Category: Justice Mariano C.

Del Castillo
18 Oct 2017 | Subject | Labor and Employment | Illegal Dismissal | Jurisprudence | Ponente |
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by
Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Meatworld International, Inc. Vs. Dominique

A. Hechanova; G.R. No. 208053; October 18,
2017
DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

“In constructive dismissal cases, the employer is, concededly, charged with the burden of
proving that its conduct and action were for valid and legitimate grounds.”[1]

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the September 12, 2012[3] and July 3, 2013[4] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R SP No. 125953.

Factual Antecedents

On September 6, 2006, petitioner Meatworld International, Inc., a corporation engaged in the

business of selling fresh meat under the brand name of “Mrs. Garcia’s Meats” in different outlets
located in different malls or markets,[5]hired respondent Dominique A. Hechanova as a head
butcher.[6] At the time of his termination; respondent was assigned at the outlet of Robinsons
Place Mall, Ermita, Manila (Robinsons Place Manila), with a salary of P10,600 a month.[7]

On March 2, 2011, respondent filed a Complaint[8] for Illegal Dismissal with claim for
reinstatement and backwages against petitioner and/or Joyce Alcoreza (Alcoreza),[9] Vice-
President[10] of petitioner. Respondent alleged that on November 10-19, 2010, he was suspended
for violating the regulation of SM Hypermarket, Muntinlupa, prohibiting employees of
concessionaires from tasting food peddled by some promodizers;[11] that after his suspension, he
reported to the office of petitioner for his reassignment but he was informed by the Employee
Relation Supervisor Junel Romadia (Romadia), that there was no available outlet yet;[12] that on
December 9, 2010, respondent was assigned at Robinsons Place Manila;[13] that on January 5,
2011, he was relieved from his assignment and was told to report to the office on January 6, 2011
for his performance evaluation;[14] that when he reported to the office on January 6, 2011, he was
told to come back on January 10, 2011;[15] that on January 10, 2011, Romadia asked him to leave
his cellphone number so she could text him when to come back;[16] that on January 12, 2011,
respondent via text message asked Romadia when he could report for work;[17] that Romadia
replied that he could report for work anytime;[18] that on January 13, 2011, respondent reported
to the office at around 1 PM but was scolded by Alcoreza for not arriving in the morning;[19] that
respondent explained to Alcoreza that he came in the afternoon because he knew the office
personnel were very busy in the morning;[20] that Alcoreza retorted, “Magresign ka na lang or
tanggalin ka namin;”[21] that respondent pleaded to her but she left without saying a word;[22] that
Romadia approached him and told him to wait for her text;[23] that on January 17, 2011, he
decided to ask the help of Mr. Raffy Tulfo (Tulfo) since he had not received any text message
from petitioner;[24] that Tulfo gave him a referral letter to the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) – CAMANAVA;[25] that on the same day, he went to the DOLE-
CAMANAVA and filled-out a Single-Entry Approach (SENA) Form for illegal constructive
dismissal alleging that he was not given any work assignment and was being forced to
resign;[26] and that the case was forwarded to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).[27]

In response, petitioner claimed that it did not dismiss respondent as he was the one who failed to
report for work.[28]Petitioner alleged that in April 2010, respondent was banned from working at
all Puregold outlets because a personnel of Puregold BF caught him urinating in the storage
room where fresh food items were kept;[29] that respondent was suspended from November 18-
25, 2010 for leaving his workplace without permission on November 5, 2010 and for being under
time for the dates October 31 and November 1, 2010;[30] that respondent was placed on
preventive suspension on November 27-30, 2010 for eating food products or sample items of
another concessionaire in the cold room storage area;[31] that respondent was banned from
working at the SM Hypermarket Muntinlupa branch because of the incident;[32] that respondent
was temporarily assigned at that Robinsons Place Manila;[33] that his assignment ended on
January 5, 2011;[34] that respondent was told to report to the office on January 6, 2011 for his
new assignment but since he arrived late he was told by his supervisor to return the following
day as there was a long queue at the Human Resources (HR) Department;[35] that since
respondent failed to report on January 6, 2011, the vacancy which he was supposed to fill was no
longer available;[36] that on January 10, 2011, respondent barged in at the HR Department and
made a demand for his new assignment;[37] that he was told to return in the morning of January
13, 2011;[38] that on said date, he arrived late giving Romadia the impression that he was no
longer interested to work;[39] that on the same day, he received a Memorandum asking him to
explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for failing to report to
the HR Department as scheduled;[40] that after the said date, he never reported back to
work;[41] and that on January 18, 2011, petitioner sent a Memorandum dated January 17, 2011,
asking respondent to submit a written explanation and to report to the HR Department on
January 24, 2011 at 3:00 PM.[42]

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On January 10, 2012, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision[43] declaring respondent to have
been illegally dismissed. The Labor Arbiter gave no credence to petitioner’s theory, that
respondent failed to return to work for fear of being investigated for his violations of company
rules and regulations, for lack of evidence.[44] The Labor Arbiter also found petitioner’s
accusations against respondent to be untrue and without basis.[45] However, considering that the
work environment would no longer be healthy, the Labor Arbiter ordered the payment of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.[46] In the absence of any factual or legal basis, the Labor
Arbiter relieved Alcoreza of any liability.[47]Thus:

WHEREFORE, a decision is hereby rendered declaring [respondent] to have been illegally

dismissed. [Petitioner] Meatworld International is directed to pay complainant P116,600.00 as
backwages and P42,400.00 as separation pay. Other claims are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.[48]

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission

Petitioner appealed the case to the NLRC.

On March 30, 2012, the NLRC rendered a Decision,[49] affirming the findings of the Labor
Arbiter that respondent was illegally dismissed and thus entitled to backwages and separation
pay. The NLRC ruled that petitioner’s allegation that it was respondent who refused to report for
work was belied by the latter’s “immediate action to seek help from Raffy Tulfo.”[50] As to the
alleged infraction of respondent of urinating in the storage room, the NLRC considered it as a
fabricated infraction as no document was presented to support this.[51] The NLRC even
considered the two previous suspensions of respondent as proof that petitioner was giving
respondent a hard time.[52] It also gave credence to the statement of respondent that he was told
to resign by Alcoreza.[53] All these taken together led the NLRC to conclude that respondent was
illegally dismissed.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the NLRC denied the same in its June 15, 2012
Resolution.[54]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Unfazed, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari[55] under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.

On September 12, 2012, the CA dismissed the Petition due to the following infirmities:

1. there was no proper proof of service of the Petition to the adverse party and the
agency a quo. While petitioners filed the Affidavit of Service and incorporated
registry receipts, [petitioner] still failed to comply with the requirement on proper
proof of service. Post office receipt is not the required proof of service by
registered mail. Section 10, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
specifically stated that service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt
by the addressee, or after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of
the postmaster, whichever is earlier. Verily, registry receipts cannot be considered
as sufficient proof of service; they are merely evidence of mail matter by the post
office to the addressee; and
2. there was no competent evidence regarding the identity of Jocelyn B. Alcoreza as
the alleged authorized representative of co-petitioner Meatworld International on
 the attached Verification and Certification Against Non-Forum Shopping as
required by Section 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Further,
there was no board resolution empowering Jocelyn B. Alcoreza to represent
petitioner corporation in this case. The Supreme Court was emphatic when it
ruled that in the absence of authority from the board of directors, no person[,] not
even the officers[,] can bind the corporation. It stressed that any suit filed on
behalf of the corporation wanting the required board resolution should be
dismissed, since the power of the corporation to sue and be sued in any court is
lodged with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers. Thus, only
individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of a corporation. In addition, the
Court has required that proof of said authority must be attached. Failure to
provide a certificate of non-forum shopping is sufficient ground to dismiss the
petition. Likewise, the petition is subject to dismissal if a certification was
submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatory’s authority.[56]

Petitioner sought reconsideration contending that it complied with the proof of service
requirement and that the Secretary’s Certificate attached to the Petition is sufficient proof of the
authority of Alcoreza to file the said Petition.[57]

In its July 3, 2013 Resolution,[58] the CA conceded that petitioner complied with the proof of
service requirement, however, it maintained that petitioner failed to present the Board Resolution
and the competent evidence of identity of the affiant.

Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, raising the following errors:

A. THE FINDING OF 1HE [CA] THAT THERE WAS NO COMPETENT

EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY AND BOARD RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING
THE VICE PRESIDENT OF PETITIONER COMPANY TO FILE THE
PETITION IS CONTRARY TO FACTS.
B. THE [CA] ERRED IN DECLARING THAT A COPY OF 1HE BOARD
RESOLUTION ITSELF, AUTHORIZING THE PERSON ACTING IN ITS
BEHALF SHOULD BE APPENDED TO THE PETITION.
C. THE [CA] ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING THE CASE ON THE MERITS
AND:1. NOT DECLARING THAT RESPONDENT WAS NOT DISMISSED,
MUCH LESS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED BY THE PETITIONER COMPANY
FROM EMPLOYMENT; AND

2. UPHOLDING THE FINDING OF THE NLRC IN AWARDING

BACKWAGES AND SEPARATION PAY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT.[59]

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner contends that the CA erred in insisting that a copy of the Board Resolution is required
to be attached to the Petition for Certiorari.[60] It claims that under prevailing jurisprudence, a
copy of the Secretary’s Certificate, attesting that petitioner authorized Alcoreza to file the said
Petition for Certiorari suffices.[61] Moreover, contrary to the findings of the CA, Alcoreza
submitted competent proof of identity before the notary public.[62] In any case, even if there were
defects in the Petition for Certiorari, these were excusable, and thus, the CA still should have
resolved the case on the merits.[63]

As to the merits of the case, petitioner insists that it did not dismiss respondent from
employment.[64] Rather, it was respondent who failed to report for work because he erroneously
assumed that he was being terminated.[65]Petitioner likewise puts in question the CA’s reliance
on respondent’s act of seeking help from Tulfo as proof of dismissal.[66]

Respondent’s Arguments

Respondent, however, argues that the instant case has been rendered moot as the judgment has
been satisfied by the release of the appeal bond by the NLRC Cashier to the respondent[67] In any
case, respondent maintains that the CA did not err in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari due to
technicalities.[68] Respondent likewise asserts that the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC are in accord with the facts and evidence on record.[69]

Ruling

The Petition must fail.

There were no procedural defects in the Petition for Certiorari.

Under the Corporation Code, a corporation exercises its powers and transacts its business
through its board of directors or trustees.[70] Its corporate officers and agents, therefore, cannot
exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of
directors.[71] Corollarily, in order for a person to represent a corporation in a suit, a board
resolution authorizing the former to represent the latter is necessary. In several instances,
however, the Court has considered a Secretary’s Certificate sufficient proof of authority for a
person named in it to represent a corporation in a suit.[72]

In this case, no board resolution was attached to the Petition for Certiorari. However, in lieu
thereof, petitioner attached a Secretary’s Certificate attesting that Alcoreza was duly authorized
by the Board of Directors to sign the necessary pleadings, verification, and certificate of non-
forum shopping on behalf of the corporation. This, under prevailing jurisprudence, is sufficient
proof of authority.

In addition, contrary to the CA’s finding, Alcoreza presented “competent evidence of identity” as
she presented before the notary public her valid Philippine Passport.[73]

In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioner that there were no procedural defects to
warrant the dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari by the CA. However, while there were no
procedural defects, the Court finds that the instant petition is still dismissible on the merits.

Respondent was illegally dismissed.

In illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the employee’s
termination was for a valid or authorized cause.[74] This rule, however, presupposes that the
employee was dismissed from service.[75]

In this case, records show that in November 2010 respondent was suspended for one week
because of his undertime on October 31, 2010 and November 5, 2010 and his absence on
November 1, 2010. Immediately after his suspension, he was placed on preventive suspension
for three days for sampling food products. After his preventive suspension, respondent reported
to the office but was told that there was no available outlet. After more than a week of making
follow-ups, respondent was assigned at Robinsons Place Manila. Less than a month later,
petitioner told respondent to report to the office on January 6, 2011 as his assignment at
Robinsons Place Manila was only temporary. Respondent reported to the office on January 6, 10,
and 13, 2011 but was told that there was no available outlet. On January 13, 2011, the last time
respondent went to the office of petitioner, he was scolded by Alcoreza for arriving late and was
told to resign, otherwise, he would be dismissed. All these factual circumstances, taken together,
led the NLRC to conclude that petitioner was giving respondent a hard time in order to make his
employment unbearable, and eventually, force him to resign. Unfortunately, instead of resigning,
respondent sought the help of Tulfo who referred him to DOLE. With these findings, the NLRC
sustained the ruling of the Labor Arbiter that respondent was illegally dismissed.

