Republic of the Philippines vs De la Rosa G.R. No.

104654, June 6, 1994

*This is with regards to the topic of Naturalization through Judicial Proceeding (can be applied with proper RTC and must have
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications, and must comply to the conditions and proceedings prescribed)

Facts:

Juan G. Frivaldo (private respondent herein), who was a former Filipino Citizen, petitioned for Naturalization (since according to
him it was his only available remedy for the reacquisition of Filipino Citizenship considering that his efforts for repatriation and
direct act of Congress failed). The petition was then set by the court for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the
publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive
weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing.

On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule" where he manifested his intention
to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. He alleged that the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy was March
15, one day before the scheduled hearing. The Motion was granted wherein the hearing of the petition was moved to February
21, 1992. The said order was not published nor a copy thereof posted.

On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He submitted some documentary
evidences. Six days later, the petition for Naturalization was granted. On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take
his oath of allegiance before respondent Judge.

A Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration was then filed, alleging that the proceedings
were tainted with jurisdictional defects, and prayed for a new trial to conform with the requirements of the Naturalization Law.

After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly with the
Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Naturalization granted to private respondent was in violative of the Judicial proceedings prescribed for the
acquisition of Filipino Citizenship.

Ruling:

Yes. The naturalization proceeding was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly.

Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is
duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the
requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which he believes are inconvenient
or merely of nuisance value.

The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to
comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law. Under Section 9 of the said law,
both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive
weeks in the Official
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation.

The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the
scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the
petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of
allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year
waiting period.
Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, et al. vs Commissioner Fernandez, Jr., et al July 26, 2010

(This case is all about the failure to register the election of Philippine Citizenship)

Facts:

Petitioners herein were children of a Taiwanese father and a Filipino mother. They were born under the 1935 constitution. They
were all raised in the Philippines and spent their whole lives living and staying in the country. Immediately upon reaching the
age of 21, they elected Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance. However, they failed to have the necessary
documents registered in the civil registry as required in the Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625. Petitioner Balgamelo and
Felix had it registered only after 30 years upon their election, but petitioner Valeriano did not comply with the registration
requirement.

Hence, a complaint-affidavit was filed against them and they were charged later on by the Bureau of Immigration for violation
of Commonwealth Act 613, for having failed to present any valid document to show their status. This was affirmed and
petitioners were subjected to deportation and enlisting in the immigration blacklist. Reconsideration was filed but was denied.
Petitioners petitioned for certiorari before the CA but then was dismissed. They set for a reconsideration but was still denied.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the failure for registration of the election for Philippine citizenship to the proper civil registry will nullify their
acquisition of the said citizenship.

Ruling:

No. In this case, it should not.

The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance
to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with
the nearest civil registry.

Petitioners complied with requirements on electing Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority except the
registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done.

We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they
should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election.

What we now say is that where, as in petitioners' case, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within
the constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election beyond the frame should be allowed
if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise of
Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is
equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.

For what purpose is registration?

It is to record formally and distinctly. Registration is made for the purpose of notification. But registration is not a mode of
acquiring a right. Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case, registration is the
confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact
that citizenship has been claimed. Indeed, we even allow the late registration of the fact of birth and of marriage. Thus, has it
been admitted through existing rules that the late registration of the fact of birth of a child does not erase the fact of birth.
Also, the fact of marriage cannot be declared void solely because of the failure to have the marriage certificate registered with
the designated government agency.

Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This was a serious undertaking. It was
commitment and fidelity to the state coupled with a pledge "to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance" to any other
state. This was unqualified acceptance of their identity as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of any other nationality.

Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners
elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat
the election and resultingly negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be
complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any.

Petition granted.

Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr., and Valeriano Cabiling Ma. Petitioners are given ninety (90) days from notice
within which to COMPLY with the requirements of the Bureau of Immigration embodied in its Judgment of 2 February 2005.
The Bureau of Immigration shall ENSURE that all requirements, including the payment of their financial obligations to the state,
if any, have been complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative fines; REVIEW the documents
submitted by the petitioners; and ACT thereon in accordance with the decision of this Court.

*(Prior to this case, daghan ang cases na the same ang facts ani pero nagrender ang court ng decision na against sa decision
dito. Pero so far, the key factor on rendering decision kay katong time of electing Philippine citizenship after attaining the age of
majority. Ang ibang case kay nag-elect man sila after several unreasonable years mao wala sila gi grant sa court.)

Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, et al. vs Commissioner Fernandez, Jr., et al July 26, 2010

(This case is all about the failure to register the election of Philippine Citizenship)

Facts:

Petitioners herein were children of a Taiwanese father and a Filipino mother. They were born under the 1935 constitution. They
were all raised in the Philippines and spent their whole lives living and staying in the country. Immediately upon reaching the
age of 21, they elected Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance. However, they failed to have the necessary
documents registered in the civil registry as required in the Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625. Petitioner Balgamelo and
Felix had it registered only after 30 years upon their election, but petitioner Valeriano did not comply with the registration
requirement.

Hence, a complaint-affidavit was filed against them and they were charged later on by the Bureau of Immigration for violation
of Commonwealth Act 613, for having failed to present any valid document to show their status. This was affirmed and
petitioners were subjected to deportation and enlisting in the immigration blacklist. Reconsideration was filed but was denied.
Petitioners petitioned for certiorari before the CA but then was dismissed. They set for a reconsideration but was still denied.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the failure for registration of the election for Philippine citizenship to the proper civil registry will nullify their
acquisition of the said citizenship.

Ruling:

No. In this case, it should not.

The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance
to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with
the nearest civil registry.
Petitioners complied with requirements on electing Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority except the
registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done.

We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they
should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election.

What we now say is that where, as in petitioners' case, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within
the constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election beyond the frame should be allowed
if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise of
Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is
equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.

