TORTS AND DAMAGES

2nd Sem, SY2018-2019

Atty. Rey Himpayan

Final Exam Reviewer

I. Definition of Terms

STRICT LIABILITY
-There is strict liability if one is made liable independent of fault, negligence, or intent after
establishing certain facts specified by law, or simply “liability without fault.” (Black’s Law
Dictionary)

ENTERPRISE THEORY (of Vicarious Liability)

-a justification of the vicarious liability of the employer, it provides that “the losses caused
by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of
the employer’s enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of
doing business. Added to this is the argument that an employer who is held strictly liable
is under the greatest incentive to be careful in the selection, instruction, and supervision
of his servants, and to take every precaution to see that the enterprise is conducted
safely.” (MMTC v. CA)

VICARIOUS LIABILITY
-There is vicarious liability where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself,
but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for
who he is responsible. (Tamargo v. CA)

DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

-The liability is strictly imputed, that is, the employer is liable not because of his act but
because of the act of the employee. What is material is the conduct of the employee, and
not whether the employee exercised due care. Verily, the employee cannot escape liability
by claiming that he exercised due diligence in the selection or supervision of his
employees. (Anglo-American Law)

DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY (Bonus Pater Familias)

-It is a standard of conduct which aims to determine in negligence cases whether such
negligent act is foreseeable to a “good father of the family” one a reasonable man, a man
of ordinary intelligence and prudence. TEST: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is negligent. (Picart v. Smith)

EFFECT OF:
PARDON-does not erase civil liability. (Mosanto v. Factoran)
DEATH-death of the accused before final judgment relieves the accused of both criminal
and civil liability arising from criminal liability. The extinguishment of civil liability is limited
to a liability ex delicto. But if the source of the obligation is other than a delict (law,
contract, quasi-contract, quasi-delict), the claim for civil liability survives. (People v.
Bayotas)
CONVICTION-
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ACQUITTAL-
*Justifying Circs-the accused is free from civil liability
*Exempting Circs-does not erase civil liability
*Art. 29, NCC-when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act/omission may be instituted.
***Civil Liability is extinguished if the criminal case resulted in acquittal with a finding that
the fact complained of was not actually committed, apply only to dependent civil actions,
meaning, civil liability arising from crimes of ex delicto. (Manliclic v. Calaunan)
SERVICE OF SENTENCE-the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil
liability resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has
served his sentence. (Art.113, RPC)

DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE

-the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party. (Bustamante v. CA)

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
-conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which fails below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection. (Valenzuela v. CA); presence of such, alongside proof that the proximate cause
of the damage is the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter’s liability shall be
equitably reduced. (Art. 2179, NCC)

EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE

-sometimes referred to as “novus actus interviens,” it is the cause that destroys the causal
connection between the negligent act and injury and thereby negates liability. (Morril v.
Morril)

PROXIMATE CAUSE
-that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. (Bataclan v. Medina)

DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK

-commonly referred to as “volenti non fit injuria” or “no wrong is done to him who
consents,” it may be raised by the defendant as a complete defense. Here, the plaintiff
must know that the risk is present; he must further understand its nature; and that his
choice to incur it is free and voluntary. (Ilocos Norte Electric Co. v. CA)

IMPUTED (CONTRIBUTORY) NEGLIGENCE

-negligence is imputed if the actor is different from the person who is being made liable.
This rule is applicable where the negligence was on the part of the person for whom the
plaintiff is responsible, and especially, by negligence of an associate in the transaction
where he was injured. (PH Commercial Int’l Bank v. CA)

RES IPSA LOQUITOR

-“the thing speaks for itself”
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s
negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant/s;
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.
(Ramos v. CA)

REQUISITES OF QUASI-DELICTS
1. Act/omission of the defendant constituting fault/negligence
2. Injury/Damage suffered by the plaintiff
3. Causal connection between act/omission and injury/damages suffered
(Taylor v. MERALCO)

DOCTRINE OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY

-regardless of its relationship with the doctor, the hospital may be held directly liable to
the patient for its own negligence or failure to follow established standard of conduct to
which it should conform as a corporation. (Professional Service Inc. v. Agana)

CAPTAIN OF THE SHIP DOCTRINE

-the surgeon is likened to a ship captain who must not only be responsible for the safety of
the crew but also of the passenger of the vessel. The head surgeon is made responsible
for everything that goes wrong within the four-corners of the operating room. (Ramos v.
CA)

ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE
-an owner is liable if he maintains in his premises dangerous instrumentalities or
appliances of a character likely to lure children in play and he fails to exercise ordinary
care to prevent children of tender age from playing therewith or resorting thereto.
(Taylor v. MERALCO)
*Public/Private Nuisance-A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage
upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the
foregoing definition. (Art. 695, NCC)

II. Codal Provisions

NEW CIVIL CODE

Art. 19- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his dues, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 21-Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

Art. 26- Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of
his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence:

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in
life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

Art. 32-Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following
rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5) Freedom of suffrage;

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;

(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

 (11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law;

(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances;

(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witness in his behalf;

(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from
being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or
reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a
State witness;

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the
same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been
judicially declared unconstitutional; and

(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an
entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted),
and mat be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute

Art. 33- In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.