Petitioner, however, insists that respondent was not dismissed from employment. Instead, it was
respondent who failed to report for work because he erroneously assumed that he was being
terminated.

After a careful review of the instant Petition, the Court finds that although there was no actual
dismissal, the failure of petitioner to assign respondent to a specific branch without any
justifiable reason constituted illegal constructive dismissal.

Constructive dismissal is defined as a “cessation of work because continued employment is

rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely.”[76] Similarly, there is constructive dismissal
“when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so
unbearable to the employee leaving him with no option but to forego with his continued
employment.”[77] Simply put, it is a “dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but
made to appear as if it were not.”[78]

In this case, petitioner admits that after relieving respondent from his assignment at Robinsons
Place Manila on January 5, 2011, it failed to assign him to a new branch. However, to justify its
failure, petitioner claims that there was no available post as the vacancy which respondent was
supposed to fill was no longer available since he failed to report on January 6, 2011. Petitioner
later clarified that respondent did report to the office on January 6, 2011 but that he arrived late,
and thus was not given the assignment Petitioner also claims it was having a hard time finding a
new branch as respondent was already banned at SM Hypermarket Muntinlupa, Market Market,
and all Puregold supermarkets.

The Court finds petitioner’s justification unacceptable.

It bears stressing that “[d]ue to the grim economic consequences to the employee, the employer
should bear the burden of proving that there are no posts available to which the employee
temporarily out of work can be assigned.”[79] Thus, in this case, it was incumbent upon petitioner
to prove that respondent was banned at SM Hypermarket Muntinlupa, Market Market, and all
Puregold supermarkets, and that there was no available branch for respondent Unfortunately,
petitioner failed to prove both. Except for a Memorandum from SM Hypermarket stating that
respondent was no longer allowed to be assigned at the Muntinlupa branch, no other evidence
was presented by petitioner to show the respondent was also banned at Market Market and at all
Puregold supermarkets and that all posts were indeed taken. Petitioner could have easily asked
its HR Department for a list of all its branches together with the list of all its employees assigned
thereat to prove its allegation that there are no available posts for respondent. But it did not.
Instead, it argued that respondent’s various infractions made it difficult for petitioner to assign
respondent to a new assignment. As evidence, petitioner submitted several memoranda it issued
against respondent. These, however, do not prove petitioner’s allegation that there are no
available posts for respondent. If at all, it only shows that petitioner considered respondent an
undesirable employee due to his various infractions. Such infractions, however, are not sufficient
to prove that there are no available posts for respondent.

Moreover, contrary to the claim of petitioner, respondent’s act of seeking help from Tulfo was
not the primary consideration of the NLRC in finding the existence of illegal dismissal. It was
only one of the many circumstances, which the NLRC took into consideration. Petitioner’s
failure to assign respondent to an outlet without any justifiable reason, as well as the apparent
disdain of petitioner towards respondent as can be seen through the acts of Alcoreza, the
immediate response of respondent to seek help from Tulfo, and the antecedent events, were all
considered in determining the existence of illegal dismissal. Accordingly, the Court finds no
error on the part of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC in ruling that respondent was illegally
dismissed, and thus entitled to backwages and separation pay.

In closing, while the Court recognizes that the management has the discretion and prerogative to
regulate all aspects of employment, which includes the transfer of employees, work assignments,
discipline, dismissal and recall of workers, the exercise of power is not absolute as “it must be
exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor.”[80] More important,
“management prerogative may not be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an
undesirable worker.”[81]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
11 Oct 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Family Code |
Nullity of Marriage | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari
to the Supreme Court

Maria Victoria Socorro Lonton-Cruz Vs. Nilo

Santos Cruz; G.R. No. 201988; October 11,
2017
DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The most challenging part of being in a difficult marriage is to thrive in one. In the case of
petitioner Maria Victoria Socorro Lontoc-Cruz (Marivi) and respondent Nilo Santos Cruz (Nilo),
their marriage withered as this was beset with problems such as the lack of quality time,
recriminations, disillusionment, loss of passion, and infidelity. The estranged spouses considered
their union as non-functional, attributing the failure of their marriage to their respective
personality disorders that repelled each other.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] challenges the November 22, 2011 Decision[2] and May
29, 2012 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93736 that affirmed the
Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 207, Muntinlupa City in Civil Case No.
05-095 which refused to declare the marriage void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Factual Antecedents

Twenty-two-year-old Marivi met 28-year old Nilo sometime in March 1986. They became
steady in August of the same year. Nilo, whose job was then in Hong Kong, prodded Marivi to
marry him so she could join him there soonest. Marivi agreed. The couple married in a civil
ceremony[5] on October 21, 1986 followed by a church wedding[6] on February 8, 1987. The
marriage produced two sons: Antonio Manuel, born on April 25, 1988, and Jose Nilo, born on
September 9, 1992.

On July 7, 2005, Marivi filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa City a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage[7] based on psychological incapacity. She averred that it had been medically
ascertained that Nilo was suffering from “inadequate personality disorder related to masculine
strivings associated with unresolved oedipal complex,”[8] while she herself was found to be
suffering from a “personality disorder of the mixed type, [h]istrionic, [n]arcissistic with
immaturity x x x.”[9]

To show that Nilo failed to provide her with the necessary emotional, psychological, and
physical support, Marivi cited the following:
 1. His infidelity and his non-commitment to the marriage as he continued to act like a
bachelor;
2. The lack of ‘oneness’ in the marriage as Nilo would make decisions (on financial
matters) without consulting or considering her suggestions; treating her as a housemate or
a “mayordoma;” keeping from her his whereabouts, when he would come home or how
much his income was;
3. The lack of sexual contact for more than a decade as Nilo made excuses;
4. Putting up a facade that he is a caring, concerned, and loving husband, especially to his
bosses; and
5. Preference towards the company of his peers/friends.[10]

In his Answer,[11] Nilo claimed that he was madly in love with Marivi; that at the start of their
relationship, both he and Marivi would exhibit negative personality traits which they overlooked;
that he believed that both he and Marivi were suffering from psychological incapacity; and that
he was not singularly responsible for the breakdown of their marriage. He stressed that Marivi
also contributed to the deterioration of their union, to wit:

1. Marivi would demand that he behave in ways he was not accustomed to or inconsistent
with his career position;
2. Marivi was jealous of his friends; and would often make hasty conclusions that he was
having an affair with other women;
3. Marivi would exhibit volatile temperament if things did not go her way; would not admit
mistakes, and blame others instead;
4. Marivi would make decisions impulsively, such as changing an item she gets tired of, or
demanding that Nilo change a motor vehicle simply because she did not like it; and
5. She lacked respect for Nilo, and would speak to him degradingly, and even accuse him of
being gay or a homosexual.[12]

On October 11, 2006, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision[13] approving the parties’
Compromise Agreement[14]pertaining to custody, support, and dissolution of the properties. Trial
on the issue of the nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity ensued.

Marivi’s Version

Marivi narrated that when they were still going steady, Nilo would only spend Saturdays and
Sundays with her and devote the weekdays to partying with his friends; that even after their
engagement, Nilo would still meet other women and accept invitations to beauty pageants and
cocktails;[15] that Nilo was not the type who would kiss passionately; that Nilo would not engage
in foreplay during sex, but wished only to satisfy himself; that Nilo would engage in anal sex and
would only stop when she complained that it was painful; that Nilo would thereafter sleep,
leaving her feeling “used,” and that Nilo was impulsive, daring, and adventurous.[16]

She also claimed that Nilo would habitually come home late; that Friday nights were Nilo’s
boys’ night out; that unless she would ask him to take her out on a date, Nilo would not do so;
and that Nilo would call her a “nagger” even if she was merely asking him to come home
early.[17]
Marivi further narrated that Nilo would engage in extramarital affairs; that a few months into
their marriage, Nilo had an affair with an unmarried female officemate;[18] that Nilo ended the
affair only after she (Marivi) threatened to tell his employer/supervisor;[19] that Nilo had another
affair a few weeks after the birth of their second son; that when confronted with his womanizing
and made to choose between her and the children or the other women, Nilo replied that he was
“confused,”[20] which prompted her to leave and stay in Cebu with her parents; and that she heard
from her friends that while she was in Cebu, Nilo was living a bachelor’s life.[21]

Marivi added that she eventually reconciled with Nilo but despite the reconciliation, Nilo never
really changed, and that he remained indifferent, insensitive, and unappreciative. According to
Marivi, she would instead call up her parents and sisters to talk about their family
problems;[22] that while he (Nilo) told people that he was proud of her, he never gave her the
emotional, psychological, and physical support she needed.[23] She felt like she was no more than
a mayordoma to him, and that they were just “housemates.” Nilo would come home late on
weekdays and preferred to go out with his friends. Their quarrels were frequent and their
conversations were superficial; Nilo would rather talk about himself, instead of asking Marivi
about her day or about their children. He was controlling and domineering,[24] and refused to
consider her suggestions; he would not want his money mingled with her (Marivi’s)
money.[25] Nilo would shell out money when he wanted to buy things, but would make excuses
when it came to Marivi’s suggestion for a family vacation.[26] Marivi also claimed that Nilo had
no sense of companionship with their children; and that Nilo even told their son that their brand
new house was everything to him.[27]

Marivi was moreover bothered by Nilo’s effeminate ways; he was vain and would have weekly
“beauty” treatments.[28] Furthermore, they no longer had sex after the birth of their second son.
While they tried to have sex twice, Nilo failed to have an erection. After that, Nilo would refuse
to have sex with her which made her (Marivi) question his sexual orientation, so much so that
Nilo physically hurt her when she questioned his virility.[29]

Marivi’s father, Manuel, likewise stated that Marivi would call them up for help because Nilo
had hurt her during the couple’s quarrel; that their marriage was not harmonious due to Marivi’s
youth and her unfamiliarity with Nilo’s personality and family values. He considered Nilo only
as a provider, not as a husband and a good father to his sons.[30]

Marivi’s younger sister, Margarita Ledesma (Margarita), who lived for four years with Nilo and
Marivi, claimed to have witnessed how lonely Marivi was. She alleged that Nilo was absent
when Marivi gave birth to their second son; that Nilo was short-tempered when driving; and that
the couple would often fight because Nilo would always come home late or because Marivi
suspected Nilo of infidelity. Margarita believed that Nilo did not really want to save the
marriage, although he told her that he loves Marivi and the children.[31]

Nilo’s Version

Nilo acknowledged his contribution to the breakdown of the marriage because his job required
him to come home late, his inability to sexually perform adequately, his failure to be the “ideal
husband,”[32] and because he had had extramarital affairs in the years 1992, 2002, and
2006.[33] At the same time, Nilo insisted that Marivi also contributed to the collapse of their
union.

