Visa Requirements, Carrier Sanctions, 'Safe Third Countries' and 'Readmission' - The Development of An Asylum 'Buffer Zone' in Europe Authors(s) - Sarah Collinson

Visa Requirements, Carrier Sanctions, 'Safe Third Countries' and 'Readmission': The
Development of an Asylum 'Buffer Zone' in Europe

Authors(s): Sarah Collinson
Source: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1996), pp. 76-
90
Published by: The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/622926
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76
Visa requirements, carrier sanctions, 'safe
third countries' and 'readmission': the
development of an asylum 'buffer zone' in
Europe
Sarah Collinson
This paper explores the development of a so-called asylum 'buffer zone' around the
eastern frontiers of the west European region as a result of the Schengen, EU and
EFTA member states' introduction of more restrictive asylum policies during the first
half of the 1990s. Restrictive policies in western Europe are forcing central and east
European states into a 'buffer role', obliging them to absorb asylum-seekers who fail
to gain entry into western Europe and/or restrict asylum-seekers' access to the
borders of potential 'receiving' states. In addition to examining the mechanisms by
which this 'buffer zone' is developing and questioning what it might mean for
future asylum trends and policies in Europe, the paper considers the wider
questions raised by this development in relation to the changing geopolitical
landscape of Europe, particularly in relation to the changing political and security
relations between western, central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
key words Europe refugee asylum flows buffer zones geopolitics
migration control
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James' Square, London SW1Y 4LE
revised manuscript received 2 October 1995
Since the events of 1989, migration has been at the

neighbours and nothing captured this state of
centre of international political concern in Europe. affairs more clearly than the arrival of asylum-
seekers at its doors.

Indeed, for western Europe, there was no more
It was not long after the collapse of the Berlin

potent a symbol of the end of the cold war than the
exodus of over a million people from the east Wall, therefore, that politicians and publics in west-
which accompanied the collapse of the Berlin Wall. ern Europe began to express increasing concern
over the perceived threat of mass uncontrolled

Hardly more than a year later, the new and appar-
ently threatening disorder in the east following the

migration from eastern Europe and the former
demise of communism was heralded by the sud- Soviet Union, as well as from poorer countries to
den flight of Albanians to Greece and Italy. The the south. Migration - previously a matter of 'low
subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union and politics', to be dealt with by labour ministries and
the like - was suddenly elevated to the level of

outbreak of hostilities in Yugoslavia added to a
growing sense of unease in western Europe, par- 'high' politics and security. This reflected broader
ticularly when the conflict in the Balkans began changes in the European security agenda. The
national security interests of the states and societies

producing refugee flows across the borders into
nearby west European states. The collapse of the of western Europe were no longer to be subordi-
iron curtain meant that western Europe could no nated to the higher interest of defence against a
longer isolate itself from the troubles of its eastern common and clearly identifiable politico-military
Trans Inst Br Geogr NS 21 76-90 1996
ISSN 0020-2754 ? Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) 1996
The geopolitics of international migration in Europe 77
Western Europe therefore faces

enemy. Europe was no longer threatened by the
potential for war between two superpowers. The
major questions about the nature of the larger regional
new perceived threats facing western Europe fol-
environment in which the EU, whatever its configur-
lowing the breakdown of the cold war bipolar
ation, will have to operate.4
system - including migration, refugee flows, illegal
arms transfers, terrorism, organized crime and The sensitivity and prominence of the migration
drug trafficking - are of a fundamentally different issue on the European political and security agen-
nature and reflect a shift in the nexus of the

das is explained primarily by the particular way in
security agenda away from military security dilem- which the issue has developed as a simultaneous
mas between states, towards broader and more reflection and component of the geopolitical trans-
formations taking place on the European continent

diverse security concerns within states. As argued
by Hassner, 'individual, social and national insecur- in the aftermath of the cold war. Thus, for example,
ity, the preoccupation with law and order, jobs the mass exodus which accompanied the collapse
and the nation' have become combined into 'one

of the Berlin Wall not only reflected the disintegra-
tion of the eastern bloc but also forced the pace of

complex syndrome in which external threats and
internal doubts are hard to disentangle'.1 that disintegration. The population displacements
The emergence of this new climate of insecurity caused by the conflict in the Balkans not only
was thus intimately related to the fragmentation of reflect the demise of the former Yugoslavia but also
the eastern bloc. West European governments had

represent an integral - as well as tragic - compo-
to develop new strategies rapidly in order to tackle nent of whatever political configuration emerges in
an enormous range of problems - many seemingly its place. The free movement of people within the
intractable - connected with political and economic Schengen area and EU is a provision designed not
reform in the region. According to Barry Buzan, the

only to symbolize regional economic and political
rapid collapse of Soviet power left the EU by integration but also to form an essential compo-
nent of a functioning single market. And, in the

default as the core focus for order and stability
throughout Europe.2 Yet western Europe was

changing context of relations between west, central
already facing serious problems of its own - linked and eastern Europe, international migration-
whether of refugees or voluntary migrants - not

principally to a deepening economic recession -
which undermined the confidence of governments

only reflects the breakdown of the previous east-
and publics alike, and which threatened increas- west division of the continent and the emergence
of a new, more dynamic, geopolitical configuration

ingly to derail the accelerating processes of econ-
omic and political integration among the EU and but is also playing a part in shaping that new
EFTA member states. Thus, the redefinition of configuration.
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that west-

'Europe' as a geopolitical concept - as a region
no longer divided into two 'hermetically sealed

ern Europe's perceived vulnerability to instability
blocs'3 - and the concomitant redefinition of rela-

to the east and south is felt most keenly in terms of
tions between western Europe and its eastern and

its perceived vulnerability to uncontrolled popu-
southern neighbours has taken place at a time of lation movements. Control over the admission of
considerable confusion and uncertainty in the west aliens has historically been viewed as inherent in
of the continent, as well as in the east. the very nature of sovereignty. At a time of consid-
It can be argued that the bipolar system of the erable economic uncertainty and when national
cold-war era has been replaced by a pattern of

sovereignty is under assault from all manner of
interstate relations structured principally along global and transnational economic, political and
core-periphery lines, in terms both of east-west and cultural forces, there is a heightened potential for
north-south relations. According to this picture, the societies to see their identity and security as threat-
EU or western Europe as a whole is clearly within

ened. The spectacle of large numbers of migrants
the core. However, as Buzan observes, the evading immigration rules provides a dramatic
example of the erosion of state sovereignty. More-
over, the fact that the majority of these migrants

certainty and security of that position ... is moderated
would have been excluded had the state been
by its location next to both the disintegrating Soviet
better able to control their movement means that,

empire (hung precariously between centre and periph-
ery) and the volatile relations of the Middle East. in all probability, they are perceived as a threat and
78 Russell King et al.
other, the more immediate concern to protect stab-

deemed 'unwanted' by much of the receiving
society. Since immigrants, by definition, represent

ility and prosperity within the west European
the 'outside brought within', they are liable to be

region itself, implying a primary concern to protect
regarded as a direct challenge to the communal western Europe from any potential instability
identity of the 'nation-state'. According to Martin which might develop in the former eastern bloc
Heisler and Zig Layton-Henry, the

region. The resulting confusion or diffidence in
west European policy has left the central and east
capacity of social, economic, political and adminis-
European countries in something of a security and
trative institutions to integrate large numbers of immi-
power vacuum, caught precariously between, to
grants ... affects the stability of society and therefore
the west, a group of prosperous states engaged in
the ability of receiving states' governments to govern.
their own troubled process of integration and, to
They argue, such challenges
the east (former Soviet Union) and south (former
Yugoslavia), a zone of great and growing political

