US VS. PINEDA
IRANG
FACTS: Defendant Pineda is a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of a drug
store in the city of Manila. One Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of
a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson, and which on other occasions Santos had given
to his horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. The medicine prescribed was
potassium chlorate. Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate
which he had asked for, put two of the packages in water the doses to two of his sick horses.
Another package was mixed with water for another horse, but was not used. The two horses, to
which had been given the preparation, died shortly afterwards. Santos, thereupon, took the
three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Peña and Darjuan, of
the Bureau of Science, on analysis found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate
but barium chlorate. At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to the drug store of
the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium
chlorate. Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses, and found that
death was the result of poisoning.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the chemist Pena and Darjuan as to their purchase of
potassium chlorate at the drugstore of the accused is admissible as evidence.
RULING: As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is
inadmissible. But appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with certain exceptions
thereto. The effort is not to convict the accused of a second offense. Nor is there an attempt to
draw the mind away from the point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant's case. The
purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence. If the
defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is
possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be established. It
has been said that there is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents.
The United States Supreme Court has held that:
On the trial of a criminal case the question relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw
light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular person, there is a certain
discretion on the part of the trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere with, unless it
manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question at issue, and
is calculated to prejudice the accused.
Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial evidence, either from the nature of
the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, objections to the testimony on the ground of irrelevancy
are not favored.
Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it tends to
prove the commission of another offense by the defendant. (Moore vs. U. S. [1893], 150 U. S.,
57.)
PEOPLE VS.
FACTS: Between 7 and 8 o'clock of the night of November 9, 1935, seven individuals with
white stripes upon their faces, two of whom were armed with guns and two with bolos, went to
the house of the spouses Perfecto Melocotones and Maximiniana Vicente. Some of said
individuals went up and others remained on guard downstairs. Those who went up approached
Perfecto Melocotones immediately and ordered him to bring his money. Melocotones answered
in the affirmative but before he could do what was ordered him he was attacked with bolos until
he fell to the floor. Later another armed with a gun went up and approaching Maximiana
Vicente, wife of Perfecto Melocotones, struck herein the face with the butt of his gun, making
her lose consciousness momentarily. When she regained consciousness he saw her husband
already dead. One of the assailants then said to her: "Bring out the money and jewelry."
Maximiniana Vicente turned over to the man who had struck her with the butt of his gun P70 in
cash and jewelry valued at P200, which she has kept in a trunk. During the short space of time
that she was turning over the money and jewelry, she looked at the man's face and saw that he
had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid.
That same night the house of Juana de la Cruz was assaulted by malefactors who had been
firing shots before arriving at and going up the house. All of them had white stripe upon their
faces. Juana de la Cruz noticed that one of them had pockmarks and a scar on the left eyelid
and was dressed in a maong-colored suit. It was he who opened her trunk.
Toribio Melocotones, who had seen the assailants arrive but without recognizing them,
immediately reported the matter to the municipal authorities and to the constabulary, who went
to the scene of the crime without loss of time. Maximiniana Vicente informed Lieutenant Roman
Alejandre of the Constabulary that the person who had struck her with the butt of his gun and
taken her money and jewelry was a man of regular statute, with a lean body and pockmarked
face. With this description, said lieutenant went in search of said individual. Having arrested a
group of persons, he brought them to Maximiniana Vicente's house so that the latter might
identify among them the one who struck her with the butt of his gun. She identified the herein
accused-appellant Benjamin Irang as the one who had struck her with the butt of his gun and
demanded delivery of her money and jewelry. Juana de la Cruz also recognized Benjamin
Irang, through his pockmarks and scar on his left eyelid, as one of the men who had gone up to
her house that same night.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Juana de la Cruz is admissible as evidence
RULING: Maximiniana Vicente, whom the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang struck in the face
with the butt of his gun and of whom he demanded delivery of her money and jewelry
scrutinized the latter's face and notice that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid.
When on that same night of the assault Lieutenant Alejandre, guided by the description given
him by Maximiniana Vicente, went in search of the person who might have maltreated the latter
and robbed her of her money and jewelry and presented a group of persons to said
Maximiniana Vicente, she said that the man who had maltreated her was not among those who
composed that first group. Said lieutenant later presented another group to her but neither did
the widow find in it the man who had struck her with the butt of his gun. In the third group
presented to her, she immediately pointed at one who turned out to be the herein accused-
appellant. The man pointed at protested but when she told him that it was he who had struck
her in the face with the butt of his gun, the appellant became silent.
The testimony of Juana de la Cruz to the effect that her house, situated only about one
hundred meters from that of Perfecto Melocotones, was assaulted that same night by some
malefactors with white stripes upon their faces, and that one of them, with pockmarks on his
face and a scar on his left eyelid and dressed in a maong-colored suit, who later turned out to
be the herein accused-appellant, opened her box, indirectly corroborates Maximiniana
Vicente's testimony that the man of the same description was the open who went to her house
and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry, having recognized him later to be the herein
accused-appellant. While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a
prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to
identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at
the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a
circumstance connected with the crime (16, C. J., 610, 611, sec. 1196).
US VS. MERCADO
FACTS: These defendants were charged with the crime of coaccion in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Bulacan. On the 13th of March, 1912, one Claro Mercado
presented a complaint against the defendants in the court of the justice of the peace of Baliuag.
The justice of the peace conducted a preliminary examination and found that there was
probable cause for believing that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged and held
them for trial in the Court of First Instance. On the 21st of March, 1912, the prosecuting
attorney of said province presented the complaint, which alleged:
That the said accused on December 22, 1911, in the municipality of Baliuag, Province of
Bulacan, P. I., did willfully and criminally, without legitimate authority therefore, and by means
of violence or force employed upon the person of Claro Mercado, prevent the latter from
rendering aid to Maria R. Mateo in order that Santiago Mercado might at his pleasure maltreat
the said Maria R. Mateo, in a violation of law.
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the Honorable Alberto
Barretto, judge, found the defendants guilty of the crime in the complaint, without any
aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and sentenced each of them to be imprisoned for a
period of two months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties of the law, to
pay a fine of 325 pesetas and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, allowing
to the defendants one-half of the time they had already suffered in prison, and each to pay one-
third part of the costs.
Mr. Ricardo Gonzalez Lloret, attorney for the private prosecutor, asked the witness for the
defense, the said Santiago Mercado, who is mentioned in the complaint presented in said
cause, the following question:
How many times have you been convicted of assault upon other persons?
To this question, the defendant Tomas Mercado objected on the ground that the question was
impertinent. Mr. Lloret explained the purpose of his question by saying:
I wish to demonstrate that he has a pugnacious disposition. I have had occasion to defend him
in various causes for assault.
ISSUE: Whether or not the question posed tends to show that defendants were either quilty or
not guilty of the crime charged.
RULING: Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he
has been called, except by showing (a) that he has made contradictory statements: or (b) by
showing that his general reputation for the truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec. 342, Act No.
190.) The question to which the defendant objected neither attempted to show that the witness
had made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity was bad. While you cannot impeach the credibility of a witness, except by showing
that he has made contradictory statements or that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, you may show by an examination of the witness himself or
from the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of a high crime. (Sec. 342, Act No.
190.) In the present case, the other offense to which the question above related was not a high
crime, as that term is generally used, and we assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in
section 342, is used in its ordinary signification. High crimes are generally defined as such
immoral and unlawful acts as are nearly allied and equal in guilt to felonies. We believe that the
objection to the above question was properly interposed and should have been sustained. The
question now arises, did the admission of the question prejudice the rights of the defendants? If
there was proof enough adduced during the trial of the cause, excluding the particular proof
brought out by this question to show that the defendants are guilty of the crime. then the
question and answer and the ruling of the court upon the same did not affect prejudicially the
interests of the defendants. Errors committed by the trial court, which are not prejudicial to the
rights of the parties, should be disregarded by the court. In our opinion the evidence clearly
shows that the witness committed the assault to which reference is made in the complaint in
the present cause. Whether he had committed other assaults or not was a matter of no
importance in the present action. The admission or rejection, therefore, of the proof to which
such question related could in no way prejudice the rights of the defendants.
PEOPLE VS ASINAS
FACTS: Canuto Asinas and his brother Eugenio were charged in the justice of the peace court
of Catubig, Province of Samar, with the crime of parricide of their father Aniceto Asinas by and
with the aid of Leon Ogacho and Felipe Credo. On or about the night of 4th of October 1927, in
the barrio of Tagabiran, CAtubig, Samar, the defendants brothers, Canuti Asinas and Eugenio
Asinas, through conspiracy and mutual help, with evident premeditation and treachery, enter
the house of Aniceto Asinas, father of said defendants, held him while he was asleep, and the
accused Canuto Asinas beat on the nape of his neck, pressing his neck strongly until Aniceto
Asinas died, while the other accused Eugenio Asinas was holding the feet assisted by his other
companions named Leon Ogacho and Felipe Credo, who also held the deceased by both
hands or arms to prevent him from making any defense, that after killing said Aniceto Asinas,
the two defendants, together with their two companions, built a fire outside of the house and
put the dead body on the fire with the intention of reducing it to coal, contrary to article 402 of
the Penal Code.
For the prosecution, corporal Marcelo Relampagos testified how and in what manner he
obtained the confession of Ogacho.
Visitacion Golondrina, over the strenuous objection of the defendants, testified that in May last,
1927, the defendant brothers tied their father to a papaya tree in the sitio of Maglolo. That she
was then in a house 25 meters distant from the place where it occurred. On cross-examination
she could not give the day or the date, and said that there were other houses near the papaya
tree.
Nazario Opinion testified that about 3 years ago Canuto Asinas tried to drown his father in the
river in Maglolo. On cross-examination he said he never told anybody about it until the present
trial. He also admitted that he was doing business in the same sitio of Inoman where the
defendant Canuto Asinas has a store, and that they were business rivals.
Cirilo Mercader testified that about 2 years ago in Canuto's house in Inoman, Canuto got hold
of his father and wanted to throw him in the pool. He admitted that he was indebted to Canuto
Asinas in the sum of P69.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Nazario Opinon, Visitacion Golondrina and Cirilo
Mercader are admissible as evidence.
RULING: The general rule is that the evidence is not admissible which shows, or tends to
show, that the accused in the criminal case has committed a crime wholly independent of the
offense for which he is on trial. It is not competent to prove that he committed other crimes of a
like nature for the purpose of showing that he would likely commit the crime charged in the
indictment. A man may be a notorious criminal, but this fact may not be shown to influence a
jury in passing upon the question of his guilt or innocence for the particular offense for which he
is on trial. To permit proof of other crimes would naturally predispose the minds of the jurors
against the defendant. One who commits one crime may be more likely to commit another; yet,
logically, one crime does not prove another, nor tend to prove another, unless there is a
relation between them that proof of one tends to prove the other. Unless such a relation exists,
it is illegal and manifestly unfair to require a man, who, is charged with specific crime in the
indictment, to prepare a defense against other crimes that the state may prove against him, but
which are not charged in the indictment. The general rule, should, therefore, be strictly
enforced in all cases where applicable.
That is good law, and the only theory upon which the testimony of Visitacion Golondrina,
Nazario Opinion, and Cirilo Mercader is admissible that the relation as to the matter about
which they testified tends to prove the commission of the crime in the manner in which it was
committed, and unless there is such a relation, their evidence is illegal and manifestly unfair to
the defendants. As stated we very much doubt the truth of the testimony of those witnesses,
and we have a serious doubt about the admissibility of their evidence for any purpose.
NICOLAS VS. ENRIQUEZ
FACTS: At the trial of a criminal case for concubinage filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal by Corazon Vizcarra against the defendant Jimmy William Nelson and his co-defendant
Priscilla Fontanosa, the court ruled out testimony of three prosecution witnesses tending to
show that a boy named Paul William Nelson, born in Cavite on September 17, 1949, was the
son of both defendants. The said testimony was objected to as immaterial, but the objection
was sustained on the ground that inquiry into the paternity of a natural child is forbidden except
in actions for forcible acknowledgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not prior sexual relations between defendants can be admitted to be used
as evidence
RULING: It is a rule of evidence that what one did at one time is no proof of his having done
the same or a similar thing at another time. But the rule is not absolute, for it is subject to the
exceptions enumerated in section 17 of Rule 123, Rules of Court, which reads —
SEC. 17. Evidence of similar acts. — Evidence that one did or ommitted to do a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he did or ommitted to do the same or a similar thing at
another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan,
system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.
We are not persuaded that the preferred evidence, when viewed in the light of facts brought out
in the present case, would come under any of the exceptions named. It appears from the order
containing the questioned ruling that the boy Paul was born five years before complainant's
marriage to one of the defendants. This means that the previous sexual relations sought to be
proved were far removed in point of time from the illicit act now complained of, and having,
moreover, taken place when there was as yet no legal impediment to the same, they furnish no
rational basis for the inference that they would be continued after complainant's marriage to
one of the defendants had created such impediment and made continuance of sexual relations
between the defendants a crime.
The evidence objected to being immaterial and irrelevant, the trial court cannot be compelled to
admit it regardless of whether or not the New Civil Code permits investigation or inquiry into the
paternity of a natural child except in actions for forcible acknowledgement.