For what purpose is registration?

It is to record formally and distinctly. Registration is made for the purpose of notification. But registration is not a mode of
acquiring a right. Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case, registration is the
confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact
that citizenship has been claimed. Indeed, we even allow the late registration of the fact of birth and of marriage. Thus, has it
been admitted through existing rules that the late registration of the fact of birth of a child does not erase the fact of birth.
Also, the fact of marriage cannot be declared void solely because of the failure to have the marriage certificate registered with
the designated government agency.

Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This was a serious undertaking. It was
commitment and fidelity to the state coupled with a pledge "to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance" to any other
state. This was unqualified acceptance of their identity as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of any other nationality.

Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners
elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat
the election and resultingly negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be
complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any.

Petition granted.

Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr., and Valeriano Cabiling Ma. Petitioners are given ninety (90) days from notice
within which to COMPLY with the requirements of the Bureau of Immigration embodied in its Judgment of 2 February 2005.
The Bureau of Immigration shall ENSURE that all requirements, including the payment of their financial obligations to the state,
if any, have been complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative fines; REVIEW the documents
submitted by the petitioners; and ACT thereon in accordance with the decision of this Court.

*(Prior to this case, daghan ang cases na the same ang facts ani pero nagrender ang court ng decision na against sa decision
dito. Pero so far, the key factor on rendering decision kay katong time of electing Philippine citizenship after attaining the age of
majority. Ang ibang case kay nag-elect man sila after several unreasonable years mao wala sila gi grant sa court.)

Co vs HRET July 30, 1991

On the topic “Modes of Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship”

Facts:

The petitioners came to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.

Sometime in 1895, the private respondent’s grandfather arrived in the Philippines and established his residence in Laoang,
Samar. Private respondent’s father was born in China in 1905 and was brought to Samar in 1915. The latter spent all his life
living as a Filipino in character and was later on married to a natural born Filipino, the mother of the respondent. Private
respondent was then born in 1948 in Samar. When the latter was still nine years old, his father, unsure of his status, petitioned
for naturalization before the CFI of Samar and was later on granted. Private respondent lived all his life as a Filipino. He got
married then to a Filipina. On the 1984 and 1986 elections, he registered himself as a voter in Laoan, Samar and voted therein.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who
vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit
and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of
the second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent contending that the latter was not a natural born citizen
in the Philippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989,
found for the private respondent. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,
however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.

Hence, these petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Ruling:

Yes. Under Art. IV, Sec. 1 (3) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, is a citizen of the Philippines. Furthermore, under Sec. 2 of the
same provides, “Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens.”

There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is
the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. Election becomes material because Section
2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if
they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had
been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973
and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship
inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an
unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.

Hence, petition is dismissed. Private respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Moy Ya vs Commissioner October 4, 1971

Judicial administrative, congressional commonwealth act no. 473

Facts:

Petitioner-wife is a Chinese national. He applied for a temporary visitor’s visa to enter and stay in the Philippines for a month
for the reason of visiting his relative. It was granted with the condition of where she cannot leave the country on or before the
designated date, she would be liable to pay a bond of 1,000 and order her deportation. Her stay in the Philippines was further
extended until it went about almost a year. A month before her allowed date to stay, she married petitioner-husband who was
allegedly a Filipino citizen. Afraid of being deported and paying the bond, she then petitioned for the injunction of the same
contending that she is now a naturalized Filipino citizen because of her marriage to a citizen of the Philippines. During the
hearing, it was admitted that petitioner-wife could not write English or Filipino. Except for few words, she could not speak
either of the language. She could not even name a Filipino name, except for Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-
in-law, or sisters-in-law. Petition was not sustained. Thus this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the clause “who might herself be lawfully naturalized” under Sec. 15 of Revised Naturalization Law would not
only mean that the alien should possess no disqualifications, but should also possess all the qualifications for her to be
naturalized with the benefit of a marriage to a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:

No. It should be construed to mean that she should not possess the disqualifications only.

After series of deliberations with previous cases having the same substantial facts with the present case, but rendering different
decisions, such as (a) it should mean to have the qualifications and none of the disqualifications; and (b) should only have none
of the disqualifications, the court ruled in the latter view.

If Section 15 of the, Revised Naturalization Law were to be interpreted, as this Court did, in such a way as to require that the
alien wife must prove the qualifications prescribed in Section 2, the privilege granted to alien wives would become illusory. It is
submitted that such a construction, being contrary to the manifested object of the statute must be rejected.

There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a construction that Section 15 of the law requires that an
alien wife of a Filipino must affirmatively prove that she possesses the qualifications prescribed under Section 2, before she
may be deemed a citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon an alien wife, becomes unreasonably onerous and compliance
therewith manifestly difficult. The unreasonableness of such requirement is shown by the following:

1. One of the qualifications required of an Applicant for naturalization under Section 2 of the law is that the applicant "must
have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years." If this requirement is applied to an alien wife
married to a Filipino citizen, this means that for a period of ten years at least, she cannot hope to acquire the citizenship of her
husband. If the wife happens to be a citizen of a country whose law declares that upon her marriage to a foreigner she
automatically loses her citizenship and acquires the citizenship of her husband, this could mean that for a period of ten years at
least, she would be stateless. And even after having acquired continuous residence in the Philippines for ten years, there is no
guarantee that her petition for naturalization will be granted, in which case she would remain stateless for an indefinite period
of time.

