobody who would have enjoyed
of X with an alternative state of affairs that good.

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 WHY IS ITBETTERNEVER TO COME INTOEXISTENCE / 351

Now it may be objected that one cannot sharply antagonistic to some of the most

possibly be mistaken about whether one's deeply seated and powerful human drives,
existence is preferable to non-existence. It the reproductive ones. In evaluating
might be said that just as one cannot be whether it is wrong to have children we
mistaken about whether one is in pain, one must be acutely aware and suspicious of
cannot be mistaken about whether one is these features of our constitution, for they
glad to have been born. Thus if "I am glad possess immense powers to bias us in their
to have been born," a proposition to which favour. At the same time, to embrace the
many people would assent, is equivalent view that procreation is wrong after fail?
to "It is better that I came into existence," ing to consider the moral significance of
then one cannot be mistaken about whether these drives would be rash.
existence is better than non-existence. The Children cannot be brought into exist?
problem with this line of reasoning is that ence for their own sakes. People have
these two propositions are not equivalent. children for other reasons, most of which
Even if one cannot be mistaken about serve their own Parents
interests. satisfy
whether one currently is glad to have been to
biological desires
procreate. They find
born, it does not follow that one cannot be fulfillment in nurturing and raising chil?
mistaken about whether it is better that one dren. Children are often an insurance
came into existence. We can imagine some? for old age. Progeny
policy provide par?
body being glad, at one stage in his life, ents with some form of immortality,
that he came to be, and then
(or earlier), the genetic material, values, and
through
perhaps in the midst of extreme agony, re? ideas that parents pass on to their children
gret his having come into existence. Now and which survive in their children and
it cannot be the case that (all things con? after the parents themselves
grandchildren
sidered) it is both better to have come into are dead. These are all good reasons for
existence and better never to have come to want to have but none
people children,
into existence. that is exactly what we
But of them show why having children is not
would have to say in such a case, if it were one's own interests is not
wrong. Serving
true that being glad or unhappy about hav? bad. It is often good, but where
always
come into existence were to harm on oth?
ing equivalent doing so inflicts significant
its actually being better or worse that one
ers, it is not usually justified.
came into being. This is true even in those One way, then, to defend the having of
cases in which people do not change their even if one
children, accepts my view that
minds about whether they are happy to be existence is a harm, is to deny that that
have been born. harm is great. One could then argue that
the harm is outweighed by the benefits to
VI
the parents. However, there is some rea?
If what I have said is correct, then there son to think that even if one takes the extra
can be no duty to bring people into exist? step and
agrees that existence is a great
ence. Does it also show that it is actually harm, it still might not be immoral to have

wrong to have children, or is procreation children. I hasten to add that, for reasons I
neither obligatory nor prohibited? Is it the shall make clear, I am not convinced of
case that our duty not to bring people into this. I offer the possible defense of having
existence not only to those who children not because I think that this activity
applies
suffer relative to others, but to all possible must be acceptable ? perhaps existence is

people? An affirmative answer would be so bad that it is wrong to have children ?

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352 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL
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but because something as valued as pro? existence. Under such circumstances this
creation must not be condemned lightly. possible justification for having children
It is morally significant that most people certainly would be doomed.
whose lives
go relatively well do not see The argument for why it might not be
their as a harm. They do not regret
lives immoral to have children is somewhat

having come into existence. My arguments worrying. For example, its paternalistic

suggest that these views may be less than form has been widely criticized in other
rational, but that does not rob them of all contexts, because of its inability to rule out
their moral significance. Because most those harmful interferences in people's

people who live comfortable lives are lives (such as indoctrination) that effect a

happy to have come into existence, pro? subsequent endorsement of the interfer?

