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11. PNB V. NEPOMUCENO PRODUCTION INC. ET AL G.R. No.

139479, 27 Dec 2002


FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted respondents a 4
Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) credit line to finance the filming of the
movie Pacific Connection. The loan was secured by mortgages on
respondents real and personal properties, to wit: (1) a 7,623 square
meters parcel of land located in Malugay Street, Makati (referred to as
the Malugay property); (2) a 3,000 square meters parcel of land
located in North Forbes Park, Makati (referred to as the Forbes
property);and (3) several motion picture equipments. The credit line
was later increased to 6M and finally to 7.5M. The respondents
defaulted in their obligation. Petitioner sought foreclosure of the
mortgaged properties. The auction sale was re-scheduled several
times without need of republication of the notice of sale as stipulated
in the Agreement to Postpone Sale, until finally, the auction sale
proceeded on December 20, 1976, with petitioner as the highest
bidder in the amount of P10,432,776.97. Subsequently, the
respondents filed an action for annulment of the foreclosure sale
claiming that such was void because, among others, there was lack of
publication of the notice of foreclosure sale. The trail court ordered the
annulment and set aside the foreclosure proceedings. Upon appeal,
the CA affirmed the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether the parties to the mortgage can validly waive the
posting and publication requirements mandated by Act No. 3135

HELD:
No. Act. No. 3135, as amended, governing extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgages on real property is specific with regard to the posting and
publication requirements of the notice of sale. It is well settled that
what Act No. 3135 requires is: (1) the posting of notices of sale in
three public places; and, (2) the publication of the same in a
newspaper of general circulation. Failure to publish the notice of sale
constitutes a jurisdictional defect, which invalidates the sale. Petitioner
and respondents have absolutely no right to waive the posting and
publication requirements of Act No. 3135. While it is established that
rights may be waived, Article 6 of the Civil Code explicitly provides
that such waiver is subject to the condition that it is not contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law. The principal object of a
notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so much to notify the
mortgagor as to inform the public generally of the nature and condition
of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the
sale. Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of the
property. Clearly, the statutory requirements of posting and publication
are mandated, not for the mortgagor’s benefit, but for the public or
third persons. In fact, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings is not even necessary, unless stipulated. As
such, it is imbued with public policy considerations and any waiver
thereon would be inconsistent with the intent and letter of Act No.
3135

12. Bernadina P. Bartolome v. SSS et al., G.R. No 192531, 12 Nov


2014

FACTS:
John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He
was enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died
due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless

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and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and,
allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.
SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered
as the parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is
Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.
According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the
restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: Yes.


The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a
significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should
be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into
account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are
no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor
adopted child if the adopter passed away?
The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned, the provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is
granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the
adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.
The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the
grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the
adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor
of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is
not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights
of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the
benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate
of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least
reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis
the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still
attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court

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ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of
their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive
petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent
parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by
adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation
Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary

13. Amelia D. De mesa et al., v. Pepsi, G.R. No. 153063-70 19


August 2005
14. David Reyes v. Jose Lim, et al., G.R.No 134241, 11 August 2003
FAC
Petitioner David Reyes filed a complaint for annulment of contract and
damages against respondents. The complaint alleged that Reyes as seller and
Lim as buyer entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land located along F.B.
Harrison Street, Pasay City with a monthly rental of P35,000.
The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the
Property before the end of January 1995. Reyes also informed Keng and
Harrison Lumber that if they failed to vacate by 8 March 1995, he would hold
them liable for the penalty of P400,000 a month as provided in the Contract to
Sell. It was also alleged that Lim connived with Harrison Lumber not to vacate
the Property until the P400,000 monthly penalty would have accumulated and
equaled the unpaid purchase price of P18,000,000.
Keng and Harrison Lumber denied that they connived with Lim to defraud
Reyes, and that Reyes approved their request for an extension of time to vacate
the Property due to their difficulty in finding a new location for their business.
Harrison Lumber claimed that it had already started transferring some of its
merchandise to its new business location in Malabon.
Lim filed his Answer stating that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of
the purchase price. Lim requested a meeting with Reyes through the latter’s
daughter on the signing of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the payment of the
balance but Reyes kept postponing their meeting. Reyes offered to return the
P10 million down payment to Lim because Reyes was having problems in
removing the lessee from the Property. Lim rejected Reyes’ offer and

