G.R. No.
74433 September 14, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte,
sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of
murder with double frustrated murder.
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With the
approval of the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all
existing death sentences to life imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to
inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In
compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished to continue
with the case by way of an appeal.
The information (amended) in this case reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban accuses Francisco
Abarca of the crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of Tacloban,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill and with
evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed with an
unlicensed firearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot several times KHINGSLEY
PAUL KOH on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon
said KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH gunshot wounds which caused his
instantaneous death and as a consequence of which also caused
gunshot wounds to LINA AMPARADO and ARNOLD AMPARADO on
the different parts of their bodies thereby inflicting gunshot wounds
which otherwise would have caused the death of said Lina
Amparado and Arnold Amparado, thus performing all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crimes of murders as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of his will, that is by the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to Lina Amparado and Arnold
Amparado which prevented their death. 1
xxx xxx xxx
On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The Solicitor General
states accurately the facts as follows:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny,
had illicit relationship. The illicit relationship apparently began while
the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations.
His wife was left behind in their residence in Tacloban, Leyte (pp.
45-47, 65, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).
On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban,
Leyte. On the morning of that date he went to the bus station to go
to Dolores, Eastern Samar, to fetch his daughter. However, he was
not able to catch the first trip (in the morning). He went back to the
station in the afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but the bus had
engine trouble and could not leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28, 1985). The
accused, then proceeded to the residence of his father after which
he went home. He arrived at his residence at the V & G Subdivision
in Tacloban City at around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon (pp. 8-9,
tsn, Id.).
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and
Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and
Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his
revolver. The accused who was then peeping above the built-in
cabinet in their room jumped and ran away (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.).
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to
the house of a PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at around
6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his
house at V & G Subdivision. He was not able to find his wife and Koh
there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was the
"hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong.
He fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle (pp. 13-19,
tsn, Id.). Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were
occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was playing
mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused (pp. 34-49,
tsn, Sept. 24, 1984). Kingsley Koh died instantaneously of
cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of
multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and abdomen (pp. 28-
29, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984; see also exh. A): Arnold Amparado was
hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet (pp.
17-23, tsn, Oct. 17, 1984; see also exh. C). His wife, Lina Amparado,
was also treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments
(p. 23, tsn, Id.). Arnold Amparado who received a salary of nearly
P1,000.00 a month was not able to work for 1-1/2 months because
of his wounds. He spent P15,000.00 for medical expenses while his
wife spent Pl,000.00 for the same purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn, Id. ). 2
On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment, the dispositive
portion whereof reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1
 WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Francisco Abarca guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with double
frustrated murder as charged in the amended information, and
pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code which does not
consider the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances when
the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48,
he is hereby sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of Khingsley
Paul Koh in the sum of P30,000, complainant spouses Arnold and
Lina Amparado in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley Paul Koh
and defendant's wife had illicit relationship while he was away in
Manila; that the accused had been deceived, betrayed, disgraced
and ruined by his wife's infidelity which disturbed his reasoning
faculties and deprived him of the capacity to reflect upon his acts.
Considering all these circumstances this court believes the accused
Francisco Abarca is deserving of executive clemency, not of full
pardon but of a substantial if not a radical reduction or
commutation of his death sentence.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Excellency, the President
of the Philippines, thru the Ministry of Justice, Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
xxx xxx xxx
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the court a quo:
I.
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED INSTEAD OF ENTERING A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE;
II.
IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF TREACHERY. 4
The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code defining death inflicted under exceptional circumstances, complexed with
double frustrated murder. Article 247 reads in full:
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional
circumstances. — Any legally married person who, having surprised
his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he
shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to
parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age,
and their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife
or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of
the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the
instant case. There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her
paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which,
he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes
the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the
act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of
them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are
present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of murder,
therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the
accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and
the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the
continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal
Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . .
immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that
he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death
caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after
chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have
been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been
influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the
accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an
offense. 5 In People v. Araque, 6 we said:
xxx xxx xxx
As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code,
the above-quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely
provides or grants a privilege or benefit — amounting practically to
an exemption from an adequate punishment — to a legally married
person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the
act of committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any
or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict
upon them any serious physical injury. Thus, in case of death or
serious physical injuries, considering the enormous provocation and
his righteous indignation, the accused — who would otherwise be
criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or
serious physical injury, as the case may be — is punished only
with destierro. This penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a
2
 case, is intended more for the protection of the accused than a
punishment. (People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where physical
injuries other than serious are inflicted, the offender is exempted
from punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or the
exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an
exempting circumstance, for even where death or serious physical
injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to
no punishment at all. A different interpretation, i.e., that it defines
and penalizes a distinct crime, would make the exceptional
circumstances which practically exempt the accused from criminal
liability integral elements of the offense, and thereby compel the
prosecuting officer to plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the
information. Such an interpretation would be illogical if not absurd,
since a mitigating and much less an exempting circumstance cannot
be an integral element of the crime charged. Only "acts or omissons
. . . constituting the offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or
information, and a circumstance which mitigates criminal liability or
exempts the accused therefrom, not being an essential element of
the offense charged-but a matter of defense that must be proved to
the satisfaction of the court-need not be pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106,
Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil., 368.)
That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest
when we consider that its counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article
423) was found under the General Provisions (Chapter VIII) of Title
VIII covering crimes against persons. There can, we think, hardly be
any dispute that as part of the general provisions, it could not have
possibly provided for a distinct and separate crime.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
does not define and provide for a specific crime, but grants a
privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing of another or the
infliction of serious physical injuries under the circumstances
therein mentioned. ... 7
xxx xxx xxx
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that
is intended for his protection. 8
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not
being a punishable act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or
other qualifying circumstances, We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this
case.
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical
injuries suffered by Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado who were caught in the
crossfire as the accused-appellant shot the victim. The Solicitor General recommends
a finding of double frustrated murder against the accused-appellant, and being the
more severe offense, proposes the imposition of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is where we disagree.
The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although
as a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that
rule presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. 9
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not
committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death
under exceptional circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the
appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any
responsibility. Granting the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he
fired shots at the victim, he cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it
appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words ("an waray
labot kagawas,") 10 that is not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries
sustained by the Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part.
Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365,
that is, less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. (The
records show that Arnold Amparado was incapacitated for one and one-half
months; 11 there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the extent of
her injuries. We presume that she was placed in confinement for only ten to fourteen
days based on the medical certificate estimating her recovery period.) 12
For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose
upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in
its maximum period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro). 13
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant
is sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period
within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these
penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the
sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as
and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to
costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED
3
[G.R. No. 123819. November 14, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. STEPHEN MARK
WHISENHUNT, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a direct appeal from the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 152, in Criminal Case No. 102687, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Stephen Mark Whisenhunt guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder defined and penalized under Art. 248, Revised Penal
Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties provided for by law, to pay the heirs of the deceased the amount
of P100,000.00 representing actual expenses for the funeral services and wake for 5
days, P3,000,000.00 by way of moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount of
P1,000,000.00 and attorneys fees in the amount of P150,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On November 19, 1993, accused-appellant was formally charged with the
murder of Elsa Santos-Castillo, under an Information which read:
That on or about September 24, 1993, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and
taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon
the person of one Elsa Elsie Santos Castillo by then and there stabbing her with a
bladed weapon in different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her death and thereafter
outraged or scoffed her corpse by then and there chopping off her head and different
parts of her body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and was raffled to
Branch 152. On January 6, 1994, accused-appellant was arraigned with the assistance
of counsel de parte. He entered a plea of not guilty.[4]
The evidence shows that accused-appellant and the deceased, Elsa Santos-
Castillo, also known as Elsie, were lovers. They met at the Apex Motor Corporation
where accused-appellant was the Manager while Elsa was the Assistant Personnel
Manager. Both accused-appellant and Elsa were married, but they were estranged
from their respective spouses. In April 1993, Elsa resigned from Apex presumably to
avoid the nasty rumors about her illicit affair with accused-appellant.[5] It appears,
however, that she continued her affair with accused-appellant even after she
resigned from Apex Motor Corporation.
On September 23, 1993, Demetrio Ravelo, an Apex employee assigned to drive
for accused-appellant, reported for work at 8:30 a.m. at the latters condominium unit
at the Platinum Condominium, Annapolis Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila.[6] Accused-appellant ordered him to fetch Elsa at her parents house in
Blumentritt, Manila at 10:30 a.m. He found Elsa standing at a corner near her parents
house, wearing a violet-colored blouse with floral prints, and was carrying three bags
--- a paper bag, a violet Giordano bag and a thick brown leather bag with the
trademark of Mitsubishi. He brought Elsa to accused-appellants condominium unit.[7]
At 2:00 p.m., Elsa told Demetrio to go to the Apex office in Mandaluyong to
deliver a paper bag to Amy Serrano, the Personnel Manager. He proceeded to the
Apex office, and then returned to Platinum. Accused-appellant asked him to stay
because he had to drive Elsa home at 10:00 p.m. He waited until a little past 10:00
p.m. When he had not heard from accused-appellant, he told Lucy, the housemaid,
that he was going home.[8]
The following day, Demetrio again reported at accused-appellants unit. At
around noon, Lucy asked if he had seen a kitchen knife which was missing. He then
overheard Lucy ask accused-appellant who told her that the kitchen knife was in his
bedroom. Demetrio saw accused-appellant go inside the room and, shortly
thereafter, hand the knife to Lucy.[9]
At 3:40 p.m., Lucy told Demetrio to buy cigarettes for accused-appellant. He
went out to buy the cigarettes and gave them to Lucy. At 5:00 p.m., accused-
appellant told Demetrio to go home.[10]
On September 25, 1993, Demetrio reported at the Platinum Condominium at
around 8:00 a.m. He was allowed by accused-appellant to go to Apex to follow up his
salary. While he was there, Amy Serrano asked him if Elsa was still in accused-
appellants condominium unit. Although Demetrio did not see Elsa there, he answered
yes. Amy gave him black plastic garbage bags which he turned over to accused-
appellant upon his return to the condominium. The latter then ordered him to drive
Lucy to Cubao and to go home to get some clothes, since they were leaving for Bagac,
Bataan. On the way to Cubao, Lucy told Demetrio that she was going home. He
dropped her off in front of the Farmers Market. Thereafter, he proceeded to his
house in Fairview, Quezon City, to pick up some clothes, then returned to the
condominium at around 10:00 a.m.[11]
Accused-appellant asked him to check the fuel gauge of the car. He was told to
go to Apex to get a gas slip and then to gas up. At around noon, he went back to the
condominium.He had lunch outside at Goodah, then returned to accused-appellants
unit and stayed in the servants quarters.[12]
While Demetrio was in the servants quarters watching television, accused-
appellant came in. He asked Demetrio how long he wanted to work for him. Demetrio
replied that he was willing to work for him forever, and expressed his full trust in
him. Upon hearing this, accused-appellant shed tears and embraced Demetrio. Then
accused-appellant said, May problema ako, Rio. Demetrio asked what it was, and
accused-appellant told him that Elsa was dead. Demetrio asked, Bakit mo siya
pinatay?[13] Accused-appellant answered that he did not kill Elsa, rather she died
of bangungot.[14]
Demetrio suggested that Elsas body be autopsied, but accused-appellant said
that he had already beheaded her. He asked Demetrio if he wanted to see the
decapitated body, but the latter refused. The two of them went to Shoppesville at the
4
Greenhills Shopping Center and bought a big bag with a zipper and rollers, colored
black and gray.[15] Demetrio noticed that accused-appellant seemed nervous and his
eyes were teary and bloodshot.
When they returned to the condominium, accused-appellant asked Demetrio to
help him wrap the body in the black garbage bags. Demetrio entered accused-
appellants bathroom and found the dismembered hands, feet, trunk and head of a
woman. He lifted the severed head by the hair and, when he lifted it, he saw Elsas
face. He placed this in a black trash bag.He helped accused-appellant place the other
body parts in three separate garbage bags. They packed all the garbage bags in the
bag with the zipper and rollers, which they had bought in Shoppesville. Then, they
brought the bag down and loaded it in the trunk of accused-appellants car. After that,
they boarded the car. Demetrio took the wheel and accused-appellant sat beside him
in front.[16]
It was almost 2:00 p.m. when Demetrio and accused-appellant left the
condominium. Accused-appellant told Demetrio to drive around Batangas and
Tagaytay City. After leaving Tagaytay, they entered the South Luzon Expressway and
headed towards Sta. Rosa, Laguna. When they were near Puting Kahoy and Silangan,
accused-appellant told Demetrio to turn into a narrow road. Somewhere along that
road, accused-appellant ordered Demetrio to stop the car.[17]
Accused-appellant alighted and told Demetrio to get the bag in the
trunk. Accused-appellant took the plastic bags inside the bag and dumped them by
the roadside. Then, accused-appellant returned the empty bag in the trunk and
boarded the car. He called Demetrio and said, Tayo na Rio, tuloy na tayo sa Bataan. It
was already 6:30 p.m.[18]
Demetrio drove to the Sta. Rosa exit gate, along the South Luzon Expressway,
through EDSA and towards the North Luzon Expressway. They stopped at a gasoline
station to refuel.They then took the San Fernando, Pampanga exit, and were soon en
route to the Whisenhunt family mansion in Bagac, Bataan.[19]
Before reaching Bagac, accused-appellant ordered Demetrio to stop the car on
top of a bridge. Accused-appellant told Demetrio to get off and to throw a bag into
the river. Later, they passed another bridge and accused-appellant again told
Demetrio to pull over. Accused-appellant alighted and threw Elsas clothes over the
bridge. On the way, Demetrio noticed that accused-appellant took something from a
bag, tore it to pieces and threw it out of the window. When they passed Pilar, Bataan,
accused-appellant threw Elsas violet Giordano bag.As they reached the road
boundary of Bagac, accused-appellant wrung a short-sleeved dress with violet and
green stripes, and threw it on a grassy lot.[20]
It was about midnight when accused-appellant and Demetrio arrived at the
mansion. Demetrio was unable to sleep that night, as he was scared that he might be
the next victim.[21]
The next morning, at 11:00 a.m., accused-appellant ordered Demetrio to clean
the trunk of the car, saying, Rio, linisan mo ang sasakyan para ang compartment hindi
babaho.[22] At 1:00 p.m., accused-appellant and Demetrio started off for Manila. As
they passed a place called Kabog-kabog, he saw accused-appellant take out an ATM
card. Accused-appellant burned the middle of the card, twisted it and threw it out of
the window. They arrived at the corner of EDSA and Quezon Avenue at 2:30
p.m. Demetrio asked accused-appellant if he can get off since he wanted to go home
to Fairview. Before Demetrio left, accused-appellant told him, Rio, you and your
family can go on a vacation. I will give you money. Accused-appellant then gave
Demetrio P50.00 for his transportation going to Fairview.[23]
When Demetrio got home, he immediately told his family what happened. His
wife told him to report the incident to Fiscal Joey Diaz. Demetrio and his wife went to
the house of Fiscal Diaz in Fairview to talk to him.[24]
The following morning, September 27, 1993, Fiscal Diaz, Demetrio, his wife and
his brothers went to the Department of Justice. They were referred to the National
Bureau of Investigation, where Demetrio gave his statement before Atty. Artemio
Sacaquing, head of the Anti-Organized Crime Division.[25]
Initially, Atty. Sacaguing could not believe what he heard and thought Demetrio
was exaggerating. He dispatched a team of NBI agents, headed by Marianito
Panganiban, to verify Demetrios report.[26] Accompanied by Demetrio, the team
proceeded to Barangay Polong, Sta. Cruz, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. There, they found a
crowd of people gathered around the mutilated parts of a human body along the
road.[27] The body parts had been discovered by tricycle drivers. The Sta. Rosa Police,
under Chief Investigator SPO3 Alipio Quintos, was already conducting an
investigation. Agent Panganiban radioed Atty. Sacaguing in Manila that Demetrios
report was positive.[28]
The mutilated body parts were brought to the Lim de Mesa Funeral Parlor in Sta.
Rosa. Two NBI agents, together with Demetrio, went to the house of Elsas family to
inform them of her death. The NBI agents accompanied Elsas two sisters, Amelia
Villadiego and Elida Santos, to the funeral parlor, where they identified the body parts
as belonging to Elsa.
In the morning of September 28, 1993, accused-appellant was arrested by
operatives of the NBI as he drove up to his parking space at Apex Motor
Corporation.[29] When Atty. Sacaguing approached and introduced himself, accused-
appellant became nervous and started to tremble.[30]
Accused-appellant was brought to the NBI in his car. When he arrived there,
Atty. Sacaguing informed him that it may be necessary to impound the car since,
based on Demetrios statement, the same was used in the commission of the
crime. Accused-appellant asked permission to retrieve personal belongings from the
car. After getting his things from the car, accused-appellant opened the trunk to place
some items inside. When he opened the compartment, the people around the car
moved away because of the foul stench that emanated from inside. Atty. Sacaguing
inspected the interior of the trunk and found stains on the lawanit board lying flat
inside the compartment, which he suspected to be blood. Thus, he instructed his
agents to fetch a technician from the NBI Chemistry Division to examine the stain. [31]
5
 During Atty. Sacaguings interview of accused-appellant, he noticed contusions
on accused-appellants lower lip and cheek. As standard procedure, and in order to
rule out any accusation of violence on accused-appellant on the part of the NBI
agents, Atty. Sacaguing ordered a medical examination of accused-appellant.[32]
The Medico-Legal Officer found contusions on accused-appellants left
periumbilical region, right elbow, left and right forearms and right leg. [33]
That same afternoon, before the close of office hours, accused-appellant was
brought to the Department of Justice for inquest. [34] However, accused-appellant
moved that a preliminary investigation be conducted, and signed a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, he was detained at the
NBI.[35]
On September 29, 1993, armed with a search warrant, [36] the NBI agents
conducted a search of the condominium unit of accused-appellant. They recovered
hair strands from underneath the rubber mat and rugs inside accused-appellants
bathroom.[37] In accused-appellants bedroom, they found bloodstains on the
bedspread and covers. They also found a pair of Topsider shoes with bloodstains, a
bottle of Vicks Formula 44 cough syrup, and some more hair strands on the
lampshade.[38]
Later that day, Demetrio Ravelo accompanied some NBI agents to retrace the
route he took with accused-appellant going to Bataan, with the objective of retrieving
the items thrown away by accused-appellant. They were able to recover a violet bag,
one brown sandal and a shirt with violet and green floral prints, [39] which were
brought to the NBI office. Amelia Santos Villadiego, Elsas sister, was summoned to
identify the items.[40]
In the meantime, Caroline Y. Custodio, Supervising Forensic Biologist of the NBI,
who conducted comparative examinations between the hair specimens found in
accused-appellants bathroom and hair samples taken from the victim while she lay in
state, found that the questioned hair specimen showed similarities to the hair taken
from the victim.[41]
Custodio further reported that the bloodstains on the bed cushion cover,
bedspread and Topsider shoes, all found inside accused-appellants bedroom, gave
positive results for human blood, showing reactions of Group B. [42] The bloodstains on
the plywood board taken from accused-appellants vehicle were also examined and
found to give positive results for human blood showing reactions of Group B. [43] On
the other hand, the examination of blood taken from the victim likewise showed
reactions of Group B.[44]
Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, the Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy,
concluded that the cause of death of Elsa Santos Castillo were stab wounds. [45] Dr.
Mendez found one stab wound on the right breast which penetrated the right
lung. He also found two stab wounds under the left breast which penetrated the
diaphragm and abdominal cavity, and also penetrated the right portion of the
liver.[46] More particularly, the autopsy yielded the following postmortem findings:
Body in moderately advanced stage of decomposition.
Head, decapitated, level above 4th cervical vertebra; both hands severed cutting
completely the lower ends of both radius and ulna; both legs, disarticulated at knee
joints and cut-off with both patellar bones, missing; both feet, disarticulated at the
ankle joints and cut-off; all soft tissues of both thighs and perineum, removed,
exposing completely the femoral bones and partially the pelvic bone,
Incised wounds: 19.5 cms., left axillary area; 55.0 cms., thoraco-abdominal area, along
median line, with the abdominal incision involving the whole thickness and the
thoracic incision involving the soft tissues and cutting the sternum from the xiphoid
process up to the level of the third cartilage; from the 3 rd cartilage up to the lower
border of the neck.
Abdominal organs, removed from the abdominal cavity.
Contusions: 26.0 x 16.5 cms., face, more on the left side involving the forehead,
temporal, nasal, orbital and maxillary areas; 25.0 x 11.0 cms., deltoid area, extending
down to the upper 2/3, arm, left.
Incised Wound, 3.0 cms., neck area, along anterior median line.
Hematoma, scalp, massive, temporo-parietal, left.
STAB WOUNDS:
1. 1.8 cms., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented obliquely with sharp infero-lateral
extremity and blunt supero-medial extremity, located at the mammary area, right; 3.0
cms., from the anterior median line, directed backwards, downwards and laterally,
involving the soft tissues, cutting completely the 4th cartilage, right side, into the right
thoracic cavity, penetrating the lower of the right lung with an approximate depth 8.5
cms.
2. 0.8 cm., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented almost vertically, with sharp inferior
extremity and blunt superior extremity, located at the inframammary area, left, 1.1
cms., from the anterior median line, directed backwards, downwards and medially,
involving the soft tissues only with an approximate depth of 2.0 cms.
3. 2.0 cms., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented obliquely, with sharp infero-lateral
extremity and blunt supero-medial extremity, located at the inframammary area, left,
2.2 cms., from the anterior median line, directed backwards, downwards, and from
left to right, involving the soft tissues, into the left thoracic cavity, perforating the
diaphragm, into the abdominal cavity, penetrating the right lobe of the liver with an
approximate depth 10.0 cms.
Brain, markedly softened and reduced to grayish white, pultaceous mass.
Other visceral organs, putrified,
Stomach is almost empty.
CAUSE OF DEATH: --- STAB WOUNDS.[47]
In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that he stayed home on September 23,
1993 because he was not feeling well. He denied that he asked Demetrio Ravelo to
fetch Elsa. He refuted Demetrios testimony that accused-appellant asked him to buy
cigarettes, or that accused-appellant told him to go home at 5:00 p.m.. Rather,
accused-appellant maintained that he did not see Demetrio at any time in the
afternoon of September 24, 1993.[48]
6
 On September 25, 1993, accused-appellant alleged that he was feeling better,
hence, told Demetrio that they were to leave for Bagac, Bataan that afternoon. They
left the condominium at about 1:00 to 1:30 p.m. and proceeded straight to
Bagac. When they arrived at Bagac, accused-appellant went straight to the kitchen
and met his mother, father, aunt and grandmother. Demetrio got the things out of
the car and then asked accused-appellants permission to take the car to go to the
town.[49]
Accused-appellants mother, Mrs. Nieves Whisenhunt, testified that accused-
appellant arrived at their beach house in Bagac, Bataan on September 25, 1993 at
5:00 p.m. At 7:00 the next morning, she saw accused-appellant clad in beach
attire. Later that day, she and her husband had lunch at the clubhouse, which was
about three to four minutes drive from their house. When they returned home at
2:00 p.m., accused-appellant and his driver, Demetrio, had already left.[50] This was
corroborated by accused-appellants aunt, Ms. Frances Sison.[51]
Accused-appellant claimed that he went jet-skiing in the morning of September
25, 1993. He alleged that the water was choppy and caused his jet-ski to lose
control. As a result, he suffered bruises on his chest and legs. Thereafter, he went
home, cleaned up, changed clothes and rested. Later, as he was going down the
stairs, he slipped and extended his arm to stop his fall. He had lunch with this
family. At 1:30 p.m., he and Demetrio left Bagac for Manila. [52]
According to accused-appellant, he first learned of Elsas death when he was
arrested by the NBI on September 28, 1993.[53] He denied having anything to do with
her death, saying that he had no reason to kill her since he was in love with
her.[54] Sometime during his relationship with Elsa, he claimed having received in the
mails two anonymous letters. The first one reads:
Salamat sa pagpapahiram mo ng sasakyan at driver. Pero masyado kang
pakialamero, Steve. Walanghiya ka. Para kang demonyo. Pinakialaman mo ang di sa
yo. Lintik lang ang walang ganti. Matitiyempuhan din kita. Putang ina mo.[55]
The second letter says:
Steve,
Ang kay Pedro kay Pedro. Kapag pinakialaman ay kay San Pedro ang tungo. Mahal
mo ba ang pamilya mo? Iniingatan mo ba ang pangalan mo? Nakakasagasa ka na.[56]
At first, accused-appellant ignored the letters. But when he told Elsa about
them, she got very upset and worried. She said the letters came from Fred, her
estranged husband.[57]
Ms. Frances Sison, accused-appellants aunt, testified that she and her mother
visited accused-appellant at 3:00 p.m. on September 23, 1993. She went inside the
bedroom and talked to accused-appellant for about 30 minutes. While they were
there, Ms. Sison testified that she did not see anyone else in the bedroom. She also
said the door of the bathroom inside the room was open, and there was nobody
inside. The next day, at 4:00 p.m., she went back to visit accused-appellant. Again,
they went inside accused-appellants bedroom and stayed there for one hour. The
door of the bathroom was open, and she saw that there was nobody inside. The
following morning, they passed by the condominium before proceeding to Bagac,
Bataan. They went inside accused-appellants bedroom and talked to him. As in the
last two occasions, Ms. Sison saw through the open door of the bathroom that there
was no one inside.[58]
Theresa Whisenhunt, accused-appellants sister-in-law, testified that between
December 21, 1991 and January 15, 1992, and again from the middle of April, 1992 to
May 15, 1992, she slept in the bedroom subsequently occupied by accused-appellant
in the Platinum Condominium; that she regularly has her menstruation around the
end of every month; and that her blood type is B.[59]
On January 31, 1996, the trial court promulgated the appealed judgment,
convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the deceased
actual damage, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.[60]
Accused-appellant interposed an appeal from the adverse decision of the trial
court, alleging that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED OF THE CRIME
CHARGED;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS
ABLE TO PRESENT ENOUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REJECTING, DISREGARDING AND/OR NOT
GIVING CREDENCE TO THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED.[61]
Much of the evidence on accused-appellants complicity was elicited from
Demetrio Ravelo, the so-called prosecution star witness.[62] On the premise that
accused-appellants guilt or innocence depends largely on the weight of his testimony,
this Court has carefully scrutinized and examined his version of the events, and has
found that Demetrio Ravelos narrative is both convincing and consistent in all
material points.
Before accused-appellant confessed to Demetrio Ravelo what had happened to
Elsa Castillo, he first asked the latter how long he was willing to work for him, and
how far his loyalty will go. This was logical if accused-appellant wanted to ensure that
Demetrio would stand by his side after learning what he was about to reveal. More
importantly, Demetrios description of Elsas dismembered body, as he found it in
accused-appellants bathroom, perfectly jibed with the appearance of the mutilated
body parts, as shown in the photographs presented by the prosecution. [63]
Likewise, the mutilated body parts, as well as the other items thrown by
accused-appellant along the road to Bataan, were found by the NBI agents as
Demetrio pointed, which confirms that, indeed, the latter witnessed how accused-
appellant disposed of Elsas body and personal belongings one by one.
All in all, the testimony of Demetrio Ravelo bears the ring of truth and
sincerity. The records show that he did not waver even during lengthy and rigorous
7
cross-examination. In fact, the trial court gave full faith and credit to his testimony,
stating:
The Court had opportunity to observe the demeanor of Demetrio Ravelo when he
took the witness stand on several occasions. He was extensively cross-examined by
one of the defense counsel and he withstood the same creditably. Demetrio Ravelo is
a very credible witness and his testimony is likewise credible.[64]
This Court has consistently ruled that factual findings of the trial court deserve
the highest respect. This is based on the fact that the trial judge is in the best position
to assess the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before his sala as he had
personally heard them and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial.[65] Especially, where issues raised involve the credibility of witnesses,
the trial courts findings thereon will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear
showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts, or
circumstances of weight or substance, which could have affected the result of the
case.[66] Succinctly put, findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of
witnesses command great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to observe
their demeanor while they testified in court.[67]
Perhaps more damning to accused-appellant is the physical evidence against
him. The findings of the forensic biologist on the examination of the hair samples and
bloodstains all confirm Elsas death inside accused-appellants bedroom. On the other
hand, the autopsy report revealed that Elsa was stabbed at least three times on the
chest. This, taken together with Demetrios testimony that accused-appellant kept the
kitchen knife inside his bedroom on September 24, 1993, leads to the inescapable
fact that accused-appellant stabbed Elsa inside the bedroom or bathroom.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks
high in the hierarchy of our trustworthy evidence. [68] For this reason, it is regarded as
evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.[69]
While it may be true that there was no eyewitness to the death of Elsa, the
confluence of the testimonial and physical evidence against accused-appellant creates
an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence that naturally leads to the fair and
reasonable conclusion that accused-appellant was the author of the crime, to the
exclusion of all others. Circumstantial evidence may be resorted to in proving the
identity of the accused when direct evidence is not available, otherwise felons would
go scot-free and the community would be denied proper protection. The rules on
evidence and jurisprudence sustain the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur: (1) there must be more
than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the
combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of
the accused.[70]
In the case at bar, the following circumstances were successfully proven by the
prosecution without a shadow of doubt, to wit: that Elsa Santos Castillo was brought
to accused-appellants condominium unit on September 23, 1993; that on September
24, 1993, accused-appellants housemaid was looking for her kitchen knife and
accused-appellant gave it to her, saying that it was in his bedroom; that on
September 25, 1993, accused-appellant and Demetrio Ravelo collected the
dismembered body parts of Elsa from the bathroom inside accused-appellants
bedroom; that accused-appellant disposed of the body parts by a roadside
somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna; that accused-appellant also disposed of Elsas
personal belongings along the road going to Bagac, Bataan; that the mutilated body
parts of a female cadaver, which was later identified as Elsa, were found by the police
and NBI agents at the spot where Demetrio pointed; that hair specimens found inside
accused-appellants bathroom and bedroom showed similarities with hair taken from
Elsas head; and that the bloodstains found on accused-appellants bedspread, covers
and in the trunk of his car, all matched Elsas blood type.
Accused-appellant makes capital of the fact that the Medico-Legal Officer, Dr.
Mendez, did not examine the pancreas of the deceased notwithstanding Demetrios
statement that, according to accused-appellant, Elsa died of bangungot, or
hemorrhage of the pancreas. Because of this, accused-appellant insists that the cause
of death was not adequately established.Then, he relied on the controverting
testimony of his witness, lawyer-doctor Ernesto Brion, who was himself a Medico-
Legal Officer of the NBI for several years, to the effect that the autopsy report
prepared by Dr. Mendez was unreliable and inconclusive. The trial court noted,
however, that Dr. Brion was a biased witness whose testimony cannot be relied upon
because he entered his appearance as one of the counsel for accused-appellant and,
in such capacity, extensively cross-examined Dr. Mendez. Accused-appellant counters
that there is no prohibition against lawyers giving testimony. Moreover, the trial
courts ruling would imply that lawyers who testify on behalf of their clients are
presumed to be lying.
By rejecting the testimony of Dr. Brion, the trial court did not mean that he
perjured himself on the witness stand. Notably, Dr. Brion was presented as expert
witness. His testimony and the questions propounded on him dealt with his opinion
on the probable cause of death of the victim. Indeed, the presentation of expert
testimony is one of the well-known exceptions to the rule against admissibility of
opinions in evidence.[71] In like manner, Dr. Mendez was presented on the stand to
give his own opinion on the same subject. His opinion differed from that of Dr. Brion,
which is not at all unusual. What the trial court simply did was to choose which ---
between two conflicting medico-legal opinions --- was the more plausible. The trial
court correctly lent more credence to Dr. Mendezs testimony, not only because Dr.
Brion was a biased witness, but more importantly, because it was Dr. Mendez who
conducted the autopsy and personally examined Elsas corpse up close.