US VS EVANGELISTA
FACTS: Romana R. Evangelista was the tenant of a portion of a building situated on Carriedo
Street, Manila, and used the ground floor for a store where were sold hats and various other
articles, while the upper floor was used as living quarters for herself and a number of student
boarders. On June 2, 1912, at 7:01 p.m., the fire department answered an alarm of fire which
proved to be in that part of the building occupied by the appellant. At the time the firemen
arrived, dense black smoke was issuing from under the eaves of the building, and the fumes of
burning coal oil were plainly discernible. The fire originated in the second floor of the building in
the appellant's living quarters. Before the fire was finally extinguished, the building was
damaged, according to the testimony of record, in the amount of P10,562.
The acting chief of the fire department testified that the fire could not been burning more than
three or four minutes when he arrived. He declared positively that the fire could not have
gained the headway it had or caused the damage it did if coal oil had not been used, and that
the whole place appeared to have been saturated with coal oil.
Three insurance polices taken out by the appellant were introduced by the prosecution.
Teodorico Fungo, who was the servant of the appellant at the time of this first fire, testified that
early on that morning, while boiling some milk, the appellant ordered him to go downstairs and
light some papers in a box standing in the court just between the appellant's door and the door
to the piano store. Witness refused to do so, and then saw the appellant to go downstairs with
a bottle of petroleum and saturate the papers in the box with the petroleum, after which she
came back upstairs and sent him out to purchase four centavos worth of petroleum. Upon his
return she took the petroleum from him and went downstairs. Pretty soon be heard people
downstairs crying, "Fire, fire," and then he heard the appellant saying the same thing to her
son. Witness then wrapped up his things and left the house. The testimony of this witness was
objected to on the ground that at the time of the trial he was living at the house of a member of
the city secret-service force who assisted in the investigation of the origin of the fire occuring
on June 2, without paying for his accommodations. This witness, however, testified that he was
washing dishes at this house, and evidently he was acting as a servant. In any event, this fact
would not effect his competency as a witness. It was established by indisputable evidence that
a fire occurred as stated above on May 31, and that unmistakable evidences of incendiarism
were found by the fire department.
ISSUE: Whether or not the introduction of all evidence relative to the fire of May 31 is
admissible as evidence.
RULING: In People vs. Shainwold (51 Ca., 468), the court said:
On a trial for arson, the prosecution may prove that the prisoner had attempted to set fire to the
house on a day previous to the burning alleged in the indictment, for the purpose of showing
the intent of the prisoner in subsequently setting fire to the house.
In Knights vs. State (58 Neb., 225; 78 N.W., 508), the court said: "Where a person is charged
with the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be received of other similar acts,
committed about the same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent of the
accused."
And in People vs. Lattimore (86 Cal., 403; 24 Pac., 1091), a similar ruling was made, when the
court said that "evidence tending to show that defendant started the former fire was admissible
to prove intent." This principle has been applied by the courts of many jurisdictions. (3 Cyc.,
1007; 1 Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 303, 354.) There was no error in receiving the evidence as
to the fire occurring on May 31 to show intent.
BALDRIDGE VS. MATTHEWS
FACTS: The gravamen of the tort is the indulgence by the offender in sexual intercourse with
another's wife without her husband's consent: "One who, without the husband's consent, has
sexual intercourse with a married woman is liable to the husband for the harm thereby caused
to any of his legally protected marital interests."
At trial, the plaintiff, in support of his allegation that his wife and the defendant had stayed
overnight in a hotel tryst, sought to show that they had baggage with them when the defendant
registered himself and companion as "Mr. & Mrs. W.D. Miller". The significance of the baggage
would be in its confirmation of an intended overnight sojourn. To prove the presence of the
baggage, the plaintiff called as a witness the hotel room clerk who was on duty when the
defendant registered. The clerk testified, over the defendant's objection, that the room was not
paid for in advance and that it was the uniform practice of the hotel to require payment in
advance for lodging when the registrant was without luggage. The appellant argues that the
testimony in respect of the hotel's practice was inadmissible since evidence as to how an act
was done on other occasions is irrelevant for the purpose of showing what was done on a
particular occasion
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the hotel room clerk is admissible as evidence
RULING: In so contending, the defendant fails to reflect accurately the rationale of the pertinent
principles involved. The probative value of a person's habit or custom, as showing what was
done on a particular occasion, is not open to doubt. Whether evidence of such usage or habit is
admissible to show what occurred in a specific instance depends on the "invariable regularity"
of the usage or habit. To be admissible the usage must have "sufficient regularity to make it
probable that it would be carried out in every instance or in most instances": Wigmore, loc. cit.
supra. In the present case, it seems clear that the clerk's testimony as to the hotel's usage is
such as to come within the compass of the Wigmore definition.
The cases cited by the defendant in this connection are not apposite. None of them involved
usage or habit even remotely approaching fixed regularity. For example, in the Roney case,
supra, the only evidence of usage was that, on a single previous occasion, an insurance agent
did not fill out an application blank as he had at other times; in the Veit case, supra, the only
evidence of usage, was that on a previous occasion the decedent had tampered with certain
steam appliances. There was no showing of custom or usage in those cases such as there is in
the present instance.
PEOPLE VS. STEELE
FACTS: The defendant, Stephen Steele, pleaded not guilty to an indictment which charged that
he "did offer to unlawfully sell a narcotic drug and then did unlawfully sell to John Stribling,
Junior a quantity of a certain purported narcotic drug". He waived a jury trial, was found guilty
after a trial before a judge, and was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less than
two nor more than six years. Upon this writ of error he contends that the allegations of the
indictment were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that prejudicial testimony was
admitted over his objection.
An informer, Robert Jackson, a Federal narcotics agent, Joseph Dino, Jr., and a State
narcotics agent, John Stribling, Jr., testified for the People. Jackson testified that about two
weeks before December 11, 1958, the defendant had told him that he could buy narcotics from
the defendant and had given him his phone number. Several narcotics agents were present
about 6:30 P.M. on December 11, when Jackson telephoned the defendant. The defendant
was not in, but he returned the call later. Jackson told him that he wanted to buy an ounce of
raw heroin. The defendant said it would cost $400, and they arranged to meet. Agent Dino
listened to the conversation on an extension telephone, and corroborated Jackson's testimony
with respect to it.
Stribling accompanied Jackson to the meeting place. There the defendant questioned
Stribling's presence, saying to Jackson, "Aw, what's this here?" Jackson replied "He's all right.
He's with me." Jackson testified that he then "stepped out of the picture and Officer Stribling
and him transacted the business."Stribling gave the defendant a roll of bills, the serial numbers
of which had been recorded, and the defendant gave him a small package wrapped in paper.
Stribling then returned to Jackson's *144 apartment and performed a field test which showed
that the substance in the package was not narcotics. Chemical analysis later disclosed it to be
quinine hydrochloride.
Agent Dino testified that he observed the meeting while sitting in a parked automobile and that
he placed the defendant under arrest after the transaction was completed. Stribling testified
that after the defendant was arrested, he denied dealing in narcotics but said that he needed
the money and "When you find a sucker, bump his head." Dino's testimony corroborated this
conversation.
The defendant denied that he had offered to sell narcotics. He testified that he had seen
Jackson several weeks before the arrest, at which time Jackson had complained of being sick
and had asked him if he had any quinine. He went home and got Jackson the quinine. He
testified that he wanted a job, and gave Jackson his phone number so that Jackson could call
him if he learned of anyone who was looking for a doorman or houseman. He also testified that
when he spoke to Jackson on the telephone Jackson asked if he had any more of "the stuff you
gave me the other day," and also requested him to keep some money that Jackson had won
gambling because "I don't want my old lady to know it." He testified that he gave the quinine to
Jackson, but that "the other fellow" gave him the money.
The statute under which the defendant was prosecuted provides: "Whoever agrees, consents
or in any manner offers to unlawfully sell any narcotic drugs to any person, and then sells to
any person any non-narcotic substance or material shall be imprisoned". The defendant
contends, and the People agree, that to establish guilt the proof must show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant offered to sell narcotics to Stribling, and sold a non-
narcotic substance to him. The defendant urges, however, that the evidence shows that if any
offer to sell was made, it was made to Jackson, and not to Stribling.
The interpretation that the parties have placed upon the statute and the indictment would seem
to exclude the case in which A offers to sell a narcotic drug to B, who communicates the offer
to C, to whom A then sells a non-narcotic substance.
ISSUE:
RULING: We express no opinion as to the correctness of this interpretation, for the court was
justified in finding from the evidence in this case that the defendant offered to sell a narcotic
drug to Stribling. Stribling testified that he said to the defendant, "$400 is a lot of money for an
ounce of heroin. I have to be sure that it's good stuff. He says `It's good. It's good. Let's deal.'"
This testimony was sufficient to establish an offer to sell narcotics to Stribling, and the sale to
him was established by his testimony that "He handed me the package with one hand and I
handed him the roll of bills with the other."
The defendant also contends that the court erred in admitting prejudicial evidence over his
objection. Jackson was the first witness for the prosecution. On direct examination, after he
had given his name and address and had stated that he used narcotics, he was asked, "What
kind of business dealings did you have with the defendant prior to December 11, 1958." Over
objection he was permitted to answer, "Buying narcotics." The defendant's motion for a mistrial
was denied.
The People suggest that this evidence of other offenses may be justified by our decision in
People v. Aldridge, 19 Ill. 2d 176, 180. The circumstances here, however, differ from those in
the Aldridge case. There the reference to prior offenses was not elicited at the outset of the
prosecution's case, but came in the course of the defendants' assertion of their innocence upon
direct examination by their own attorney. It was in that context that we pointed out that the
"testimony tended to negative the possibility of innocent *146 or inadvertent conduct on the part
of the defendants, and to establish their guilty knowledge, and so would apparently have been
admissible even if offered by the prosecution."
The unique nature of the crime with which the defendant was here charged must be taken into
account in determining the admissibility of the evidence. This case does not involve a
prosecution for the sale of narcotics, but rather a prosecution for offering to sell narcotics and
then selling a different substance. The element of deceit is thus a principal ingredient in the
offense, and the overtones are those of confidence game, or of obtaining money under false
pretenses. Evidence of earlier transactions in narcotics supports an inference that those earlier
sales were part of a course of conduct designed to induce the belief that what was now offered
for sale was also a narcotic drug. That evidence also makes it more likely that on the present
occasion the defendant offered to sell narcotics rather than some other substance, and it tends
to show that the defendant knew that what he was selling was not a narcotic drug. The
evidence of other transactions was thus independently relevant apart from its tendency to show
the bad character of the accused, and so its admission was not improper.
BOSTON BANK VS. MANALO
FACTS: Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) sold to Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM), initial bank-
buyer) some residential lots in Xavierville subdivision. XEI became agent of the bank and
continued selling the residential lots. Carlos Manalo, Jr. proposed to XEI, through its President
Emerito Ramos (Ramos), that he will purchase two lots in the subdivision and offered as part of
the downpayment the PHP 34, 887.66 that Ramos owed him. XEI, through Ramos, agreed. In
a letter-agreement dated 22August 1972 to Perla Manalo, Carlos’ wife, Ramos confirmed the
reservation of the lots. In the letter, he also pegged the price of the lots at PHP 348,060 with a
20% downpayment of the purchase price amounting to PHP 69,612 (less the PHP 34,887.66
owing from Ramos) payable as soon as XEI resumes its selling operations; the corresponding
Contract of Conditional Sale would then be signed on or before the same date. Perla Manalo
conformed to the letter agreement. The spouses constructed a house on the property. They
were notified of XEI’s resumption of selling operation but they did not pay the balance of the
downpayment because XEI failed to give them a contract of conditional sale. XEI turned over
its selling operations to OBM. Then, Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) acquired the Xavierville
Estate from OBM. In the meantime, CBM was renamed as Boston Bank. CBM requested Perla
Manalo to stop any on-going construction on the property since she had no permission for such
construction. Perla informed them that her husband had a contract with OBM, through XEI, to
purchase the property. She promised to send CBM the documents but she failed to do so. The
spouses filed a complaint for damages and specific performance against bank to obtain
contract. The spouses alleged that upon their partial payment of the downpayment, they were
entitled to the execution and delivery of a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject lots. RTC
ruled in favor of spouses and ordered delivery of Deed of Sale of lots, stating letter agreement
was a valid Contract to Sell. CA upheld ruling of RTC.
ISSUE: whether respondents spouse Manalo are bound to pay the balance of the purchase
price of the property in instalment basis.
RULING: Respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to allege in their complaint that the terms of
payment of the ₱278,448.00 to be incorporated in the "corresponding contract of conditional
sale" were those contained in the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and Soller,
Aguila and Roque.76 They likewise failed to prove such allegation in this Court.
The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the purchase price of lots
purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments does not constitute evidence that XEI
also agreed to give the respondents the same mode and timeline of payment of the
₱278,448.00.
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at another
time, although such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the
intent of the parties.
Similar acts as evidence. – Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it
may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit,
custom or usage, and the like.