According to Nilo, Marivi would always want to know his companions and whereabouts; would
demand information about his female acquaintances; and would even call up his workplace to
ask where he was. Moreover, her conceit and her “prima donna” attitude embarrassed him.
Marivi would order him to act in accordance with their stature in life, and would demand that he
instruct his office staff to accord her special treatment as Hewlett Packard’s “first lady” during
the time that he was Hewlett Packard’s President. Marivi would also instruct their housemaids to
call him “señorito;” and she would make a “big deal” out of her being a “mestiza,” and would
think of herself a “trophy wife.”[34]

Nilo claimed that Marivi was “unappreciative” of him, had a misdirected sense of self-
entitlement, and would complain if she did not get her own way, as she was used to, she being
her father’s favorite daughter; Marivi did not even care about discussing family finances with
him as long as she got what she wanted. She also had a violent temper and would hurl things at
him during their fights; that she would blame him for everything, and would keep on reciting his
past mistakes. Marivi did not understand the demands of his job, and unfairly compared his work
to her father’s job, the operation of which was limited to a single area, a compound in a mine site
in Cebu. He explained that the multinational companies he then worked for required him to work
beyond the normal office hours because he has to meet “sales quotas in millions of dollars,”
entertain people from different headquarters, and meet with different clients from areas far from
his residence.[35]

Worse, Nilo was turned off by Marivi’s act of broadcasting to her whole clan his inadequacies
during their intimate sexual relations, which began after he witnessed Marivi giving birth to their
first child. When he confided to Marivi about this, she instead accused him of having another
affair. Since then, he did not feel any sexual excitement and attraction toward her when they
were together. Instead of discussing the problem with him candidly, she accused him of being
gay. Nilo stated that the last time they had sex was in 1997 or in 1998.[36]

The Clinical Findings

In support of her claim that she and Nilo were suffering from psychological incapacity, Marivi
presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Ruben Encarnacion (Dr.
Encarnacion), a clinical psychologist.

Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nilo to have “inadequate personality disorder related to masculine
strivings associated with unresolved oedipal complex,”[37] while she diagnosed Marivi to have
“personality disorder of the mixed type, [h]istrionic, [n]arcissistic, with immaturity x x x.”[38]

In the March 21, 2005 Psychiatric Report,[39] Dr. Villegas stated:

The root cause of the above clinical conditions on the part of Marivi Cruz, were the
overindulgence and over attention of her parents, in a prolonged manner, carried over to adult
adjustments. On the part of Nilo Cruz, his negative identification and resentments towards his
father and close attachments to his mother, continued by his long-time maid, to the point of an
oedipal situation led to his inadequacy, along masculine strivings, with difficult assertions of his
authority and power.

The above clinical conditions existed prior [to] marriage but became manifest only after the
celebration due to marital stresses and demands. Both are considered as permanent in nature,
because they started early in their developmental stage, and therefore became so deeply
engrained into their personality structures. Both are considered grave in degree, because they
hampered, interfered and disrupted their normal functioning related to heterosexual
adjustments.[40]

According to Dr. Villegas, both parties could not tolerate each others’ weaknesses and that the
incapacities of the parties are grave because they preferred to satisfy their own needs rather than
to give in to the other’s needs.[41]

She claimed that Nilo’s lack of a father figure weakened his masculinity. He cross-identified
himself with his mother because his father, a disciplinarian and the thrifty one, was often absent
because of his military service. While he was still a teenager, his mother migrated to Canada and
their long-time maid acted as his surrogate mother. Nilo sought from his wife his mother’s
nurturing qualities, but he felt hostility when Marivi failed to meet his ego ideal. His aggression
was in the form of passivity, punishing his wife by not sexually performing.[42]

Dr. Villegas noted that Nilo would put on a facade, a compensatory mechanism according to
social norms. While he was not exactly a homosexual. he covered up his weak masculine traits
by being a “playboy.” Nilo could only comply with the financial obligation of marital life, but
not the psychological and emotional parts of it.[43] Nilo likewise was an inadequate father figure
to his own two sons, especially the younger, who has already manifested strong feminine
traits.[44]

Marivi, on the other hand, expected that her interactions with the world would be like that of her
own close-knit family, a perception attributable to her parents’ prolonged gratification of her
dependency needs. Her father was a dedicated, devoted, and responsible family man who
regularly came home to spend time with them, while her mother was a good housewife, who
always found time to personally attend to their needs. Dr. Villegas described Marivi as one with
strong mood fluctuations, emotionally immature, with low self-esteem, has difficulty
neutralizing the outbreak of negativity in her behavior, is suggestible, egocentric, and impelled
by a desire to “extort” from others. To Dr. Villegas, the couple’s respective personality disorders
were mutually repelling, their brain waves not being in sync because what Marivi expected from
Nilo happened to be Nilo’s weakest point.[45]

Dr. Encarnacion supported Dr. Villegas’ diagnosis. On the basis of Nilo’s five-to-six sessions
and Marivi’s eight bi-weekly psychotherapy sessions with him, Dr. Encarnacion concluded that
there was no chance of a successful marriage in a dysfunctional union when there is double
psychological incapacity. He categorically stated that Nilo was incapable of being a good
husband and a good father. Nilo lacked an individual coherent identity and instead went by the
standards of general society, which is driven by the desire to gain material wealth, power, and
control. Nilo did not like close relationships and was incapable of forming some; his social
anxiety, associated with paranoid fears, was manifested by excessive vanity. Nilo projected an
image of a wealthy, successful, handsome man surrounded by women, in none of whom,
however, he was interested in a long-term sexual relationship; he saw himself as a performer-
provider and was disinterested in spending quality time with his family, in carrying on
conversations with members of his family, insensitive, intolerant, and demanding.[46]

Dr. Encarnacion attributed respondent’s psychological disorder to his childhood, in which he did
not have fond memories of tender moments and vacation times with his family. Nilo grew up
very close to his mother who always listened to his complaints and with whom he sympathized,
hence his unresolved oedipal issues; even as he patterned his masculinity strivings after his
stingy father, the family provider, but whom he nonetheless described as “unappreciative,
undemonstrative, and quite materialistic.” At the age of 18, when his parents migrated to Canada
and left him in the Philippines, he then lost his role models, incapacitating him from creating his
own identity. Thus, when he began working at the age of 21, he imbibed the values of his
workplace, where feelings and emotional discussions were absent, factors that nonetheless
somehow worked to his advantage in his job.[47] Dr. Encarnacion opined that Nilo’s incapacity
was his “rigidity,” which drove him into imposing his family upbringing on his own family,
instead of adjusting to the modem family setup, i.e., that the modem father should take on new
roles and be part of family activities where his family needs him to be, e.g. taking the children to
the pediatrician or to the park, camping with the family, or being with them in church, instead of
strictly confining himself to being a provider.[48]

As for Marivi, Dr. Encarnacion found that she exhibited “Histrionic Personality Behaviors and
Features” as manifested by her impressionistic speech, her exaggerated expression of emotions,
and her suggestibility. He stated that Marivi’s “inflexibility” consisted in her expecting a high
standard of faithfulness from all men as exemplified by her dad, who was also very devoted to
her mother. However, because dissatisfied and frustrated by her actual marital situation, she
sought attention, externalized blame, displayed anger, mistrust, resentment, and self-
indulgence.[49]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its October 13, 2008 Decision,[50] the RTC denied the Petition.

The RTC took a dim view of the expert witnesses’ attribution of a double psychological
incapacity to Marivi’s nature of being a “father figure woman,” and to Nilo’s “oedipal complex.”
The court noted that Marivi already disengaged herself from her father as her standard of an ideal
husband when she married Nilo, despite the latter’s limitations and his then being already very
focused on his job. Marivi’s need for assurance that she is loved, vis-a-vis her looking up to her
father as her standard, was not by itself sufficient to declare her psychologically incapacitated.

As for Nilo, the RTC found no concrete evidence of “oedipal complex;” the RTC held that
prioritizing his work over the emotional needs of his family was not reflective of his
psychological incapacity because what he did was still for his family’s benefit. Neither was
Nilo’s lack of sexual interest in Marivi a case of psychological incapacity, for this was a result of
his being turned off by Marivi’s unabated naggings and her revelations to her family of his
sexual inadequacies.

From the RTC’s verdict, petitioner appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its November 22, 2011 Decision,[51] the CA united with the RTC in rejecting the alleged.
existence of psychological incapacity pointed out by Dr. Villegas and by Dr. Encarnacion.

The CA found that Dr. Villegas and Dr. Encarnacion failed to paint a clear picture of the
supposed gravity or seriousness of Nilo’s psychological incapacity, and that it was unconvinced
of the doctors’ conclusion that Nilo had a deep propensity to cover up for his serious
inadequacies.

It ruled that Marivi failed to prove that Nilo’s failure to comply with his sexual obligation was
due to some psychological condition or makeup, as this could very well be explained by the
stress brought about by Marivi’s negative attitude toward Nilo, who was turned off by her act of
revealing to her clan their bedroom secrets instead of privately resolving the problem with him.
Moreover, the CA said it is a non sequitur, that just because he could not sexually perform
according to Marivi’s standard, he should thus be labelled a gay or homosexual. It appears that
Nilo has “selective” impotency, for while he could not have an erection for Marivi, he
nevertheless had had extramarital affairs. Neither did the CA see anything wrong with Nilo’s
“put-on facade” of a happy marriage to protect the family’s privacy.

The CA did not even consider Marivi’s alleged histrionic traits as ref1ected in her behavior, e.g.,
her persistent demand as to Nilo’s whereabouts, her constant naggings, her attention-seeking
acts, grave or serious enough to qualify as psychological incapacity. The CA ruled that it was the
couple’s irreconcilable differences that marred their marriage; that the negative acts or actions of
one spouse were neutralized or offset by the other’s negative acts or actions, and that these are
“mere character flaws or bad habits that the spouses developed over the years [which] can be
modified or changed depending on the desire of either spouse to do so.”[52] The CA thereafter
disposed of the appeal, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in CV No. 05-
095 denying the petition tor declaration of nullity of marriage between appellant Maria Victoria
Socorro Lontoc-Cruz and appellee Nilo Santos Cruz for insufficiency of evidence is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[53]

Marivi moved for a reconsideration but it was denied in the CA’s May 29, 2012 Resolution.[54]

Issue
At issue before us is whether the psychological conditions of the parties fall under Article 36 of
the Family Code to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling

We sustain the findings of both the RTC and the CA. Article 36 of the Family Code states:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

We have laid down guidelines in interpreting and applying this provision. In Republic v. De
Gracia,[55] we reiterated the doctrine in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[56] “that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical
antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved).” Also, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[57] we reiterated the well-settled guidelines in
resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, as embodied in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,[58] viz.:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x.

xxxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.

xxxx

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ‘the time of the celebration’ of the marriage.
x x x.

xxxx

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x x
x.

xxxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, ‘mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts’ cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.

xxxx

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
x x x.

xxxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. x x x.

Notably, “mere showing of ‘irreconcilable differences’ and ‘conflicting personalities’ [as in the
present case,] in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.”[59] “Nor does failure of the parties
to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons” amount to psychological
incapacity.[60] We further elucidated in Yambao v. Republic[61] that the psychological condition
should render the subject totally unaware or incognitive of the basic marital obligations:

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations
or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations
of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological illness.[62]

In Marcos v. Marcos,[63] the actual medical examination of the one claimed to have
psychological incapacity is not a condition sine qua non, for what matters is the totality of
evidence to sustain a finding of such psychological incapacity. While it behooves this Court to
weigh the clinical findings of psychology experts as part of the evidence, the court’s hands are
nonetheless free to make its own independent factual findings. “It bears repeating that the trial
courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the
expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of
the proceedings.”[64]
With specific reference to the case before us, even granting that both parties did suffer from
personality disorders as evaluated by the expert witnesses, we find that the conclusions reached
by these expert witnesses do not irresistibly point to the fact that the personality disorders which
plague the spouses antedated the marriage; that these personality disorders are indeed grave or
serious; or that these personality disorders are incurable or permanent as to render the parties
psychologically incapacitated to carry out and carry on their marital duties. What can be inferred
from the totality of evidence, at most, is a case of incompatibility. For a personality disorder to
be declared clinically or medically incurable or permanent is one thing; for a spouse to refuse or
to be reluctant to perform his/her marital duties is another.[65]

Indeed, we are loath to overturn the findings of the RTC and the CA. More than that, too, the
evidence on record do not square with the existence of psychological incapacity as contemplated
by law and jurisprudence. In the case of Nilo, what brought about the breakdown of his
relationship with Marivi was not necessarily attributable to his so-called “psychological
disorder” but can be imputed to his work and marital stress, and his ordinary human failings.