In any event, the foregoing does not detract from the established fact that Elsas
body was found mutilated inside accused-appellants bathroom. This clearly indicated
that it was accused-appellant who cut up Elsas body to pieces. Naturally, accused-
appellant would be the only suspect to her killing. Otherwise, why else would he cut
up Elsas body as if to conceal the real cause of her death?
8
 As already stated above, Demetrios testimony was convincing. Accused-
appellant attempts to refute Demetrios statements by saying that he had repeatedly
reprimanded the latter for discourteous and reckless driving, and that he had already
asked the latter to tender his resignation. Thus, accused-appellant claims that
Demetrio imputed Elsas death on him in order to get back at him. This Court finds the
cruel treatment by an employer too flimsy a motive for the employee to implicate
him in such a gruesome and hideous crime. Rather than entertain an accusation of ill-
motive and bad faith on Demetrio Ravelo, this Court views his act of promptly
reporting the incident to his family and, later, to the authorities, as a genuine desire
to bring justice to the cruel and senseless slaying of Elsa Santos Castillo, whom he
knew well.
Accused-appellant also argues that his arrest was without a warrant and,
therefore, illegal. In this regard, the rule is settled that any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the
person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the
objection is deemed waived.[72] In other words, it is too late in the day for accused-
appellant to raise an issue about his warrantless arrest after he pleaded to a valid
information and after a judgment of conviction was rendered against him after a full-
blown trial.
Accused-appellant presented in evidence two supposedly threatening letters
which, according to Elsa, were written by the latters husband. There is nothing in
these letters which will exculpate accused-appellant from criminal liability. The
threats were directed at accused-appellant, not Elsa. The fact remains that Elsa was
last seen alive in accused-appellants condominium unit, and subsequently discovered
dead in accused-appellants bathroom. Surely, the place where her dead body was
found does not support the theory that it was Fred Castillo who was probably
responsible for her death.
We do not agree with the trial court that the prosecution sufficiently proved the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superiority is present
whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor,
assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the
aggressor and selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the
crime.[73] The fact that the victim was a woman does not, by itself, establish that
accused-appellant committed the crime with abuse of superior strength.There ought
to be enough proof of the relative strength of the aggressor and the victim. [74]
Abuse of superior strength must be shown and clearly established as the crime
itself.[75] In this case, nobody witnessed the actual killing. Nowhere in Demetrios
testimony, and it is not indicated in any of the pieces of physical evidence, that
accused-appellant deliberately took advantage of his superior strength in
overpowering Elsa. On the contrary, this Court observed from viewing the photograph
of accused-appellant[76] that he has a rather small frame. Hence, the attendance of
the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not adequately proved
and cannot be appreciated against accused-appellant.
However, the other circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the
victim was correctly appreciated by the trial court. The mere decapitation of the
victims head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus
qualifying the killing to murder.[77] In this case, accused-appellant not only beheaded
Elsa. He further cut up her body like pieces of meat. Then, he strewed the
dismembered parts of her body in a deserted road in the countryside, leaving them to
rot on the ground. The sight of Elsas severed body parts on the ground, vividly
depicted in the photographs offered in evidence, is both revolting and horrifying. At
the same time, the viewer cannot help but feel utter pity for the sub-human manner
of disposing of her remains.
In a case with strikingly similar facts, we ruled:
Even if treachery was not present in this case, the crime would still be murder
because of the dismemberment of the dead body. One of the qualifying
circumstances of murder under Article 248, par. 6, of the Revised Penal Code is
outraging or scoffing at (the) person or corpse of the victim. There is no question that
the corpse of Billy Agotano was outraged when it was dismembered with the cutting
off of the head and limbs and the opening up of the body to remove the intestines,
lungs and liver. The killer scoffed at the dead when the intestines were removed and
hung around Victorianos neck as a necklace, and the lungs and liver were facetiously
described as pulutan.[78]
Hence, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of
murder, qualified by outraging and scoffing at the victims person or corpse. [79] This
circumstance was both alleged in the information and proved during the trial. At the
time of its commission, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal maximum to
death.[80] No aggravating or mitigating circumstance was alleged or proved; hence,
the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. [81] Therefore, the trial courts
imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correct, and need not be
modified.
However, the damages awarded by trial court should be modified. Elida Santos,
Elsas sister, testified that the funeral expenses was only P50,000.00.[82] Hence, the
trial court erred when it awarded the amount of P100,000.00. Basic is the
jurisprudential principle that in determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on
mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on
competent proof and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount of the
loss. Actual damages cannot be presumed but must be duly proved with reasonable
certainty.[83]
The award of moral damages in murder cases is justified because of the physical
suffering and mental anguish brought about by the felonious acts, and is thus
recoverable in criminal offenses resulting in death.[84] It is true that moral damages
are not intended to enrich the victims heirs or to penalize the convict, but to obviate
the spiritual sufferings of the heirs.[85] Considering, however, the extraordinary
circumstances in the case at bar, more particularly the unusual grief and outrage
suffered by her bereaved family as a result of the brutal and indecent mutilation and
9
disposal of Elsas body, the moral damages to be awarded to them should be more
than the normal amount dictated by jurisprudence. However, the amount of
P3,000,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages is rather excessive. The
reasonable amount is P1,000,000.00 considering the immense sorrow and shock
suffered by Elsas heirs.
The award of attorneys fees of P150,000.00 was duly proved, [86] and thus should
be affirmed.
Finally, the heirs of Elsa Santos Castillo should be indemnified for her death. In
murder, the civil indemnity has been fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00. The grant
of civil indemnity in murder requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result
of the crime and proof of accused-appellants responsibility therefor.[87]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152,
in Criminal Case No. 102687, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay
the heirs of Elsa Santos Castillo actual damages in the amount of P50,000.00; civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00; moral damages in the amount of
P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00; and attorneys
fees in the amount of P150,000.00. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

10
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. INOCENCIO GONZALEZ,
JR., accused-appellant.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Many unfortunate tragedies would not have happened if the improvident use of
a firearm did not exacerbate a simple altercation over traffic. This is one of them.
On a day intended to pay homage to the dead, a pregnant woman was shot to
death in the course of her husbands altercation with the accused-appellant and his
son along the Garden of Remembrance within the Loyola Memorial Park in
Marikina. The trial court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder and
two counts of frustrated murder and accordingly sentenced him to death. This case is
before us on automatic review.
The details of what actually transpired in the few seconds immediately
preceding the shooting are controverted by both parties but the events leading to this
tragedy are not disputed.
In the afternoon of October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m. both the families of the
private complainant Noel Andres and that of the accused-appellant Inocencio
Gonzalez were on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. The appellant
was driving a white Isuzu Esteem with his grandson and three housemaids, while the
private complainant was driving a maroon Toyota FX with his pregnant wife Feliber
Andres, his two year old son, Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his sister-in-law, Francar
Valdez. At the intersection near the Garden of Remembrance, while the accused-
appellant Gonzalez was turning left towards the exit and the complainant Noel
Andres was headed straight along the road to the exit their two vehicles almost
collided. Noel Andres was able to timely step on the brakes. The appellant continued
driving along his way while Noel Andres drove behind the appellants vehicle for some
time and cut him off when he found the opportunity to do so. [1] Noel Andres then got
out of his vehicle and knocked on the appellants car window. [2] This is as far as their
versions of the incident coincide.
The prosecutions version of the incident is that Noel Andres calmly told the
appellant to be careful with his driving and informed the latter that he, Andres, is
with his family and to this Gonzalez allegedly replied, Accidents are accidents, whats
your problem. Andres stated that he saw the appellant turning red in anger so he
decided to go back to his vehicle when he was blocked by the appellants son who
said, Anong problema mo sa erpat ko. Andres testified that he felt threatened and so
he immediately boarded his vehicle, sat at the drivers seat, closed the door, and
partially opened the car window just wide enough to talk back to appellants son,
Dino. Suddenly, one of his passengers said Binaril kami. He turned to his wife Feliber
Andres and saw her bloodied and unconscious. He turned around and saw his son
Kenneth and nephew Kevin were also wounded. Andres admitted in court that he and
Dino were shouting at each other so that he did not hear the shot. Andres then got
out of his vehicle to warn the appellant not to flee. He then took the wounded
members of his family to the exit where there was an ambulance standing by. The
three were then taken to the Sta. Monica Hospital and were later transferred to the
Quezon City Medical Center.
The defenses version of the incident is that Andres cut the appellants path by
positioning his FX obliquely along the appellants lane from the latters left side. Andres
then got out of his vehicle, stood beside the appellants car window, and repeatedly
cursed the appellant, Putang ina mo, ang tanda-tanda mo na hindi ka pa
marunong magmaneho. Ang bobo-bobo mo.[3] The appellant stayed inside his car and
allegedly replied, Pasensiya ka na hindi kita nakita, nasilaw ako. Aksidente lang. The
appellant Gonzalez and another witness for the defense, Quidic, testified that Noel
Andres went back to his vehicle to move it in such a way that it is straight in front of
the appellants car. Andres allegedly got out of his vehicle again and continued
shouting and cursing at the appellant.[4] Dino, the appellants son, who rode in another
vehicle decided to go back when he did not see his fathers car behind him. When
Dino arrived at the scene he confronted Andres and the two had an altercation. Both
Dino and the appellant stated that Andres remained outside his vehicle during the
altercation with Dino.When Andres suddenly reached for something inside his
vehicle, Dino froze on the spot where he stood. This prompted the appellant to get
his gun from the glove compartment and feeling that his son was threatened he got
out of his car ready to shoot. When he saw that Andres did not have a weapon he put
down his hand holding the gun. This is when the appellants daughter Trisha who was
riding in Dinos car arrived at the scene, walked past Dino and Andres, and pushed the
appellant away. She hugged her father and in the process held his hand holding the
gun. The appellant tried to free his hand and with Trishas substantial body weight
pushing against him the appellant lost his balance and the gun accidentally fired.The
accused stated that he did not know he shot somebody until the private complainants
sister-in-law, Francar Valdez, got out of the vehicle carrying a bloodied small boy. The
defense claims that the appellant did not try to flee and even told the complainants
sister-in-law to take the wounded to the hospital.
On November 4, 1998 an Information for the complex crime of Murder, Double
Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder was filed against herein accused-
appellant:
That on or about the 31st day of October 1998, in the city of Marikina, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, attack, assault and
employ personal violence by means of treachery and abuse of superior strength upon
the person of Noel Andres y Tomas, by then and there shooting him with a Glock cal.
9mm pistol but instead hitting one Feliber Andres y Ordoo, on the left back portion of
her head, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wound which directly caused
her death, as well as hitting John Kenneth Andres y Ordoo and Kevin Valdez y
11
Ordoo physical injuries which ordinarily would have caused their death, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder
as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some cause or
causes, independent of their will, that is, the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to John Kenneth Andres y Ordoo and Kevin Valdez y Ordoo to their damage
and prejudice as well as to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Feliber Andres y
Ordoo.
On arraignment the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
The case records show that Feliber Andres, the wife of Noel Andres did not die
instantaneously. She lived to give birth to a baby girl[5] by caesarian section and died
the following morning on November 1, 1998. The Autopsy Report[6] states:
FINDINGS: Fairly nourished, fairly developed female cadaver, with post mortem
lividity. Conjunctivae are pale. Lips and nail beds are cyanotic. Surgical incisions were
noted at left tempero-parietal region. Surgical incisions is also noted at the abdominal
region secondary to a caesarian section.
HEAD: (1) gunshot wound, point of entry, left fronto-temporal region, measuring 1 by
0.9 cm, 9 cm from the anterior midline, with a uniform abraided collar measuring 0.2
cm., directed posteriorwards, slightly downwards, and medialwards, fracturing the
frontal, and left temporal bones, lacerating the left cerebral hemisphere, with a
deformed slug fragment embedded and recovered at the posterior lobe of the left
cerebral hemisphere. (2) hematoma, left orbital region, measuring 4.5 by 2 cm, 4 cm
from the anterior midline. There are subdural and subarachnoidal
hemorrages. Stomach contains 1 glassful of partially digested food particles mostly
rice and meaty material.
CONCLUSION: Cause of death is gunshot wound on the head.
Kenneth and Kevin were treated for extraction of metallic fragments on their
faces. They were discharged from the hospital six days later or on November 6, 1998.
On June 25, 1999 the trial court rendered judgement finding that the shooting
was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and held the appellant
guilty of the complex crime of murder for the death of Feliber Andres and for two
counts of frustrated murder for the injuries sustained by Kenneth Andres and Kevin
Valdez and sentenced the appellant to the maximum of the imposable penalty which
is death. The trial court held:
Beforehand, the Court takes note of the judicial admissions on the verbal declarations
of the accused that the court a quo has jurisdiction over the case; that he owns the
black Gluck 9 mm. automatic pistol; that the said gun will never fire even if he drops
it; that only one bullet was fired from his gun; and that the victim Feliber Andres is
already dead. With this exegesis and the declarations in open court of the eyewitness
of both the prosecution and some of the defense, there is no real dispute on the
antecedent facts showing that the accused fired on Noel Andres but instead hit and
caused the fatal injuries to the victims John Kenneth Andres, Kevin Valdez and Feliber
Andres resulting to the ultimate death of the latter. The court takes further judicial
admissions of the accused made in their memorandum demonstrating the existence
of five (5) sequences of events leading to the death of Feliber Andres and the
wounding of John Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez which are as follows: First is
when Noel Andres overtook the car driven of the accused and cut cross his path;
Second is when Noel Andres alighted from his vehicle and confronted Inocencio; Third
is when Noel had an argument with Dino Gonzalez, the son of the accused; Forth is
when, Inocencio seeing his son having confrontation with Noel, got his gun to protect
Dino; and Fifth is when Inocencio had a struggle with his daughter. Trisha Gonzalez,
who tried to reach for the gun and as a result of which Inocencio lost his balance and
as he was falling backward to his side, his right arm holding the gun hit the rear
window of the Tamaraw FX van and the gun accidentally went off hitting the victim,
who were all then inside the van.
The court likewise take judicial notice on the feature of the automatic pistol used in
this case which is capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions. Practically, the stages before an automatic
firearm would be capable of firing are as follows: 1) the loading of a bullet into the
chamber of the gun; 2) the cocking of the hammer, if uncocked; 3) the releasing of
the safety pin; 4) the pressing of the trigger to unleash the hammer so that the firing
pin will hit the cartridge to propel the bullet out to hit the target. Realistically, it
demonstrates that a gun will not fire even if the bullet is loaded in its chamber if the
hammer is uncocked; or even if cocked if the safety pin is engaged; or even if the
safety pin is disengaged if the trigger will not be pressed. However, even if the gun is
fired if it is not aimed and leveled to the target, the purpose of firing it shall not be
achieved. Contrarily, once a gun is drawn against a person, the means methods and
forms employed for its execution is already conceived. And once it is tended directly
and specifically to insure its execution, it consequently produces the conscious and
deliberate intention. Finally if all the acts of execution had been effectively done
without risk on the part of the offender arising from any defense coming from the
offended party, treachery results. In brief, there is treachery when the offender
commits any crime against persons, employing means, methods and forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make (People
vs. Mesa 276 SCRA 407; People vs. Carlos Patrolla, Jr. G. R. No. 112445, March 7,
1996). To appreciate treachery two (2) conditions must be present, to wit: 1) the
employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or retaliate; and 2) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted.(People vs. Azugue, 268 SCRA 711; People vs. Pea, G. R. No.
116022, July 1, 1998, p. 1)
In the case at bar and guided with the above-quoted doctrinal cases, logically, the
accused is positive of the crime charged against him. When he alighted with a drawn
12
gun to protect his son and released all the safety measures of his gun as he fired and
missed at Noel who was then unarmed, but instead hit Kevin Valdez, John Kenneth
Andres and Feliber Andres which resulted to the death of the latter, demonstrate that
the accused has executed the two (2) conditions to generate treachery enough to
qualify the crime committed to murder.
XXXX XXXXX XXXX
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the accused Inocencio Gonzalez, Jr., y
Esquivel is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Murder with Double Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder penalized under Art.
248, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of Death by lethal
injection.
The accused is further ordered to pay the following civil liabilities:
1. To the private complainant Noel Andres:
a) the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Feliber Andres;
b) the amount of P3,363,663.60 as indemnity for the loss of earning
capacity of the deceased Feliber Andres;
c) the amount of P98,384.19 as funeral expenses;
d) the amount of P271,800.56 for the hospitalization expenses incurred for
the injuries sustained by the deceased Feliber Andres and the amount
of P23,622.58 representing the expenses for the untimely delivery of
the child Ma. Clarisse Andres;
e) the amount of P51,566.00 representing the hospitalization expenses for
the injuries sustained by the victim John Kenneth Andres;
f) the amount of P150,000.00 as moral damages suffered for the untimely
death of his wife Feliber Andres and for the injuries caused to his son
John Kenneth Andres;
g) the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees and a fee of
P2,000.00 per appearance; and
h) the costs of the suit.
2. To the private complainant Nicasio Valdez:
a) the amount of P73,824.75 as actual damages for the injuries sustained
by the victim Kevin Valdez; and
b) the amount of P75,000.00 as and by way of moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
In his appeal, Gonzalez submits the following assignments of error:
1. The trial court committed reversible error when it found that treachery was
present.
2. The trial court committed reversible error when it presumed that there was
treachery by taking judicial notice of the feature of the automatic pistol involved in
this case.
3. The trial court committed reversible error when it violated the constitutional right
of the accused-appellant to due process when it took judicial notice of the feature of
the automatic pistol involved in this case without notice.
4. The trial court committed reversible error when it found Accused-Appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Double Frustrated
Murder.
5. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appreciate the
mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation, lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong, provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately
preceded the act, incomplete defense of relative, and voluntary surrender.
6. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to find that the shooting
incident was accidental.
7. The trial court committed reversible error when it gave credence to the testimonies
of prosecution witnesses Elmer Ramos and Moises Castro.
8. The trial court committed reversible error when it disregarded the basic principle
that the accused is presumed innocent and his guilt must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
9. The trial court committed reversible error when it ordered Accused-Appellant to
pay for the civil liabilities.
The appellant seeks a reversal and prays that judgment be rendered exempting
him from criminal and civil liabilities. Appellant declared that he had no intention to
shoot Noel Andres much less his wife nor the children. He lost his balance when his
daughter Trisha approached and pushed him backwards to stop him from joining Dino
and Noel Andres but the appellant tried to free his right hand holding the gun and it
accidentally fired. The single bullet fired hit the last window on the left side of the
Tamaraw FX. The appellant claims that he did not see the passengers inside the
vehicle at the time of the shooting. This is corroborated by the testimony of two
witnesses for the prosecution who testified that the windows of Andres vehicle are
heavily tinted so that a person outside the vehicle would not be able to see if there
are people inside. It is also argued that had the appellant intended to shoot Noel
Andres he could have simply done so by shooting at him directly. The defense asserts
that the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish the attendance of treachery
and without the attendance of the said qualifying circumstance the crime committed
is homicide, not murder.
13
 The appellant also points out that the trial court made the factual finding that
the shooting happened in a matter of seconds and that it was preceded by a heated
argument between the parties. Such being the case, it is argued that the shooting
could not have been attended by treachery. There was no time for the appellant to
consciously and deliberately employ the mode of attack against Noel Andres, nor
against any one of the actual victims, to insure its execution and at the same time to
eliminate any form of retaliation from the alleged intended victim. And yet, the trial
court, contrary to the evidence on record, held that the loading of the bullet into the
chamber of the gun, the cocking of the hammer, the release of the safety pin and the
pulling of the trigger by the appellant of his automatic pistol constitute conscious and
deliberate effort to employ the gun as a means of committing the crime and
resultantly, qualified its commission by treachery. Such a finding presupposes that the
appellant loaded the gun to shoot Noel Andres only that very moment when his son
Dino and Noel Andres were arguing. This conclusion has no basis on record. The
appellant testified that his gun was loaded before he left the house and two
witnesses for prosecution stated in court that a few seconds after Noel Andres and
Dino started shouting at each other, the appellant got out of his car and shot at the
last window on the left side of the complainants vehicle. Further, the appellant
assigns as error the procedure adopted by the trial court in taking judicial notice that
the gun used by the appellant is an automatic pistol and as such, it will not fire unless
aimed at the intended target. The procedure taken by the trial court is contrary to
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.[7] The trial court should have given both
parties the opportunity to present evidence, expert evidence, if necessary, to inform
the court on the subject matter. The appellant argues that the factual finding borne
by such erroneous procedure is equally erroneous. The gun used by the appellant is a
semi-automatic and not an automatic pistol which means that the pistol used has no
external safety pin to be released and that the hammer need not be cocked. The
pulling of the trigger, intentional or not, will fire the gun. The use of a semi-automatic
pistol does not necessarily imply treachery.
Appellant also argues that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Castro and
Ramos were improperly given credence by the trial court. The appellant contends
that a reading of their testimonies would show that their narration of the incident is
rather absurd and would show that they did not witness the actual shooting. Defense
witnesses, Gonzalez and his daughter, Trisha, on the other hand, testified that Castro
and Ramos arrived at the scene only after the shooting.
As regards the injuries sustained by Kevin and Kenneth, it is argued that
considering that there was no intent to kill and that they stayed in the hospital only
for six days, the crime committed is physical injuries. It is argued that the trial court
erred in awarding damages. The bunch of receipts allegedly representing the medical
expenses incurred for the injuries sustained by the victims was erroneously admitted
in evidence, without first requiring the prosecution to establish the authenticity of the
receipts. The appellant also points out that the award for loss of earning capacity has
no basis as the deceased was unemployed at the time of the incident.
Finally, the appellant assigns as error the trial courts rejection of the mitigating
circumstances pleaded by the defense which allegedly attended the commission of
the crime, i.e., lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, passion and obfuscation,
incomplete defense of a relative and voluntary surrender. The appellant asserts that
these mitigating circumstances were duly proven during the trial and are supported
by the evidence on record. The private complainant Noel Andres testified that he saw
the appellant getting red in anger after they, Andres and the appellant, had a heated
argument immediately prior to the shooting. These admitted circumstances show
that the appellant was not in his proper state of mind at the time of the
shooting. First, he was angered by Andres abusive language and later he got out of his
car with a loaded gun to protect his son from a perceived danger. The appellant clams
that his willingness to help the injured and his voluntary surrender to the police
should likewise be considered as mitigating circumstances in the imposition of
penalties.
The Solicitor-General agrees with the appellant that the crime was not attended
by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and hence the crime committed by the
appellant for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide, not murder. The appellee takes
into consideration that the shooting was preceded by a heated argument and that the
supposed victim was placed on guard that attack was imminent. It also appears that
the shooting was done impulsively. There is no evidence that the appellant
deliberately employed the means of attack to insure execution of the crime and at
the same time eliminate the risk of retaliation from the private complainant. The
appellee also agrees with the appellant that the trial court erred in equating the use
of an automatic pistol with treachery. The trial court made the factual finding that the
appellants automatic pistol would not fire unless aimed and the trigger is deliberately
pulled and hence treachery attended the shooting. The appellee submits that if we
follow the reasoning of the trial court it would appear that the appellant intended to
shoot at the complainants vehicle only as the shot was fired at the last window on the
left side of the FX away from where Andres was allegedly seated. The fact that the
gun was drawn and fired does not mean that the mode of attack was consciously and
deliberately employed.
However, with respect to the injuries sustained by Kevin and Kenneth, the
appellee disagrees with the contention that the appellant is liable only for slight
physical injuries. The injuries sustained by both children are head injuries and could
have caused their death if not for the immediate medical attention given them. The
number of days spent in the hospital is not determinative of the severity of the
wounds. Their nature and location should instead be considered. The appellant
cannot escape liability for frustrated homicide for the injuries of the two children on
the ground that he fired a single shot at the vehicle of Noel Andres. He is liable for all
the consequences of his unlawful act even if the crime committed is different from
that intended.
As regards the pleaded mitigating circumstances, appellee asserts that none can
be considered in favor of the appellant. There is evidence on record that the
14
appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police and it appears from the
testimonies of witnesses that he entertained the possibility of flight but his car was
stuck in traffic along the exit of the memorial park. His pretense of incomplete
defense of a relative is belied by his own admission that when he saw that Noel
Andres did not have a gun he lowered his hand holding the gun. There was allegedly
no threat on the life of his son at the time of the shooting, no uncontrollable fear nor
irresistible force that would mitigate the commission of the offense.
The Solicitor-General also seeks to uphold the pecuniary awards granted by the
trial court. The appellee alleges that it is not denied by the appellant that Feliber
Andres was a 38 year old registered nurse at the time of the shooting. Although she
was then unemployed on account of her pregnancy, she still had earning capacity and
the trial court properly applied the salary of a government nurse under the salary
standardization scheme in the computation of damages for the loss of earning
capacity. The receipts presented in evidence by the prosecution to establish
hospitalization and other medical expenses incurred by the private complainants by
reason of the injuries suffered by the victims were duly authenticated by the
prosecution witnesses and there is no dispute that they are exact copies of the
original receipts presented in court. The objections raised by the appellant in this
regard were duly met by the evidence presented by the private complainants.
In sum, the appellee asserts that considering that the appellant fired a single
shot and in the process committed four offenses the appellant should be held liable
for the complex crime of homicide for the death of Feliber Andres, double frustrated
homicide against Kevin and Kenneth and attempted homicide against Noel
Andres. Under the rules on complex crimes the penalty for the gravest offense,
i.e., reclusion temporal for homicide, should be imposed in its maximum period.
The appeal has merit.
Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the
deliberate employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of a crime
against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to the offender arising from the defense which the intended victim might raise. For
treachery to be appreciated two elements must concur: 1) the employment of means
of execution that would insure the safety of the accused from retaliatory acts of the
intended victim and leaving the latter without an opportunity to defend himself and
2) the means employed were deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender.[8] The suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the wound from behind the
victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the time the attack was made or the
fact that the victim was unarmed do not by themselves render the attack as
treacherous.[9]This is of particular significance in a case of an instantaneous attack
made by the accused whereby he gained an advantageous position over the victim
when the latter accidentally fell and was rendered defenseless. [10] The means
employed for the commission of the crime or the mode of attack must be shown to
have been consciously or deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the
consummation of the crime and at the same time eliminate or reduce the risk of
retaliation from the intended victim.[11] Accordingly, it has been consistently held by
this court that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of
the moment or that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended
by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a
treacherous mode of attack.[12] Thus, the sudden attack made by the accused due to
his infuriation by reason of the victims provocation was held to be without
treachery. Sudden attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and insults by the
victim or acts taunting the accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive
behavior of the victim were held to be without treachery as the victim was sufficiently
forewarned of reprisal.[13] For the rules on treachery to apply the sudden attack must
have been preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim and without
provocation on the part of the latter.[14]
This Court has also had occasion to state that whether or not the attack
succeeds against its intended victim or injures another or whether the crime
committed is graver than that intended is immaterial, as long as it is shown that the
attack is attended by treachery, the said qualifying circumstance may still be
considered by the court.[15] Thus, the determining factor on whether or not the
commission of a crime is attended by treachery is not the resulting crime committed
but the mode of attack employed in its execution.[16]
Treachery is never presumed. It is required that the manner of attack must be
shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime itself. [17]
We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the shooting was
not attended by treachery and accordingly the crime committed for the death of
Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder.
The encounter between Noel Andres and the appellant was a chance
encounter. They were total strangers before their vehicles almost collided at an
intersection inside the memorial park. Unfortunately, heated exchange of remarks
that followed the near collision was fanned by a short temper, which in the case of
the appellant, was augmented by the improvident use of a firearm.
From a reading of the transcript of the testimonies of the witnesses, it would
appear that Noel Andres, who had his pregnant wife and child with him, among
others, on board the Tamaraw FX provoked the altercation. After the near collision of
his vehicle with that of the appellant, he tailed behind the latters car towards the exit
until he had the chance to cut him off to scold him for his failure to observe traffic
rules.[18] Andres stated in court that he calmly told the appellant to be careful with his
driving and denied that he was angry when he alighted from his vehicle to confront
the appellant.[19] His statement is belied by the witnesses, two prosecution witnesses
included, who uniformly testified that Andres quarreled with or shouted and cursed
at the appellant for the latters recklessness at the intersection.[20] The appellant
narrated in court that Andres repeatedly shouted at him, Putang ina mo, ang tanda-
tanda mo na gago ka pa.[21] Andres hostile behavior towards the appellant is evident
from his statement in court that he noticed the appellant turning red in anger. [22] It is
highly improbable for Gonzalez to have turned red in anger had Andres been polite,
15
as he claims he was, in scolding Gonzalez. Andres could have simply communicated to
the appellant his disgust for the latters bad driving when he overtook the appellants
car near the scene of the shooting but instead he chose to block the appellants path,
insult and virtually provoke the appellant to retaliate.
Andres stated in court that when he noticed Gonzalez infuriation he
immediately walked towards his vehicle, because according to him the altercation
was over. On his way to his FX he met another man, whom he later found out to be
the appellants son, Dino. It appears that the altercation was far from over because
again Andres had a shouting match this time with Dino. [23] In a matter of seconds, the
appellant alighted from his car and fired a single shot at the last window on the left
side of Andres vehicle at an angle away from Noel Andres.The single bullet fired hit
Feliber Andres on the forehead near the temporal region above the left eye and the
two children with metallic fragments of the bullet on their faces, one at the cheek and
the other below his left eye.
The prosecution did not present evidence as to the exact seating arrangement
of the victims inside the vehicle; suffice it to say, that an examination of the pictures
of the vehicle[24]one of which shows a mass of blood stains on the left side (towards
the drivers seat) of the white seat cover below the head rest [25], would show that the
deceased Feliber must have been seated at the front passengers seat and the children
at the middle row behind the drivers seat.[26] Another picture shows a bullet hole on
the last window on the left side of the vehicle[27]and another shows that the front
windshield appears undamaged.[28] A ballistics expert appeared in court for the
prosecution and testified that the bullet fired at the FX came from the appellants gun,
which fact was admitted by the defense. The prosecution did not inquire from the
ballistics expert regarding the trajectory of the bullet or the approximate distance of
the appellant from the FX when he fired his gun to establish whether or not the
appellant aimed for Noel or Feliber or simply fired indiscriminately at the latters
vehicle.[29]
At first blush it would seem that the shooting of Feliber Andres was attended by
treachery as she was inside the FX witnessing her husbands altercation, first, with the
appellant then with the appellants son, totally defenseless from the shot that came
suddenly from her left side. Public outrage over the death of Feliber was heightened
by the fact that she was then pregnant with her second child and her death left a new
born baby girl and a two year old boy motherless.
However, a meticulous review of the evidence prevents a conclusive finding of
treachery and any doubt must be resolved, like the fact of the commission of an
offense, in favor of the accused. The pictures indicate that Gonzalez fired at the FX at
an angle away from Noel Andres and that Gonzalez was not aiming at anybody in
particular. It is not disputed that the appellants car was directly behind the
complainants FX and that Gonzalez who was then seated at the drivers seat alighted
from his car, took a few steps then fired at the left side of the FX. Whether Noel
Andres was seated at the drivers seat inside his vehicle when Gonzalez fired at the FX,
as the prosecution asserts, or was standing by the door of the drivers seat outside his
vehicle, as the defense submits, it is clear that the shot was fired away from Noel
Andres. The bullet hit Feliber near her temple above the left eye indicating that she
was facing left towards her husband when the shot was fired. [30] The direct hit on
Felibers head shows that the angle of the shot was indeed away from Noel
Andres. Even the eyewitness for the prosecution testified that had the appellant
intended to kill Noel Andres he could have shot directly at him, considering that Noel
Andres was just a few steps away from him[31] and that Noel Andres was visible from
the outside because his window was partially open.[32] The pictures show that the
bullet hole was on the third window on the left side of the Tamaraw FX [33] belying any
attempt to shoot Noel Andres. Two prosecution witnesses Ramos and Castro
unequivocally declared that nothing or no one prevented Gonzalez from shooting
directly at Noel Andres and that Gonzalez could have simply done so if he wanted
to. But after alighting from his car, Gonzalez took a few steps and shot at the left side
window of the FX.[34]
The fact that the appellant fired his gun from behind the victim does not by itself
amount to treachery. There is no evidence on record that the appellant deliberately
positioned himself behind the victim to gain advantage over him when he fired the
shot. On the contrary, the evidence before us reveals that the position of the
appellants car was not of his own doing but it became so when Noel Andres overtook
his car and cut off his path.