are particularly likely to be acute in the presence of
and economic instability.6

long-term economic problems, ineffectual government,
The current ambiguous geopolitical status of the

deep political polarisation or rapid social change.5
central and east European countries, particularly
Whether the threat is more real or perceived
Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak
in the west European case, the very fact that
Republics - the so-called 'Visegrad Four' - is
unwanted or uncontrolled immigration has come
clearly reflected in the policy regime emerging
to be seen as a potential threat to the security and
among west, central and east European states to
stability of society has meant that recent policy
control international migration, more especially in
responses in western Europe have been predicated
the emerging regime governing asylum and refu-
almost exclusively along defensive 'security' lines.
gee policies. Policy developments during the first
Thus, responding to increasing levels of immigra-
half of the 1990s have reflected a concern among
tion from both the south and the east during the
west European states to establish a control regime
early 1990s and fearful of the perceived potential
extending beyond the boundaries of the Schengen,
for massive uncontrolled migration flows triggered
EU and EEA groupings. To some extent, responsi-
by growing instability in neighbouring regions,
bility for developing this regime was seen to fall to
west European governments have focused on
institutions, such as the Council of Europe and the
strengthening their external borders and improv-
Organization for Security and Cooperation in
ing all other immigration-control mechanisms at
Europe (OSCE, previously CSCE), with represen-
their disposal.
tation already extended to central and eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union. However,
governments in western Europe have been con-
Central and eastern Europe and the
cerned to introduce a stronger regime than could
geopolitics of migration control
be achieved through cooperation in existing inter-
This overwhelmingly defensive posture towards

governmental fora, at least as regards controlling
immigration in western Europe - a posture based migratory flows across their external borders.
The first states to be involved in such a regime

primarily on immediate domestic political con-
were those already associated with the EU on the

cerns - is affecting neighbouring central and east
basis of the Europe agreements (Visegrad states)

European states in ways which both reflect and
and others identified as primary sources of

contribute to the ambiguity and uncertainty which
'unwanted' migration to western Europe, such as

characterizes current relations between the west
Romania and Bulgaria. The Europe agreements

European states and their neighbours to the east.
themselves reflect the ambiguous position of the

At the heart of this problem is the difficulty
central European countries vis-?i-vis the movement

encountered by west European governments in
attempting to marry, on the one hand, the concern of persons and control over migration. These states
to export stability and prosperity eastwards are essentially migrant-source countries in respect
of the EU, and thus the agreements - while con-

through the support of economic and political
taining provisions related to their association with

transition in the former eastern bloc countries and,
the EU's labour markets (provisions allowing for

potentially, through the extension of EU member-
movement for the purposes of self-employment)-
ship and NATO security guarantees, and, on the
contain only very weak provisions for those seek-

and reflects the fact that, as noted above, today's
ing employment.7 Although clearly excluded from European security agenda differs in important
the free-movement provisions associated with

ways from traditional security configurations con-
Schengen, EU or EEA membership, the nationals of cerned more exclusively with problems of political
and military rivalry and confrontation between

the Visegrad states have, nevertheless, relatively
states. In the context of this discussion, the term

privileged access to Schengen and EU member
states because visas are not required of their 'buffer zone' is used to denote an identifiable
nationals for visits of less than three months. The

geographical zone 'protecting', by non-military
countries of central Europe can thus be seen to be means, a group of powerful and essentially stable
in a 'probationary' or transitional position as states from a perceived non-military security threat
regards movements of their nationals and estab- deriving from a proximate region of economic and
lishment rights in western Europe. political instability. It thus denotes the age-old idea
This transitional status has come at a price, of seeking to secure borders by extending their
however, since these countries are also seen by depth.1?
west European governments as important partners

Thus, just as the buffer states of old were under-
for controlling migration, whether it be the mi- stood to perform their role by separating rival
gration of their own nationals or that of migrants in

powers and absorbing the shocks of rivalry and
transit from other countries further east or else-

confrontation when it occurred, so it is argued here
where in the world. Yet, because these states

that, in the non-military context of migration and
remain outside the Schengen, EU and EEA 'clubs'

refugee flows, central and east European countries
with their concomitant - and increasingly inte-

can be seen to be buffering western Europe both by
grated - mechanisms for joint immigration control;

providing an additional control zone protecting or
because they lack the kind of institutional and distancing western Europe from actual or potential
financial resources which are available to western

refugee movements or other kinds of migration
governments for controlling their borders; and from more unstable or less prosperous areas fur-
because of their geographical position (proximity ther east or south and by absorbing asylum-seekers
to actual or potential migrant-source countries in

and other migrants who would otherwise be des-
the former Soviet space), this controlling role is

tined for western Europe. The process and mech-
predominantly one of acting as migration or asy- anisms by which this is taking place are discussed
lum 'buffer states' protecting western Europe, as

below in the context of refugee flows and asylum
opposed to acting as equal partners in the (west)

policy.
European migration-control regime with its equal
benefits.
Asylum and refugee policy in western
It should be clear that the concept of 'buffer' is
Europe
not applied here in the traditional sense of a small
independent state or group of states lying between

Against a growing potential for interethnic conflict,
two or more larger rival military powers.8 Perhaps civil war and generalized political instability in the
it is no coincidence that a term previously used to

former eastern bloc and in countries to the 'south',
describe the geopolitical status of east-central

refugee movements have been pinpointed increas-
Europe during the interwar period (when the

ingly as the primary migration challenge facing
region was seen as a politico-military buffer

Europe in the years to come. Indeed, a ten-fold
between Germany and Russia) should be applied

increase in the number of asylum applications was
to the region once again.9 Moreover, to the extent
witnessed in western Europe between the early
that NATO is reluctant to extend membership to 1980s and 1990s, reaching a peak of some 700 000
countries in central and eastern Europe for fear of

in 1992.11 This escalation in asylum inflows (much
provoking Russia, there could be a case for arguing

of it from eastern Europe after 1989), coupled with
that the region is caught once again in a more
the mass displacement of population caused by the
traditional form of 'buffer' politics (between NATO
outbreak of conflict in the former Yugoslavia, trig-
and Russia), following the retreat of Russian
gered a policy crisis in western Europe in the early
(Soviet) domination and the expansion of west

1990s. Asylum systems came under sudden
European interest and involvement in the region.
and enormous pressure at a time of worsening
Yet the term is used here in a rather different sense
economic recession and political uncertainty in
western Europe, when receiving governments This provision will be strengthened by current
were anxious to limit all kinds of immigration.

moves to develop a common visa policy among the
Moreover, the prevailing policy 'regime' - with EU member states.
its emphasis on asylum for targeted victims of

