Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.

Court of Appeals
240 SCRA 368
FACTS:

Executive Order No. 41 was promulgated declaring a one-time tax amnesty on unpaid income taxes. Availing itself
of the amnesty, respondent R.O.H. Auto Products Philippines, Inc., its Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-41 and
Supplemental Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-64-B, and paid the corresponding amnesty taxes due. Prior to
this availment, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in a communication received by private respondent
on 13 August 1986, assessed the latter deficiency income and business taxes for its fiscal years ended 30
September 1981 and 30 September 1982 in an aggregate amount of P1,410,157.71. The taxpayer wrote back to
state that since it had been able to avail itself of the tax amnesty, the deficiency tax notice should forthwith be
cancelled and withdrawn. The request was denied by the Commissioner, in his letter of 22 November 1988, on the
ground that Revenue Memorandum Order No. 4-87, dated 09 February 1987, implementing Executive Order No.
41, had construed the amnesty coverage to include only assessments issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
after the promulgation of the executive order on 22 August 1986 and not to assessments theretofore made.

ISSUE:

WON the CIR has erred in denying the private respondent’s tax amnesty claim.

HELD:

Yes. If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax
liabilities already assessed (administratively) prior to 22 August 1986, the law could have simply so provided in its
exclusionary clauses. It did not. The conclusion is unavoidable, and it is that the executive order has been
designed to be in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it.

All issuances must not override, but must remain consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and
implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, not to supplant nor to modify, the law.

Ople v. Torres
G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998
293 SCR A 141
FACTS:

Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System,"
was issued by President Fidel Ramos On December 12, 1996. Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition seeking to
invalidate A.O. No. 308. One of the grounds is that its establishment requires a legislative act. Thus, the issuance
of A.O. No.308 by the President is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of congress. Petitioner
claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the
President to issue.

On this point, respondents counter-argue that: A.O. No. 308 was issued within the executive and administrative
powers of the president without encroaching on the legislative powers of congress.

ISSUE:

Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate.

HELD:

A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative
order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing
the law and carrying out the legislative policy.

It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It
establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a
delicate adjustment of various contending state policies - -- the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy
interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc.

President has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public
order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to
discharge his duties effectively.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
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administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.

[Gonzalez v. Land Bank

183 SCRA 520]

Interpretative legislation. They are rules and regulations construing or interpreting the provisions of a statute to be
enforced and they are binding on all concerned until they are changed, e.g., BIR Circulars, CB circulars, etc.. They
have the effect of law and are entitled to great respect; they have in their favor the presumption of legality.

[Manila Jockey Club v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 103533, December 15, 1998].

FACTS:
On June 18, 1948, Congress approved Republic Act No. 309, entitled An Act to Regulate Horse Racing in the
Philippines. This Act consolidated all existing laws and amended inconsistent provisions relative to horse racing. It
provided for the distribution of gross receipts from the sale of betting tickets, but is silent on the allocation of so-
called breakages .

On October 23, 1992, petitioners, Manila Jockey Club, Inc. (MJCI) and Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI), were
granted franchises to operate and maintain race tracks for horse racing in the City of Manila and the Province of
Rizal by virtue of Republic Act Nos. 6631 and 6632, respectively, and allowed to hold horse race on specific days.

On March 20, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 420 was issued creating the Philippine Racing Commission
(PHILRACOM), giving it exclusive jurisdiction and control over every aspect of the conduct of horse racing. By
virtue of this power, the PHILRACOM authorized the holding of races on Wednesdays starting on December 22,
1976. Petitioners made a joint query regarding the ownership of breakages accumulated during Wednesday races.
In response to the query, PHILRACOM rendered its opinion in a letter dated September 20, 1978. It declared that
the breakages belonged to the racing clubs concerned.

On December 16, 1986 President Corazon Aquino amended certain provisions Sec. 4 of R.A. 6631 and Sec. 6 of
R.A. 6632 through Executive Orders No. 88 and 89. On April 23, 1987, PHILRACOM itself addressed a query to the
Office of the President asking which agency is entitled to dispose of the proceeds of the breakages derived from
the Tuesday and Wednesday races. In a letter dated May 21, 1987, the Office of the President, through then
Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., replied that the disposition of the breakages rightfully belongs
to PHILRACOM, not only those derived from the Saturday, Sunday and holiday races, but also from the Tuesday
and Wednesday races in accordance with the distribution scheme prescribed in said Executive Orders. Controversy
arose when herein respondent PHILRACOM, sent a series of demand letters to petitioners MJCI and PRCI,
requesting its share in the breakages of mid-week-races and proof of remittances to other legal beneficiaries as
provided under the franchise laws.