We note further, that the appellant did not act belligerently towards Noel
Andres even after the latter cut off the appellants path. Andres stated in court that
the appellant did not alight from his car nor opened his window until he, Andres,
tapped on it.[35] For his part Gonzalez categorically stated in court that he did not
point his gun nor threatened Andres during their short spat. [36] Gonzalez, although he
had his gun in his car, did not react to Andres cursing until the latter was having an
altercation with the appellants son, Dino. Gonzalez claimed that he perceived that his
son was in imminent danger.[37] Whether he overreacted or he shot at Andres vehicle
out of rage over Andres aggressive behavior, one thing appears clear to us, that the
shooting was not done in cold blood. It is undisputed that the windows of the FX are
heavily or darkly tinted so that a person outside would not see if anybody was
inside.[38]The pictures of the FX[39] on record confirm the testimonies of both
prosecution and defense witnesses that the other passengers of the FX were not
visible from the outside. Gonzalez admitted in court that Noel Andres mentioned that
he has passengers with him while he was shouting and cursing at Gonzalez but there
is no indication that Gonzalez had any opportunity to see the passengers when he
fired the shot. The totality of the evidence on record fails to support a conclusion that
Gonzalez deliberately employed the mode of attack to gain undue advantage over the
intended nor the actual victim. Without any decisive evidence to the contrary,
treachery cannot be considered; thus the crime committed is homicide. [40]
The trial courts finding that the loading of the gun, the cocking of the hammer
and finally the pulling of the trigger constitute a deliberate effort on the part of
appellant to use the gun as a means of a treacherous attack is patently erroneous. A
16
single and continuous attack cannot be divided into stages to make it appear that
treachery was involved.[41] The entire incident happened in a matter of minutes, as
testified to by witnesses, and as noted by the trial court. [42] It was error to our mind
for the trial court to divide the assault in stages to arrive at the conclusion that the
mode of attack was consciously employed by the appellant. Contrary to the finding of
the trial court that the appellant prepared the gun before getting out of his car, the
appellant testified that he loaded his gun before he left the house and that it was
ready to fire when he alighted his car. There was no time for him to reflect on the
mode of attack since he just picked up his gun and alighted from his car and shot at
the FX a few seconds after Dino and Noel Andres started shouting at each
other.[43] We note further that the trial court pointed out that from the fact that the
appellant prepared his gun to shoot, this was an indication of the deliberate
employment of the gun as a means to kill; i.e. that the use of an automatic pistol
shows that the shooting was attended by treachery.
We do not agree that the weapon used, by itself, is determinative of treachery,
unless it is shown, and it is not herein shown, that the appellant deliberately used the
gun to insure the commission of the crime and to render the unarmed victim
defenseless. As discussed above, the encounter between the appellant and the
Andresses was a chance encounter and the appellants gun was in the glove
compartment of his car even before he left his house. The shooting was clearly a spur
of the moment or impulsive decision made by the appellant preceded by a heated
altercation at the instance of the private complainant. Jurisprudence teaches us that
under the circumstances, treachery is not obtaining. In the case of People vs.
Valles,[44] the accused, a security guard, fired his Armalite and mortally wounded the
victim when the latter approached the accused four times insisting on entering the
workplace wearing improper uniform, then cursed and insulted and challenged the
accused to a fight. We held that the shooting was not attended by treachery as the
shooting was preceded by a heated altercation at the instance of the victim. It is to be
noted that the kind of weapon used against an unarmed victim was not taken into
consideration in determining the attendance of treachery; it is the mode of attack
employed by the accused under the particular circumstances of a case that
determines its attendance in the commission of a crime. We find that the prosecution
has not discharged its burden to show that the shooting was attended by treachery
and we are convinced that the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is
homicide.
As regards the injuries sustained by the two children we find that the crime
committed are two counts of slight physical injuries. The intent to kill determines
whether the crime committed is physical injuries or homicide and such intent is made
manifest by the acts of the accused which are undoubtedly intended to kill the
victim.[45] In a case wherein the accused did not know that a person was hiding behind
a table who was hit by a stray bullet causing superficial injuries requiring treatment
for three days, the crime committed is slight physical injuries. [46] In case of doubt as to
the homicidal intent of the accused, he should be convicted of the lesser offense of
physical injuries.[47] We have earlier pointed out that the intent to kill is absent in this
case. It was also found that one small metallic fragment was extracted from Kenneth
below his left eye while another fragment was extracted from Kevin immediately
below the level of his skin before the cheek bone. [48] An examination of the
testimonies of the attending physicians, showed that the wounds sustained by the
two children from the metallic fragments are not in themselves fatal but may cause
death if left untreated. One of the attending physician testified in court that the
fragments themselves will not cause complication, it is the entry of the fragment or
the open wound that is susceptible to infection. [49] Two small fragments were no
longer extracted from the face of Kevin Valdez, as the doctor deemed it to be without
danger of complication.[50] We note that the various sizes of the metallic fragments
were not established, at least to give an indication of the severity of the wounds
sustained. Both children were discharged after six days of treatment and there is no
showing that they required subsequent treatment or that they were immobilized for
a greater number of days by reason of the injuries sustained. Considering the nature
and location of their injuries and the number of days required for their treatment, we
find that the crime committed for the injuries sustained by the children are two
counts of slight physical injuries under Art. 266 of the Revised Penal Code which
imposes a penalty of arresto menor or imprisonment for 1 to 30 days for injuries
sustained that has incapacitated the victim for one to nine days or required medical
attendance for the same period. For evident lack of criminal intent to kill the
complainant, Noel Andres, as above stated, the information for attempted homicide
must fail.
The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation,
incomplete defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong,
pleaded by the defense, were not convincingly proved and none can be considered in
the imposition of penalties. The testimony of prosecution witness contradicts the
appellants pretense of voluntary surrender. Witness Ramos testified that the
appellant drove away towards the gate of the memorial park while he was
questioning him after the shooting and had not Noel Andres and onlookers blocked
his path the appellant could have fled the scene of the crime. [51]
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining. For
this mitigating circumstance to be considered, it must be shown that (1) an unlawful
act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was committed by the intended
victim; (2) that the crime was committed within a reasonable length of time from the
commission of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accuseds mind;
and that (3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a
spirit of lawlessness or revenge.[52] Noel Andres act of shouting at the appellants son,
who was then a nurse and of legal age, is not sufficient to produce passion and
obfuscation as it is claimed by the accused. Besides, the appellants son, Dino was
shouting back at Noel Andres. It was not a case wherein the appellants son appeared
helpless and oppressed that the appellant lost his reason and shot at the FX of Noel
Andres. The same holds true for the appellants claim of provocation on the part of
17
Noel Andres. Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong by the prosecution. The award for loss of earning capacity is likewise sustained for the
committed and that the provocation must be commensurate to the crime reason that while Feliber Andres was pregnant and was unemployed at the time of
committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies according to the circumstances of death, it is not disputed that she was a registered nurse and had earning
the case.[53] The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres towards the appellant and his son capacity. Noel Andres also testified that he and his wife had plans to go back to Saudi
may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient provocation to shoot at the Arabia to work after Feliber had given birth to their second baby. While there is no
complainants vehicle. evidence as to Felibers actual income at the time of her death, in view of her
The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete temporary separation from work because of her pregnancy, we do not consider it
defense of a relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and reversible error for the trial court to peg her earning capacity to that of the salary of a
shouting at the appellant and his son do not amount to an unlawful aggression government nurse under the salary standardization law, as a fair estimate or
against them, Dino Gonzalez. Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating reasonable assessment of her earning capacity at the time of her death. It would be
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of grossly inequitous to deny her spouse and her minor children damages for the
merit. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity support that they would have received, considering clear evidence on record that she
between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting did have earning capacity at the time of her death.
crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the The awards for moral damages for the death of Feliber Andres and for the
crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and the injuries sustained by the two children, which under the circumstances are reasonable,
injury sustained by the victim.[54] The appellants use of a gun, although not are likewise sustained.
deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably placed the WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED. The appellant is
appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun is hereby found guilty of homicide for the death of Feliber Andres and is sentenced to
sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed. an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium
For the death of Feliber Andres, and in the absence of any mitigating period, as minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its
circumstance, the appellant is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 8 medium period, as maximum. For each count of the slight physical injuries committed
years and 1 day of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum to 14 years 8 against Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced to 20
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. For each days of arresto menor.
count of the slight physical injuries committed against Kenneth Andres and Kevin The pecuniary awards granted by the trial court are hereby sustained.
Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor in its medium
period. SO ORDERED
The rules on the imposition of penalties for complex crimes under Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code are not applicable in this case. Art. 48 applies if a single act
constitutes two or more grave and less grave felonies or when an offense is a
necessary means of committing another; in such a case, the penalty for the most
serious offense shall be imposed in its maximum period. Art. 9 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Art. 25 defines grave felonies as those to which the law attaches
the capital punishment or afflictive penalties from reclusion perpetua to prision
mayor; less grave felonies are those to which the law attaches a penalty which in its
maximum period falls under correctional penalties; and light felonies are those
punishable by arresto menor or fine not exceeding two hundred pesos. Considering
that the offenses committed by the act of the appellant of firing a single shot are one
count of homicide, a grave felony, and two counts of slight physical injuries, a light
felony, the rules on the imposition of penalties for complex crimes, which requires
two or more grave and/or less grave felonies, will not apply.
The pecuniary award granted by the trial court for actual damages was duly
established by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as supported by the
original receipts for hospitalization and other medical expenses presented in evidence

18
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO S. ANTONIO, SPO4
JUANITO N. NIETO and SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR., accused-appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated April 30, 1997, rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156 in Criminal Case No. 111232-H, for
Murder, the dispositive portion of which is quoted hereunder, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery as charged in the
Information, and there being no mitigating or any aggravating circumstance, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Sec. 6 of
Republic Act No. 7659 entitled An Act to Impose The Death Penalty On Certain
Heinous Crimes and Art. 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the service of his sentence, accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet shall be
credited in full with the period of his preventive imprisonment.
The guilt of both accused JUANITO NIETO y NEMER and HONORIO C. CARTALLA, JR.,
as accessories, having also been established beyond any reasonable doubt, each of
them is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correcional as minimum to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
Accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet is likewise hereby ordered to pay, unto the
heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles, the following sums:
a. P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B. Tuadles;
b. P226,298.36, as actual damages;
c. P7,200,000.00, representing compensable earnings lost by reason of
Arnulfo B. Tuadles death;
d. P3,000,000.00 or the stipulated P1,000,000.00 each for the three (3)
children of Arnulfo B. Tuadles, and another P500,000.00 for the widow,
Ma. Odyssa Suzette Tecarro-Tuadles, as moral damages;
e. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;
f. Costs.
In case of insolvency of accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet, accused JUANITO
NIETO y NEMER and HONORIO C. CARTALLA, JR., shall be liable to pay, jointly and
severally, one-third (1/3) of the above-adjudicated sums or the amount of
P3,675,432.78 unto the said heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles.
In any event, the foregoing civil liabilities shall all be without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.
Being instruments of the crime, let the caliber .9mm Beretta Mode 92F with Serial
Number BER-041965-Z, including its black magazine and five (5) live bullets, which are
presently under the custody of the Court, be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government and turned over to the Firearms and Explosives Office, Camp Crame,
Quezon City.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO
@ Ambet from the San Juan Municipal Jail to the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa
City.
SO ORDERED.[1]
On that fateful morning of November 2, 1996, what should have been an
amiable game of cards between two erstwhile friends turned into a deadly
confrontation resulting in the fatal shooting of one by the hand of the other. The
victim, Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles, a former professional basketball player, succumbed
instantaneously to a single gunshot wound right between the eyes, inflicted with
deadly precision by the bullet of a .9mm caliber Beretta pistol.
Convicted of murder by the trial court as the killer is Alberto Ambet S. Antonio, a
one-time chairman of the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). It was during his stint
as such that he and Tuadles became socially acquainted. They somehow lost touch,
but later became reacquainted when they both started frequenting the International
Business Club (IBC), located along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro Manila, which
houses amenities such as a dining room, music bar and gameroom.Often, the two
would meet with other members and friends to play cards in the gameroom at the
second floor of the club. Their preferred games were poker or pusoy dos, ordinary
poker or Russian poker. Their bets always ran into the tens of thousands of pesos.
The tragic events began to unravel in the final hours of November 1,
1996. Antonio, Tuadles, and a certain Danny Debdani, then president of the IBC, had
agreed to meet at the club for another poker session, their third night in a
row. Antonio arrived at the club first, followed by Tuadles at around
midnight. Debdani, however, failed to appear, so after waiting for sometime, Antonio
and Tuadles decided to play pusoy dos, a game for two (2) players only. They
continued playing until morning, pausing only when either of them had to visit the
restroom. They stopped playing at around 9:00 oclock in the morning of November 2,
1996, to eat breakfast.
When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings from the loser,
an argument arose. It is at this point where the prosecution and the defense
presented two very different scenarios. The prosecution alleged and sought to prove
that in the course of an argument, without warning or cause, Antonio pulled his gun
from behind his back and shot Tuadles at very close range, thus employing
treacherous means to accomplish the nefarious deed. The pivotal evidence presented
by the prosecution was the testimony of one Jose Jimmy T. Bobis, a security guard
who testified as to how the shooting of Tuadles occurred.
On the other hand, the defense hinged its opposing arguments on the testimony
of accused Antonio himself, who testified that their argument was caused by Tuadles
refusal to pay Antonios winnings. In the middle of a heated altercation where they
traded expletives, Tuadles suddenly grabbed Antonios gun from atop a
sidetable. Fearing for his life, Antonio claimed that he reached for Tuadles hand and
they grappled for possession of the gun. As they wrestled, a single shot roared,
Tuadles fell face down to the floor, and Antonio was left too stunned to recall who
19
had actually pulled the trigger. In fine, Antonio alleged that the shooting was
accidental, and his only motivation was to defend himself. He also refuted the
testimony of the prosecutions eyewitness, averring that SG Bobis could not have seen
the actual shooting since he (Bobis) and co-accused SPO4 Juanito Nieto, who were
alerted by Antonios yells, reached the scene when Tuadles had already been shot and
was lying on the floor.
While Tuadles lay bloodied and still, no one remembered to call an ambulance
or check if he was still alive. Instead, and there is no dispute in these succeeding
events, Antonio convinced the two (2) security guards, prosecution eyewitness SG
Bobis included, to accompany him to his home in Greenmeadows Subdivision,
Quezon City, after which they proceeded to the San Juan Police Station. With them
was SPO4 Nieto, a member of the San Juan Police Force. They remained at Antonios
residence for several hours, during which time Antonio made phone calls and
summoned his lawyer. At around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, Antonio, accompanied
by SPO4 Nieto, placed himself and his gun in the custody of San Juan Mayor Jinggoy
Estrada and the police authorities. Later, the two security guards and SPO4 Nieto
were driven back to the club where they waited for the police
investigators. Sometime thereafter, SG Bobis narrated the events and executed his
statement at the police station, a statement which he would repudiate three (3) days
later.
On November 18, 1996, an Information was filed against Antonio for the crime
of murder. Also charged as accessories were SPO4 Nieto and SPO1 Honorio Cartalla,
Jr. The Information alleged that:
On or about November 2, 1996, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the accused Antonio, armed with a gun, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery, attack,
assault and use personal violence upon the person of Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles, by then
and there suddenly, unexpectedly, deliberately and without provocation, shooting
Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles on his forehead, right between the eyes, thereby inflicting upon
the latter mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death;
The accused Nieto, without having participated in said crime of murder, either as
principal or accomplice, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take
part subsequent to its commission, with abuse of his public functions and position as
a public officer, by harboring or assisting the accused Antonio, by then and there
failing to arrest and surrender immediately the said accused Antonio to the
authorities and by giving false information which tended to deceive the investigating
authorities; and
The accused Cartalla, Jr., without having participated in said crime of murder either as
principal or accomplice, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take
part subsequent to its commission, with abuse of his public functions and position as
a public officer, by concealing or destroying the effects or instruments of the body of
the crime, in order to prevent its discovery, by then and there removing the laser
sight of the gun used in shooting Tuadles, deliberately omitting to take steps to
preserve the evidence at the scene of the crime, and purposely failing to call on the
crime laboratory service of the proper agencies for appropriate action.
Contrary to law.[2]
Upon arraignment, co-accused SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. entered a plea of Not
Guilty. Accused Antonio and SPO4 Nieto both refused to enter a plea, and the trial
court entered a plea of not guilty for both of them.
After trial on the merits, all three accused were found guilty as charged,
imposing on them the appropriate penalties and ordering them to pay to the heirs of
Tuadles various amounts as and for indemnity and damages, set forth in the
dispositive portion quoted above. All three accused filed separate appeals assailing
the trial courts findings and disposition.
Appellant Antonio assails the trial courts judgment on the following assigned
errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF JOSE
JIMMY BOBIS WHICH CONFLICTS DRASTICALLY NOT ONLY WITH HIS INITIAL
DECLARATIONS BUT ALSO WITH HIS PREVIOUSLY EXECUTED STATEMENT, AND WHICH
TESTIMONY IS TAINTED WITH SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES, INCREDIBILITIES, AND
OMISSIONS ON SUBSTANTIAL MATTERS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY ATTENDED THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE VERSION OF APPELLANT
ALBERTO AMBET ANTONIO.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE
PART OF THE VICTIM ARNULFO ARNIE TUADLES IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE
COMMISION OF THE IMPUTED ACT, AND IN NOT APPRECIATING THIS MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE SUM OF P7,200,000.00 AS
COMPENSABLE EARNINGS LOST BY REASON OF ARNIE TUADLES DEATH, DESPITE
INADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH AWARD.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PALPABLY EXCESSIVE MORAL DAMAGES TO
THE HEIRS OF ARNIE TUADLES.
VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT ALBERTO AMBET ANTONIO GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.[3]
20
 Appellant SPO4 Nieto likewise questions the trial courts decision, arguing that:
I against appellant Antonio would be strengthened.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING NIETO AS AN ACCESSORY
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED BY THE
PRINCIPAL ACCUSED ANTONIO WAS MURDER[4]
Appellant Cartalla, Jr. also challenged the said decision on the following grounds:
I parte are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are
THE COURT OF ORIGIN HAS COMMITTED A BLATANT ERROR IN CONVICTING SPO1
HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. AS ACCESSORY TO THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE RECORD IS SO REPLETE WITH EVIDENCES THAT THERE ARE REASONABLE
DOUBTS TO HOLD HIM AS SUCH.
II
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR AND HAS NOT SHOWN FAIRNESS IN
NOT CONSIDERING FULLY THE GOOD FAITH, DILIGENCE AND HARD WORK EXERTED
BY SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. WHEN HE INVESTIGATED THE CASE ON HAND TILL
THE TIME HE DELIVERED THE SPECIMEN OR PIECES OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF THE
CRIME TO THE PNP-CLS, CAMP CRAME, QUEZON CITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT HAS COMMITTED A SERIOUS MISTAKE IN DISREGARDING THE
SIXTEEN (16) YEARS OF ACTIVE POLICE SERVICE OF SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR.
SHOWN WITH DEDICATION AND LOYALTY THERETO SUSTAINING MORE HIS
INNOCENCE OF THE CRIME CHARGED HEREIN.[5]
Considering that appellant Antonio is the principal accused, we shall deal first
with the issues raised in his appeal, foremost of which is the credibility of the
prosecutions sole eyewitness, SG Jose Jimmy Bobis. Appellant Antonio challenges SG
Bobis worth and credibility as an eyewitness on two (2) grounds.
First, SG Bobis, in his first sworn statement before the San Juan authorities
averred that he did not see the actual shooting since he was still ascending the stairs
leading to the second floor where the crime took place when he heard the
gunshot. Days later, in a second statement taken at the Eastern Police District (EPD)
and in his testimony before the trial court, SG Bobis negated his earlier statement,
this time averring that he had indeed seen appellant Antonio pull his gun from
behind, and with neither warning nor provocation, aim the gun at the head of Tuadles
and shoot the latter pointblank. This complete turnabout in SG Bobis testimony,
according to appellant Antonio, is a sure sign of the said witness unreliability,
incredibility, and unworthiness. He also points out the contradictions and
inconsistencies between SG Bobis first and second statements and court testimony.
Second, appellant Antonio belittles SG Bobis reasons for giving the San Juan
Police investigators false information in his first statement, saying that nobody
threatened SG Bobis if he testified against appellant Antonio. On the other hand,
appellant Antonio suggests that it was Colonel Lucas Managuelod of the EPD who
coerced SG Bobis to change his statement and testimony so that the murder charge
There is no question that SG Bobis second statement and court testimony, on
the one hand, contradicted what he previously narrated in his first statement, on the
other hand. The question therefore is: Which is more credible and of more value to
the courts in ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the accused?
It is a matter of judicial experience that affidavits or statements taken ex
inferior to testimony given in court, and whenever there is inconsistency between the
affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater
weight.[6] Moreover, inconsistencies between the declaration of the affiant in his
sworn statements and those in open court do not necessarily discredit said
witness.[7] Thus, the trial court followed precedents in giving more credence to SG
Bobis testimony given in open court despite his having executed an earlier statement
which was inconsistent with his testimony.
Besides, when confronted with his first contradictory statement, SG Bobis
explained the reasons why he was moved to give false information in his first
statement.He had testified that moments after he saw appellant Antonio shoot
Tuadles, the appellant warned him: Ikaw, wag kang tumistigo, ha.[8] Later, he and the
other security guard, SG Olac, were allegedly coerced to go to the appellants house in
Quezon City. He also testified that while they were there, appellant Antonio and his
lawyer instructed him (Bobis), should the police investigator ask him who shot
Tuadles, to say that what happened was only an accident. [9]
At the police station, appellant SPO4 Nieto allegedly told SG Bobis to say that
they were both outside the club when the trouble started, saying: kailangan ipalabas
natin na nasa labas tayo ng club.[10] Bobis stated that he was confused and afraid,
and, therefore, told the police investigator, appellant Cartalla, Jr., on November 2,
1996, that he did not see appellant Antonio shoot Tuadles because he was still
ascending the stairs when the gun went off.
Apparently, it was not only fear that ruled his thoughts and actions at that time,
but also remorse and confusion. As found by the trial court:
He admits that he had acted contrary to the ethical standards and code of conduct of
private security guards when he did not make a formal report to his superior about
the shooting incident of November 2, 1996 at the Club but countered that this was
because accused Antonio had taken him to the latters house. This being so, neither
was he able to put said accused Antonio under arrest.
Added to this was the fact that even accused Nieto, a policeman in active service who
was with them at the time and who should have done so, had also failed to arrest
accused Antonio, more so with him and SG Olac who are just ordinary security
guards. (Dahil po maam, si SPO4 Nieto, pulis na po ang kasama namin, hindi niya po
nagawa na arestuhin si Mr. Ambet Antonio mas lalo po kami na ordinary guard lang
po.)
21
True, he had his service .38 caliber in his possession at the time. Nevertheless,
because accused Antonio looked: parang galit pa sila sa amin he can not, as in fact he
did not, insist that instead of going to the house of accused Antonio, he will effect the
arrest.[11]
Nevertheless, Bobis stated that his conscience bothered him, and seeing Tuadles
widow crying on television, he gathered enough resolve and courage to finally tell the
truth to the police authorities at the EPD. When he testified in open court, SG Bobis
did not waver in his declaration that he witnessed appellant Antonio suddenly pull his
gun from behind and shoot Tuadles three (3) feet away.
Rule 132, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related
to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and
he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain
them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any
question is put to him concerning them. (Underscoring ours).
Thus, this Court has uniformly held that:
Previous statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility of a witness
unless his attention was first directed to the discrepancies and he was then given an
opportunity to explain them. It is only when no reasonable explanation is given by a
witness in reconciling his conflicting declarations that he should be deemed
impeached.[12]
We find no reason to discredit the trial courts finding that the reasons given by
SG Bobis sufficiently explained the conflicting declarations he made in his two (2)
sworn statements and in his court testimony. Therefore, he cannot be impeached as
an eyewitness. This Court also recognizes that the initial reticence of witnesses to
volunteer information about a criminal case and their aversion to be involved in
criminal investigations due to fear of reprisal is not uncommon, and this fact has been
judicially declared not to adversely affect the credibility of witnesses. [13]
Apart from the issue of SG Bobis having given an earlier contradictory
statement, his direct testimony and answers under cross-examination appear clear
and convincing. We agree with the trial court when it held:
But it is SG Bobis whom the Court finds credible.
Why he had executed a first, then a second statement, totally in conflict with each
other, SG Bobis had fully explained to the satisfaction of the Court. His lowly station in
life had been taken advantage of by accused Antonio and Nieto. These two (2) had
thought that they had succeeded in completely prevailing upon SG Bobis. For did not
SG Bobis tell their lies?
Still, the conscience of a good man had won over.
SG Bobis had redeemed himself. He gave spontaneous and straightforward answers
to the gruelling questions propounded on him and had stuck to his truth.
The Court had painstakingly, taken note of each of the witnesses demeanor on the
stand. While SG Bobis was steadfast with his words, accused Antonio and Nieto were
evidently recalling from a script. The other prosecution witnesses, SG Olac and Romeo
M. Solano were, like SG Bobis, untainted in their testimonies.[14]
Finding nothing that would compel us to conclude otherwise, we respect the
findings of the trial court on the issue of the credibility of SG Bobis as an eyewitness,
especially considering that the trial court was in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witness himself and observed his deportment and manner
of testifying during the trial.[15]
In the recent case of People v. Pili, this Court had occasion to rule that:
It is doctrinally settled that the assessments of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct
and attitude under grilling examination. These are the most significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face
of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the
trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose
testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on
such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of
weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially
affect the disposition of the case.[16]
And in People v. Deleverio, this Court ruled that:
It is axiomatic to point out, furthermore, that in an appeal, where the culpability or
innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the
veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are entitled to and given the
highest degree of respect.[17]
Moreover, in People v. Reynaldo, we reiterated the principle that:
The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can
weigh the testimony of a witness in the light of his demeanor, conduct and attitude as
he testified, and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate
between the true and the false.[18]
There are other reasons why the eyewitness testimony of SG Bobis was given
full faith and credit. SG Bobis, a mere security guard, realized he was no match to
appellants Antonio and SPO4 Nieto. The former, a wealthy businessman, is known as
an intimate friend of people in power. Appellant Antonio admitted in court that he
surrendered himself and his gun to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, who was his good
friend. Hours later, he went to see then Vice President Joseph Estrada in Tagaytay City
so he (Antonio) could tell his friend, the Vice President, what happened in his own
words.[19]
Appellant SPO4 Nieto was a member in active duty of the San Juan Police Force
who was close to appellant Antonio. Considering SG Bobis lowly station in life, as
compared to that of the said appellants, it is understandable that his initial reaction
to the shocking events would be one of intimidation, if not fear. SG Bobis believed
then, and no one can fault him for thinking so, that going against the instructions and
22
dictates of appellant Antonio and SPO4 Nieto would make life very difficult for him,
knowing they were well-connected to the powers that be. This perceived threat,
whether real or imagined, compelled him to take the easy way out and just repeat
what appellants told him to say.
There is an oft-quoted adage that a person may be able to avoid his enemies,
but he can never run away from himself. SG Bobis may have momentarily avoided
incurring the wrath of the appellants by acceding to their dictates, but he could not
escape the proddings of his conscience. He realized he had to right a wrong, and this
he did with selflessness and at great risk to himself.
Furthermore, appellants could not impute any ill motive on the part of SG Bobis
except the statement that it was Colonel Lucas Managuelod of the EPD who told him
how to testify. Thus, his positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand
under solemn oath without convincing evidence to the contrary deserve full faith and
credence.[20]
Appellant Antonio, however, would seek to completely avoid culpability by
claiming that the shooting of Tuadles was caused by mere accident without his fault
or intention of causing it, or that he acted in self-defense.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that where an accused admits
having killed the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, he
assumes the burden of proof to establish his plea of self-defense by clear, credible
and convincing evidence.[21] To successfully interpose self-defense, appellant Antonio
must clearly and convincingly prove: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack;
and (3) the person defending himself must not have provoked the victim into
committing the act of aggression.[22]
Without granting that his testimony is an accurate narration of the events that
took place, we shall discuss the points raised by appellant Antonio only for the
purpose of determining whether the requisites of self-defense were attendant as
claimed. In his testimony appellant Antonio alleged that Tuadles committed an act of
aggression when he (Tuadles) grabbed the gun which was on top of a
sidetable. Appellant Antonio then concluded that Tuadles had the sole intention of
using the gun against him (Antonio), so he grappled with Tuadles to prevent the latter
from shooting him. His bare testimony, uncorroborated as it is, does not convince us
that Tuadles would, so to speak, beat him to the draw. The testimony of Bobis shows
that Tuadles was calm in answering Appellant Antonios loud invectives, and it would
be hard to imagine Tuadles as the aggressor under such a situation. And even if
Tuadles had grabbed the gun, it could very well have been that Tuadles intended to
keep the gun away from appellant Antonio to prevent the latter from using it against
him considering the state of mind and the foul mood appellant Antonio was in. This
would be a more believable scenario since even appellant Antonio admitted that he
was suffused with anger, his temper short due to three (3) consecutive sleepless
nights.
Appellant Antonio never said that Tuadles aimed or pointed the gun at
him. There is no evidence, apart from appellant Antonios uncorroborated testimony,
that Tuadles made an attempt to shoot him. Hence, there is no convincing proof that
there was unlawful aggression on the part of Tuadles. For unlawful aggression to be
appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.[23] The burden of
proving unlawful aggression lay on appellant Antonio, but he has not presented
incontrovertible proof that would stand careful scrutiny before any court. Lacking this
requirement, appellant Antonios claim of self-defense cannot be appreciated. He
cannot even claim it as an extenuating circumstance.[24]
Besides, it cannot be said that appellant Antonio did not provoke Tuadles, if
indeed the latter had grabbed the gun from the table. Antonio himself admitted that
he was shouting and cursing Tuadles while in a furious rage. Such a threatening
stance could be interpreted as a provocation which could have prompted Tuadles to
get the gun so that appellant Antonio, in his anger, would not be able to use it against
Tuadles. If ever there was provocation, it was certainly coming from appellant
Antonio, not from Tuadles.
In the alternative, appellant Antonio claims that the shooting of Tuadles was an
accident. He further argues that Tuadles was killed while he, Antonio, was performing
a lawful act with due care, and without fault or intention of causing it. Having ruled
that appellant Antonio failed to prove his claim of self-defense, (i.e., there was no
unlawful aggression on the part of Tuadles and provocation coming from Antonio
himself), there is no basis for us to argue with appellant Antonio that he was
performing a lawful act when he shot Tuadles.[25]
We note that appellant Antonios version of how the shooting took place leaves
much room for conjecture. It is true that there is no fixed dictum on the reaction of a
person under the circumstances of a sudden death he may have caused. He could
react in a variety of ways, some of them even irrational. However, we respect the trial
courts findings. The trial court upheld the prosecutions version thus sustaining the
theory that if Antonio indeed shot Tuadles by accident, the natural reaction expected
of him would be to immediately see to it that Tuadles be brought to a hospital or get
medical attention at the quickest time possible. Instead, appellant Antonio left
Tuadles, who was supposed to be his good friend, lying dead on the floor for several
hours. If indeed he and Tuadles both had their hands on the gun and there was no
telling who actually pulled the trigger, we agree that appellant Antonio should have
seen to it that no one else would touch the gun barehanded to preserve the
fingerprints on it. Instead, he gave the gun to SPO4 Nieto who had no concern for
preserving the fingerprints on the gun. Not only that, appellant Antonio also handed
the gun to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Thus, one tangible piece of evidence that could
have proven his claim of self-defense or accident was unfortunately lost due to his
lack of presence and due care.
