Social Semiotics

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Memes as speech acts

L. Grundlingh

To cite this article: L. Grundlingh (2018) Memes as speech acts, Social Semiotics, 28:2, 147-168,
DOI: 10.1080/10350330.2017.1303020

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10350330.2017.1303020

Published online: 28 Mar 2017.

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SOCIAL SEMIOTICS, 2018
VOL. 28, NO. 2, 147–168
https://doi.org/10.1080/10350330.2017.1303020

Memes as speech acts

L. Grundlingh
Department of Afrikaans and Theory of Literature, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Memes are a common way for individuals to communicate online. Illocution; meme;
Internet users often use memes to reply to each other on social multimodality; semiotic
networking sites or other online forums. This research argues that resource; speech acts
memes are successfully used for communication purposes
because certain memes (specifically image macros) are essentially
speech acts and are also understood as being speech acts by
internet users. When creating a meme, choices are made
concerning the specific semiotic resources to be used and the
internet community then interprets these resources to facilitate
communication between the meme creator and the internet
community. Memes can be recreated for different purposes and
therefore it is possible to group memes under already existing
speech acts and speculate about the ways in which these might
correspond to speech acts in the future. To accomplish this, a
limited amount of specific meme types are analysed and discussed.

Introduction
Frequent users of popular social media sites should be very familiar with the terms meme
and gif. The term meme is, however, not a modern term recently coined by users of social
media. Richard Dawkins already coined the term in 1979 when he published The selfish
gene (Davidson 2009; Milner 2012; Börzsei 2013; Shifman 2014). Börzsei (2013, 3) states
that Dawkins based the term meme on the Ancient Greek word mīmēma which means
“something imitated.” Dawkins (1989) discusses two areas where evolutionary theory
might be heading next and distinguishes between genes and memes (nongenetic behav-
iour). He acknowledges that much of human nature comes from culture rather than gen-
etics. The differences between genes and memes are explained by Davidson (2009, 121) as
follows:
Genes determine an organism’s physical characteristics. […] Memes determine the behaviour
of an organism. They are either taught to an organism (you go to school to learn math) or
learned through experience (you stick a finger in an outlet, get shocked, understand that
outlets should be avoided). […] While genes rely on the physical process of reproduction
to replicate, memes rely on the mental processes of observation and learning. (emphasis in
the original)

Dawkins’ original use of the term meme referred to sports, religion, ideas, catch-phrases,
language, etc. (Davidson 2009; Milner 2012). Davidson (2009, 122) mentions that an

CONTACT L. Grundlingh thiarl@unisa.ac.za

© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
148 L. GRUNDLINGH

accurate definition for the modern concept of an internet meme is lacking, but uses the
following definition to describe internet memes:
An Internet meme is a piece of culture, typically a joke, which gains influence through online
transmission.

Milner (2012, iii) defines internet memes as “amateur media artifacts, extensively remixed
and recirculated by different participants on social media networks.” This definition corre-
sponds to some extent to the ideas expressed in the theories of multimodality and semio-
tics which are also discussed in this research paper. It also speaks to the idea behind
resemiotisation, which is described as the “process of semiotic change in the circulation
and flow of discourses across social and cultural boundaries” (Leppänen et al. 2013, 8).
In this research, I will be referring to the term meme throughout the text, but meme
here should be understood in terms of Milner’s (2012) definition and not meme as dis-
cussed by Dawkins (1989).
In recent years research on memes has increased. The research topics include the
language found in memes (Davidson 2009; De la Rosa-Carrillo 2015), discourse and iden-
tity in participatory media through the use of memes (Milner 2012) and the cultural logic of
photo-based meme genres (Shifman 2014).
This article proposes an alternative way of looking at memes from a theoretical frame-
work that is not memetics by arguing that memes are in fact speech acts and that is why
we are able to understand them and communicate with each other using them. Accord-
ing to Edmonds (2005, 01), memetics does not show demonstrable progress to interest
other academics. Memetics is described as a “narrow” approach that “involves a closer
analogy between genes and memes […].” Furthermore, Edmonds (2005, 01) states the
following:
[…] whilst the idea of memes has retained its attractiveness for some in terms of a framework
for thinking about phenomena, it has not provided any “added value” it terms of providing
new understanding of phenomena. (emphasis in the original)