However, respondents failed to allege and prove, in the trial court, that, as a matter of business
usage, habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the balance of the
purchase price in installments of 120 months of fixed amounts with pre-computed interests,
and that XEI and the respondents had intended to adopt such terms of payment relative to the
sale of the two lots in question. Indeed, respondents adduced in evidence the three contracts
of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers merely to prove that XEI continued to
sell lots in the subdivision as sales agent of OBM after it acquired said lots, not to prove usage,
habit or pattern of conduct on the part of XEI to require all lot buyers in the subdivision to pay
the balance of the purchase price of said lots in 120 months. It further failed to prive that the
trial court admitted the said deeds77 as part of the testimony of respondent Manalo, Jr.78
Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts. Courts must
contend with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of usage, of habit or pattern of
conduct, the offering party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform
response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather, conduct
that is semi-automatic in nature. The offering party must allege and prove specific, repetitive
conduct that might constitute evidence of habit. The examples offered in evidence to prove
habit, or pattern of evidence must be numerous enough to base on inference of systematic
conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently similar
circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion.
In determining whether the examples are numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the key
criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. After all, habit means a course of
behavior of a person regularly represented in like circumstances.79 It is only when examples
offered to establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an inference of
systematic conduct that examples are admissible. The key criteria are adequacy of sampling
and uniformity of response or ratio of reaction to situations.80
There are cases where the course of dealings to be followed is defined by the usage of a
particular trade or market or profession.
However, the respondents inexplicably failed to adduce sufficient competent evidence to prove
usage, habit or pattern of conduct of XEI to justify the use of the terms of payment in the
contracts of the other lot buyers, and thus grant respondents the right to pay the ₱278,448.00
in 120 months, presumably because of respondents’ belief that the manner of payment of the
said amount is not an essential element of a contract to sell. There is no evidence that XEI or
OBM and all the lot buyers in the subdivision, including lot buyers who pay part of the
downpayment of the property purchased by them in the form of service, had executed
contracts of conditional sale containing uniform terms and conditions. Moreover, under the
terms of the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and three lot buyers in the
subdivision, XEI agreed to grant 120 months within which to pay the balance of the purchase
price to two of them, but granted one 180 months to do so.84 There is no evidence on record
that XEI granted the same right to buyers of two or more lots.
MICHELSON VS. UNITED STATES
FACTS: Defendant Michelson is on trial for bribing a federal revenue agent. The defendant
called character witnesses and volunteered information that he was convicted of an offense
twenty years ago. The character witnesses testified that the defendant had a good reputation
for honesty and truthfulness. The defense was allowed to cross-examine the witnesses and
asked them whether they were familiar with the fact that the defendant had been arrested
twenty seven years prior for receiving stolen goods. The court allowed the cross-examination
and warned the jury of the limited purpose of such testimony. The defendant argued that he did
not bribe the official and that this was a case of entrapment.
ISSUE: Whether a party has the right to cross-examine another parties character witnesses
and inquire about past bad acts such as arrests and/or convictions?
RULING: Arrest without more does not impeach the integrity or impair the credibility of witness
and hence only a conviction may be inquired about to undermine the trustworthiness of a
witness. Before a character witness is cross-examined as to a prior arrest of the defendant, the
prosecution should demonstrate privately to the court that it is not based on unsupported or
untrue innuendo.
Generally, the prosecution may not resort in its case in chief to any kind of evidence of
defendant’s evil character, disposition, and reputation to establish probability of his guilt.
However, when the defendant puts his reputation in issue, the entire subject is fair game and
the prosecution may cross-examine the defendant’s character witnesses as to the contents and
extent of the hearsay on which they base their conclusions. When the defendant elects to
initiate a character inquiry commonly called character evidence, the witness may not testify
about defendant’s specific acts or courses of conduct.
In this case, the inquiry concerned an arrest twenty-seven years before the trial. Events a
generation old are likely to be lived down and dropped from the present thought and talk of the
community and to be absent from the knowledge of younger or more recent acquaintances.
But, where defendant has put his reputation in issue by the calling of character witnesses, he
cannot complain at the latitude which is allowed the prosecution in meeting, by cross-
examination the issue thus voluntarily tendered, notwithstanding the difficulty which the jury
may experience in comprehending the court’s limiting instructions.
PEOPLE VS. SOLIMAN
FACTS: Appellants, Soliman Buenaventura and Sofronio Palin, were charged with murder
before the Court of First Instance of Manila and were sentenced each to suffer the extreme
penalty of death.
Appellant Soliman testified that prior to the present incident, or on April 21, 1955, the deceased
tried to borrow his pushcart and, as he was not able to lend it to him, the deceased boxed him
and as a consequence, he suffered physical injuries; that incident was settled amicably on the
same day by the companions of the deceased; that on another occasion the beat up Soliman
with an iron pipe and the latter had to undergo medical treatment; that in the night of April 29,
1955, after he had eaten in Folgueras St., he proceeded to a truck by the United Bus Line of
which he was a watchman; that while he was passing Sto. Cristo Street, the deceased called
him and asked for a drink; that he told the deceased he had no money, but the deceased
forced him to give him money and even boxed him; that because the deceased had three
companions, he pulled out his knife and upon seeing this, the three companions ran away; that
he and the deceased fought in the course of which he stabbed him; that while they were
fighting, one Sofronio Palin came and separated them; and that when they were separated
Palin advised him to surrender to the police, so he went home and asked his brothers to
accompany him to the Meisic Station.
Appellant Palin merely corroborated the testimony of his co-accused by declaring that while he
was eating at a restaurant at the corner of Sto. Cristo and Azcarraga Streets in the morning in
question, he saw Soliman and the deceased grappling with each other; that he tried to
separate them and succeeded in doing so; that after the two were separated, he asked
Soliman to surrender and the latter heeded his advice.
The defense, however, claims that the testimony of Ernesto Balaktaw should not be given
credit because it is self-contradictory and inconsistent with the testimony of Pat. Tolentino and
Det. Senen. But, aside from the fact that the alleged contradictions refer to unimportant details
or circumstances, they can be explained and reconciled.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants are disqualified to be a witness for the reason of
conviction of moral turpitude
RULING: No. In this respect, we notice that the trial court has been most careful in taking
notice not only of the conduct of the witness during the trial, but of other extraneous matters
that may help in reaching a correct conclusion. The Court found the testimony of Balaktaw
worthy of credence not only because it is in part corroborated by the testimony of appellant
Soliman himself who admitted having inflicted the wounds that caused the death of the victim,
(although by way of self-defense) but also because it is supported by the nature of the wounds
as found by Dr. Lara in his autopsy.
The fact that a person has been previously convicted of a crime does not necessarily disqualify
him as a witness for he may still prove to be a truthful one.
PEOPLE VS. BABIERA
FACTS: Justo Babiera was the owner of two parcels of land situated in the Municipality of
Oton. Babiera executed a contract of sale with the right if repurchase in favour of Basilio
Copreros Copreros whereby he sold the two parcels of land to the latter for the sum of P124
with the condition that if the vendor did not repurchase them on or before August 1, 1923, the
sale would become absolute and irrevocable. The period for repurchase having expired, Basilio
Copreros took possession of said two parcels of land, and on March 24, 1927, made
application to the registrar of deeds for the Province of Iloilo for the registration of the
consolidation of his title to said parcels. On the 26th of the said month, Basilio Copreros leased
said parcels to Severino Haro, municipal president of Oton
On August 21, 1927, Severino Haro, as usual, went to visit his land in the barrio of Bita,
accompanied by Gregorio Torrija, Benito Carreon and Pedro Tauro. On arriving there Fermin
Bruces, his copartner on shares, told him that the day before he had found Clemente Babiera's
cow grazing on that land. It happened at that moment Clemente Babiera, daughter of Justo
Babiera and Dominga Bores, Justo’s mistress, were passing by. Severino Haro then informed
Clemente Babiera of what his cow had done on the former's land and told him to take better
care of his cow in future and not to let it run loose. He then ordered Fermin Bruces to take the
animal to where the Babiera family lived. Severino Haro was not able to return to town until
almost 7 o'clock in the evening. As it was already dark, he and his companions had to make
use of a torch made out of split bamboo to light them on their way. Severino Haro went ahead,
followed by Pedro Tauro, who carried the torch, some 8 brazas behind, with Gregorio Torrija
and Benito Carreon following. On Coming to a place in the road near Rosendo Paycol's house,
Clemente Babiera suddenly sprang from the cogon grass, went after Severino Haro and struck
him with his bolo in the back. On turning his head to see who had attacked him Severino Haro
received another bolo blow in the forehead near the right eyebrow. In trying to defend himself
with his hand he was wounded between the index finger and the thumb. He then tried to grasp
his assailant but did not succeed and he fell to the ground. Then Justo Babiera appeared and
placing himself upon Severino Haro's stomach, held the latter's hands. Later, Dominga Bores
appeared on the scene and held both knees of the wounded man. When Justo Babiera arrived,
a voice was heard saying: "Hold him, papa," and at the same time, Severino Haro's voice was
heard saying: "Help! help!" Pedro Tauro wished to come near in order to help Severino Haro,
but Clemente Babiera raised his bolo in the air and kept on brandishing it to warn everybody
off. Pedro Tauro, in fear, stepped back, dropping the torch he carried. Not far from there were
also Buenaventura Gabalfin and Gregorio Paycol, who threatened to kill Severino Haro's
companions if they helped him. After the torch had been extinguished they heard a voice which
they recognized as Severino Haro's saying: "Uncle Justo, have patience with me, for I have
done no wrong." Then they heard another voice, that of Dominga Bores, which said: "Here is
the revolver; let us return." Before the assailants left two or three revolver shots were heard.
When Severino Haro's companions saw that their assailants had already departed, they drew
near to where Severino lay stretched out to see what had happened to him. Severino Haro told
them not to fear for he did not feel as if he were going to die, and calling his copartner on
shares, Fermin Bruces, directed him to bring a cot and take him to town. Pedro Tauro and
Gregorio Torrija did as Severino Haro wished, and on arriving at the barrio of Santa Monica,
they by chance came upon a truck in which were some policemen. They place the wounded
man in the same truck and took him to Saint Paul's Hospital in the City of Iloilo. When Severino
Haro was taken to the town he did not have his revolver and the cartridge belt, without the
holster, was found by Gregorio Torrija near where the incident took place.
Clemente Babiera contended that she only acted in defense of his life and property. She also
attempted to prove that Severino Haro was of a quarrelsome disposition, provoking, irascible,
and fond of starting quarrels in the municipality of Oton
ISSUE: Whether or not the conduct and character of Severino Haro is admissible as evidence
to prove that he began the attack.
RULING: While it is true that when the defense of the accused is that he acted in self-defense,
he may prove the deceased to have been of a quarrelsome, provoking and irascible
disposition, the proof must be of his general reputation in the community and not of isolated
and specific acts, such as the accused Clemente Babiera tried to prove, and hence the lower
court did not err in not admitting such proof. But even if it had been proved by competent
evidence that the deceased was of such a disposition, nevertheless, it would not have been
sufficient to overthrow the conclusive proof that it was the said accused who treacherously
attacked the deceased.
PEOPLE VS. CHENG
FACTS: On February 20, 1989, jail guards Edwin Ramos and Redentor Lamiao were in the
night shift at Gate 1 of the Manila City Jail, their tour of duty commencing at 7 P.M. and ending
at 7 A.M. the following day. Early in the morning of February 21, 1989, Ramos allowed Yehia
Aburawash, an Egyptian national who had been previously detained in the city jail, to enter the
premises together with a female companion. Before 4 A.M., Aburawash and his companion
went out of the jail and some time thereafter, or at about 4 A.M., accused-appellant who was
then on duty on the night shift escorted out co-accused and then a detainee in the said city jail,
Patrolman Alex Malubay, without any authorization from the desk officer or platoon commander
on duty. Jail Guard Ramos asked accused-appellant to secure the approval of the desk officer
but accused-appellant simply ignored Ramos and continued on his way out.
At about 4:30 o'clock that same morning, Emma Ruth Ilocso and her companions Catalina
Balboa, and Marivic Policarpio, having just come from a disco joint, were at the corner of Claro
M. Recto Avenue and Quezon Boulevard, right outside the vicinity of Manila City Jail. Ilocso
decided to pass by the city jail to see her brother who was detained thereat. She, however,
stopped at a nearby Burger Machine stand to have the P100.00 she intended to give her
brother broken to smaller denominations.
It was while she was at the burger stand that Ilocso witnessed the commission of the crime.
Ilocso saw the Egyptian national, Yehia Aburawash, at the center island of Quezon Boulevard.
She recognized him because she had previously seen him while the latter was detained at the
same city jail for swindling. She also saw Aburawash's female companion who was later
identified to be Esperanza Viterbo. Ilocso observed that Aburawash and Viterbo were then
engaged in an argument with accused-appellant, Sioco, and a third man. Thereupon, she
heard the first gunfire from accused-appellant which caused Aburawash to fall to the ground.
Two shots then quickly followed, one from Sioco, and another from accused-appellant.
Afterwards, accused-appellant and Sioco went after Viterbo who ran towards the burger stand.
Accused-appellant and Sioco told Viterbo that she would be brought to a waiting cab. However,
when the two were already beside her, they both shot her, after which the two ran towards the
direction of the Central Market.
Accused-appellant also assails the credibility of Emma Ruth Ilocso who rendered an
eyewitness account of the killing of Esperanza Viterbo and Yehia Aburawash Mohammed.
Accused-appellant claims that there appear in the record some facts or circumstances of
weight and influence which were misappreciated by the trial court. One is the alleged loose
morals of Emma Ruth Ilocso. Another such factor would refer to the supposed inconsistencies
in some of the details between her declarations during the administrative proceedings and the
trial of the criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Emma Ruth Ilocso is admissible as evidence.