Visa requirements are given greater effect by
state-sanctioned persecution and detailed case-by- their frequent combination with carrier sanctions,
case determinations - appeared increasingly ill- according to which airlines and other carriers are
fined for bringing into a country any person who

equipped to cope with large and growing numbers
of refugees fleeing conditions of generalized or lacks a visa or other requisite documentation for
interethnic violence, civil war or state collapse. entry. Indeed, carrier sanctions are included as a
Set against a global population of over 45

provision of both the Schengen Implementing Con-
million refugees and displaced persons in the vention and the draft External Borders Convention,
and have been progressively incorporated into

world, the numbers arriving in western Europe
national legislation in western Europe over recent

appear modest. Nevertheless, the response of west
European governments to their asylum crisis has years.12 Carrier sanctions are designed essentially
proved crucial, not least because of the impact on to prevent the arrival of asylum-seekers who might
policy developments elsewhere, particularly in attempt to travel direct from their country or
central and eastern Europe. Although some effort

region of origin to a country in western Europe to
has been put into formulating new, more prag- apply for asylum. They therefore apply principally
matic or comprehensive mechanisms for coping to asylum-seekers who might attempt to travel by
air. This policy appears to have resulted in a

with today's refugee problems, west European
decline in the number of asylum applications made

governments have sought principally to reduce the
at airports and can therefore be described as a

pressure on existing asylum systems by rationaliz-
ing and accelerating procedures and introducing qualified success from the point of view of the
policies which restrict would-be asylum-seekers' governments in question.13
access to their territory or asylum procedures. Indeed, visa requirements and carrier sanctions
It is the policies falling within the latter category have played an important part in restricting the
- specifically the three principal measures dis- numbers of refugees arriving in western Europe
cussed below, namely visa requirements combined

from Bosnia-Herzegovina, for the majority of
with carrier sanctions, the 'safe third country' governments in western Europe have imposed a
policy and 'readmission' arrangements - which visa requirement for Bosnian nationals in response
can be seen to be pushing the states of central and to rising refugee outflows since the outbreak of
eastern Europe most directly into the role of hostilities there. As in other cases, the 'contain-
ment' of refugee flows out of the former Yugoslavia

asylum 'buffer states'.
is supported by the argument made by govern-
ments that refugees should, if possible, stay in the
Visa requirements and carrier sanctions
nearest 'safe areas' to their homes, as outlined in
the 'Conclusion on certain common standards
It is now common practice for west European
relating to the reception of particularly vulnerable

states to impose visa requirements on nationals of
groups from former Yugoslav states' reached by

particular states generating refugees. Britain led
EU governments in June 1993. On the ground, the

the way in this respect by introducing visa require-
containment policy is supported by the creation

ments for nationals of Sri Lanka and Turkey in the
of the so-called 'UN protected zones' within
1980s following a rise in the number of asylum
Bosnia-Herzegovina itself.
applications from people originating in these coun-
Considerable numbers of refugees from the
tries. The practice is now supported by the Treaty
former Yugoslavia have been granted protection in

on European Union which, under Article 100c,
western Europe, most commonly on the basis of

states that
'temporary protection' rather than full refugee
in the event of an emergency situation in a third
status. Some countries - such as Germany, host to
country posing a threat of a sudden inflow of nationals
between 350 000 and 400 000 refugees from the
from that country into the Community, the Council
former Yugoslavia - have received far higher
may .. introduce [rather than remove] a visa require-
numbers than others, such as the UK, host to under

ment for nationals from the country in question.
10 000. Nevertheless, far fewer refugees from the

(emphasis added)
Balkan conflict have reached western Europe than in the country, most from the former Yugoslavia,
Romania and Bulgaria.'18 Whether owing to these

would have been the case had visa requirements
states' continuing involvement in the Bosnian con-

not been imposed and, indeed, many of those
flict, the fragile nature of asylum institutions or

fleeing the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina managed to
do so only by travelling on Croatian passports. In a more general political and economic instability and
1993 report to the Executive Committee of the lack of resources to cope with large displaced
United Nations High Commission for Refugees populations, the situation of refugees - particularly
those from Bosnia - has been far from secure in

(UNHCR), Amnesty International expressed con-
these countries.
cern about the emphasis placed by governments on
the belief that refugees should find protection in Following the lead of western Europe, other
the territories of former Yugoslavia - a policy borne

governments have imposed visas and other
restrictions on the entry of nationals of Bosnia-

out in practice, the report argued,
Herzegovina. Poland and the Czech Republic, for
because almost all EC member states, and many
example, introduced mandatory visa restrictions
other European states, impose visa requirements on
for Bosnian nationals in July 1993 and January 1994

nationals of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
respectively; Bulgaria recommends that Bosnians
It was argued that, despite reassurances from EU
apply for a visa to secure entry; and Hungary, the
ministers vis-a-vis the flexible application of visa
Slovak Republic and Slovenia require Bosnian
and entry controls for some people from the former
nationals to produce proof - such as a visa from a
Yugoslavia, Amnesty International continued to
third country allowing for onward travel or a
receive reports indicating
verified letter of guarantee from a national or
a clear reluctance on the part of EC and other govern- institution of the country concerned - that they will
ments to admit and grant protection to asylum-seekers

not apply for asylum or intend to stay after entry.
from former Yugoslavia arriving at their borders.14

In its 1993 report to the UNHCR Executive
Committee, Amnesty International argued that
it appears they have done so, at least in part, because

The impact on central and eastern Europe
they feared receiving a disproportionate number of
Largely as a result of restrictive visa policies in
refugees as a result of closed borders elsewhere in
western Europe, far larger numbers of people dis-
Europe.19
placed by the Bosnian conflict have become con-
In a clear articulation of the pressure felt by these
centrated in neighbouring 'frontline' states than
new 'receiving' states, the Hungarian correspond-
would otherwise have been the case. Thus, for
ent to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
example, Croatia's population of refugees and dis-
and Development's (OECD) 1993 SOPEMI report
placed persons was reported to have reached 12.5
argued that
per cent of the total population in February 1994,15
including up to 200000 refugees from Bosnia- Restrictive western policy leaves Hungary unable to
act independently on the international scene. Because

Herzegovina among the 400 000 or so displaced
of war and ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia,
persons in the country.16' This may be contrasted
several unforeseen decisions have had to be made ...
with the situation in Germany, where foreigners
Thus, amid mounting tension the government decided
(including immigrant workers and their descend-
to move towards more harmonised, selective admis-
ants) are estimated to represent around 8 per cent
sion. At the end of 1992, new legislation concerning
of the total population. Similarly, Serbia is host to
aliens, immigrants, residence permit holders, minori-
between 400 000 and 500 000 refugees from both
ties, refugees and asylum seekers was passed. A
Croatia and Bosnia; Slovenia and Macedonia are

million aliens who did not meet the conditions for
each reported to have taken in around 30 000, the

entry have been expelled. The movements towards
Hungary are still growing, mostly from Romania and

majority from Bosnia-Herzegovina; Hungary is
the former Yugoslavia ... In the light of the current

host to some 130 000;17 and in the Czech Republic,
burdens faced in Hungary, fewer opportunities for

where the number of registered asylum-seekers and
humanitarian admissions will occur.20
refugees remains comparatively low (in the region
of 4000), the International Organisation for Mi-

Thus, not only are such states 'buffering' western
gration (IOM) estimated in 1994 that 140 000 or

Europe by absorbing refugee and other migrant
more undocumented 'transit' migrants are present

populations which would otherwise be directed
there but, by introducing their own restrictions and

The statistical data on these new migration flows
controls over refugees' entry, they are also support- are scarce and unreliable, particularly because the
ing and strengthening the west European govern-

greater part remains undocumented.23 Neverthe-
ments' policies of containment vis-4-vis refugee less, the broad spectrum of nationalities involved
movements, thereby providing an additional con-

points to a complex pattern of migration deriving
from a wide range of source regions. Most mi-

trol zone between the refugees' countries of origin
and potential destination countries in western gration affecting the central and east European
Europe. countries is intraregional (dominated by mi-
Indeed, all governments in central and eastern

gration from the former Yugoslavia, Romania and
Europe have introduced - or are in the process of Bulgaria, and including movements of the Roma
introducing - stricter controls over immigration

population) but an important proportion concerns
and asylum entries. Thus, for example, Hungary nationals of former Soviet countries (including
introduced a new law in 1993 which stipulates inter

migrants from Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Moldova,
alia that foreigners must show adequate financial

Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) and, increas-
means for their stay. In the Czech Republic, the

ingly, the middle east and Asia (including Turkey,
Refugee Act was amended in January 1994 to Iran, Bangladesh, India, Vietnam and China), and
speed up asylum procedure in cases where the Africa (e.g. Somalia, Liberia and Angola).24 Many
such migrants rely on exploitative traffickers to

application is deemed 'manifestly unfounded' and,
as of September 1995, the Czech border police will assist their transit.
be authorized to refuse entry to foreigners without

Despite the introduction of more restrictive rules
sufficient funds for their stay. And, in addition to

and procedures, immigration controls are not as
work on a draft bill on the entry and residence developed in central and eastern Europe as in the
conditions of foreigners, new rules in Poland

EU member states and other west European
hold that those with no right to remain in Poland countries. Thus asylum-seekers and other migrants
and who do not comply voluntarily with an continue to reach the borders of countries such as
Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Sweden from

expulsion order may be detained pending their
their eastern neighbours. Indeed, of the 90 per cent

deportation.21
This process was sparked off not only by arrivals or so of Germany's asylum-seekers who arrive via
of asylum-seekers from the former Yugoslavia but

neighbouring countries, the majority enter from
also by more general changes in these countries'

Poland and the Czech Republic.25 In 1993, for
migration status as they found themselves host to example, there were 43 302 illegal border crossings
increasing numbers of asylum-seekers and other

detected in the Czech Republic, most involving
migrants transiting through - or attempting to migrants trying to enter Germany, and, in 1994,
transit through - to western Europe from countries 14 300 migrants were caught trying to cross into
Germany from Poland.26

further east or south. Moreover, while continuing
to 'send' migrants to western Europe, these coun- In these cases, visa regimes and carrier sanctions
tries have also become 'receiving' states in their

provide no asylum 'buffer' for western Europe
own right vis-a-vis poorer countries to the east and since, according to UNHCR Executive Committee
conclusions, once an asylum-seeker arrives at the

south, a process linked to the increasing difficulty
faced by migrants trying to gain access to countries frontier asking for protection, these states are
in western Europe. Poland and the Czech Republic bound by Article 33 of the 1951 UN Convention
relating to the status of refuges which stipulates

are most affected in both respects, due to their long
that
land-borders with Germany and their higher wage
levels relative to other countries in the region.
No Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in
Hungary and Bulgaria also receive transit migrants
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
seeking to reach Austria and Greece respectively.
where his life or freedom would be threatened on
Following a reinforcement of the Austro-
account of his race, nationality, political opinion or
Hungarian border, the Slovak Republic has been
membership of a particular group [the principle of
targeted increasingly by migrants as a potential
non-refoulement].
route into Germany. And the Baltic States have
become an important transit point for migrants Although the 1951 Convention creates no direct
trying to reach the Nordic countries.22 obligation for states to admit asylum-seekers at the
frontier or to grant asylum, Article 33 does create and the Benelux countries).28 At the time of writ-
an obligation for signatory states to examine asy- ing, the Dublin Convention had yet to enter into
lum applications if necessary to ensure that refoule- force and, although the Schengen Convention
ment does not take place. In order to relieve further officially entered into force in March 1995, it had
the 'load' placed on their asylum systems by yet to be fully implemented due to French hesi-
tation over the suppression of border controls.

asylum-seekers arriving via neighbouring and
other 'transit' countries, governments in western Nevertheless, some of their provisions have been
Europe have therefore moved to introduce two practised since as early as 1993 (the year that
further measures: the 'safe third country' rule and

Germany amended its asylum laws), as asylum-
readmission arrangements. These measures are seekers are frequently returned from one member
state to another on the grounds that s/he should

clearly - if not explicitly - designed to push neigh-
have applied for asylum in the first EU member

bouring countries in central and eastern Europe
further into the role of asylum 'buffer states' by state entered. This has caused concern among
human-rights and refugee-support organizations

transferring responsibility for examining asylum
requests and by facilitating expulsions of undocu-

since, without the Dublin Convention (or Schengen
mented migrants and rejected asylum-seekers back

Convention) in force, there is no multi-lateral legal
to the asylum 'transit' states.

instrument providing safeguards for individual
asylum-seekers or binding states to take responsi-
bility for examining asylum requests. The Dublin
The 'safe third country' rule
Convention is designed to resolve the problem of
There is some confusion in the terms used to 'refugees in orbit' (i.e. refugees for whom no state
is willing to take responsibility). Ironically, how-

denote the so-called 'safe third country' policy;
other terms used include 'first host country', 'host

ever, in the absence of multilaterally accepted
criteria and legally binding provisions for deter-

third country' and 'safe first country'. As noted by
the UNHCR, all these terms denote the rather

mining which state should deal with an asylum-
straightforward idea of 'protection elsewhere'.27

seeker's claim, the application of a 'Dublin'-type
mechanism carries the danger that asylum-seekers

At the London meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on
Immigration in November/December 1992, EU will be shunted from one state to another and, in
ministers agreed to a resolution on 'host third some cases, returned to the country from which
countries', which refers to claims in cases where

they originally fled (refoulement) as has been
the asylum-seeker has passed through, or spent reported in a number of cases.29
time in, another country where s/he could have

National legislation has been amended through-
been expected to seek protection. It holds that, if out western Europe to incorporate, or to allow for
there is such a 'host third country' or 'safe third the incorporation of, the provisions of the Dublin
Convention and/or the Schengen Convention and

country', 'the application for refugee status may
'safe third country' provisions into individual

not be examined and the asylum applicant may be
sent to that country'. This is not a legal agreement countries' asylum policies. In both France and
but it carries considerable political weight and the Germany, this necessitated constitutional amend-
assumption when it was introduced was that its

ments as both countries had a right of asylum
provisions would be incorporated into national written into their constitutions, albeit a more
legislation. limited right in the French case. Because of its
The 'safe third country' notion was already symbolic importance, this proved a complex, pro-
tracted and, at times, explosive political process in

becoming an accepted principle for determining
Germany but the government's determination and

responsibility for examining asylum claims among
the EU member states as it forms the central success in seeing it through is testimony to the
building block of the so-called 'Dublin Convention'

importance attached to measures designed to
- 'Convention Determining the State Responsible

reduce the number of asylum-seekers applying for
for Examining Applications for Asylum' - signed protection in that country. Germany's new, more
by the EU member states in 1990. The provisions of

restrictive, asylum law entered into force in July
the Dublin Convention are echoed in the Schengen 1993 and includes among its provisions the ruling,
Implementing Convention signed the same year by echoing the EU ministers' 1992 resolution, that
the five original Schengen states (France, Germany asylum-seekers entering Germany from a 'safe
third country' should not be allowed to enter the house has not yet been built' and arguing that
German asylum procedures but should instead be the rule can only be meaningful if there is first
returned immediately to the country from which a Europe-wide consensus on the criteria for the
they entered. recognition of refugees.32
All Germany's neighbours have been deemed