From the comments by Edmonds, it is clear that an alternative approach to the analyses of
memes is necessary since memes are still very popular and are still being used to commu-
nicate online.
Speech acts are central to communication. Every time we communicate with other indi-
viduals, we (the speaker-/-writer and the hearer-/-reader) are using speech acts to commu-
nicate a message and understand the message being received. Although speech acts have
in the past mainly been discussed with reference to spoken communication, the same
principles can apply to written texts and memes. Memes can contain text or they can
contain just an image (a facial expression, gestures, etc.). These are called reaction shots
and will be discussed later. These types of memes are a form of non-verbal communication
(in the same way, the use of facial expressions when taking to an individual would be).
However, I argue that speech act theory can still be applied to these types of memes
and memes in general. Sebeok (1994, 113) states that from the perspective of semiotics,
the two repertoires of non-verbal and verbal sign systems become profoundly interwoven
and both complement and supplement one another throughout each individual’s life.
While speech act theory falls within the area of pragmatics, semiotics provides evidence
that non-verbal communication is interpreted in much the same way as verbal communication.
 SOCIAL SEMIOTICS 149

I argue that a non-verbal meme can still be a speech act as long as the context of the non-
verbal message is understood by the addressee.
This article constitutes a novel approach to memes because it examines memes using
central concepts from pragmatics and semiotics which have not been included in previous
studies.
In the following sections, multimodality and semiotic resources will be explored before
speech acts and memes will be discussed in greater detail. Lastly, a conclusion is drawn on
memes as speech acts.

Multimodality and semiotic resources

Multimodality
The concept of multimodality was developed in the early 2000s and originated, in particu-
lar, from the work of Michael Halliday on language as a social semiotic system. According
to Jewitt (2013, 252), Halliday’s work shifted the attention from language as a static linguis-
tic system to language as a social system. Jewitt (2013, 250) defines multimodality as “an
interdisciplinary approach drawn from social semiotics that understands communication
and representation as more than language and attends systematically to the social
interpretation of a range of forms of making meaning.” Multimodality provides concepts,
methods and frameworks that assist in the collection and analysis of visual, aural, embo-
died and spatial aspects of interactions and environments. Furthermore, multimodality not
only investigates the interaction between communicational means, but also challenges
the prior predominance of spoken and written language in research. Multimodality
places emphasis on the importance of social context, as well as the resources available
for meaning making. It specifically emphasises people’s situated choice of resources
and not the system of available resources. As it is, one can also analyse the production
and interpretation of memes from a multimodal perspective. With memes, the choice of
resource and the social context in which the meme is interpreted are central to successful
communication since communicating through memes is dependent on the addressee
understanding why, for example, a certain meme was used to comment on a statement.
As mentioned earlier, memes are media artefacts that are remixed and circulated. They
consist of different media and modes and each of these modes has different uses and func-
tions. According to Jewitt (2013, 251–252), the “meanings in any mode is always interwo-
ven with the meanings made with those of other modes cooperating in the
communicative ensemble. The interaction between modes is itself a part of the production
of meaning.” Jones (2013, 1) refers to Scollon and Levine (2004) when distinguishing
between the concepts of media and mode. A mode is described as a conventionally recog-
nised semiotic system “with an internal grammaticality, such as speech, color, taste, or the
design of images.” Media, on the other hand, are viewed as the physical carriers of modes,
for example, paper, telephones, computer screens, etc.
In the case of memes, it can be argued that the meme itself qualifies as a mode which is
distributed through online and social media. As mentioned, modes are interpreted within
a semiotic system in order for communication and interpretation of the mode to take
place. Within a semiotic system, the terms mode and media are replaced by the term
semiotic resource.
150 L. GRUNDLINGH

Semiotic resources
Van Leeuwen (2005, 285) defines a semiotic resource as all the materials and artefacts or
actions that we use to communicate. Semiotic resources can be produced physiologically,
with our vocal apparatus, for example, or it can be produced technologically. Technologi-
cal semiotic resources can be produced with pen and ink, or computer hardware and soft-
ware. Furthermore, Van Leeuwen (2005, 285) states that
[S]emiotic resources have a meaning potential, based on their past uses, and a set of affor-
dances based on their possible uses, and these will be actualized in concrete social contexts
where their use is subject to some form of semiotic regime.