RULING: Accused-appellant's efforts to discredit Emma Ruth Ilocso are futile.
We stress that in this jurisdiction, loose morals per se is not a ground to discredit a witness.
There must be clear indications militating against her credibility other than her being a person
of ill repute. Otherwise stated, even a prostitute may be a competent witness to the extent that
even with her sole testimony an accused may be duly convicted, provided that such witness is
not coached and her testimony is not rehearsed and on all other counts worthy of credence
beyond reasonable doubt.
The all too sweeping contention in accused-appellant's motion for reconsideration that it is
improbable that Ilocso will tell the exact truth where there is the slightest motive for testifying
falsely as she would probably be willing to bring her evidence to market as she was ready to
offer her person for sale, presents a cynical and too dark an outlook of a human person for
acceptance. In the first place, Ilocso has not been shown to be a person of ill repute. Then too,
the reputation of this witness is not germane to the case.
To further discredit Emma Ruth Ilocso, accused-appellant capitalizes on the supposed
discrepancies in her answers as to exactly where she and her companions came from before
they came to the city jail, or who her companions were. He also points out her supposed lie
concerning her personal circumstances such as her educational background. Ilocso was
forthright enough to say that some of her statements in the administrative case are not correct
and true. But she ascribes, with reason we believe, the same to her constant fear as she was
threatened by accused-appellant, a policeman whom she knows could kill as he did kill the
herein victims. In any event, the supposed untrue statements do not deal with Ilocso's positive
identification of accused-appellant and his companion, Sioco, both of whom Ilocso had known
2 years previous to the incident.
Under the foregoing consideration, there is no cogent reason for the Court to depart from the
well established doctrine that on questions of credibility of witnesses, this Court will hold with
high respect the factual findings of the trial judge who actually observed the demeanor of the
witnesses at the witness stand.
Accused-appellant's argument that conspiracy has hot been established in the instant case
with the same quantum of evidence required for conviction does not persuade us. The unity of
purpose of accused-appellant and co-accused Sioco was clearly established by the plain and
clear testimony of witness Ilocso. She saw the two co-accused engaged in an argument with
Aburawash before both accused shot the latter. Immediately thereafter, both accused went
after a defenseless woman, Viterbo, who ran towards the burger stand and there they shot her
too. There is no indication whatsoever that either of them desisted from executing all the overt
acts necessary to perpetrate the two crimes of murder. Clearly, there was conspiracy.
CSC VS. BELAGAN
FACTS: Magdalena Gapuz filed an application with Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) Office in Baguio City for permit to operate a pre-school. One of the requisites
for the issuance of the permit was the inspection of the school premises by the DECS Division
Office.
Respondent Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of DECS and Complainant Gapuz visited the
school. In the course of inspection, while both descending the stairs, respondent suddenly
placed his arms around complainant’s shoulders and kissed her cheek. Gapuz then wrote a
letter-complaint for sexual indignities and harassment to former DECS Secretary Ricardo
Gloria. Respondent Belagan was then placed under suspension. Meanwhile Ligaya Annawi, a
public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School, alleged in her complaint accusing
respondent of several sexual harassment acts and imputation of dereliction of duty.
DECS conducted joint investigation of the complaints of Gapuz and Annawi, of which
respondent was found guilty and was ordered dismissed from service.
Respondent filed Motion for Reconsideration contending that he has never been charged of
any offense in his 37 years of service, and by contrast, Gapuz was charged with several
offenses of Defamation, Slight Physical Injuries, Grave Theats, Malicious Mischief, Unjust
Vexation, Light Threats, and Grave Oral Threats on separation occasions. Thus, the numerous
cases filed against Gapuz case doubt on her character, integrity and credibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complainant Gapuz is credible as a witness.
RULING: Respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of the criminal
cases specified by respondent. The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is
that it is not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that he has been charged
with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his
credibility.26 This view has usually been based upon one or more of the following grounds or
theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge against the witness does not logically tend to affect
his credibility, (b) that innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that one
accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally established, and (d) that
a witness may not be impeached or discredited by evidence of particular acts of misconduct.27
Significantly, the same Section 11, Rule 132 of our Revised Rules on Evidence provides that a
witness may not be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts. Such evidence is
rejected because of the confusion of issues and the waste of time that would be involved, and
because the witness may not be prepared to expose the falsity of such wrongful acts.28 As it
happened in this case, Magdalena was not able to explain or rebut each of the charges against
her listed by respondent.
But more than anything else, what convinces us to sustain the Resolution of the CSC is the fact
that it is supported by substantial evidence. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
Magdalena testified in a straightforward, candid and spontaneous manner. Her testimony is
replete with details, such as the number of times she and respondent inspected the pre-school,
the specific part of the stairs where respondent kissed her, and the matter about her transient
boarders during summer. Magdalena would not have normally thought about these details if
she were not telling the truth.
PEOPLE VS. BRIOSO
FACTS: Accused Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza were charged with the crime of murder for
killing Silvino Daria. Motive for the killing appears to have been the disapproval of Sivino and
Susana of Mariano Taeza’s courtship of their daughter, Angelita. Mariano Taeza is a nephew
of Silvino by a first degree cousin. The records of the case show that on the night of December
23, 1966 spouses Silvino Daria and Susana Tumalip were in their house. Prosecution’s
eyewitness Cecilia Bernal was a niece and neighbour of the spouses who lived only six (6)
meters away from the spouses’ house. She narrated that she was alarmed by the barking of
dogs so she peeped through a crack in the wall of her house. She saw accused carrying a long
gun and heading towards Silvino’s house. Her suspicions awakened, she went downstairs and
shielded by the fence. She witnessed appellant point a gun at the bamboo wall of Daria’s
house. Two detonations followed and thereafter she heard Daria moaning and his wife calling
for help, saying her husband had been shot. Bernal went to the house and found the victim
prostrate, wounded and unable to speak. The wife of the victim rushed to Silvino and he told
her that he was shot by Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza. Silvino Daria perished one hour later
as a result of gunshot wounds in the abdomen and leg. A few days later, Cecilia Bernal and the
widow, Susana Tumalip, executed affidavits pointing to the two accused as the killers. Both
accused interposed alibi as their defense.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in relying on the uncorroborated and contradictory
testimony and statement of the prosecution witness Cecilia Bernal
RULING: The house of Cecilia Bernal was only six meters away from that of Silvino Daria's.
The night was brightly illuminated by the moon. Cecilia Bernal had known both accused for a
long time and it is admitted that they also know her. There could have been no difficulty in
identifying the accused under the circumstances.
Cecilia Bernal had no motive to impute falsely this heinous charge of murder against the
above-said accused, considering that Mariano Taeza is a nephew of the deceased by a first
degree cousin. Even Juan Brioso specifically said that he knew of no reason why she should
testify against him. Hence, her statement that she came to court only to tell the truth should be
believed. The witness also stated that she was hard of hearing and could not understand some
of the questions; thus, the alleged inconsistencies in her testimony do not detract from the
"positive and straightforward"1 identification of the accused as the ones who were seen at the
scene of the crime and who actually shot Silvino Daria.
Moreover, the testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in the declaration of the victim,
who told his wife that it was Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza who shot him. This statement
does satisfy the requirements of an ante mortem statement. Judged by the nature and extent of
his wounds, Silvino Daria must have realized the seriousness of his condition, and it can be
safely inferred that he made the same under the consciousness of impending
death,considering that he died only one hour after being shot.
PEOPLE VS. CUSI, JR.
FACTS: Respondents were charged with robbery in band with homicide, to which they pleaded
not guilty. During the trial, and while Sgt. Lucio Bano of the Police Force of Digos, Davao was
testifying as a prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by the
accused Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting his participation in the
commission of the offense charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to commit
the offense, mentioning the name of each and everyone of them. Following up this testimony,
the prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention in court the names of Puesca's alleged co-
conspirators. Counsel for the accused-respondents Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to
this, upon the ground that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his
clients were concerned. The respondent judge resolved the objection directing the witness to
answer the question but without mentioning or giving the names of the accused who had
interposed the objection. In other words, the witness was allowed to answer the question and
name his co-conspirators except those who had raised the objection. The prosecuting officer's
motion for reconsideration of this ruling was denied. Hence the present petition for certiorari
praying that the abovementioned ruling of the respondent judge be declared erroneous and for
a further order directing said respondent judge to allow witness Bano to answer the question in
full.
ISSUE:
RULING: In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer, as manifested by him in
the discussions below, is nothing more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca had
mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of those who conspired with him to commit the offense
charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement or the answer to be given by Sgt. Bano
would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named really
conspired with Puesca. For this limited purpose, we believe that the question propounded to
the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the
understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to show
that the persons named really and actually conspired with Puesca and later took part in the
commission of the offense.
On the other hand, the fact which the prosecuting officer intended to establish would seem to
be relevant to explain why the police force of the place where the offense was committed
subsequently questioned and investigated the persons allegedly named by Puesca.
PEOPLE VS. GADDI
FACTS: At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 11, 1981, at San Bartolome,
Novaliches, Quezon City, Ernesto Guzman saw appellant Nerio Gaddi and the victim Augusto
Esguerra drinking gin. In the morning of the following day, December 12, 1981, appellant told
Ernesto Guzman that he killed his drinking partner Augusto Esguerra and dumped his body in
a toilet pit. Guzman advised appellant to surrender to the police. After work, Guzman went to
the police and reported what appellant told him.
Accused Gaddi alleged that on December 11, 1981, at around 2:00 to 5:00 p.m., he was
drinking with Augusta Esguerra (Bong Kuleleng) near the house of Ernesto Guzman. At about
5:00 p.m., be was requested by Ernesto Guzman to buy gin. He left Ernesto Guzman and
Augusta Esguerra (who were allegedly drinking) in order to buy a bottle of gin in a nearby
store, about 200 meters away. At the store, he met an acquaintance and they talked for a while
before returning. Upon his arrival at the place (where they had a drinking spree) he noticed
stain of blood in the place where they had been drinking and Augusta Esguerra, alias Bong
Kuleleng was not there anymore. He inquired from Ernesto Guzman the whereabouts of
Augusta Esguerra and was told that the latter "went home already". He then asked Guzman
about the blood and was told that it was the blood stain of a "butchered chicken." At about
12:00 o'clock midnight, Ernesto Guzman informed him about the killing of Augusta Esguerra.
Guzman narrated to him that Bong Kuleleng (Augusta Esguerra) held his rooster by the neck
and that his tattoo mark BCJ (Batang City Jail) will be erased by him. He did not report the
killing to the authorities. Guzman likewise requested ban to admit the killing but he refused.
While in the house, Guzman filed the case ahead. He was later arrested and investigated while
looking for the corpse. When brought to the police station, he was forced to admit the killing of
Augusto Esguerra
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Ernesto Guman cannot be given credence for being
hearsay.
RULING: A confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong
presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a
crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience
Proof that a person confessed to the commission of a crime can be presented in evidence
without violating the hearsay rule [Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court] which
only prohibits a witness from testifying as to those facts which he merely learned from other
persons but not as to those facts which he "knows of his own knowledge: that is, which are
derived from his own perception." Hence, while the testimony of a witness regarding the
statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the
statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in
the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such
statement. Here, when Guzman testified that the appellant, who probably was bothered by his
conscience, admitted the killing to him, there was no violation of the hearsay rule as Guzman
was testifying to a fact which he knows of his own personal knowledge; that is, be was
testifying to the fact that the appellant told him that he stabbed Augusta Esguerra and not to
the truth of the appellant's statement.
LEAKE VS. HAGERT
FACTS: On October 25, 1966, Allen Leake (plaintiff) was driving his tractor and plow on a
public highway after sunset. Charlotte Hagert (defendant) drove her car into the rear of Leake’s
plow, which was being towed by his tractor. Leake sued Hagert, alleging that her negligence
was the sole and proximate cause for his personal injuries and the damages to his plow and
tractor. Hagert counterclaimed, alleging that the sole and proximate cause of the crash was
Leake’s negligence. At trial, the trial court admitted testimony from Edward Gross, an adjuster
who conducted an investigation of the accident. Gross testified that he spoke to Leake’s son,
who told him that a rear red light on the tractor had been broken for some time. At least three
other witnesses testified about the condition of the rear red light. The jury returned a verdict
dismissing both Leake’s and Hagert’s claims. Leake filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial
court denied. Leake appealed the dismissal and the denial of his motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Edward Gross is inadmissible for being hearsay.
RULING: The hearsay rule prohibits use of a person's assertion, as equivalent to testimony of
the fact asserted, unless the assertor is brought to testify in court on the stand, where he may
be probed and cross-examined as to the grounds of his assertion and his qualifications to
make it. Allen Leake contends that whether or not the red lens was out at the time of the
accident is a material question of fact, determinative as to the contributory negligence by Allen
Leake, and whether he complied with the standards which requires that every tractor, when
operating upon a highway of this state at any time from one-half hour after sunset to a half-hour
before sunrise, be equipped with at least one lamp displaying a red light visible, when lighted,
from a distance of one thousand feet to the rear of such tractor. Leake's son did not testify in
the present action; he was not a party to the action; his statement was not made under oath;
his statement was not subject to cross-examination; and he was not available as a witness at
the time of trial because he was in the Army and overseas. We find that it was error for the trial
court to admit into evidence the testimony concerning what Leake's son said to Edward Gross;
the son's statement was hearsay and should have been excluded.
