Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Ducat, on the other hand, filed and was granted a MTD on the basis of litis pendentia and forum non
conveniens. The trial court also held that it had no jurisdiction over 1488 Inc. because the action was
neither in rem nor quasiin rem, accompanied by the fact that the said defendant was a non-resident. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUES
1.Does a judgment in a US court bar actions to be instituted in Philippine courts? (i.e. Can the foreign
judgment constitute res judicata?)
2. Did CA err in dismissing the case based on the principle of forum non conveniens?
RULING
1.It depends. The FOREIGN JUDGMENT CANNOT BE GIVEN THE EFFECT OF RES JUDICATA WITHOUTGIVING
THE ADVERSE PARTY AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMPEACH IT ON GROUNDS STATED IN RULE 39, §50 of the Rules
of Court, to wit: “ WANT OF JURISDICTION, WANT OF NOTICE TO THE PARTY, COLLUSION, FRAUD, OR
CLEAR MISTAKE OF LAW OR FACT.”
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the
parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed
under the law. IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE TO INITIATE A SEPARATE ACTION OR PROCEEDING
FORENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT.
WHAT IS ESSENTIAL IS THAT THERE IS OPPORTUNITY TO CHALLENGE THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT, INORDER
FOR THE COURT TO PROPERLY DETERMINE ITS EFFICACY.
This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to ACTIONS IN PERSONAM, as distinguished from actions
in rem, a FOREIGN JUDGMENT MERELY CONSTITUTES PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE JUSTNESS OFTHE
CLAIM OF A PARTY AND, AS SUCH, IS SUBJECT TO PROOF TO THE CONTRARY.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge the judgment
of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private respondents.
The proceedings in the trial court were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even
furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure
a proper determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues
raised in this case such that the judgment that might be rendered would constitute res judicata.
2.Yes.
First, a MTD
is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, §1, which does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety
of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly
considered a matter of defense.
Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this
ground, it should do so only after “vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances”
require the court’s desistance.
In this case, the TRIAL COURT ABSTAINED FROM TAKING JURISDICTION SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF
THEPLEADINGS FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE MOTION TO DISMISS.
IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT PHILSEC IS A DOMESTIC CORPORATION AND DUCAT IS A FILIPINO, AND
THAT IT WAS THE EXTINGUISHMENT OF THE LATTER’S DEBT WHICH WAS THE OBJECT OF THE
TRANSACTION UNDER LITIGATION.
The trial court arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case
On January 9, 2002, Ting Guan obligated itself under a contract of sale to deliver heavy metal scrap iron
and steel to Tung Ho. Subsequently, Tung Ho filed a request for arbitration before the ICC International
Court of Arbitration (ICC) in Singapore after Ting Guan failed to deliver the full quantity of the promised
heavy metal scrap iron and steel.6
The ICC ruled in favor of Tung Ho on June 18, 2004 and ordered Ting Guan to pay Tung Ho the following:
(1) actual damages in the amount of US$ 659,646.15 with interest of 6% per annum from December 4,
2002 until final payment; (2) cost of arbitration in the amount of US $ 47,000.00; and (3) legal costs and
expenses in the amount of NT $ 761,448.00 and US $ 34,552.83.7
On October 24, 2004, Tung Ho filed an action against Ting Guan for the recognition and enforcement of
the arbitral award before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 145. Ting Guan moved to
dismiss the case based on Tung Ho’s lack of capacity to sue and for prematurity. Ting Guan subsequently
filed a supplemental motion to dismiss based on improper venue. Ting Guan argued that the complaint
should have been filed in Cebu where its principal place of business was located.
This case presents to us the following issues:
1) Whether the present petition is barred by res judicata; and
2) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ting Guan, specifically:
a) Whether Tejero was the proper person to receive the summons; and
b) Whether Ting Guan made a voluntary appearance before the trial court.
Ruling:
A. The petition is not barred by res judicata
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive on the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and
matters determined in the former suit.19 For res judicata to apply, the final judgment must be on the
merits of the case which means that the court has unequivocally determined the parties’ rights and
obligations with respect to the causes of action and the subject matter of the case.20
Contrary to Ting Guan’s position, our ruling in G.R. No. 176110 does not operate as res judicata on Tung
Ho’s appeal; G.R. No. 176110 did not conclusively rule on all issues raised by the parties in this case so
that this Court would now be barred from taking cognizance of Tung Ho’s petition. Our disposition in G.R.
No. 176110 only dwelt on technical or collateral aspects of the case, and not on its merits. Specifically, we
did not rule on whether Tung Ho may enforce the foreign arbitral award against Ting Guan in that case.