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proceeded to verify the status of Reyes’ title to the Property. Lim learned that
Reyes had already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation Lim denied
conniving with Keng and Harrison Lumber to defraud Reyes.Reyes filed a
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint due to supervening facts. These
included the filing by Lim of a complaint for estafa against Reyes as well as an
action for specific performance and nullification of sale and title plus damages
before another trial court. The trial court granted the motion.
In his Amended Answer Lim prayed for the cancellation of the Contract to Sell
and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Reyes. The trial
court denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment.
Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10 million
down payment with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. The
trial court granted this motion.
Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order on the ground the Order practically
granted the reliefs Lim prayed for in his Amended Answer. The trial court denied
Reyes’ motion.
The trial court denied Reyes’ Motion for Reconsideration. In the same order,
the trial court directed Reyes to deposit the P10 million down payment with the
Clerk of Court.
Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals and prayed that
the orders of the trial court be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. But the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: Whether on not the equity jurisdiction is an applicable law on the matter?
Held: The instant case, the Supreme Court held that if this was a case where
there is hiatus in the law and in the Rules of Court. If this case was left alone,
the hiatus will result in unjust enrichment to Reyes at the expense of Lim.
Here the court excercised equity jurisdiction.The purpose of the exercise of
equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure
restitution so that substantial justice may be attained in cases where the
prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.
The Supreme Court also state that rescission is possible only when the
person demanding rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to
restore. A court of equity will not rescind a contract unless there is restitution,
that is, the parties are restored to the status quo ante.

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In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the
deposit of the P10 million down payment. The decision of the Court of
Appeals.was affirmed.
15. People v. Veneracion 249 SCRA 247
FACTS:
The case arose from the conviction of two individuals by the respondent judge with the
crime of Rape with Homicide of seven-year old girl. The accused on the incident also
caused fatal injuries to the minor child by slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a
thick peace of wood and stabling her neck, which were all the direct cause of her
immediate death. Respondent-judge however, instead of imposing the corresponding
death penalty, imposed rather the reclusion perpetua to each accused.
The City Prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the decision be
modified that the penalty be death instead of reclusion perpetua. Respondent-judge still
denied the motion citing religious convictions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent-judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when he failed to attach the corresponding penalty of the
crime of Rape with Homicide.
HELD:
Yes, respondent-judge clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in the attaching the proper corresponding penalty of the crime of
Rape with Homicide. The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the
judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by law on the accused regardless of
his own religious or moral beliefs. Respondent-judge is duty bound to emphasize that a
court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the
sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as penalty in specific and
well defined instances. The discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose the death
penalty is an ancient one, but is a matter upon which judges have no choice. This is
consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9, that no judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.
Thus, the petition was granted, the Court remanded the case back to the respondent-judge
for the imposition of death penalty of the accused

16. CESARIO Ursua v. CA et al., GR No. 112170, 10 April 1996


FACTS:

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Petitioner wrote the name “Oscar Perez” in the visitor’s logbook and used the same in receiving the copy of a
complaint against him at the Office of the Ombudsman. This was discovered and reported to the Deputy
Ombudsman who recommended that the petitioner be accordingly charged. Trial Court found the petitioner guilty
of violating Sec.1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the
Use of Aliases“. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with some modification of sentence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the use of alias in isolated transaction falls within the prohibition of Commonwealth Act No. 142.

HELD:

NO. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the RTC was reversed and set aside and
petitioner was acquitted of the crime charged

An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in
business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or
substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he
is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by
several different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name
belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known
by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A.
No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.

Time and again [courts] have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved
and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in
mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may
consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within
the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal
statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle
is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity
to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited

17. CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., G.R. No. 184823

FACTS

Respondent Aichi filed a claim for refund/credit of input VAT for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002,
with the petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), through the Department of Finance (DOF) One-Stop
Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center.On even date, respondent filed a Petition for Review
with the CTA for the refund/credit of the same input VAT. The CTA partially granted the petition. In a Motion for

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Reconsideration, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial claims
contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC and a prior filing of an administrative claim is a “condition
precedent” before a judicial claim can be filed. The CTA En Banc affirmed the division ruling.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent’s judicial and administrative claims for tax refund/credit were filed within the two-year
prescriptive period as provided in Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC.