US VS. ZENNI
FACTS: Defendant Zenni was arrested under suspicion of illegal bookmaking activities. The
police had gone to Zenni’s house and answered his phone. A number of unknown people
called and tried to place bets with Zenni. They seek to introduce evidence that individuals who
called during that time placed bets, and thus believed that the premises was used for such
purposes, and was thus likely used for such a purpose. The Trial Court convicted Zenni of
bookmaking. Zenni appealed. Zenni argued that the evidence about the phone calls was
inadmissible because it was hearsay.
ISSUE: Whether implied assertions are hearsay
RULING: No. To be hearsay an assertion must be made, and in this case the statements made
by the gamblers on the telephone were non-assertive verbal conduct. They were not made to
prove that the place they were calling was a bookmaking establishment, but simply made to
place bets. The dangers inherent in hearsay do not exist in the context of non-assertive verbal
conduct, or implied assertions. The declarant’s veracity is not at issue, and so one of the
reasons that it is so important to have an out of court declarant available for cross examination
is not present. The statement was not made to show the truth or falsity of something, and so
the veracity is not in issue.
RICHMOND VS. ANCHUELO
FACTS: Anchuello, who was blind, employed Richmond, a doctor, to treat his eyes. Plaintiff did
so, without success, and brought this action to recover for his services. The principal question
in the case is, What was the contract between the parties?
Richmond claimed that he was to receive 200 pesos in any event, and if he effected a cure he
was to receive 500 pesos more. Anchuello claimed that if a cure was effected Richmond was to
receive 200 pesos, but if no cure was effected he was to receive nothing. The court below
found upon the evidence in favor of Richmond, and we think this finding is supported by the
proof.
At the trial Anchuello presented a witness, Jose Pastor, and offered to prove by him that
Anchuello, on returning from Richmond’s office, had stated to the witness that Richmond had
agreed to cure him for 200 pesos, and not to charge anything if no cure was effected. The
judge excluded this evidence, to which ruling Anchuello excepted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Jose Pastor is admissible.
RULING: It will be noticed that the witness did not offer to testify to anything which Richmond
had said, but offered to testify to what Anchuello said that Richmond had said. The witness did
not know that Richmond had made these statements; he only knew that Anchuello said that
Richmond had made them. Such evidence is inadmissible, according to the provisions of
section 276 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
CALIFORNIA VS. GREEN
FACTS: Defendant Green was charged with felony offenses related to the sale of marijuana.
Green was charged on the basis of statements made to an undercover police officer by Porter.
The state called Porter to testify at Green’s preliminary hearing. The state called Porter as a
witness again during Green’s trial. When Porter gave testimony that conflicted with his
testimony at the preliminary hearing, the prosecution introduced excerpts from the preliminary
hearing. The prosecution also called a police officer to testify about Porter’s initial statements to
police. Green was convicted. The state supreme court had previously held that prior
statements of a witness could not be admitted as evidence if the statements had not previously
been subject to cross examination. In Green’s case, the state supreme court applied the same
ban to Porter’s preliminary hearing testimony. The state of California (plaintiff) petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the porter is admissible.
RULING: Admitting a declarant's out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant was
testifying as a witness and was subject to cross-examination, did not violate U.S. Constitutional
Amendment VI.
State or federal evidence rules could restrict resort to prior sworn testimony where the
declarant was present at trial, but the restriction would not be as a constitutional matter.
The judgment was vacated and remanded. The court concluded that because the declarant
was testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination, admitting his
out-of-court statements did not violate the Sixth Amendment.
OHIO VS. ROBERTS
FACTS: Defendant Herschel Roberts was charged with forgery of a check and possession of
stolen credit cards belonging to the Isaacses. At the preliminary hearing, the Isaacses’
daughter, Anita, denied Roberts’s contention that she had given Roberts her parents’
checkbook and credit cards with the instruction that he could use them. Despite being
subpoenaed, Anita did not show up at Roberts’s trial and her mother said Anita was traveling
out of state and did not know Anita’s whereabouts. The prosecution sought to introduce into
evidence a transcript of Anita’s testimony at the preliminary hearing. Roberts objected to the
admission of the transcript on the basis of the Confrontation Clause. The trial court admitted
the transcript and convicted Roberts. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, holding that
admission of the transcript violated the Confrontation Clause. The prosecution appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the preliminary hearing testimony by an unavailable witness is admissible.
RULING: When a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his
statement is admissible only if it bears adequate indicia of reliability. Reliability can be inferred
without more in a case where evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other
cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness. The admission of the preliminary hearing testimony does not violate
Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. The
witness was unavailable, but the prosecution made a good-faith effort in trying to locate her.
There were also several factors that demonstrated the reliability of her testimony such as
Defendant’s counsel asked her leading questions at length during the preliminary hearing. The
court breaks the Confrontation Clause requirements into two parts. First, the state needs to
prove that they made a good-effort attempt to reach the witness. Second, the state has to
prove that the prior testimony carries an indicia of trustworthiness.
DASMARINAS GARMENTS, INC. VS REYES
FACTS: American President Lines, LTD (APL) sued Dasmarinas Garments for sum of money
at the hearing. Instead of presenting its witness, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to
take the depositions of some Taiwan nationals. The lower court granted the deposition which
was in compliance with the rules on taking of testimony by deposition upon written
interrogatories under Rules of Court. Court of Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not a party could present its evidence by taking the deposition of its witness
in a foreign jurisdiction before a private entity.
RULING: Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to
compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are
relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions are principally made by law to the
parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts. They are not therefore
generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party witness.
Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before a secretary or
embassy or legation, consul general, etc., and the defendants answer has already been
served.
Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or
convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition. Taking only to the period of pre-trial or
before it. No prohibition against the taking of deposition after pre-trial. The law authorizes the
taking of depositions before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment of RTC to perpetuate
their testimony for use in event of further proceedings in court or during the process of
execution of a final and executor judgment.
LEA MER INDUSTRIES VS. MALAYAN INSURANCE
FACTS: Ilian Silica Mining entered into a contract of carriage with Lea Mer Industries, Inc., for
the shipment of 900 metric tons of silica sand valued at ₱565,000.5 Consigned to Vulcan
Industrial and Mining Corporation, the cargo was to be transported from Palawan to Manila. On
October 25, 1991, the silica sand was placed on board Judy VII, a barge leased by Lea Mer.6
During the voyage, the vessel sank, resulting in the loss of the cargo.7
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., as insurer, paid Vulcan the value of the lost cargo.8 To recover
the amount paid and in the exercise of its right of subrogation, Malayan demanded
reimbursement from Lea Mer, which refused to comply. Consequently, Malayan instituted a
Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila on September 4, 1992, for the
collection of ₱565,000 representing the amount that respondent had paid Vulcan.9
On October 7, 1999, the trial court dismissed the Complaint, upon finding that the cause of the
loss was a fortuitous event.10 The RTC noted that the vessel had sunk because of the bad
weather condition brought about by Typhoon Trining. The court ruled that petitioner had no
advance knowledge of the incoming typhoon, and that the vessel had been cleared by the
Philippine Coast Guard to travel from Palawan to Manila.11
ISSUE: Whether or not the survey report of the cargo surveyor, Jesus Cortez, who had not
been presented as a witness of the said report during the trial of this case before the lower
court can be admitted in evidence to prove the alleged facts cited in the said report.
RULING: That witnesses must be examined and presented during the trial,50 and that their
testimonies must be confined to personal knowledge is required by the rules on evidence, from
which we quote:
"Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. –A
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which
are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules."51
On this basis, the trial court correctly refused to admit Jesus Cortez’s Affidavit, which
respondent had offered as evidence.52 Well-settled is the rule that, unless the affiant is
presented as a witness, an affidavit is considered hearsay.53
An exception to the foregoing rule is that on "independently relevant statements." A report
made by a person is admissible if it is intended to prove the tenor, not the truth, of the
statements.54 Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement given in the report, the
fact that it has been made is relevant. Here, the hearsay rule does not apply.55
In the instant case, the challenged Survey Report prepared by Cortez was admitted only as
part of the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses. The referral to Cortez’s Report was in
relation to Manlapig’s final Adjustment Report. Evidently, it was the existence of the Survey
Report that was testified to. The admissibility of that Report as part of the testimonies of the
witnesses was correctly ruled upon by the trial court.
At any rate, even without the Survey Report, petitioner has already failed to overcome the
presumption of fault that applies to common carriers.
PATULA VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: Petitioner Patula was charged with estafa under an information filed in RTC. The only
other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan, who is a store auditor. she based her
testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner iin the ledgers
corresponding each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Guivencan is a mere hearsay.
RULING: Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court states that a witness can testfy only to those
facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own
perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. Witness bereft of personal
knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony
derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from
the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.
ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO
FACTS: It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking,
illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious
allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on
January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing
damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an
uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned
after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd
at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this
election. As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state
of mind of the petitioner. The window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada,"
the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer. On January
20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively
resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the cr2owd at
EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after
his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his
term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of Angara Diary violates the rule against the admission of
hearsay evidence
RULING: We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court
statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot
complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its
use. To be sure, the said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings.[3]
The three parts of the Diary published in the PDI from February 4-6, 2001 were attached as
Annexes A-C, respectively, of the Memorandum of private respondents Romeo T. Capulong, et
al., dated February 20, 2001. The second and third parts of the Diary were earlier also attached
as Annexes 12 and 13 of the Comment of private respondents Capulong, et al., dated February
12, 2001. In fact, petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum both
the second part of the diary, published on February 5, 2001, and the third part, published on
February 6, 2001. It was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his
oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but
unfortunately failed to do so.
Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is
not covered by the hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends,
in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness
by whom it is sought to produce it. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1)
absence of cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the
oath. Not at all hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a
huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their relevance,
trustworthiness and necessity. The emergence of these exceptions and their wide spread
acceptance is well-explained by Weinstein, Mansfield, Abrams and Berger as follows:
xxx
On the other hand, we all make decisions in our everyday lives on the basis of other persons
accounts of what happened, and verdicts are usually sustained and affirmed even if they are
based on hearsay erroneously admitted, or admitted because no objection was made. See
Shepp v. Uehlinger, 775 F 2d 452, 454-455 (1st Cir. 1985) (hearsay evidence alone can
support a verdict). Although volumes have been written suggesting ways to revise the hearsay
rule, no one advocates a rule that would bar all hearsay evidence. Indeed, the decided
historical trend has been to exclude categories of highly probative statements from the
definition of hearsay (sections 2 and 3, infra), and to develop more class exceptions to the
hearsay rule (sections 4-11, infra).Furthermore, many states have added to their rules the
residual, or catch-all, exceptions first pioneered by the Federal Rules which authorize the
admission of hearsay that does not satisfy a class exception, provided it is adequately
trustworthy and probative (section 12, infra).
Moreover, some commentators believe that the hearsay rule should be abolished altogether
instead of being loosened. See, e.g., Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules,
93 Harv.L.Rev. 1786, 1804-1805, 1815 (1980) (footnotes omitted):
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Under this
structure, exclusion is justified by fears of how the jury will be influenced by the evidence.
However, it is not traditional to think of hearsay as merely a subdivision of this structure, and
the Federal Rules do not conceive of hearsay in that manner. Prejudice refers to the jurys use
of evidence for inferences other than those for which the evidence is legally relevant; by
contrast, the rule against hearsay questions the jurys ability to evaluate the strength of a
legitimate inference to be drawn from the evidence. For example, were a judge to exclude
testimony because a witness was particularly smooth or convincing, there would be no doubt
as to the usurpation of the jurys function. Thus, unlike prejudices recognized by the evidence
rules, such as those stemming from racial or religious biases or from the introduction of
photographs of a victims final state, the exclusion of hearsay on the basis of misperception
strikes at the root of the jurys function by usurping its power to process quite ordinary evidence,
the type of information routinely encountered by jurors in their everyday lives.
Since virtually all criteria seeking to distinguish between good and bad hearsay are either
incoherent, inconsistent, or indeterminate, the only altenative to a general rule of admission
would be an absolute rule of exclusion, which is surely inferior. More important, the
assumptions necessary to justify a rule against hearsay seem insupportable and, in any event,
are inconsistent with accepted notions of the function of the jury. Therefore, the hearsay rules
should be abolished.
Some support for this view can be found in the limited empirical research now available which
is, however, derived from simulations that suggests that admitting hearsay has little effect on
trial outcomes because jurors discount the value of hearsay evidence. See Rakos &
Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future
Directions, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 655 (1992); Miene, Park, & Borgidas, Jury Decision Making and the
Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 683 (1992); Kovera, Park, & Penrod, Jurors
Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 703 (1992); Landsman &
Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary Empirical Enquiry Concerning the prohibition of
Hearsay Evidence in American Courts, 15 Law & Psychol. Rev. 65 (1991).
Others, even if they concede that restrictions on hearsay have some utility, question whether
the benefits outweigh the cost:
The cost of maintaining the rule is not just a function of its contribution to justice. It also
includes the time spent on litigating the rule. And of course this is not just a cost voluntarily
borne by the parties, for in our system virtually all the cost of the court salaries, administrative
costs, and capital costs are borne by the public. As expensive as litigation is for the parties, it is
supported by an enormous public subsidy. Each time a hearsay question is litigated, the public
pays. The rule imposes other costs as well. Enormous time is spent teaching and writing about
the hearsay rule, which are both costly enterprises. In some law schools, students spend over
half their time in evidence classes learning the intricacies of the hearsay rule, and enormous
academic resources are expended on the rule.