Appellant Antonios ambivalence in his choice of defenses is clear from the
records. First, he denies that he pulled the trigger because it was Tuadles who was
23
holding the gun. Then he says that he cannot recall who fired the gun so it could have
very well been either him or Tuadles who did it. Next, he admits firing the gun, but he
did it in self-defense. Only, he could not indubitably prove that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of Tuadles. Failing there, he again admitted shooting Tuadles,
but that it was an accident. Again, he failed to prove that he was in the process of
performing a lawful act when he shot Tuadles.
When an accused invokes self-defense or claims that it was an accident to
escape criminal liability, he admits having caused the death of the victim. And when
he fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence the positiveness of that justifying
circumstance, having admitted the killing, conviction of the accused is
inescapable.[26]Appellant Antonio had to rely on the strength of his evidence and not
on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence for, even if the latter were weak, his
invoking self-defense is already an open admission of responsibility for the
killing.[27] As it was, appellant Antonios testimony is not only uncorroborated by
independent and competent evidence, but also doubtful by itself [28] for being
ambivalent and self-serving.[29]
Having admitted responsibility for the killing of Tuadles, appellant Antonio
claims the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. On this score, we find
merit in his claim considering that all the elements in order that voluntary surrender
may be appreciated were attendant in his case. First, he had not been actually
arrested;Second, he surrendered himself to a person in authority; and Third, his
surrender was voluntary. It is of no moment that appellant Antonio did not
immediately surrender to the authorities, but did so only after the lapse of about six
(6) hours. In the case of People v. Bautista,[30] the voluntary surrender of the accused
to a police authority four (4) days after the commission of the crime was considered
attenuating. There is no dispute that appellant Antonio voluntarily surrendered to the
mayor, a person in authority, before he was arrested, hence the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered in appellant Antonios
favor.[31]
Appellant Antonio also claims the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation on the part of Tuadles. To avail of this mitigating circumstance, it must be
shown that the provocation originated from the offended party.[32] However, apart
from his own testimony, appellant Antonio has not proven by convincing evidence
that he was provoked by Tuadles. He claimed that Tuadles provoked him when the
latter refused or could not pay his winning. Refusal to pay cannot be a mitigating
provocation for appellant Antonio to kill Tuadles. An unpaid debt cannot, and never
will, be a reason to shoot the debtor dead. Besides, appellant Antonio had no other
proof that he won and that the argument arose from Tuadles refusal to pay. His bare
testimony is, at best, self-serving. Accordingly, appellant Antonio is not entitled to the
benefit of the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation. [33]
There is, however, a significant and consequential aspect of the case which the
trial court overlooked and disregarded.
As earlier stated, we find no sufficient reason to disagree with the trial court
when it relied on the testimony of SG Bobis. However, we have carefully examined
said testimony, the records of this petition, and the justifications of the trial court
upon which it based its decision.
There is no basis for the trial courts conclusion that accused Antonio consciously
and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his
criminal design without risk to himself.[34] It ruled that treachery qualified the killing
to murder. The trial court did not explain the basis for the qualification except for a
terse citation that there was a sudden attack and the victim had no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate. As stated by counsel for appellant, out of the 71-page
decision, typed single space, the trial court devoted only a few sentences to the issue
of treachery.
There was no treachery in this case.
It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must
be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose.
All the evidence shows that the incident was an impulse killing. It was a spur of
the moment crime.
The precedents are many. They are consistent. Among them:
Mere suddenness of attack is not enough to constitute treachery where accused
made no preparation or employed no means, method and form of execution tending
directly and specially to insure the commission of a crime and to eliminate or diminish
risk from defense which the victim may take.[35]
A sudden and unexpected attack would not constitute alevosia where the aggressor
did not consciously adopt a mode of attack intended to perpetrate the homicide
without risk to himself.[36]
A sudden and unexpected attack constitutes the absence of alevosia where it did not
appear that the aggressor had consciously adopted a mode of attack intended to
facilitate the perpetration of the homicide without risk to himself, as where the
appellant followed the victims when the latter refused appellant's invitation to have
some more alcoholic drinks.[37]
The mere suddenness of attack does not, of itself suffice for a finding of alevosia if the
mode adopted by the accused does not positively tend to prove that they thereby
knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without
any risk to themselves arising from the defense that might be offered.[38]
The aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when decision to attack was
arrived at on the spur of the moment.[39]
The annotations are similarly consistent. It is not enough that the means,
methods, or form of execution of the offense was without danger to the offender
arising from the defense or retaliation that might be made by the offended party. It is
further required, for treachery to be appreciable, that such means, method or form
was deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offender. [40] Such deliberate or
conscious choice was held non-existent where the attack was the product of an
impulse of the moment.[41]
24
 The trial court's ruling that the mere suddenness of an attack makes the killing a
murder because of treachery is not consistent with the decisions of this
Court.[42]Conscious deliberation or conscious adoption of the mode of attack has to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. For it is likewise an established principle that the
quantum of evidence to prove a person's being guilty of a crime is also required to
prove treachery. The same degree of proof to dispel any reasonable doubt is required
before any conclusion may also be reached respecting the attendance of treachery,
whether as qualifying or aggravating, in a criminal case.[43] There is no such proof in
this case.
There is no dispute that prior to the shooting, appellant Antonio and Tuadles
spent several hours having fun playing "pusoy dos." The situation turned ugly,
however, when Tuadles could not pay to appellant Antonio his alleged winnings. An
argument arose, with appellant Antonio and Tuadles standing face to face three (3)
feet away from each other, a fact attested to by the defense and even by the
prosecution eyewitness himself.
Accordingly to SG Bobis, Tuadles and Antonio were arguing. Antonio even called
out: Sarge! Sarge! Sarge! Just before the shooting, Bobis heard Antonio
saying:Putang ina ka kasi. The argument precluded the presence of treachery. If
Antonio had consciously adopted means and methods to kill Tuadles, there was no
reason to call for a Sergeant or any eyewitness for that matter.
To the point is our ruling in the case of People v. Alacar,[44] where we held that
there was no treachery where the attempt to kill resulted from a verbal
altercation.More recently, in People v. Salvador, we pronounced that:
There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such as when a
heated argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was standing face to face
with his assailants and the initial assault could not have been
unforseen.[45] (Underscoring Ours)
Even if it could be said that the attack was sudden, there would still be no
treachery. In People v. Chua,[46] we reiterated our consistent view that:
While the killing itself appears to have occurred on sudden impulse, it was preceded
by acts of appellant showing hostility and a heated temper that indicated an
imminent attack and should have put the deceased on guard.
Thus, treachery could not be appreciated where the victim was forewarned and
could have anticipated the aggression of the accused. Since the sudden shooting of
Tuadles was preceded by a heated verbal altercation between Tuadles and appellant
Antonio, as admitted by both prosecution and defense, then it cannot be concluded
that the shooting was committed with treachery.
It is also clear that appellant Antonio did not set out or plan to kill Tuadles in the
first place. His criminal act was an offshoot of their argument which neither of them
had foreseen. Hence, there was no treachery because treachery requires that the
mode of attack must have been thought of by the offender and must have sprung
from an unforeseen occurrence.[47]
In People v. Nitcha,[48] we held that:
To establish treachery, the evidence must show that the accused made some
preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to ensure the execution of the crime
or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself. A killing
done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous. (Underscoring ours)
It was Antonio's sudden anger and heated passion which drove him to pull his
gun and shoot Tuadles. Said passion, however, cannot co-exist with treachery. In
passion, the offender loses his reason and control. In treachery, on the other hand,
the means employed is adopted consciously and deliberately. One who, in the heat of
passion, loses his reason and self-control, cannot consciously employ a particular
means, method or form of attack in the execution of the crime. [49] Thus, the killing of
Tuadles by appellant Antonio was not attended by treachery.
That the treachery, which was alleged in the information and favorably
considered by the trial court to elevate the killing to murder, was not proven by
convincing evidence[50] is advocated by the Solicitor General in the Appellee's
Brief. He agreed with Appellant Antonio's contention on the matter:
On the basis of the evidence at hand, appellee is constrained to agree with this
particular submission of Antonio. Antonio and Tuadles engaged in pusoy dos. In the
beginning, they were heard laughing and kidding each other (nagtatawanan at
nagkakantiyawan). Later, the banter turned into verbal altercation.
Under the circumstances, Tuadles became aware of the incipient
violence. Hence, Tuadles could have braced himself with the aggression of
Antonio. There is no treachery when the killing results from a verbal altercation or
spat between the victim and the assailant such that the victim must have been
forewarned of the impending danger. In this case, Bobis testified that he saw Antonio
and Tuadles facing each other before Antonio raised his hand and shot Tuadles on the
forehead.The proximate distance of three feet between Tuadles and Antonio
immediately before the fatal shooting allowed and gave Tuadles opportunity to
defend himself.[51]
Consequently, Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal code.
Having been found guilty of the crime of homicide, the penalty that should be
imposed on appellant Antonio should be reduced to reclusion temporal under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being one (1) mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, the penalty to be imposed shall be the minimum period
of reclusion temporal, that is, from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
of the penalty to be imposed shall be the penalty next lower which is prision mayor in
any of its periods.[52] Therefore, appellant Alberto Antonio is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
Appellant Antonio challenges the award of compensatory and moral damages to
the heirs of Tuadles, arguing that said award was unsupported by adequate
25
evidence. In arriving at the amount of P7,200,000.00 as compensatory damages, the
trial court relied completely on the testimony of the victim's widow, Suzette Tuadles,
who stated that at the time of his death, Tuadles was earning P50,000.00 a month
from his construction business. Applying the formula laid down by this Court in the
cases of Villa Rey Transit v. CA,[53] and People v. Quilaton,[54] the trial court arrived at
the amount of P7,200,000.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning
capacity. Appellant Antonio argues that the trial court cannot just rely on the sole
testimony of Suzette Tuadles, otherwise, it would be basing its computation on mere
speculation, conjecture, or guess work.
In People v. Silvestre[55] and People v. Verde,[56] we held that the absence of
documentary evidence to support the prosecution's claim for damages for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of said damages. There,
we awarded damages for loss of earning capacity computed on the basis of the
testimonies of the victim's wives. This was reiterated in People v. Dizon,[57] where we
held that:
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity. In People vs. Verde (G. R. No. 119077, February
10, 1999), the non-presentation of documentary evidence to support the claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity did not prevent this Court from awarding said
damages. The testimony of the victim's wife as to the earning capacity of her
murdered husband, who was then 48 years old and was earning P200.00 a day as a
tricycle driver, sufficed to establish the basis for such an award. x x x As in People vs.
Verde, the Court is inclined to grant the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity
despite the absence of documentary evidence. (Underscoring ours)
In the case at bar, however, the award for compensatory damages should be
calculated as follows:
Net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x gross annual income - living expenses
(50% of
gross annual income)
x = 2(80-40) x [P600,000.00 - 300,000.00]
3 The evidence in the case at bar, insofar as appellant Nieto's culpability is
= 26.67 x P300,000.00
= P8,001,000.00
Considering that moral damages may be awarded without proof of pecuniary
loss, the Court shall take into account the circumstances obtaining in the case and
assess damages according to its discretion.[58] We agree with appellant Antonio that
the trial court's award of moral damages was excessive. While there is no hard and
fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages, each
case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.[59] And though moral
damages are incapable of pecuniary estimation to compensate the claimants for
actual injury, they are not designed to enrich the complainants at the expense of the
accused.[60]
Applied to this case, we recognize that Tuadles was the sole support of his
family and they will also be deprived of his love and companionship. No amount of
money could ever compensate for their loss. While the award of moral damages may
help ease the emotional and psychological trauma that they continue to suffer, this
Court has not granted so large an amount as moral damages. Accordingly, we find
that the amount of P3,000,000.00 granted by the trial court in this case is excessive,
and the same is therefore reduced to P500,000.00. Moreover, there being no
aggravating circumstances attendant in this case, the award of exemplary damages
should also be deleted.[61]
We now come to the errors assigned by appellant SPO4 Juanito M. Nieto. He
argues that the trial court erred in convicting him as an accessory. The trial court's
grounds for finding him guilty are: (1) he failed to arrest appellant Antonio; and (2) he
gave false information tending to deceive the investigating authorities.[62]
The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as one who has
knowledge of the commission of the crime, yet did not take part in its commission as
principal or accomplice, but took part in it subsequent to its commission by any of
three modes: (1) profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of
the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or
instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing,
or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts
with abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.[63]
Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, there are two (2)
classes of accessories, one of which is a public officer who harbors, conceals or assists
in the escape of the principal. Such public officer must have acted with abuse of his
public functions, and the crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is
not a light felony. Appellant SPO4 Nieto is one such public officer, and he abused his
public function when he failed to effect the immediate arrest of accused Antonio and
to conduct a speedy investigation of the crime committed.
concerned, shows that in the middle of the argument between appellant Antonio and
the deceased, Antonio called Nieto by shouting, Sarge! Sarge! Hearing this, SG Bobis
woke Nieto up and the latter went upstairs. Immediately thereafter, appellant
Antonio shot Tuadles, and then ordered Nieto to get the scoresheet and the cards
from the table, which Nieto did. Antonio, Nieto and Bobis went downstairs. Antonio
told guards Bobis and Ernesto Olac to go with them, and they all boarded Antonio's
Mercedes Benz van, including Nieto. They arrived at Antonio's residence in
Greenmeadows Subdivision at around 11:30 o'clock in the morning. There, they had
coffee while Antonio made some telephone calls. Soon after, a certain Atty. Abaya
arrived and talked to the two security guards, while Nieto was present. Nieto then
told Bobis that in his statement, he should say that the two of them, i.e., Bobis and
Nieto, were seated outside the entrance of the Club when the incident took place. At
26
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Nieto, Bobis and Olac returned to the Club. They waited
outside until members of the San Juan police, together with Mayor Jinggoy Estrada
and Vice Mayor Philip Cezar, arrived at 6:00 o'clock in the evening. After the police
investigated the scene, they proceeded to the police station. There, Nieto reiterated
his instruction to Bobis to say that the two of them were outside the club. While
Bobis gave his statement to the police, Nieto remained in front of him and dictated to
him what he should answer to the questions of the police investigator.[64]
The foregoing facts were culled from the testimony of SG Bobis. Appellant
Nieto's actuations immediately after the commission of the crime demonstrate his
liability as an accessory. Being a police officer in the active service, he had the duty to
arrest appellant Antonio after the latter committed a crime in his presence, and
which he himself witnessed. Unfortunately, he failed to do what was incumbent upon
him to do. Instead, he rode with the offender to the latter's house where they stayed
for more than five (5) hours. In the early case of U. S. v. Yacat, et al., it was held:[65]
It is, however, unquestionable that Pedro Ureta, who was the local president of the
town of Cabiao at the time the crime was committed, has incurred criminal
liability.Abusing his public office, he refused to prosecute the crime of homicide and
those guilty thereof, and thus made it possible for them to escape, as the defendant
Pedro Lising did in fact. This fact is sufficiently demonstrated in the records, and he
has been unable to explain his conduct in refusing to make an investigation of this
serious occurrence, of which complaint was made to him, and consequently he
should suffer a penalty two degrees inferior to that designated by paragraph 2 of
article 405 of the Code, by virtue of article 68 thereof.
Appellant Nieto knew of the commission of the crime. Right before the shooting,
appellant Antonio called him and he immediately went upstairs. He saw that
appellant shot Tuadles. Despite this knowledge, he failed to arrest appellant and,
instead, left the crime scene together with the latter. To this extent, he assisted
appellant Antonio in his escape.[66]
Furthermore, as correctly found by the trial court, appellant Nieto provided false
information to deceive the investigating authorities. He instructed Bobis to answer
falsely to the questions of the investigating officer, in order to make it appear that
there were no eyewitnesses to the incident and thus make it more difficult for the
police to solve the crime.
Accordingly, the court a quo was correct in convicting appellant as an accessory
to the crime, and he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty prescribed by
law.Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we impose on appellant Nieto the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years of prison correccional, as maximum.
Finally, we come to appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.'s appeal. After carefully
reviewing the facts and issues raised therein, we find that the trial court erred in
finding said appellant guilty as an accessory.
The trial court's sole reason for convicting appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. was his
failure to produce the laser sight of the gun as evidence during the trial. However,
such omission does not amount to concealing or destroying the body of the crime or
effects or instruments thereof to prevent its discovery. The laser sight had been
surrendered to the police authorities so there was no more need for discovery. Its
loss thereafter does not make appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. an accessory. At most, as
custodian thereof, he may be made answerable administratively.
In his testimony, he made clear that the loss was not intentional. He further
stated:
Q Finally, Mr. Cartalla, what can you say about the charge against you as alleged in
the information that you tried to conceal or destroy the effects or body of
the crime to prevent its discovery?
A It's not true, sir.
Q Why?
A Because I did not conceal anything, I did not destroy anything on the body of the
crime and as far as I know, I did all my job as investigator and I worked for it
up to the wee hours of the morning up to the next morning, I still did it and I
gathered evidence and I submitted it to the Crime Laboratory and even when
at the time, I have been hearing that I will not be the one who will
investigate, they got it from me without proper notice, that they will take
over the investigation, I still did my job, and on the fifth, I was asked by
Prosecutor Llorente to retrieve the slug and what I did was even the
investigation is not with me, I still did it, I still went to the IBC and I still
worked hard, I even remember
Atty. Flaminiano
We want to make of record that the witness is now in tears at this moment.
COURT
Continue.
A The companion of Inspector de Leon and PO2 Rojas even said that this
policeman is very hardworking, even the investigation is not with him
anymore, but still, he's working and I answered him, whatever, whatever
they will charge to me, maybe it's just their job and so, I will also do my
job. Because as far as I know, I will not be implicated because I have not
done anything, I have not done the charges that they filed against me, I was
surprised when I was given a confirmation that I was an accessory that is why
my youngest child even told me "kala ko Papa, Mabait ka?" and I told him
that it's not true. For me, I have not done anything like that.
Atty. Fernandez
That's all for the witness, your Honor.
COURT
The way I look at your case, you are indicted here as an accessory because
according to one of the witnesses, the gun together with the laser sight was
handled to you and when that gun reached Crame, the laser sight was no
longer there, answer me, what happened?
27
 A The truth, your Honor, is, when the gun was submitted to me by Inspector
Cabrera, the laser sight was there, I immediately made the transmittal for
the laboratory and I described what is there, together with the laser and
after that, I placed it in a brown envelope, I placed it in my drawer. On the
second day, I was really busy on that day because I was the only one. I was
asking for assistance because I would go out, I will investigate and then I just
found out when I was about to submit the laser to the laboratory, I gave the
envelope together with the transmittal and when it was being received, he
checked it and he said Sgt. Where is the laser sight? and I said it's there,
attached. And he said please look at it.
COURT
Who told you that?
A The person who received, your Honor.
COURT
But in your transmittal, you wrote there that there was a laser?
A Yes, your Honor. When I saw the envelope, there was no laser, I was planning to
go back right away but I just said, okay, I will just cross it out and I did not
erase because I want that I will not hide anything. It has happened because
maybe somebody is interested or I might have left in my drawer. Because I
will not hide it. That's why I did not sno-pake it and I just crossed it out so it
can be read together with my initial and when I came back, I asked them
who touched my things.
COURT
What answer did you get?
A There was no answer. Nobody was answering me, nobody was talking.[67]
From the foregoing, it is clear that appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. did not
intentionally conceal or destroy the laser sight, and the prosecution failed to prove
that he did so with intent to derail the prosecution of the principal accused. On the
other hand, while the laser sight was an accessory device attached to the gun, it was
not essential to the commission, investigation and prosecution of the crime. The gun
itself, which was the instrument of the crime, was surrendered to the authorities and
presented as evidence in court. The failure of appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. to present
the laser sight as part of the evidence did not in any way affect the outcome of the
trial, much less prevent the discovery of the crime. Furthermore, there is no showing
that appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. profited by the non-presentation of the laser sight.
Thus, under the definition of an accessory under the Revised Penal Code and
jurisprudence, appellant Cartalla, Jr.'s omission does not make him liable as an
accessory to the crime committed by appellant Antonio. Even the Solicitor General
submits that there are no grounds to convict appellant Cartalla, to wit:
At the time the laser sight was turned over to Cartalla, the crime or its corpus
delicti had been discovered. Hence, the loss of the laser sight could not have
prevented the discovery of the crime. The essential instrument of the crime, namely,
a caliber .9 mm Beretta Model 92F with serial number BER-041965-7 and black
magazine had been preserved and presented as evidence.
Neither could Cartalla be said to have profited with the non-presentation of the laser
sight as this was not proved by the prosecution. Either way, concealing or profiting,
there is no convicting motive for Cartalla to have so committed. More so, as Cartalla
was the investigating officer on the case.
It is submitted that the non-production of the laser sight by Cartalla did not make him
an accessory to the crime committed by Antonio, although he may be
administratively liable for the loss of a part of the evidence for the prosecution in this
case.[68]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision in Criminal Case
No. 111232-H is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Alberto "Ambet" Antonio is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE and is
correspondingly sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant Juanito Nieto y Nemer is
likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the crime of
HOMICIDE, and is correspondingly sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional,
as maximum.
Accused-appellant Antonio is likewise ordered to pay to the heirs of Arnulfo B.
Tuadles the following sums:
(1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B. Tuadles;
(2) P226,298.36 as actual damages;
(3) P8,001,000.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity;
(4) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and
(5) Costs.
For failure to prove accused-appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.'s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt as accessory to the crime, he is ACQUITTED and absolved of all
liability, both criminal or civil.
In case of insolvency of appellant Alberto S. Antonio @ Ambet, appellant Juanito
Nieto y Nemer shall be liable to pay one-half (1/2) of the above-adjudicated sums or
the amount of P4,388,649.18 unto the said heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles.
In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), joins Justice Puno in his concurring & dissenting
opinion.
Puno, J., see concurring & dissenting opinion.
Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTNG OPINION
PUNO, J.:
I agree with the majority decision except its finding that treachery did
not attend the killing of the victim, Arnulfo Tuadles, and the conclusion that the
28
accused-appellant, Alberto "Ambet" Antonio, should not be held guilty of murder but
only of homicide.
For proper perspective, I wish to relate the relevant facts on the issue of
treachery.
On November 2, 1996, at about 9:30 a.m., the victim, Arnulfo "Arnie" Tuadles,
40 years old, a former professional basketball player and a family man, was shot to
death by accused-appellant Alberto "Ambet" Antonio, 59 years old and former
Chairman of the Games and Amusement Board. The murder weapon was a 9mm
Beretta Model 92F pistol, with a laser sight.1 Tuadles sustained a single gunshot
wound on the forehead, between the eyes.2 The bullet hit the brain and exited at the
right portion of the back of the head.3 He died due to "intracranial hemmorhage."4
Dr. Jaime Leal, Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory, conducted the
autopsy examination on the Tuadles. His examination showed that Tuadles was shot
at close range, specifically at a distance of less than 12 inches.5 The bullet's trajectory
was directed backwards, slightly upwards and to the right. 6
The autopsy also revealed that Tuadles suffered five (5) abrasions ("gasgas"),
located on his forehead, nose, tip of nose, cheek, and right lower lip. He sustained
these abrasions as he collapsed on the floor after he was shot. There were also
contusions on Tuadles' forehead and lower lip that could have been sustained when
his face hit a hard blunt object, and hematomas on both eyes caused by the "pulling
of the blood in the spaces between the eyes." He had a lacerated wound on the cheek
which could have been caused by a forcible contact of the skin with a hard blunt
object, such as chairs or tables, when he was falling to the floor. 7 All the injuries were
located on the head of the victim.
Security guard Jose Jimmy Bobis gave the eyewitness account of the
shooting. He reported at the IBC Club in Greenhills, San Juan, on November 2, 1996 at
7:00 a.m. He relieved co-security guard Ernesto Olac. At that time, there were only
five (5) people inside the club: Antonio, Tuadles, SP04 Juanito Nieto, Olac and
Bobis.Antonio and Tuadles were at the second floor playing "pusoy dos", SP04 Nieto
and Olac were sleeping in the dining area at the ground floor, while Bobis was in the
bar, also at the ground floor, keeping watch of the premises.
In the course of his duty, Bobis heard Antonio and Tuadles laughing and teasing
each other ("nagkakantiyawan") while playing "pusoy dos". He recognized the voice
of Antonio because it was loud in contrast to Tuadles' voice which was soft. At past
9:00 a.m., he heard Antonio say in a loud voice: "Di ba may usapan tayo na ang mag
pa pass ay mag-ta-tap ng dalawang beses sa ibabaw ng mesa?" Antonio then
said "Sige ". Tuadles' response was almost inaudible because he spoke in a soft, cool
voice (mahina at malamig ang boses).8 Again, Antonio spoke: "Barya lang itong
pinagla-laruan natin" (We are only playing for loose change). Tuadles kept silent.
Antonio then called: "Sarge, Sarge, Sarge!," referring to SPO4 Nieto. Bobis walked to
the sleeping Nieto and informed him that Antonio was calling him. They went to the
second floor and saw Antonio and Tuadles standing between the billiard table and the
"pusoy" table. They were facing each other but at a certain angle, and about three
feet of space separated them. Antonio appeared, hiding his right hand behind his
back. He (Antonio) cursed "putang ina ka kasi". Tuadles uttered something which
Bobis could not understand because Tuadles' back was turned on him. Antonio then
quickly raised his right hand, pointed a gun at the face of Tuadles and fired the
gun ("Mabilis na inangat niya ang kanang kamay niya at itinapat sa mukha ni Arnie
Tuadles at ipinutok ang baril ").9 Tuadles twisted to the right and fell on the floor face
down. Antonio removed the gun's magazine, cocked it and replaced its magazine. The
gun had a laser light attached to its end.10 Antonio ordered SPO4 Nieto to get the
score sheet and the cards laying on top of a table. SPO4 Nieto placed the cards on a
paper, folded it several times, and placed it inside the clutch bag of Antonio. Bobis
was taken aback by the incident. When he regained his composure, he asked Antonio:
"Boss, bakit nangyari ito." Antonio did not immediately respond but later pointed his
finger at Bobis and then warned: "Ikaw, huwag kang tumistigo, ha!" Bobis kept quiet
due to fear. They all went downstairs. Olac who heard the gunfire inquired from Bobis
what happened. He told him that Antonio shot Tuadles. Antonio then commanded
Bobis to get the key of Tuadles' car. He did as he was told. Only two vehicles were
parked in the premises of the club: the Mercedes Benz van of Antonio and the car of
Tuadles. They boarded the van, with Antonio driving.Following them was the car of
Tuadles driven by Antonio's driver. The driver left Tuadles' car near Shaw Blvd. and
rode in the van. They headed to the house of Antonio. They left the club at 10:00 a.m.
and arrived at Antonio's house in Green Meadows at 11:30 a.m. On instruction of
Antonio, his driver burned the score sheet and the cards. They stayed at Antonio's
house for several hours while Antonio conferred with his lawyer. Antonio's lawyer
told Bobis that he should say that the shooting was an accident. SPO4 Nieto
instructed Bobis to claim that he was outside the entrance of the club when the
shooting took place. Bobis, Nieto, Olac and Antonio's driver returned to the club at
5:00 p.m. Thirty minutes later, a team of policemen from San Juan arrived. They
found the lifeless body of Tuadles sprawled on the second floor.
Police investigator SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. took the statement of Bobis that same day.
In his statement, Bobis denied seeing the shooting incident. On November 4, 1996,
Bobis happened to watch the television and he saw the crying Mrs. Tuadles while
being interviewed. Bothered by his conscience, he requested the operations manager
of their security agency to bring him to the Eastern Police District. On November 5,
1996, he gave another statement to the EPD and revealed the truth that fateful day
of November 2, 1996.
Given these facts, the majority holds that treachery did not attend the killing
of Tuadles.
There is treachery (alevosia) when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.11
The two elements that must be proved to establish treachery are: (1) the
employment of means of execution which would ensure the safety of the offender
29
from defensive and retaliatory acts of the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to
defend himself, and (2) the means, method and manner of execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted by the offender.12
I respectfully submit that the killing of Tuadles was characterized by treachery.
First. There is little doubt that the first element of treachery was proved by the
prosecution. The victim, Tuadles, had absolutely no opportunity to defend himself
from the aggression of Antonio. The attack was sudden, coming as it did like a
thunderbolt from a blue sky. It was preceded by a not too serious argument about a
rule of the "pusoy dos" game which appeared to have been overlooked by
Tuadles. The little argument agitated Antonio but not Tuadles. Hence, the attack
was unexpected especially because Tuadles and Antonio did not have any prior
misunderstanding. Tuadles even endearingly called Antonio "uncle". Likewise, Tuadles
was a basketball player when Antonio served as Chairman of the Games and
Amusement Board.
Second. The prosecution also proved the second element of treachery that "the
means, method and manner of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted
by the offender." This element deals with the subjective aspect of treachery, hence,
the more difficult element to determine. We are not, however, without any
established jurisprudence in determining whether the accused-appellant deliberately
and consciously adopted the means, method and manner of killing the victim. The
authoritative La Fave and Scott, after a survey of court rulings, tell us of the relevant
evidence to consider, viz:13
"On the basis of events before and at the time of the killing, the trier of fact will
sometimes be entitled to infer that the defendant actually premeditated and
deliberated his intentional killing. Three categories of evidence are important for this
purpose: (1) facts about how and what the defendant did prior to the actual killing
which show he was engaged in activity directed toward the killing, that is, planning
activity; (2) facts about the defendant's prior relationship and conduct with the victim
from which motive may be inferred; and (3) facts about the nature of the killing from
which it may be inferred that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that
the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a preconceived
design. Illustrative of the first category are such acts by the defendant as prior
possession of the murder weapon, surreptitious approach of the victim, or taking the
prospective victim to a place where others are unlikely to intrude. In the second
category are prior threats by the defendants to do violence to the victim, plans or
desires of the defendant which would be facilitated by the death of the victim,
and prior conduct of the victim known to have angered the defendant. As to the
third category, the manner of killing, what is required is evidence (usually based upon
examination of the victim's body) showing that the wounds were deliberately placed
at vital areas of the body. The mere fact that the killing was attended by much
violence or that a great many wounds were inflicted is not relevant in this regard, as
such a killing is just as likely (or perhaps more likely) to have been on impulse.Conduct
by the defendant after the killing in an effort to avoid detection and punishment is
obviously not relevant for purposes of showing premeditation and deliberation, as it
only goes to show the defendant's state of mind at the time and not before or during
the killing." (emphasis ours)
The evidence proves the deliberateness of the attack made by Antonio. The
attack was done with swiftness. It was motivated by the failure of Tuadles to follow
an agreement on the "pusoy" game. The deliberateness of the attack is also shown by
the fact that Tuadles was shot at close range, with the muzzle of the gun less than 12
inches from Tuadles' forehead. Antonio aimed at Tuadles' forehead, between the
eyes. The bullet penetrated Tuadles' brain, destroyed its right hemisphere and caused
Tuadles' instantaneous death. Clearly, Antonio chose to shoot Tuadles at a vital
part of his body. As a result, Tuadles became an instant statistic of the graveyard.
With due respect, I do not agree with the majority that the case at bar involves
a spur of the moment killing, hence, there is no treachery. The majority states that
there was a prior heated altercation between Tuadles and Antonio. The heated
altercation allegedly forewarned Tuadles of the attack. The so-called heated
altercation, however, is not well-established by the evidence. A replay of the facts
will reveal that eyewitness Bobis initially heard the two teasing each
other ("nagkakantiyawan"). Later, an argument developed between them which
cannot be characterized as a "heated altercation." Bobis testified as follows: 14
"Q: Now, this matter of 'kantiyawan' and 'nagtatawanan' iyong dalawa, how long
did this continue during the period of time you were there?