Art. 34-When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or
protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be
primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible
therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

Art. 38- Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil
interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated
person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property
relations, such as easements.

Art. 39- The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age,
insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations,
alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances
are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to
act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.

A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life,
except in cases specified by law.
Art. 1157- Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;

(2) Contracts;

(3) Quasi-contracts;

(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and

(5) Quasi-delicts.

Art. 1173- The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances
of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the
provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.

Art. 2177- Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.

Art. 2178-The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.

Art. 2179-When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of
his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Art. 2180-The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when
the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in
which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Art. 2184- In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the
former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found
guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next
preceding two months.

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.

Art. 2188-There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if
the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such
as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his
occupation or business.

Art. 2201- In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted
in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the
breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for
all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.

Art. 2202-In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which
are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen
by the defendant.

Art. 2219- Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this
article, may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action
mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal
liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of
Article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced subject to the following rules:

First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed
by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over
nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve
upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears
that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal
guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor
shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in
accordance with the civil law.

Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit
the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they
may have received.

The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each
one shall be liable.

When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when
the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the
town, and, in all events, whenever the damages have been caused with the consent of the
authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by
special laws or regulations.

Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence
or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such
persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their
property exempt from execution.

Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony,
the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage
to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an
amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in
no case be less than twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person
who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in
the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty
next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may
deem proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death
of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an

act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed
upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be
in this hand to give. (As amended by R.A. 1790, approved June 21, 1957).

PD 603-CHILD & YOUTH WELFARE CODE

Art. 58.Torts. - Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child
under their parental authority in accordance with the Civil Code.

FAMILY CODE

Art. 221- Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for
the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children
living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate
defenses provided by law.

Art. 236-Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person
and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil
life.

RA 7877-ANTI-SEXUAL HARRASSMENT LAW

Aquino: RA 7877 penalizes any person who is guilty of sexual harassment. Hence, tort
liability may be in the form of liability arising from delict in view of the basic principle that
a person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable. On the other hand, civil liability for
harassment under Magna Carta for Women or RA9710 is justified under its Sec.41.

III. Jurisprudence

Aberca v. Ver

Other individuals who can be held liable under Article 32 for having indirectly violated the
constitutional right of another against unreasonable searches and seizure are the superior
officers of the law enforcement officers who conducted the raid. Under Article 32, it is not
the actor alone who must answer for damages. In Aberca vs. Ver (160 SCRA 590, 606
[1988]), the Supreme Court explained that with the provisions of Article 32, “the principles
of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and
assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or
abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in thought that he does not have
to answer the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally
protected rights and liberties of the citizen.”

Amadora v. CA

Whenever the school or teacher is being made liable, the parents and those exercising
substitute parental authority are not free from liability because Article 219 of the Family
Code expressly provides that they are subsidiarily liable. The parents are only subsidiarily
liable because persons exercising special parental authority replaces the primary authority
of the parents when the minor is under their custody. Athough parental authority remains,
the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the
authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction.

Aquinas v. Inton

Jose Luis was a grade three student at Aquinas School. Respondent Sister Margarita
Yamyamin, a religion teacher who began teaching at that school only in June of that year,
taught Jose Luis’ grade three religion class. Jose Luis left his seat and went over to a
classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent him back to his
seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again and went over to the same classmate. Yamyamin
approached the Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She also pulled and
shoved his head on the classmate’s seat. Should Aquinas School be solidarily liable with
Yamyamin for the damages awarded to Jose Luis? NO.

In public schools, Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamin’s teaching methods.
Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside
catechists are allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it cannot be said that
Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the students
by their religion teacher. They showed records, certificates and diploma that Yamyamin is
qualified to teach. There is no question that she came from a legitimate congregation of
sisters. They provided Faculty Staff Manual in handling the students. They pre-approved
the content of the course she wanted to teach. They have a classroom evaluation program
for her unfortunately, she was new, therefore do not have sufficient opportunity to
observe her.

Baksh v. CA

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that
would have made it so. Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of
the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise
was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and
to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.

