PADUA vs RANADA

Administrative Law; Toll Regulatory Board; Expressways; Doctrine of Primary

Jurisdiction; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The laws and the TRB Rules of
Procedure have provided the remedies of an interested expressway user—there must
be a prior resort to the Toll Regulatory Board since it is the agency assigned to
supervise the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities.—Obviously, the
laws and the TRB Rules of Procedure have provided the remedies of an interested
Expressways user. The initial proper recourse is to file a petition for review of the
adjusted toll rates with the TRB. The need for a prior resort to this body is with reason.
The TRB, as the agency assigned to supervise the collection of toll fees and the
operation of toll facilities, has the necessary expertise, training and skills to judiciously
decide matters of this kind. As may be gleaned from the petition, the main thrust of
petitioner Zialcita’s argument is that the provisional toll rate adjustments are exorbitant,
oppressive, onerous and unconscionable. This is obviously a question of fact requiring
knowledge of the formula used and the factors considered in determining the assailed
rates. Definitely, this task is within the province of the TRB.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for
specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters
or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of
discretion, is indispensable—between the power lodged in an administrative body and a
court, the unmistakable trend is to refer it to the former.—We take cognizance of the
wealth of jurisprudence on the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and
exhaustion of administrative remedies. In this era of clogged court dockets, the need
for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters
or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of
discretion, is indispensable. “Between the power lodged in an administrative body and a
court, the unmistakable trend is to refer it to the former.” In Industrial Enterprises, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled: “x x x, if the case is such that its determination requires
the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies
because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must
first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by
the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.”
Same; Same; Same; Actions; Prohibition; The office of the remedy of prohibition is not
to correct errors of judgments but to prevent or restrain usurpation of jurisdiction or
authority by inferior tribunals and to compel them to observe the limitation of their
jurisdictions.—Petitioner Zialcita’s resort to prohibition is intrinsically inappropriate. It
bears stressing that the office of this remedy is not to correct errors of judgment but to
prevent or restrain usurpation of jurisdiction or authority by inferior tribunals and to
compel them to observe the limitation of their jurisdictions. G.R. No. 151108, while
designated as a petition for prohibition, has for its object the setting aside of Resolution
No. 2001-89 on the ground that it was issued without prior notice, hearing and
publication and that the provisional toll rate adjustments are exorbitant. This is not the
proper subject of prohibition because as long as the inferior court, tribunal or board has
jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of the controversy, the writ will not lie
to correct errors and irregularities in procedure, or to prevent an erroneous decision or
an enforcement of an erroneous judgment. And even in cases of encroachment,
usurpation, and improper assumption of jurisdiction, the writ will not issue where an
adequate and applicable remedy by appeal, writ or error, certiorari, or other prescribed
methods of review are available. In this case, petitioner Zialcita should have sought a
review of the assailed Resolution before the TRB.

Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The TRB may grant and issue ex-parte to any petitioner,
without need of notice, publication or hearing, provisional authority to collect, pending
hearing and decision on the merits of the petition, the increase in rates prayed for or
such lesser amount as the TRB may in its discretion provisionally grant; That LOI No.
1334-A has the force and effect of law finds support in a catena of cases decreeing that
“all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done
by the former President (Ferdinand E. Marcos) are part of the law of the land, and shall
remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by
subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the
President.”—For one, it is not true that the provisional toll rate adjustments were not
published prior to its implementation on January 1, 2002. Records show that they were
published on December 17, 24 and 31, 2001 in three newspapers of general circulation,
particularly the Philippine Star, Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Manila Bulletin. Surely,
such publications sufficiently complied with Section 5 of P.D. No. 1112 which mandates
that “no new rates shall be collected unless published in a newspaper of general
publication at least once a week for three consecutive weeks.” At any rate, it must be
pointed out that under Letter of Instruction No. 1334-A, the TRB may grant and issue
ex-parte to any petitioner, without need of notice, publication or hearing, provisional
authority to collect, pending hearing and decision on the merits of the petition, the
increase in rates prayed for or such lesser amount as the TRB may in its discretion
provisionally grant. That LOI No. Padua vs. Ranada, 390 SCRA 663, G.R. No. 141949,
G.R. No. 151108 October 14, 2002

them to observe the limitation of their jurisdictions.—Petitioner Zialcita’s resort to