HELD

NO.

The two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired
on September 30, 2004. Hence, respondent’s administrative claim was timely filed.The filing of the judicial claim
was premature. However, notwithstanding the timely filing of the administrative claim, [the Supreme Court is]
constrained to deny respondent’s claim for tax refund/credit for having been filed in violation of Section 112(D).
Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has “120 days, from the date of the submission of the
complete documents in support of the application [for tax refund/credit],” within which to grant or deny the claim.
In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayer’s recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30
days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the
application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30
days.

In this case, the administrative and the judicial claims were simultaneously filed on September 30, 2004.
Obviously, respondent did not wait for the decision of the CIR or the lapse of the 120-day period. For this reason,
we find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature. The premature filing of respondent’s claim for
refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the
CTA.

18. Norma A. Del Socorro, for and in behalf of her minor child
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, G.R. No 193707, 10 Dec 2014

FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed
with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by
virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her
son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly
support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst

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never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again the
Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against
Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information do
not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien

ISSUES:
1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

HELD:
1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree
with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he
is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This
does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In
international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position
that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst
to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents
the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and
our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would
work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates
the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-
compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would
be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living here
in the Philippines and committed the offense here

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19. Bellis v. Bellis 20 SCRA 358
FACTS:
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom
he divorced he had five legitimate children (Edward Bellis et al), by his second wife, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children. He, however, also had three illegitimate children in the
Philippines (Maria Cristina Bellis et al). Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his
Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate
children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that
they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were
to be applied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the
illegitimate children.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that the said children, maria Kristina et al, are not entitled to their
legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes

20. Aznar v. Garcia 7 SCRA 95


FACTS:

Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen from California and domiciled in the Philippines, left a will executed
in the Philippines in which he bequeathed Php 3,600.00 to Maria Helen Christensen ("Helen") and the remainder
of his estate to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen Daney. The laws of California allows the testator to dispose
of his estate in any manner he pleases. However, California law also provides that the personal property of a
person is governed by the laws of his domicile. The executor, Adolfo C. Aznar, drew a project of partition in
conformity with the will. Helen opposed the project of partition arguing that Philippine laws govern the distribution
of the estate and manner proposed in the project deprived her of her legitime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the succession is governed by Philippine laws.

HELD:
Yes. Philippine law governs.Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the intrinsic validity of testamentary
dispositions are governed by the national law of the decedent, in this case, California law. The provision in the
laws of California giving a testator absolute freedom in disposing of his estate is the internal law which applies
only to persons domiciled within the said estate. On the other hand, the provision in the laws of California stating
that personal property is governed by the laws of the domicile of its owner is the conflict of laws rule that applies
to persons not domicile in the said state. Accordingly, the laws of the Philippines, in which the testator is domiciled
governs the succession and the regime of legitimes

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21. Elizabeth Diaz v. Encanto, et al., G.R. No 171303, 20 Jan 2016
FACTS:
Petitioner Diaz has been a professor in UP since 1963. In 1988, she applied for sabbatical leave with pay
for one year. The Chair of the Broadcast Department initially recommended to CMC Dean Encanto that
Diaz’s sabbatical application be granted. Thereafter, Encanto referred Diaz’s sabbatical application to the
Secretary of U.P., recommending its denial. Encanto also requested the her salary be withheld effective
July 1, 1988 until further notice since her sabbatical application has not yet been approved and that she did
not teach that semester.
On July 4, 1988, it was recommended that Diaz be granted a leave without pay in order to enable the CMC
to hire a substitute. The next day, the U.P.’s Secretary referred to the Vice-President for Academic Affairs,
the fact of denial of such sabbatical request, for his own recommendation to the U.P. President. On July 8,
1988, Abad returned the Reference Slip indicating therein that Diaz had promised him to put down in writing
the historical backdrop to the latest denial of her sabbatical leave, but she did not do so. On Diaz’s request
to teach for that semester, the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and the HRDO Director instructed
Encanto that until Prof. Diaz officially reports for duty, accomplishes the Certificate of Report for Duty, and
the Dean of CMC confirms her date of actual report for duty, she is considered absent without official leave.
On November 8, 1988, Abad, issued a Memorandum to Diaz to confirm as valid Encanto’s reason of
shortage of teaching staff in denying her sabbatical. Later, he also informed Diaz of her lack of service
during the first semester of AY 1988-89, hence she is not entitled to be paid. While Diaz was able to teach
during the second semester of AY 1988-89, she was not able to claim her salaries for her refusal to submit
the Report for Duty Form.
Diaz instituted a complaint against U.P., Abueva, Encanto, Tabujara and Abad with the Pasig RTC praying
that the latter be adjudged, jointly and severally to pay her damages. She claimed, among others, that
They conspired together as joint tortfeasors, in not paying her salaries from July 1, 1988 in the first semester
of academic year 1988-89, for the entire period when her sabbatical application was left unresolved, as well
as the salaries she earned from teaching in the second semester from November 1988 to May 1989. She
likewise claimed moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The RTC held that Diaz was entitled
to a sabbatical leave and that they delay in the resolution of her application was unreasonable and
unconscionable but the CA reversed it on appeal, ruling that there was neither negligence nor bad faith in
denying her application and withholding her salaries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents acted in bad faith when they resolved Diaz’s application for leave thus
entitling her to damages

