BALABAGAN, SITTIE AINA M.

Velasco vs CA
GR NO.301018, June 29, 1973

Facts: Lorenzo Velasco& Magdalena Estate, Inc. entered into a

contract of sale involving a lot in New Manila for 100K.The
agreement was that Lorenzo would give a down payment of 10K
(as evidenced by a receipt) to be followed by 20K (time w/in
which to make full down payment was not specified) and the
balance of 70K would be paid in installments, the equal monthly
amortization to be determined as soon as the 30K had been
paid. Lorenzo
paid the 10K but when he tendered payment for 20K, Magdalena
refused to accept & refused to execute a formal deed of sale. Velasco
filed a complaint for damages. Magdalena denied having any
dealings/contractual relations w/ Lorenzo. It contends that a
portion of the property was being leased by Lorenzo’s sister-
in-law, Socorro Velasco who went to their office & they
agreed to the sale of the property (30K down payment, 70K on
installments +9% interest). Since Socorro was only able to pay10K,
it was merely accepted as deposit & on her request, the receipt was
made in the name of Lorenzo. Socorro failed to complete the down
payment & neither has she paid the 70K. It was only 2 years after
that she tendered payment for 20K & by then, Magdalena
considered their offer to sell rescinded.
According to Lorenzo, he had requested Socorro to make the
necessary contracts & he had authorized her to make
negotiations w/ Magdalena on her own name, as he doesn’t
understand English. He also uses as evidence the receipt to prove
that there already had been a perfected contract to sell as the
annotations therein indicated that earnest money for 10K had
been
received & also the agreed price (100K, 30K dp&bal in 10
yrs) appears thereon. To further prove that it was w/ him & not w/
Socorro that Magdalena dealt with, he showed 5 checks drawn by
him for payment of the lease of the property.

Issue: WON there was a consummated sale? NO

Held: The minds of the parties did not meet in regard to the
matter of payment. It is admitted that they still had to meet and
agree on how & when the down payment &
installments were to be paid. Therefore, it cannot be said that
a definite & firm sales agreement between the parties had been
perfected. The definite agreement on the manner of payment of
the purchase price is an essential element in the formation of a
binding & enforceable contract of sale. The fact that Velasco
delivered to Magdalena the sum of 10K as part of the down payment
that they had to be pay cannot be considered as sufficient proof
of the perfection of any purchase & sale agreement between the
parties under Art 1428, NCC.
BALABAGAN, SITTIE AINA M.

SPS DOROMAL vs. CA

66 SCRA (575)

FACTS:
A parcel of land in Iloilo were co-owned by 7 siblings all
surnamed Horilleno. 5 of the siblings gave a SPA to their niece
Mary Jimenez, who succeeded her father as a co-owner, for the
sale of the land to father and son Doromal. One of the co-
owner, herein petitioner, Filomena Javellana however did not gave
her consent to the sale even though her siblings executed a SPA
for her signature. The co-owners went on with the sale of 6/7
part of the land and a new title for the Doromals were issued.
Respondent offered to repurchase the land for 30K as stated in the
deed of sale but petitioners declined invoking lapse in time for
the right of repurchase. Petitioner also contend that the 30K
price was only placed in the deed of sale to minimize payment of
fees and taxes and as such, respondent should pay the real price paid
which was P115, 250.

Issue: WON the period to repurchase of petitioner has already

lapsed.

Held: Period of repurchase has not yet lapsed because the

respondent was not notified of the sale. The 30-day period for the
right of repurchase starts only after actual notice not only of a
perfected sale but of actual execution and delivery of the deed of
sale.The letter sent to the respondent by the other co-owners cannot
be considered as actual notice because the letter was only to inform
her of the intention to sell the property but not its actual sale.
As such, the 30-day period has not yet commenced and the
respondent can still exercise his right to repurchase.
The respondent should also pay only the 30K stipulated in the deed
of sale because a redemptioner’s right is to be subrogated by
the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract.
BALABAGAN, SITTIE AINA M.

SALAS RODRIGUEZ vs. LEUTERIO

47 Phil 818
Facts: On September 24, 1920, the parties to this action entered into
a contract by which the defendant agreed to sell, and the
plaintiff to buy, seven thousand square meters of land in the
barrio of Tuliahan, municipality of Caloocan, Rizal, for the
consideration of P5,600, which was paid by the plaintiff in the
act of transfer. At the time of this sale the particular lots
contemplated as the subject of the sale had not been segregated, but
the seller agreed to establish the lots with a special frontage on
a principal thorough fare as soon as the streets should be laid out
in a projected new subdivision of the city. As time passed the
seller was unable to comply with this part of the agreement
and was therefore unable to place the purchaser in possession.
The present action was accordingly instituted by the purchaser
in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal for the
resolution (in the complaint improperly denominated rescission)
of the contract and a return of double the amount delivered to
the defendant as the purchase price of the land. The trial court
decreed a rescission (properly resolution) of the contract and
ordered the defense to return to the plaintiff the amount received, or
the sum of P5,600, with legal interest from the date of the filing of
the complaint. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Issue: WON the plaintiff is entitled to recover double the amount

paid out by him as the purchase price of the land.

Held: Article 1454 of the Civil Code is relied upon by plaintiff-

appellant as authority for claiming double the amount paid out
by him. In this article it is declared that when earnest money
or pledge is given to bind a contract of purchase and sale, the
contract may be rescinded if the vendee should be willing to
forfeit the earnest money or pledge or the vendor to return double
the amount. This provision is clearly not pertinent to the case, for
the reason that where the purchase price is paid in whole or in part,
the payment cannot be considered to be either earnest money or
pledge. In this connection the commentator Manresa observes
that the delivery of part of the purchase should not be understood
as constituting earnest money unless it be shown that such was the
intention of the parties.