prohibition is intrinsically inappropriate. It bears stressing that the office of this remedy
is not to correct errors of judgment but to prevent or restrain usurpation of jurisdiction
or authority by inferior tribunals and to compel them to observe the limitation of their
jurisdictions. G.R. No. 151108, while designated as a petition for prohibition, has for its
object the setting aside of Resolution No. 2001-89 on the ground that it was issued
without prior notice, hearing and publication and that the provisional toll rate
adjustments are exorbitant. This is not the proper subject of prohibition because as
long as the inferior court, tribunal or board has jurisdiction over the person and subject
matter of the controversy, the writ will not lie to correct errors and irregularities in
procedure, or to prevent an erroneous decision or an enforcement of an erroneous
judgment. And even in cases of encroachment, usurpation, and improper assumption of
jurisdiction, the writ will not issue where an adequate and applicable remedy by appeal,
writ or error, certiorari, or other prescribed methods of review are available. In this
case, petitioner Zialcita should have sought a review of the assailed Resolution before
the TRB.

Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The TRB may grant and issue ex-parte to any petitioner,
without need of notice, publication or hearing, provisional authority to collect, pending
hearing and decision on the merits of the petition, the increase in rates prayed for or
such lesser amount as the TRB may in its discretion provisionally grant; That LOI No.
1334-A has the force and effect of law finds support in a catena of cases decreeing that
“all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done
by the former President (Ferdinand E. Marcos) are part of the law of the land, and shall
remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by
subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the
President.”—For one, it is not true that the provisional toll rate adjustments were not
published prior to its implementation on January 1, 2002. Records show that they were
published on December 17, 24 and 31, 2001 in three newspapers of general circulation,
particularly the Philippine Star, Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Manila Bulletin. Surely,
such publications sufficiently complied with Section 5 of P.D. No. 1112 which mandates
that “no new rates shall be collected unless published in a newspaper of general
publication at least once a week for three consecutive weeks.” At any rate, it must be
pointed out that under Letter of Instruction No. 1334-A, the TRB may grant and issue
ex-parte to any petitioner, without need of notice, publication or hearing, provisional
authority to collect, pending hearing and decision on the merits of the petition, the
increase in rates prayed for or such lesser amount as the TRB may in its discretion
provisionally grant. That LOI No. Padua vs. Ranada, 390 SCRA 663, G.R. No. 141949,
G.R. No. 151108 October 14, 2002

them to observe the limitation of their jurisdictions.—Petitioner Zialcita’s resort to

prohibition is intrinsically inappropriate. It bears stressing that the office of this remedy
is not to correct errors of judgment but to prevent or restrain usurpation of jurisdiction
or authority by inferior tribunals and to compel them to observe the limitation of their
jurisdictions. G.R. No. 151108, while designated as a petition for prohibition, has for its
object the setting aside of Resolution No. 2001-89 on the ground that it was issued
without prior notice, hearing and publication and that the provisional toll rate
adjustments are exorbitant. This is not the proper subject of prohibition because as
long as the inferior court, tribunal or board has jurisdiction over the person and subject
matter of the controversy, the writ will not lie to correct errors and irregularities in
procedure, or to prevent an erroneous decision or an enforcement of an erroneous
judgment. And even in cases of encroachment, usurpation, and improper assumption of
jurisdiction, the writ will not issue where an adequate and applicable remedy by appeal,
writ or error, certiorari, or other prescribed methods of review are available. In this
case, petitioner Zialcita should have sought a review of the assailed Resolution before
the TRB.

Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The TRB may grant and issue ex-parte to any petitioner,
without need of notice, publication or hearing, provisional authority to collect, pending
hearing and decision on the merits of the petition, the increase in rates prayed for or
such lesser amount as the TRB may in its discretion provisionally grant; That LOI No.
1334-A has the force and effect of law finds support in a catena of cases decreeing that
“all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done
by the former President (Ferdinand E. Marcos) are part of the law of the land, and shall
remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by
subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the
President.”—For one, it is not true that the provisional toll rate adjustments were not
published prior to its implementation on January 1, 2002. Records show that they were
published on December 17, 24 and 31, 2001 in three newspapers of general circulation,
particularly the Philippine Star, Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Manila Bulletin. Surely,
such publications sufficiently complied with Section 5 of P.D. No. 1112 which mandates
that “no new rates shall be collected unless published in a newspaper of general
publication at least once a week for three consecutive weeks.” At any rate, it must be
pointed out that under Letter of Instruction No. 1334-A, the TRB may grant and issue
ex-parte to any petitioner, without need of notice, publication or hearing, provisional
authority to collect, pending hearing and decision on the merits of the petition, the
increase in rates prayed for or such lesser amount as the TRB may in its discretion
provisionally grant.
BEAUTIFONT vs CA