Bertalot v. Kinnare

Although the proprietor of a natatorium is liable for injuries to a patron, resulting from lack
of ordinary care in providing for his safety, without the fault of the patron, he is not,
however, in any sense deemed to be the insurer of the safety of patrons. And the death of
a patron within his premises does not cast upon him the burden of excusing himself from
any presumption of negligence. There could be no recovery for the death by drowning of a
fifteen-year boy in defendant’s natatorium, where it appeared merely that he was lastly
seen alive in water at the shallow end of the pool, and some ten or fifteen minutes later
was discovered unconscious, and perhaps lifeless, at the bottom of the pool, all efforts to
resuscitate him being without avail.”

Borjal v. CA

The plaintiffs or the complainants in defamation cases include both natural and juridical
persons. To be successful, the plaintiff must establish that the defamatory statement
referred to him. “In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be
identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the
offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be
shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous
publication.

Corpus v. Paje

It has been ruled in this jurisdiction that the term “physical injuries” in Article 33 include
bodily injuries causing death. However, there is an authority (Justice Capistrano)
supporting the view that the term “physical injuries” do not include the cases where the
crime committed is reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. However, it was observed
in one case that the well reasoned opinion of Justice Capistrano in Corpus vs. Paje is not
the controlling doctrine.
De Los Santos v. CA

(no digest/couldn’t locate it in the book)

Dingcong v. Kanaan

The term head of the family is not limited to the owner of the building and it may even
include the lessee thereof. The petitioner in Dingcong was a co-lessee of the property. He
was made liable for the act of a guest who left the faucet open causing water to fall from
the second floor and to damage the goods of Kanaan in the floor below. It should be noted
however that although Article 1910 of the Old Civil Code (now Article 2183) was cited,
there was no finding that the liability under the said Article is strict liability; Dingcong was
held liable for his failure to exercise diligence of a good father of a family.

Filipinas Broadcasting Network v. Ago Medical

A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or

imaginary, or any act or omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory
of one who is dead. The public has a right to expect and demand that radio broadcast
practitioners live up to the code of conduct of their profession, just like other professionals.
A professional code of conduct provides the standards for determining whether a person
has acted justly, honestly and with good faith in the exercise of his rights and performance
of his duties as required by Article 19 of the Civil Code. A professional code of conduct also
provides the standards for determining whether a person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another has acted in a manner contrary to morals or good customs under Article 21 of
the Civil Code.

Francisco v. CA

A guardian is a person in whom the law has entrusted the custody and control of the
person or estate or both of an infant, insane, or other persons incapable of managing his
own affair. Guardianship involves not only custody, that is immediate care and control, but
those of one in loco parentis as well. Hence, even if their ward is already of age, guardians
have the same liability as persons exercising parental authority.

Genson v. Adarle

Public officers who are guilty of tortious conduct are personally liable for their actions.
They cannot raise the defense that the State is immune from suits. It is a well settled
principle of law that a public official may be held liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice, bad faith or gross
negligence or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. The fact that the duties and
position of the public officer were indicated in the complaint does not mean that he is
being sued in his official capacity.

Globe Mackay v. CA

The award of reasonable attorney’s fees is proper for the private respondents were
compelled to litigate to protect their interest. (Art. 2208, Civil Code). However, the
absence of malice and bad faith renders the award of exemplary damages improper.

There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not
the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not the
principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and
21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case.
It follows that an employer may be held liable for damages if the manner of dismissing the
complainant is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. This may be done by
false imputation of misdeed to justify dismissal or any similar manner of dismissal which is
done abusively.

Guillang v. Bedania

Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, a person driving
a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation. In this case, the report showed that the truck, while making the U-turn, failed
to signal, a violation of traffic rules. The police records also stated that, after the collision,
Bedania escaped and abandoned the petitioners and his truck. This is another violation of
a traffic regulation. Therefore, the presumption arises that Bedania was negligent at the
time of the mishap. The point of impact was on the lane where the car was cruising.
Therefore, the car had every right to be on that road and the car had the right of way over
the truck that was making a U-turn. Clearly, the truck encroached upon the cars lane when
it suddenly made the U-turn.

Hyatt v. Asia Dynamic

Prior to the filing of the case for recovery of sum of money before the RTC, Hyatt had
already filed separate criminal complaints for violation of B.P. 22 against the officers of
Asia which were pending before the MTC. These cases involve the same checks which are
the subjects of Civil Case. Thus, upon filing of the criminal cases, the civil action for the
recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of
Rule 111.

The criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer needed. Purpose
behind the law: The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to
significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on
dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases.

Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. CA

The essential characteristics that resulted in the rule that the defendant will not be
excused from liability if the fortuitous event is not the sole cause of the injury. In other
words, the negligence of the defendant which concurred with the fortuitous event or which
resulted in the aggravation of the injury of the plaintiff will make him liable even if there
was a fortuitous event. When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of
the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have
resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission. The whole occurrence is
humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.