Here Van Leeuwen mentions some very important characteristics that can be applied to
memes. Firstly, a meme has a meaning potential. Almost every meme is created with
the purpose of expressing something. This can be an emotion or an opinion. Memes
can also be created to express the intent to apologise, ask a question, etc. This will then
be the meme’s meaning potential. Very importantly, Van Leeuwen states that the
meaning potential is actualised in concrete social contexts. In the context in which
memes are used (the internet and social networking sites, mostly), the interpretation of
the meme will largely depend on the “knowledge” of memes, their functions, and their
uses by the different internet users.
Some memes, such as reaction shots, do not include text (although the inclusion of text
as a heading or introduction to the meme is common), which means that the addressee or
reader must be able to interpret the meme and any text, or lack thereof, correctly. This
reader corresponds to what Eco (1984) calls a “model reader.” Eco (1984, 7) mentions
that the model reader of a specific text plays an important role in the organisation of a
text. In order to make a text communicative, the author of the text has to assume that
the ensemble of codes he/she relies upon is the same as the codes shared by the possible
reader. According to Eco (1984, 7), an author has to foresee a model reader who is, suppo-
sedly, able to deal interpretatively with the expressions in the same way that the author
deals generatively with them.
Eco (1976, 8) states that there is a difference between a communicative process and a
process of signification. A communicative process is defined as “the passage of a signal
(not necessarily a sign) from a source (through a transmitter, along a channel) to a desti-
nation.” Here only the passage of some information takes place, but no signification. When
the destination becomes a human being, even if the source is not human, and the signal is
not merely a stimulus but arouses an interpretive response in the addressee, a process of
signification takes place. Eco (1976, 8) states that this process is made possible because of
the existence of a code. A code is basically a system of signification, insofar as it couples
present entities with absent units.
The interpretation of a meme can therefore be seen as a process of signification.
Because memes are multimodal artefacts that can also be interpreted through the
theory of semiotics, it is possible for them to be a message that is more complex than
just a simple image being sent from one individual to another.
Although the process of signification and the theory of speech acts are studied in two
different areas of research, both semiotics and pragmatics assist in contributing to a
thorough understanding of how memes are used to communicate.
 SOCIAL SEMIOTICS 151

Speech acts and pragmatics

Speech acts are studied within the research field of pragmatics. Yule (2006, 112) describes
pragmatics as the study of “what speakers mean” and emphasises that communication
depends on “not only recognizing the meaning of words in an utterance, but recognizing
what speakers mean by their utterances.”
When we interpret the meaning of a text (written or spoken), we do not only consider
the words or utterances used to communicate the message, we also rely on what we think
the writer or speaker intended to communicate. Intended meaning plays a central role in
the understanding of speech acts and will be discussed in detail later.

Speech acts: locution, illocution, perlocution

In 1955, John Austin suggested that an utterance can also be used to perform an act.
Austin pointed out that when you utter a sentence you are not only saying something,
you are also doing something, for example, making a commitment, apologising, etc.
(Parker and Riley 1994, 14; Schiffrin 2005, 31). To illustrate his point, Austin developed a
trichotomy to distinguish between the different speech acts (Austin 1962). This trichotomy
consists of the locutionary act, the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary act. These acts
can be defined as follows: The locutionary act involves the production of sounds and the
production of words. The illocutionary act refers to performing one of the functions of
language, that is, the act of saying something. The perlocutionary act refers to the
effects (intended and unintended) that result from saying something (Austin 1962;
Evans 1982). Bach and Harnish (1980, 3) also refer to Austin’s trichotomy. Their explanation
of the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts include the speaker (S), hearer (H),
expression (e), language (L) and the context of the utterance (C). According to Bach and
Harnish, an utterance (or utterance act), for example, can be defined as “S utters e from
L to H in C.”
Searle’s research (2002) also focuses on speech acts, but places most of his emphasis on
illocutionary acts. Searle was of the opinion that there are an endless number of illocution-
ary acts and that some illocutionary acts are more closely related than others (Parker and
Riley 1994, 15–16). He classified illocutionary acts as (1) representative or assertive, (2)
directive, (3) commissive, (4) expressive or (5) declarative (Parker and Riley 1994, 15).
Searle (2002, 5–6) explains these classifications as follows:
The claim is that there are not, as Wittgenstein said, an indefinitely large number of different
uses of language, but rather in the illocutionary line of business, there are five, and only five,
basic types of things one can do with language. One can tell people how things are (asser-
tives); one can try to get them to do things (directives); one can commit oneself to doing
things (commissives); one can express one’s feelings and attitudes (expressives); and one
can bring about changes in the world through one’s utterances (declarations).

Austin (1962) also classified illocutionary acts but Austin’s classifications were developed
before those of Searle, and therefore there are similarities between Austin’s classifications
and Searle’s classifications. According to Austin, illocutionary acts can be classified as: (1)
Expositives: this refers to the act of stating, denying, accepting, correcting, etc. (2) Exerci-
tives: this includes warning, advising and nominating. (3) Commissives: the act of assum-
ing an obligation or declaring an intention. This act includes undertaking to do something,
152 L. GRUNDLINGH