ISSUE

Who are the rightful beneficiaries of the breakages derived from mid-week races?

HELD

A reasonable reading of the horse racing laws favors the determination that the entities enumerated in the
distribution scheme provided under R.A. Nos. 6631 and 6632, as amended by Executive Orders 88 and 89, are the
rightful beneficiaries of breakages from mid-week races. Petitioners should therefore remit the proceeds of
breakages to those benefactors designated by the aforesaid laws.

While herein petitioners might have relied on a prior opinion issued by an administrative body, the
well-entrenched principle is that the State could not be estopped by a mistake committed by its
officials or agents. Well-settled also is the rule that the erroneous application of the law by public
officers does not prevent a subsequent correct application of the law. Although there was an initial
interpretation of the law by PHILRACOM, a court of law could not be precluded from setting that
interpretation aside if later on it is shown to be inappropriate.

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 Public Schools District Supervisors Association v. Hon. Edilberto de Jesus
G.R. No. 157299, June 19, 2006

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the “Governance of Basic Education Act 2001,” became a law on
August 11, 2001, in accordance with Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Under Section 14 of the law, the
DepEd Secretary is mandated to “promulgate the implementing rules and regulations within ninety (90) days after
the approval of the Act, provided that the principle of shared governance shall be fully implemented within two (2)
years” after such approval.

On March 13, 2003, the PSDSA, the national organization of about 1,800 public school district supervisors of the
DepEd, in behalf of its officers and members, filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to declare as
unconstitutional Rule IV, Section 4.3; Rule V, Sections 5.1 and the second paragraph of Section 5.2; and Rule VI,
Section 6.2, paragraph 11 of Department of Education Order No. 1, Series of 2003 which alleged to have removed
petitioners’ administrative supervision over elementary schools and its principals (school heads) within his/her
district and converting his/her administrative function to that of performing staff function.

Petitioners maintain that the questioned provisions of the IRR are invalid because they extended or expanded and
modified the provisions of R.A. No. 9155. They argue that the said law should be read in harmony with other
existing educational laws which it did not specifically repeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the questioned provisions of the IRR is invalid?

HELD:

We have reviewed the IRR and find that Section 4.3 of Rule IV, and Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of Rule V are valid. The
provisions merely reiterate and implement the related provisions of R.A. No. 9155.

It must be stressed that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative
enactment. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its
coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature. It bears stressing,
however, that administrative bodies are allowed under their power of subordinate legislation to
implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by filling in the details. All that is required is that
the regulation be germane to the objectives and purposes of the law; that the regulation does not
contradict but conforms with the standards prescribed by law. Moreover, as a matter of policy, this Court
accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because of the doctrine
of separation of powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and
regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction. The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the
multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the establishment of diverse administrative agencies
for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to the accumulation of experience and growth of
specialized capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing a particular statute.

Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v. Drilon, 176 SCRA 24

Romulo, Mabanta Law Office v. Home Development Mutual Fund

G.R. No. 131082, June 19, 2000

FACTS:

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los Angeles, a law firm, was exempted for the period 1 January to
31 December 1995 from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage by respondent Home Development Mutual Fund (hereafter
HDMF) because of a superior retirement plan. The HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 7742, issued Board Resolution No. 1011, Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be entitled to a
waiver or suspension of Fund coverage,it must have a plan providing for both provident/ retirement and housing
benefits superior to those provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund.

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PETITIONER filed with the respondent an application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage because of its
superior retirement plan and submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the Amendments to the Rules are
invalid in so far as they abolished the exemption granted by Section 19 of PD 1752, as amended. However, HDMF
disapproved PETITIONER's application.

ISSUE:

Whether the HDMF Board exceeded its delegated power.

HELD:

Yes. It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule~making power as provided in Section 5 ] of R.A. No. 7742
and Section 13 of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is well~settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a
delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency.It is required that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity
with, the standards prescribed by law.

In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995
Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have both
provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Fund, it
effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently abolished that exemption
through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent
repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the Board. The
HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule~making power, issue a regulation not consistent with the law
it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but
must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the
law.

Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority

G.R. No. 110526, February 10, 1998

FACTS:

On November 5, 1992, seven desiccated coconut processing companies belonging to the APCD brought suit in the
Regional Trial Court to enjoin the PCA from issuing permits to certain applicants for the establishment of new
desiccated coconut processing plants. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would
violate PCA's Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1991, as the applicants were seeking permits to operate in
areas considered "congested" under the administrative order.