The doctrine of assumption of risk is consistent with the Latin maxim volenti non fit injuria.
The doctrine involves three (3) elements or requirements: (1) the plaintiff must know that
the risk is present; (2) he must further understand its nature; and that (3) his choice to
incur it is free and voluntary. In relation to the last requisite, it has been held that the
plaintiff is excused from the force of the rule if an emergency is found to exist or if the life
or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. The
deceased was electrocuted when she ventured out of her house and waded through
floodwaters. The defendant company was found to have failed to prevent the fallen lines
from causing damage.

Juaniza v. Jose

The Supreme Court imposed liability on the conjugal partnership for the tort committed by
the driver of a vehicle who was hired in furtherance of the husband’s business. Since the
profits inured to the benefit of the partnership, the liabilities to it must also be born by the
partnership. Consistent with such ruling, the conjugal partnership should be made liable if
one of the spouses committed the tort while performing a business or if the act was
supposed to benefit the partnership. The rule is consistent with the provisions of Article
122 of the Family Code which states “the payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.” Under the said
provision, tort indemnity may be enforced against the partnership assets provided that
liabilities mentioned in Article 121 are satisfied.

Justiniani v. Castillo

Allegations and averments in pleadings filed in court are absolutely privileged as long as
they are relevant or pertinent to the issues. The test to break through the protective
barrier of an absolutely privileged communication is not bona fides but relevance. There is
no liability so long as the averments are relevant to the issues involved in the case.
Statements made in a pleading in a civil action are absolutely privileged and no action for
libel may be founded thereon provided such statements are pertinent and relevant to the
subject under inquiry, however false and malicious they may be. “If the rule were
otherwise, the courts would be flooded with libel suits from irate litigants who will be suing
each other on the basis of each and every pleading. Such a rule will breed endless
vexatious litigations contrary to public policy and the orderly administration of justice.”

Lagunzad v. Gonzales

As a personal right, the right of privacy can be subject to waiver of the person whose zone
of privacy is sought to be intruded into. Thus, a person may voluntarily enter into a
licensing agreement with another to depict his own life in film. He can even enter into a
licensing agreement to depict his and the life of his deceased relative. In Lagunzad, which
concerned the life story of Moises Padilla necessarily including at least his immediate
family, what we have here is not a film biography, more or less fictionalized, of private
respondent Ponce Enrile. “The Four Day Revolution” is not principally about, nor is it
focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile; but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to
refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events
of the change of government in February 1986.

Libi v. IAC

It should be emphasized that paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 2180 of the Civil Code were not
rendered ineffective by the Family Code. The provisions remain effective subject to the
modifications resulting from the operation of the provisions of the Family Code. Thus, the
provisions with respect to parents in the second paragraph of Article 2180 is modified by
Article 221 of the Family Code by removing the alternative qualification of the liability of
the father and the mother. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation of the
parents are alternative — the father shall be primarily liable and the mother shall be liable
in his absence. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such
alternative qualification. The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor
children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary.
In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint
tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly,
such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article
2180 provides that ‘(t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damages.

The first paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code imposes liability on parents
and other persons exercising legal authority over minors. Under the said provision, parents
are primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offense committed by their
minor children under their legal authority or control or who live in their company. As stated
in Article 101, the liability arises with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their
children nine (9) years of age or under, or over nine (9) but under fifteen (15) years of age
who acted without discernment. Article 101 does not cover cases involving minors over
nine who acted with discernment. However, prevailing jurisprudence is to the effect that
parents and other persons exercising parental authority are also liable for the acts of their
children over nine (9) but under fifteen (15) years of age who acted with discernment
pursuant to Article 2180. Justice Regalado explained in Libi vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court that diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child
relationship consists, to a large extent, of instruction and supervision of the child. This
includes the duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their
children. This is especially true if their children are engaged in dangerous work.

Lim v. CA

The “registered owner” rule is applicable whenever the persons involved are engaged in
what is known as the “kabit system.” The “kabit system” is an arrangement whereby a
person who has been granted a certificate of public convenience allows other persons who
own motor vehicles to operate them under his license, sometimes for a fee or percentage
of the earnings. Although the parties to such an agreement are not outrightly penalized by
law, the kabit system is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and
therefore void and inexistent under Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. owner who is sought to be
made liable for quasi-delict cannot be allowed to prove the actual operator of the vehicle
involved in the accident. He should not be allowed to escape liability even if in fact
another person is operating the carrier under a “kabit system.”