HELD:
No, they did not act in bad faith. Diaz’s complaint for recovery of damages before the RTC was based on
the alleged bad faith of the respondents in denying her application for sabbatical leave vis-à-vis Articles 19
and 20 of the Civil Code. Xxxxx Article 19 of the Civil Code “prescribes a ‘primordial limitation on all rights’
by setting certain standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof.” Abuse of right under Article 19

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exists when the following elements are present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

22. GF Equity, Inc., v. Arturo Valenzona, G.R. No. 156841, 30 June


2005
FACTS:
GF Equity hired Arturo Valenzona (Valenzona) as head basketball coach of Alaska team.
As head coach, Valenzona was required to comply to his duties such as coaching at all
practices and games scheduled for the team. Under their contract, Valenzona would
receive P 35,000.00 monthly and GF Equity will provide him with a service vehicle and
gasoline allowance. Under paragraph 3 of the same contract it was stipulated there that;
“If at any time during the contract, the COACH, in the sole opinion of the
CORPORATION, fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team,
the CORPORATION may terminate this contract.”
Subsequently, Valenzona was terminated. GF equity invoked paragraph 3 of the said
contract. Counsel of Valenzona demands for compensation arising from arbitrary and
unilateral termination of his employment. However, GF equity refused it. Valenzona filed
a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila against GF Equity for breach
of contract. Valenzona contends that the condition in paragraph 3 violates Article 1308 of
New Civil Code (NCC). But the RTC dismissed the complaint and affirmed the validity of
paragraph 3 on the grounds that Valenzona was fully aware of entering into a bad bargain.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) held that the questioned provision in the contract
―merely confers upon GF Equity the right to fire its coach upon a finding of inefficiency,
a valid reason within the ambit of its management prerogatives, subject to limitations
imposed by law, although not expressly stated in the clause‖ ; and ―the right granted in
the contract can neither be said to be immoral, unlawful, or contrary to public policy.‖
It concluded, however, that while ―the mutuality of the clause‖ is evident, GF Equity
―abused its right by arbitrarily terminating Valenzona‘s employment and opened itself
to a charge of bad faith.‖

ISSUE:
Whether or not paragraph 3 of the contract is violative of the principle of mutuality of
contracts

HELD:
The ultimate purpose of the mutuality principle is thus to nullify a contract containing a
condition which makes its fulfillment or pre-termination dependent exclusively upon the
uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties.

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The contract incorporates in paragraph 3 the right of GF Equity to pre-terminate the
contract — that ―if the coach, in the sole opinion of the corporation, fails to exhibit
sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the corporation may terminate the
contract.‖ The assailed condition clearly transgresses the principle of mutuality of
contracts. It leaves the determination of whether Valenzona failed to exhibit sufficient
skill or competitive ability to coach Alaska team solely to the opinion of GF Equity.
Whether Valenzona indeed failed to exhibit the required skill or competitive ability
depended exclusively on the judgment of GF Equity. In other words, GF Equity was given
an unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate the contract irrespective of the soundness,
fairness or reasonableness, or even lack of basis of its opinion.
To sustain the validity of the assailed paragraph would open the gate for arbitrary and
illegal dismissals, for void contractual stipulations would be used as justification therefor.
The nullity of the stipulation notwithstanding, GF Equity was not precluded from the
right to pre-terminate the contract. The pre-termination must have legal basis, however,
if it is to be declared justified