2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for naturalization that he "must own real estate in the Philippines Commented [u1]: Requirements for section 2 of
worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful Naturalization
occupation." Considering the constitutional prohibition against acquisition by an alien of real estate except in cases of 1.Must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less
hereditary succession (Art. XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an alien wife desiring to acquire the citizenship of her husband must have than five thousand pesos.
to prove that she has a lucrative income derived from a lawful trade, profession or occupation. The income requirement has 2. Must have known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
been interpreted to mean that the petitioner herself must be the one to possess the said income. In other words, the wife must occupation.
prove that she has a lucrative income derived from sources other than her husband's trade, profession or calling. It is of 3.
common knowledge, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that most wives in the Philippines do not have gainful
occupations of their own. Indeed, Philippine law, recognizing the dependence of the wife upon the husband, imposes upon the
latter the duty of supporting the former. It should be borne in mind that universally, it is an accepted concept that when a
woman marries, her primary duty is to be a wife, mother and housekeeper. If an alien wife is not to be remiss in this duty, how
can she hope to acquire a lucrative income of her own to qualify her for citizenship?

3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization "must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of
the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of the Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine
history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum during the entire period of residence in
the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen." If an alien woman has
minor children by a previous marriage to another alien before she marries a Filipino, and such minor children had not been
enrolled in Philippine schools during her period of residence in the country, she cannot qualify for naturalization under the
interpretation of this Court. The reason behind the requirement that children should be enrolled in recognized educational
institutions is that they follow the citizenship of their father. Considering that said minor children by her first husband generally
follow the citizenship of their alien father, the basis for such requirement as applied to her does not exist. Cessante ratione legis
cessat ipsa lex.
4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous residence prescribed by Section 2 "shall be understood as reduced to five
years for any petitioner (who is) married to a Filipino woman." It is absurd that an alien male married to a Filipino wife should
be required to reside only for five years in the Philippines to qualify for citizenship, whereas an alien woman married to a
Filipino husband must reside for ten years.

Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing appellants' petition for injunction is hereby
reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration and/or his authorized representative is permanently enjoined from causing the
arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have become a
Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino
citizen on January 25, 1962. No costs.

COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs CAMPOS RUEDA

FACTS:
In January 1955, Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, Morocco (an international zone [foreign country] in North Africa). At the time
of her death, she was a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier. She however left some personal properties (shares of
stocks and other intangibles) in the Philippines. The designated administrator of her estate here is Antonio Campos Rueda.

In the same year, the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) assessed the estate for deficiency tax amounting to about P161k.
Campos Rueda refused to pay the assessed tax as he claimed that the estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant
to section 122 of the Tax Code which provides:
That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his
death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any
character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the
foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or
death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in
that foreign country.

Campos Rueda was able to prove that there is reciprocity between Tangier and the Philippines.
However, the CIR still denied any tax exemption in favor of the estate as it averred that Tangier is not a “state” as contemplated
by Section 22 of the Tax Code and that the Philippines does not recognize Tangier as a foreign country.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the requisites of statehood or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an
international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code

HELD:
For purposes of the Tax Code, Tangier is a state.
A foreign country to be identified as a state must be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside
control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a
regime of law. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by
means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality.
Further, the Supreme Court noted that there is already an existing jurisprudence (Collector vs De Lara) which provides
that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall under the exempt
category provided for in Section 22 of the Tax Code. Thus, recognition is not necessary. Hence, since it was proven that Tangier
provides such exemption to personal properties of Filipinos found therein so must the Philippines honor the exemption as
provided for by our tax law with respect to the doctrine of reciprocity.

MAGALLONA VS ERMITA
FACTS:
RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation lines of the baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelago. This is in consonance with UNCLOS I.

RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in which the government reserved the
drawing of baselines in Sabah in North Borneo.

RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which are in compliance with UNCLOS III in which
the Philippines is one of the signatory, shortening one baseline while optimizing the other and classifying Kalayaan Group of
Island and Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.

Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the constitutionality of RA 9522:- it reduces the territory
of the Philippines in violation to the Constitution and it opens the country to maritime passage of vessels and aircrafts of other
states to the detriment of the economy, sovereignty, national security and of the Constitution as well. They added that the
classification of Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to the lives of the fishermen.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9522 is unconstitutional

HELD:
Petition is dismissed. The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.

First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime
zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as
provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish a
uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone
[24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental
shelves. In order to measure said distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines measured in
accordance to the treaty—the role played by RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of
15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base points, increased the
Philippines total maritime space of 145,216 square nautical miles.

Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is consistent with the Philippines’ sovereignty. Had
RA 9522 enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that
the length of the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation:
the country, for decades, had been claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand
they had to consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago. So, the classification is in accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and State’s responsible observance of its
pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.

Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea
around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty.

And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitution’s delineation of internal waters. Petitioners
contend that RA 9522 transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters
to the right of innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution
hazards. The Court emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless whether internal or archipelagic
waters. However, sovereignty will not bar the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation
and the generally accepted principles of international law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the
absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a customary
international law, thus automatically incorporated thereto.
This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies concession of archipelagic states in exchange
for their right to claim all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit
its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such
zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III.
If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be
bound by it.

The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to determine the passing of a law and not the Court.
Moreover, such enactment was necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire on the Philippines
for its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas
around our archipelago and it will weaken the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA
9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf.
RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the
Constitution and our national interest.

LEE VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS

FACTS:
Sometime in March 1936, the Dinglasans sold to Lee Liong (Chinese citizen) a parcel of land situated at the corner of Roxas
Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City. In 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the RTC of Roxas City a petition
for reconstitution of title of the lot. (Alleging that the transfer certificate of title issued to Lee Liong was lost or destroyed
during World War II.) Petitioners Elizabeth and Pacita alleged that they were the widows of the deceased Lee Bing Hoo
and Lee Bun Ting, who were the heirs of Lee Liong, the owner of the lot. The RTC approved reconstitution of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong on the basis of an approve plan and technical description.

Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the RTC decision alleging that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case. The Solicitor General contended that the petitioners were not the proper parties in the
reconstitution of title, since their predecessor-in- interest Lee Liong did no acquire title to the lot because he was a
Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land. CA declared the reconstitution void.