However, the Supreme Court explained in Abelardo Lim et al v. Court of Appeals et al.,
(supra.) that the thrust of the law in enjoining the kabit system is not so much as to
penalize the parties but to identify the person upon whom responsibility may be fixed in
case of an accident with the end view of protecting the riding public. The policy therefore
loses its force if the public at large is not deceived, much less involved.

Thus, the policy cannot be applied if the plaintiff is the person who is allegedly involved in
such system.

Llorente v. CA

(not a case about Torts and Damages)

LRTA v. Natividad

The duty owed by owners or possessors to visitors are also imposed on common carriers.
Common carriers may be held liable for negligence to persons who stay in their premises
even if they are not passengers.

It should be recalled by way of a background that the law requires common carriers to
carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due
regard for all circumstances. Thus, the petitioner was held liable for breach of contract
when a certain Nicanor Navidad died after he fell on the LRT tracks and was struck by a
moving train which was coming in at the exact moment that Mr. Nividad fell from the
platform. Mr. Navidad was treated as a passenger because he entered the LRT station after
having purchased a “token” and he fell while he was on the platform waiting for a train.
Thus, he was where he was supposed to be with the intention of boarding a train.

Nevertheless, the carrier may still be liable to non-passengers. The liability of operators of
common carriers, like railroad companies, to persons other than passengers who come
upon the premises of such companies may in general be said to be determined according
to the general rules of negligence relating to the duties of the owners or occupiers of
property generally to trespassers, licensees or invitees. A licensee is one who enters
another’s premises either without invitation or purposes not connected with business
conducted on the premises but with permission or tolerance. An invitee is one who is at a
place upon invitation. In so far as railroad cases are concerned, the element of greatest
significance in determining the liability of a railroad company to a licensee or invitee
injured upon its premises seems to be whether the presence of the injured person was to
have been anticipated. As to persons who are considered licensees or invitees, the carrier
may be liable if said licensees or invitees are injured through the negligence of the
carrier’s employees (ibid.). The liability is based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code and not
based on contract.

Magbanua v. IAC

With respect to personal property, the commission of the crimes of theft or robbery is
obviously trespass. In the field of tort, however, trespass extends to all cases where a
person is deprived of his personal property even in the absence of criminal liability.

Trespass may then include cases covered by accession continua with respect to movable
property where the person who took possession of the property of another was in bad
faith.

It may also cover cases where the defendant deprived the plaintiff of personal property for
the purpose of obtaining possession of a real property. Here, the Supreme Court sustained
the finding of liability against the defendant because the latter, who was landlord,
deprived the plaintiffs, his tenants, of water in order to force the said tenants to vacate the
lot that they were cultivating.

Manliclic v. Calaunan

Civil Liability is extinguished if the criminal case resulted in acquittal with a finding that
the fact complained of was not actually committed, apply only to dependent civil actions,
meaning, civil liability arising from crimes of ex delicto.

Matura v. Laya

In criminal cases, the damages to be adjudicated may either be increased or reduced

depending on the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Article 2230 of the
Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The award of moral
damages was reduced because the accused acted under the influence of passion and
obfuscation. Hence, no exemplary damages may be awarded if no aggravating
circumstance is present.

Meralco v. CA

A usual form of deprivation of access to property is the unjustified disconnection of

electricity service. An electric company certainly has the right to disconnect the electricity
service of a customer if the latter unreasonably fails to pay his bills. However, the right to
disconnect and deprive the customer of electricity should be exercised in accordance with
law and rules. For instance, if the company disconnect the electricity service without prior
notice as required by the rules promulgated by duly authorized government agency, the
company commits a tort under Article 21.

MNL Doctors v. So Un Chua

Notwithstanding the provision of R.A. 9439 [antidetention law] that “[i]t shall be unlawful
for any hospital or medical clinic in the country to detain” patients, there are instances
wherein hospitals can legally detain a patient against his will. In the case of Manila Doctors
Hospital v. So Un Chua and Vicky Ty1, the Supreme Court enumerated these instances, to
wit, (1) the patient is a detained or convicted prisoner, (2) the patient is suffering from a
very contagious disease where his release will be prejudicial to public health, (3) when the
patient is mentally ill such that his release will endanger public safety, (4) in other exigent
cases as may be provided by law.

NPC v. CA

One of the trucks owned by petitioner NPC figured in a head-on-collision with another
vehicle resulting in death of three (3) passengers of the latter as well as physical injuries
to the other passengers. NPC denied liability by claiming that the driver of the truck was
not its employee but that of PHESCO Incorporated. The Supreme Court rejected the
argument ruling that NPC was liable as a direct employer of the driver under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, PHESCO being a “labor-only” contractor. Given the above considerations,
it is apparent that Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code will determine the
liability of NPC in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person for any negligent
act of the employees of the “labor-only” contractor. This is consistent with the ruling that a
finding that a contractor was a “labor-only” contractor is equivalent to a finding that an
employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the
“labor-only” contractor, including the latter’s workers.