promising, swearing, betting or planning. (4) Verdictives: the act of exercising judgement
by convicting, ruling, valuing, analysing, calculating, etc. (5) Behabitives: this act includes
apologising, thanking, sympathising, commanding, welcoming, etc. (Schiffrin 2005, 41–
42).
If an addressee is not able to recognise the speech act (illocutionary act), successful
communication is not possible, since recognising the speech act provides the addressee
with appropriate constraints for his/her response(s). Shifman (2005, 5) states that “in
every utterance conversational expectations are created (either implicitly or explicitly)
which serve us in understanding later conversation.” These conversational expectations
assist us in responding appropriately and identifying when and where a conversation
goes wrong.
However, not all communication is verbal. As mentioned, communication can be either
verbal or non-verbal (for instance, the use of facial expressions, body language and ges-
tures), and memes can also be used as a form of non-verbal communication. Sebeok
(1994, 115) mentions that “[a]ll living beings interact by means of non-verbal message
exchanges.” In an analysis of performative speech acts in non-verbal communication in
Iraqi, Ajaaj (n.d., 375) notes that non-verbal speech acts can be categorised into refusal,
threat, promise, insult or greeting. Non-verbal speech acts will differ from culture to
culture and it will be expressed in different ways, but this study acknowledges the fact
that speech acts can also be non-verbal and interpreted in certain contexts without the
use of written or spoken words.
Many different factors play a role in the addressee recognising a speech act (verbal and
non-verbal) and responding to it correctly. Two of the most important factors are intention
and context.

Intention and inference

The intention of a speaker can be described as that which the speaker wants the hearer or
reader to recognise in a communication. If person A is threatening person B, the intention
of person A is to make it clear to person B that he/she is being threatened. Person A’s
intention can only be fulfilled if person B recognises it. Bach and Harnish (1980, xi) empha-
sises the importance of the speaker’s intentions being recognised, and the link between
intention and context, by stating:
The structure and meaning of the expressions used are essential, but so are the speaker’s
intention and the hearer’s recognition of it. In our view a communicative intention has the
peculiar feature that its fulfilment consists in its recognition. The speaker intends the hearer
to recognize the point of his utterance not just through (1) content and (2) context but also
because (3) the point is intended to be recognized.

An illocutionary act is performed with the intention that the hearer will correctly identify
the act being performed. In order for this recognition to be successful, the speaker pro-
vides, through what he or she says, a basis for the hearer to infer what the intention of
the act is (Bach and Harnish 1980, 4–5).
Bach and Harnish (1980) argue that inference is one of the most important aspects of
successful communication. They believe in an intention–inference approach that contrasts
Austin’s view of illocutionary acts as conventional and that is at odds with Searle’s contro-
versial notion of constitutive rules.
 SOCIAL SEMIOTICS 153

Bach and Harnish (1980, 5) mention that an utterance could have more than one infer-
ence based on “mutual contextual beliefs.” They refer to beliefs rather than knowledge
because they “need not be true in order to figure in the speaker’s intention and the
hearer’s inference.” They call these beliefs contextual because the beliefs are relevant to
and also activated by the context of the utterance or by the utterance itself. Bach and
Harnish use the term mutual to refer to the fact that both the speaker and the hearer
have these beliefs, they both believe that they have these beliefs and they believe the
other to believe they both have them. According to Bach and Harnish, the contextual
beliefs that figure in the speaker’s intentions and the hearer’s inferences must be
mutual if communication is to take place. In addition to mutual contextual beliefs, two
other general beliefs are relied upon when a hearer makes an inference. These are
shared between S and H and among members of the linguistic community at large: linguis-
tic presumption and communicative presumption (Bach and Harnish 1980, 7). Linguistic
presumption is the mutual belief in the linguistic community that (1) the members of
the linguistic community share language and that (2) whenever S utters any e in L to
any other member H, H can identify what S is saying, given that H knows the meaning
(s) of e in L and is aware of the appropriate background information. Communicative pre-
sumption is the mutual belief in the linguistic community that whenever a member S says
something in L to another member H, he is doing so with some recognisable illocutionary
intent.
Evans (1982, 69) states that the interpretation of utterances is only possible because the
subparts of the utterance interact meaningfully with the information that is already
present in the discourse situation, and the subparts also interact meaningfully with one
another. The constituent parts of an utterance, as well as facts or information present in
the discourse situation, lead to the successful interpretation of an utterance.
This illustrates why the context of an illocutionary act plays an important role when a
hearer has to make an inference based on the act of a speaker. Context and how it relates
to the interpretation of memes as speech acts will now be investigated in more detail.

Context
Schiffrin (2005, 5) makes the following observation regarding context:
Before being able to ascribe a particular meaning (specifically that intended by the speaker) to
any utterance, a hearer must have a clear idea of the context in which such an utterance
occurs.