The question of standards is an important one,
'safe' for such returns. Therefore, theoretically, all particularly because the logical outcome of the
'safe third country' rule is an intensification of the

of the 90 per cent or so of asylum-seekers who
hitherto arrived via a neighbouring state can be burden of refugee protection on first asylum or
rejected on the grounds that they have passed asylum 'transit' countries in central and eastern
through a 'safe third country' where they had an Europe, where resources are considerably more
limited and refugee-protection institutions consid-

opportunity to apply for asylum. During the
erably more fragile. In its most recent communi-

twelve months following the introduction of the
cation to the European Parliament and Council of

new law, asylum applications in Germany dropped
Ministers, the European Commission noted that

by 66 per cent on the levels of the preceding twelve
months.30 Given the fact that Germany continues
the application of the principle of third host countries
to receive far higher numbers of asylum appli-
to countries of transit will affect in particular the
cations than its EU partners, this decrease cannot
neighbouring countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
be attributed to the return of asylum-seekers to
observing that
other EU member states. Indeed, one might say
that Germany has acted, and continues to act, as
the implementation of asylum policies poses severe
an asylum 'buffer' for other west European states.
budgetary and operational problems for these
The fall in numbers is explained primarily by the countries.33
German authorities' ability, under the new legis-
Indeed, it has been argued repeatedly by
lation, to return asylum-seekers to 'safe' transit
refugee-support organizations that, in the light of
countries, and 'safe' countries of origin, in central
tighter refugee laws in Germany and elsewhere in
and eastern Europe.
Europe, central and east European states need
The majority of states now have similar legis-
urgent support from western Europe, both finan-
lation that allows for the return of asylum-seekers
cial and institutional, to strengthen systems of
to countries outside the principal west European
refugee protection and help these countries cope
groupings. Thus, transit or the 'mere possibility to
with the added burden of asylum applications
seek protection' in a third country is being used as
which will inevitably result from restricted access
a basis for refusing asylum in western Europe.
to asylum in western Europe.34
Furthermore, this is taking place in the absence of a
Unwilling, or unable, to take in greater and
multilateral legal instrument to regulate the prac-
greater numbers of asylum-seekers, such countries
tice. While some progress has been made on the
have followed the west European lead by attempt-
formulation of a parallel Dublin Convention to
ing to 'pass the buck' progressively east or south,
involve non-EU member states in western Europe
potentially resulting in a chain of deportations
(plus Canada and the United States), no clear
from one country to the next. As argued by
statement has been made to the effect that such an
Amnesty International:
instrument will, or is intended to be, extended to
the countries of central and eastern Europe. Even a

if individual countries or small groups of countries
framework for reaching common positions on the take measures to restrict the number of refugees and
conditions of protection and treatment of asylum- asylum-seekers reaching their territory, to return
asylum-seekers to so-called 'safe countries', and to

seekers in 'host third countries' among the EU
revise or reinterpret established international stand-
member states has yet to be fully developed. Nor is
ards designed to enhance refugee protection and
there any requirement in the resolution that the
international solidarity, then other states may feel
'host third country' agrees to readmit the asylum-
compelled to follow their example and the entire
seeker.3' At a conference convened by the Catholic
system is put in jeopardy.3
Academy in Stuttgart-Hohenheim in September
Of course, it is not long before the chain of 'safe'
1994, a judge of the Germany federal constitutional
returns becomes exhausted. Large numbers of the

court is reported to have criticized the rule on 'safe
4000 or so refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina who

third countries', comparing it to 'a roof for which
UNHCR report, agreements of this sort 'could

entered Sweden on Croatian passports, for exam-
potentially enhance the international protection of

ple, were returned to Croatia by the Swedish
authorities in 1994 on the basis that they could find refugees by leading to the orderly handling of
asylum applications'. The report argues, however,

protection there. These returns continued despite
information from the UNHCR, the Swedish Refu- that 'an analysis of current readmission agree-
ments indicates that such agreements are not
gee Council, Amnesty International and other
humanitarian organizations that a number of the originally meant for this purpose' and, indeed, that
expelled Bosnians had been returned to Bosnia by
they do not generally take into account the special
the Croatian authorities. The Croatian authorities
situation of asylum-seekers, in particular the responsi-
indicated that those repatriated would not be

bility of States to afford them access to fair procedures
registered as refugees in Croatia and, in October for the determination of refugee status and the grant-
1994, the representative of the Croatian immi- ing of asylum and in this way to ensure that refugees
are not subject, directly or indirectly, to refoulement.37

gration authorities confirmed that Croatia could
not guarantee that all rejected asylum-seekers
The purpose of these agreements is, indeed, to
returned from Sweden would be allowed to stay in
facilitate deportations, which can otherwise prove
Croatia, stating that those expelled from Sweden
a very costly, lengthy and complex process, par-
must return to Bosnia 'if they come from the
ticularly when the government of the state to
liberated areas ... and from areas where no battles
which individuals are being deported does not
are taking place' and adding that 'however much it
cooperate with the returning state. Although these
would like to, [Croatia] cannot take care of all the
agreements may not take into account the special
Bosnian refugees'.36
needs of asylum-seekers, a primary motivation for
Without adequate legal safeguards or inter-
the agreements with central and east European
national agreements on standards to be applied,
states has been the concern to facilitate the return
and without an adequate system of burden-sharing
of asylum-seekers to countries of origin and transit.
and/or adequate financial and institutional sup-
Not surprisingly, therefore, it was the German
port for the countries most affected, the inevitable
government which led the way, seeking a whole
outcome is an increase in the numbers of refugees
series of bilateral agreements, starting with
being returned to their country of origin without

Romania in September 1992, Bulgaria in November
their cases being given a fair hearing in a potential
1992, Poland in May 1993 and the Czech Republic
country of asylum. As with visa restrictions, the
in November 1994. In the words of the Schengen-
'safe third country' rule results initially in countries
Poland agreement, these agreements oblige each
outside western Europe absorbing many of the
signatory state to
asylum-seekers who might otherwise have been
the responsibility of governments in western readmit to its territory, on the request of another party,
without formalities, any person who does not fulfil (or
Europe. The end result is a strengthening of the
who no longer fulfils) the conditions of entry or
restrictions applied by these countries themselves,
residence prevailing on the territory of the requesting
ultimately leading to an eastwards expansion of
party.
the west European control regime and, possibly,
the virtual closing off of asylum channels in

Such arrangements have proliferated rapidly in
Europe, in the east as well as the west. recent years, leading to a complex 'web' of agree-
ments linking states throughout the region. Thus,
for example, Switzerland has sought agreements
'Readmission' agreements
with Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria; Austria has
concluded agreements with Hungary, the Czech

Although there is, as yet, no overarching multi-
lateral agreement regulating 'safe country' returns and Slovak Republics and Slovenia; and France
with Romania.
between west and east European states, the Schen-
Some of these agreements relate primarily to the

gen states and Poland reached a so-called 'readmis-
sion agreement' in March 1992 which was soon return of nationals of one of the signatory states,
often in return for reciprocal visa-free movement.

followed by the negotiation of a whole series of
bilateral agreements designed to facilitate returns Thus, for example, the agreement reached between
of rejected asylum-seekers and irregular migrants Poland and the Schengen states, as well as the
from one state to another. As observed in a recent

majority of agreements concluded between the
democratic societies and adequate social con-