Elizabeth and Pacita emphasized that the ownership of the land had been settled in two previous cases of the Supreme
Court, where the Court ruled in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Lee Liong. They also pointed out that they
acquired ownership of the land through actual possession of the lot and their consistent payment of taxes over the land for
more than sixty years. On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that the decision in the reconstitution case was void
otherwise; it would amount to circumventing the constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring ownership of private or
public agricultural lands.

ISSUES:
1. WON Lee Liong, being not a Filipino citizen has the qualification to own land in the Philippines.
2. WON the reconstitution was valid.

HELD:
1. Lee Liong was not qualified but the ownership of the lot was already acquired by Filipino citizens Lee Liong was disqualified
to acquire the land under the 1935 Constitution. The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March
1936, during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.
Under the 1935 Constitution aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus, Lee
Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question. The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the
land to an alien did not validate the transaction. It was still contrary to the constitutional proscription against aliens
acquiring lands of the public or private domain.
The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor General. This was what was done in this case when the Solicitor General
initiated an action for annulment of judgment of reconstitution of title. While it took the Republic more than sixty years to
assert itself, it is not barred from initiating such action. Prescription never lies against the State. The land is now in the hands of
Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently
their heirs, petitioners herein Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute. The
constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from
falling in the hands of non- Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is
in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land.

“If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in
the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.”

Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the
invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
achieved. Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the original certificate of title must be based on an owner’s
duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other valid sources of the title to be reconstituted.

2. Reconstitution was void for lack of factual support. In this case, reconstitution was based on the plan and technical
description approved by the Land Registration Authority. This renders the order of reconstitution void for lack of factual
support. A judgment with absolutely nothing to support it is void. As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the re-
issuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. It does not pass upon the ownership of
the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.

Any change in the ownership of the property must be the subject of a separate suit. Thus, although petitioners are in
possession of the land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue of ownership of the land. The SC Court
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the CA.

TECSON V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:

On December 31, 2003, FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Philippines under the Koalisyon
ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP). In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ represented himself to be a natural-born citizen. His real
name was stated to be “Fernando, Jr.” or “Ronald Allan” Poe, born in Manila on August 20, 1939.
On January 9, 2004, Victorino X. Fornier filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen.
According to Fornier, FPJ’s parents were foreigners – his mother Bessie Kelley Poe was an American and his father Allan F. Poe
was a Spanish national being a son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Even if Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate.
Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before marrying Bessie Kelley according to an “uncertified”
copy of a supposed certification of the marriage in July 5, 1936. COMELEC dismissed the Fornier petition for lack of merit and
Fornier filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc.
February 10, 2004 – Fornier filed a petition before the Supreme Court, praying for TRO, a writ of preliminary injunction or any
other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The two other petitions (Tecson and
Desidero v. COMELEC and Velez v. Poe) challenge the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and assert that only the Supreme Court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.

HELD:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a candidate” for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to
“contests” relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the
Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s birth, provided that among the citizens
of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."

Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter’s death certificate was identified as a
Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would
have been born in 1870. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in 1954 was
presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son,
Allan---respondent’s father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of
paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a
distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that
respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view of the established
paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

Re: Application of Ching

Bar Matter No. 914
October 1, 1999

Topic: Election of Philippine citizenship

Facts:
Vicente Ching, the legitimate son of Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila Dulay, a Filipino, was born in La Union
on April 11, 1964. Since his birth, he has resided in the Philippines.
On July 17, 1998, after having completed his Bachelor of Laws course, he filed an application to take the 1998 Bar
Examinations. In a Court Resolution, dated September 1, 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the
condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his citizenship.
 In compliance with the above resolution, he submitted on November 18, 1998, the following documents:

a.) Certification issued by the Board of Accountancy Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a
certified public accountant;
b.) Voter Certification showing that Ching is a registered voter in Tubao, La Union;
c.) Certification showing that Ching was elected member of the Sangguniang Bayan in Tubao, La Union during the May
12, 1992 elections.

When the results for the 1998 Bar Examinations were released, he was one of the successful examinees. However,
because of the questionable status of his citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. He was required to submit further
proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its comment:

a.) Ching, being a legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a
Chinese citizen and will continue to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority, he elected Philippine
citizenship in compliance with the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled “An Act Providing for
the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a
Filipino Citizen.”
b.) Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and if he ever does, it would be beyond the reasonable
time.

Ching had already elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999.

Issue: Whether or not Ching has elected Philippine citizenship within the reasonable time
Held:
The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years
from reaching the age of majority.
Ching, having been born on April 11, 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the
requirements of CA No. 625, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation
“upon reaching the age of majority,” his election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within
which to exercise the privilege.
The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious process. All that is required is to execute
an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, file the same with the nearest civil registry.
The special circumstances that he invoked, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being
a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine Citizenship by election.
Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over. He slept on his
opportunity to elect Philippine Citizenship, and as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
The Court resolves to DENY Vicente Ching’s application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
“Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient.”

“One who is privileged to elect Philippine Citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the
right with fervor, enthusiasm, and promptitude.”

Bengson III vs HRET

GR No. 142840

Topics: Natural-born citizenship; Repatriation

Facts:
Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law applicable then
was the 1935 Constitution.
On November 5, 1985, he enlisted in the United States Marine Corps, and without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under the
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by “rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”
On March 17, 1994, he reacquired his citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and
was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing
margin of 26, 671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for re-election.
Petitioner filed a case claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives
since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article 6, Section 6 of the Constitution; that he lost his citizenship when
he swore allegiance to the United States, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article 4, Section 2 of
the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any
act to perfect such citizenship.
Cruz contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he repatriated since the phrase “from
birth” in Article 4, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent characteristic of being natural-born citizen.
The HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan. They likewise denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether or not Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino
upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship

Held:
 Having taken the oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Pangasinan,
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as a son of a
Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover or return to his original status before he lost
his Philippine citizenship.
As Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as a member of the House
of Representatives.
The petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Rationale:
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: a.) by birth, and b.) by naturalization. A person who at the time of his
birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.