With regard to his failure to sexually perform “adequately,” the same appeared to be a case of
“selective impotency,” as he was turned off by Marivi’s disclosure of their bed secrets to her
family. Furthermore, Nilo testified that the sexual problem with Marivi did not crop up until the
birth of their second son, and that he felt that the blame was invariably and unfairly laid on upon
him, thus:

THE COURT:
The Court has just some questions with regard to the main issue. During your direct
testimony; Mr. Witness, you mentioned some of your faults which [may be] the reason why
the instant case was filed. x x x one of those faults is no sex. When did that happen? x x x

A. If I recall it right, Your Honor; I [had] some challenge[s] immediately after the first birth of
my eldest son which I x x x shared with the psychologist or psychiatrist who [had]
examined me.

THE COURT:
But when you got married with your wife that was not a problem until the birth of your last
son?

A. Yes, your Honor.

ATTY. STA MARIA, JR.:

Q. So it is attributable to the petitioner though you claim that it is your fault, is that correct?
A. Because, your Honor, that kind of situation, I always get blamed, so for the purpose of
settling all these questions, when you make that mistake, you’ll always be the one to be
blamed although as per the psychologist and the psychiatrist, there’s also a reason why I am
not able to perform sex to my wife because in those ten (10) years that we were together,
after the first one, [didn’t] have any other affairs but I kept being blamed that I [had] just
because I [was] not able to perform sex to her. The whole family, her family knows that in
that premise because I got, one time, in one of our quarrels x x x told me, “maybe you’re not
 making love with my daughter because you are having an affair with another woman.” So, I
know I made a mistake in the past but if I’m x x x kept [being] reminded of it, it’s a
punishment, your Honor.

xxxx

Q. What you initially said was your fault was…as you’re now talking before this Honorable
Court, is really the fault of the petitioner; is that what you are saying?
A. There [were] times, your Honor, I would say it was my fault. There [were] times it was
caused by her faults as well. It’s not one plus one it was hers and one plus one it was mine,
it depends on the situation. We’ve been dealing with cases before so not all the time it’s the
fault of Mrs. Cruz. And not all the time it’s the fault of Mr. Cruz. It’s a relationship, there
are times it’s hers, there are times, it’s mine but we’re able to fix it until this annulment
situation came.

x x x x[67]

Nor can it be said that Nilo’s failure to provide quality time for the family was caused by his
“inadequate personality disorder” or “unresolved oedipal complex.” Nilo explained that he has a
taxing and demanding job, and that unfortunately, with his working hours eating up his home
life, while he was able to provide his family with an adequate standard of living, the lack of
quality time for his wife became attenuated and resulted in severing his bond with Marivi, who
failed to understand the nature of his job. They were a happy couple during the period of
courtship, and even during the early years of their marriage. Nilo testified:

ATTY. REVILLA:
Q. x x x What was the reason why you had to stay up late?
A. Ma’am, I’m…in those I.T. companies that I worked for whether manager or managing
director, my companies are…the companies are involved in sales and marketing and support
so it entails entertainment of clients, entertainment of principals coming from headquarters
and entertainment of customers with my staff and other company.

Q. When you say I.T., what does it stand for?

A. Information Technology.

Q. You also referred to a headquarters. What do you mean by headquarters?

A. Headquarters, if you work in a multinational company like companies I worked for, they
have headquarters in Hong Kong, they have headquarters in Singapore, they have
headquarters in the U.S.

Q. So you had to entertain principals corning from [these] headquarters?

A. As a part of the job as required by the principals who [visit] us.

Q. How often were you required to stay out late because of your job?
A. Ma’am, it is unpredictable. Sometimes, we were required to stay for dinner and
entertainment thereafter. Sometimes, we can go home early also.
Q. Could you not refuse the invitations of going out and just go home and spend time with your
family?
A. Sometimes I can refuse, sometimes I cannot. Because it becomes a condition of sale of the
clients x x x.

xxxx

Q. So x x x what’s the latest time of the night that you usually come home?
A. My objective as a husband and as a father is to really come as early as I can which I have
explained on and on, your Honor. But to meet my million dollar targets of the country, I
have to do things beyond 5 o’clock. In several occasions when I tried to go home early, to
my disappointment, my kids are not at home because they were borrowed by my in-laws to
have merienda. That’s why I complained to my wife that time that “please tell me if they are
going with my in-laws because I don’t want to deprive them also of the few times I’m able
to go home early.”

Q. So, you are saying that you only have few times of coming home early?
A. Well, yes, but not very few.

Q. Okay. Have you tried to make an effort to remedy the situation?

A. Well, if I have my way to be able to direct my appointments in the South, my meetings in
Amkor Anam, Mamplasan, in Sta. Rosa then that will allow me to be home at least 5-6
o’clock. But most of my meetings in Makati, Quezon City, Manila especially with
government clients [do] allow me to go home early, your Honor.
x x x x[68]

THE COURT:
What about another fault you mentioned which is staying late, when did this thing happen?

A. When I came back from my assignment in Hong Kong in 1988 when I was given a new job
in sales and marketing.

xxxx

THE COURT:
So before the birth of your children, that is after your marriage with the petitioner, this was
not a problem?

A. Because, your Honor, I was assigned in Hong Kong and I was only twelve (12) minutes
[away] by [foot] to our office x x x.

xxxx
 And I was not in [sales] and marketing, I was the Administrative Assistant of the President
of IBM in Southeast Asia so it’s the…purely management administrative work as an
administrative assistant so there’s [not] much of entertaining done in Hong Kong.

THE COURT:
Okay, so in other words, at that time, that was not a problem. It was only a problem when
you were appointed to your position in…

A. IBM.

THE COURT:
That was so many years after you got married with your wife?

A. We got married, your Honor, in 1987 then we went back to the Philippines in July 1988
[when] I was given a new marketing and [sales] role as a manager of general marketing
which is…which encompasses all industries aside [from] the government.

THE COURT:
So you mean to say that this problem of staying late only happened lately?

xxxx

A. The definition, your Honor, of my family…late is when you don’t make it at 7:00 o’clock
or…[with] the family at 7:00 o’clock in the evening. So if I don’t make it at seven, I
considered myself late.

THE COURT:
What is the reason why you have been late?

A. Your Honor, my job is not a 9 to 5 job because we…we call on customers, we entertain
customers, partners, principals, we also have fellowship with our teams. So, we either have
dinner or we have happy hours. We also see friends after. So but, physically I cannot do that
everyday, your Honor, because I also wake up automatically at 6:00 everyday whether I
have a drink, or have dinner, or I worked out in the evening or play[ed] basketball during
that time, I always wake up at six. So if I stayed up late like previously…like 2, 3, it’s
gonna be a burden for me physically and [I would be] unable to perform my job well. So,
like I mentioned earlier in a hearing, your Honor, many times I tried to be home by 10 to be
able to watch. Before 10 to be able to watch the 10:00 o’clock news and be able to enjoy my
ice cream while watching it.

THE COURT:
Well, one of those faults you mentioned is also working hard, why did you say that it is your
fault?

A. In our industry, your Honor, when you work out, you will definitely end up late several
couple of times, but not all the time.
xxxx

Your Honor, sometimes, I get all these complaints. But when they saw my picture in the
newspaper or in the TV having success stories and contract signing, they are proud of me.

THE COURT:
When you say “so proud of me,” to whom are you referring x x x?

A. My family. They call me, they congratulate me, we have dinners together to celebrate but to
get to that, is the working hard and staying away from the family.

xxxx

THE COURT:
How long did you court your wife?

A. Six (6) months, your Honor.

x x x x[69]

THE COURT:
Could you say that you were a perfect couple at that time?

A. When we were starting, your Honor, we [were] happy, and during the time that we were in
Hong Kong. But when we went back to Manila, there are times (the witness is in
tears)…adjusting to work and family that is why it affected my relationship to her family
and combination of mistakes happened which I admitted.

THE COURT:
How would you describe your wife during your first years of marriage?

A. [She was] a very good wife.

THE COURT:
Did she perform her duties as a wife and as a mother?

A. Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:
And was she that independent from her parents or she was too dependent [on] her parents?

A. On her performing her duties, with the…as a wife and as a friend, she’s independent. When
it comes to our problems, she would consult her family.

THE COURT:
 So only those times when you have a problem. Like what problems, Mr. Witness?

A. Our relationship, your Honor.

THE COURT:
But most of the time, you were able to patch up your problems?

A. Yes, your Honor.

x x x x[70]

Interestingly, when asked if there was no more functional marital life between him and Marivi,
Nilo candidly highlighted his different perception from his estranged wife:

ATTY. STA. MARIA, JR.:

Q. So, Mr. Witness, well in reality today, Mr. Witness, even the petitioner believes that there is
no more functional marital life in this relationship, would you agree with that?
A. If that’s the way she thinks, I…I will have my own way of looking at things because…

xxxx

Q. Even…as I was saying since she was asking for nullity and you were asking for nullity, it’s
a fact of life as of today, as you speak today that there is no more functional marital life
between the two (2) of you?
A. You see, your Honor, that’s why we’re different. Her style is conclude and conclude. I have
a different style because of my background. I will only stop till death. I cannot share her
legal counsel’s statement with my own thinking, your Honor.

x x x x[71]

Even the psychiatrist Dr. Villegas pinpointed the differences of the estranged couple which led to
squabbles –

ATTY. STA. MARIA, JR.:

Q. Doctor, from your examination of both respondent and petitioner the obligation of trust and
respect for each other, how did it not manifest in this relationship?
A. The respondent [sees] the petitioner as one who’s very negativistic on him or who’s very
demanding and who is also trying to put him down because according to him, the petitioner
would always see his weak points rather than his strong points.

Q. Are you saying that this developed a non-trust just between them?
A. None trust. They do not trust each other anymore. On the part of the petitioner, because of
his womanizing activities and on the part of the respondent, that the petitioner is always
looking at his weak points rather than his strong points.

x x x x[72]
It is significant to note that Marivi failed to substantiate Nilo’s penchant for womanizing as a
manifestation of his psychological incapacity. Aside from her bare allegations, which were
chiefly based on what other people told her, she never presented irrefutable proof to corroborate
her claims of his sexual proclivities, i.e., that these proclivities were already existing before the
marriage and during the first years of their marriage. Nilo, on the other hand, categorically
admitted to having extramarital affairs in 1992, 2002, and 2006, the period when the marriage
was already on the rocks. Neither is there evidence of Nilo’s alleged oedipal complex, the
manifestations of which were not cited by the experts, that caused the couple to fall out of love.

Anent Marivi’s case, based on her family history as reflected in the experts’ clinical evaluation,
she grew up in a well-functioning, supportive, and emotionally healthy family environment.
Even Nilo himself attested that she was a good wife and a good mother to their children. Her
demand for attention, time, love, and fidelity is normal for a wife. The anger she felt within her is
also a legitimate reaction.

Yet the psychologist Dr. Encarnacion himself acknowledged that Marivi’s so-called
psychological incapacity is in fact, curable. Thus:

ATTY. REVILLA:
Q. So even without the respondent, Nilo Cruz, petitioner would still be psychologically
incapacitated?
A. I beg to [differ] from that because the needs were not fulfilled in this particular marriage,
it’s like a tendency to have cancer, but if you take care of yourself with the right
environment, you will not catch cancer. Those were previous positions, that’s why I called
them Histrionic Personality Traits Behaviors and Features not a full blown Histrionic
Personality Disorder, the needs were badly unfulfilled in this marriage because she married
a man who did not know the language of feeling of showing some attention towards his
spouse, meaning, if she is put in a relationship with a man who is able to address these
needs, she would be better, she would be better in a marriage.

Q. So this psychological incapacity of the petitioner is only dormant at the time that she was
not yet married?
A. Well, it’s grave…

Q. Was it grave already at the time…

A. Yes, it is, it’s grave but…

Q. Even before the marriage?

A. …but not incurable, that is the only adjective, grave, pre-existing…

Q. Pre-existing?
Grave and pre-existing, yes, incurable, no, in the sense that if she married properly if her
needs were addressed, it would not appear in that marriage.

Q. But because of her marriage to the respondent, are you saying now that her psychological
incapacity now…
A. Became an incapacity, yes.