Allen, Commentary on Professor Friendmans Article: The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a
Rule of Admission, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 797, 800 [1992] (but would abolish rule only in civil cases).
See also Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 Minn.
L. Rev. 723 (1992).
A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine whether the
hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of exclusion. A more circumspect
examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party and
the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. It
has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. Retired
Justice Oscar Herrera of the Court of Appeals cites the various authorities who explain why
admissions are not covered by the hearsay rule:
Wigmore, after pointing out that the partys declaration has generally the probative value of any
other persons asssertion, argued that it had a special value when offered against the party. In
that circumstance, the admission discredits the partys statement with the present claim
asserted in pleadings and testimony, much like a witness impeached by contradictory
statements. Moreover, he continued, admissions pass the gauntlet of the hearsay rule, which
requires that extrajudicial assertions be excluded if there was no opportunity for the opponent
to cross-examine because it is the opponents own declaration, and he does not need to cross
examine himself. Wigmore then added that the Hearsay Rule is satisfied since the party now as
opponent has the full opportunity to put himself on the stand and explain his former assertion.
(Wigmore on evidence, Sec. 1048 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972), cited in Sec. 154, McCormick)
According to Morgan: The admissibility of an admission made by the party himself rests not
upon any notion that the circumstances in which it was made furnish the trier means of
evaluating it fairly, but upon the adversary theory of litigation. A party can hardly object that he
had no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when
speaking under sanction of an oath.
A mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against
him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault
if they do not. (U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583).
The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as
admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a
candidate; his statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff
Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be
opened by Monday and Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na
ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too
painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my name,
then I will go. We noted that days before, petitioner had repeatedly declared that he would not
resign despite the growing clamor for his resignation. The reason for the meltdown is obvious -
- - his will not to resign has wilted.
It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, non-
binding on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive
admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable
to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person.
[Jones explains that the basis for admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that arising
from the ratification or adoption by the party of the statements which the other person had
made. To use the blunt language of Mueller and Kirkpatrick, this process of attribution is not
mumbo jumbo but common sense. In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to
dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-
chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise
petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation. Petitioner did not object to the
suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country. Petitioners silence on this
and other related suggestions can be taken as an admission by him.
PEOPLE VS. LAQUINON
FACTS: On November 13, 1972, at about 11:30 o'clock in the evening, Samama Buat, barrio
captain of Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur, was at his residence in barrio Clib. In a short while he
heard gunshots coming from the bank of a river some three hundred meters to the south of his
house. Then, his brother, Leocario Buat, arrived and told him that a man was shouting for help
at the bank of the river. Samama Buat told his brother to call the barrio councilman. Thereafter,
he proceeded to the place where the unidentified man was. His brother, Leocario and the
barrio councilman also arrived there. Samama Buat found the man lying on the sand and
asked who he was. The man answered, "I am Pablo Remonde". Remonde's two hands were
tied on his back. He was lying face down.
Samama Buat then took the "ante mortem" statement of Pablo Remonde. He asked him who
he was to which he answered that he was Pablo Remonde. Samama Buat asked "who shot
you" and Remonde said that it was Gregorio Laquinon. He asked Pablo Remonde whether
from the gunshot wounds he suffered he would survive to which the victim answered "I do not
know”. After that, barrio captain Buat went to the municipality of Hagonoy and reported to Vice
Mayor Antonio Biran the shooting of Pablo Remonde. Vice Mayor Biran went to the scene of
the incident and asked the victim who shot him to which the latter answered that he was shot
by Gregorio Laquinon. Pablo Remonde was placed on a jeep of the Vice Mayor and brought to
the hospital (p. 23, Id,). Pablo Remonde was admitted to the Canos Hospital in Digos, Davao
del Sur where he was attended to by Dr. Alfonso Llanos. Dr. Llanos performed an operation on
the victim from whose body a slug was recovered. Pablo Remonde died in the hospital on
November 16, 1972 because of bullet wounds.
The accused-appellant prays for the reversal of the appealed judgment on the ground that the
lower court erred in finding him guilty of the crime charged on the basis of the statement
attributed to the deceased Pablo Remonde which reads:
Q State your name and other personal circumstances.
A Pablo Remonde y Saballa, 24 years old, laborer and resident of Pob. this mun.
Q Who shot you?
A Mr. Laquinon, a person who ran for councilor before the ticket of Liberal last local election
and son of Suelo Maravllias whose name I don't know.
Q Why you were shot by said persons above?
A They are suspecting me that I'm an informer of Vice Mayor Viran regarding KM .
Q Do you think you'll die with your wound?
A I don't know sir.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony presented is considered as a dying declaration or ante-
mortem declaration
RULING: The fact that the deceased had named the son of Suelo Maravillas who turned out as
Cristino Nerosa as one of those who shot him in his dying declaration does not make the
deceased an incompetent witness. Nor does it render said dying declaration incredible of
belief. The testimony of the accused that he and Nerosa separated and that he alone brought
the deceased to Noli Cabardo is not corroborated. It may be that Nerosa was with the accused
when the latter shot the deceased, as stated in the dying declaration, but that the accused
testified that Nerosa was not with him when he brought the deceased to Noli Cabardo in order
to free Nerosa from criminal liability.
Nor does the testimony of Barrio Captain Samama Buat that the place was dark and that the
victim had told him that he was shot by members of the KM make the deceased an
incompetent witness. On the contrary, it strengthens the statement of the deceased since the
accused is a member of the KM.
But the dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an ante-
mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The
declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremist, "at the point of death
when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of
declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule." 1
It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made
immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to
concoct a charge against the accused.
PEOPLE v. RODULFO SABIO, alias "PAPU"
2 SCRA 218 (1981)
Doctrine: The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal
prosecutions for homicide or murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances
of death.
That death did not ensue till three days after the declaration was made will not alter its
probative force since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It is
the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death, in point of fact, that
renders the dying declaration admissible.
FACTS: Accused Rodolfo Sabio was convicted by the CFI Cebu of Robbery with Homicide.
The victim is Catalino Espina, 80 y.o. and owner of a small sari--sari store in his house. The
victim was found wounded in his house, and he died 3 days later because of the wound in his
forehead. It was around 5:00am on October 5, 1965, Witness Birondo testified that she heard a
shout of help from the house of neighbor Espina, which is just across the street from her
house. She looked out Sabio since his birth so she knew it was him. She shouted for help and
told Sgt. Alberca about what she heard and saw and executed a sworn statement.
Another witness, Semilla, the grand--nephew of Catalino, was at the seashore around 4:00am
the morning of the crime, he saw Sabi􀁒inside his shirt. Minutes later, someone informed him to
go home because his granduncle Catalino was crying for help. Semilla went home and saw his
wounded granduncle. He was told to fetch a policeman.
He testified that he noticed the merchandise in the store were in disarray. He brought the victim
to the hospital but the latter died 3 days later.
Fuentes is the policeman assigned to receive a report about the crime. He proceeded to the
vic􀁒
victim who had hacked him and the latter answered that it was "Papu" Sabio. Patrolman
Fuentes asked the victim why "Papu" hacked him and the latter answered that "Papu" had
demanded money from him.
Patrolman Fuentes also asked the victim how much money he had lost but the latter was not
able to answer that question. Sensing that the wound was serious since it was bleeding
profusely Patrolman
Fuentes decided to take down the statement of the victim. He detached a leaf from a calendar
and wrote down on it the questions he propounded as well as the answers of the victim. He
then had it thumbmarked by the victim with the latter's own blood as no ink was available.
Present at the time were Pedro Burgos, another police officer, and Camilo Semilla, the
grandnephew. Patrolman Fuentes himself and Pedro Burgos signed as witnesses.cProsecution
also presented evidence that Sabio had previously been convicted by final judgment and
served sentences for Theft.
Rodolfo, as defense, claimed that he was at home sleeping and was awaken by his brother
around 6:00 am saying that certain policemen were looking for him. Thereafter, he was
arrested. The trial court convicted Sabio of Robbery with Homicide. Hence, he appealed to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the ante--mortem declaration of the victim as presented by Patrolman Fuentes is
admissible in evidence? 􀁒 YES.
RATIO: The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal
prosecutions for homicide or murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances
of death.
Counsel for Sabio contends that the ante--mortem statement is inadmissible because such was
not made under the consciousness of an impending death. However, the Supreme Court
disagrees. The seriousness of the injury on the victim's forehead which had affected the brain
and was profusely bleeding;; the victim's inability to speak until his head was raised;; the
spontaneous answer of the victim that "only Papu Sabio is responsible for my death";; and his
subsequent demise from the direct effects of the wound on his forehead, strengthen the
conclusion that the victim must have known that his end was inevitable. That death did not
ensue till three days after the declaration was made will not alter its probative force since it is
not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending
death and not the rapid succession of death, in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration
admissible. Further, the fact that the victim told his grandnephew Camilo Semilla to fetch the
police, does not negative the victim's feeling of hopelessness of recovery but rather
emphasizes the realization that he had so little time to disclose his assailant to the authorities.
However, the crime of Robbery was not proven and Sabio is convicted only of the crime of
Homicide.
If this case were to be decided applying the proposed Rules of Evidence, the outcome or
decision would be the same because the rule on dying declarations remain the same. The
declaration or statement of such person must be made under the consciousness of an
impending death, and may be received only when the subject of the inquiry involve the
surrounding circumstances of the death or its cause.
The state of mind of the deceased during the time the statements are being made need not be
expressly said. In other words, the deceased need not say expressly that he thinks he is going
to die. Such state of mind may be implied from his acts.
PEOPLE VS DE JOYA
The dying declaration was of the victim was not applied in this case since the purported dying
declaration was incomplete and it did not correspond to the question asked.
FACTS:
Respondent was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide to which the respondent
pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision convicting De Joya of the
crime charged. The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together with their
ten year old son Alvin and Herminia’ 88-year old mother, Eulalia, are residents of Baliuag,
Bulacan. In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia left for school to teach. Her mother
Eulalia was then sitting at their sofa watching the television set. Her son Alvin likewise left for
school at 1:00 o'clock. And at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, his classes were dismissed and he
proceeded home. At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the spouses
Valencia's neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong, together with a friend, went out of the
former's house to visit a friend. While at her yard, Gloria looked back to the direction of the
Valencia's house. She noticed respondent standing and holding a bicycle at the yard of the
Valencia's. When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia lying down prostrate
and drenched with her own blood. He immediately threw his bag and ran towards her. He then
held her hands and asked her what happened, to which Eulalia answered “Si Paqui”. After
saying these words, she let go of Alvin's hand and passed away. Dr. Tolentino arrived at
around 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon and examined the body of Eulalia. The said doctor
declared that said Eulalia had a heart attack which caused her death. When asked by Herminia
Valencia why her mother's ears were punctured, no reply was given by said doctor. Herminia
requested for a death certificate, but Dr. Tolentino did not issue one and instead immediately
left. Herminia found out that the two gold rings worn by her mother were missing. The right
earring of her mother was likewise missing. All of these were valued at P300. That same
afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor ransacked. The contents of the wardrobe
closet were taken out. Its secret compartment/box was missing. And the lock of the aparador
was destroyed. On the same night, Herminia found a beach walk step-in by the side of the
cabinet near the door of their room downstairs, more or less one meter from where the victim
was lying prostrate. Herminia was able to recognize the said step-in because of its color and
size, as the other half of the pair she bought for her husband Arnedo but which she gave to
Socorro De Joya, the wife of the respondent.
RULING:
It must be noted that the words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence.
Those two words could have been intended to designate either (a) the subject of a sentence or
(b) the object of a verb. If they had been intended to designate the subject, we must note that
no predicate was uttered by the deceased. If they were designed to designate the object of a
verb, we must note once more that no verb was used by the deceased. The phrase "Si Paqui"
must, moreover, be related to the question asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" Alvin's
question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?" It has been held that a dying declaration to
be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that the
declarant must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement,
but that his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say
as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. The statement as offered must not be merely
a part of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. But
it is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death is related, provided the statement
includes all that the declarant wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by
death or by an intruder) cuts short a statement which thus remains clearly less than that which
the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the
intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of a very different effect from that of the
fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection
that he has told only a portion of what he might have been able to tell. The reason upon which
incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no weight, is
that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other circumstance) from saying all that he
wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by the statements which he was
prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption
of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are received. It is
clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete. In
other words, the deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or
sensible communication to Alvin. The other elements taken into account by the trial court are
purely circumstantial in nature. When these circumstances are examined one by one, none of
them can be said to lead clearly and necessarily to the conclusion that appellant had robbed
and killed the deceased Eulalia. The quarrel over the use of the bicycle which was supposed to
have taken place two weeks before Eulalia's death does not, in our view, constitute adequate
proof of a motive capable of moving a person to slay another in such a violent and gory
manner. The testimony of Herminia about the single slipper that she found near or under the
cabinet in the living room where Eulalia was slain, can scarcely be regarded as conclusive
evidence that such slipper was indeed one of the very same pair of slippers that she had given
to appellant's wife, who was also the sister of Herminia's husband. Rubber or beach, walk
slippers are made in such quantities by multiple manufacturers that there must have been
dozens if not hundreds of slippers of the same color, shape and size as the pair that Herminia
gave to appellant's wife
The testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of 31 January
1978 around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and doing
nothing is, by itself, not proof of any act or circumstance that would show that appellant had
perpetrated the slaying or the robbery. Appellant's failure to present himself to pay his respects
to the deceased or her immediate family during the four-day wake, does not give rise to any
inference that appellant was the slayer of Eulalia. Appellant had explained that he had been
busily at work, sewing and carrying on his trade as a tailor. Appellant, as already noted, had
dropped in the Valencias' house in the afternoon Eulalia was killed and had viewed the body
(before it was lying in state) along with several other persons. His reluctance or inability to
participate in the formal wake is not necessarily a sign of guilt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REY SALISON, JR., TIRSO ANDIENTE, RUFINO
DIGNARAN and LEONILO FEDILES, REY SALISON, JR.