A: A few seconds only.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Would you be in a position to recognize the voices of Ambet Antonio and Arnie
Tuadles?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why?
A: Arnie Tuadles' voice is soft and Ambet Antonio's voice is loud.
Q: Let's focus on Mr. Antonio, you said his voice was loud, did you hear him
mentioned (sic) anything at that time?
Atty. Flaminiano:
Leading, your Honor.
COURT:
Answer.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you hear?
xxxxxxxxx
A: Di ba may usapan tayo na ang mag-pa-pass ay mag-ta-tap ng dalawang beses
sa ibabaw ng mesa?
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Before you heard this statement, did you hear other things from Mr. Ambet
Antonio apart from what you have said, before that?
A: None, sir.
30
xxxxxxxxx to his aid and taken him to a hospital, instead of abandoning him." The Court further
Q: Was there any comment that you heard from Mr. Tuadles? held that the accused was liable for murder. The victim was unarmed. He did not have
A: Yes, sir. the least suspicion of the accused's design to shoot him. In contrast, accused had a
Q: What did you hear from Mr. Tuadles? gun. The victim, therefore, had no chance to defend himself against the latter's
A: I could not understand because his voice was soft and ... frontal attack. Treachery qualified the killing to murder.
Prosecutor Llorente: With due respect to the majority, I find the killing of the victim Tuadles
May we put on record the answer of the witness in Tagalog? qualified by treachery. I vote to convict accused-appellant Antonio of murder as
COURT: charged.
Granted.
A: "Mahina at malamig ang boses."
Despite the soft response from Tuadles, Antonio continued with his outburst,
15
thus:
"Q: Going back now to Mr. Antonio, did you hear him again mentioned (sic) or say
other things?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you hear from Mr. Ambet Antonio?
A: 'Barya lang and pinagla-laruan natin.' It's only a (sic) loose change that we are
playing with here.
Q: Did you hear any word from Mr. Tuadles?
A: No more, sir."
In sum, it was only Antonio who appeared agitated during the alleged
altercation. Tuadles spoke in a soft and cool voice that Bobis could hardly hear and
understand him. The characterization of the argument that preceded the shooting
of is decisive of the issue of treachery. I submit that the argument between Antonio
and Tuadles was trivial for it merely concerned the inadvertence of Tuadles to tap
the table when making a pass. Nothing in the records shows that Tuadles violated the
rule intentionally. Nothing shows the degree of damage suffered by Antonio as a
consequence of Tuadles' omission. It is thus my submission that the argument
appears to be slight and cannot justify the conclusion that Antonio acted in the heat
of passion or on impulse in killing the victim.
The case of People vs. Cruz 16 is apropos. In said case, the accused and the victim
were "compadres" for having stood as sponsors in the baptism of a common
friend. The accused used to drive one of the tricycles of the victim until the latter sold
the tricycle the accused was driving. It was claimed that the accused bore a grudge
against the victim because of the said incident. At any rate, while the victim was
talking with a co-tricycle driver along the street while waiting for passengers, the
accused appeared and approached the victim. Upon nearing the victim, accused
angrily uttered, "Pare, walang presidente presidente sa akin" as he simultaneously
drew out a gun from the front portion of his waist and shot the victim with it point
blank, hitting the upper left eyebrow of the latter which caused him to fall on the
ground.Thereafter, accused left. This Court rejected the claim of the accused that the
shooting was accidental and noted with approval the observation of the Solicitor
General that "if the shooting of the victim were accidental, accused would have come

31
G.R. Nos. 111206-08 October 6, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
Three (3) separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. for
the shooting of Roland John Chapman, Jussi Olavi Leino and Maureen Hultman.
Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two
(2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and
MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman died on October 17, 1991, during the course of
the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder against accused was amended to
MURDER.1
The Information for murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4605 thus reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed
with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident premeditation and
by means of treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with and shoot with the said
handgun Roland John Chapman who war hit in the chest, thereby
inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused the death of said
Roland John Chapman.
Contrary to law.2
The Amended Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4606 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed
with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident premeditation, and
by means of treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said
handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the head,
thereby inflicting moral wounds which directly caused the death of
the said Maureen Hultman.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Finally, the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4607 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a
handgun, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one Jussi Olavi Leino on the head, thereby
inflicting gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have caused the
death of said Jussi Olavi Leino, thereby performing all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
cause or causes independent of his will, that is, due to the timely
and able medical assistance rendered to said Jussi Olavi Leino which
prevented his death.
Contrary to law.4
In the two (2) Informations for frustrated murder initially filed against accused, bail
was set at twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) each. No bail was recommended for
the murder of Roland John Chapman. A petition for bail was thus filed by accused.
Hearing was set on August 9, 1991, while his arraignment was scheduled on August
14, 1991.
At the hearing of the petition for bail on August 9, 1991, the prosecution manifested
that it would present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on the killing of
Chapman and on the circumstances resulting to the wounding of the witness himself
and Hultman. Defense counsel Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez objected on the ground that the
incident pending that day was hearing of the evidence on the petition for bail relative
to the murder charge for the killing of Chapman only. He opined that Leino's
testimony on the frustrated murder charges with respect to the wounding of Leino
and Hultman would be irrelevant.5
Private prosecutor, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, countered that time would be wasted if the
testimony of Leino would be limited to the killing of Chapman considering that the
crimes for which accused were charged involved only one continuing incident. He
pleaded that Leino should be allowed to testify on all three (3) charges to obviate
delay and the inconvenience of recalling him later to prove the two (2) frustrated
murder charges.6
By way of accommodation, the defense suggested that if the prosecution wanted to
present Leino to testify on all three (3) charges, it should wait until after the
arraignment of accused on August 14, 1991. The defense pointed out that if accused
did not file a petition for bail, the prosecution would still have to wait until after
accused had been arraigned before it could present Leino. 7
The private prosecutor agreed to defer the hearing on the petition for bail until after
arraignment of accused on the condition that there shall be trial on the merits and, at
the same time, hearing on the petition for bail. The defense counsel acceded.8
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the three (3) charges. The
prosecution then started to adduce evidence relative to all three (3) cases. No
objection was made by the defense.9
A replay of the facts will show that on July 12, 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino invited Roland
Chapman, Maureen Hultman and other friends for a party at his house in Forbes Park,
Makati. The party started at about 8:30 p.m. and ended at past midnight. They then
proceeded to Roxy's, a pub where students of International School hang out. 10 After
an hour, they transferred to Vintage, another pub in Makati, where they stayed until
32
past 3:00 a.m. of July 13, 1991. Their group returned to Roxy's to pick up a friend of
Maureen, then went back to Leino's house to eat. 11
After a while, Maureen requested Leino to take her home at Campanilla Street,
Dasmariñas Village, Makati. Chapman tagged along. 12 When they entered the village,
Maureen asked Leino to stop along Mahogany Street, about a block away from her
house in Campanilla Street. She wanted to walk the rest of the way for she did not
like to create too much noise in going back to her house. She did not want her
parents to know that she was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her
while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio. 13
Leino and Maureen started walking on the sidewalk along Mahogany Street. When
they reached the corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets, a light-colored
Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up
from behind them and stopped on the middle of the road. Accused alighted from his
car, approached them, and asked: "Who are you? (Show me your) I.D." Leino thought
accused only wanted to check their identities. He reached into his pocket, took out his
plastic wallet, and handed to accused his Asian Development Bank (ADB)
I.D. 14 Accused did not bother to look at his I.D. as he just grabbed Leino's wallet and
pocketed it. 15
Chapman saw the incident. All of a sudden, he manifested from behind Leino and
inquired what was going on. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused:
"Why are you bothering us?" Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out
a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and
asked: "Why did you shoot me?" Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt
beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave Chapman
alone. 16
Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: "Do you want
a trouble?" Leino said "no" and took a step backward. The shooting initially shocked
Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became hysterical and started
screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: "Oh, my God, he's got a gun. He's gonna
kill us. Will somebody help us?"
All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen, warning
the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino
obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from
him. He knew he could not run far without being shot by accused.
Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of
accused's car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accused's
car, trying to put some distance between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or
two. Eventually, accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and
sit down beside Leino. 17
Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk. Two (2) meters away and directly in
front of them stood accused. 18 For a moment, accused turned his back from the two.
He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards
on the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw
Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening and saw
accused return to his car and drive away. 19
Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least three (3) people
looking on and standing outside their houses along Caballero Street. 20 The three
were: DOMINGO FLORECE, a private security guard hired by Stephen Roxas to secure
his residence at #1357 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village, Makati; 21 VICENTE
MANGUBAT, a stay-in driver of Margarita Canto, residing at #1352 Caballero Street,
corner Mahogany Street, Dasmariñas Village; 22 and AGRIPINO CADENAS, a private
security guard assigned at the house of Rey Dempsey, located at #1351 Caballero
Street, corner Mahogany Street, Dasmariñas Village. 23
Security guards Florece and Cadenas were then on duty at the house of their
employer, while driver Mangubat was in his quarters, preparing to return to his own
house. These three (3) eyewitnesses heard the first gunshot while at their respective
posts.
Upon hearing the first shot, Florece went out to Caballero Street to see what was
happening, while Mangubat and Cadenas peeped over the fence of their employer's
house and looked out to Caballero Street. Each saw a man (Chapman) sprawled on
the ground, another man (Leino) sitting on the sidewalk, a third man standing up ad
holding a gun and a woman (Hultman). They saw the gunman shoot Leino and
Hultman and flee aboard his Lancer car. However, because of Florece's distance from
the scene of the crime, 24 he was not able to discern the face of the gunman. He saw
the control numbers of the gunman's car as 566. He described the gateway car as a
box-type Lancer, its color somewhat white ("medyo maputi"). 25 Cadenas noticed in
full the plate number of the getaway car and gave it as PDW 566. He described the
car as silver metallic gray. 26 Both Cadenas and Mangubat saw the gunman's face.
They had a good look at him. Cadenas was then a mere four (4) meters away from the
gunman's car, 27 while Mangubat was about twenty (20) meters away from the scene
of the crime. 28 The three confirmed that the corner of Caballero and Mahogany
Streets where the shooting took place was adequately illuminated by a Meralco
lamppost at the time of the incident. 29
After the gunman sped away, Mangubat ran outside his employer's house and went
near the scene of the crime. He noticed security guard Florece along Caballero Street.
A man on a bike passed by and Mangubat requested him to report the shooting
incident to the security officers of Dasmariñas Village. 30 Meanwhile, Florece returned
to his post and narrated to his employer, Mrs. Helen Roxas, what he saw. Mrs. Roxas
repaired to the crime scene while Florece noted the incident in his logbook (Exhibit
"B"). He also jotted down the license plate control number of the gunman's car as
566. 31
The security guards of Dasmariñas Village came after a few minutes. They rushed
Leino and Maureen to the Makati Medical Center for treatment. 32
The Makati police and agents of the NBI also came. Patrolman JAMES BALDADO of
the Makati police, together with SPO3 ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, investigated the
incident. 33 Their initial investigation disclosed that the gunman's car was a box-type
33
Mitsubishi Lancer with plate control number 566. They checked the list of vehicles
registered with the village Homeowners' Association and were able to track down
two (2) Lancer cars bearing plate control number 566. One was registered in the
name of JOSE MONTAÑO of 1823 Santan Street, Dasmariñas Village, with plate
number PKX 566, and another was traced to accused CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., of
1339 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village, with plate number PDW 566.
SALVADOR RANIN, Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the NBI, was also
tasked by then NBI Director Alfredo Lim 34 to head a team to investigate the shooting.
Ranin's team immediately proceeded to the house of Jose Montaño35 where they
found ahead of them the Makati police and operatives of the Constabulary Highway
Patrol. Ranin tried to verify from Mrs. Montaño whether the white Lancer car
registered in the name of Mr. Montaño and bearing plate number 566 was the
gunman's car. Mrs. Montaño denied and declared they had already sold the car to
Saldaña Enterprises. She averred the car was being used by one Ben Conti, a
comptroller in said company, who resides in Cubao, Quezon City. Mrs. Montaño
called up her husband and informed him about the investigation. She also called up
Conti and asked him to bring the car to the house. 36
Jose Montaño came around noon. Conti followed with white Lancer car. Ranin
brought them to the NBI office for investigation, together with Lancer car. At the NBI
Ranin inquired from Montaño the whereabouts of his car on July 12 and 13, 1991.
Montaño informed him that the car was at the residence of his employee, Ben Conti,
at E. Rodriguez Street, Cubao, Quezon City, the night of July 12, 1991. In the morning
of July 13, 1991, Conti drove the car to their office at Saldaña Enterprises. Conti
confirmed this information. Ranin received the same confirmation from two (2) NBI
agents who made a countercheck of the allegation. Upon Ranin's request, Montaño
left his car at the NBI parking lot pending identification by possible witnesses. 37
On July 14, 1991, a team of NBI agents conducted an on-the-spot investigation and
neighborhood inquiry of the shooting incident. They interviewed Domingo Florece
and asked him to report to their office the next day for further investigation. 38 They
also interviewed Agripino Cadenas who was reluctant to divulge any information and
even denied having witnessed the incident. Sensing his reluctance, they returned to
Cadenas' post at Dasmariñas Village that night and served him a subpoena, inviting
him to appear at the NBI office for investigation the next day. 39 The NBI agents also
talked with Armenia Asliami, an Egyptian national residing at #1350 Caballero Street,
Dasmariñas Village, near the scene of the crime. Asliami informed the agents that the
gunman's car was not white but light gray. A foreign national, Asliami was afraid and
refused to give a statement about the incident. The agents exerted every effort to
convince Asliami to cooperate, assuring her of their protection. Ranin even asked a
representative of the Egyptian embassy to coax Asliami to cooperate. They failed. 40
On July 15, 1991, Florece and Cadenas appeared at the NBI office as summoned.
Florece readily executed a sworn statement.41 Cadenas, however, continued to feign
ignorance and bridled his knowledge of the incident. He was lengthily interviewed. At
around 2:00 p.m., the NBI agents informed SOG Chief Ranin that Cadenas was still
withholding information from them. Ranin talked to Cadenas in his office. Cadenas
confided to Ranin his fear to get involved in the case. He was apprehensive that the
gunman would harass or harm him or his family. After Ranin assured him of NBI
protection, Cadenas relented. 42
The next day, July 16, 1991, Cadenas gave a full disclosure to Ranin. He described the
gunman's car as a box-type Lancer with plate number PDW 566. He was brought to
the NBI parking lot where Montaño's white Lancer car was parked to identify the
gunman's car. Ranin asked Cadenas if Montaño's was the gunman's car. Cadenas
replied that its color was different. Ranin directed him to look around the cars in the
parking lot and to point the color that most resembled the color of the gunman's car.
He pointed to a light gray car. Ranin told him that the color of the car he pointed to
was not white but light gray. 43
Ranin then asked Cadenas if he could identify the gunman. Cadenas replied in the
affirmative. Ranin led Cadenas to his office and showed him ten (10) pictures of
different men (Exhibits "CC-1" to "CC-10) taken from the NBI files. One of the pictures
belonged to accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Cadenas studied the pictures, picked
accused's picture (Exhibit "CC-7"), and identified him as the gunman. Cadenas wrote
his name and the date at the back of said picture. Atty. Alex Tenerife of the NBI then
took down Cadenas' statement. 44
Ranin sent his agents and the witnesses to the Makati Regional Trial Court to apply
for a search warrant. After a searching examination of the witnesses, Judge Rebecca
Salvador issued a search warrant (Exhibit "RR"), authorizing the NBI to search and
seize the silver metallic gray, 1983 Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by accused, bearing
plate number PDW 566. Ranin and his agents drove to accused's house at #1339
Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village, to implement the warrant. 45
At accused's house, Ranin informed Mrs. Pilar Teehankee, mother of accused, of their
search warrant. Ranin also told Mrs. Teehankee that they had orders from Director
Lim to invite accused to the NBI office for investigation. Mrs. Teehankee informed
them that accused was not in the house at that time. She excused herself, went to the
kitchen and called up someone on the phone. 46
In the meantime, Ranin and his men slipped to the Teehankee garage and secured
accused's car. After a while, Mrs. Teehankee joined them. Ranin asked her for the car
keys but she told him that the keys were with accused. Upon Ranin's request, Mrs.
Teehankee got in touch with accused on the phone. Ranin conversed with accused
and invited him to the NBI for investigation. Accused assured Ranin that he would
report to the NBI later that day. The agents then towed the car of accused to the NBI
office. 47
At around 9:00 p.m., accused's brother, Raul Teehankee, arrived at the NBI office and
waited for accused. Accused came, escorted by three (3) Makati policemen, after an
hour. He informed them that he just came from the Makati police station where he
was also investigated. He told Lim that he was given a statement to the Makati police
and was brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for paraffin test. 48
34
Accused's NBI investigation started. Lim asked accused of the whereabouts of his
Lancer car at the time of the shooting. Accused claimed that his car was involved in an
accident a few weeks back and was no longer functioning. The car had been parked in
his mother's house at Dasmariñas Village since then. Due to the lateness of the
evening, the group decided to continue the investigation the following day. 49
The next day, July 17, 1991, after breakfast at the Manila Hotel, Lim pressed accused
on what really happened at Dasmariñas Village. Accused said he did not see anything.
Lim apprised accused that he would be confronted with some eyewitnesses. Accused
sank into silence. 50
Lim directed Ranin to prepare a lineup at his office. Accused was requested to join the
lineup composed of seven (7) men and he acceded. Cadenas was called from an
adjoining room 51 and Ranin asked him to identify the gunman from the lineup.
Forthwith, Cadenas pointed to accused. 52 Accused merely stared at Cadenas. 53
On the same day, then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco, Ranin and two (2) other
agents brought accused to Forbes Park for further identification by the surviving
victim, Jussi Leino. Leino has just been discharged from the hospital the day before.
Since Leino's parents were worried about his safety, they requested the NBI to
conduct the identification of the gunman in Forbes Park where the Leinos also reside.
The NBI agreed. 54
House security agents from the U.S. embassy fetched Leino at his house and escorted
him and his father to a vacant house in Forbes Park, along Narra Avenue. After a
couple of minutes, Leino was brought out of the house and placed in a car with
slightly tinted windows. The car was parked about five (5) meters away from the
house. Inside the car with Leino was his father, NBI-SOG Chief Salvador Ranin and a
driver. Leino was instructed to look at the men who would be coming out of the
house and identify the gunman from the lineup. 55
A group of five to six men (including accused) then came out of the unoccupied
house, into the street, in a line-up. Leino noticed that one of them was wearing
sunglasses. Since Leino could not yet speak at that time due to the extensive injury on
his tongue, he wrote down on a piece of paper a request for one of the men in the
lineup to remove his sunglasses. Leino handed this written request to his father. The
men in the lineup were herded back inside the house. After a couple of minutes, they
again stepped out and none was wearing sunglasses. From the lineup, Leino identified
accused as the gunman. 56
The agents brought back accused to the NBI. They prepared and referred the cases of
murder and double frustrated murder against accused to the Department of Justice
for appropriate action. At the inquest, Fiscal Dennis Villa-Ignacio did not recommend
bail insofar as the murder charge was concerned. Hence, accused was detained at the
NBI. 57
The shooting incident was also investigated by the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado went
to see security guard Vicente Mangubat at his post, at the residence of his employer
in Dasmariñas Village. Baldado interviewed Mangubat and invited him to the Makati
police station where his statement (Exhibit "D") was taken. 58
The next day, July 16, 1991, at about 8:30 a.m., Pat. Baldado fetched Mangubat from
his house and brought him to the Makati police station. At the station, Baldado told
him to wait for a man who would be coming and see if the person was the gunman.
Mangubat was posted at the top of the stairs at the second floor of the station. 59
After a couple of hours, accused, came with Makati police Major Lovete. He ascended
the stairs, passed by Mangubat and proceeded to Major Lovete's office at the second
floor. While accused was going up the stairs, Pat. Baldado inquired from Mangubat if
accused was the gunman. Mangubat initially declined to identify accused, saying that
he wanted to see the man again to be sure. He also confided to Pat. Baldado that he
was nervous and afraid for accused was accompanied by a police Major. When
accused came out from Major Lovete's office, Pat. Baldado again asked Mangubat if
accused was the gunman. Mangubat nodded his head in response. 60 Accused,
together with Major Lovete and Pat. Baldado, boarded a Mercedes Benz and left.
Mangubat was brought back to his post at Dasmariñas Village by other Makati
policemen.61
Two (2) days later, Pat. Baldado visited Mangubat at his employer's house and asked
him again if accused was really the gunman. Once more, Mangubat answered in the
affirmative. Pat. Baldado told Mangubat that he would no longer ask him to sign a
statement which he (Baldado) earlier prepared (Exhibit "HHH"). 62 Baldado then
left. 63
In the afternoon of July 23, 1991, Mangubat was also questioned by the NBI agents.
Director Lim asked Mangubat if he could recognize the gunman. Mangubat said he
could. Mangubat was shown twelve (12) pictures (Exhibits "E" to "E-11) of different
men and was asked to identify the gun gunman from them. He chose one picture
(Exhibit "E-10"), that of accused, and identified him as the gunman. Mangubat's
statement was taken. He was asked to return to the NBI the next day to make a
personal identification. 64
When Mangubat returned, a lineup was prepared in Lim's office in the presence of
the media. At that time, accused's counsels, Attys. Jimenez and Malvar, were at the
office of then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco protesting to the submission of accused
to identification. They pointed out that since the cases against accused had already
been filed in court and they have secured a court order for the transfer of accused to
the Makati municipal jail, any identification of accused should be made in the
courtroom. Asst. Director Velasco insisted on the identification as it was part of their
on-going investigation. Eventually, accused's counsels acquiesced but requested that
identification be made without the presence of the media. Velasco turned them down
and explained that if accused is not identified n the lineup, the media coverage would
favor accused. 65
All that time, accused was at the SOG office. He refused to join the lineup at Lim's
office and remained seated. Ranin was compelled to bring to the SOG office the men
composing the lineup and he asked them to go near accused. Ranin then told
Mangubat to go in the office. Mangubat pointed to accused as the gunman.
35
With the identification of accused by Mangubat, the NBI wrote finis to its
investigation. 66
JUSSI LEINO, the surviving victim, suffered the following injuries:
FINDINGS:
= Abrasion, 0.5 cm., temporal area, left.
= Wound, gunshot, entrance, circular in shape, 1.0
cm. in diameter, located at the upper lip, mouth,
along the medial line, directed backwards and
downwards, fracturing the maxillary bone and
central and lateral incisors, both sides, to the
buccal cavity then lacerating the tongue with
fragments of the bullet lodged in the right
palatine, tongue and tonsillar region.
SKULL
CHEST FOR RIBS X-RAY #353322
July 13, 1991
No demonstrable evidence of fracture. Note of
radioopaque foreign body (bullet fragments) along
the superior alveolar border on the right. No
remarkable findings.
CT SCAN #43992 July 13, 1991
Small hyperdensities presumably bullet and bone
fragments in the right palatine, tongue and
tonsillar regions with associated soft tissue
swelling.
Anterior maxillary bone comminuted fracture.
Temporal lobe contusions with small hematomata on the right side.
Minimal subarachnoid hemorrhage.
Intact bone calvarium.
xxx xxx xxx 67
Dr. Pedro Solis, testified that the bullet entered the left temple of Leino. After
entering Leino's head, it fractured his upper jaw and his front teeth. Some of the
bullet fragments pierced his palette and tongue. Brain scanning revealed contusions
on the temporal lobe and hemorrhage on the covering of the brain. Physical
deformity resulted as a consequence of the gunshot wound because of the fractured
upper jaw and the loss of the front teeth. Sutures were performed on the upper
portion of his tongue. Nonetheless, Leino's injuries on the tongue caused him
difficulty in speaking. 68
Dr. Solis also testified as to the relative position of Leino and the gunman. He opined
that the muzzle of the gun, like in the case of Maureen, must have been at a higher
level than the victim's head. He concluded that the gun must have been pointed
above Leino's head considering the acuteness and downward trajectory of the
bullet. 69
Dr. Leovigildo C. Isabela, a neuro-surgeon at the Makati Medical Center, operated on
MAUREEN HULTMAN. He testified that when he first saw Maureen, she was
unconscious and her face was bloodied all over. Maureen had a bullet hole on the left
side of the forehead, above the eyebrow. Brain tissues were oozing out of her nostrils
and on the left side of the forehead where the bullet entered. 70
They brought Maureen to the x-ray room for examination of her skull. She was also
given a CT scan. The examination revealed that she suffered injuries on the skull and
brain. There were several splintered bullets in her brain and the major portion of the
bullet, after it fragmented, was lodged beneath her right jaw. 71
Maureen was rushed to the operating room for surgery. Dr. Isabela led a team who
operated on her brain to arrest the bleeding inside her head, remove devitalized
brain tissues and retrieve the splintered bullets embedded in her brain. Due to the
extensive swelling of Maureen's brain and her very unstable condition, he failed to
patch the destroyed undersurface covering of her brain. 72 After the surgery,
Maureen's vital signs continued to function but she remained unconscious. She was
wheeled to the ICU for further observation.
Two (2) weeks later, brain tissues and fluid continue to flow out of Maureen's nostrils
due to the unpatched undersurface covering of her brain, leaving the swollen portion
of her brain exposed. A second surgery was made on July 30, 1991 to repair
Maureen's brain covering. He used the fascia lata of Maureen's right thigh to replace
the destroyed covering of the brain. Nonetheless, Maureen remained unconscious.
The trickle of brain tissues through her nose was lessened but Maureen developed
infection as a result of the destruction of her brain covering. Maureen developed
brain abscess because of the infection. She underwent a third operation to remove
brain abscess and all possible focus of infection. 73
Testifying on the extensive injuries suffered by Maureen Hultman, Dr. Solis explained
that Maureen was shot at the left side of the forehead. The bullet entry was at 1.5
cm. above the eyebrow. Upon entering the forehead, the bullet fragmented into
pieces and went from the left to the right side of the temple, fracturing the frontal
bone of the skull. The bullet eventually settled behind the right jaw of Maureen. 74
The wound inflicted on Maureen was mortal for it hit one of the most vital parts of
the body, the brain. When Maureen was subjected to CT scan, they discovered
hemorrhage in her brain. After the bullet hit her head, it caused hemorrhagic lesion
on the ventricles of the brain and the second covering of the brain. 75
The bullet also injured Maureen's eye sockets. There was swelling underneath the
forehead brought about by edema in the area. Scanning also showed that Maureen's
right jaw was affected by the fragmented bullet. The whole interior portion of her
nose was also swollen. 76
A team of doctors operated on Maureen's brain. They tried to control the internal
bleeding and remove the splintered bullets, small bone fragments and dead tissues.
The main bullet was recovered behind Maureen's right jaw. There was also an acute
downward trajectory of the bullet. Hence, it was opined that Maureen was shot while
she was seated. 77
36
With each passing day, Maureen's condition deteriorated. Even if Maureen survived,
she would have led a vegetating life and she would have needed assistance in the
execution of normal and ordinary routines. 78 She would have been completely blind
on the left eye and there was possibility she would have also lost her vision on the
right eye. All her senses would have been modified and the same would have affected
her motor functions. There was practically no possibility for Maureen to return to
normal. 79
Maureen did not survive her ordeal. After ninety-seven (97) days of confinement in
the hospital, she ceased to be a breathing soul on October 17, 1991.
For his exculpation, accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused claimed
that on said date and time, he was not anywhere near the scene of the crime. He
alleged that he was then in his house at #53 San Juan, Barrio Kapitolyo, Pasig. He slept
at around 1:00 a.m. on July 13, 1991 and woke up at around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m. that
same morning. Accused avowed his two (2) maids could attest to his presence in his
house that fateful day. 80
Accused averred that he only came to know the three (3) victims in the Dasmariñas
shooting when he read the newspaper reports about it. He denied knowing
prosecution eyewitnesses Agripino Cadenas and Vicente Mangubat before they
identified him as the gunman. 81
Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer,
with plate number PDW 566. He, however, claimed that said car ceased to be in good
running condition after its involvement in an accident in February 1991. Since May
1991 until the day of the shooting, his Lancer car had been parked in the garage of his
mother's house in Dasmariñas Village. He has not used this car since then. Accused,
however, conceded that although the car was not in good running condition, it could
still be used. 82
Accused said that on July 16, 1991, he went to the Makati police station at around
5:00 p.m. upon invitation of Chief of Police Remy Macaspac and Major Lovete who
wanted to ask him about the ownership of the Lancer car parked in his mother's
house. He readily gave a statement to the Makati police denying complicity in the
crime. He submitted himself to a paraffin test. He was accompanied by the Makati
police to the Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame and was tested negative for
gunpowder nitrates. 83 After the test, he asked the Makati policemen to accompany
him to the NBI for he had earlier committed to his mother that he would present
himself to Director Lim. 84
He arrived at Director Lim's office at about 9:30 to 10:00 p.m. He furnished Lim with
the statement he earlier gave to the Makati police. Thereafter, Lim detained him at
the NBI against his will. 85
The following day, July 17, 1991, Lim and his agents brought him to the Manila Hotel
for breakfast. When they returned to the NBI, he was asked to proceed to Lim's
office. On his way, he saw a lineup formed inside Lim's office. The NBI agents forced
him to join the lineup and placed him in the number seven (7) slot. He observed that
the man who was to identify him was already in the room. As soon as he walked up to
the lineup, Cadenas identified him as the gunman. 86
A second identification was made on the same day at a house in Forbes Park. The NBI
agents brought him to Forbes Park but he never saw Jussi Leino who allegedly
identified him as the gunman in a lineup. 87
A third identification was conducted on July 24, 1991. He was then seated at the
office of Ranin for he refused to join another lineup. Despite his protest, the NBI
agents insisted on the conduct of the identification and ordered a group of men to
line up alongside him. While thus seated, he was identified by Mangubat as the
gunman. He complained that he was not assisted by counsel at any stage of said
investigation. 88
The defense also presented CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE III, son of accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. He testified that from May 1989 to February 1991, he had been using
his father's Lancer car bearing plate number PDW 566 in going to school. 89
In February 1991, while driving his father's Lancer car, he accidentally hit a bicycle
driver and two (2) trucks parked at the side of the road. The accident resulted in the
death of the bicycle driver and damage to his father's car, 90especially on its body. The
timing of the engine became a little off and the car was hard to start. They had the car
repaired at Reliable Shop located in Banawe Street, Quezon city. After a month, he
brought the car to the residence of his grandmother, Pilar Teehankee, at Dasmariñas
Village, Makati. He personally started the car's engine and drove it to Makati from the
shop in Quezon City. He did not bring the car to their house in Pasig for it was still
scheduled for further repairs and they preferred to have the repair done in a shop in
Makati. Teehankee III claimed that from that time on, he was prohibited by his father
from using the car because of his careless driving. He kept the keys to the car and
since he was busy in school, no further repair on said car had been made. 91
Accused also imputed the commission of the crimes at bar to Anders Hultman,
adoptive father of deceased victim Maureen Hultman. He capitalized on a newspaper
report that the gunman may have been an overprotective father. This theory was
formed when an eyewitness allegedly overheard Maureen pleading to the gunman:
"Huwag Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The defense presented Anders Hultman as a hostile
witness.