Q. …became incurable?
A. No.

xxxx

Q. Okay. I am quite curious about the curability of the personality disorder of the petitioner.
Now, if her needs are satisfied with…in case, assuming the petitioner enters into another
relationship and her needs are satisfied then her incapacity is cured, is that what you’re
saying?
A. In effect, yes, in effect, yes.

Q. Would you say, what are these needs of the petitioner that [you’re]…not satisfied of the
respondent?
A. Need to be paid attention to, need to be valued, need to have an effect on someone, it is a
universal need. She was made to feel that she did not have any effect on him and so are the
children, x x x well, the father made the children feel that they, wife and two sons did not
have any effect on him, ma’am.

x x x[73]

Q. One last question. The needs of the petitioner, like you say, do you think she was able to
convey, clearly convey her needs to the respondent, properly convey?
A. Very clearly, yes, and then when they were still not being heard, well, iyon na nga eh, yung
hostility niya and resentment would get the better of her as a ano…so it would become
dysfunctional reaction upon reaction. That’s a good question.[74]

Upon the view we take of this case, thus, this Court believes that the protagonists in this case are
in reality simply unwilling to work out a solution for each other’s personality differences, and
have thus become overwhelmed by feelings of disappointment or disillusionment toward one
another. Sadly, a marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage.[75]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
09 Oct 2017 | Subject | Administrative Code | Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service |
Subject | Administrative Code | Gross Misconduct | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo | Subject | Administrative Code | Violation of Supreme Court Rules, Directives and Circulars

Re: Anonymous Complaints against Hon.

Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong, former
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 59, Lucena City, Quezon Province;
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2507; October 9, 2017
DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On April 16, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received two letters-complaints,
one from an anonymous sender[1] (first letter-complaint) and the other under the pseudonym
“Shirley Gomez”[2] (second letter-complaint), both narrating the difficulties encountered by the
employees of, and litigants appearing before, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City,
Branch 59 concerning then Presiding Judge Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong (Judge Bandong).

The first letter-complaint allege telenovelas; and, (5) Judge Bandong would unreasonably
demand that all checks covering her salaries and allowances be immediately delivered to her
upon release.

Further, Judge Bandong would unduly favor Criminal Case Clerk-in Charge Eduardo Febrer
(Febrer) thereby affecting the office dynamics negatively. Febrer, for his part, would always stay
out of the office and delegate his tasks to his co-workers, on top of their respective assignments.
Febrer would also look for records or process bail bonds only when given money by bonding
companies or litigants. While obvious to all, Judge Bandong seemed not to mind Febrer’s ways.

The second letter-complaint was of similar import. It claimed that Judge Bandong was not keen
on studying cases, and would inst ad direct her staff, except the utility worker, to talk to the
parties to settle the case at the outset. If the parties disagreed, Judge Bandong would repeatedly
postpone the hearing until such time that the parties would just opt to settle. In one instance,
Judge Bandong even pursued the settlement of a rape case notwithstanding that it was already
submitted for decision prior to her assumption as Presiding Judge of the branch. She ordered the
accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense, and when the Public Attorney’s Office lawyer refused
to assist the accused, Judge Bandong appointed another lawyer to the prejudice of the private
complainant whose efforts to obtain justice was put to naught.
Also, Judge Bandong would refrain from reading voluminous case records and would instead
order her staff, usually the stenographers and clerks, to make a digest or orally narrate to her the
circumstances of the case. Because of this, the stenographers could not attend to the transcription
of stenographic notes, causing them to pile up.

In addition, the second letter-complaint mentioned that Judge Bandong was especially fond of
Febrer, whose wife would also frequent the office and bring food for Judge Bandong. Because of
these, Judge Bandong tolerated Febrer’s act of receiving money from litigants.

On April 18, 2013, the OCA received another anonymous letter-complaint,[3] this time against
Febrer and the Court Interpreter of the same branch, Francisco Mendioro (Mendioro). It similarly
alleged that Judge Bandong would assign Febrer’s duties to other staff1nembers, leaving the
latter with nothing to do. It also mentioned Febrer’s scheme of demanding money from litigants
before attending to follow-ups of cases. The letter-complaint likewise pointed to Mendioro as the
person responsible for the missing records that would re-surface a few days later, a scheme on
the part of Mendioro to make money.

Acting thereon, the OCA indorsed the two letters-complaints against Judge Bandong and the
letter-complaint against Febrer and Mendioro to the Executive Judge of RTC Lucena City for
discreet investigation and report.[4]

Meanwhile, on November 20, 2013, the Court in A.M. No. 14889-Ret. approved the application
of Judge Bandong for optional retirement effective at the close of office hours of September 30,
2013.[5] However, her retirement benefits, except for the money value of her accrued leave
credits, were ordered withheld pending resolution of the two aforementioned letters-complaints
against her and of two other administrative complaints, to wit: (1) OCA IPI No. 12-3944-RTJ
entitled “Liberty R. Beltran v. Presiding Judge Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong“;[6] and (2) OCA
IPI No. 12-3963-RTJ entitled “Yolanda G. Maniwang v. Presiding Judge Dinah Evangeline B.
Bandong.”[7]

On February 26, 2014, the OCA received the separate reports[8]

of then RTC Lucena City Executive Judge Eloida R De Leon-Diaz (EJ De Leon-Diaz) on the
discreet investigations she conducted. While EJ De Leon-Diaz recommended the dismissal of the
charges against Febrer and Mendioro for want of concrete evidence, she opined otherwise with
respect to Judge Bandong.

EJ De Leon-Diaz revealed that even before the discreet investigation was made, the staff
members of Judge Bandong already requested detail to other branches on account of the
difficulties they experienced in dealing with the latter. Instead of acceding, EJ De Leon-Diaz
advised Judge Bandong to settle the issues between her and her staff. Judge Bandong refused to
heed EJ De Leon-Diaz’ advice and even scolded her staff for discussing their problems with the
Executive Judge. She allegedly told her staff not to listen to EJ De Leon-Diaz since it was her
(Judge Bandong), as the Presiding Judge of Branch 59, who has the final say on matters
concerning the branch. Because of the above-mentioned incident, EJ De Leon-Diaz claimed that
she continued to monitor the activities in Branch 59.
EJ De Leon-Diaz further stated that when Judge Bandong assumed office as Presiding Judge of
Branch 59, there were complaints from prosecutors, lawyers, and litigants regarding her failure
to conduct formal hearings in her court; compelling parties to conciliate even in criminal cases;
and admitting that she does not know how to conduct hearings and write decisions and
resolutions. Because of these, Judge Bandong had become the laughing stock of lawyers
appearing before the RTC Lucena City.

EJ De Leon-Diaz also confirmed the allegation that Judge Bandong pursued the settlement of a
rape case even if the same was already submitted for decision. The said incident, according to the
Executive Judge, even caused the prosecutor assigned at Judge Bandong’s sala to request detail
to another station due to her disappointment with the latter’s actuation.

Moreover, EJ De Leon-Diaz recounted that while conducting an observation of the courts in

RTC Lucena City, she noticed that no hearing was being conducted in the sala of Judge
Bandong. When she went inside, she found Judge Bandong in her chambers watching television
with feet on the table. Judge Bandong even invited EJ De Leon-Diaz to join her in watching but
the latter declined and advised her to just turn off the television and attend to her cases instead.
Later, the staff of Judge Bandong told EJ De Leon-Diaz that they were scolded by their boss for
their failure to warn her of the Executive Judge’s arrival. They also told her that the money used
to buy the television set of Judge Bandong came from their own contributions.

EJ De Leon-Diaz likewise confirmed the following charges: (1) Judge Bandong would assign
duties not commensurate to the plantilla positions of her staff, i.e., the Process Server was
assigned duties of a Clerk; the Utility Worker was assigned duties of a Process Server; and the
Stenographers were required to summarize cases; (2) it was the Legal Researcher who would
resolve cases; (3) Judge Bandong would unreasonably demand priority in the delivery of money
and checks no matter how small the amount; and, (4) Judge Bandong would exhibit eccentricities
and attitude problems. She disallowed her staff from talking to other court personnel and
instructed them to prevent the entry of other persons inside their office; she also at one time
padlocked their office and brought the keys with her to Infanta, Quezon, forcing her staff to
engage a locksmith so they could enter their office.

In view of the above, EJ De Leon-Diaz recommended that administrative charges tor gross
ignorance of the law, incompetence, and conduct unbecoming of a member of the bench be filed
against Judge Bandong.

In the Resolution[9] dated October 15, 2014, the Court, per recommendation of the
OCA,[10] resolved as follows:

1. CONSIDER the two (2) anonymous complaints filed on 1 April 2013 and 16
April 2013 against Presiding Judge Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong, RTC, Br. 59,
Lucena City, Quezon Province, and the Reports both dated 15 August 2013 of
Executive Judge Eloida R De Leon-Diaz on her discreet investigation on the
anonymous complaints as an ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT against former
Presiding Judge Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong;
 2. DIRECT the Division Clerk of Court to FURNISH former Judge Bandong with
copies of the two (2) anonymous complaints and the Reports both dated 15
August 2013 of Executive Judge Eloida R De Leon-Diaz;
3. REQUIRE Judge Bandong to COMMENT on the charges against her within a
period often (10) days from notice;
4. DISMISS the charges against Clerk III Eduardo Febrer and Court Interpreter
Francisco Mendioro, both of the RTC, Br. 59, Lucena City, Quezon Province for
lack of merit; and
5. DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to CONDUCT a JUDICIAL
AUDIT in the RTC, Br. 59, Lucena City, Quezon Province.x x x x[11]

In her Compliance[12] dated February 18, 2015, Judge Bandong vehemently denied the charges
against her. She instead imputed “sinister delight and malevolent glee” upon EJ De Leon-Diaz in
drafting the investigation report and even insinuated that EJ De Leon-Diaz could be responsible
for the two anonymous letter-complaints.[13]

Relevant portions of Judge Bandong’s comment to the charges against her are as follows:

That the entire staff of Branch 59 has come to her (EJ. De Leon-Diaz) personally to
communicate their grievances against Judge Bandong and request that they be detailed to the
other branches or offices of the court, leaving no support staff in Branch 59′ is too absurd and
far-fetched to be worthy of belief. First, while there may be at least a couple of ‘bad eggs’ in the
staff of Branch 59, the rest are practical and sensible enough to recognize the irrationality of
leaving the branch without a single member of its staff. Second, it is no secret that EJ De Leon-
Diaz is generally known, at least within the courthouse in Lucena City and local legal circles, to
be unapproachable to most, to the point of being fearsome.

xxxx

As to EJ. De Leon-Diaz’ claim that she received complaints that respondent ‘does not conduct
any formal hearings in her court’, the records will show otherwise. Information, though
unconfirmed, has reached [the] respondent that EJ. De Leon-Diaz has been spreading rumors to
that effect, all the way up to the Supreme Court. And because EJ. De Leon-Diaz is an absentee
judge, being always out of the courthouse, she has never seen how respondent has been working,
sometimes staying in court up to 8:00 o’clock at night, to meet her self-imposed deadlines for
court work.

There is simply no truth to EJ. De Leon-Diaz’ finding that respondent’s ‘former prosecutor asked
to be detailed in Laguna because she refused to conciliate criminal cases.’ The truth is that
former Prosecutor Alelie B. Garcia was already detailed in Laguna as early as April 2011 x x x
concurrently serving as prosecutor for Branch 59, and acted in both capacities until her
appointment as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court at Polillo Island on 09 September
2013.