B. The appellate court cannot be ousted of jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case
The court’s jurisdiction, once attached, cannot be ousted until it finally disposes of the case. When a court
has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the
final determination of the case is retained.21 A judge is competent to act on the case while its incidents
remain pending for his disposition.
The CA was not ousted of its jurisdiction with the promulgation of G.R. No. 176110. The July 5, 2006
decision has not yet become final and executory for the reason that there remained a pending incident
before the CA – the resolution of Tung Ho’s motion for reconsideration – when this Court promulgated
G.R. No. 176110. In this latter case, on the other hand, we only resolved procedural issues that are
divorced from the present jurisdictional question before us. Thus, what became immutable in G.R. No.
176110 was the ruling that Tung Ho’s complaint is not dismissible on grounds of prematurity, nullity of
the foreign arbitral award, improper venue, and the foreign arbitral award’s repugnance to local public
policy. This leads us to the conclusion that in the absence of any ruling on the merits on the issue of
jurisdiction, res judicata on this point could not have set in.
C. Tung Ho’s timely filing of a motion for reconsideration and of a petition for review on certiorari
prevented the July 5, 2006 decision from attaining finality
Furthermore, under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Tung Ho may file a petition for review on
certiorari before the Court within (15) days from the denial of its motion for reconsideration filed in due
time after notice of the judgment. Tung Ho’s timely filing of a motion for reconsideration before the CA
and of a Rule 45 petition before this Court prevented the July 5, 2006 CA decision from attaining finality.
For this Court to deny Tung Ho’s petition would result in an anomalous situation where a party litigant is
penalized and deprived of his fair opportunity to appeal the case by faithfully complying with the Rules of
Court.
II. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ting Guan
Nonetheless, we see no reason to disturb the lower courts’ finding that Tejero was not a corporate
secretary and, therefore, was not the proper person to receive the summons under Section 11, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court. This Court is not a trier of facts; we cannot re-examine, review or re-evaluate the
evidence and the factual review made by the lower courts. In the absence of compelling reasons, we will
not deviate from the rule that factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding on this Court.22
However, we cannot agree with the legal conclusion that the appellate court reached, given the
established facts.23 To our mind, Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the trial court in view of the
procedural recourse that it took before that court. Its voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of
summons
Even assuming that Ting Guan did not voluntarily appear before the RTC, the CA should have ordered the
RTC to issue an alias summons instead. In Lingner & Fisher GMBH vs. Intermediate Appellate Court35, we
enunciated the policy that the courts should not dismiss a case simply because there was an improper
service of summons. The lower courts should be cautious in haphazardly dismissing complaints on this
ground alone considering that the trial court can cure this defect and order the issuance of alias summons
on the proper person in the interest of substantial justice and to expedite the proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws.
RULING:
No, the Turkish law should govern the disposition of his property pursuant to Article 16. According to
Article 16 of the Civil Code, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions. The provision in the will is not valid. Said condition then is considered unwritten, hence the
institution of legatees is unconditional and consequently valid and effective.
The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The
court of the domicile cannot and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the
issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth
between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state
of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of
the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960 TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased.PHILIPPINE TRUST CO.,
executor-appellee,vs.MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA
BOHANAN,oppositors-appellants.
Issues:
The oppositors, Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children, question the validity of the
executor/testator C.O. Bohanan’s last will and testament, claiming that they havebeen deprived of the
legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them. Another, is the claim of the testator's children,
Edward and Mary Lydia Bohanan, who had received legacies in the amount of PHP 6, 000 each only, and,
therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws, should be
two-thirds of the estate left by the testator.
Facts:
C.O. Bohanan was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that state.Notwithstanding his long
residence in the Philippines, he continued and remained to bea citizen of the United States and of the
state of his pertinent residence to spend therest of his days in that state. His permanent residence or
domicile in the United Statesdepended upon his personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his
homicideand therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state.
Held:
The first issue refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan,should be
entitled to receive. The will has not given her any share in the estate left bythe testator. It is argued that
it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from his Filipino
wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction. The
court refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which
thedeceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any
portion of his estate to his former (or divorced) wife. No right to share in the inheritance in favor of a
divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada, thus the oppositor can no longer claim portion of the estate
left by the testator.
With regards the second issue, the old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the
testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by
the national law of the person whose succession is in question, thus the two-third rule is not enforceable.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen
of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament is fully in
accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate.
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are
to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that
the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada which allows a testator to dispose of all his
property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition
made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellants.