While the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the Governing Board of the PCA issued on March 24, 1993
Resolution No. 018-93, providing for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the
coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of coconut product processors, the
registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration of quality
standards. The PCA then proceeded to issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated
coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines on April
26, 1993 not to approve the resolution in question. Despite follow-up letters sent on May 25 and June 2, 1993,
petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. The "certificates of registration" issued in the
meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PCA’s Board Resolution No. 018-93 is null and void for being an undue exercise of legislative power
by an administrative body.

HELD: 1. Yes. The petition is GRANTED. PCA Resolution No. 018-93 and all certificates of registration
issued under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of
the Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue.

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 Any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the government. The regulatory
system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it.

t issue in this case is the validity of a resolution, dated March 24, 1993, of the Philippine Coconut
Authority in which it declares that it will no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut
processing to apply to it for a license or permit as a condition for engaging in such business.

Petitioner Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (hereafter referred to as APCD) brought this
suit for certiorari and mandamus against respondent Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to invalidate
the latter's Board Resolution No. 018-93 and the certificates of registration issued under it on the
ground that the resolution in question is beyond the power of the PCA to adopt, and to compel said
administrative agency to comply instead with the mandatory provisions of statutes regulating the
desiccated coconut industry, in particular, and the coconut industry, in general.

Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998

FACTS:

The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10
year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty
for the said crime. He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape.

In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution
to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS
THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659. Pursuant to the provisions of
said law, the Secretary of Justice promulgated the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177
("implementing rules") and directed the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection
Manual

The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the grounds that
it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a violation of the
Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an
unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated
powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.

ISSUE

WON RA 8177 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power?

HELD

THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in the framing of our Constitution. Each department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. Corollary
to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. "The rule is that what has
been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non
delegari potest." The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of delegation
of legislative authority to administrative bodies.
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 The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the task of
government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to attend to by itself. Specialization even in
legislation has become necessary. On many problems involving day-to-day undertakings, the legislature may not
have the needed competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These
solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
assigned to them.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself - it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate - and (b) fix a standard - the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable - to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

Considering the scope and the definiteness of R.A. No. 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the
death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what
is the scope of his authority.

R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its
boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. it indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "[t]he death sentence shall be
executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to
mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during
the proceedings prior to the execution." Further, "[t]he Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps
to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of
the convict." The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration of lethal
injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task." The Court cannot see that any useful
purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a
criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Courts.

Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise of discretion by the Secretary of Justice and
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections under delegated legislative power is proper where standards are
formulated for the guidance and the exercise of limited discretion, which though general, are capable of
reasonable application.

A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is no undue delegation of legislative power from the
Secretary of Justice to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere constituent unit of the Department of
Justice. Further, the Department of Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge of the "administration of the
correctional system." Hence, the import of the phraseology of the law is that the Secretary of Justice should
supervise the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in consultation
with the Department of Health.

However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not
be overlooked. The Courts finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a veritable
vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the
execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of
review and approval thereof. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of
Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative
superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent
abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.

Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848

FACTS

Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as part of its "Additional Instructions to
Examinees to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution
embodied the following pertinent provisions: "No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or
the like conducted by, or shall receive any handout, review material, or any tip from any school, college or
university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every examination day
including the examination day. Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions.
Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy filed in their own behalf and
in behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer for the

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issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-
mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

WON the Resolution is valid?

HELD:

It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the
issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly
adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are
authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.

Resolution No. 105 is null and void and of no force and effect for being unconstitutional. The unreasonableness is
more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred
from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the
Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the
examination period.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they
should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful
steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to
make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom
to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth.

De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 109023, August 12, 1998

FACTS

Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). Prior to July 1, 1989, they were
receiving honoraria as designated members of the LWUA Board Secretariat and the Pre-Qualifcation, Bids and
Awards Committee.

On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (Rep. Act 6758), entitled An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and
Position Classifcation System in the Government and For Other Purposes, took effect. Section 12 of said law
provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates. Certain
additional compensations, however, were exempted from consolidation. To implement Rep. Act 6758, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No.
10), discontinuing without qualification effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on
top of basic salary. Petitioners contend that DBM-CCC No. 10 is inconsistent with the provisions of Rep. Act 6758
(the law it is supposed to implement) and, therefore, void. And it is without force and effect because it was not
published in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE

WON the Circular is void.

HELD

YES. On the need for publication of subject DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in the affirmative.
Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the
nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing
law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the
requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.

In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows
payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and employees, starting
November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It is something more than that. And why
not, when it tends to deprive government workers of their allowances and additional compensation sorely needed
to keep body and soul together. At the very least, before the said circular under attack may be permitted to
substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and
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alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines - to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have,
and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and
rudiments of fairness and transparency.

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