EJ. De Leon-Diaz’ story about finding respondent ‘inside her chamber x x x, feet raised and very
relaxed in watching her favorite telenovela’ is a complete fabrication, a deliberate falsehood and
a vicious lie. It must be stressed here that respondent previously underwent surgery on account of
a complete fracture of her leg bone, and can neither walk long distances nor prop up her legs
without experiencing disabling pain. Consequently[,] respondent would never raise her feet on a
table, particularly one as high as that in her chambers at Branch 59, unless it was absolutely
necessary. EJ. De Leon-Diaz seems to have forgotten that respondent walks with a limp, or it
may have entirely escaped her notice. At any rate, it runs against respondent’s moral fiber to
watch a television show in lieu of hearing cases during the business hours of the court.

xxxx

About the television set: while other courts/branches have refrigerators, water dispensers and
other electrical appliances, Branch 59 procured only a television set for use during lunch break
which almost all members of the staff spent in court, to keep abreast of goings-on in the country
and elsewhere as well as for entertainment. Worth some Php6,000.00, respondent paid the
Php1,500.00 down payment while the balance was paid via contributions from the court
employees. Respondent also shouldered the expenses for the installation of a cable TV service
and the monthly subscription fees therefor while she was still presiding over Branch 59. The TV
set is, as far as respondent knows, still in [the] court.

xxxx

It is not ‘the Legal Researcher who resolves whatever is pending for the (respondent’s)
consideration’. That is the duty of respondent, which duty she discharges and fulfills by writing
the drafts of her own decisions, orders and other issuances, then affixing her signature to the
finalized form thereof. The Legal Researcher, Shiela Amandy, is asked to check the citations of
law and precedent, if any, that these drafts may contain, and proceed with the reduction of the
drafts into typewritten or printed form for respondent’s signature. Every decision or resolution
respondent made and signed was the product of her study of the facts alleged, the evidence
adduced, and the law and jurisprudence applicable to the case. Aware that such
decisions/resolutions are subject to challenge by the parties, respondent takes care to carefully
apply the law and precedent to the facts as shown by the evidence.

xxxx

Respondent did not and does not play favorites. An examination of her work in all the courts she
served will show that she is a fair, just and humane judge and leader, who does not tolerate
idleness and wrongdoing. She adheres to the principle that every member of the court staff
represents a spoke in the wheel of justice. For the wheel to keep turning, each spoke must give its
best and contribute its strength to the whole.

Branch 59’s caseload consists of approximately eighty percent (80%) criminal cases and twenty
percent (20%) civil and other cases. In view of the number of cases, the workload relative to
criminal cases could not be accomplished singlehandedly by Criminal Docket Clerk Eduardo
Febrer so that he was assisted by a provincial employee who was, however, appointed Process
Server of the Municipal Trial Court at Lucban, Quezon, in March 2013. Process Server Eric
Atienza was assigned to perform duties related to his position and functions, specifically the
service of notices, orders, subpoenae, etc. by registered mail. Prior to March 2013 Atienza’s
workload was very light – he had much time on his hands that he could afford to attend to his
bar/restaurant and construction contracting businesses as well as his functions as President of the
Process Servers Association of the Philippines during office hours. When Atienza was given his
new assignment of mailing notices, he became scarce, frequently absenting himself and when
present refusing to work at the office, forcing his co-employees Sheriff Grace Armamento, Clerk
III Madeleine Gaviola and OIC-Branch Clerk of Court Teodora Parfan to fill in for him. On
hindsight, respondent should have filed a case or cases against Atienza.

xxxx

There is no truth whatsoever to EJ. De Leon-Diaz’ report that respondent ‘closed the entire office
because she wanted her staff in San Pablo City as she was sick.’ Respondent prefers to rest in
private when she is under the weather or otherwise feels unwell, which preference is known to
her staff in Branch 59 and the other courts she had served, to friends and relations.

The story laying responsibility, nay, culpability, upon respondent for the keys that went missing
sometime in June 2013 while she was on official travel to Infanta, Quezon, is only for the
gullible. Even EJ. De Leon-Diaz[, is] or should be aware that respondent is not the custodian of
the keys to the offices of Branch 59, so that blaming respondent for their loss stretches logic and
reason, and is certainly unjustified and unreasonable. EJ. De Leon-Diaz exaggerates when she
reports that ‘The staff members are not allowed to talk to other court personnel, [that] no one
shall be allowed inside the office of Branch 59, even those court personnel who [have] important
business with any member of her staff, like to secure x x x stenographic notes in consolidated
cases pending before the other branches of the court’. [It was just that] the workplace was
rationalized whereby the staff was housed in a lower staff room open to the court-going public
and in the mezzanine which was off-limits to the public and non-Branch 59 personnel, the latter
for security reasons.

On Demands for Priority in the Delivery of Checks and Moneys

There is a payroll for the eight (8) judges presiding over the different branches of the Regional
Trial Court in Lucena City, which is prepared ahead of and apart from the payroll for the other
court employees. As a natural consequence, respondent received her paychecks ahead of her
staff, but she never demanded that the same be given ahead of the other judges.

EJ De Leon-Diaz’ confirmation of the claim that respondent wants to be prioritized in the

delivery of her checks appears to be a ploy on her part to cover or camouflage her own
shortcomings regarding her pay. Unconfirmed reports have it that the EJ has a lot of loans. But it
is a fact that there is a pending matter between Nedy Taringan and Lorelei Caranto, both
employees of Branch 54. It is also a fact that the EJ has not investigated this matter until the
present. Then there is talk that the EJ could not proceed with the investigation because she is in
deep monetary debt to both employees.

At any rate, whether or not the reports are true, the issue on priority in check delivery is too petty
to deserve any consideration. x x x[14]
In its Memorandum[15] dated August 19, 2015, the OCA informed the Court that in compliance
with the Resolution dated October 15, 2014, it dispatched a team to RTC-Lucena City, Branch
59 to conduct a judicial audit. In the course thereof, the OCA likewise conducted a parallel
investigation in connection with the complaints against Judge Bandong which yielded the
following:

x x x Four (4) of the court personnel, namely, OIC-Legal Researcher Shiela May Amandy, Court
Interpreter Francisco Mendioro, Clerk III Eduardo Febrer, and Process Server Eric Atienza gave
their respective sworn statements. OIC-Legal Researcher Amandy narrated her initial non-
designation by respondent Judge Bandong as OIC. Moreover, she confirmed the allegation that
respondent Judge Bandong belatedly conducted court hearings due to her habit of watching
Korean telenovelas and how she instructed her staff to give her a detailed update on the scenes
she missed whenever she was constrained to conduct hearings. OIC-Legal Researcher Amandy
stressed that respondent Judge Bandong practically delegated to her the duty of preparing court
decisions without any significant output from the latter.

Court Interpreter Mendioro confirmed respondent Judge Bandong’s obsession to watch

Korean telenovelas and revealed the latter’s peculiar manner of dressing up [in] public by
wearing dusters, slippers, and other household clothes. He expressed incredulity over respondent
Judge Bandong’s propensity to delegate cases (including appealed ones) for mediation even to
the lower-ranked employees such as the process server. On the other hand, Clerk III Febrer
denied being the pet employee of respondent Judge Bandong as he also received some dressing-
down from the latter. He also denied loafing around or looking for records only when there was
money involved. He, however, validated respondent Judge Bandong’s declaration that Process
Server Atienza’s frequent loitering prompted the magistrate to delegate to the latter the duty of
releasing orders and notices.

For his part, Process Server Atienza confirmed all the allegations against respondent Judge
Bandong and Clerk III Febrer, without[,] however[,] giving specifics. He asserted that he was
overloaded with tasks which are not part of his job description, including the mediation of cases,
to the detriment of his own workload. x x x[16]

Interestingly, Process Server Atienza (Atienza) also stated that there were allegations that their
former OIC, Stenographer Teodora Parfan (Parfan), was asking money in exchange of favorable
orders or decisions. In fact, Atienza, for several times, saw litigants giving money to Parfan in
their branch session hall. Later, the OCA investigating team came across a piece of paper which
appeared to be a handwritten receipt issued and signed by Parfan on November 27, 2014
indicating as follows: “Received the amount of P5,000.00 from Rowel Abella as partial
settlement of case.” Apparently, the said receipt pertained to Criminal Case No. 2005-1127, a
case for fiustrated homicide. The investigating team then tracked down the accused therein,
Rowell Abella (Abella), and private complainant’s father, Ruben de Ocampo (de Ocampo). They
both confirmed that after a scheduled hearing, Judge Bandong referred the parties to Parfan for
mediation.[17]

Considering the foregoing, the OCA evaluated the complaints as follows:

In the instant matter, respondent Judge Bandong is confronted with a considerable number of
charges. After a careful evaluation of the charges, this Office is convinced that most of them
failed to surpass and transcend the required substantial evidence to prove her culpability on said
allegations, either the charges against her were uncorroborated and inadequate, or because they
were merely derived from second-hand information, or because they were just too
inconsequential to merit the Court’s attention, viz.:

a. Her alleged predisposition to keep favorite employees;

b. Her alleged public admission of ineptitude when conducting trials and hearings
and/or propensity to compel litigants and lawyers to conciliate;
c. Her alleged failure to conduct trials and hearings;
d. Her alleged undue insistence for an immediate dispatch of her checks;
e. Her alleged proclivity to delegate her decision-making duty to her court
personnel; and,
f. Her alleged eccentricities and/or peculiar directives to her personnel.

Some of the above allegations might have been considered as serious enough to have merited a
deeper scrutiny had they been supported by additional evidence. Unfortunately, mere allegation
without any proof of the supposed improprieties committed by respondent Judge Bandong in the
anonymous letters and the report submitted by Executive Judge De Leon-Diaz is evidently not
sufficient to make her accountable for such misfeasance.

Still, this Office believes that substantial evidence exists against respondent Judge Bandong on
the following charges:

a. Her habit of watching TV programs during court trials and hearings;

b. Her predeliction to delegate mediation of cases to court personnel; and,
c. Her designation of Process Server Atienza to perform the functions and duties
appertaining to Clerk III Febrer.[18]

As to Judge Bandong’s habit of watching telenovelas during office hours, the OCA noted that (1)
EJ De Leon-Diaz had a first-hand information on this as she herself witnessed it; and (2) the
same was confirmed by Judge Bandong’s staff, namely, Atienza, Amandy, Febrer and Mendioro
in their respective sworn statements. For this, the OCA found Judge Bandong to have exhibited
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violated Sections 1 and 2, Canon 6 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct which mandate a judge’s strict devotion to judicial duties.

With respect to Judge Bandong’s practice of delegating to her court staff the mediation of cases,
this was confirmed by the sworn statements of Abella and de Ocampo which revealed that per
instruction of Judge Bandong, Stenographer Parfan caused the parties in Criminal Case No.
2005-1127 to enter into monetary settlement in order to terminate the case. Per A.M. No. 01-10-
5-SC-PHILJA dated October 16, 2001, cases where amicable settlement is possible should be
referred to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) which shall assist the parties in selecting a
duly accredited mediator. Judge Bandong therefore erred in not referring mediatable cases to the
PMC and in letting her staff, who were not accredited mediators, handle the mediation of cases.
This, according to the OCA, constituted grave misconduct
Anent Judge Bandong’s designation of (Process Server) Atienza to perform the duties and
functions pertaining to (Clerk III) Febrer, the OCA stressed that under Section 7, Canon IV of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, court personnel shall not be required to perform any
work or duty outside the scope of their assigned job description. Here, the OCA noted the
significant difference between the duties of a Clerk III, which are basically clerical in nature and
require one to be always in the office, and the duties of a Process Server, which require the latter
in the field to personally serve and/or mail court processes. The OCA opined that it is
incongruent to assign a Process Server with duties pertaining to a Clerk since the same would tie
down the former to the office to the detriment of his own work, which as mentioned, requires
him to be out of the office most of the time. While Judge Bandong might have had the best
intention in wanting to lighten the workload of Febrer, her assignment to Atienza of the duties
pertaining to Febrer, however, adversely affected another important aspect of court management,
that is, the prompt service of court processes. This, according to OCA, was counter-productive
and did not serve the ends of justice. Hence, it found Judge Bandong to have violated Supreme
Court circulars, rules and directives.

The OCA summed up its report as follows:

Recapitulating the three (3) charges discussed above, this Office believes that respondent Judge
Bandong is liable for (1) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service (for watching TV
during court trials and hearings), (2) gross misconduct (for erroneously referring cases for
mediation), and (3) violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars (for wrongful
delegation of duties to court personnel). Under Section 50, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), if the respondent is found guilty of two (2)
or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most
serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances. In the instant case,
the charge of gross misconduct is the most serious charge, making the charges of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and
circulars as aggravating circumstances. Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross
misconduct is punishable by dismissal from the service.