23. UE v. Jader, G.R. No 132344, Feb 17 2000


FACTS:

Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-88. During his last year, 1st
semester, he failed to take the regular final examination in Practical Court 1where he was
given an incomplete grade remarks. He filed an application for removal of the incomplete
grade given by Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was approved by Dean
Celedonio Tiongson after the payment of required fees. He took the exam on March 28 and
on May 30, the professor gave him a grade of 5.

The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April 16, 1988, 3PM. In the
invitation, his name appeared. In preparation for the bar exam, he took a leave of absence
from work from April 20- Sept 30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class review in FEU. Upon
learning of such deficiency, he dropped his review classes and was not able to take the bar
exam.

Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, sleepless nights due to UE’s negligence.

ISSUE: Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into believing JADER
satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case. Can he claim moral
damages?

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HELD:

SC held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to respondent for the latter’s
actual damages. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their
academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent
should not have been awarded moral damages though JADER suffered shock, trauma, and
pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the
bar examinations as what CA held because it’s also respondent’s duty to verify for himself
whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar
examinations. As a senior law student, he should have been responsible in ensuring that all
his affairs specifically those in relation with his academic achievement are in order. Before
taking the bar examinations, it doesn’t only entail a mental preparation on the subjects but
there are other prerequisites such as documentation and submission of requirements which
prospective examinee must meet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with


MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum
computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of
moral damages is DELETED.

24. Pe, et al., v. Pe, 02 SCRA 200


FACTS:

Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette
Factory in Gasan Marinduque who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one of the
petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his children and was given access to visit their
house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio. The defendant
frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he wanted her to teach
him how to pray the rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each other.

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Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso deliberately
and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s affection. The case on moral damages was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral, good
custom and public policy due to their illicit affair.

HELD:

Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The defendant took
advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as a reason to get
close with Lolita. The wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the fact that
he is a married man.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to


pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and
expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee

25. Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA and Marilou Gonzales, G.R. No.


97336 19 Feb 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges at Dagupan City. He was an
Iranian exchange student and was 29 years old. Respondent was a former waitress on a
luncheonette, and was 22 years old. Petitioner was allegedly the lover of the respondent, and was
said to promise marriage to the latter, which convinced her to live with him in his apartment. It was
even alleged that the petitioner went to the house of the respondent to inform her family about the
marriage on the end of the semester. However, the marriage did not materialize, with several
beatings and maltreatment experienced by the respondent from the petitioner. The case was filed in
the RTC of Pangasinan, and the decision was held in favor of the respondent. However, the
petitioner claimed that the judgment of the RTC was an error, for the claims of the respondent are
not true, and that he did not know about the custom of the Filipinos; his acts were in accordance of
his custom. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the
petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent could claim payment for the damages incurred by the petitioner.
HELD:

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Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, since the respondent was proved to
have a good moral character, and that she had just let her virginity be taken away by the petitioner
since the latter offered a promise of marriage, then she could ask for payment for damages.
Furthermore, since she let her lover, the petitioner, “deflowered” her since she believed that his
promise to marry was true, and not due to her carnal desire, then she could have her claims against
the petitioner. Moreover, the father of the respondent had already looked for pigs and chicken for the
marriage reception and the sponsors for the marriage, and then damages were caused by the
petitioner against the respondents, which qualified the claims of the respondent against the petitione

26. Nikko Hotel Manla Garden, et al., v. Roberto Reyes, alias *Amay
Bisaya*, G.R. No 154259, Feb 28, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals
in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to
Roberto Reyes aka “Amang Bisaya”, an entertainment artist.

There are two versions of the story:

Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of
Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to
Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s
former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for
him and carried a basket of fruits, the latter’s gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon
as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s
Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people
around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied him
to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and
humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner
claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms.
Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes
was with Dr. Filart’s group. She wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the
latter was talking over the phone and doesn’t want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to
leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate consisting
only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food
then leave the party.

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During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she
approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly
kissed each other”. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the
request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to
know what happened.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all
the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him
to leave the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim
is experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be
held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.