ANDERS HULTMAN, testified that he is a Swedish national. He and Vivian Hultman
were married in the Philippines in 1981. Vivian had two (2) children by her previous
marriage, one of whom was Maureen. He legally adopted Vivian's two (2) daughters
in 1991. He and Vivian had three (3) children of their own. 92
The defense confronted Anders with one of the angles of the crime in the initial stage
of the investigation, i.e., that Maureen was overhead pleading to the gunman:
"Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." Anders explained that Maureen could not have
uttered those words for Maureen never spoke Tagalog. He also said that all his
children call him "Papa," not "Daddy." 93
On July 12, 1991, he and Vivian permitted Maureen to have a night out but instructed
her to be home by 2:00 a.m. Maureen just received her first salary in her first job and
37
she wanted to celebrate with friends. At the time of the shooting, he and his wife
were sleeping in their house. He woke up at around 5:15 a.m. of July 13, 1991 when a
security guard came to their house and informed them about the killings. 94
Anders admitted he had been vocal about the VIP treatment accorded to accused at
the Makati municipal jail. On several occasions, he checked on accused in jail and
discovered that accused was not in his cell. The jail guards even covered up accused's
whereabouts. His complaint was investigated by the Congressional Committee on
Crime Prevention, headed by Congressman Concepcion. 95
The defense also presented two (2) Makati policemen, PAT. JAMES F. BALDADO and
SPO3 ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, who investigated the shooting.
Pat. Baldado testified that in the course of his investigation, he learned from Mr. Jose
Montaño that he sold his white Lancer car, with plate number PKX 566, to Saldaña
Lending Investors in February 1991. This car was assigned to Ben Conti, Operations
Manager of said company and was in the residence of Conti at the time of the
shooting. The other witnesses he interviewed confirmed that Montaño's white Lancer
car was not in the vicinity of Montaño's residence at the time of the incident. 96
SPO3 Fernandez testified that he interviewed security guard Vicente Mangubat.
Mangubat saw the gunman and the get-away car but could not give the central letters
of the car's license plate. Fernandez went to one of the houses at the corner of
Mahogany and Caballero Streets and asked the maid therein if he could use the
phone. After placing a call, the maid told him that he saw the gunman and heard one
of the victims say: "Daddy, don't shoot. Don't, don't." Fernandez tried to get the
maid's name but the latter refused. The defense did not present this maid in court
nor asked the court to subpoena her to testify. Neither was the alleged statement of
the maid included in the Progress Report (Exhibit "13") prepared by the Makati police
investigators. 97
SPO3 Fernandez saw Mangubat the next time on July 16, 1991 when he and Baldado
fetched the latter at Dasmariñas Village for identification of the gunman at the Makati
police station.
At the police station, Fernandez and Baldado posted Mangubat at the lobby. After a
few minutes, accused and company arrived. When accused passed by them, they
instructed Mangubat to look around and see if he could identify the gunman.
Mangubat failed to identify accused. Mangubat told Fernandez that the gunman was
younger and shorter than accused. 98
SPO3 Fernandez also took the statement of security guard Domingo Florece (Exhibit
"MM"). It was signed by Florece in his presence. In said statement, Florece described
the gunman's car as "medyo puti" (somewhat white). 99
ELIZABETH AYONON, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified on the
paraffin test she conducted on July 17, 1991 on both hands of accused. 100 As per
Chemistry Report No. C 274-91, 101 the test yielded a negative result of gunpowder
nitrates on accused's hands. In said Report, she noted that accused was subjected to
paraffin test more than seventy-two (72) hours after the shooting incident. She
explained that 72 hours is the reasonable period within which nitrate residues may
not be removed by ordinary washing and would remain on the hands of a person who
has fired a gun. 102
ATTY. MANUEL Q. MALVAR, one of accused's counsel of record, also took the stand
for the defense. He testified that in the course of handling the cases, he was able to
confer with Ponferrada, Cadenas' supervisor at the Security agency where Cadenas
was employed. Ponferrada informed him that Cadenas confided to him that he was
tortured at the NBI and was compelled to execute a statement. Ponferrada, allegedly,
refused to testify. Atty. Malvar, however, admitted the defense did not compel the
attendance of Ponferrada by subpoena. On rebuttal, Cadenas denied the torture
story.
Atty. Malvar also admitted that he and Atty. Jimenez were aware of the irregularities
committed in the off-court identification of their client. When asked what he did to
remedy this perceived irregularity, Malvar said he objected to the conduct of the
lineup. When further pressed whether he filed a petition for review raising this issue
with the Department of Justice upon the filing of the cases therewith, he said he did
not. He offered the excuse that he deferred to Atty. Jimenez, the principal counsel of
accused at that time. He also declared that although they knew that arraignment
would mean waiver of the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the investigation
and preliminary investigation, he and Atty. Jimenez allowed accused to be
arraigned. 103
The defense likewise relied on a number of news accounts reporting the progress in
the investigation of the case. It presented seven (7) newspaper reporters as
witnesses, viz: Nestor Barrameda of the Manila Times, Martin Marfil and Dave
Veridiano of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Nida Mendoza of Malaya, Itchie Kabayan
and Alex Allan of the People's Journal and Elena Aben of the Manila Bulletin. The bulk
of defense evidence consists of newspaper clippings and the testimonies of the news
reporters, thus:
NESTOR BARRAMEDA, a news reporter of the Manila Times identified two (2) news
reports as having been partly written by him. One was a news item, entitled: "JUSTICE
DEP'T ORDERS PROBE OF THREE METRO KILLINGS" (Exhibit "1"), appearing on the July
16, 1991 issue of the Manila Times. 104 He, however, clarified that a news report is
usually the product of collaborative work among several reporters. They follow the
practice of pooling news reports where several reporters are tasked to cover one
subject matter. The news editor then compiles the different reports they file and
summarizes them into one story. 105
The defense lifted only certain portions of Exhibit "1" and marked them in evidence as
follows:
Exhibit "1-A":
Bello directed NBI Deputy Director Epimaco Velasco to take over the
investigation of the murders of Roland Chapman, 21, Eldon
Maguan, 25, and three members of a family — Estrellita Vizconde
and her daughters, Carmela, 19, and Anne Marie Jennifer, 7.
Exhibit "1-B"
38
 Police said that Chapman's assailant could have been angered when
Hultman, a 10th grader at the International School in Makati was
escorted home by Chapman after going to a disco.
Exhibit "1-C"
The lone gunman, witnesses told police, first pistol-whipped
Hultman.
Exhibit "l-D"
The same witnesses said Chapman and Leino were shot when they
tried to escape.
Exhibit "1-E"
Other angles
Velasco said "we are pursuing two angles" in the Chapman murder.
One, he said, is the jealousy angle and the other is a "highly
sensitive" matter that might involve influential people. 106
Barrameda testified that he had no personal knowledge of the content of the news
items marked as Exhibits "1-C" to "1-D". He just culled them from previous news
reports of other newspapers. He admitted that the only portion he wrote based on an
actual interview with NBI Asst. Director Velasco was Exhibit "I-E."
Barrameda identified another news item in the July 23, 1991 issue of the Manila
Times, entitled: "NBI INSISTS IT HAS "RIGHT" SUSPECT IN CHAPMAN SLAY" which was
marked as Exhibit "2." Certain portions thereof, which were not written by
Barrameda, 107 were lifted by the defense and offered in evidence, viz:
Exhibit "2-a"
Superintendent Lucas Managuelod, CIS director for the national
capital region, claims, however, that another security guard, Vic
Mangubat, had testified before the police that another man, not
Teehankee, had fired at Chapman and his companions.
Exhibit "2-b"
The CIS official added that the absence of nitrite or powder burns
on Teehankee's hands as shown by paraffin tests at the CIS
laboratory indicated that he may not have fired the gun. 108
MARTIN MARFIL, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer identified two (2)
newspaper clippings which were partly written by him.
One news item, which appeared on the July 17, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, was entitled: "FBI JOINS PROBE OF DASMA SLAY" (Exhibit "3"). 109
Again, the defense marked in evidence certain portions of Exhibit "3", thus:
Exhibit "3-a"
Witnesses said Hultman talked with the gunman whom she called
"Daddy" shortly before Chapman's shooting.
Exhibit "3-b"
But Ranin said they were also looking into reports that Hultman was
a dancer before she was adopted by her foster parent.
Exhibit "3-c"
Investigations showed that the gunman sped along Caballero street
inside the village after the shooting and was believed to have
proceeded toward Forbes Park using the Palm street gate.
On cross-examination, Marfil admitted that he did not write Exhibits "3-a" and "3-c".
He just reiterated previous reports in other newspapers. They were based on
speculations.
Marfil also wrote some portions of a news item, entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON HELD FOR
DASMA SLAY," which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer (Exhibit "4"), viz:
Exhibit "4-B"
According to NBI Director Alfredo Lim, the break in the case came
when the witness showed up and said that the gunman was on
board a silver-metallic Lancer.
Exhibit "4-C"
The witness said the gunman was standing a few feet away near the
car and was talking to Hultman, who was shouting "Huwag! Daddy!"
several times. 110
Marfil's source of information was Director Lim. On cross-examination,
Marfil admitted that the news reports marked as Exhibits "3" and "4" were
written based on information available at that time. 111
NIDA MENDOZA, a reporter of the Malaya identified a news report, entitled:
"TEEHANKEE SON HELD ON DASMA SLAYING," which appeared on the July 18, 1991
issue of Malaya. She testified that she wrote a portion thereof, marked as Exhibit "5-
c", and the sources of her information were several Makati policemen. 112 Exhibit "5-
c" reads:
Makati policemen, meanwhile, disputed NBI accounts that
Teehankee was arrested at his house.
They said Teehankee, the last remaining owner of a car with plate
control number 566 who had not been questioned, voluntarily went
to police headquarters upon invitation of Makati police chief
Superintendent Remy Macaspac. 113
The defense presented EXHIBITS "1-5" to prove: (a) the alleged concerted effort of
the investigators to implicate accused as the lone gunman; (b) that there were other
suspects aside from accused and that someone whom Maureen called as "Daddy"
was the actual gunman; (c) that the initial police investigation showed that the
gunman's car was a white Lancer with plate no. 566; and, (d) that after the NBI took
over the investigation, the white Lancer car of the gunman became a silver gray
Lancer of accused and thereafter, he became the gunman.
ITCHIE CABAYAN, a reporter of the People's Journal identified the portions she wrote
in the news item, entitled: ''I WILL HOUND YOU", which appeared on the October 24,
1991 issue of People's Journal (Exhibit "6"). She identified the source of her
information as Mr. Anders Hultman himself. 114
The portions thereof were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:
39
 Exhibit "6-a"
"I will be visiting him often and at the most unexpected occasion,"
Hultman said the day after his 17-year old daughter was
cremated. 115
Exhibit "6-b"
The day Maureen died, a congressional hearing granted the
Hultman family's request for permission to visit Teehankee in his
cell "at anytime of their choice."
Exhibit "6-c"
"If on my next visit he still refuses to come out and is still hiding
behind the curtain," Hultman said, "Congress told me that I can take
the curtain down and jail authorities will pull him out." 116
ALEX ALLAN, also a reporter of People's Journal co-wrote the news item marked as
Exhibit "6". Specifically, he wrote Exhibits "6-d" and "6-e" 117 which read:
Exhibit "6-d"
"Kaawaawa naman ang mga Hultmans, tulungan natin sila," Ong
was quoted as telling Vergel de Dios.
Exhibit "6-e"
BIR insiders said Ong has shown a keen interest in the Chapman-
Hultman, Vizconde and Eldon Maguan cases because he belongs to
a secret but very influential multi-sectoral group monitoring graft
and corruption and other crimes in high levels of government and
society. 118
Allan was not able to check or verify the information in Exhibit "6-e" given to him by
BIR insiders for the latter refused to be identified. 119
Exhibit "6" and its sub-markings were offered to prove: (a) the alleged blind and
consuming personal rage and bias of Anders Hultman against accused; and (b) the
unwarranted pressure, prejudice and prejudgment by some congressional leaders in
favor of the Hultmans in violation of due process.
DAVE VERIDIANO, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, identified the news
account which appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Inquirer, entitled: "DASMA
SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "7"). He wrote a portion of said article (Exhibit "7-
c") and the source of his information was Camp Crame. 120 It reads:
Exhibit "7-c"
Witnesses said the gunman fled aboard a white Mitsubishi Lancer
with plate number "566." The witnesses cannot tell the plate's
control letters. 121
Veridiano likewise identified a news item which appeared on the July 1991 issue of
the Inquirer, entitled: "N.B.I. FINDINGS DISPUTED, SECOND WITNESS TAGS
TEEHANKEE" (Exhibit "8"). The portions of said news item which he wrote were
marked in evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "8-a"
At the Criminal Investigation Service, however, an investigator who
asked not to be identified insisted that the NBI got the wrong man.
The NBI has taken over the case from the CIS.
Exhibit "8-c"
He said the CIS will shortly identify the suspect killer whom he
described as "resembling Teehankee but looks much younger."
Exhibit "8-e"
The source said that the police's "prime witness," identified only as
Mangubat, saw everything that happened in the early morning of
July 13. The witness, however, failed to identify Teehankee as the
gunman. 122
Veridiano was shown another news report, entitled: "CIS GIVES UP CHAPMAN SLAY
CASE", which appeared on the July 26, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer
(Exhibit 9). 123 He wrote the entire news account, 124 portions of which were marked
by the defense in evidence, thus:
Exhibit "9-a"
The CIS pulled out from the case a day after its so-called "surprise
witness" picked Claudio Teehankee, Jr. from an NBI lineup.
He gathered this information from his source but he was not able to
interview Mangubat himself. 125
Exhibit "9-b"
Sira ulo pala siya (Mangubat). Ilang beses kong pinarada sa kanya si
Bobby (Teehankee Jr.) puro iling siya. Hindi raw ito ang
suspect. Ngayon bigla niyang ituturo, said a red-faced Makati
investigator who, as usual, did not want to be identified.
ELENA ABEN, a reporter from the Manila Bulletin, wrote the entire article, entitled:
"US DIPLOMAT'S SON SHOT DEAD", which appeared on the July 14, 1991 issue of the
Manila Bulletin (Exhibit "10"). 126 Two (2) portions thereof were marked as evidence
by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "10-a-1"
The victims were on their way home in Olanileino's Mercedez Benz
with a diplomat's plate number when a white Lancer with plate
number PKX-566 blocked its path.
Exhibit "10-a-2"
US embassy spokesman Stanley Schrager said Chapman's father is a
communications specialist. He said the shooting could be the result
of an altercation on the street. 127
Finally, VICTOR VEGA, a reporter of the Manila Bulletin, identified the news account
he wrote which appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Bulletin, entitled: "4
MURDER SUSPECTS FALL" (Exhibit "22"). Portions of said news item were marked by
the defense as follows:
Exhibit "22-b"
40
 . . . He was shot to death by a group of armed men at the corner of
Mahogany and Caballero Sts. in Dasmariñas Village at past 4 a.m.
Friday.
Exhibit "22-c"
The NBI sources said that jealousy sparked the slaying of Chapman
who was killed in front of his friends on his way home from a party.
The armed men, on board a white Lancer car, blocked the path of
the victim's Mercedes Benz car inside the village before the
shooting.
Exhibit "22-a-1"
The gunmen then alighted from their car and at gunpoint ordered
Chapman to alight from the car. They shot Chapman several times
in the body, while his companions identified as Maureen Hultman,
and Jussi Olanileino, were seriously wounded when the gunmen
sprayed the car with bullets.
The gunmen escaped after the shooting. Lim said he will announce
later the names of the detained suspects after their initial
investigation. 128
Finally, his article, entitled: "MAKATI SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "23"), which
appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin, was introduced by the
defense in evidence as follows:
Exhibit "23-a-1"
The NBI said Teehankee was one of four men who blocked
Chapman's car on Mahogany St. in the subdivision.
Exhibit "23-a-2"
Witnesses said they saw Teehankee order Chapman and his two
companions, Maureen Hultman and Jussi Olanileino, a Finn, to get
out of their car.
Exhibit "23-a-3"
They identified the car used by the suspect, a silver gray Lancer with
plate No. PDW 566. They added that they saw the same car in the
garage of the Teehankee family. 129
On cross-examination, Vega declared that the source of his two (a) stories was the
NBI and they were based on information available to the NBI at that time 130
The prosecution recalled to the stand eyewitness VICENTE MANGUBAT as its rebuttal
witness. Mangubat insisted that he was able to identify accused when he saw the
latter at the Makati police station. Her reiterated that the next day, Pat. Baldado of
the Makati police went to his place of work in Dasmariñas Village and asked him if he
was sure about the identity of the gunman. He told Baldado he was positive. Baldado
then said him he would no longer require him to sign the statement he prepared for
him earlier. 131
LEONORA C. VALLADO, chief of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI, was also
presented as a prosecution rebuttal witness. She testified that extensive washing of
hands or excessive perspiration can eliminate gunpowder nitrates lodged on skin
pores of the hands. Continued washing with hot water can induce perspiration and
remove nitrate residue embedded in the skin pores. Application of vinegar on the
hand can register the same effect. 132
She testified that their practice at the NBI is to take the paraffin test on a suspect
within 72 hours from the time of the alleged firing of a gun, during which time, any
possible trace of nitrate may still be found. 133
She divulged that questions have been raised regarding the reliability of the paraffin
test. She related that she once attended a training in Baguio City where they tried to
test the accuracy of a paraffin test. In said training, two (2) NBI agents fired a .38
revolver. One of them washed his hands. They then subjected both agents to a
paraffin test using diphylamine reagent. Both yielded a negative result. Thus, she
opined, the result of a paraffin test should merely be taken as a corroborative
evidence and evaluated together with other physical evidence. 134
The records show that the case was set for hearing on October 29, 1992 for the
presentation by the defense of sur-rebuttal evidence. However, a day before the
scheduled hearing, the defense filed a Constancia 135 manifesting that it shall waive its
right to present sur-rebuttal evidence, the same being unneccesary. The defense,
however, declared that this is without prejudice to the presentation of its evidence in
the trial proper should the same be necessary.
At the hearing of October 29, 1992, the defense counsels did not appear. The
prosecution moved in open court that the main cases and the petition for bail be
submitted for decision in view of the absence of defense counsels who had
manifested that they would no longer present their sur-rebuttal evidence. The motion
was granted and the parties were given ten (10) days from receipt of the Order within
which to submit their simultaneous Memorandum. 136 It does not appear that the
defense objected to this Order. The records show that the defense even filed a
motion asking for additional time to file its Memorandum. 137 In due time, both
parties submitted their respective Memorandum.
On December 22, 1992, the trial court convicted accused CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR. of
the crimes charged. 138The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders
judgment:
(1) In criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J.
Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Murder, qualified by treachery, for the fatal shooting of Roland John
Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer imprisonment
of Reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the
sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50, 000.00), Philippine Currency, plus
moderate or temperate and exemplary damages in the sum of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), Philippine Currency;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio J.
Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
41
 Murder, qualified by treachery, for the fatal shooting of Maureen
Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment
of Reclusion Perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the
sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, plus
the sums of Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four
Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos
(P2,350,461.83), Philippine Currency, as actual damages; Thirteen
Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, for loss of
earning capacity of the said deceased; and One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral, moderate and
exemplary damages;
(3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4607, finding accused Claudio J.
Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi
Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the said
offended party the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00),
Philippine Currency; plus the sum of One Hundred Eighteen
Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four
Centavos (P118,369.84), Philippine Currency, and another sum
equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S. $55,600.00, both as actual
damages; an amount equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S.
$40,000.00, as loss of earning capacity of said offended party; and
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral,
moderate and exemplary damages.
(4) In all these three cases ordering said accused to pay all the
offended parties the sum of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, as and for attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in these three cases.
Consequently the petition for bail is hereby denied for utter lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Accused hired a new counsel in the person of Atty. Nicanor B. Gatmaytan, Jr. He filed
a Motion for New Trial, 139alleging for the first time that the trial court erred in
considering as submitted for decision not only the petition for bail but also the case
on the merits. He claimed that accused's right to adduce further evidence was
violated. His motion for new trial was denied.
Accused interposed the present appeal. 140 He contends that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED HAD
BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY JUSSI LEINO, CADENAS AND
MANGUBAT AS THE ONE WHO SHOT HIM, ROLAND CHAPMAN AND
MAUREEN NAVARRO HULTMAN.
II. THE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III. THE PUBLICITY GIVEN THE CASE AGAINST THE APPELLANT WAS
MASSIVE, OVERWHELMING, AND PREJUDICIAL AS TO EFFECTIVELY
DEPRIVE THE ACCUSED OF RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL.
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING OF
CHAPMAN AND HULTMAN AND THE SHOOTING OF LEINO WAS
ATTENDED BY TREACHERY.
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING EXORBITANT MORAL
AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY.
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES OF
THREE MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00).
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT ON THE
MERITS AND ON THE PETITION FOR BAIL AT THE SAME TIME
WITHOUT GIVING THE ACCUSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE ON THE MERITS OF THE
CASE AND DENYING THE ACCUSED'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
We shall discuss these alleged errors in seriatim.
Appellant was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of three (3) eyewitnesses
who positively identified him as the gunman. He vigorously assails his out-of-court
identification by these eyewitnesses.
He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Jussi Leino, the lone surviving
victim of the crimes at bar. Appellant urges:
First, that Leino's identification of him outside an unoccupied house in Forbes Park
was highly irregular.
Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the newspapers before he
identified him.
Third, that Leino's interview at the hospital was never put in writing.
Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based on the description given by Leino to the CIS
agents was suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must have been
among the evidence turned over to the NBI when the latter assumed jurisdiction over
the investigation.
Lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of appellant. The shooting
lasted for only five (5) minutes. During that period, his gaze could not have been fixed
only on the gunman's face. His senses were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer
he imbibed that night.
It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of-court identification by the
prosecution witnesses in his first assignment of error. Eyewitness identification
constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the success or failure of the
prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate
and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the
42
fingerprint or DNA testing. Some authors even describe eyewitness evidence as
"inherently suspect." 141 The causes of misidentification are known, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Identification testimony has at least three components. First,
witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves
perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the witness must
memorize details of the event. Third, the witness must be able to
recall and communicate accurately. Dangers of unreliability in
eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three stages, for
whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve
information accurately, they are limited by normal human
fallibilities and suggestive influences. (Emphasis Supplied) 142
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru
show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness
to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the
suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-
court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the
trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its
compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following
factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. 143
Using the totality of circumstances test, we hold that the alleged irregularities cited
by appellant did not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due process.
There is nothing wrong in Leino's identification of appellant in an unoccupied house in
Forbes Park. The records reveal that this mode was resorted to by the authorities for
security reasons. 144 The need for security even compelled that Leino be fetched and
escorted from his house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy security officials and brought
to the house where he was to make the identification. The Leinos refused to have the
identification at the NBI office as it was cramped with people and with high security
risk. 145 Leino's fear for his safety was not irrational. He and his companions had been
shot in cold blood in one of the exclusive, supposedly safe subdivisions in the
metropolis. Atty. Salvador Ranin, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI,
correctly testified that there is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects
are identified by witnesses. Identification may be done in open field. It is often done
in hospitals while the crime and the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the
victim. 146
Appellant cannot also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and TV
accounts of the shooting before he personally identified him. Indeed, the records
show that on July 15, 1991, while Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown three
(3) pictures of different men by the investigators. He identified appellant as the
gunman from these pictures. He, however, categorically stated that, before the mug
shot identification, he has not seen any picture of appellant or read any report
relative to the shooting incident. 147 The burden is on appellant to prove that his mug
shot identification was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible
suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the admission of his out-of-court
identification by Leino.
We have no reason to doubt the correctness of appellant's identification by Leino.
The scene of the crime was well-lighted by a Meralco lamp post. Appellant was
merely 2-3 meters away when he shot Leino. The incident happened for a full five (5)
minutes. Leino had no ill-motive to falsely testify against appellant. His testimony at
the trial was straightforward. He was unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of the
defense counsels. He never wavered in his identification of appellant. When asked
how sure he was that appellant was responsible for the crime, he confidently replied:
"I'm very sure. It could not have been somebody else." 148
Appellant cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators to reduce to a
sworn statement the information revealed by Leino during his hospital interviews. It
was sufficiently established that Leino's extensive injuries, especially the injury to his
tongue, limited his mobility. The day he identified appellant in the line-up, he was still
physically unable to speak. He was being fed through a tube inserted in his
throat. 149 There is also no rule of evidence which requires the rejection of the
testimony of a witness whose statement has not been priorly reduced to writing.
Reliance by appellant on the case of People v. Alindog 150 to erode Leino's credibility is
misplaced. In Alindog, accused was acquitted not solely on the basis of delay in taking
his statement, but mainly on the finding that the prosecution evidence was, at best,
circumstancial and "suspiciosly short in important details," there being no
investigation whatsoever conducted by the police.
We also reject appellant's contention that the NBI suppressed the sketch prepared by
the CIS on the basis of the description given by Leino. There is nothing on the record
to show that said sketch was turned over by the CIS to the NBI which could warrant a
presumption that the sketch was suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not
resemble appellant is not evidence. It is unmitigated guesswork.
We are not likewise impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to
have remembered appellant's face when the incident happened within a span of five
(5) minutes. Five (5) minutes is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind the
picture of appellant. Experience shows that precisely because of the unusual acts of
bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a
crime, can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals. 151 We
have ruled that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see
the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed.
43
Most often, the face end body movements of the assailant create an impression
which cannot be easily erased from their memory. 152 In the case at bar, there is
absolutely no improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to appellant. The
victims and appellant were unknown to each other before their chance encounter. If
Leino identified appellant, it must be because appellant was the real culprit.
Appellant also assails his identification by Cadenas. He contends that Cadenas did not
witness the crime. He stresses that when the Dasmariñas security force and the
Makati police conducted an on-the-spot investigation on the day of the incident,
neither came across Cadenas. The next day, in the afternoon of July 14, 1991, an NBI
agent interviewed Cadenas and asked if he saw the incident. He merely replied:
"Nakita ko pero patay na." He did not volunteer information to anyone as to what he
supposedly witnessed. That same night, the NBI subpoenaed him for investigation. He
went to the NBI the next morning. It was only the next day, July 16, 1991, that he
gave his statement to the NBI. Cadenas allegedly told Ponferrada, his supervisor, that
the NBI tortured him.
We reject appellant's submission. Cadenas' initial reluctance to reveal to the
authorities what he witnessed was sufficiently explained during the trial. He related
that he feared for his and his family's safety. His fear was not imaginary. He saw with
his own eyes the senseless violence perpetrated by appellant. He knew appellant
belonged to an influential family. It was only after consistent prodding and assurance
of protection from NBI officials that he agreed to cooperate with the
authorities. 153 The Court has taken judicial notice of the natural reticence of
witnesses to get involved in the solution of crimes considering the risk to their lives
and limbs. In light of these all too real risks, the court has not considered the initial
reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with authorities as an authorities
as an indicium of credibility. 154 It will not depart from this ruling.
Appellant's assertion that Cadenas was tortured by the NBI is not borne out by the
records. Supposedly, Cadenas passed on to his superior, a certain Ponferrada,
information about his torture. The allegation is an out and out hearsay as Ponferrada
was not presented in the witness stand. Cadenas himself stoutly denied this
allegation of torture. The claim of torture is also belied by the fact that Cadenas'
entire family was allowed to stay with him at the NBI headquarters and likewise
extended protection. 155
Appellant then discredits his identification by VICENTE MANGUBAT, citing the
testimony of defense witness Pat. James Baldado of the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado
testified that Mangubat failed to identify appellant as the gunman the first time he
was brought to the Makati police station. Mangubat, however, belied Baldado's story.
He declared he positively identified appellant as the gunman at the Makati police
station. He averred that the day after he identified appellant, Pat. Baldado returned
to his place of work in Dasmariñas and asked him again whether appellant was the
gunman. Again, he replied in the affirmative. Forthwith, Pat. Baldado said he would
no longer ask him to sign a statement (Exhibit "HHH") 156 earlier prepared by Baldado.
In said statement previously prepared by Baldado, Mangubat was supposed to state
that appellant, whom he saw at the Makati police station, was NOT the gunman. We
give more weight to the testimony of Mangubat. We find nothing in the records to
suspect that Mangubat would perjure himself. The Court cannot be as generous to
Pat. Baldado of the Makati Police. Mr. Hultman has proved that the Makati police,
including some of its jail officials, gave appellant favored treatment while in their
custody. The anomaly triggered nothing less than a congressional investigation.
II
We now rule on appellant's second assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred
in not holding that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
First, he claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement in previous
shooting incidents for this contravenes the rule 157 that evidence that one did or
omitted to do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or
omitted to do the same or similar thing at another time. Second, the NBI failed to
conduct an examination to compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of the
crime with the bullets recovered from the body of Chapman. Third, the prosecution
eyewitnesses described the gunman's car as white, but the trial court found it to be
silver mettalic gray. Fourth, appellant could not have been the gunman for Mangubat,
in his statement dated July 15, 1991, said that he overheard the victim Maureen
Hultman plead to the gunman, thus: "Please, don't shoot me and don't kill me. I
promise Mommy, Daddy." Appellant also contends that a maid in a house near the
scene of the crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard Maureen say:
"Daddy don't shoot. Don't." Fifth, the NBI towed accused's car from Dasmariñas
Village to the NBI office which proved that the same was not in good running
condition. Lastly, the result of the paraffin test conducted on appellant showed he
was negative of nitrates.
Appellant points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS HULTMAN, since one of the
eyewitnesses was quoted in the newspapers as having overheard Maureen plead to
the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy."; and, (b) JOSE MONTAÑO, another resident of
Dasmariñas Village, who had a white Lancer car, also bearing license plate number
566.
We reject appellant's thesis as bereft of merit.
Appellant cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge violated
the rule on res inter alios actawhen he considered his involvement in previous
shooting incidents. This stance is a specie of a mid-1800 rule known as the English
Exchequer Rule pursuant to which "a trial court's error as to the admission of
evidence was presumed to have caused prejudice and therefore, almost
automatically required a new trial." 158 The Exchequer rule has long been laid to rest
for even English appellate courts now disregard an error in the admission of evidence
"unless in its opinion, some substantial wrong or miscarriage (of justice) has been
occasioned." 159 American courts adopted this approach especially after the
enactment of a 1915 federal statute which required a federal appellate court to "give
judgment after an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard
44
to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties." 160 We have likewise followed the harmless error rule in our jurisdiction.
In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial, we examine its damaging
quality and its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight
and insignificant, we disregard the error as it will not overcome the weight of the
properly admitted evidence against the prejudiced party. 161
In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the troublesome
character of appellant is a harmless error. The reference is not the linchpin of the
inculpatory evidence appreciated by the trial judge in convicting appellant. As
aforestated, the appellant was convicted mainly because of his identification by three
(3) eyewitnesses with high credibility.
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal gun with the
bullets found at the scene of the crime. The omission, however, cannot exculpate
appellant. The omitted comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the positive
identification of appellant.
There is also little to the contention of appellant that his Lancer car was not in
running condition. Allegedly, this was vicariously proved when the NBI towed his car
from Dasmariñas Village where it was parked to the NBI office. Again, the argument is
negated by the records which show that said car was towed because the NBI could
not get its ignition key which was then in the possession of appellant. Clearly, the car
was towed not because it was not in running condition. Even appellant's evidence
show that said car could run. After its repairs, appellant's son, Claudio Teehankee III,
drove it from the repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to Dasmariñas Village, in
Makati, where it was
parked. 162
Nor are we impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the eyewitnesses' description of
the color of the gunman's car. Leino described the car as light-colored; Florece said
the car was somewhat white ("medyo puti"); 163 Mangubat declared the car was
white; 164 and Cadenas testified it was silver metallic gray. 165 These alleged
discrepancies amount to no more than shades of differences and are not meaningful,
referring as they do to colors white, somewhat white and silver metallic gray.
Considering the speed and shocking nature of the incident which happened before
the break of dawn, these slight discrepancies in the description of the car do not
make the prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy of credence.
Appellant's attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the adoptive father
of Maureen Hultman, deserves scant consideration. Appellant cites a newspaper
item 166 where Maureen was allegedly overheard as saying to the gunman: "Huwag,
Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The evidence on record, however, demonstrates that Anders
Hultman could not have been the gunman. It was clearly established that Maureen
could not have uttered said statement for two (2) reasons: Maureen did not speak
Tagalog, and she addressed Anders Hultman as "Papa," not "Daddy." 167Moreover,
Leino outrightly dismissed this suspicion. While still in the hospital and when
informed that the Makati police were looking into this possibility, Leino flatly stated
that Anders Hultman was NOT the gunman. 168 Leino is a reliable witness.
Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was negative of
nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has ". . . proved
extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can definitely establish is the
presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from
this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a
firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of substances which
give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks,
fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A
person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since
these substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco." 169 In
numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors which may bring about the
absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant
washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if
the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. 170 In the
case at bar, NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified and confirmed that
excessive perspiration or washing of hands with the use of warm water or vinegar
may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She likewise opined that the
conduct of the paraffin test after more than seventy-two (72) hours from the time of
the shooting may not lead to a reliable result for, by such time, the nitrates could
have already been removed by washing or perspiration. 171 In the Report 172 on the
paraffin test conducted on appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon noted that
when appellant was tested for the presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours has
already lapsed from the time of the alleged shooting.
III
In his third assigned error, appellant blames the press for his conviction as he
contends that the publicity given to his case impaired his right to an impartial trial. He
postulates there was pressure on the trial judge for high-ranking government officials
avidly followed the developments in the case (as no less than Vice-President Joseph
Estrada and then Department of Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon attended some of
the hearings and, President Corazon Aquino even visited victim Maureen Hultman
while she was still confined at the hospital). He submits that the trial judge failed to
protect him from prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences which attended the
prosecution of the cases. He claims there were placards displayed during the hearing
of the cases, spectators inside the courtroom clapped their hands and converted the
proceedings into a carnival. In another instance, he was allegedly given the "finger
sign" by several young people while he was leaving the courtroom on his way back to
his cell.
We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due
to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at
bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and
now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free
45
press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial for,
as well pointed out, "a responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field . . . The
press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting in the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes
to extensive public scrutiny and criticism." 173
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The
mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage
does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge
and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members
of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases.
The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen
straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of
our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and
impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have
not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest
they lose their impartiality. Criticisms against the jury system are mounting and Mark
Twain's wit and wisdom put them all in better perspective when he observed: "When
a gentleman of high social standing, intelligence, and probity swears that testimony
given under the same oath will outweigh with him, street talk and newspaper reports
based upon mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to their
own ignorance and stupidity . . . Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give
men of brains and honesty an equal chance with fools and miscreants?" 174 Our
judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-
camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications
and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial
judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of
the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et a1., 175 we rejected this standard of
possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to
warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed
actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the
pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove
that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is
incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the
burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
We have minutely examined the transcripts of the proceedings and they do not
disclose that the trial judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did he
consent to or condone any manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or conduct
inside the courtroom during the trial of the case at bar. The transcripts reveal the
following:
1. At the August 14, 1991 hearing, the defense counsel called the
attention of the court to the visible display of a placard inside the
courtroom. Acting on the manifestation, the trial judge immediately
directed that the placard be hidden. Only then did he order the start
of the arraignment of accused. 176
On the same hearing, the defense counsel asked for the exclusion of
the media after they had enough opportunity to take pictures. The
court granted defense's request, noting that the courtroom was
also too crowded. 177
2. During the testimony of Domingo Florece, an argument ensued
between the defense lawyer and the fiscal. When part of the
audience clapped their hands, the defense counsel invoked Rule
119, Section 13 of the Rules of Court and moved for the exclusion of
the public. Assistant Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio objected on the
ground that the public was not unruly. The trial judge noted that
there were yet no guidelines drafted by the Supreme Court
regarding media coverage of the trial proceedings. 178Collaborating
defense counsel, Atty. Malvar, complained that the outpouring of
sympathy by spectators inside the courtroom has turned the
proceedings into a carnival. He also manifested that he personally
saw that when accused was being brought back to his cell from the
courtroom, a group of young people were pointing dirty fingers at
accused in full view of policemen. Forthwith, the trial judge
declared that he could not be dissuaded by public sentiments. He
noted that the clapping of hands by the public was just a reaction at
the spur of the moment. He then admonished the audience not to
repeat it. 179
3. At the hearing of July 14, 1992, the parties again argued on the
coverage of the trial by the press. The defense alleged that the
media coverage will constitute mistrial and deny accused's
constitutional right to due process. It invoked the provision in the
Rules of Court which allows the accused to exclude everybody in the
courtroom, except the organic personnel. The prosecutor, however,
argued that exclusion of the public can be ordered only in
prosecution of private offenses and does not apply to murder cases.
He added that the public is entitled to observe and witness trial of
public offenses. He quoted the U.S. case of Sheppard v.
Maxwell 180 where it was held: "A responsible press is always
regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration
especially in the criminal field. The press does not simply publish
information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of
justice by subjecting the police, the prosecutors and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. What transpires
46
 in the courtrooms public property." The trial judge then ruled that
the media should be given a chance to cover the proceedings before
the trial proper but, thereafter, he prohibited them from taking
pictures during the trial. They were allowed to remain inside the
courtroom but were ordered to desist from taking live coverage of
the proceedings. 181
4. At the August 14, 1992 hearing, before the hearing began, the
trial judge gave the media two (2) minutes to take video coverage
and no more. Trial then ensued. 182
5. At the September 8, 1992 hearing, the trial judge again gave the
media two (2) minutes to take pictures before the trial proper.
Afterwards, the reporters were duly admonished to remain silent,
to quietly observe the proceedings and just take down notes. 183
6 On September 10, 1992 before the start of the afternoon session,
the judge admonished the media people present in the courtroom
to stop taking pictures. 184
Parenthetically, appellant should be the last person to complain against the press for
prejudicial coverage of his trial. The records reveal he presented in court no less than
seven (7) newspaper reporters and relied heavily on selected portions of their reports
for his defense. The defense's documentary evidence consists mostly of newspaper
clippings relative to the investigation of the case at bar and which appeared to cast
doubt on his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair to appellant at the same time.
Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that on May 29, 1992, the trial judge
voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing the case at bar to assuage
appellant's suspicion of bias and partiality. 185 However, upon elevation of the trial
judge's voluntary Order of Inhibition to this Court, we directed the trial judge to
proceed with the trial to speed up the administration of justice. 186 We found nothing
in the conduct of the proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality against the trial
judge.
IV
In his fourth assigned error, appellant claims that treachery was not present in the
killing of Hultman and Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was not shown that
the gunman consciously and deliberately adopted particular means, methods and
forms in the execution of the crime. Appellant asserts that mere suddenness of attack
does not prove treachery.
The three (3) Informations charged appellant with having committed the crimes at
bar with treachery and evident premeditation. Evident premeditation was correctly
ruled out by the trial court for, admittedly, the shooting incident was merely a casual
encounter or a chance meeting on the street since the victims were unknown to
appellant and vice-versa It, however, appreciated the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
We hold that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of Chapman.
Prosecution witness Leino established the sequence of events leading to the shooting.
He testified that for no apparent reason, appellant suddenly alighted from his car and
accosted him and Maureen Hultman who were then walking along the sidewalk.
Appellant questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D. After Leino handed
him his I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino and asked what was going on.
Chapman then stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was
wrong. There and then, appellant pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt,
and shot him. The gun attack was unexpected. "Why did you shoot me?" was all
Chapman could utter.
Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him with no
chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove that
appellant consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the
accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself. It appears to us that
appellant acted on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were
strangers to each other. The time between the initial encounter and the shooting was
short and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and
impetuous impulse on the part of appellant rather than a deliberate act of will. We
have consistently ruled that mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not,
by itself, constitute treachery. 187 Hence, absent any qualifying circumstance,
appellant should only be held liable for Homicide for the shooting and killing of
Chapman.
As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we hold that
treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that
after shooting Chapman in cold blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the
pavement. Maureen became hysterical and wandered to the side of appellant's car.
When appellant went after her, Maureen moved around his car and tried to put some
distance between them. After a minute or two, appellant got to Maureen and
ordered her to sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging
for mercy, the two were gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely
placed his two victims in a completely defenseless position before shooting them.
There was an appreciable lapse of time between the killing of Chapman and the
shooting of Leino and Hultman — a period which appellant used to prepare for a
mode of attack which ensured the execution of the crime without risk to himself.
Treachery was thus correctly appreciated by the trial court against appellant insofar
as the killing of Hultman and the wounding of Leino are concerned.
V and VI
We come now to the civil liability imposed against appellant. Appellant posits that the
awards of moral and exemplary damages and for loss of earning capacity of Maureen
Hultman, Roland Chapman and Jussi Leino were exorbitant. He likewise claims that
the trial court's award of attorney's fees was excessive.
In its Decision, the trial court awarded to Jussi Leino end the heirs of victims Hultman
and Chapman the following damages:
1. For the murder of Roland John Chapman, appellant was
sentenced to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of Fifty
47
 Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity for death and the sum of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moderate or
temperate and exemplary damages.
2. For the murder of Maureen Navarro Hultman, appellant was
sentenced to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of: Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity for death; Two Million
Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and
Eighty-Three Centavos
(P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Thirteen Million Pesos
(P13,000,000.00) for loss of earning capacity of deceased; and, One
Million Pesos as moral, moderate and exemplary damages.
3. For the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, appellant was sentenced to
pay: Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as indemnity for the injury;
One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three-Hundred Sixty Nine Pesos
and Eighty-Four Centavos (P118,369.84) and the sum equivalent in
Philippine pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; an
amount equivalent in Philippine pesos of U.S.$40,000.00, for loss of
earning capacity of Jussi Leino; and, One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as moral, moderate and exemplary damages.
4. In all three cases, appellant was also ordered to pay each of the
offended parties the sum of One Million Pesos (or a total of three
million pesos) for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
5. Costs of litigation. 188
The early case of Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos 189 discussed in detail the matter
of damages recoverable in case of death arising from a felony, thus:
When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil
obligations arising therefrom are governed by penal laws, ". . .
subject to the provisions of Art. 2177, and of the pertinent
provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations, and
of Title XVIII of this Book (Book IV) regulating damages." (Art. 1161,
Civil Code)
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable." (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code). This civil liability, in case the
felony involves death, includes indemnification for consequential
damages (Art. 104, id.) and said consequential damages in turn
include ". . . those suffered by his family or by a third person by
reason of the crime." (Art. 107, id.) Since these provisions are
subject, however, as above indicated, to certain provisions of the
Civil Code, (w)e will now turn to said provisions.
The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be
liable for all damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. It is not necessary that such
damages have been foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen by the defendant. (Art. 2202)
When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art.
2206 which provides thus:
The amount of damages for death caused by a
crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the
earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter;
such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and
awarded by the court, unless the deceased on
account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity
at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support
according to the provisions of article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the
descendant's inheritance by law of testate or
intestate succession, may demand support from
the person causing the death, for a period not
exceeding five years, the exact duration to be
fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased.
The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already
been increased by this Court first, to P6,000.00 in People
v. Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and lately to P12,000.00 in the case
of People v. Pantoja, G.R. No. L-18793, promulgated October 11,
1968 190, and it must be stressed that this amount, as well as the
amount of moral damages, may be adjudicated even without proof
of pecuniary loss, the assessment of the moral damages being "left
to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of
each case." (Art. 2216)
Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil
liability when the crime has been committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances, such damages being "separate and
distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party." (Art.
2230). Exemplary damages cannot however be recovered as a
48
matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be
given. (Art. 2233)
In any event, save as expressly provided in connection with the
indemnity for the sole fact of death (1st par., Art. 2206) and is cases
wherein exemplary damages are awarded precisely because of the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, (Art. 2230) ". . . damages
to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened
according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances," (Art.
2204) "but the party suffering the loss or injury must exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages
resulting from the act or omission in question." (Art. 2203) "Interest
as a part of the damages, may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in
the discretion of the Court." (Art. 2211) As to attorneys' fees and
expenses of litigation, the same may be recovered only when
exemplary damages have been granted (Art. 2208, par. 1) or . . .
when there is a separate civil action.
Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the
heirs of the deceased are entitled to the following items of
damages:
1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the
offense — P12,000.00 (now P50,000.00), without
the need of any evidence or proof of damages,
and even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances attending the commission of the
offense.
2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased — an amount to be fixed by the court
according to the circumstances of the deceased
related to his actual income at the time of death
and his probable life expectancy, the said
indemnity to be assessed and awarded by the
court as a matter of duty, unless the deceased had
no earning capacity at said time on account of
permanent disability not caused by the accused. If
the deceased was obliged to give support, under
Art. 291, Civil Code, the recipient who is not an
heir, may demand support from the accused for
not more than five years, the exact duration to be
fixed by the court.
3. As moral damages for mental anguish, — an
amount to be fixed by the court. This may be
recovered even by the illegitimate descendants
and ascendants of the deceased.
4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is
attended by one or more aggravating
circumstances, — an amount to be fixed in the
discretion of the court, the same to be considered
separate from fines.
5. As attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, —
the actual amount thereof, (but only when a
separate civil action to recover civil liability has
been filed or when exemplary damages are
awarded).
6. Interests in the proper cases.
7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for
loss of earning capacity of the deceased and for
moral damages are recoverable separately from
and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00
(now P50,000.00) corresponding to the indemnity
for the sole fact of death, and that these damages
may, however, be respectively increased or
lessened according to the mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, except items 1 and 4
above, for obvious reasons. 191
We shall first review the damages awarded to the heirs of ROLAND JOHN CHAPMAN
in light of the law and the case law.
Appellant claims that the award of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos as
moderate or temperate and exemplary damages to the heirs of Roland John Chapman
was baseless.
We start with the observation that the trial court should not have lumped together
the awards for moderate or temperate and exemplary damages at Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), without specifying the particular amount which
corresponds to each, as they are of a different kind. We shall, however, consider their
propriety and reasonableness.
The amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos cannot be given as
temperate or moderate damages for the records do not show any basis for sustaining
the award. Nor can it be given as exemplary damages. The killing of Chapman was not
attended by either evident premeditation or treachery. Be that as it may, the award
can be considered as one for moral damages under Article 2206 (3) of the New Civil
Code. 192 It states:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime . . .
shall be at least (fifty thousand pesos, under current jurisprudence)
. . . In addition:
xxx xxx xxx
49
 (3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
Moreover, considering the shocking and senseless aggression committed by
appellant, we increase the amount of moral damages to One Million (P1,000,000.00)
pesos for the death of Chapman.
We next rule on the legality of damages awarded to the heirs of MAUREEN NAVARRO
HULTMAN.
Appellant argues that the damages for the death of Maureen should be awarded to
her mother, Vivian Hultman, and her natural father. He contends that under Article
352 of the New Civil Code, Anders Hultman as adoptive father of Maureen, is not
entitled to said award. Only the parents by nature of Maureen should inherit from
her.
We reject the argument. Under the Family Code which was already in effect at the
time of Maureen's death, Anders Hultman, as adoptive father, is entitled to the award
made by the trial court. Article 190 of the Family Code provides:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate
descendants of the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall
divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or
ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire
estate;
It does not appear on the records whether Maureen was survived by her natural
father. During the trial of these cases, only Vivian and Anders Hultman testified on
their claim of damages. Hence, we find that the award of damages in their favor has
sufficient factual and legal basis.
Appellant also urges that the award to the heirs of Maureen Hultman of One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral and exemplary damages is unjustified or, at the very
least, exorbitant and should be reduced.
We hold that the award of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos is amply justified by the
circumstances. The records reveal that Maureen recovered between life and death
for ninety-seven (97) days. Her family experienced the peaks and valleys of
unspeakable suffering. During that time, she underwent brain surgery three (3) times.
Her condition was never stable and remained critical. It was always touch and go with
death. She could not be left alone at the hospital. Her parents had to be perpetually
by her side at least six (6) to seven (7) hours daily. After the shooting, their siblings
had to be sent back to Sweden for their safety. Left unattended, her family's business
took a downspin. Soon, her family's assets were depleted, then wiped out. A total of
twenty-three (23) doctors attended to her and their bills ballooned without
abatement. They were forced to rely on the goodness of the gracious. Her family
started receiving contributions from other people to defray the medical expenses and
hospital bills. 193 Maureen never regained consciousness until her demise on October
17, 1991, at the tender age of seventeen. Under the foregoing circumstances, we thus
find the award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages to be
reasonable.
Moreover, we find that the grant of exemplary damages is called for by the
circumstances of the case. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, 194 in addition to the
award of moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages may be adjudged in order
to deter the commission of similar acts in the future. The award for exemplary
damages is designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially
deleterious consequences. Its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the
wanton acts of an offender.
In the case at bar, appellant's unprovoked aggression snuffed the life of Maureen
Hultman, a girl in the prime of her youth. Hultman and her companions were gunned
down by appellant in cold-blood, for no apparent reason. Appellant's vicious
criminality led to the suffering of his victims and their families. Considering our
soaring crime rate, the imposition of exemplary damages against appellant to deter
others from taking the lives of people without any sense of sin is proper. Moreover,
since the killing of Hultman was attended by treachery and pursuant to Article 2229
of the new Civil Code, 195 we impose an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos
as exemplary damages against appellant for the death of Maureen Hultman.
We now review the award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral, moderate
and exemplary damages to victim JUSSI LEINO.
From the record, it is incontrovertible that Leino likewise suffered extensive injuries
as a result of the shooting. His upper jaw bone was shattered. He would need a bone
transplant operation to restore it. His tongue was also injured. He partially lost his
sense of taste for his taste buds were also affected. When he was discharged from
the hospital, he had difficulty in speaking and had to be fed through a tube running
down his nose. He lost eight of his teeth. The roots of his teeth were cut off and the
raw nerves were exposed. But all these speak only of his physical injuries and
suffering. More devastating was the emotional strain that distressed Leino. His
parents were in Europe for a vacation at the time of the shooting. Only a neighbor
attended to him at the hospital. It took two (2) days for his father to come and
comfort by his bedside. Leino had trouble sleeping in peace at night. The traumatic
event woke him up in the middle of the night. Black memories of the incident kept
coming back to
mind. 196 Understably, the ill-effects of the incident spilled over his family. Seppo
Leino, Jussi's father, was tortured by thoughts of insecurity. He had to relocate his
entire family to Europe where he felt they would be safe. 197 Under the foregoing
circumstances, we find that an award of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos to Jussi
Leino as indemnity for moral damages is justified and reasonable.
As in the case of Hultman, since the shooting of Leino was committed with treachery
and pursuant to Article 2229 of the New Civil Code, 198 appellant is additionally
50
adjudged liable for the payment to Leino of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as
exemplary damages.
We come now to the trial court's monetary award to compensate the LOSS OF
EARNING CAPACITY OF VICTIMS JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN.
To be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessary that the victim, at
the time of injury or death, is gainfully employed. Compensation of this nature is
awarded not for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money. In Cariaga
v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, 199 we awarded to the heirs of Cariaga a sum
representing loss of his earning capacity although he was still a medical student at the
time of injury. However, the award was not without basis for Cariaga was then a
fourth year medical student at a reputable school; his scholastic record, which was
presented at the trial, justified an assumption that he would have been able to finish
his course and pass the board in due time; and a doctor, presented as witness for the
appellee, testified as to the amount of income Cariaga would have earned had he
finished his medical studies.
In the case at bar, the trial court awarded the amount, equivalent in Philippine pesos,
of Forty capacity of JUSSI LEINO. We agree with appellant that this amount is highly
speculative and should be denied considering that Leino had only earned a high
school degree at the International School, Manila, in 1989. He went back to Finland to
serve the military and has just arrived in Manila in February 1991 to pursue his
ambition to become a pilot. At the time of the shooting on July 13, 1991, he has just
enrolled at the Manila Aero Club to become a professional pilot. He was thus only on
his first year, first semester, in said school and was practically, a mere high school
graduate. Under the foregoing circumstances, we find the records wanting with
substantial evidence to justify a reasonable assumption that Leino would have been
able to finish his studies at the Manila Aero Club and ultimately become a
professional pilot.
We now pass upon the propriety of the award of Thirteen Million Pesos
(P13,000,000.00) for loss of earning capacity of deceased MAUREEN HULTMAN. We
find that the award is not supported by the records.
In adjudging an award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, the trial court
incorrectly used the monthly salary of a secretary working in Sweden, computed at
two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) a month, as per the estimate given by Anders
Hultman. Nowhere in the records does it appear that, at the time of her death,
Maureen had acquired the skills needed for a secretarial job or that she intended to
take a secretarial course in preparation for such job in Sweden. Anders Hultman
himself testified that there was uncertainty as to Maureen's future career path, thus:
ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q Mr. Witness, if Maureen would not been (sic)
shot and she continued her studies, what
professional career would she (sic) like to pursue
considering her interests and inclinations?
WITNESS:
A That is very difficult to say. She has just turned
17 and our projection is that, certainly she would
have been an artist in the creative side. She would
have become an actress or a movie producer or
probably she would have been a college graduate.
ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q But if you would just say based on the salary of
a secretary in Sweden, how much would she have
much earned?
A. Not less than Two Thousand Dollars a
month. 200
Clearly, there is no factual basis for the award of thirteen million (P13,000,000.00)
pesos to the heirs of Maureen far loss of earning capacity as a probable secretary in
Sweden.
In any event, what was proved on record is that after graduating from high school,
Maureen took up a short personality development course at the John Roberts
Powers. Maureen was employed at the John Roberts Powers at the time of her death.
It was her first job. In fact, she had just received her first salary, for which reason she
went out with her friends to celebrate on that fateful day. However, neither the
nature of her work nor her salary in said company was disclosed at the trial. Thus, to
compute the award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, we are constrained to use
the minimum wage prevailing as of the date of her death (October 17, 1991), i.e., one
hundred eighteen pesos (P118.00). 201 Allowing for reasonable and necessary
expenses in the amount of P19,800.00, her net income per annum would amount to
P26,859.17. 202 Hence, using the formula repeatedly adopted by this Court: 203 (2/3 x
[80 — age of victim at time of death]) x a reasonable portion of the net income which
would have been received by the heirs as support, 204 we fix the award for loss of
earning as capacity of deceased Maureen Hultman at Five Hundred Sixty-Four
Thousand Forty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos (P564,042.57).
It also bears emphasis that in the computation of the award for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased, the life expectancy of the deceased's heirs is not factored
in. The rule is well-settled that the award of damages for death is computed on the
basis of the life expectancy of the deceased, and not the beneficiary. 205
Lastly, appellant seeks a reduction of the award of attorney's fees in the amount of
Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), claiming that the same is exorbitant.
We disagree. The three (3) private complainants were represented by the ACCRA law
firm, with Atty. Rogelio Vinluan as lead counsel. They agreed to pay the amount of
One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos each as attorney's fees and for litigation expenses.
The three criminal cases were consolidated. A continuous trial was conducted, with
some hearings having both morning and afternoon sessions. The trial lasted for
almost one and a half years. More than forty (40) witnesses testified during the
hearings. Several pleadings were prepared and filed. A total of sixty-eight (68)
documentary exhibits were presented by the prosecution. Incidents related to the
51
trial of the cases came up to this Court for review at least twice during the pendency
of the trial. 206 Given these circumstances and the evident effort exerted by the
private prosecutor throughout the trial, the trial court's award of a total of Three
Million (P3,000,000.00) pesos as attorney's fees and litigation expenses appears just
and reasonable.
VII
In his last assigned error, appellant urges that the hearings conducted on the cases,
where no less than forty-one (41) witnesses were presented by the parties, 207 were
merely hearings on the petition for bail concerning the murder charge for the killing
of Roland Chapman, and not a trial on the merits of all three (3) cases. Appellant
insists that after the termination of the hearing, he still had the right to adduce
evidence at the trial proper. He claims he was denied due process when the trial court
considered all the cases submitted for decision after the defense waived its right to
present its surrebuttal evidence.
Appellant's position is untenable. This issue was resolved at the very first hearing of
the cases on August 9, 1991. The incident then pending was appellant's petition for
bail for the murder of Chapman. It will be remembered that, initially, there was only
one murder charge against appellant since Maureen Hultman succumbed to death
during the course of the proceedings on October 17, 1991.
Thus, at the initial hearing on August 9, 1991, the incident for resolution was
appellant's petition for bail. The prosecution sought to present the surviving victim,
Jussi Leino, to testify on all three (3) charges to obviate delay and inconvenience since
all three (3) charges involved one continuing incident. Appellant, through counsel,
objected to the testimony of Leino insofar as the two (2) frustrated murder charges
(with respect to the wounding of Leino and Hultman) were concerned. He argued that
since the pending incident was the petition for bail with respect to the killing of
Chapman, any testimony relative to the two (2) other charges in which bail were
recommended was irrelevant.
After arguments, the defense suggested that if the prosecution would present Leino
to testify on all three (3) charges, it should wait until after accused's arraingment on
August 14, 1991. 208 The prosecution agreed on the condition that there shall be trial
on the merits and, at the same time, hearing on the petition for bail. Defense counsel
agreed. 209
As agreed upon, accused was arraigned and the prosecution presented Jussi Leino as
its first witness to testify on all three (3) cases. No objection was made by the
defense. 210
Subsequent proceedings likewise disprove appellant's insistence that the hearings
conducted by the trial court were limited to the petition for bail, viz:
1. The prosecution presented all their witnesses and documentary
evidence relative to the shooting incident, including evidence in
support of the claim for damages. These witnesses were extensively
cross-examined by the defense counsels. The defense never
objected that evidence on damages would be unnecessary if its
intention was really to limit presentation of evidence to appellant's
petition for bail.
2. After the prosecution and the defense rested their cases, the trial
court issued an Order 211 directing the parties to submit their
Memorandum, after which "the main case as well as the petition for
bail are respectively submitted for Decision and Resolution." After
receipt of this Order, the defense counsel filed two (2) motions for
extension of time to file the defense Memorandum. In both
Motions, the defense did not object to the trial court's Order
submitting for decision the main case and the petition for bail.
Neither did it move for a reconsideration of this Order and notify
the court that it still had witnesses to present.
3. In compliance with said Order, appellant's counsel, Atty. Rodolfo
Jimenez, filed a Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum
praying for accused's acquittal. This is inconsistent with the
defense's position that the hearing conducted was only on the
petition for bail. If the defense insist that what was submitted for
decision was only his petition for bail, he would have only prayed
that he be granted bail.
4. Upon receipt of the notice of promulgation of judgment from the
trial court, the defense did not interpose any objection to the
intended promulgation. In fact, the defense attended the
promulgation of the Decision and manifested that they were ready
therefor.
All these clearly show that the merits of the cases and the petition for bail were heard
simultaneously and appellant acquiesced thereto. Moreover, appellant's right to
present additional evidence was not abridged by the trial court. On the contrary, the
records disclose that the trial court afforded the defense fair opportunity to adduce
its evidence. It took the defense almost one and a half years to submit its evidence.
The defense presented more than twenty (20) witnesses and several documentary
evidence. It was only after the trial court rendered a decision against appellant that
he filed a motion for new
trial, 212 through his new counsel, Atty. Gatmaytan, Jr. For the first time, he alleged
that the joint decision of the cases, both on the merits and on the petition for bail,
was irregular for he was not given a chance to present further evidence to
corroborate his alibi. We note that in his motion for new trial, 213 appellant did not
even identify his alleged additional witnesses and the substance of their testimonies.
Nor was it shown that he could not have produced these evidence at the trial with
reasonable diligence. Appellant's motion was a patent ploy to delay the decision on
his cases. His motion was properly denied by the trial court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS the Decision of the trial
court, dated December 22, 1992, thus:
52
 (1) In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J.
Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide for the shooting of Roland John Chapman, and sentencing
said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased
the following amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as
indemnity for the victim's death; and, One Million (P1,000,000.00)
pesos as moral damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio J.
Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Maureen
Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the
following amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity
for her death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four
Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos
(P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Five Hundred Sixty-Four
Thousand Fourty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos
(P564,042.57) for loss of earning capacity of said deceased; One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages; and Two Million
(P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4807, finding accused Claudio J.
Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi
Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and
to pay the said offended party the following amounts: (P30,000.00)
pesos as Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) pesos as indemnity for his
injuries; One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine
pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos (P118,369.84) and equivalent in
Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; One
Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and, Two Million
(P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
(4) In all three cases, ordering said accused to pay each of the three
(3) offended parties the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00;
or a total of Three Million [P3,000,000.00] pesos] for attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
SO ORDERED.

53
G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995
ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO
TAMAYO, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 114931-33 November 16, 1995
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANNIE FERRER, accused, ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS
SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, accused-appellants.
PUNO, J.:
The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the aftermath
of the 1986 EDSA Revolution. This was the time when the newly-installed government
of President Corazon C. Aquino was being openly challenged in rallies,
demonstrations and other public fora by "Marcos loyalists," supporters of deposed
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Tension and animosity between the two (2) groups
sometimes broke into violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the murder of Stephen
Salcedo, a known "Coryista."
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court against eleven
persons identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the murder of Salcedo.
Criminal Case No. 86-47322 was filed against Raul Billosos y de Leon and Gerry Nery y
Babazon; Criminal Case No. 86-47617 against Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y
Abe and Joel Tan y Mostero; Criminal Case No. 86-47790 against Richard de los Santos
y Arambulo; Criminal Case No. 86-48538 against Joselito Tamayo y Ortia; and Criminal
Case No. 86-48931 against Rolando Fernandez y Mandapat. Also filed were Criminal
Cases Nos. 86-49007 and 86-49008 against Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega as well
as Annie Ferrer charging them as accomplices to the murder of Salcedo.
The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX,
Manila. All of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued
accordingly. The prosecution presented twelve witnesses, including two
eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and the police officers who
were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their testimonies, the
prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper
accounts of the incident and various photographs taken during the mauling.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at
the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a permit to hold the rally
but their application was denied by the authorities. Despite this setback, three
thousand of them gathered at the Rizal Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the
afternoon of the scheduled day. Led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, both
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the loyalists started an impromptu
singing contest, recited prayers and delivered speeches in between. Colonel Edgar
Dula Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, arrived and
asked the leaders for their permit. No permit could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres
thereupon gave them ten minutes to disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for thirty
minutes but this was refused. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and said
"Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators." Atty. Nuega added "Sige, sige
gulpihin ninyo!" The police then pushed the crowd, and used tear gas and truncheons
to disperse them. The loyalists scampered away but some of them fought back and
threw stones at the police. Eventually, the crowd fled towards Maria Orosa Street and
the situation later stabilized.1
At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase
III of the Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter
of President Marcos, jogging around the fountain. They approached her and informed
her of their dispersal and Annie Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga
Cory hecklers!" Then she continued jogging around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa
rin, Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos, Bugbugin ang mga
nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!" A few minutes later, Annie Ferrer was
arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang gumanti, tayo ngayon!" A
commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists
attacking persons in yellow, the color of the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow
shirt.2 He then saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons
shouting "Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!" The man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo
and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and
kicked and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they
again pounced on him and pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on
various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician at the Luneta,
rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he could extricate
Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with
stones in their fists. Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed to
Salcedo's attackers. They backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo
away from them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as
another man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed
Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was already fallen.3Salcedo
tried to stand but accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left side of his head and
ear.4 Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo on his nape, shouting: "Iyan, Cory Iyan.
Patayin!"5 Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the latter lunged at the victim again.
Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once
more fell. Banculo saw accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head,
and when he tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxed him.6 Sumilang saw accused
Gerry Neri approach the victim but did not notice what he did.7
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the blood
from his face. He sat on some cement steps8 and then tried to flee towards Roxas
boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but accused Joel Tan and Nilo
Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for his life
54
exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin. Tulungan ninyo ako." He cried: "Pulis, pulis. Wala
bang pulis?"9
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard
until Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged down a van and with
the help of a traffic officer, brought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila but he was
refused admission. So they took him to the Philippine General Hospital where he died
upon arrival.
Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained various
contusions, abrasions, lacerated wounds and skull fractures as revealed in the
following post-mortem findings:
Cyanosis, lips, and nailbeds.