G.R. No. 115690 February 20, 1996
Doctrine: In all events, assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is
still admissible as part of the res gestae, if it was made shortly after the startling incident and,
under the circumstances, the victim had no opportunity to contrive.
It is true that Section 33, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court prohibits the admission of such
document in an unofficial language but the SC believes that in the interest of justice, such
injunction should not be taken literally here, especially if no objection thereto was interposed by
appellant.
FACTS: Accused Rey Salison, Jr., among others, is charged with the murder of Rolando
Valmoria, on November 30, 1990, in Davao City. The trial of the case proceeded only against
him because the other accused are still at large.
It was 8:00 pm on November 30, 1990 when witness Ayola saw Salison approach victim
Valmoria, wh was then watching television in a store. Salison placed an arm around Valmoria
and brought him to
􀁒 During the fistfight, the 3 other accused arrived and joined the fight, simultaneously attacking
Valmoria. Witness Fernandez approached and separated them. However, the assailants came
back and continued assaulting the victim. Valmoria fought back, and Salison together with the
others picked up pieces of wood and hit Valmoria at the back of his nape and the rear part of
his head. Valmoria fell to the ground but he was able to stand and hun towards his house. The
assailants followed him but Valmoria was able to go inside his house. Later on, he started
complaining of dizzinwss and pain in his head which was bleeding. So Valmoria, with his
parents, went to the house of purok leader Patricia Alcoseba. Valmoria asked Alcoseba to write
down his declaration regarding the incident explaining that if he should die and no witness
would testif, his written declaration could be utilized as evidence. After making the declaration,
Valmoria was brought to the hospital. He was allowed to go home after that but he died after 3
days.
On the other hand, the lone defense witness was Salison himself who merely denied having
killed the victim. He testified that on that day he was visiting his girlfriend and that he was
merely pacifying a fight between Valmoria and Andiente, one of the assailants. He claims he
has nothing to do with the fight.
The trial court convicted Salison, giving full credit to the testimonies of all the witnesses for the
prosecution. Salison argues that the declaration made by the victim before the purok leader
cannot be considered as a dying declaration because it was not made by the deceased "under
the consciousness of an impending death."
ISSUE:
1. Whether the declaration made by Valmoria before the purok leader is admissible in evidence
as a dying declaration? 􀁒 YES.
2. Whether the declaration is admissible in evidence given that such was made in Cebuano
dialect and evidence is not accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino? 􀁒 YES.
RATIO: At the time the deceased made the declaration he was in great pain. He expressed a
belief on his imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be used as evidence
regarding the circumstances thereof. A person would not say so if he believes he would
recover and be able to testify against his assailants. At all events, assuming that declaration is
not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as part of the res gestae, since it was
made shortly after the startling incident and, under the circumstances, the victim had no
opportunity to contrive.
On the second issue, the general rule is that if it is not written in the official language, it is
inadmissible if not accompanied by a translation in English or Filipino. However, in this case,
the records do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the admission of the
declaration. Thus, the defense waived whatever infirmity the document had at the time of its
submission as evidence. The declaration can be translated into English or Pilipino as it is
already admitted in evidence and forms part of the record.
Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy. A conspiracy may be inferred without need of
showing that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and
pursue a common design. Even if there is no direct evidence showing that all of the accused
had a prior agreement on how to kill Valmoria, the doctrine is well--settled that conspiracy need
not be proved by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime.
Celestino Marturillas vs. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
On 04 November 1998, after Lito Santos had served his wife Cecilia and Artemio Pantinople
with lunch, Artemio returned to his store which was five (5) meters away from Santos’ house.
At about 7:30 in the evening, Santos was eating lunch in his house when he heard a gunshot.
Artemio had been shot on the chest. He shouted at Santos “Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni
kapitan.” (Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain.) Lito saw a man running away from the
direction of Artemio’s store, but he wasn’t able to see his face. Artemio’s wife, Ernita, came
running from her house to her husband’s side upon seeing him sprawled on the ground and
bloodied. She had left her infant lying on the kitchen floor in surprise. Ernita shouted several
times, “Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay ang akong bana.” (Captain, why did you shoot my
husband?)
Barangay Captain Celestino Marturillas was invited by a couple of police officers to the police
station upon informing that he was the principal suspect in the slaying of Artemio Pantinople.
He also took with him his government-issued M-14 Rifle and one magazine of live M-14
ammunition, and turned over the same to the Bunawan PNP. To his defense, he claimed that
he was asleep in his home which was 250 meters away from Artemio’s store. Further, he is
said to have just risen from bed when two Barangay Kagawads wanted to see him because of
the shooting incident. He even tried to approach Artemio’s family, but he could not do so
because they had turned belligerent at his presence.
During the trial of the case, Ernita positively identified Marturillas as her husband’s assailant.
This positive identification is corroborated by Santos’ testimony and expert witness Dr. Danilo
Ledesma, a medico-legal officer for Davao City, that the gunshot wound in Artemio’s body had
been caused by a bullet that is of the same size as that fired from an M-14 Rifle. However, the
same expert witness testified that Marturillas’ hands do not contain gunpowder nitrates.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution’s evidence is credible and enough to convict Marturillas of homicide.
RULING:
Ernita positively identified Marturillas as the one “running away” immediately after the sound of
a gunshot. Certain that she had seen him, she even described what he was wearing, the
firearm he was carrying, and the direction towards which he was running. She also clarified
that she had heard the statement, “help me pre, I was shot by the captain.” The Supreme
Court upheld the findings of the RTC and the CA that Ernita’s testimony is credible because the
spot where Artemio was shot was only 30 meters away from her house. The identification of a
person can be established through familiarity with one’s physical features. Once a person has
gained familiarity with one another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a
considerable distance. Judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that people in rural
communities generally know each other both by face and name, and can be expected to know
each other’s distinct and particular features and characteristics. Settled is the rule that on
questions of credibility of witnesses and veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court
are given the highest degree of respect.
It should be clear that Santos never testified that petitioner was the one who had actually shot
the victim. Still, the testimony of this witness is valuable, because it validates the statements
made by Ernita. He confirms that after hearing the gunshot, he saw the victim and heard the
latter cry out those same words.
Moreover, the statement of the victim is considered by the Court as both a dying declaration
and res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as part of res gestae. Res gestae refers to statements made by the
participants of the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after
its commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false
statement. All the requisites of res gestae are present in this case:
1.) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
2.) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
3.) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
Both the statements of the victim and Ernita can be considered res gestae.
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs.RODRIGO SALAFRANCA G.R. No. 173476 Feb 22, 2012
FACTS
Johnny Bolanon (Bolanon) was stabbed by Rodrigo Salafranca (Salafranca) on the night of
July 31, 1993, after the said incident, the assailant ran away. Bolanon still being able to walk,
went to his uncle, Rodolfo B. Estaño to seek help. After having known of the incident, Estaño
then brought Bolanon to PGH. On their way to the hospital on board a taxi, Bolanon confided to
Estaño about the incident and told him that it was Salafranca who stabbed him and a certain
Augusto Mendoza witnessed the said incident. At around 2:30am, despite receiving medical
attention, Bolanon succumbed to death.
ISSUE
Whether the utterance of Bolanonis qualified as a dying declaration or part of the res gestae?
RULING
Such circumstances are qualified as both a dying declaration and a part of res gestae, the
Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after
the incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae.
Generally, dying declaration is inadmissible as evidence being hearsay, however, it may be
admitted when the following requisites concur:
(a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death;
(b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an
impending death;
(c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and
(d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which
the declarant is a victim.
All the requisites were met. Bolanon communicated his statements, identifying Salafranca as
the person who had stabbed him; that at the time of his declaration, he was conscious of his
impending death. Bolanon died in the emergency room a few minutes after admission, which
occurred under three hours after the incident.
Furthermore, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and is admissible in evidence
when the following requisites concur:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
(b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
The requisites for admissibility as part of the res gestae concur herein. That when he
gave the identity of the assailant, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, and had no
time to contrive his identification. His utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to
such startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the
perpetrator.
Hence, such circumstances are qualified as both a dying declaration and a part of res gestae
for having borne the requisites of the both principles.
People vs. Cerilla
The dying declaration was of the victim was applied in this case as sufficient to prove the
criminal liability of the accused Cerilla.
At around 6:00 pm on 24 April 1998, the victim, Alexander Parreño (Alexander), his 14-year old
daughter, Michelle, and neighbor, Phoebe Sendin (Sendin), went to the house of Cerilla. They
were cordially welcomed and entertained by Cerilla and his wife. An hour later, a blackout
occurred. At this time, Alexander sought permission from the couple to leave, which the latter
acknowledged. On their way home,
Michelle was walking ahead of Alexander with the latter closely following his daughter.
Suddenly, after walking for about 100 meters from Cerilla’s house, Michelle heard an
explosion. Michelle immediately turned her back and saw Cerilla pointing a gun at Alexander
who, at that moment, was staggering towards her. Sendin, who was also with Alexander and
Michelle, did not look back but instead ran away and proceeded to the house of Mrs. Parreño.
Meanwhile, Michelle was cuddling Alexander beside the road when the latter repeatedly told
her that it was Cerilla who shot him. Twenty minutes later, Alexander’s other daughter arrived.
She was also told by Alexander at that moment that it was Cerilla who shot him.
Police officers rushed to the crime scene and helped carry Alexander to an ambulance. A
police officer was able to ask Alexander who shot him to which he answered "Pato." "Pato" is
an alias by which Cerilla is known. Alexander’s wife, Susan, who rushed to the hospital was
also told by Alexander that it was appellant who shot him. Alexander died the following day.
A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the material
facts which concern the cause and circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a
fixed belief that death is impending and is certain to follow immediately, or in a very short time,
without an opportunity of retraction and in the absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words,
it is a statement made by a person after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief that
death is certain, stating the facts concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her
death.
NOTE: Requisites for a dying declaration to be admissible –
(1) The declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death. This refers not only to the facts of the assault itself, but also to matters both before and
after the assault having a direct causal connection with it.
(2) At the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an
impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed
belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in
impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders the dying
declaration admissible. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival
and looked on death as certainly impending. (3) The declarant is competent as a witness.
The rule is that where the declarant would not have been a competent witness had he
survived, the proffered declarations will not be admissible. (4) The declaration must be offered
in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim. Anent
this requisite, the same deserves no further elaboration as, in fact, the prosecution had caused
its witnesses to take the stand and testify in open court on the substance of Alexander’s ante
mortem statement in the present criminal case for murder.
The victim communicated his ante-mortem statement to three persons who testified with
unanimity that they had been told by the victim himself that it was appellant who shot him. The
statements of victim complied with all the requisites of a dying declaration. First, Alexander’s
declaration pertains to the identity of the person who shot him. Second, the fatal quality and
extent of the injuries he suffered underscore the imminence of his death as his condition was
so serious that his demise occurred the following morning after a thirteen (13)-hour operation.
Third, he would have been competent to testify had he survived. Fourth, his dying declaration
is offered in a criminal prosecution for murder where he was the victim.
The fact that the crime was committed during a blackout does not cast doubt on Alexander’s
and Michelle’s positive identification of appellant. While the place of occurrence was dark, this
did not prevent the Alexander or Michelle from identifying the assailant, especially since the
shot was delivered at close range.
The positive identification of appellant must necessarily prevail over his alibi. It was not
physically impossible for appellant to have been present at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission. The distance of his house, where he supposedly was, from the locus criminis is
only 120-150 meters, more or less.
FUENTES VS CA
The declaration made by Zolio was not given credence as an exception to the hearsay
rule under declaration against interest because the socalled declarant was not shown to
be dead or unable to testify.
FACTS:
Petitioner Fuentes seeks the reversal of the decision of the CA affirming his conviction for
murder. At four o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989, Julieto Malaspina together with
Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was at a benefit dance at Dump Site,
Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Petitioner called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the
shoulder of the latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a short hair."
Suddenly petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to
the ground and his companions rushed to his side. Petitioner fled. Before the victim succumbed
to the gaping wound on his abdomen he muttered that Fuentes stabbed him. Petitioner claims
on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina;
that when the victim was killed he was conversing with him; that he was compelled to run away
when he heard that somebody with a bolo and spear would "kill all those from San Isidro"
because "Jonie," the killer, was from that place; that since he was also from San Isidro he
sought refuge in his brother's house where he met "Jonie;" that "Jonie" admitted spontaneously
that he stabbed Malaspina because after a boxing match before the latter untied his gloves and
punched him; that as there were many persons milling around the house "Jonie" jumped out
and escaped through the window; that he was arrested at eight o'clock in the morning of 24
June 1989 while he was in a store in the barangay.