Czech Republic and west European countries, are
concerned with the return of Polish and Czech ditions; [and] a liberal trade policy'41 - the 1993
nationals to Poland and Czechoslovakia respec- Action Plan places the emphasis firmly on
tively, thus facilitating visa-free access of Poles and readmission. It states that
Czechs to the west European states concerned.
[a]s regards incorporation of asylum and immigration
Meanwhile, agreements with Romania and
policy objectives in external relations... principles be
Bulgaria have been sought principally as a means

adopted which must appear in bilateral and multi-
of reducing the load of Romanian and Bulgarian

lateral readmission agreements [and] a link be estab-
lished where appropriate between Europe association

asylum-seekers on asylum systems in west
and cooperation agreements concluded by the Com-
European states.38
munity and its Member States and the practices of
Other agreements cover returns both of nation-
third countries regarding readmission.42
als of the countries in question and foreign
The central and east European states have been

nationals - including asylum-seekers and 'irregu-
lar' migrants - who have travelled to one state via willing to enter into these agreements because their
economic and political relations with western

the other. These agreements are therefore designed
inter alia to facilitate 'safe third country' returns of

Europe depend on their cooperation in matters
connected with migration, including relations in

asylum-seekers. This is the case, for example, with
the agreements reached between Austria and terms of their nationals' visa-free access to western
Hungary, between Austria and the Czech and Europe as visitors, businessmen and workers.
Slovak Republics, and between Germany and the Moreover, the formalization of return or 're-
Czech Republic.39 Others, such as the agreements admission' arrangements with countries in western
sought by the Swiss government with Hungary, Europe has been seen to have advantages because
these arrangements might regulate what is an

Bulgaria and Romania, have been intended inter
alia to facilitate the transit of rejected asylum- inevitable development and because many include
seekers directly back to their country of origin. provisions for financial and institutional assistance
Switzerland sought agreements with these three to improve these states' capacity to control im-
countries to allow for the transit of rejected

migration and cope with increasing numbers of
ethnic Albanian asylum-seekers to Kosovo after

asylum applications.
Macedonia decided to stop the transit of Kosovo However, so as to protect themselves from the
Albanians across its territory in late 1993. Serbian increase in numbers of asylum-seekers and other
unwillingness to readmit asylum-seekers from

migrant populations that these agreements are
Kosovo led to the suspension of deportations from

expected to bring about, governments in central
Switzerland, Austria and Sweden in December and eastern Europe have sought readmission
1994.40
agreements of their own with countries further
The importance attached to the readmission east or south. Thus, at the time of writing, Poland
had concluded readmission agreements with the

agreements by the west European governments
was reflected in the 'Plan of Action' and 'Priority Czech and Slovak Republics, Bulgaria, Hungary,
Work Programme' in the areas of justice and home Romania, Croatia and Ukraine, and was working
affairs adopted by EU ministers at the first Justice

on agreements with Belarus, Russia and the Baltic
and Home Affairs Council in December 1993. Both

states: the Czech Republic had concluded agree-
ments with the Slovak Republic, Romania and

documents list readmission as an area of priority as
regards asylum and immigration policy. Ministers Hungary (as well as Poland); Hungary (after an
also adopted a recommendation 'concerning a agreement with Austria) with Romania, the Slovak
framework text of a readmission agreement

Republic, Ukraine and Slovenia (as well as with the
Czech Republic and Poland).43 These agreements

between an EU member state and a third country'.
Indeed, in contrast to the EU's Declaration on are to a large extent dependent on one another.
Hence, the Czech Republic was unwilling to take

principles governing external aspects of migration
back deportees from Germany until agreements

policy issued at the Edinburgh European Council
in December 1992 - which called, among other had been secured with Romania, Bulgaria and
Slovakia (which depended on a new border agree-

things, for policies to promote 'the preservation
ment between the Czech and Slovak Republics);

of peace and termination of armed conflicts;
full respect for human rights; the creation of and the Slovak Republic was unwilling to
implement an agreement with the Czech Republic and restrict entries of asylum-seekers. Thus,
until it had reached agreements with Hungary, together with visa regulations, carrier sanctions
Ukraine and Romania. and the application of the 'safe third country' rule
Standing alone, a number of problems seem in western Europe, they are already proving effec-
likely to beset these agreements in terms of their

tive for 'buffering' countries in western Europe
from increasing numbers of asylum applications.

application on the ground. For example, once an
Principally as a result of the mechanisms discussed

asylum-seeker or immigrant has entered a country,
it is often very difficult to prove which country that

here - and despite continuing increases in refugee
person entered from, how long they have been in populations worldwide - asylum applications in
the receiving state and what the identity and, in western Europe have fallen significantly from the
many cases, the nationality of that person is. Even peak of 700 000 in 1992 to 550 000 in 1993, 320 000
where return is secured, there may be little guar- in 1994 and to just over 100 000 in the first half of
antee of adequate follow-up to ensure that those 1995.45
deported do not get a second (or third, or fourth, or
fifth) attempt at crossing the border (as has proved
Conclusion
a problem in the case of returns from Germany to
Poland). The secondary readmission agreements
As noted in the introduction, the prominence of
between central and east European countries, such
international migration on the European political
as that between Poland and the Czech Republic,
and security agendas is explained in large part by
may go some way to resolving this problem as they
the peculiar way in which the phenomenon both
should facilitate regulated transit back towards the
reflects and affects the geopolitical landscape at
country of origin. However, these have not yet
any one time. During the cold war, the restriction
been fully tested and reliance on them assumes a
of people's movement from east to west not only
level of control over land borders which has not
captured, in the most graphic way possible, the
been achieved even by Germany.
bipolar division of the European continent but that
Moreover, the financial costs of supporting a

division itself depended on the maintenance of
higher level of regulation in this area are likely to
those restrictions. Although initially instituted to
be very high. It is worth noting, for example, that,
protect their labour markets, the eastern bloc gov-
according to information from the German Federal
ernments came to look on emigration control as
Interior Ministry, the cost of expelling foreigners by

essential for protecting the ideological foundations
air from Germany was expected to reach some
of their socialist regimes. In the post-cold war era,
DM18 million in 1995.44 One is therefore led to
the increased movement of people within the
question whether the pay-off in terms of detection
former eastern bloc and between east and west
and deportation levels would be in any way pro-

provides a potent illustration of the breakdown of
portional to the costs of the system. Moreover, if a
the old east-west division. It reflects the lack of
tighter system were to be brought into operation, a
political integration and the instability of the new
further question of burden-sharing would arise.
system (in the form of increased refugee flows)46
Which countries would be responsible for bearing

but it also represents a central component of the
the costs? While countries such as Germany,

economic, political, social and cultural reinte-
Austria and Switzerland can afford to offer finan-
gration of the two sides of the continent. Yet the
cial 'sweeteners' to encourage neighbouring coun-
imposition of new restrictions on east-west move-
tries to enter into readmission agreements, it is not
ment, this time by the governments of western
entirely clear how countries such as Poland and the
Europe, also captures the limits to east-west
Slovak Republic are to encourage their neighbours
integration. As Anthony Richmond observes:
to participate fully in a potentially very costly
we recognise the existence of an interdependent global
readmission system. The 'buffer' countries often
economy in which information, goods, services, and
lack the resources to ship deportees home.
money move relatively freely in what has been
Nevertheless, these agreements are already
described as a 'borderless world' ... [Yet while the]
proving effective in facilitating 'safe third country'
goal of the so-called interlinked economy ... may be
returns of asylum-seekers and in putting pressure
free movement of labour across borders ... this is far
on governments in central and eastern Europe

from having been achieved. On the contrary, immi-
further to strengthen their immigration controls

gration doors are closing and freedom of movement is
limited for refugees and others ... Regional economic

little to alter their 'buffer' status, in the present
communities, such as the European Union ... are

situation it may be possible for the central
facilitating movement within the region while more
European states, and perhaps for some east
severely restricting access to it.47
European states, to transform their status to
The states of central and eastern Europe are, of become members of the 'protected' west, no doubt
course, becoming progressively incorporated into creating migration or asylum 'buffers' of their
the west European economic and political 'space' eastern and/or southern neighbours in the process.
In the meantime, it is to be hoped that their

but at present their integration is at a strictly
transitionary stage, as demonstrated by the uncer- buffer status will have the more positive feature of
tainty surrounding their future membership of the

representing a communication bridge or cultural,
EU and NATO. This transitionary status is also economic and political crossroads between east
clearly reflected in, and affected by, the position and west. However, this will happen only if their
of these states vis-a-vis migration and migration

economic and political stability is not severely
control. Although trade and other economic and disrupted by the very forces (including migration)
political barriers between west and east are being from which they are protecting western Europe
(i.e. if their asylum or migration 'buffer' status does

progressively broken down and, although west
not become more akin to a conflict-prone 'shatter-