According to Schiffrin (2005, 26–27), context consists of three aspects. The first of these are
the roles of the conversational participants. These include (1) the speaker (the one perform-
ing the utterance), (2) the addressee (the one at whom the utterance is directed), (3) the
agent (the intended agent of the action, that is, the one who is affected by the utterance)
and (4) the hearers (the individuals who are present in the conversation, but who are not
expected to contribute). The second aspect of context is referred to as assumed common
ground. This term is used to describe background information in communication and is
defined as the set of background facts, assumptions and beliefs presupposed to exist in
the mental model of the participants. Assumed common ground can include the physical
and social context, general knowledge, world knowledge and personal knowledge. To
154 L. GRUNDLINGH

some extent, this corresponds with the mutual contextual beliefs proposed by Bach and
Harnish (1980). The third aspect of context is the verbal act of making an utterance.
When interpreting the meaning of a meme, just like one would interpret the meaning of
any speech act, it is very important that the hearer is aware of the background information
that precedes the communication. In a conversation, background information is not the only
contextual information that can assist a hearer in interpreting an utterance. The non-verbal
aspects of communication can also be used by the hearer to interpret the intent of a
speaker. The photo in the meme usually provides either the non-verbal aspect of the
context, or the background information needed in order to interpret the meme correctly.
Because memes are often used as jokes (this will be explained in detail later), the context
of the meme is very important when interpreting the intent of the creator of the meme.
Both verbal and non-verbal memes have different characteristics. These characteristics
could influence the interpretation of a meme. Because of the limitation of an article, only
two types of memes (image macros and reaction shots) will be used for analysis. These are
discussed in more detail in the next section.

Memes
The origin and definitions of memes have already been discussed in this article. We now
turn to the components of memes in general and focus specifically on two popular types
of memes used today to indicate how these can be interpreted as speech acts.
The amount of memes currently circulating on the internet and social media is enor-
mous. Meme creation platforms such as Memegenerator.net make it possible for anyone
to create a meme. However, while the numbers of possible meme types are unlimited,
the number of standard meme types is actually quite small (Shifman 2014, 342). A stan-
dard meme refers to a meme that becomes well known and is frequently used by the inter-
net community as a whole. These include standard image macros (see description below).
The reason for standard meme types being limited is the fact that, as De la Rosa-Carrillo
(2015, 22) states,
[…] just because a person, or group of persons, generates specific instances of content that
look like Internet Memes does not mean that they will in fact become Internet Memes, since
only the internet culture itself will decide whether or not they are in fact Internet Memes.

Standard memes that become very popular and are used regularly by meme creators are
established through shared pathways that, according to Shifman (2014, 342), create a
“sense of community in a fragmented world.”
Although all meme types could potentially be interpreted as speech acts, it is true that
some types are easier to interpret than others and are also used with more frequency. In
the next section, two specific types of memes will be discussed in detail to illustrate how
these meme types can be interpreted as speech acts.

Types of memes: image macros and reaction shots

Milner (2012, 85) identifies 13 types of memes. These 13 types are separated into remixed
images and stable images. The remixed images are separated into single images and
stacked images. The following taxonomy is taken from Milner (2012, 85) (Figure 1).
 SOCIAL SEMIOTICS 155

Figure 1. A taxonomy of meme collectives (Milner 2012, 85).

For the purposes of this article, only macros (or image macros) and variations
thereof will be used. Milner (2012, 89) argues that image macros are not only the
most common genre of memes, but are also “one of the clearest examples of inter-
play of imitation and transformation in the process that guides the construction of
memes.”
De la Rosa-Carrillo (2015, 18) refers to Brown (2012) when describing image macros as
“captioned images that typically consist of a picture and a witty message or a catchphrase.
The structure of an image macro usually consists of a picture with text above and below
the image in the macro” (Figure 2). Variations of the typical structure of an image macro
can also occur, especially when the image macro is used to comment on something
(Figure 3). Image macros without any text also occur. Image macros with variation in struc-
ture or without text are normally referred to as reaction shots. Milner (2012, 96) states that
reaction shots are used when “[…] the macro is applied to offer a representation of social
cues that accompany a response during a conversation.” Figure 4 shows examples of
different reaction shots.
156 L. GRUNDLINGH

Figure 2. Example of a typical image macro (www.findmemes.com).

An image macro becomes standard when the image or the image and the catchphrase
are used over and over again. Standard image macros (a stable image with variations in
text) are in my opinion the most popular memes. Standard image macros can become
so popular that they get named by internet users. Standard image macros include
Advice Animals (Socially Awkward Penguin and Courage Wolf, for example), Success Kid
and Scumbag Steve. Examples of these image macros are included in Figure 5.
Image macros and reaction shots are often easy to identify as speech acts since these
types of memes can be either verbal or non-verbal and can easily represent either an utter-
ance act or an illocutionary act.
An analysis of the functions of memes and the interpretation of memes support the
argument that memes can be interpreted as speech acts.

Functions and interpretation of memes

As already stated, in order for an illocutionary act to be successful, the hearer must
interpret the intent of the speaker correctly. Consider the following example: a social

Figure 3. Example of an image macro with a variation in structure (www.pinterest.com).