As defined in the Constitution, natural-born citizens “are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.”

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. CA 63
enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2)
repatriation, (3) direct act of Congress.
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed
forces, (2) service in the armed forces in World War II, (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
(4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien, (5) political and economic necessity.
It simply consists of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. If he was originally a natural-born citizen before he
lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

Go vs Ramos
GR No. 167569/167570/171946
September 4, 2009

Topic: Election of Philippine citizenship

Facts:
Luis T. Ramos initiated a complaint-affidavit before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of
Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. He alleged that while Jimmy
represents himself as a Filipino citizen, his personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so.
To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as “FChinese”. Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate
that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of
Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten.
He also averred that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed
to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a
Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit averring that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was
merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. He maintained that there is no
truth to the allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is a natural-born Filipino.
He alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine
citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625, as
evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine
citizenship on July 12, 1950.
Although the said oath and affidavit were registered only on September 11, 1956, the reason behind such late
registration was sufficiently explained in an affidavit. Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections. He
denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as an undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of arrival in
this country as alleged in the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was born and raised in the Philippines, and in fact,
speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog.
Considering that his citizenship affects that of his son, Carlos opted to present controverting arguments to sustain his
claim to Philippine citizenship, notwithstanding the fact that according to him, he was never impleaded in the deportation
proceedings.
According to Carlos, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916 deemed all inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands as well as their children born after the passage of said laws to be citizens of the Philippines. Because his father, Go Yin
An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the Jones Law of 1916, he (Carlos) undoubtedly acquired his
father’s citizenship. Article IV, first paragraph, of the 1935 Constitution therefore applies to him.
Even assuming that his father remained as a Chinese, Carlos also claims that he followed the citizenship of his Filipina
mother, being an illegitimate son, and that he even validly elected Philippine citizenship when he complied with all the
requirements of Com. Act No. 625. He submits that what is being disputed is not whether he complied with Com. Act No. 625,
but rather, the timeliness of his compliance. He stresses that the 3-year compliance period following the interpretation given
by Cuenco v. Secretary of Justice to Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 when election must
be made, is not an inflexible rule. He reasoned that the same decision held that such period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino, like in his case.

Issue: Whether or not Carlos is a Filipino citizen

Held:
Jimmy claims that he is a Filipino under Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution because Carlos, his father, is
allegedly a citizen. Since his citizenship hinges on that of his father’s, it becomes necessary to pass upon the citizenship of the
latter. However, whatever will be the findings as to Carlos citizenship will in no way prejudice him.
 Neither will the Philippine Bill of 1902 nor the Jones Law of 1916 make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare
claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the said laws, without any
supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice.

“It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority
of the mother and follow her nationality. Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer
upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself.”

However, it is our considered view that absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a
Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to him.
As to the question of whether the election of Philippine citizenship conferred on Carlos Filipino citizenship, we find
that the appellate court correctly found that it did not.
Com. Act No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the
procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof,
legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and the Government of the Philippines.
However, the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of
Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made upon reaching the age
of majority. The age of majority then commenced upon reaching 21 years. In the opinions of the then Secretary of Justice on
cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the
decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing
Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government
to the effect that the election should be made within a reasonable time after attaining the age of majority. The phrase
reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority.
It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as when the person
has always regarded himself as a Filipino. Be that as it may, it is our considered view that not a single circumstance was
sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year period. The fact that Carlos exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and
1955 does not demonstrate such belief, considering that the acts were done after he elected Philippine citizenship.
On the other hand, the mere fact that he was able to vote does not validate his irregular election of Philippine
citizenship. At most, his registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens
but does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the
rights and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself
to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country.
 “It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No
presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor
of the state.”

As Carlos and Jimmy neither showed conclusive proof of their citizenship nor presented substantial proof of the same,
we have no choice but to sustain the Boards jurisdiction over the deportation proceedings. This is not to say that we are ruling
that they are not Filipinos, for that is not what we are called upon to do. This Court necessarily has to pass upon the issue of
citizenship only to determine whether the proceedings may be enjoined in order to give way to a judicial determination of the
same. And we are of the opinion that said proceedings should not be enjoined.
Valles vs COMELEC
GR No. 137000

Topics: Jus sanguinis principle; Dual citizenship; Principal Organic Acts

Facts:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Western Australia to spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen,
and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. At the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen. Since then, she has continuously participated
in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well.
Her citizenship was raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998
elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the petitioner, Cirilo Valles.
Petitioner theorized that Lopez had renounced her citizenship in her application for alien certificate of registration
and immigrant certificate of residence; that she expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen of Australia and the said
declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.
He further argued that the COMELEC’s finding that she had renounced her Australian citizenship before the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and cancellation of her Australian passport did not automatically
restore her status as a Filipino citizen.

Issue: Whether or not Lopez is a Filipino citizen

Held:

“Philippine law adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis where the child follows the citizenship of the parent regardless of the place of
his/her birth, as opposed to jus soli which determines citizenship on the basis of place of birth.”