G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010 HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner, vs. SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN,
Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Herald Dacasin, an American citizen filed the case for review, the dismissal of a suit to enforce
a post-foreign divorce child custody agreement for their daughter, Stephanie, whose sole custody was
awarded to the respondent, a Filipino citizen, filed in Illinois court for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner sued
respondent in RTC Makati to enforce the agreement (contract) executed by the parties in Manila that
modified the terms of the post-divorce decree from sole custody of their daughter to joint custody,
alleging the respondent’s retention of sole custody. The respondent sought for the dismissal of the case
for lack of jurisdiction because the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce decree even after
the respondent undertook the relinquishment of the Illinois court’s jurisdiction to the Philippine courts.
Hence, the agreement both parties executed is void. The RTC dismissed the case The petitioner sought
reconsideration. His contention is that the divorce decree sought by the respondent in Illinois court is
void. Hence, the post-foreign divorce decree is also void citing the Nationality Rule under Art. 15 of the
Civil Code. The RTC denied the motion. Hence, this case.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the RTC has the jurisdiction over the case.
Whether or not the Agreement (contract) executed in Manila is valid.
RULING:
The RTC has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is Void.
However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit and call for
the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.
The RTC has jurisdiction
. Parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement subject to the minimum ban on
stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
The agreement is void. At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts
are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years old (having been born on 21 September 1995). This
is in contrary to law as stated in Art. 213 of the Civil Code; and (2) petitioner and respondent were no
longer married under the laws of the United States because of the divorce decree.
Based on Art. 15 or the Nationality Rule, petitioner cannot rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity
- not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but
because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse. Only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.
Call for the Remand of the Case. Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside of
the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of
the default standard on child custody proceedings – the best interest of the child.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine President Lines, Inc. is liable under the said Venezuelan laws.
HELD: No. The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as fact before the court. Only mere photocopies
of the laws were presented as evidence. For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the
following requisites are mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office.
And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed
and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be
commonly admitted in such courts.
Failure to prove the foreign laws gives rise to processual presumption where the foreign law is deemed
to be the same as Philippine laws. Under Philippine laws, PPL nor Captain Colon cannot be held liable for
the negligence of Vasquez. PPL and Colon had shown due diligence in selecting Vasquez to pilot the vessel.
Vasquez is competent and was a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela in good standing when he was
engaged.
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. v. GUERRERO G.R. No. 136804 February 19, 2003
FACTS
The petition alleged the following:
- On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero fled before the Regional Trial Court
of Mania against Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank
- Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxed charged
against interests on his checking account with the Bank, (2) a returned check worth
$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of
his account.
- The bank filed its Answer alleging that Guerrero’s account is governed by New York law
which does not permit any Guerrero’s claims except actual damages.
- Seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims, the Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, supported by an affidavit of New York attorney Alyssa Walden.
- The RTC denied the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
- The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing
the RTC Orders
ISSUE
Whether the Walden affidavit does serve as proof of the New York law and jurisprudence
HELD
The Walden affidavit stated conclusions from the affiant’s personal interpretation and opinion of
the facts of the case vis-à-vis, the alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any laws in
particular. While the attached copies of some US court decisions do not comply with Section 24
of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts. Thus, the Walden affidavit
did not prove the current state of New York law and jurisprudence.
Hence, the petition is denied for lack of merit and Court of Appeal’s decision is affirmed.
Like any other fact is not a matter of judicial notice, they must be alleged and proven. The conflicting
allegations as to whether NewYork law or Philippine law applies to Guerreros claims present a clear
disputeon material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits. TheWalden affidavit
cannot be considered as proof of New York law on damagesnot only because it is self-serving but also
because it does not state the specificNew York law on damages. Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted
the averments in the Banks motionfor partial summary judgment and the Walden affidavit just because
he failed tofile an opposing affidavit. The Bank still had the burden of proving New Yorklaw and
jurisprudence even if Guerrero did not present an opposing affidavit.
When Gran returned, he filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against EDI and OAB. EDI in its defense
averred that the dismissal is valid because when Gran and OAB signed the employment contract, both
parties agreed that Saudi labor laws shall govern all matters relating to the termination of Gran’s
employment; that under Saudi labor laws, Gran’s termination due to incompetence and insubordination
is valid; that Gran’s insubordination and incompetence is outlined in the termination letter Gran received.
The labor arbiter dismissed the labor case but on appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
reversed the decision of the arbiter. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the NLRC.