RULING:
One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made
against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration
made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact
asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest
and against third persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on
necessity and trustworthiness. There are three essential requisites for the admissibility of a
declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration
must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it
improbable that a motive to falsify existed. The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth.
The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is
not the best method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the
fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be
closed to such evidence. The Court noted, however, that no less than petitioner's own witness,
Nerio Biscocho who claimed he also saw the killing, testified that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., the
petitioner, and "Jonie" Fuentes are one and the same person. Consider this factual scenario:
the alleged declarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a cousin of accusedappellant, verbally admitted to the
latter, and later to their common uncle Felicisimo Fuentes, that he (Zoilo) killed the victim
because of a grudge, after which he disappeared. One striking feature that militates against the
acceptance of such a statement is its patent untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to
accused-appellant had every motive to prevaricate. The same can be said of accused-
appellant and his uncle Felicisimo. But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the
admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is
not "unable to testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or
physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the
jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. For it is incumbent upon
the defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the prosecution and
assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant
and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records show that
the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness
PAREL VS PRUDENCIO
The declaration made by the petitioner’s father to the effect that he is the occupant of
the residential building and not the owner of such building, was admitted and
considered as a declaration against interest (against the heir, who is the petitioner in
this case) as an exception to the hearsay rule.
FACTS:
On February 27, 1992, respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages
against petitioner with the RTC alleging that he is the owner of a two-storey residential house
located at No. 61 Forbes Park National Reservation near DPS compound in Baguio City. Such
property was constructed solely from his own funds and declared in his name under Tax
Declaration No. 47048. He commenced the construction of said house in 1972 until its
completion three years later. When the second floor of said house became habitable in 1973,
he allowed petitioner’s parents to move therein and occupy the second floor while the
construction of the ground floor was on-going to supervise the construction and to safeguard
the materials. When the construction of the second floor was finished in 1975, respondent
allowed petitioner’s parents and children to transfer and temporarily reside thereat; it was done
out of sheer magnanimity as petitioner’s parents have no house of their own and since
respondent’s wife is the older sister of Florentino, petitioner’s father. In November 1985,
respondent wrote petitioner’s father a notice for them to vacate the said house as the former
was due for retirement and he needed the place to which petitioner’s parents heeded when
they migrated to U.S. in 1986. However, without respondent’s knowledge, petitioner and his
family unlawfully entered and took possession of the ground floor of respondent’s house.
Petitioner’s refusal to vacate the house despite repeated demands prompted respondent to file
the instant action for recovery of possession. Petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim
alleging that his parents are the co-owners of the said residential house, i.e., the upper story
belongs to respondent while the ground floor pertains to petitioner’s parents. In deciding in
favor of the petitioner, RTC did not give credence to the tax declaration as well as the several
documents showing the City Assessor’s assessment of the property all in respondent’s name
since tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership. It rejected the affidavit executed
by Florentino declaring the house as owned by respondent saying that the affidavit should be
read in its entirety to determine the purpose of its execution; that it was executed because of
an advisement addressed to the late Florentino by the City Treasurer concerning the property’s
tax assessment and Florentino, thought then that it should be the respondent who should pay
the taxes; and that the affidavit cannot be accepted for being hearsay.
RULING:
We agree with the CA that respondent had shown sufficient evidence to support his complaint
for recovery of possession of the ground floor of the subject house as the exclusive owner
thereof. The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence
notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of
such evidence advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which
are against his own pecuniary or moral interest. The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was
petitioner’s father and had adequate knowledge with respect to the subject covered by his
statement. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically declared that while he is the occupant of
the residential building, he is not the owner of the same as it is owned by respondent who is
residing in Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not have made such declaration
unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well as to his children’s interests
as his heirs. A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest
certainty of the facts in dispute. Notably, during Florentino’s lifetime, from 1973, the year he
executed said affidavit until 1989, the year of his death, there is no showing that he had
revoked such affidavit even when a criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had been filed
by respondent against him (Florentino) and petitioner in 1988 regarding the subject house
which the trial court dismissed due to the absence of evidence showing that petitioner entered
the house against the latter’s will and held that the remedy of respondent was to file an action
for ejectment; and even when a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against petitioner and
his wife also in 1988 which was subsequently dismissed on the ground that respondent’s action
should be an accion publiciana which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
Moreover, the building plan of the residential house dated January 16, 1973 was in the name of
respondent and his wife. It was established during petitioner’s cross-examination that the
existing structure of the two-storey house was in accordance with said building plan. Notably,
respondent has been religiously paying the real estate property taxes on the house declared
under his name since 1974. In fact, petitioner during his cross-examination admitted that there
was no occasion that they paid the real estate taxes nor declared any portion of the house in
their name. In this case, the records show that although petitioner’s counsel asked that he be
allowed to offer his documentary evidence in writing, he, however, did not file the same. Thus,
the CA did not consider the documentary evidence presented by petitioner.
A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. It is a settled rule
that the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not
mean that it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. Petitioner
himself testified that it was his father who saw the progress of the construction and purchased
the materials to be used; and as a young boy he would follow-up some deliveries upon order of
his father and never saw respondent in the construction site. The fact that not one of the
witnesses saw respondent during the construction of the said house does not establish that
petitioner’s father and respondent co-owned the house
G.R. No. L-38833 March 12, 1980;THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.AIROL ALING Y MAJURI, accused whose death sentence is under review.; AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
Jan 28, 1972: Airol Aling, 35, stabbed his wife, Norija Mohammad, 30 in the chest and
diaphragm. She died 2 days later. (Note: They were married in Musilim rites.)
February 21, 1972 affidavit of Girlie Aling (Airol’s relative): She and Darla Aling (Norija's
daughter) brought the victim to the hospital. They learned from the police that Norija was
stabbed by her husband
March 24, 1972: Airol was investigated by the police. He declared in the Chavacano dialect
(translated into English) that he killed his wife. (Why? He was informed in prison by his
relatives that his wife was living with another man and fooling around with other men.)
He recounted the killing in this manner:
At or about one o'clock in the afternoon of January 28, 1972, I was at the seashore of Calarian
relaxing since I have just arrived from Jolo, Sulu that particular day.
At that time, I was already running away from the authorities because I am an escapee from
San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm.
Later on, I proceeded to my father's house which is just near the seashore, Upon reaching the
house, I saw Nori Mohamad but I had no time to talk to her because immediately after seeing
me, Nori ran away, going to the direction of the street.
Armed with the bolo which I had been carrying with me, I chased after Nori and I catch up with
her at the street where I started stabbing her with the bolo, hitting her on the different parts of
the body.
When I saw Nori fell down on the street badly wounded, I hurriedly left the place and ran
towards the far end of Calarian. (Exh. 2).
March 24, 1972: 2policemen in their affidavit, affirmed that Airol admitted to Sergeant Antonio
Macrohon in their presence that he stabbed his wife because she had been going with many
men (Exh. 1).
April 19, 1972, CFI Zamboanga: Charged Airol with parricide. (It was alleged in the information
that Airol was a convict serving sentence at the penal colony for robbery with frustrated
homicide.)
March 15, 1974 (first call for arraignment wherein Airol said he’s willing to plead guilty even if
he had no lawyer. A counsel de oficio was appointed for him. The arraignment was postponed
thrice until April 30, 1974 when the accused finally pleaded guilty. (The information was
translated into Tausug, the accused’s spoken dialect.)
In the witness stand: Again he recounted the same story of how he killed his wife when he was
examined by his counsel. Also, He declared that after he was informed by his counsel that
the penalty for parricide is death or life imprisonment, he, nevertheless, admitted the
killing of his wife because that was the truth.
In answer to the question of the fiscal, the accused said that he understood that by pleading
guilty he could be sentenced to death or reclusion perpetua because he was an escaped
convict. His testimony included:
 How he killed his wife: (see story above)
 He was not coerced into admitting his guilty
 Why he killed his wife: aside from the “men” part, that she didn’t visit him in prison
and didn’t take care of his 4 children (later the children were said to be 5) (Note: but
then he was inconsistent re: this because later on he said that “When he went to his
house on January 28, 1972, his purpose was to be reconciled with his wife but when
she saw him, instead of waiting for him, she ran away. He had information that his
wife was guilty of infidelity or had a "kabit". That was a grievous offense under
Muslim customs.”
 He also admitted that he was a prisoner in the penal colony.
 He was a Muslim belonging to the Samal tribe of Siasi Sulu.
 He agreed that his father-in-law could have the custody of his children.
 He was able to leave the penal colony because he was a "living-out-prisoner".
 He Identified his signature in his confession which was sworn to before the clerk of
court (Exh. B or 2).
RTC: Death to Airol plus indeminity of 12k to the heirs of his wife. It noted that he pleaded
guilty with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his plea. Elevated to SC on
automatic review.
ISSUE: WON the accused’s previous statements bind him?
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
Defense: Marriage was not indubitably proven.
SC: UNMERITORIOUS. Accused already admitted it and it was an admission against his penal
interest. It was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the
presumption "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage" (Sec. 5[bbl, Rule 131, Rules of Court).
He alluded in his testimony to his father-in-law that he had 5 children with Norija. That implies
that the deceased was his lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her infidelity. Her failure
to visit him n prison and her neglect of their children are other circumstances confirmatory of
their marital status.
Accused fully understood the effect of his plea of guilty. He stood firm even if the arraignment
was postponed 3 times so that his lawyer can explain to him the effect of pleading guilty His
confession and the affidavit of the policemen who investigated him were presented in evidence.
The contention that the crime was mitigated by the plea of guilty lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong and the circumstance that the accused is a non-Christian is not well taken
because he is a quasi-recidivist. The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism
cannot be offset by generic investigating circumstances.
The fact that he escaped from confinement in order to kill his wife shows a high degree of
perversity and incorrigibility His being a non-Christian cannot serve to extenuate the
heinousness of his offense. He understood the gravity of his crime because he had attained
some education. He reached first year high school and he used to be a checker in a
stevedoring firm.
Ending: reclusion perpetua only because the minimum votes for death penalty were not
reached)
People of the Philippines v. Toledo and Holgado (digest)
Facts: Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the occupation of certain
land situated in the municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro. On the morning of June
15, 1927, the two men happened to meet. The argument was renewed, and they agreed to
fight. They did engage in a bolo duel with a fatal result for Filomeno Morales, who was killed
almost instantly. Sisenando Holgado was also seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a
neighboring house. From there Sisenando Holgado was taken to the municipal building where
he made a sworn authenticated statement before the municipal president, in which he declared
that only he and Filomeno Morales fought and that there was nobody else around. About one
month later, Sisenando Holgado died from the wounds received in the fight. The disputable
point is whether the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the quarrel and dealt a mortal blow
to Filomeno Morales. For the prosecution was presented the witness Justina Villanueva, the
querida of Filomeno Morales, who testified to the presence and participation of Eugenio
Toledo. Her testimony was partially corroborated by that of the witness Justina Llave. On the
other hand, the theory for the defense was that Toledo was in another place when the fight
between Morales and Holgado occurred and that his only participation was on meeting
Holgado, who was his landlord or master, in helping him to a nearby house. To this effect is the
testimony of the accused and of Conrado Holgado, the son of Sisenando Holgado. The
defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was identified by
the municipal president of Pinamalayan.
Issue: 1. Is the exhibit (exhibit 1) considered hearsay? Is it admissible as evidence?
2. Should the accused be acquitted?
Ruling: 1. Yes. The affidavit is considered hearsay because the one who made it was not
presented in court under oath to testify on his written statement. This is the general rule. But
regarding the supporting question, the answer is also yes. The exhibit is admissible as
evidence the reason being that it is one of the accepted exceptions of the hearsay rule. This is
called the Declaration Against interest or in the book of Agpalo, the dead man’s statute. Sec.
38 of the Rules of Court exemplifies this rule.
Sec.38 Declaration against interest.- The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the
time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received
in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons.
In order for a statement to be admissible (in this case made as an exhibit) it must comply the
following requisites:
1. That the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
2. That it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;
3. That at the time he maid said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was
contrary to his aforesaid interest; and
4. That the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.
In the case it bar, it is clear as day that the declarant made the statement before the municipal
president before he died and that it was clearly against his interest because it had the effect of
exonerating Eugenio Toledo from liability. Declarant was also aware of this fact and knows this
to be true because otherwise, he wouldn’t have made such a statement. Here the declarant is
deceased and his statements were made under oath. They also read in such a way as to ring
with the truth. When Sisenando Holgado declared "When we fought, there was nobody
present," it was at the end of just such a rambling statement as a wounded man would be
expected to make. When Sisenando Holgado declared "I met one of my workers named
Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic," he did so in
response to a question by the municipal president. Exhibit 1 should have been received not as
conclusive evidence of innocence, but as evidence to be taken into consideration in connection
with the other proven facts.
2. Yes. The accused should be acquitted. Any man outside of a court and unhampered by the
pressure of technical procedure, unreasoned rules of evidence, and cumulative authority,
would say that if a man deliberately acknowledged himself to be the perpetrator of a crime and
exonerated the person charged with the crime, and there was other evidence indicative of the
truthfulness of the statement, the accused man should not be permitted to go to prison. He
should be acquitted because of reasonable doubt.