spective parents of such people are justified ences. I am not so sure that this objection
in assuming that, if they have children, has force in the context of having children.
their children too will feel this way. Given This is because the harmful action of bring?
that it is not possible to obtain consent from ing people into existence is distinct from

people prior to their existence to bring them the factors that cause the subsequent ap?
into existence, this presumption might play proval of that action by the offspring. In
a key role in a justification for having chil? this way it appears different from the harm
dren. Where we can presume that those of indoctrination.
whom we into existence will not However, other similar concerns remain.
bring
mind that we do, we are entitled, the argu? Coming to endorse the views one is indoc?
ment might go, to give expression to our trinated to hold is one
form of adaptive
interests. Where these inter? preference, a where
paternalistic interfer?
procreational
ests can be met by having either a child ence comes to be endorsed. However, there
with a relatively or a relatively are other kinds of adaptive of
good life preference
bad life, it would be wrong if the parents which we are also suspicious. Desired
the latter into existence, even goods which prove unattainable can cease
brought
where that child would also not regret its to be desired ("sour grapes"). The reverse
existence. This is because, if the prospec? is also true. It is not uncommon for people
tive parents are to satisfy their procreational to find themselves in unfortunate circum?
interests, they must do so with as little cost stances (being forced to feed on lemons)
as possible. The less bad the life they bring and adapt their preferences to suit their
into being, the less the cost. Some costs predicament ("sweet lemons").8 If coming

(such as where the offspring would lead into existence is as great a harm as I have
a sub-minimally decent life) are so great suggested, and if that is a heavy psycho?
that they would always override the par? logical burden to bear, then it is quite
ents' interests. possible that we could be engaged in a mass
Those cases in which the offspring turn self-deception about how wonderful things
out to regret their existence are exceedingly are for us. Some may find this suggestion
should consider a few
tragic, but where parents cannot reasonably implausible. They
foresee this, we cannot say, the argument matters. First, there is the phenomenon of
would suggest, that they do wrong to fol? how people's quality-of-life evaluations
low their important interests in having differ and change.
Amongst people with?
children. how different things out any serious disease or disability it is
Imagine,
would be if the majority or even a sizeable often thought that such conditions are suf?
of people into ficiently serious harms to make never
minority regretted coming

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 WHY IS ITBETTERNEVER TO COME INTOEXISTENCE / 353

coming to exist preferable to existence with that most people do not regret having come
such harms. Sometimes the claim is even into existence provides compelling reason
stronger, that ceasing to exist is preferable to think that their lives are a benefit to them
to continued existence with such diseases and therefore that my conclusion to the
or disabilities. Very often, however, people contrary must be false. What the adaptive
who have or acquire these same appalling preference concern shows is that the mere
conditions adapt to them and prefer exist? belief that one has been benefited is not
ence with these conditions to never existing sufficient to show that one has been ben?
(or ceasing to exist). This might suggest, efited or that one's appraisal is rational. We
as some disabilities rights advocates have would not take a slave's endorsement of

argued, that the threshold in judgments his slavery as conclusive evidence that sla?
about what constitutes a minimally decent very is in his interests. In the face of an

quality-of-life is set too high. However, the argument why he was not benefited by his
phenomenon is equally compatible with the enslavement, we would view with
suspicion
claim that the ordinary threshold is set too his enthusiasm for his own enslavement. We
low (so that at least some of us should pass should do the same about people's enthu?
it).The latter is exactly the judgment which siasm for their having come into existence.
we can imagine would be made by an ex? Even if having children is not immoral
tra-terrestrial with a charmed life, devoid (given the presumption we might be en?
of any suffering or hardship. It would look titled to make), my argument suggests, at
with pity on our species and see the disap? the very least, that it is not morally desir?

pointment, anguish, grief, pain, and able. Although our potential offspring may
suffering that marks every human life and not regret coming into existence, they cer?
judge our existence, as we (relatively tainly would not regret not coming into
healthy and able-bodied humans) judge the existence. Since it is actually not in their
existence of bedridden quadriplegics, to be interests to come into being, the morally
worse than the alternative of non-existence. desirable course of action is to ensure that
Our judgments of what constitutes accept? they do not.
able limits of suffering are deeply rooted One implication of my view is that it
in the state of our well-being. How can we would be preferable for our species to die
be so confident that we are not guilty of out. It would be better if there were no more

self-deception? people. Many people, but not I, find such

But why should such
self-deception be a prospect inherently intolerable.
so pervasive? One
explanation is the strong Imagine that everybody entered a non