 SOCIAL SEMIOTICS 157

Figure 4. Examples of two different types of reaction shots.

media user (person A) posts a status update in which he/she states something that
is considered general knowledge to most people. If another user (person B) then
posts one of the reaction shots in Figure 4 as a reaction to the post, it should be
clear that person B does not actually find the information person A has given inter-
esting, on the contrary he/she sees the information as self-explanatory or obvious
and therefore offers a sarcastic comment on the post. Similarly, if person B posted
the image in Figure 6, it could also be interpreted as a sarcastic comment on
person A’s post:
The combination of the text, the facial expression of the person in the image macro and
the fact that he is holding a gun to his head makes it clear that he is not really interested in
whatever is being said. In the case of the examples above, the concept of a model reader
(as mentioned earlier) becomes important. An individual posting a meme as a comment or
just posting memes in general, must assume that the addressee shares the same codes
and that he/she will interpret the meme in a specific way before choosing which meme
to use.
158 L. GRUNDLINGH

Figure 5. Examples of standard image macros (Socially Awkward Penguin, Courage Wolf, Scumbag
Steve and Success Kid).

Figure 6. An example of a sarcastic meme comment.

 SOCIAL SEMIOTICS 159

From the example given, it is clear that for a meme to be a successful illocutionary act,
the context of the meme (the text and the image) must be interpreted within the context
of the larger communication. Even if memes are not used as comments on already existing
statements, they still have to be interpreted in a larger context in order to make sense. In
Figure 7, an image macro shows President Barack Obama wearing Scumbag Steve’s hat
(Figure 5). This image macro is both a statement and a comment and without the
reader’s knowledge of the context behind the hat Photo-shopped into the image, he/
she will not be able to interpret the full intent of the creator. In this image macro, the
creator states that Obama changes his promises after making them and also simul-
taneously comments that Obama can be considered a “scumbag” because of this.
Milner (2012, 11) states that memes are used in networks of mediated cultural partici-
pation as multimodal artefacts (the integration of image and text) to tell a joke, make an
observation or advance an argument. De la Rosa-Carrillo (2015, 15) is of the opinion that
memes have become synonymous with a particular brand of vernacular language used by
internet users when they post, share or remix digital content to communicate jokes,
emotions and opinions. Although the goal of an image macro is predominantly humour
(Figure 2), it can also be used to communicate something more serious (Figure 7).
Based on research by Milner (2012) and De la Rosa-Carrillo (2015) and personal obser-
vations on social media sites, I come to the conclusion that image macros could be used to:
joke about something/someone, express opinions (to agree, disagree or differ), express a
judgment, express an emotion, make a statement, make a comment (about someone/
something or about yourself/your circumstances), accuse someone, make an observation,
advance an argument, apologise, give advice, make suggestions/suggest something,
confess something, make predictions, ask questions/question something, etc. It is impor-
tant to note that these are not all the possible functions of image macros and quantitative
analysis will have to be done in order to verify all the possible functions of image macros.
Davidson (2009, 127) says that it is important to note that the same memes can use
different text to communicate different advice, humour, emotions, etc. The reason is

Figure 7. Barack Obama wearing Scumbag Steve’s hat.

160 L. GRUNDLINGH

that memes are “open, collaborative and adaptable” and “countless participants create, cir-
culate, and transform memes on amateur networks of mediated cultural participation.
With each new remix, memes are appropriated in order to produce new iterations and
variations of broader ideas […]” (Milner 2012, 12).
I argue that the functions of memes correspond to the illocutionary acts identified by
Bach and Harnish (1980). Bach and Harnish proposed the most comprehensive taxonomy
based on both Austin and Searle’s categories of illocutionary acts. This taxonomy and the
relation to the functions of memes are discussed in the next section.

Memes as speech acts

Bach and Harnish (1980, 40) suggest six types of illocutionary acts. The four main illocu-
tionary acts are constatives, directives, commissives and acknowledgements (Figure 8).
These correspond to some degree to Austin’s expositives, exercitives, commissives and
behabitives and also to Searle’s representatives, directives, commissives and expressives.
The four main illocutionary acts identified by Bach and Harnish are all communicative. The
other two illocutionary act categories are effectives and verdictives and are conventional,
not communicative. Conventional illocutionary acts are described as the acts of voting,
resigning, arresting, acquitting, marrying, christening, etc. (Bach and Harnish 1980, 108).
Bach and Harnish (1980, 41) explain their four main categories as follows:
For us, constatives express the speaker’s belief and his intention or desire that the hearer have
or form a like belief. Directives express the speaker’s attitude toward some prospective action