Lopez was born on May 16, 1934. Historically, this was the year before the 1935 Constitution took effect and at that
time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed
the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as
the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided
therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Her father was born on January 5, 1879 and was deemed
to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were in force at the time of her birth, she is likewise a citizen of the
Philippines.
The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows
the principle of jus soli, she can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Holding an Australian passport and an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting effective renunciation
of citizenship and do not militate against her claim. For renunciation to effectively result in loss of citizenship, the same must be
express.
Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Re: Application of Ching

Bar Matter No. 914
October 1, 1999

Topic: Election of Philippine citizenship

Facts:
Vicente Ching, the legitimate son of Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila Dulay, a Filipino, was born in La Union
on April 11, 1964. Since his birth, he has resided in the Philippines.
On July 17, 1998, after having completed his Bachelor of Laws course, he filed an application to take the 1998 Bar
Examinations. In a Court Resolution, dated September 1, 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the
condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, he submitted on November 18, 1998, the following documents:

d.) Certification issued by the Board of Accountancy Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a
certified public accountant;
e.) Voter Certification showing that Ching is a registered voter in Tubao, La Union;
f.) Certification showing that Ching was elected member of the Sangguniang Bayan in Tubao, La Union during the May
12, 1992 elections.

When the results for the 1998 Bar Examinations were released, he was one of the successful examinees. However,
because of the questionable status of his citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. He was required to submit further
proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its comment:

c.) Ching, being a legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a
Chinese citizen and will continue to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority, he elected Philippine
 citizenship in compliance with the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled “An Act Providing for
the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a
Filipino Citizen.”
d.) Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and if he ever does, it would be beyond the reasonable
time.

Ching had already elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999.

Issue: Whether or not Ching has elected Philippine citizenship within the reasonable time
Held:
The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years
from reaching the age of majority.
Ching, having been born on April 11, 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the
requirements of CA No. 625, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation
“upon reaching the age of majority,” his election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within
which to exercise the privilege.
The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious process. All that is required is to execute
an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, file the same with the nearest civil registry.
The special circumstances that he invoked, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being
a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine Citizenship by election.
Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over. He slept on his
opportunity to elect Philippine Citizenship, and as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
The Court resolves to DENY Vicente Ching’s application for admission to the Philippine Bar.

“Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient.”

“One who is privileged to elect Philippine Citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the
right with fervor, enthusiasm, and promptitude.”

CHAVEZ vs JUDUCIAL and BAR COUNCIL

FACTS:
The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior decision rendered July 17, 2012 that
JBC’s action of allowing more than one member of the congress to represent the JBC to be
unconstitutional

In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and
one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas,
Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that
petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should mean one representative each from both Houses
which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase “ a representative of
congress” refers that both houses of congress should have one representative each, and that these two
houses are permanent and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the bicameral system of
legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative
from congress.

ISSUE:
Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives
making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution.

HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a representative of congress”
should be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either house, not both.
That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the
legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role
of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that
the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that
the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.The motion was denied.

FRANCISCO vs HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved
the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment
Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation,
on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was
referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article
XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for
being insufficient in substance. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against
the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year."
Issue: Whether or not the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that
as of the time of filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it.
Held: The court’s power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is
subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality
of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. The Court found the
existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and
duty of the judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or
interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a
genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and
adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the
main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the
constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction
where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions.
Because it not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great
branches of the government.

Political questions are “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Citing Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner: “…The powers of
government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive, and the
Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that
supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice… courts
of justice determine the limits of powers of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those
of its officers. The judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government
or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not
only a judicial power but also a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature…” a duty which cannot
be abdicated by the mere specter of the political law doctrine.

The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer
to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.

The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the merits of the second
impeachment complaint. More importantly, any discussion of this would require this Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC vs ANTI- TERRORISM COUNCIL

FACTS:
-This caseconsists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, “An Act to Secure the State
and Protect our People from Terrorism,” aka Human Security Act of 2007.
- Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected “communist fronts by the
government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the transcendental importance doctrine and their
status as citizens and taxpayers
- KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP, and PCR allege they have been subjected to close
security surveillanceby state security forces,” their members followed by “suspicious persons” and
“vehicles with dark windshields,” and their offices monitored by “men with military build.”
-They likewise claim they have been branded as “enemies of the State.”
-BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT,
Migrante, HEAD, and Agham would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents’ alleged action
of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the CPP and NPA. They claim such tagging is
tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law.
-Meanwhile, IBP and CODAL base their claim oflocus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the
Constitution.
- Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are
nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
ISSUES:
1.WON petitioners’ resort to certiorari is proper (NO)

2.WON petitioners havelocus standi (NO)

3. WON the Court can take judicial notice of the alleged “tagging” (NO)

4.WON petitioners can invoke the “transcendental importance” doctrine (NO)

5.WON petitioners can be conferred locus standi as they are taxpayers and citizens (NO)