27. People v. Casipit, 232 SCRA 638

FACTS:
Guillermo Casipit found guilty of rape and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua as well as to indemnify the offended party (Myra Reynaldo)
P30,000 for moral damages.
Myra Reynaldo is a 14 year-old, innocent barrio lass
The medical findings of Dr. Ochave showed no external signs of
physical injuries but noted first degree fresh healing lasceration at the
perineum and of hymen at 6 o’clock position, and negative for
spermatozoa.

ISSUE:

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Appellant assails the trial court for giving credence to the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses while discarding his and finding him
guilty instead, on the basis that:
The doctor who examined Reynaldo found no external injuries on her
body as claimed for raping by means of force and intimidation
She is attracted to him for she go with him on a movie date and that
they are sweet hearts.
She slept with him in the hut until morning which is an unnatural
behavior of one who had been raped

HELD:
The absence of external signs or physical injuries doesn’t negate the
commission of rape, it’s proof is not necessary as it is not an element
of the crime. This does not mean that no force or intimidation was
used on the victim. The force or intimidation required in rape is
relative, it is viewd on the victims perception and not by any hard and
fast rule. Aside from force, the appellant used intimidation by
threatening the victim with a knife.
The fact that Myra went with the appellant to a movie is no indication
that she agreed to have sex with him, it is not improvable that the
victim put a trust on him for she is a close relative according to the
appellant’s grandfather, she is only 14 yr-old barrio lass with no ill-
reputation of flirtatious nature to incite or provoke the appellant to
have sex with him. If it is true that they are sweethearts she would
have concealed it as this would disgrace her honor and the reputation
and her family or keep silent about it. The fact that Myra lost no time in
reporting the violation of her honor and submit herself to medical
examination bolster her credibility and reflects the truthfulness and
spontaneity of her account of the incident, Her unwavering and firm
denunciation of appellant negates a consent.

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Conidering the victims physical condition and the place where the
crime was perpetrated which was an isolated hut in an open field, it is
not difficult for the accused to subdue the victim and coerce her into
submission.

The court lend credence to the testimonies of the victims of tender


years regarding their version of what transpired since the State, as
parens patriae is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to
those who because of their minority, are not yet capable to fully
protect themselves.
Appellant is declared guilty of rape, sentencing him of reclusion
perpetua and modification in favor of indemnifying Myra Reynaldo
increased to P50,000.

28. St. Louis Realty Corp v. CA 133 SCRA 179

FACTS:

Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon


Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the
Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio.

St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading “where the heart is”.
This was republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr
Aramil’s house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the
intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St.
Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was
published despite that it was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the
advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramil’s counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary
damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadio’s real house
but nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for
damages on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published.

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ISSUE:

Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil.

HELD:

St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication.


Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just
contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".

The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and
P2,000 as attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA
affirmed the judgement for the reason that “St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-
delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements
pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who,
naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps”.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.

29. Ledesma v. CA G.R. No L-54598

FACTS:
A student, Violeta Delmo, was not able to graduate as Magna Cum Laude,
because the president, herein petitioner Jose Ledesma, of the West Visayas
College neglected his duty to inform the student on the result of a case against
the student which has, as its punishment, the removal of awards or citations of
the student. Said case was the extension of loans to students, which the
president contends to be against the school rules and regulations, and which
the student innocently performed in her capacity as the treasurer of the Student
Leadership Club and in accordance to the Constitution and By-Laws of the club,
on the belief that said constitution was presented and approved by the
president. The student appealed to the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools
after being denied for reconsideration by the president, where upon
investigation, it was found out that the student acted in good faith and that her
awards be reinstituted. The president, upon receiving said decision, delayed
action and even e-mailed the director to reverse his decision. The student

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therefore graduated as a plain student and without honors and her award as
Magna Cum Laude was only entered on the scholastic records weeks after the
receipt by the president of the decision and after the graduation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.

HELD:
Yes. The president’s failure to graduate a student with honors and blatant
disregard of the student’s rights on the account of him being embarrassed
shows neglect of duty without just cause, rendering him liable for damages
under Article 27 of the Civil Code. Undoubtedly, the student and the student’s
parents went through a painful ordeal brought about by such neglect. Thus,
moral and exemplary damages under Article 27 are but proper.

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