Figure 8. Classification of the communicative illocutionary acts (Bach and Harnish 1980, 41).
 SOCIAL SEMIOTICS 161

by the hearer and his intention that his utterance, or the attitude it expresses, be taken as a
reason for the hearer’s action. Commissives express the speaker’s intention and belief that his
utterance obligates him to do something (perhaps under certain conditions). And acknowl-
edgements express feelings regarding the hearer or, in cases where the utterance is clearly per-
functory or formal, the speaker’s intention that his utterances satisfy a social expectation to
express certain feelings and his belief that it does. (emphasis in the original)

Speech acts have traditionally been used to describe spoken communication although
some researchers do acknowledge that speech acts can apply to written communication
as well. I argue that speech acts can also apply to memes. Memes, although different
from traditional written communication still make use of a creator and a receiver
(instead of a writer-/-reader or speaker-/-hearer). Even though memes are often jokes,
they can communicate important information and opinions. Just as one would
address a letter to one or more than one person or ask a question to one person or a
group, a meme can be directed to one person or it can be directed to all internet
users. As in all speech acts, the context and the intent of the creator also plays an impor-
tant role in the understanding of memes.
I would argue that the possible functions of memes mentioned above correspond to
most of the communicative illocutionary acts identified by Bach and Harnish, because
these functions are also illocutionary acts. To illustrate this, I have grouped all the functions
into the four main categories of illocutionary acts identified in Figure 8. The illocutionary
acts that correspond with the meme functions are marked in blue and the meme function
(s) is inserted underneath the appropriate illocutionary act (Figure 9). The conventional
illocutionary acts will not be discussed further since a meme as an illocutionary act
cannot fulfil the criteria for conventional illocutionary acts. One cannot create a meme
that acquits someone or marries someone to someone else, unless it is meant as a joke
and then the act would not be an official act.
From the figure, it is clear that most of the meme functions can be grouped under
constative illocutionary acts. Fourteen of the fifteen subcategories correspond to the
different meme functions. Two of the subcategories of directives also correspond to
the meme functions. Because memes are a unique way of communicating, it is
obvious that the functions of memes will not be able to correspond to all the commu-
nicative illocutionary acts identified. However, memes can be created for specific and
personal purposes. This means that a meme that thanks someone or congratulates
someone in a sincere manner is completely possible. It is also possible to create a
meme that begs someone to do something, instructs someone to do something,
forbids someone to do something or forgives someone, which means that the rest
of the directives could also be matched. In the same way, memes could be created
through which the creator sincerely promises or offers to do something. Because the
possibilities with memes are endless any of the illocutionary acts mentioned by Bach
and Harnish could in theory be created using a meme. Two functions of memes are
not mentioned in Figure 9: joking about something or someone, and advancing an
argument.
“Advancing an argument” could in fact be grouped with any of the constative illocu-
tionary acts. It can be argued that in order to advance an argument one could use any
of the constative illocutionary acts. Because this function can be grouped with any consta-
tive illocutionary act, it was not linked to any of the acts in particular.
162 L. GRUNDLINGH

Figure 9. The meme functions divided into the four main categories of illocutionary acts.

The function of joking about something or someone is not grouped under the illocu-
tionary act categories, because a joke is considered a violation of the general rules and
limits that govern illocutionary acts. In order for something to be a joke (especially
sarcasm), a person must pretend to perform a specific illocutionary act, but not actually
 SOCIAL SEMIOTICS 163

intend to perform that act. Any of the illocutionary act categories, including the two con-
ventional categories, could be meant as a joke. In fact, through the use of humorous
memes a creator can perform almost all of the constative illocutionary acts highlighted
in Figure 9.
As mentioned earlier, the main function of a meme has traditionally been humour or
sarcasm. Memes can, however, contain either serious or humorous content that convey
a serious message. A meme can also simply be meant as a joke and nothing more. To illus-
trate this point, I will be discussing two types of “joke memes”:

1. Memes as jokes: The aim of these memes is simply to be a joke; they have no under-
lying message.
2. Memes as humorous comments-/-opinions: These memes appear to be jokes, but they
actually comment or provide opinions on very serious matters.

Using memes to ask questions or question things will also be explored. In such memes, the
use of humour is also present.