European security guarantees may eventually be
extended to central and eastern Europe, these belt').49 For it should not be forgotten that, if
countries' integration with western Europe will be international migration constitutes a threat to west-
seen to be complete only when their nationals can ern Europe, it must constitute an even greater
move and work as freely within the Schengen and threat to the much less stable and prosperous
EU areas as EU citizens do today. And that day will

countries of central and eastern Europe.
come only when they themselves have succeeded Fortunately for these countries, however, the
in pushing the migration 'frontier' further east- 'threatening' aspect of migration is prone to exag-
wards or southwards, so that they are seen to be

geration and, at least in the west European setting,
'buffered' from unwanted immigration in the same has proved itself to be an issue played out more in
terms of threat perception than actual threats to

way that they themselves buffer western Europe
today. stability. Thus, while no less important in geo-
Because of the symbolic importance of migration political terms, the 'protective' mechanisms set up
controls for defining 'insiders' and 'outsiders' in

to restrict unwanted migration are in many ways
more significant at the level of perception than in

terms of national (or regional) identities, the posi-
tion of the migration 'frontier' or 'buffer' in Europe terms of the reality on the ground. As Major-
can be seen as being of fundamental importance General J H Marshall-Cornwall observed in his
treatise on 'Geographic disarmament', published

for defining where the (stable) 'west' ends and the
less stable 'east' begins in perceptions of the new in 1935,
and changing European geopolitical order. John
Security is a mental state, not so much based on
O'Loughlin and Herman van der Wusten note that,
deductive reasoning as inspired by faith and confi-
while the border between the eastern bloc and rest
dence... We sleep more securely in a country cottage
of Europe was frozen by the cold war, there was no
surrounded by a garden than if that cottage gave
doubt as to the location of the western frontier of
directly on to the main road. The garden wall may be
western Europe. The situation today, however, is

totally ineffective as an obstacle; possibly we do not
less clear-cut and much more dynamic: we now

even lock the gate at night; but we are surrounded
talk again of 'central' Europe, a geopolitical con- with a zone of space, and that zone, though it cannot
physically guarantee security, yet psychologically

cept which more or less disappeared from view
imparts it. Transpose the garden wall into a national

after the Second World War.48 Although central-
frontier and the same effect is produced ... We have
eastern Europe was seen as a buffer between two
replaced the 'razor's edge' of sharp contact by a
great European powers during the interwar period,
blunter insulating zone. In future we must think of
the region can now be seen to be treated by
frontiers, not as lines, but as zones, which, in effect,
western Europe as a buffer between relative order
they are.so
and stability in the west and chaos and conflict to
the east and south of the continent. But whereas, It is, perhaps, to be hoped that the new asylum
during the interwar period, these states could do and migration 'frontier' or 'buffer zone' emerging
workers are lawfully employed in the EU; and

in central and eastern Europe serves the purpose of
access to the labour market for legally resident
pacifying worries in western Europe about the
spouses and children of a legally employed worker
perceived vulnerability to unwanted immigration
for the duration of the worker's authorized employ-
without succeeding to the point where borders are
ment. See Guild E 1992 Protecting migrants' rights:
sealed off and pressures build up to unmanageable
application of EC agreements with third countries
levels in the'new asylum or migration 'buffer'
CCME Briefing Paper no. 10, Churches Committee
states on western Europe's borders. The burden
for Migrants in Europe, Brussels.
of migration control in Europe now rests on the
8. As defined by Mathison T 1971 The functions of
receiving states. As they exercise this control,

small states in the strategies of great powers Scandina-
receiving governments should not lose sight of

vian University Books, Oslo, cited in Greenfeld
what is at stake. The world is still divided into Partem M 1983 The buffer system in international
relations Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 1 (March

states but the borders between states are 'soft': they
1983) 4. See also Marshall-Cornwall J H 1935 Geo-

remain open for emigration and, despite the intro-
graphic disarmament: a study of regional demilitariz-
duction of more restrictive migration policies, par-
ation Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute
tially open for immigration. This is fundamental to
of International Affairs, London, especially Chapter
the liberal western vision of the world and thus
IV; and see Chay J and Ross T E eds 1986 Buffer
might be expected to be central to the values of
states in world politics Westview Press (Westview
democracy and respect for human rights which the
Special Studies in International Relations), Boulder,
west professes to see take root in the former eastern
CO, and London.
bloc. A world in which people can move to work,
9. Chay and Ross 1986 Buffer states in world politics op.
form families or, when forced to, seek protection

cit.
should be one of the great achievements of

10. See Marshall-Cornwall 1935 Geographic disarma-
modernity and, as such, safeguarded. ment op. cit., especially Chapter I.
11. Figure provided by the Intergovernmental Consul-
tations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies
in Europe, North America and Australia (June

Notes
1995), quoted in Migration News Sheet 148/95-07
1. Hassner P 1993 Culture and society The Inter-
(July 1995) 10.
national Spectator 26 1 151, quoted in Buzan B 1993
12. At the time of writing, the Schengen Implementing
Introduction: the changing security agenda in
Convention had officially entered into force (March
Europe in Waever O Buzan B Kelstrup M Lemaitre
1995) but had not been fully implemented due to
P eds Identity, migration and the new security agenda in
France's reimposition of controls on the borders
Europe Pinter Publishers, London 3.
with its Schengen neighbours; and the External
2. Buzan B 1993 Introduction op. cit. 8.
Borders Convention remained unsigned owing
3. Williams C H and Williams S 1993 Issues of peace
principally to a dispute between the United King-
and security in contemporary Europe in Williams C
dom and Spain over the status of Gibraltar.
H ed. The political geography of the new world order
For further discussion of these conventions, see
Belhaven Press, London and New York 102.
Collinson S 1994 Europe and international migration
4. Buzan B 1993 Introduction op. cit. 12-13.
2nd edn. Pinter Publishers for the Royal Institute of
5. Heisler M O and Layton-Henry Z 1993 Migration
International Affairs, London 120-32.
and the links between social and societal security in
13. Cour Bodtcher A and Hughes A 1991 The effects of
Waever O Buzan B Kelstrup M Lemaitre P eds
legislation imposing fines on airlines for transport-
Identity, migration and the new security agenda in
ing undocumented passengers in Danish Refugee
Europe Pinter Publishers, London 162.
Council and Danish Center of Human Rights The
6. Hudak V 1993 East-central Europe and the Czech
effects of carrier sanctions on the asylum system Danish
and Slovak Republics in a new security environ-
Refugee Council, Copenhagen 11-12.
ment in Kipp J W ed. Central European security
14. Amnesty International 1993 Refugee protection at
concerns: bridge, buffer or barrier? Frank Cass, London
risk. Amnesty International's recommendations to the
121-3.
44th session of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR
7. In contrast to the free-movement provisions for
AI Index POL 33/06/93 (September 1993) Amnesty
states joining the European economic area. The
International (International Secretariat), London 10.
Europe agreements contain no right of access for
15. Migration News Sheet 131/94-02 (February 1994).
workers from the Association countries but guaran-
16. Migration News Sheet 139/94-10 (October 1994).