HELD: No. The specific Saudi labor laws were not proven in court. EDI did not present proof as to the
existence and the specific provisions of such foreign law. Hence, processual presumption applies and
Philippine labor laws shall be used. Under our laws, an employee like Gran shall only be terminated upon
just cause. The allegations against him, at worst, shall only merit a suspension not a dismissal. His
incompetence is not proven because prior to being sent to Saudi Arabia, he underwent the required trade
test to prove his competence. The presumption therefore is that he is competent and that it is upon OAB
and EDI to prove otherwise. No proof of his incompetence was ever adduced in court. His alleged
insubordination is likewise not proven. It was not proven that the submission of daily track records is part
of his job as a computer specialist. There was also a lack of due process. Under our laws, Gran is entitled
to the two notice rule whereby prior to termination he should receive two notices. In the case at bar, he
only received one and he was immediately terminated on the same day he received the notice.
Lastly, the quitclaim may not also release OAB from liability. Philippine laws is again applied here sans
proof of Saudi laws. Under Philippine Laws, a quitclaim is generally frowned upon and are strictly
examined. In this case, based on the circumstances, Gran at that time has no option but to sign the
quitclaim. The quitclaim is also void because his separation pay was merely 2,948 Riyal which is lower than
the $850.00 monthly salary (3,190 Riyal).
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. opposes a suit by a passenger injured on one of
their cruise ships, because the cruise tickets contained an agreement that all matters relating to the cruise
would be litigated before a Florida court.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Forum-selection clauses forcing individuals to agree to submit to jurisdiction in a
particular place are enforceable so long as they pass the test for judicial fairness.
Facts. Defendant Shute purchased passage for a seven day cruise on the Tropicale, a ship owned by
Plaintiff, through a Washington travel agent. The face of each ticket contained terms and conditions of
passage, which included an agreement that all matters disputed or litigated subject to the travel
agreement, would be before a Florida court. Defendant boarded the ship in California, which then sailed
to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico before returning to Los Angeles. While the ship was in international waters,
Defendant Eulala Shute was injured from slipping on a deck mat. Defendants filed suit in Federal District
Court in Washington. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the clause in the
tickets required Defendants to bring their suit in Florida.
Issue. Whether the court should enforce a forum-selection clause forcing individuals to submit to
jurisdiction in a particular state.
Held. Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to
enforce the forum-selection clause.
Forum-selection clauses contained in form passage contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for
fundamental fairness, but where they are not lacking in fairness, they will be enforced.
Dissent. Justice Stevens dissented, in which he was joined by Justice Marshall. Essentially Justice Stevens
feels that adhesion contracts, particularly forum-selection clauses, are void as contrary to public policy if
they were not freely bargained for, create additional expense for one party, or deny one party a remedy.
Discussion. In reaching its decision, the court noted that there is no evidence that Plaintiff set Florida as
the forum as a means of discouraging cruise passengers from pursuing their claims. Such a suggestion is
negated by the fact that Plaintiff has its headquarters in Florida, and many of its cruises depart from
Florida.
Small vs US
Facts of the case
Federal law made gun possession illegal for any person "convicted in any court" for crimes punishable by
more than a year in prison. A Japanese court convicted Gary Sherwood Small for crimes punishable by a
prison term longer than one year. Years later a U.S. District Court convicted Small, because of his prior
conviction, of illegally possessing a gun. Small appealed and argued the term "convicted in any court" did
not include convictions in foreign courts. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Small.
Question
Federal law made gun possession illegal for any person "convicted in any court" for crimes punishable by
more than a year in prison. Does "convicted in any court" include convictions in foreign courts?
Held:
No. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the federal law's phrase,
"convicted in any court," encompassed only domestic, not foreign, convictions. The majority reasoned
that in determining the scope of the phrase, it was appropriate to assume Congress had domestic
concerns in mind. Moreover, the statute's overall language suggested no intent to reach beyond domestic
convictions.
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA
GUEVARA-SALONGA
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez,
a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14,
1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.
Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the children should be vested to
Wolfgang.
Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had already
been promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the
purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties between
her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially set aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the
issues of support and custody of their children.
1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion for reconsideration.
Ruling: Yes.
A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality, as in the case at
bar.
The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a judgment even after the same
has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable,
as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired
after the judgment has become final and executory and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest
of justice or when supervening events warrant it.
2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained jurisdiction as regards child
custody and support.
Ruling: Yes.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody
to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now
Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard
to the rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German
court were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmen’s participation in the proceedings in the
German court, the records remain unclear.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was
correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and
education mindful of the best interests of the children.