Occena v. Icamina

The basic rule in this jurisdiction is that every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable. (Article 100, Revised Penal Code). Civil liability arising from criminal liability is
expressly recognized as a source of obligation under the Civil Code although it provides
that civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by penal laws.
(Article 1161, Civil Code).

The underlying legal principle of such rule is the view that from the standpoint of its
effects, a crime has a dual character. A crime is an offense against the State because of
the disturbance of the social order and at the same time an offense against the private
person injured by the crime. In the ultimate analysis, what gives rise to the civil liability is
really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another
by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or
not punishable by law.

Similarly, the crimes of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and other similar crimes
do not result in civil liability. The absence of civil liability in those cases is the result of the
fact that either there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person
injured by the crime.

PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. v. UCPB

The principle of holding the registered owner of a vehicle liable for quasi-delicts resulting
from its use is well-established in jurisprudence. As explained in the case of Erezo v. Jepte,
thus:

Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership
in vehicles is transferred, as in land registration cases, because the administrative
proceeding of registration does not bear any essential relation to the contract of sale
between the parties (Chinchilla vs. Rafael and Verdaguer, 39 Phil. 888), but to permit the
use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway (section 5 [a], Act No. 3992, as
amended.) The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if
any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public
highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered
owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused
accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the
owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these
circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle
registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons
responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways.

People v. Ruiz

The award of moral damages was reduced because there was no aggravating
circumstance but there were three mitigating circumstances. Article 2230 of the Civil Code
provides that exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Hence, no exemplary damages
may be awarded if no aggravating circumstance is present.

PH Bank of Commerce v. CA
Depositor may file an action for damages under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code if
through the fault of the bank’s employee, the secretary of the depositor was able to
fraudulently divert his funds from his account to the account of the secretary’s husband.
There was contributory negligence on the part of the depositor but considered the
negligence of the bank and its employees as the proximate cause of the loss.

Picart v. Smith

Even if the plaintiff was guilty of antecedent negligence, the defendant is still liable
because he had the last clear chance of avoiding injury. The law is that the person who
has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with
the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to
the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last
clear chance means that even though a person’s own acts may have placed him in a
position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. As the
doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of
avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third
person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident.

PSBA v. CA

The school can escape liability if it can establish that it exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees (including teachers) under Article 2180. In
addition thereto, liability may be based on contract. In both cases, the school as employer
or as contracting party may be held liable even if the injury was inflicted by a non-student.
It is believed that the Court was not correct when it observed in PSBA that “even if there
be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contract only”
and that “a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school’s liability.” Even
in the absence of contract, the school may still be liable as employer under Article 2176.
The two basis of liability — contract and quasi-delict — may even concur; in which case,
the injured student may choose to file an action for breach of contract or for quasi-delict
subject only to the proscription against double recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil
Code.

Quezon City Govt v. Dacara

The negligence of Engr Ramir J Thompson as an instrumentality of the Quezon City

Government is the proximate cause of the injuries and damage to property suffered by
Fulgencio Dacara’s (respondent) son, which make the LGU subsidiarily liable for the
damage incurred. The petitioner’s claim that they were not negligent insisting that they
placed all the necessary precautionary signs to alert the public of the roadside
construction, but none were presented , gave a more substantial support to the report of
the policeman who responded to the scene of incident that no precautionary signs were
found on the said place of incident. Thus, the LGU and Engr Ramir J Thompson as its
instrumentality were held negligent in the execise of their functions whereas capsulized
under Article 2189 of the New Civil Code that Local Government and its employees should
be responsible not only for the maintenance roads/ streets but also for the safety of the
public. Hence, compensatory damages was awarded to the respondent.

Ramos v. CA

The following requisites must be present before one can be held liable for defamatory
imputations: (1) it must be defamatory; (2) it must be malicious; (3) it must be given
publicity; and (4) the victim must be identifiable. The imputation is likewise defamatory if
the president of a homeowner’s association in a subdivision published an article in their
newsletter calling the complainant “mandurugas” and other terms such as “mag-ingat sa
panlilinlang,” “matagal na tayong niloloko,” “mastermind sa paninirang puri” and other
similar terms.

Well-settled is the rule that actual damages which may be claimed by the plaintiff are
those suffered by him as he has duly proved. The Civil Code provides:

“ARTICLE 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate

compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.’’

Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of
litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been
completed and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these provisions neglect to take
into account those situations, as in this case, where the resulting injury might be
continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the injury, while certain
to occur, are difficult to predict

Saludaga v. FEU

A school security guard accidentally shot one of its students. Should the school liable for
breach of contract? YES.

It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and
the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. In the
instant case, we find that, when petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less the
security guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a prima
facie showing that respondents failed to comply with the defense of Caso Fortuito cannot
be sustained. After a thorough review of the records, we find that respondents failed to
discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in providing a safe
learning environment for their students. They failed to prove that they ensured that the
guards assigned in the campus met the requirements stipulated in the Security Service
Agreement. also failed to show that they understood steps to ascertain and confirm that
the security guards assigned to them actually possess the qualifications required in the
Security Service Agreement. Consequently, respondents' defense of force majeure must
fail. In order for force majeure to be considered, respondents must show that no
negligence or misconduct was committed that may have occasioned the loss. An act of
God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the
possible adverse consequences of such a loss. One's negligence may have concurred with
an act of God in producing damage and injury to another.

Santiago v. De Leon

One who was hurt while trying to rescue another who was injured through negligence may
recover damages.

In determining whether one making or attempting such rescue exercised ordinary care, all
the surrounding circumstances are to be considered including the existing emergency, the
alarm, excitement and confusion usually present, the uncertainty as to the means to be
employed, the necessity for immediate action, and the liability to err in the choice of the
best course of action to pursue.

Santos v. CA

The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press. To be

more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending
publication without doing violence to the concept of privileged communications implicit in
the freedom of the press. As was so well put by Justice Malcolm in Bustos: ‘Public policy,
the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded
protection of public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the
development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.

SMA v. Carpitanos
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Mary’s Academy liable for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was
negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor
students in the jeep. However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the
act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused
because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.

In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the
‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong
done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what
it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury
complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred. In this case, the respondents failed
to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the
victim.

Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or
mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the
minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a
remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened
the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep.

The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle
was being driven on the highways or streets.” Hence, with the overwhelming evidence
presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred
because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but
the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

St. Joseph College v. Miranda

In the middle of the experiment,[Jayson], who was the assistant leader of one of the class
groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying
glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved it close and
towards the eye of [Jayson]. At that instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out
and several particles of which hit [Jayson’s] eye and the different parts of the bodies of
some of his group mates. As a result thereof, [Jayson’s] eyes were chemically burned.

Is St. Joseph liable for the accident? YES.

The proximate cause of Jason’s injury was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent
to foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment.
Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and
foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers. "The defense of due
diligence of a good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St.Joseph College will not
exculpate it from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity
in the supervision of its teachers (despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring)
and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured environment for
conducting dangerous experiments. [Petitioner] school is still liable for the wrongful acts of
the teachers and employees because it had full information on the nature of dangerous
science experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to
students. The fact that there has never been any accident in the past during the conduct
of science experiments is not a justification to be complacent in just preserving the status
quo and do away with creative foresight to install safety measures to protect the students.
Schools should not simply install safety reminders and distribute safety instructional
manuals. More importantly, schools should provide protective gears and devices to shield
students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.

Tenchavez v. Escano

The Supreme Court explained that Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño, were validly
married to each other and that said marriage was subsisting and undissolved under
Philippine Law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and
obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County,
State of Nevada. The Court ruled that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño’s divorce and
second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff
Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. The Supreme Court found
that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her
desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the
husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity. (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Plaintiff
Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta’s aged parents with racial or social discrimination
and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce,
unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While
his suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless
in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for
parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.

UE v. Jader

May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into
believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not
the case? QUALIFIED YES.

Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led
to the delayed relay of information to respondent. When one of two innocent parties must
suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. The modern tendency is
to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act
is not illicit. If mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for damages for
injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A
person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that
is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or
abuse.

However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the
latter’s actual damages, we hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral
damages. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals’ findings that respondent suffered
shock, trauma and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and will not be
allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very least, it behooved on respondent to
verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for
the bar examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should have been responsible
enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic
achievement, are in order

US v. Baggay

True it is that civil liability accompanies criminal liability, because every person liable
criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage and for
indemnification of the harm done, but there may be civil liability because of acts ordinarily
punishable, although the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from criminal liability.
Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in spite of his irresponsibility on
account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably and justly
liable with his property for the consequences of his acts, even though they be performed
unwittingly, for the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer from the disastrous results
of his harmful acts more than is necessary, in spite of his unfortunate condition. Law and
society are under obligation to protect him during his illness and so when he is declared to
be liable with his property for reparation and indemnification, he is still entitled to the
benefit of what is necessary for his decent maintenance, but this protection does not
exclude liability for damage caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer the
consequences of his acts.