Administrative Agencies; Evidence; Findings of facts of Administrative

agencies respected unless there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof
or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial.—There is
moreover so strong a presumption respecting the correctness of the acts and
determinations of administrative agencies like the BOI, that the policy has been
adopted for courts not to interfere therewith unless there be a clear showing of
arbitrary action or palpable and serious error. The legal presumption is that official duty
has been duly performed; and it is “particularly strong as regards administrative
agencies x x vested with powers said to be quasi-judicial in nature, in connection with
the enforcement of laws affecting particular fields of activity, the proper regulations
and/or promotion of which requires a technical or special training, aside from a good
knowledge and grasp of the overall conditions, relevant to said field, obtaining in the
nation (Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public Utility Commission, 70 Phil. 221). The
consequent policy and practice underlying our Administrative Law is that courts of
justice should respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, unless there
is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and
patently insubstantial (Heacock vs. NLU, 95 Phil. 553). Hence, “(c)ourts of justice will
not generally interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies unless there is a clear showing that the latter
acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a
capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess or
lack of jurisdiction.” Beautifont, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 481, No. L-50141
January 29, 1988
DADOLE VS COA

Constitutional Law; Local Governments; Local Autonomy; Power of Supervision vs.

Power of Control; The supervisory power of the President is different from the power of
control exercised by Congress.—In Pimentel vs. Aguirre, we defined the supervisory
power of the President and distinguished it from the power of control exercised by
Congress. Thus: This provision (Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution) has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v.
Silvosa, the Court contrasted the President’s power of supervision over local
government officials with that of his power of control over executive officials of the
national government. It was emphasized that the two terms—supervision and control—
differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows: “x x x In
administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer
to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.” In Taule v. Santos,we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more
authority than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were
performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot
interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority.
“Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over
an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body,” we said.
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim, the difference between control and supervision
was further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or
accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion,
order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it
themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising
officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay
down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules
are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such
rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no
discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. Under our
present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The
members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such,
they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they
can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or
reversed. In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their
sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable.
By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President’s supervision only, not control,
so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the
same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them
by the Constitution and the law.

Same; Same; Publication of Administrative Laws; Administrative rules and regulations

must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
to a valid delegation.—LBC 55 is void on account of its lack of publication, in violation of
our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera where we held that: x x x. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal
in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of an administrative agency and the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of
instruction issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Dadole vs.
Commission on Audit, 393 SCRA 262, G.R. No. 125350 December 3, 2002
LUPANGCO VS CA

Administrative Law; Courts; Jurisdiction; Orders or resolutions of the Professional

Regulations Commission fall within the general jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court; Absence of provision in the law creating the Commission that its orders
and resolutions are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme
Court.—Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next course of action for
a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation
Commission. Unlike Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902-A,
there is no provision in Presidential Decree No. 223, the law creating the Professional
Regulation Commission, that orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable
either to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court. Consequently, Civil Case No.
86–37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the
respondent Professionai Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should
fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial
Court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Professional Regulations Commission is attached to the
Office of the President, and even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by
the Court ofFirst Instance, now Regional Trial Court.—What is clear from Presidential
Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the Office
of the President for general direction and coordination. Well settled in our jurisprudence
is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court
of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court).

Same; Same; Same; To invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals under BP 129, there must be a final order or ruling by an administrative body
exercising quasi-judicial functions; Meaning of “quasi-judicial adjudication"—In order to
invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in
Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or ruling which
resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-
judicial functions. In Black’s Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied
to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a
determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which
applies to a specific situation. This does not cover rules and regulations of general
applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative
policies and functionB like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent
PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.

Same; Same; Same;Axiom In administrative law that administrative authority should

not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations.—It is an
axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and
regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown
to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be
issued, then they must be held to be invalid.

Same; Same; Same; Resolution No. 105 prohibiting examinees from attending any
review class, briefing conference conducted by or shall receive any hand-out, review
materials or any tip from any school, college or any university or any review center
infringes on the examinees’ right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution; Reason.—
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the
examinees’ right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no
authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the
licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps
needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They
have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors.
They should be allowed to eDjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will
promote their personal growth.

Same; Same; Same; Resolution No. 105 violates the academic freedom of the schools
concerned.—Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the
academic freedom of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the
conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their
enrollees to meet the standards required before becoming a fullfledged public
accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be
inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not
be stopped from helping out their students. Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA
848, No. L-77372 April 29, 1988