Considering, however, that respondent Judge Bandong has already retired from the service, this
Office finds wisdom in applying the principle laid down in Santiago B. Burgos vs. Clerk of Court
II Vicky A. Baes. In lieu of dismissal that the offense carries but which can no longer be
effectively imposed because of respondent Judge Bandong’s retirement, this Office recommends
the forfeiture of whatever benefits still due her from the government, except for the accrued
leave credits, if any, that she had earned. It is also recommended that she be barred from
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned
and controlled corporations.

xxxx

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office respectfully recommends that:

(a) the instant complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;

(b) retired Judge Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong, formerly of Branch 59, Regional Trial Court,
Lucena City, Quezon be found LIABLE for Gross Misconduct;

(c) considering that dismissal from the service can no longer be effectively imposed on
respondent Judge Bandong in view of her optional retirement effective 30 September 2013,
that whatever benefits still due her from the government, except for accrued leave credits, if
any, be FORFEITED and that she be BARRED from re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.

x x x x[19]

The Court’s Ruling

The Court partly adopts the findings and recommendations of the OCA.

Among the many charges against Judge Bandong, the OCA aptly found that only the following
were supported by substantial evidence: (1) Judge Bandong’s habit of watching television during
office hours; (2) her predeliction to delegate mediation of cases to court personnel; and (3) her
delegation to Process Server Atienza the performance of the functions and duties pertaining to
Clerk III Febrer. “In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is that of substantial
evidence.”[20] “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable
ground to believe that the [respondent] is guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the
evidence might not be overwhelming.”[21]Here, the other charges against Judge Bandong remain
to be mere allegations and therefore did not meet the mandated quantum of evidence. Rightly so,
Judge Bandong “should not be held responsible for allegations which were not
proven.”[22] However and as stated, it is otherwise with respect to the three charges specifically
mentioned as will be discussed below.

Judge Bandong’s habit of watching television programs during office hours

As noted by the OCA, Judge Bandong’s habit of watching telenovelas during office hours was
personally witnessed by EJ De Leon-Diaz. Aside from this, the staff of Branch 59 in their
respective sworn statements[23] uniformly attested that Judge Bandong would watch
Korean telenovelas during office hours thereby causing delay in the conduct of hearings.
Lawyers and litigants were made to wait until she had finished watching. Indeed, the report of EJ
De LeonDiaz regarding this matter and the consistent statements of the staff of Branch 59
already constituted substantial evidence On the other hand, Judge Bandong did not categorically
deny the charge and merely stated that “it runs against [her] moral fiber to watch a television
show in lieu of hearing cases during the business hours of the court.”[24]

Thus, the Court agrees with the OCA that Judge Bandong violated Sections 1 and 2, Canon 6 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provide, viz.:
 CANON 6
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.

SECTION 1. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other activities.

SECTION 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which include not
only the performance of judicial fi.mctions and responsibilities in court and the making of
decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court’s operations.

The Court has stressed time and again that “decision-making is the primordial x x x duty of a
member of the [bench].”[25] “No other [task] can be more important than decision-making x x
x.”[26] In the case of trial courts, the conduct of hearings is llllquestionably an important
component of their decision-making process and, conversely, all other official tasks must give
way thereto.[27] Hence, for a judge to allow an activity, and an unofficial one at that, to take
precedence over the conduct of hearings is totally unacceptable. It is a patent derogation of
Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 6 and a blatant disregard of the professional yardstick that “all judicial
[officials and] employees must devote their official time to government service.[28]

Additionally, Judge Bandong’s habit of watching television during office hours violates Section
7 of the same Canon 6 which requires Judges “not to engage in conduct incompatible with the
diligent discharge of judicial duties.” Watching telenovelas surely dissipates away Judge
Bandong’s precious time in the office, which, needless to say, has an adverse effect on the
prompt administration ofjustice.[29] Such activity is by all means counter-productive to the due
performance of judicial duties.

For the afore-stated violations, the Court finds Judge Bandong guilty of conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. “Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of [the] service x x x
pertains to any conduct that is detrimental or derogatory or naturally or probably bringing about
a wrong result; it refers to acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish – or tend to diminish – the people’s faith in the Judiciary.”[30] As correctly stated by
OCA, Judge Bandong’s “audacity to delay – and even interrupt – court trials and hearings just to
satisfy her obsession for soap operas [is w]ithout a doubt [a] reprehensible conduct [which]
lowers the people’s respect for the judiciary.”[31]

Judge Bandong’s predeliction to delegate mediation of cases to court personnel

Both the affidavits of De Ocampo and Abella confirmed that it was (Stenographer) Parfan who
mediated between them in Criminal Case No. 2005-1127. This was supported by the handwritten
receipt signed by Parfan (which the OCA investigating team came across in the course of its
investigation) purportedly showing partial payment of the settlement amount in the said criminal
case. Abella also categorically stated that it was Judge Bandong who referred them to Parfan. To
the Court, these are substantial evidence to support the subject charge against Judge Bandong.
Notably, Judge Bandong was silent about the matter. She totally fuiled to deny or proffer any
explanation for the same.
To decongest court dockets and enhance access to justice, the Court through A.M. No. 01-10-05-
SC-PHILJA approved the institutionalization of mediation in the Philippines through court-
annexed mediation. Along with this, structures and guidelines for the implementation of court-
annexed mediation were put in place. Trial courts, therefore, cannot just indiscriminately refer
for mediation any case to just anybody. For one, there are cases which shall[32] and shall
not[33] be referred to court-annexed mediation. For another, mediatable cases where amicable
settlement is possible must be referred by the trial courts to the PMC, who in turn, shall assist the
parties in selecting a mutually acceptable mediator from its list of duly accredited mediators.
Here, Criminal Case No. 2005-1127 involving frustrated homicide is apparently not a mediatable
case. Clearly on this score alone, Judge Bandong had already violated A.M. No. 01-10-05-SC-
PHILJA. Worse, Judge Bandong entrusted the settlement of the case to Parfan, a Court
Stenographer, who obviously was not a qualified, trained, or an accredited mediator. It must be
emphasized that while courts and their personnel are enjoined to assist in the successful
implementation of mediation, A.M. No. 01-10-05-SC-PHILJA does not authorize them to
conduct the mediation themselves. Mediation of cases can only be done by individuals who
possess the basic qualifications for the position, have undergone relevant trainings, seminars-
workshops, and internship programs and were duly accredited by the court as mediators. These
are to ensure that the mediators have the ability to discharge their responsibility of seeing to it
that the parties to a case consider and understand the terms of a settlement agreement. Unlike
therefore when the mediation is facilitated by an accredited mediator, there is great danger that
legal rights or obligations of parties may be adversely affected by an improper settlement if
mediation is handled by an ordinary court employee.

The above important points could not have been unwittingly missed out by Judge Bandong. As
opined by the OCA, Judge Bandong could not feign ignorance of A.M. No. 01-10-05-SC-
PHILJA since the Philippine Judicial Academy frequently conducts “conventions and seminars
for judges and clerks of court nationwide regarding the implementation of court-annexed
mediations and judicial dispute resolutions.”[34] To the mind of the Court, Judge Bandong
knowingly made the wrongful referral because her indolence got the better of her. Indeed, this
wanton disregard and mockery of the proper procedure in mediation of cases, as correctly held
by the OCA, was tantamount to misconduct.

Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a

forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong
behavior. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of
grave misconduct.[35]

Here, the misconduct committed by Judge Bandong was grave since the circumstances obtaining
established her flagrant disregard of the rules on referral of cases for mediation. Judge Bandong
committed a patent deviation from the rules when she wrongfully referred a non-mediatable case
to her staff, a court stenographer, who was not an accredited mediator. This was despite the
expectation that as a member of the bench, she not only knows the rules and regulations
promulgated by this Court but also faithfully complies with it. Indeed, Judge Bandong is guilty
of grave misconduct.

Judge Bandong’s delegation of the functions and duties of Clerk III Febrer to Process Server
Atienza

The separate sworn statements[36] of Atienza and Febrer confirmed the fact that the former was
assigned the duties and functions of the latter as Clerk III. Judge Bandong, on the other hand, did
not directly confront the subject charge and simply stated that: (1) the number of workload
relative to criminal cases could not be accomplished singlehandedly by Febrer as the Clerk-in-
Charge of criminal cases; and, (2) that prior to March 2013, Atienza’s workload was very light,
allowing him to attend to his other businesses as well as to his functions as President of the
Process Servers Association of the Philippines during office hours.[37] The consistent statements
of the two personnel involved in this charge vis-a-vis Judge Bandong’s ambivalent explanation
on the matter lead this Court to sustain the charge.

In Executive Judge Apita v. Estanislao,[38] the Court had the occasion to explain that:

While the [2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court which defines the general functions of all
court personnel in the judiciary] provides that court personnel may perform other duties the
presiding judge may assign from time to time, said additional duties must be directly related to,
and must not significantly vary from, the court personnel’s job description. x x x

Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel expressly states that court
personnel shall not be required to perform any work outside the scope of their job description,
thus:

Sec. 7. Court personnel shall not be required to perfonn any work or duty outside the scope of
their assigned job description.[39]

The rationale for this is as follows:

This rule is rooted in the time-honored constitutional principle that public office is a public trust.
Hence, all public officers and employees, including court personnel in the judiciary, must serve
the public with utmost responsibility and efficiency. Exhorting court personnel to exhibit the
highest sense of dedication to their assigned duty necessarily precludes requiring them to
perform any work outside the scope of their assigned job description, save for duties that
are identical with or are subsumed under their present functions.[40]

Clearly here, Judge Bandong violated Supreme Court circulars, rules and directives when she
delegated to Atienza the duties of Febrer as Clerk III. As explained by the OCA, the duties of a
Clerk III are not directly related to and significantly vary from those of a Process Server, viz.:

The duties of a Clerk III differ significantly from those of a Process Server. A Clerk III’s job is
basically clerical in nature and requires him to be always in the office to assist the clerk of court
in maintaining the integrity of the docket books of the court. A Process Server, on the other hand,
has the primary duty of serving court processes such as subpoenas, summons, court orders and
notices, thus, necessitating him to be mostly out of the office and in the field personally serving
and/or mailing court processes. Hence, it would be incongruent to assign a Process Server with
duties pertaining to that of a Clerk III since it would tie him down in the office to the detriment
of his own work accomplishment Evidently, a Clerk III’s duties are not directly related to, and
significantly vary from, the functions of a Process Server. Such arrangement diminishes the court
personnel’s professional responsibility and peak efficacy in the performance of their respective
roles in the administration of justice.[41]

Penalty

Under Sec. 46(B), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS), the offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is punishable by
suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense and dismissal
from the service for the second offense.

The penalty for grave or gross misconduct under Sec. 11 in relation to Sec. 8, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court is any of the following: “(1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of
the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; Provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.”

With respect to violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars, the same is
sanctioned by any of the following under Sec. 11 in relation to Sec. 9 of the same Rule 140: “(1)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than
three (3) months; or (2) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.”

Under Sec. 50, Rule 10 of the RRACCS, if the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges
or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding the most serious charge and
the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances. Here, the most serious charge against
Judge Bandong is grave or gross misconduct. As mentioned above, any of the three sanctions
therefor provided under Sec. 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court may be imposed for the said
charge. Considering Judge Bandong’s service to the government spanning 46 years[42] and also
the fact that she has not yet been previously penalized for an administrative offense, the Court
deems it proper to impose upon her the penalty of fme in the amount of P40,000.00 to be
deducted from her retirement benefits. It may be recalled, however, that the Court, in its
Resolution of November 20, 2013, ordered the withholding of Judge Bandong’s retirement
benefits pending the outcome of this case and of the then two other pending administrative cases
against her, to wit OCA IPI No. 12-3944-RTJ and OCA IPI No. 12-3963-RTJ. In view of this
decision and also of the January 29, 2014 Resolution in OCA IPI No. 12-3944-RTJ (dismissing
the complaint against Judge Bandong for involving issues that are judicial in nature and for lack
of merit) and the July 6, 2015 Resolution in OCA IPI No. 12-3963-RTJ (merely admonishing
Judge Bandong and directing her to refrain from further acts of impropriety), it is proper that
Judge Bandong’s retirement pay and other benefits be now ordered released after deducting the
fine herein imposed, subject to the usual clearance requirements, unless withheld for some other
lawful cause.