evolutionary reasons why we might be dis? procreation pact or even without an

posed to view our lives as a benefit. Such agreement acted on the non-procreation
a view facilitates survival, of the individual ideal. No more children would come into
and the species. the world and the human population would
These issues merit more substantial treat? age and then become extinct. There is no
ment than I am able to offer here. I am chance of this occurring. If our species
unsure, therefore, whether the suggested comes to an end, it will not be because we
argument for the permissibility of (some? have freely chosen to bring this about
times) having children is sound. However, (though it may result from other freely
the worry that adaptive preferences may be chosen actions). Nevertheless the possibil?
operative does provide one response to an ity is one which must be considered
objection some critics raise, that the fact because it is a theoretical implication of

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354 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL
QUARTERLY

my view. I agree that there would be some people to make (especially when they knew
aspects of the demise of humans which that all others were making it too). They
would be tragic. The last generation to die would be accepting additional suffering
out would live in a world in which the upon themselves to spare possible future
structures of
society had broken down. people the harm of existence. That would
There wouldbe no younger working gen? be something to be admired even though
eration growing the crops, preserving the consequences for the heroes would be
order, running hospitals and homes for the extremely unpleasant. If we do not object

aged, and burying the dead. The situation to heroic sacrifice in other contexts, why
is a bleak one indeed. It is hard to know should we object to it when it would pre?
whether the suffering of
people the final vent any further suffering?
would be any greater than that of so many But what if the assumption that having

people in each generation. I doubt that it children is permissible is mistaken? Even

would, but let us imagine the opposite for then we should see that if there is some?
the moment. thing tragic about the demise of humanity,
I have suggested (with some trepidation) it is not the demise itself but the suffering
that having children might not always be that heralds it. I believe that people who
immoral. Assume first that this view is think that the demise itself would be un?
correct. What if, despite the permissibility fortunate would be hard-pressed to provide
of having children, people acted on the an explanation of this in terms of the in?
ideal, forwent having children and suffered terests of those who could have come into

tremendously as a result? How could that being. Who would there be to suffer the
be acceptable as a moral ideal? end of homo sapiens? One possible sug?
The first thing to note is that itwould be gestion is that it would affect the people
an outcome which a generation willingly who knew it was going to happen. How?
(albeit fearfully) would accept upon itself ever, that would simply be another feature
in the name of the moral ideal. It would be of the suffering that foreshadowed the end
a supererogatory or heroic decision for of human life.9

College of Charleston
Received October 21, 1996

NOTES

1. Only extremely rarely, if ever, is death a good, although it is often the lesser of two evils
where continued life is unbearable.

2. The term "non-existence" is multiply ambiguous. It is applicable to those who never exist
and to those who do not currently exist. The latter can be divided further into those who do not
yet exist and those who are no longer existing. In the current context I am using "non-existence" to
denote those who never exist. Joel Feinberg has argued that the not yet existent and the no
longer existent can be harmed. I embrace that view. What I have to say here applies only to the
never existent.

3. Today, in poorer parts of the world, life expectancy matches that of the developed countries
in former centuries. Notice that we view the shortness of the lives of people in these poorer
countries (and sometimes also of people in earlier times) as tragic, but precisely because we are
comparing their life spans with the life spans to which we are accustomed.

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 WHY IS ITBETTERNEVER TO COME INTOEXISTENCE / 355

4. Joel Feinberg, "Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming" in Freedom and
Fulfillment, p. 19.
5. Some support for such comparisons can be drawn from considering the difference between X's
living a miserable life and X's non-existence. Many people find even this comparison troubling,
but others will have sympathy for the idea that non-existence is preferable for X who would
otherwise exist. For them, this kind of comparison might be the thin edge of the wedge, leading
to the other comparative scenarios I am suggesting.

6. See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, chapter 17.

7. I defend this claim more fully elsewhere.

8. Often, although not always, this will start out as a way to save face, but even then it eventually
can be internalized.

9. I am grateful to APQ reviewers for copious and insightful comments which have helped me to
make significant improvements to this paper.

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