Memes as jokes
Memes are often used to joke about something or someone. The possible content for
these jokes is endless, but is normally focused around politicians, politics, religion and
current events or celebrities. Examples of memes as jokes appear in Figure 10.
As mentioned, a joke (especially sarcasm) is a violation of the rules governing an illocu-
tionary act. Goatly (2012, 216) mentions that “[p]lenty of jokes depend upon the ambiguity
of utterances as illocutionary acts, that is, the speech act intended by the speaker/writer is
unclear and open to misinterpretation.” However, there are certain characteristics that
define a joke. Goatly (2012, 22) refers to Attardo (2001) who suggests that the simplest struc-
ture of a joke includes a set-up, an incongruity and a resolution and claims that overlapping
scripts (or schemas) is essential to humour. According to Goatly (2012, 22), a punchline (or
disjunctor) is crucial to the joke structure since it introduces the incongruity and forces a
switch from the schema made most salient in the set-up. Furthermore, Goatly claims
there needs to be connector functioning as a bridge between schemas or scripts in order
to achieve a resolution. For example, in order to understand the joke meme made about
Charlie Sheen, a schema is which he is an actor in a show called Two and a half men and
a schema in which Sheen was diagnosed with HIV will have to overlap. This is the connecter
between the references in the meme. The line at the top of the meme acts as the set-up and
the line at the bottom is the punchline.
Often, however, jokes are used to mask a more serious issue or problem or to express a
negative opinion about an individual in power (politicians, religious figures, etc.) The defi-
nition of what classifies as a serious topic or issue will differ from person to person, but it
could, for example, refer to political events.

Using humorous memes to express an opinion or to comment on something

Humour is sometimes an easier vessel to use when one wants to communicate an opinion.
As mentioned, memes have a meaning potential that is actualised in concrete social
164 L. GRUNDLINGH

Figure 10. Examples of memes as jokes.

contexts. Humorous memes that is used to comment on political events, for example,
often refers to current events. This again emphasises that the model reader of the
meme must have knowledge of the background of the issue or situation depicted in
the meme. Examples of memes that use humour to emphasise an issue or serious topic
are given in Figure 11.
Goatly (2012, 311) notes that the positive functions of humour (to liberate or to
enhance solidarity) may be disguised for the exercises of power. Goatly (2012, 311) men-
tions that we might express our aggression towards powerful politicians through the use
of humour “but this does nothing to remove them from power.” For example, in Figure 11,
the first meme comment on Donald Trump’s alleged racism (especially towards Mexicans).
Juan is a popular Mexican name. In order for the reader to interpret the meme correctly,
 SOCIAL SEMIOTICS 165

Figure 11. Examples of memes that use humour to comment on serious issues or express opinions.

he/she must know that Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign has, for some time,
been dominated by accusations of racist remarks, especially towards Mexican immigrants
in America.
Humour might be the most common feature and function of memes, but memes are
also used to perform other illocutionary acts. Asking a question or questioning something
is another function of memes that is discussed for the purpose of illustration.

Using memes to ask questions or question something

Memes used to ask questions or to question something often include humour and cannot
always be seen as serious questions. However, some of the creators use questions that can
lead to debate. The questions in memes do not focus on a specific topic. A standard image
macro called Philosoraptor is often used for memes that ask questions. The illocutionary
acts found in these memes can include suggestives (constatives) and questions (direc-
tives). Figure 12 shows some examples of the Philosoraptor standard image macro.
166 L. GRUNDLINGH

Figure 12. Philosoraptor memes: Asking questions or questioning something.

The Philosoraptor meme could be used to hypothesise or speculate about something

(suggestives), or it could be used to ask, inquire, query or question (questions), thus fulfill-
ing at least some of the criteria for both constative and directive illocutionary acts.

Conclusion
Through the analysis and discussion, it is argued that memes could function as speech acts. This
alternative approach to an understanding and analysis of memes is necessary since memetics is
not always an effective approach. Although a large amount of theory is based within prag-
matics, both pragmatics and semiotics offer support for the interpretation of memes from a lin-
guistic perspective. Semiotics offers information on how the media and modes that memes
consist of can be interpreted and how the characteristics of semiotic resources apply to
memes. Pragmatics offers information on how memes could function as speech acts. It is
clear that the functions of the identified memes fit into most of the communicative illocutionary
act categories distinguished by Bach and Harnish (1980). Although the memes mentioned in
this research cannot fulfil the criteria for all the categories, it is entirely possible that memes
can be created for the purpose of fulfilling specific illocutionary acts not identified in this article.
It is worth noting that communication using memes is more complex that one might
expect. Not only are memes media artefacts that can be remixed and reused in a multitude
of different ways, but the model reader who needs to interpret the meme and the context
of the meme correctly in order for effective communication, is not always present.
Although communication through memes could lead to misunderstandings, it seems
that social media users who have enough knowledge of memes and how they are
used, are able to successfully communicate online using them.
This article only examined image macros and reaction shots. Research into other meme
types and their possible functions as speech acts could add valuable insights. Furthermore,
determining the exact core functions of memes through research could also be of value to
support the argument of memes being used as speech acts.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
 SOCIAL SEMIOTICS 167

Notes on contributor
L. Grundlingh is a lecturer in the department of Afrikaans and Theory of Literature at the University
of South Africa. Her research interests include discourse analysis and forensic linguistics.

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