As a final note, it bears to emphasize that a judge’s “high and exalted position in the Judiciary
requires [her] to observe exacting standards of x x x decency and competence. As the visible
representation of the law and given [her] task of dispensing justice, a judge should conduct
[herself] at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and confidence of the people.”[43]

WHEREFORE, the instant complaints are RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter.

Retired Judge Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong, formerly of Branch 59, Regional Trial Court,
Lucena City, Quezon is hereby found GUILTYof Gross Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service, and Violation of Supreme Court Rules, Directives and Circulars for
which she is imposed a FINE of P40,000.00 to be deducted from whatever retirement pay and
other benefits which may be due her. The Financial Management Office of the Office of the
Court Administrator is directed to release Judge Bandong’s retirement pay and other benefits
after deducting the fine herein imposed, unless withheld for some other lawful purpose.

SO ORDERED.
02 Oct 2017 | Jurisprudence | Subject | Civil Law | Just Compensation | Ponente | Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo

Department of Agrarian Reform Vs. Susie Irene Galle/Land Bank of the Philippines Vs.
Susie Irene Galle; G.R. No. 171836/G.R. No. 195213; October 2, 2017
02 Oct 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Labor and
Employment | Non-payment of Salaries, Benefits, Claims and Damages | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil
Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. and Columbian Shipmanagement, Ltd. Vs.

Eduardo J. Godinez/Eduardo J. Godinez Vs. Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. and
Columbian Shipmanagement, Ltd.; G.R. No. 206826/G.R. No. 206828; October 2, 2017
27 Sep 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Labor and
Employment | Non-payment of Salaries, Benefits, Claims and Damages | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil
Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

TSM Shipping (Phils.), Inc. and MST Marine Services Phils, Inc. Vs. Shirley G. De Chavez;
G.R. No. 198225; September 27, 2017
26 Sep 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil
Procedure | Rule 65 - Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

Engr. Oscar A. Marmeto Vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC); G.R. No. 213953;
September 26, 2017
25 Sep 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Labor and
Employment | Non-payment of Salaries, Benefits, Claims and Damages | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil
Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc., its President, and Gulf Energy Maritime; G.R. No.
211111; September 25, 2017
20 Sep 2017 | Subject | Civil Law | Inherited Properties | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme
Court

Roberto A. Torres, et al. Vs. Antonia F. Aruego; G.R. No. 201271; September 20, 2017
14 Sep 2017 | Subject | Criminal Law | Estafa | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
| Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Jesus V. Coson Vs. People of the Philippines; G.R. No. 218830; September 14, 2017
11 Sep 2017 | Subject | Criminal Law | Art. 266-A Rape | Subject | Criminal Law | Child Abuse |
Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo

People of the Philippines Vs. Robert Balanza; G.R. No. 207943; September 11, 2017
11 Sep 2017 | Subject | Criminal Law | Art. 266-A Rape | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo
People of the Philippines Vs. Melchor Panes y Magsanop; G.R. No. 215730; September
11, 2017
06 Sep 2017 | Subject | Criminal Law | Art. 266-A Rape | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo

People of the Philippines Vs. Amante Padlan y Leones; G.R. No. 214880; September 6,
2017
06 Sep 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Civil Law | Loans and
Mortgages | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme
Court

Sps. Firmo S. Rosario and Agnes Annabelle Dean-Rosario Vs. Priscilla P. Alvar; G.R. No.
212731; September 6, 2017
05 Sep 2017 | Subject | Civil Service | Dismissal or Disqualification | Subject | Administrative Code |
Gross Ignorance of the Law | Subject | Administrative Code | Gross Misconduct | Jurisprudence |
Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Administrative Code | Simple Misconduct

Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
170, Malabon City; A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC; September 5, 2017
30 Aug 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Administrative
Complaint | Notary Public

Cesar O. Sta. Ana, et al. Vs. Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes; A.C. No. 6980; August 30, 2017
30 Aug 2017 | Subject | Administrative Code | Gross Misconduct | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo

Ms. Florita Palma and Ms. Filipina Mercado Vs. Judge George E. Omelio, et al.; A.M. No.
RTJ-10-2223; August 30, 2017
30 Aug 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil
Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court | Subject | Taxation | Tax Amnesty

Edison (Bataan) Cogeneration Corporation Vs. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue/Republic of the Philippines represented by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue Vs. Edison (Bataan) Cogeneration Corporation; G.R. No. 201665/G.R. No.
201668; August 30, 2017
16 Aug 2017 | Subject | Administrative Complaint | Violation of Lawyer's Code | Canon 07 | Subject |
Administrative Complaint | Violation of Lawyer's Code | Canon 17 | Subject | Administrative Complaint
| Violation of Lawyer's Code | Canon 18 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo

Elibena A. Cabiles Vs. Atty. Leandro S. Cedo; A.C. No. 10245; August 16, 2017
14 Aug 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Labor and
Employment | Non-payment of Salaries, Benefits, Claims and Damages | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil
Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
North Sea Marine Services Corporation, Ms. Rosalinda Cerdina and/or Carnival Cruise
Lines Vs. Santiago S. Enriquez; G.R. No. 201806; August 14, 2017
09 Aug 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Civil Law | Land
Titles and Deeds | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the
Supreme Court

Pen Development Corporation and Las Brisas Resort Corporation Vs. Martinez Leyba, Inc.;
G.R. No. 211845; August 9, 2017
09 Aug 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil
Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Cathay Land, Inc. and Cathay Metal Corporation Vs. Ayala Land, Inc., Avida Land
Corporation and Laguna Technopark, Inc.; G.R. No. 210209; August 9, 2017
07 Aug 2017 | Subject | Civil Law | Claims and Damages | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme
Court | Subject | Civil Law | Unlawful Detainer

Jose Audie Abagatnan, et al. Vs. Sps. Jonathan Clarito and Elsa Clarito; G.R. No. 211966;
August 7, 2017
02 Aug 2017 | Subject | Civil Law | Breach of Contract | Subject | Civil Law | Claims and Damages |
Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure |
Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Judith D. Darines and Joyce D. Darines Vs. Eduardo Quiñones and Rolando Quitan; G.R.
No. 206468; August 2, 2017
31 Jul 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil
Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court | Subject | Labor and Employment |
Unfair Labor Practice

United Polyresins, Inc., Ernesto Uy Soon, Jr. and/or Julito Uy Soon Vs. Marcelino Pinuela;
G.R. No. 209555; July 31, 2017
26 Jul 2017 | Subject | Criminal Law | Art. 266-A Rape | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo

People of the Philippines Vs. Nomerto Napoles y Bajas; G.R. No. 215200; July 26, 2017
26 Jul 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil
Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court | Subject | Labor and Employment |
Termination by Employer

Vigel Dave Japos Vs. First Agrarian Reform Multi-Purpose Cooperative (FARMCOOP)
and/or Crislino Bagares; G.R. No. 208000; July 26, 2017
24 Jul 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Criminal Law |
Robbery with Homicide
People of the Philippines Vs. Mark Gamba y Nissorada; G.R. No. 215332; July 24, 2017
24 Jul 2017 | Subject | Criminal Law | Homicide | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Roble Barbosa and Ramdy Barbosa Vs. People of the Philippines; G.R. No. 207193; July
24, 2017
19 Jul 2017 | Subject | Criminal Law | Illegal Recruitment | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo

People of the Philippines Vs. Gilda Abellanosa; G.R. No. 214340; July 19, 2017
19 Jul 2017 | Subject | Civil Law | Claims and Damages | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme
Court

Sps. Dionisio Estrada and Jovita R. Estrada Vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and
Eduardo R. Saylan; G.R. No. 203902; July 19, 2017
04 Jul 2017 | Subject | Constitutional Law | Bill of Rights | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Special Proceedings | Rule 102 - Habeas Corpus

Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. Vs. Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea, et al./Eufemia
C. Cullamat, et al. Vs. President Rodrigo Duterter, et al./Norkaya S. Mohamad, et al. Vs.
Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea, et al.; G.R. No. 231658/G.R. No. 231771/G.R.
No. 231774; July 4, 2017
07 Jun 2017 | Jurisprudence | Subject | Civil Law | Just Compensation | Ponente | Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme
Court

Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and

Highways (DPWH) Vs. Spouses Senando F. Salvador and Josefina R. Salvador; G.R. No.
205428; June 7, 2017
05 Jun 2017 | Subject | Criminal Law | Art. 248 - Murder | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo

People of the Philippines Vs. Marlon Soriano y Narag; G.R. No. 216063; June 5, 2017
05 Jun 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil
Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong, et

al. Vs. Maria Elena L. Malaga; G.R. No. 204906; June 5, 2017
25 Apr 2017 | Subject | Labor and Employment | Illegal Dismissal | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the
Supreme Court
Dutch Movers, Inc., Cesar Lee and Yolanda Lee Vs. Edilberto Lequin, et al.; G.R. No.
210032; April 25, 2017
25 Apr 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Civil Law | Recovery
of Possession | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme
Court

Rodante F. Guyamin, et al. Vs. Jacinto G. Flores and Maximo G. Flores represented by
Ramon G. Flores; G.R. No. 202189; April 25, 2017
24 Apr 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Civil Law | Recovery
of Possession | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme
Court

William Anghian Siy Vs. Alvin Tomlin; G.R. No. 205998; April 24, 2017
19 Apr 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Criminal Law |
Taxation

Asia Trust Development Bank, Inc. Vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue/Commissioner

of Internal Revenue Vs. Asia Trust Development Bank, Inc.; G.R. No. 201530/G.R. Nos.
201680-81; April 19, 2017
19 Apr 2017 | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo

Bankard, Inc. Vs. Luz P. Alarte; G.R. No. 202573; April 19, 2017
17 Apr 2017 | Subject | Labor and Employment | Illegal Dismissal | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the
Supreme Court

Herma Shipyard, Inc. and Mr. Herminio Esguerra Vs. Danilo Oliveros, et al.; G.R. No.
208936; April 17, 2017
29 Mar 2017 | Subject | Criminal Law | Art. 248 - Murder | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo

People of the Philippines Vs. Tirso Sibbu; G.R. No. 214757; March 29, 2017
29 Mar 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil
Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Land Bank of the Philippines Vs. Sps. Esteban and Cresencia Chu; G.R. No. 192345; March
29, 2017
27 Mar 2017 | Subject | Criminal Law | Illegal Drugs | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo

People of the Philippines Vs. Myra Gayoso y Arguelles; G.R. No. 206590; March 27, 2017
22 Mar 2017 | Subject | Criminal Law | Illegal Gambling | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme
Court
Martin Villamor y Tayson, and Victor Bonaobra y Gianan Vs. People of the Philippines;
G.R. No. 200396; March 22, 2017
22 Mar 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Civil Law | Land
Titles and Deeds | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the
Supreme Court

Alexis C. Almendras Vs. South Davao Development Corporation, Inc. (SODACO), et al.;
G.R. No. 198209; March 22, 2017
20 Mar 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil
Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

TSM Shipping Phils., Inc. and/or Dampskibsselskabet Norden A/S and/or Capt. Castillo Vs.
Louie L. Patiño; G.R. No. 210289; March 20, 2017
15 Mar 2017 | Subject | Criminal Law | Art. 335 - Rape* | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo

People of the Philippines Vs. Jessie Gabriel y Gajardo; G.R. No. 213390; March 15, 2017
15 Mar 2017 | Subject | Labor and Employment | Illegal Dismissal | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to the
Supreme Court

Ernesto Brown Vs. Marswin Marketing, Inc. and Sany Tan; G.R. No. 206891; March 15,
2017
20 Feb 2017 | Jurisprudence | Ponente | Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo | Subject | Civil Law |
Obligations and Contracts | Subject | Rules of Court | Civil Procedure | Rule 45 - Appeal by Certiorari to
the Supreme Court

Sps. Romeo Pajares and Ida T. Pajares Vs. Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning,
represented by Archemedes G. Solis; G.R. No. 212690; February 20, 2017