Valenzuela v. CA

The liability extends to acts committed even outside the school so long as it is an official
activity of the school. The subject dealing with a school and its teacher’s supervision
during an extracurricular activity “now falls under the provision on special parental
authority found in Art. 218 of the Family Code which generally encompasses all authorized
school activities whether inside or outside school premises.

It is to be noted that the injury involved was not inflicted by another student. However, it
is believed that if damage was caused by a student in the same factual milieu as in St.
Francis, the school, its administrators and teachers should be held liable under Article 219
of the Family Code. It is believed that the picnic should be considered within the purview
“authorized activity.” It should be considered as a sanctioned extracurricular activity
because the principal knew that the students and several teachers were planning a picnic.
It is part of the responsibility of a person exercising special parental authority to see to it
that all the necessary precautions are undertaken. It is believed that Justice Padilla was
more convincing in his dissent in St. Francis when he argued that the silence of the
principal should be taken as an implied sanction. He explained that: “Having preferred to
remain silent and even indifferent, he (principal) now seeks excuse from such omission by
invoking his alleged lack of consent to the excursion. But it is precisely his silence and
negligence in performing his role as principal head of the school that must be construed as
an implied consent to such activity.”

Vedana v. Valencia

The historical development of the action based on sexual harassment was discussed in
Vedana vs. Valencia, a disciplinary case against a member of the judiciary:

“Before closing, it is apropos to discuss the implications of the enactment of R.A. No. 7877
or the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law to the Judiciary. Under our system of governance, the
very tenets of our republican democracy presuppose that the will of the people is
expressed, in large part, through the statutes passed by the Legislature. Thus, the Court,
in instances such as these, may take judicial notice of the heightened sensitivity of the
people to gender-related issues as manifested through legislative issuances. It would not
be remiss to point out that no less than the Constitution itself has expressly recognized
the invaluable contributions of the women’s sector to national development, thus the need
to provide women with a working environment conducive to productivity and befitting
their dignity.

In the community of nations, there was a time when discrimination was institutionalized
through the legalization of now prohibited practices. Indeed, even within this century,
persons were discriminated against merely because of gender, creed or the color of their
skin, to the extent that the validity of human beings being treated as mere chattel was
judicially upheld in other jurisdictions. But in humanity’s march towards a more refined
sense of civilization, the law has stepped in and seen it fit to condemn this type of conduct
for, at bottom, history reveals that the moving force of civilization has been to realize and
secure a more humane existence. Ultimately, this is what humanity as a whole seeks to
attain as we strive for a better quality of life or higher standard of living. Thus, in our
nation’s very recent history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct
constitutive of sexual harassment or hazing, acts previously considered harmless by
custom, as criminal. In disciplining erring judges and personnel of the Judiciary then, this
Court can do no less.”

Vestil v. IAC

The owner or possessor of nondomesticated animals known as animals ferae naturae, was
subject to strict liability if the animals attacked a person. The owners or possessors of
domestic animals are liable only if they knew or had reason to know that the animal had
vicious properties. On the other hand, Article 2183 by the Civil Code, does not admit of the
distinction under English law. The Civil Code provision, is therefore, applicable whether the
animal is domestic, domesticated or wild.

What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the
house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.

Article 2183 reads as follows:

The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall
cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the
person who has suffered damage.

According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not
based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of
the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social
interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for
the damage which such animal may cause.

Worcester v. Ocampo

So long as sufficient circumstances are present which establish that the offending
statements refer to the plaintiff, the requirement that the defamed is identified is satisfied.
the application of the slanderous words to the plaintiff and the extrinsic matters alleged in
the declaration may be shown by the testimony of witnesses who knew the parties and
circumstances and who can state their judgment and opinion upon the application and
meaning of the terms used by the defendant: It is said that where the words are
ambiguous on the face of the libel, to whom it was intended to be applied, the judgment
and opinion of witnesses, who from their knowledge of the parties and circumstances are
able to form a conclusion as to the defendant’s intention and application of the libel is
evidence for the information of the jury.

Yuchengco v. MNL Chronicle

“when malice in fact is proven, assertions and proofs that the libelous articles are
qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since being qualifiedly privileged
communications merely prevents the presumption of malice from attaching in a
defamatory imputation.”

Four elements constitute the crime of libel, namely (a) defamatory imputation tending to
cause dishonor, discredit or contempt; (b) malice, either in law or in fact; (c) publication;
and (d) identifiability of the person defamed.

Despite being defined in the Revised Penal Code, libel can also be instituted, like in the
case at bar, as a purely civil action, the cause of action for which is provided by Article 33
of the Civil Code, which provides:

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.