tee protection from discrimination as regards work-
ing conditions, remuneration or dismissal when 17. See Le Monde Diplomatique 10 January 1994.
18. International Organisation for Migration 1994 1994), 138/94-09 (September 1994), 139/94-10
Transit migration in the Czech Republic IOM, Geneva. (October 1994) and 140/94-11 (November 1994).
37. UNHCR 1994 Readmission agreements, 'protection

elsewhere' and asylum policy Paper presented to

risk op. cit. 10.
the Committee of Permanent Representatives at the

20. OECD, Continuous Reporting System on
Permanent Representation of Germany to the
Migration (SOPEMI) 1994 Trends in international
European Union UNHCR, Geneva 1.

migration: annual report 1993 OECD, Paris 133.
38. Readmission agreements reported to the Inter-

21. Migration News Sheet 145/95-04 (April 1995) and
governmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee

150/95-09 (September 1995); and OECD, Continu-
and Migration Policies in Europe, North America

ous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI)
and Australia in Migration News Sheet 148/95-07
1995 Trends in international migration: annual report
(July 1995) 7.
1994 OECD, Paris.
39. Ibid.
22. OECD (SOPEMI) 1995 Trends in international
40. Migration News Sheet 142/95-01 (January 1995).
migration 1994 op. cit. 59.
41. Council of Ministers 1992 Declaration on Prin-
23. Ibid., 58 and 152-5.
ciples Governing External Aspects of Migration
24. Ibid. See also International Organisation for Mi-
Policy in Conclusions of the Presidency SN 456/1/92
gration 1994 Transit migration in the Czech Republic;
REV 1 Edinburgh, December.
Transit migration in Poland; Transit migration in
42. EU Council of Ministers document 10655/93 JAI
Bulgaria; and Transit migration in Ukraine IOM,
11.
Geneva.
43. Readmission Agreements Reported to the Inter-
25. Le Monde Diplomatique 10 January 1994.
governmental Consultations op. cit. Migration News
26. International Organisation for Migration 1994
Sheet 148/95-07 (July 1995); OECD 1995 Trends in
Transit migration in the Czech Republic op. cit.; and
international migration 1994 op. cit.; and Migration
Migration News Sheet 145/95-04 (April 1995).
News Sheet various issues.
27. UNHCR November 1994 Fair and expeditious asy-
44. Migration News Sheet 145/95-04 (April 1995). Note
lum procedures Paper presented to the Committee
that much of this cost is borne by the airlines
of Permanent Representatives at the Permanent
concerned, as is stipulated under carrier liability
Representation of Germany to the European Union
rules.
UNHCR, Geneva 3.
45. Figures from the Intergovernmental Consultations
28. Subsequently joined by Italy, Spain, Portugal and
on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in
Greece in the early 1990s and by Austria in 1995.
Europe, North America and Australia (June 1995),
29. See, for example, The Guardian 26 July 1993.
reported in Migration News Sheet 148/95-07 (July
30. Migration News Sheet 137/94-08 (August 1994).
1995) 10.
46. Richmond A H 1994 Global apartheid: refugees,
risk op. cit. 4-5.
racism, and the new world order Oxford University
32. Migration News Sheet 139/94-10 (October 1994).
Press, Toronto, New York and Oxford 106.
33. Commission of the European Communities 1994

47. Ibid.
Communication from the Commission to the Council and

48. O'Loughlin J and van der Wusten H eds 1993 The
the European Parliament on immigration and asylum

new political geography of eastern Europe in The
policies COM(94) 23 final, EC Commission, Brussels

new political geography of eastern Europe Belhaven
27.
Press, London and New York 1.
34. See, for example, The Guardian 26 May 1994.

49. For a discussion of this concept, see Hensel P R and
35. Amnesty International 1993 Refugee protection at Diehl P F 1994 Testing empirical propositions about
risk op. cit. 1. shatterbelts, 1945-76 Political Geography 13 1 33-51.
50. Marshall-Cornwall 1935 Geographic disarmament

36. See The Independent 7 April 1994; The Guardian 13
op. cit. 175.

July 1994; Migration News Sheet 137/94-08 (August

Visa Requirements, Carrier Sanctions, 'Safe Third Countries' and 'Readmission' - The Development of An Asylum 'Buffer Zone' in Europe Authors(s) - Sarah Collinson

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Visa Requirements, Carrier Sanctions, 'Safe Third Countries' and 'Readmission': The

Development of an Asylum 'Buffer Zone' in Europe

Visa requirements, carrier sanctions, 'safe

third countries' and 'readmission': the

development of an asylum 'buffer zone' in

borders of potential 'receiving' states. In addition to examining the mechanisms by

questions raised by this development in relation to the changing geopolitical

landscape of Europe, particularly in relation to the changing political and security

key words Europe refugee asylum flows buffer zones geopolitics

revised manuscript received 2 October 1995

Since the events of 1989, migration has been at the

seekers at its doors.

It was not long after the collapse of the Berlin

over the perceived threat of mass uncontrolled

ently threatening disorder in the east following the

the like - was suddenly elevated to the level of

national security interests of the states and societies

Trans Inst Br Geogr NS 21 76-90 1996

Western Europe therefore faces

potential for war between two superpowers. The

major questions about the nature of the larger regional

new perceived threats facing western Europe fol-

environment in which the EU, whatever its configur-

lowing the breakdown of the cold war bipolar

ation, will have to operate.4

system - including migration, refugee flows, illegal

nature and reflect a shift in the nexus of the

formations taking place on the European continent

and the nation' have become combined into 'one

tion of the eastern bloc but also forced the pace of

the eastern bloc. West European governments had

reform in the region. According to Barry Buzan, the

nent of a functioning single market. And, in the

throughout Europe.2 Yet western Europe was

whether of refugees or voluntary migrants - not

which undermined the confidence of governments

of a new, more dynamic, geopolitical configuration

EFTA member states. Thus, the redefinition of configuration.

It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that west-

no longer divided into two 'hermetically sealed

blocs'3 - and the concomitant redefinition of rela-

tions between western Europe and its eastern and

cold-war era has been replaced by a pattern of

EU or western Europe as a whole is clearly within

example of the erosion of state sovereignty. More-

over, the fact that the majority of these migrants

would have been excluded had the state been

by its location next to both the disintegrating Soviet

better able to control their movement means that,

other, the more immediate concern to protect stab-

society. Since immigrants, by definition, represent

the 'outside brought within', they are liable to be

Heisler and Zig Layton-Henry, the

west European policy has left the central and east

capacity of social, economic, political and adminis-

European countries in something of a security and

trative institutions to integrate large numbers of immi-

power vacuum, caught precariously between, to

grants ... affects the stability of society and therefore

the west, a group of prosperous states engaged in

the ability of receiving states' governments to govern.

their own troubled process of integration and, to

They argue, such challenges