6. WON petitioners were able to present an actual case or controversy (NO)

7. WON RA 9372 is vague and broad in defining the crime of terrorism (NO)
HELD: In the case, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions questioning the constitutionality of the
said law on the basis of the following doctrinal pronouncements, which are extensively quoted below,
for research purposes, to wit:
1. Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted
without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
2. In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must
be the lis mota of the case.
3. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
4. Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
5. A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must
show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right
or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
6. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.
7. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be
one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful
or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The
principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of
general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in
that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questionable.
8. Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of
men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are
generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus,
facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As
the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been
judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any
fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no
constructive knowledge.
9. While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the United States of
America[17] (US) and the European Union[18] (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf
Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would
adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations.[19] Such statement
notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA
organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been
in effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted
their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription
under RA 9372.
10. The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, suffice to clothe the
IBP or any of its members with standing.[27] The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate
under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP
and CODAL have not pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
11. Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. A
taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress,[28]
whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.
12. RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its
implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal
interest in the implementation of the law.
13. It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do
not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.
14. By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
15. The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
16. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion.
17. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable—definite and concrete, touching on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand;
that is, it must concern a real and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual
and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
18. The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any
constitutional interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however,
is qualified by the requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently
adjudicate the issues.
19. Petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic “surveillance” and supposedly being tagged as
“communist fronts” in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the
Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its function.
20. Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by “double
contingency,” where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction
to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
21. The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present
petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372
since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused.[45] Allegations of abuse must be
anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable.
22. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of
constitutional litigation are rightly excepted.
23. Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of
terrorism[46] under RA 9372 in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law
enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
24. The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases, and
are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.[50] It added that, at any rate, the
challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.[51]
25. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn
with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may
well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the
law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
26. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases.
They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment." Claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and, again, that "overbreadth claims,
if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to
be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative
act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set
of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that
a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff
who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as
applied to the conduct of others."
27. In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed
for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken
as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As
has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth
challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process
typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
28. Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground
that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and
permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.
29. To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same
plane. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
30. As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will
understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some
of it is protected.
31. A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as-applied” challenge.Distinguished from an as-
applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual
operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.
32. The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to
penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on
either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
33. The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the “chilling
effect” on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged.[62] As reflected
earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an “in terrorem effect” in
deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly
considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights.
34. The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected
to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the
prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against
employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go
against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial
power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous
and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I
have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will
impair the State’s ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an
accused from defeating the State’s power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third
parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.
35. It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial
kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech
cases.By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in
order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court,
that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute
cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as
applied to the litigants.
36. In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two cases,[67]
observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment,[68] and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in
cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.[69] In Virginia v.
Hicks,[70] it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or
regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly
broad statutes are justified by the “transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression.”[71]
37. American jurisprudence[74] instructs that “vagueness challenges that do not involve the First
Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to
the statute's facial validity.”
38. In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been
utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases,[76] the Court
brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on
fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the
vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these
three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the
therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case.
39. From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following
elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of
the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the
predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand.
40. Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime
actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the
crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an “unlawful demand.” Given the
presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component
of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
42. As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of
prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of “terrorism” is
thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates
speculative counseling on a statute’s future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be
used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress. Facts:

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs GRP

FACTS: Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which
is scheduled to be signed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF in August
05, 2008. Five cases bearing the same subject matter were consolidated by this court namely:-
GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer to declare
unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD disclosed to the public and be open for public consultation.
GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null and void said MOA-AD and to
exclude the city to the BJE.
GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing the MOA-AD and additionally
impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.
GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to declare null and void the MOA-AD
and without operative effect and those respondents enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently
enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement
derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal
and impleading Iqbal.
The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between the government and the
MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities; and
the following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.
However, in 1999 and in the early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central
Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; hence, then Pres. Estrada
declared an all-out war-which tolled the peace negotiation. It was when then Pres. Arroyo assumed
office, when the negotiation regarding peace in Mindanao continued. MILF was hesitant; however, this
negotiation proceeded when the government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace talks resumed and
MILF suspended all its military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001 lead to the ceasefire between the
parties. After the death of MILF Chairman Hashim and Iqbal took over his position, the crafting of MOA-
AD in its final form was born.

MOA-AD Overview
This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in the birth of this MOA-
AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws such as ILO
Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e compact right entrenchment (law of
compact, treaty and order). The body is divided into concepts and principles, territory, resources, and
governance.
Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people have the right to self- governance of their Bangsamoro
homeland to which they have exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of occupation in the
land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with defined
territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with
foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it
grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.
As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in the inclusion to
ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two categories, “A” which will be subject to plebiscite
not later than 12 mos. after the signing and “B” which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the
signing of another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE shall have jurisdiction
over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE territory; they shall also have "territorial
waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the
Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial
waters, the BJE and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all
natural resources. There will also be sharing of minerals in the territorial waters; but no provision on the
internal waters.

Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation
and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those
countries, as well as environmental cooperation agreements, but not to include aggression in the GRP.
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the government. The BJE shall
have participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized
agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations
for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable
sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands
forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to explore its resources and that
the sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural
resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions
and TLAs.

And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the GRP and MILF is
associative i.e. characterized by shared authority and responsibility. This structure of governance shall
be further discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was highly contested before
the court. The BJE shall also be given the right to build, develop and maintain its own institutions, the
details of which shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact as well.

Issues:

1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the exercise of judicial review

2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right
to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD; and

3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws

Ruling:

The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution.

On the Procedural Issue

1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed a need for the exercise of
judicial review.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the court will decline on
issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere academic questions. Related to the requirement
of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. The contention of the SolGen is that
there is no issue ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a proposal and does not automatically
create legally demandable rights and obligations. Such was denied.

The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of their duty or in grave abuse
of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states that acts made by authority which exceed their
authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes,
the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or
controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. This is aside from the fact that concrete acts made under the MOA-AD are not
necessary to render the present controversy ripe and that the law or act in question as not yet effective
does not negate ripeness.

With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the Province of Cotabato,
Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province
of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to have locus standi since it is their LGUs
which will be affected in whole or in part if include within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel
Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for
the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score
alone, they can be given legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also given a standing as an intervenor. And
lastly, the Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an
advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim
Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers since they stand to
be benefited or prejudiced in the resolution of the petitions regarding the MOA-AD.

On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD has already been
suspended and that the President has already disbanded the GRP, the SC disagrees. The court reiterates
that the moot and academic principle is a general rule only, the exceptions, provided in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, that it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public
interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review;
and that where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer, it
does not divest the court the power to hear and try the case especially when the plaintiff is seeking for
damages or injunctive relief.

Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the GRP did not render
the petitions moot and academic. The MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible
Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating
entity.

At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. There is a reasonable
expectation that petitioners will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents'
actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. But with respect to the prayer of Mandamus to
the signing of the MOA-AD, such has become moot and academic considering that parties have already
complied thereat.
On the Substantive Issue

2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.

As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, and integrated therein is the recognition of the duty of the officialdom to give information
even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the
conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the
centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are
vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times
accountable to the people.

Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-executory with reasonable safeguards —
the effectivity of which need not await the passing of a statute. Hence, it is essential to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the
interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.

The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is corollary to the twin rights to
information and disclosure. And feedback means not only the conduct of the plebiscite as per the
contention of the respondents. Clearly, what the law states is the right of the petitioners to be consulted
in the peace agenda as corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. As such,
respondent Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion for failing to carry out the furtive process by
which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and
amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereto. Moreover, he
cannot invoke of executive privilege because he already waived it when he complied with the Court’s
order to the unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD.

In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be involved in matters related to such peace talks as
enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally
vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically
result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully at all levels on decisions that
would clearly affect their lives, rights and destinies. The MOA-AD is an instrument recognizing ancestral
domain, hence it should have observed the free and prior informed consent to the ICC/IPPs; but it failed
to do so. More specially noted by the court is the excess in authority exercised by the respondent—since
they allowed delineation and recognition of ancestral domain claim by mere agreement and
compromise; such power cannot be found in IPRA or in any law to the effect.

3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot be
all accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very
concept underlying them:
On matters of the Constitution.

Association as the type of relationship governing between the parties. The parties manifested that in
crafting the MOA-AD, the term association was adapted from the international law. In international law,
association happens when two states of equal power voluntarily establish durable links i.e. the one
state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, principal, while maintaining its
international status as state; free association is a middle ground between integration and independence.
The MOA-AD contains many provisions that are consistent with the international definition of
association which fairly would deduced that the agreement vest into the BJE a status of an associated
state, or at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The court vehemently objects because the
principle of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power beyond what the Constitution
can grant to a local government; even the ARMM do not have such recognition; and the fact is such
concept implies recognition of the associated entity as a state. There is nothing in the law that
contemplate any state within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide
for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. The court
disagrees with the respondent that the MOA-AD merely expands the ARMM. BJE is a state in all but
name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
As such the MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic.

On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE includes those areas who
voted in the plebiscite for them to become part of the ARMM. The stipulation of the respondents in the
MOA-AD that these areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in contrary to the express provision of
the Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region." Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an expansion of the
ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings of the law since those included in its territory are areas
which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and not to the BJE.

On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend that the powers vested to the
BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-paragraph 9 of sec 20, art. 10 of the constitution and that a mere
passage of a law is necessary in order to vest in the BJE powers included in the agreement. The Court
was not persuaded. SC ruled that such conferment calls for amendment of the Constitution; otherwise
new legislation will not concur with the Constitution. Take for instance the treaty making power vested
to the BJE in the MOA-AD. The Constitution is clear that only the President has the sole organ and is the
country’s sole representative with foreign nation. Should the BJE be granted with the authority to
negotiate with other states, the former provision must be amended consequently. Section 22 must also
be amended—the provision of the law that promotes national unity and development. Because clearly,
associative arrangement of the MOA-AD does not epitomize national unity but rather, of semblance of
unity. The associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of
Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for
independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.
On matters of domestic statutes.

o Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the adoption of the definition of
Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD. Said law specifically distinguishes between the Bangsamoro
people and the Tribal peoples that is contrary with the definition of the MOA-AD which includes all
indigenous people of Mindanao.

o Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the delineation and recognition of the ancestral domain is a
clear departure from the procedure embodied in the IPRA law which ironically is the term of reference
of the MOA-AD.

On matters of international law.

The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part of the law of the
land. In international law, the right to self-determination has long been recognized which states that
people can freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development. There are the internal and external self-determination—internal, meaning the self-pursuit
of man and the external which takes the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral secession. This
principle of self-determination is viewed with respect accorded to the territorial integrity of existing
states. External self-determination is only afforded in exceptional cases when there is an actual block in
the meaningful exercise of the right to internal self-determination. International law, as a general rule,
subject only to limited and exceptional cases, recognizes that the right of disposing national territory is
essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every state.

On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that indigenous peoples situated
within states do not have a general right to independence or secession from those states under
international law, but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to
internal self-determination; have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their
internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions; have the
right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise
used or acquired.

Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee the indigenous people their own
police and security force; but rather, it shall be the State, through police officers, that will provide for
the protection of the people. With regards to the autonomy of the indigenous people, the law does not
obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of a state; since it would impair
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states.

On the basis of the suspensive clause.

o It was contented by the respondents that grave abuse of discretion cannot be had, since the
provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall not take effect until the necessary changes to the legal
framework are effected.

The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause runs contrary to Memorandum of Instructions from
the President stating that negotiations shall be conducted in accordance to the territorial integrity of the
country—such was negated by the provision on association incorporated in the MOA-AD. Apart from
this, the suspensive clause was also held invalid because of the delegated power to the GRP Peace panel
to advance peace talks even if it will require new legislation or even constitutional amendments. The
legality of the suspensive clause hence hinges on the query whether the President can exercise such
power as delegated by EO No.3 to the GRP Peace Panel. Well settled is the rule that the President
cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. The power of the President to conduct
peace negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but is rather implied from her powers
as Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general
responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to
prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.

As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that
may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. At all event, the president may not,
of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable; but she may not be prevented
from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon
them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision.

While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may
submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation
of constituent powers. Clearly, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of
conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies that require
changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of
Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty. The President’s
power is limited only to the preservation and defense of the Constitution but not changing the same but
simply recommending proposed amendments or revisions.

o The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive condition but is a term because it is
not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will take effect; but, when.
Hence, the stipulation is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework –which
changes would include constitutional amendments. Simply put, the suspensive clause is inconsistent
with the limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual
guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted
to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as
unconstitutional.

On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding
on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself,
already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. The MOA-AD not being a
document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost
consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to
constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a
solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to
guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution.
Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only
in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for
the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue
influence or interference with that process.