Contused-abrasions: 6.0 x 2.5 cm., and 3.0 x 2.4 cm., frontal region,
right side; 6.8 x 4.2 cm., frontal region, left side; 5.0 x 4.0 cm., right
cheek; 5.0 x 3.5 cm., face, left side; 3.5 x 2.0 cm., nose; 4.0 x 2.1 cm.,
left ear, pinna; 5.0 x 4.0 cm. left suprascapular region; 6.0 x 2.8 cm.,
right elbow.
Abrasions: 4.0 x 2.0 cm., left elbow; 2.0 x 1.5 cm., right knee.
Lacerated wounds: 2.2 cm., over the left eyebrow; 1.0 cm., upper
lip.
Hematoma, scalp; frontal region, both sides; left parietal region;
right temporal region; occipital region, right side.
Fractures, skull; occipital bone, right side; right posterior cranial
fossa; right anterior cranial fossa.
Hemorrhage, subdural, extensive.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, about 1/2 filled with grayish brown food materials and
fluid.10
The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both
local and foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the event which became
front-page news the following day, capturing national and international attention.
This prompted President Aquino to order the Capital Regional Command and the
Western Police District to investigate the incident. A reward of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) was put up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief, for
persons who could give information leading to the arrest of the killers. 11Several
persons, including Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, cooperated with the police,
and on the basis of their identification, several persons, including the accused, were
apprehended and investigated.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of
the victim and offered their respective alibis. Accused Joselito Tamayo testified that
he was not in any of the photographs presented by the prosecution 12 because on July
27, 1986, he was in his house in Quezon City.13 Gerry Neri claimed that he was at the
Luneta Theater at the time of the
incident. 14 Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at his office near
the Luneta waiting for some pictures to be developed at that time. 15 He claimed to
be afflicted with hernia impairing his mobility; he cannot run normally nor do things
forcefully. 16 Richard de los Santos admits he was at the Luneta at the time of the
mauling but denies hitting Salcedo. 17 He said that he merely watched the mauling
which explains why his face appeared in some of the photographs. 18 Unlike the other
accused, Nilo Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a member of the Ako'y
Pilipino Movement and that he attended the rally on that fateful day. According to
him, he saw Salcedo being mauled and like Richard de los Santos, merely viewed the
incident. 19 His face was in the pictures because he shouted to the maulers to stop
hitting Salcedo. 20 Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify the maulers because
he pitied Salcedo. The maulers however ignored him. 21
The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and Annie Ferrer opted not
to testify in their defense.
On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo
Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the
crime of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced them to 14 years 10 months
and 20 days of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Annie Ferrer was likewise convicted as an accomplice. The court, however,
found that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other accused and thus
acquitted Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and Benjamin
Nuega. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered in the aforementioned
cases as follows:
1. In "People versus Raul Billosos and Gerry Nery," Criminal Case No.
86-47322, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the
guilt of the two (2) Accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged and hereby acquits them of said charge;
2. In "People versus Romeo Sison, et al.," Criminal Case No. 86-
47617, the Court finds the Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar and
Joel Tan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals for the crime
of Murder, defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and,
there being no other mitigating or aggravating circumstances,
hereby imposes on each of them an indeterminate penalty of from
FOURTEEN (14)YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS,
of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) DAYS,
of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS
of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
3. In "People versus Richard de los Santos," Criminal Case No. 86-
47790, the Court finds the Accused Richard de los Santos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of Murder
defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no
other extenuating circumstances, the Court hereby imposes on him
an indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10)
55
MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as
Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal as
Maximum;
4. In "People versus Joselito Tamayo," Criminal Case No. 86-
48538 the Court finds the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principal, for the crime of "Murder" defined in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes on him an indeterminate
penalty of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and
TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY
(20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
5. In "People versus Rolando Fernandez," Criminal Case No. 86-
4893l, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt
of the Accused for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt and
hereby acquits him of said charge;
6. In "People versus Oliver Lozano, et al.," Criminal Case No. 86-
49007, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt
of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged and
hereby acquits them of said charge;
7. In "People versus Annie Ferrer," Criminal Case No. 86-49008, the
Court finds the said Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
accomplice to the crime of Murder under Article 18 in relation to
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes on her an
indeterminate penalty of NINE (9) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS
of Prision Mayor, as Minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS, FIVE (5)
MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as
Maximum.
The Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Richard de los Santos, Joel
Tan, Joselito Tamayo and Annie Ferrer are hereby ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, to the heirs of Stephen Salcedo the total
amount of P74,000.00 as actual damages and the amount of
P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and one-half (1/2) of
the costs of suit.
The period during which the Accused Nilo Pacadar, Romeo Sison,
Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo had been under
detention during the pendency of these cases shall be credited to
them provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply
strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail.
The Warden of the City Jail of Manila is hereby ordered to release
the Accused Gerry Nery, Raul Billosos and Rolando Fernandez from
the City Jail unless they are being detained for another cause or
charge.
The Petition for Bail of the Accused Rolando Fernandez has become
moot and academic. The Petition for Bail of the Accused Joel Tan,
Romeo Sison and Joselito Tamayo is denied for lack of merit.
The bail bonds posted by the Accused Oliver Lozano and Benjamin
Nuega are hereby cancelled. 22
On appeal, the Court of Appeals 23 on December 28, 1992, modified the decision of
the trial court by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the
accused, except for Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court found
them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, but convicted Joselito
Tamayo of homicide because the information against him did not allege the said
qualifying circumstance. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby
MODIFIED as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe, Joel
Tan y Mostero and Richard de los Santos are hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and are each hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo y Oria is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with the generic
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and, as a
consequence, an indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS
of prision mayor as Minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as Maximum is hereby imposed upon him;
3. Accused-appellant Annie Ferrer is hereby ACQUITTED of being an
accomplice to the crime of Murder.
CONSIDERING that the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua has been
imposed in the instant consolidated cases, the said cases are now
hereby certified to the Honorable Supreme Court for review. 24
Petitioners filed G.R. Nos. 108280-83 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
inasmuch as Joselito Tamayo was not sentenced to reclusion perpetua. G.R. Nos.
114931-33 was certified to us for automatic review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals against the four accused-appellants sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Before this court, accused-appellants assign the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
NOTED THAT THE ACCUSED FAILED TO CITE ANYTHING ON RECORD
TO SUPPORT THEIR AVERMENT THAT THERE WERE NO WITNESSES
WHO HAVE COME FORWARD TO IDENTIFY THE PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF STEPHEN SALCEDO.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE, DOUBTFUL, SUSPICIOUS AND
56
 INCONCLUSIVE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESS RANULFO
SUMILANG.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN FINDING
THE ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE
THAT ANY OF THE ACCUSED CARRIED A HARD AND BLUNT
INSTRUMENT, THE ADMITTED CAUSE OF THE HEMORRHAGE
RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THERE EXISTS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED.
V testimony incredible. The sworn statements were made to identify more suspects
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS MURDER AND NOT DEATH
(HOMICIDE) CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY. 25
In their additional brief, appellants contend that:
I throughout his testimony. On the whole, his testimony was correctly given credence
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REACHING
A CONCLUSION OF FACT UTILIZING SPECULATIONS, SURMISES,
NON-SEQUITUR CONCLUSIONS, AND EVEN THE DISPUTED DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT, TO UPHOLD THE VALIDITY OF THE VERY SAME
JUDGMENT, ALL CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING
EXHIBITS "D", "G", "O", "P", "V", TO "V-48", "W" TO "W-13", ALL OF
WHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR
DISREGARDING ALTOGETHER THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
MATTER.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS MURDER, NOT DEATH
(HOMICIDE) IN TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY SIDESTEPPING IN THE
PROCESS THE FACTUAL GROUNDS SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT. 26
Appellants mainly claim that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the
testimonies of the two in prosecution eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and
Renato Banculo, because they are unreliable, doubtful and do not deserve
any credence. According to them, the testimonies of these two witnesses are
suspect because they surfaced only after a reward was announced by
General Lim. Renato Banculo even submitted three sworn statements to the
police geared at providing a new or improved version of the incident. On the
witness stand, he mistakenly identified a detention prisoner in another case
as accused Rolando Fernandez. 27 Ranulfo Sumilang was evasive and
unresponsive prompting the trial court to reprimand him several times. 28
There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward
announced by General Lim, much less that both or either of them ever received such
reward from the government. On the contrary, the evidence shows that Sumilang
reported the incident to the police and submitted his sworn statement immediately
two hours after the mauling, even before announcement of any reward. 29 He
informed the police that he would cooperate with them and identify Salcedo's
assailants if he saw them again. 30
The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make them and his
who were apprehended during the investigation of Salcedo's death. 31
The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial court on
the witness stand for being argumentative and evasive. 32 This is not enough reason
to reject Sumilang's testimony for he did not exhibit this undesirable conduct all
by the trial court despite his evasiveness at some instances. Except for compelling
reasons, we cannot disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of witnesses
considering their visual view of the demeanor of witnesses when on the witness
stand. As trial courts, they can best appreciate the verbal and non-verbal dimensions
of a witness' testimony.
Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does not make
him an entirely untrustworthy witness. 33 It does not make his whole testimony a
falsity. An honest mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful testimony. Perfect
testimonies cannot be expected from persons with imperfect senses. In the court's
discretion, therefore, the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts but
disbelieved with respect to the others. 34
We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the witnesses' testimonies
corroborate each other on all important and relevant details of the principal
occurrence. Their positive identification of all petitioners jibe with each other and
their narration of the events are supported by the medical and documentary
evidence on record.
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation,
testified that the victim had various wounds on his body which could have been
inflicted by pressure from more than one hard object. 35 The contusions and abrasions
found could have been caused by punches, kicks and blows from rough stones. 36 The
fatal injury of intracranial hemorrhage was a result of fractures in Salcedo's skull
which may have been caused by contact with a hard and blunt object such as
fistblows, kicks and a blunt wooden instrument. 37
Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and punched. Sumilang in
fact testified that Salcedo was pummeled by his assailants with stones in their
hands. 38
57
Appellants also contend that although the appellate court correctly disregarded
Exhibits "D," "G," and "P," it erroneously gave evidentiary weight to Exhibits "O," "V,"
"V-1" to "V-48," "W," "W-1" to "W-13." 39 Exhibit "O" is the Joint Affidavit of Pat.
Flores and Pat. Bautista, the police intelligence-operatives who witnessed the rally
and subsequent dispersal operation. Pat. Flores properly identified Exhibit "O" as his
sworn statement and in fact gave testimony corroborating the contents
thereof. 40 Besides, the Joint Affidavit merely reiterates what the other prosecution
witnesses testified to. Identification by Pat. Bautista is a surplusage. If appellants
wanted to impeach the said affidavit, they should have placed Pat. Flores on the
witness stand.
Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was being
mauled at the Luneta — starting from a grassy portion to the pavement at the Rizal
Monument and along Roxas Boulevard, 41 — as he was being chased by his
assailants 42 and as he sat pleading with his assailants. 43 Exhibits "W", "W-1" to "W-
13" are photographs of Salcedo and the mauling published in local newspapers and
magazines such as the Philippine Star, 44 Mr. and Ms. Magazine, 45 Philippine Daily
Inquirer, 46 and the Malaya. 47 The admissibility of these photographs is being
questioned by appellants for lack of proper identification by the person or persons
who took the same.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be
identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the
circumstances under which they were produced. 48 The value of this kind of evidence
lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, 49 and its
admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the
crime. 50 The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the
pictures he has taken. 51 The correctness of the photograph as a faithful
representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the
testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which
the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. 52Photographs,
therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness
who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. 53
This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its
evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their
admissibility for lack of proper identification. 54 However, when the accused
presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito
Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-48" to prove that his clients
were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the
mauling of the victim. 55 The photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo
and accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty.
Dumayas represented all the other accused per understanding with their respective
counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent hearings, the
prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the
witness stand. 56 No objection was made by counsel for any of the accused, not until
Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a continuing objection to
their admissibility. 57
The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on
the fact that the person who took the same was not presented to identify them. We
rule that the use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged
non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof.
That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling incident was
affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified
themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. 58
An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only
three of the appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan
could be readily seen in various belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over
the victim. 59 Appellant Romeo Sison appears only once and he, although afflicted
with hernia is shown merely running after the
victim. 60Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures. The
absence of the two appellants in the photographs does not exculpate them. The
photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only
segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting
Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang and
Banculo61Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification.
Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the existence of conspiracy
among the principal accused and in convicting them of murder qualified by abuse of
superior strength, not death in tumultuous affray.
Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of the Revised Penal code as
follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. — When, while
several persons, not composing groups organized for the common
purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel
and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and
in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be
ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or
persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified,
such person or persons shall be punished by prison mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries
on the deceased, the penalty ofprision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all those who shall
have used violence upon the person of the victim.
For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be several
persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized for the common
purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these several
persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous
manner; (4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be
ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or
58
 persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be
identified.62
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and
they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person
is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. 63
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct
group and one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police
dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled
to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after said dispersal that one distinct
group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless individual and attacked him
repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no
confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at
this stage of the incident.64
As the lower courts found, the victim's assailants were numerous by as much as fifty
in number65 and were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took
advantage of their superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any attempt
by Salcedo to escape and free himself. They followed Salcedo from the Chinese
Garden to the Rizal Monument several meters away and hit him mercilessly even
when he was already fallen on the ground. There was a time when Salcedo was able
to get up, prop himself against the pavement and wipe off the blood from his face.
But his attackers continued to pursue him relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend
himself nor could he find means to defend himself. Sumilang tried to save him from
his assailants but they continued beating him, hitting Sumilang in the process. Salcedo
pleaded for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost consciousness. The
deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless victim qualifies
the killing to murder.
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in the instant case.
There is no proof that the attack on Salcedo was deliberately and consciously chosen
to ensure the assailants' safety from any defense the victim could have made. True,
the attack on Salcedo was sudden and unexpected but it was apparently because of
the fact that he was wearing a yellow t-shirt or because he allegedly flashed the
"Laban" sign against the rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the appellate
court well found, Salcedo had the opportunity to sense the temper of the rallyists and
run away from them but he, unfortunately, was overtaken by them. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on
the part of the person being attacked. 66
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged in the information
against Joselito Tamayo. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case
because the attack against Salcedo was sudden and spontaneous, spurred by the
raging animosity against the so-called "Coryistas." It was not preceded by cool
thought and reflection.
We find however the existence of a conspiracy among appellants. At the time they
were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose among
them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of Salcedo. Where a conspiracy
existed and is proved, a showing as to who among the conspirators inflicted the fatal
wound is not required to sustain a conviction. 67 Each of the conspirators is liable for
all acts of the others regardless of the intent and character of their participation,
because the act of one is the act of all. 68
The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00 as actual damages,
P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and one half of the costs of the suit. At
the time he died on July 27, 1986, Salcedo was twenty three years old and was set to
leave on August 4, 1986 for employment in Saudi Arabia. 69 The reckless disregard for
such a young person's life and the anguish wrought on his widow and three small
children, 70 warrant an increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00.
The indemnity of P50,000.00 must also be awarded for the death of the victim.71
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and modified as
follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan and
Richard de los Santos are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance and are
each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with the generic
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and, as a
consequence, he is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to TWENTY (20)
YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum;
3. All accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of Stephen Salcedo the following amounts:
(a) P74,000.00 as actual damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
(c) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the
victim.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
59
GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE vs
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, MICHELINA S. AGUIRRE-
OLONDRIZ, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, DR.
JUVIDO AGATEP and DR. MARISSA B.
PASCUAL,
Respondents.
In this petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, petitioner Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre (Gloria Aguirre) seeks the reversal of the
21 July 2005 Decision[2] and 5 December 2005 Resolution,[3] both of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88370, entitled Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre v. Secretary of the
Department of Justice, Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz, Dr. Juvido Agatep, Dra. Marissa
B. Pascual, Pedro B. Aguirre and John and Jane Does.
The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) when the latter issued the twin
resolutions dated 11 February 2004[4] and 12 November 2004,[5] respectively, which in
turn affirmed the 8 January 2003 Resolution[6] of the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) of Quezon City.
The Assistant City Prosecutor for the OCP of Quezon City recommended the
dismissal of the criminal complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 02-12466, for violation of
Articles 172 (Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents) and
262 (Mutilation), both of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610,
otherwise known as Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, for insufficiency
of evidence.
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner Gloria Aguirre against
respondents Pedro B. Aguirre (Pedro Aguirre), Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz
(Olondriz), Dr. Juvido Agatep (Dr. Agatep), Dr. Marissa B. Pascual (Dr. Pascual) and
several John/Jane Does for falsification, mutilation and child abuse.
The antecedents of the present petition are:
Laureano Larry Aguirre[7] used to be a charge of the Heart of Mary Villa, a
child caring agency run by the Good Shepherd Sisters and licensed by the Department
of Social Work and Development (DSWD). Sometime in 1978, respondent Pedro
Aguirre; the latters spouse, Lourdes S. Aguirre (Lourdes Aguirre); and their four
daughters, who included petitioner Gloria Aguirre and respondent Olondriz, came to
know Larry, who was then just over a year old. The Aguirres would have Larry spend a
few days at their home and then return him to the orphanage thereafter. In June
1980, Larry, then two years and nine months of age, formally became the ward of
respondent Pedro Aguirre and his spouse Lourdes Aguirre by virtue of an Affidavit of
Consent to Legal Guardianship executed in their favor by Sister Mary Concepta
Bellosillo, Superior of the Heart of Mary Villa. On 19 June 1986, the Aguirre spouses
guardianship of Larry was legalized when the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of
Balanga, Bataan, duly appointed them as joint co-guardians over the person and
property of Larry.
As Larry was growing up, the Aguirre spouses and their children noticed that
his developmental milestones were remarkably delayed. His cognitive and physical
growth did not appear normal in that at age 3 to 4 years, Larry could only crawl on his
tummy like a frog x x x;[8] he did not utter his first word until he was three years of
age; did not speak in sentences until his sixth year; and only learned to stand up and
walk after he turned five years old. At age six, the Aguirre spouses first enrolled Larry
at the Colegio de San Agustin, Dasmarias Village, but the child experienced significant
learning difficulties there. In 1989, at age eleven, Larry was taken to specialists for
neurological and psychological evaluations. The psychological evaluation[9] done on
Larry revealed the latter to be suffering from a mild mental deficiency. [10] Consequent
thereto, the Aguirre spouses transferred Larry to St. John Ma. Vianney, an educational
institution for special children.
In November of 2001, respondent Dr. Agatep, a urologist/surgeon, was
approached concerning the intention to have Larry, then 24 years of age,
vasectomized. Prior to performing the procedure on the intended patient,
respondent Dr. Agatep required that Larry be evaluated by a psychiatrist in order to
confirm and validate whether or not the former could validly give his consent to the
medical procedure on account of his mental deficiency.
In view of the required psychiatric clearance, Larry was brought to
respondent Dr. Pascual, a psychiatrist, for evaluation. In a psychiatric report dated 21
January 2002, respondent Dr. Pascual made the following recommendation:
[T]he responsibility of decision making may be given to his parent or
guardian.[11]
the full text of which reads
PSYCHIATRY REPORT
21 January 2002
GENERAL DATA
60
LAUREANO AGUIRRE, 24 years old, male, high school graduate of St.
John [Marie Vianney], was referred for psychiatric evaluation to
determine competency to give consent for vasectomy.
CLINICAL SUMMARY
Larry was adopted at age 3 from an orphanage and prenatal history
is not known to the adoptive family except that abortion was
attempted. Developmental milestones were noted to be
delayed. He started to walk and speak in single word at around age
5. He was enrolled in Colegio de San Agustin at age 6 where he
showed significant learning difficulties that he had to repeat 1 st and
4th grades. A consult was done in 1989 when he was 11 years
old. Neurological findings and EEG results were not normal and he
was given Tecretol and Encephabol by his neurologist. Psychological
evaluation revealed mild to moderate mental retardation, special
education training was advised and thus, he was transferred to St.
John Marie Vianney. He finished his elementary and secondary
education in the said school. He was later enrolled in a vocational
course at Don Bosco which he was unable to continue. There has
been no reported behavioral problems in school and he gets along
relatively well with his teachers and some of his classmates.
Larry grew up with a very supportive adoptive family. He is the
youngest in the family of four sisters. Currently, his adoptive
parents are already old and have medical problem and thus, they
could no longer monitor and take care of him like before. His
adoptive mother has Bipolar Mood Disorder and used to physically
maltreat him. A year ago, he had an episode of dizziness, vomiting
and headaches after he was hit by his adoptive mother. Consult was
done in Makati Medical Center and several tests were done, results
of which were consistent with his developmental problem. There
was no evidence of acute insults. The family subsequently decided
that he should stay with one of his sisters to avoid similar incident
and the possibility that he would retaliate although he has never
hurt anybody. There has been no episode of violent outburst or
aggressive behavior. He would often keep to himself when sad,
angry or frustrated.
He is currently employed in the company of his sister and given
assignment to do some photocopying, usually in the mornings. He
enjoys playing billiards and basketball with his nephews and, he
spends most of his leisure time watching TV and listening to
music. He could perform activities of daily living without assistance
except that he still needs supervision in taking a bath. He cannot
prepare his own meal and never allowed to go out and run errands
alone. He does not have friends and it is only his adoptive family
whom he has significant relationships. He claims that he once had a
girlfriend when he was in high school who was more like a best
friend to him. He never had sexual relations. He has learned to
smoke and drink alcohol few years ago through his cousins and the
drivers. There is no history of abuse of alcohol or any prohibited
substances.
MEDICAL STATUS EXAMINATION
The applicant was appropriately dressed. He was cooperative and
he had intermittent eye contact. Speech was spontaneous, soft, and
relevant. He responded to questions in single words or simple
sentences. He was anxious specially at the start of the interview,
with full affect appropriate to mood and thought content. There
was no apparent thought or perceptual disturbance. No
suicidal/homicidal thoughts elicited. He was oriented to time, place
and person. He has intact remote and recent memory. He could do
simple calculation. He could write his name and read simple
words. His human figure was comparable to a 7-8 year old. He
demonstrated fair judgment and poor insight. He had fair impulse
control.
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS
Psychological tests done on March 6, 1990 (Dr. Lourdes Ledesma)
and on August 4, 2000 (Dr. Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villaosor)
consistently revealed mild to moderate mental deficiency.
SIGNIFICANT LABORATORY EXAMS RESULTS
CT scan done 09 January 2001 showed nonspecific right deep
parietal subcortical malacia. No localized mass lesion in the brain.
MRI done on 10 January 2001 showed bilateral parietal x x x volume
loss, encephalomalacia, gliosis and ulegyria consistent with sequela
of postnatal or neonatal infarcts.Ex-vacuo dilatation of the atria of
lateral ventricles associated thinned posterior half of the corpus
callosum.
61
 ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION
Axis I None
Axis II Mental Retardation, mild to moderate type
Axis III None
Axis IV None at present
Axis V Current GAF = 50-60
Larrys mental deficiency could be associated with possible
perinatal insults, which is consistent with the neuroimaging
findings. Mental retardation associated with neurological problems
usually has poorer prognosis. Larry is very much dependent on his
family for his needs, adaptive functioning, direction and in making
major life decisions. At his capacity, he may never understand the
nature, the foreseeable risks and benefits, and consequences of the
procedure (vasectomy) that his family wants for his
protection. Thus, the responsibility of decision making may be given
to his parent or guardian.
Marissa B. Pascual, M.D.
Psychiatrist[12]
Considering the above recommendation, respondent Pedro Aguirres written
consent was deemed sufficient in order to proceed with the conduct of the
vasectomy. Hence, on 31 January 2002, respondent Dr. Agatep performed a bilateral
vasectomy on Larry.
On 11 June 2002, petitioner Gloria Aguirre, respondent Pedro Aguirres eldest
child, instituted a criminal complaint for the violation of the Revised Penal Code,
particularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 against
respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several John/Jane
Does before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The Complaint Affidavit,[13] docketed as I.S. No. 02-12466, contained the
following allegations:
2. x x x Dr. Agatep and Dra. Pascual were (sic) medical
practitioners specializing in urology and psychiatry respectively;
while respondent Pedro B. Aguirre is my father; Michelina S.
Aguirre-Olondriz is my sister, and the victim Laureano Larry Aguirre
xxx is my common law brother. JOHN and JANE DOES were the
persons who, acting upon the apparent instructions of respondents
Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz and/or Pedro B. Aguirre, actually
scouted, prospected, facilitated, solicited and/or procured the
medical services of respondents Dra. Pascual and Dr. Agatep vis--vis
the intended mutilation via bilateral vasectomy of my common law
brother Larry Aguirre subject hereof.
xxxx
4. Sometime in March 2002, however, the Heart of Mary Villa of the
Good Shepherd Sisters was furnished a copy of respondent Dra.
Pascuals Psychiatry Report dated 21 January 2004 by the DSWD, in
which my common law brother Larry was falsely and maliciously
declared incompetent and incapable of purportedly giving his own
consent to the MUTILATION VIA BILATERAL VASECTOMY intended
to be performed on him by all the respondents.
xxxx
6. Based on the foregoing charade and false pretenses invariably
committed by all of the respondents in conspiracy with each other,
on 31 January 2002, my common law brother Larry Aguirre,
although of legal age but conspiratorially caused to be declared by
respondents to be mentally deficient and incompetent to give
consent to his BILATERAL VASECTOMY, was then intentionally,
unlawfully, maliciously, feloniously and/or criminally placed
thereafter under surgery for MUTILATION VIA BILATERAL
VASECTOMY x x x, EVEN WITHOUT ANY AUTHORIZATION ORDER
from the GUARDIANSHIP COURT, nor personal consent of Larry
Aguirre himself.
In addition to the above, the complaint included therein an allegation that
v. x x x without a PRIOR medical examination,
professional interview of nor verification
and consultation with my mother,
Lourdes Sabino-Aguirre, respondent Dra.
Pascual baselessly, fraudulently and with
obvious intent to defame and malign her
reputation and honor, and worse, that of
our Sabido family, falsely concluded and
diagnosed, via her falsified Psychiatry
Report, that my mother Lourdes Sabido-
62
 Aguirre purportedly suffers from
BIPOLAR MOOD DISORDER x x x.
To answer petitioner Gloria Aguirres accusations against them, respondents
Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual submitted their respective
Counter-Affidavits.
In her defense,[14] respondent Olondriz denied that she prospected, scouted,
facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false statement, mutilated or abused her
common-law brother, Larry Aguirre. Further, she countered that:
3. x x x While I am aware and admit that Larry went
through a vasectomy procedure, there is nothing
in the Complaint which explains how the
vasectomy amounts to a mutilation.
xxxx
5. In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can
state with complete confidence that I did not
participate in any way in the alleged mutilation.
6. Neither did I procure or solicit the services of the
physician who performed the vasectomy, Dr.
Juvido Agatep x x x. It was my father, Pedro
Aguirre, Larrys guardian, who obtained his
services. I merely acted upon his instructions and
accompanied my brother to the physician,
respondents Dra. Marissa B. Pascual x x x.
xxxx
10. Neither does the Complaint explain in what manner the
Complainant is authorized or has any standing to
declare that Larrys consent was not obtained.
Complainant is not the guardian or relative of
Larry. While she argues that Larrys consent should
have been obtained the Complaint does not
dispute the psychiatrists findings about Larrys
inability to give consent.
xxxx
13. x x x the Complaint does not even state what alleged
participation was falsified or the portion of the
psychiatric report that allegedly states that
someone participated when in fact that person
did not so participate.
xxxx
15. Again, I had no participation in the preparation of the
report of Dr. Pascual x x x.
xxxx
17. x x x the Complaint does not dispute that he (Larry) is
mentally deficient or incompetent to give consent.
xxxx
19. x x x I verified that the effect of a vasectomy operation
was explained to him (Larry) by both respondent
doctors.
20. x x x I accompanied Larry and obeyed my father on the
belief that my father continues to be the legal
guardian of Larry. I know of no one else who
asserts to be his legal guardian x x x.[15]
Alleging the same statement of facts and defenses, respondent Pedro
Aguirre argues against his complicity in the crime of mutilation as charged and asserts
that:
5. In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can state with
complete confidence that I did not participate in any way in
the alleged mutilation.[16]
Nevertheless, he maintains that the vasectomy performed on Larry does not in any
way amount to mutilation, as the latters reproductive organ is still completely
intact.[17] In any case, respondent Pedro Aguirre explains that the procedure
performed is reversible through another procedure called Vasovasostomy, to wit:
63
 8. I understand that vasectomy is reversible through a procedure
called Vasovasostomy. I can also state with confidence that
the procedure enables men who have undergone a
vasectomy to sire a child. Hence, no permanent damage
was caused by the procedure.
Respondent Pedro Aguirre challenges the charge of falsification in the
complaint, to wit:
14. x x x I did not make it appear that any person participated in any
act or proceeding when that person did not in fact
participate x x x.
xxxx
16. x x x I had no participation in the preparation of the report of
Dra. Pascual. She arrived at her report independently,
using her own professional judgment x x x.
xxxx
31. What I cannot understand about Petitas Complaint is how Larry
is argued to be legally a child under the definition of one
law but nonetheless and simultaneously argued to be
capacitated to give his consent as fully as an adult.[18]
Agatep argued that subject complaint should be dismissed for the following reasons:
Respondent Pedro Aguirre further clarifies that co-guardianship over Larry
had been granted to himself and his wife, Lourdes Aguirre, way back on 19 June
1986 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan. Respondent Pedro
Aguirre contends that being one of the legal guardians, consequently, parental
authority over Larry is vested in him. But assuming for the sake of argument that
Larry does have the capacity to make the decision concerning his vasectomy,
respondent Pedro Aguirre argues that petitioner Gloria Aguirre has no legal
personality to institute the subject criminal complaint, for only Larry would have the
right to do so.
Just as the two preceding respondents did, respondent Dr. Agatep also
disputed the allegations of facts stated in the Complaint. Adopting the allegations of
his co-respondents insofar as they were material to the charges against him, he
vehemently denied failing to inform Larry of the intended procedure. In his counter-
statement of facts he averred that:
(b) x x x I scheduled Larry for consultative interview x x x wherein I
painstakingly explained what vasectomy is and the consequences
thereof; but finding signs of mental deficiency, x x x I advised his
relatives and his nurse who accompanied him to have Larry
examined by a psychiatrist who could properly determine whether
or not Larry x x x can really give his consent, thus I required them to
secure first a psychiatric evaluation and clearance prior to the
contemplated procedure.
(c) On January 21, 2002, I was furnished a copy of a psychiatric
report prepared by Dr. Marissa Pascual x x x. In her said report, Dr.
Pascual found Larry to suffer from mental retardation, mild to
moderate type and further stated that at his capacity, he may never
understand the nature, the foreseeable risks and benefits and
consequences of the procedure (vasectomy) x x x, thus the
responsibility of decision making may be given to his parent or
guardian x x x.
(d) x x x I was likewise furnished a copy of an affidavit executed by
Pedro Aguirre stating that he was the legal guardian of Larry x x x
Pedro Aguirre gave his consent to vasectomize Larry x x x.
(e) Only then, specifically January 31, 2002, vasectomy was
performed with utmost care and diligence.[19]
In defense against the charge of falsification and mutilation, respondent Dr.
1. The complainant has no legal personality to file this case. As
mentioned above, she is only a common law sister of Larry who has
a legal guardian in the person of Pedro Aguirre, one of the herein
respondents x x x.
2. x x x [t]he allegations in the complaint clearly centers on the
condition of complainants mother, Lourdes Aguirre, her reputation,
and miserably fails to implicate the degree of participation of herein
respondent. x x x
xxxx
(b) Falsification. x x x I strongly aver that this felony does not apply
to me since it clearly gives reference to co-respondent, Dr. Marissa
64
 Pascuals Psychiatry Report, dated January 21, 2002, in relation with
her field of profession, an expert opinion. I do not have any
participation in the preparation of said report, x x x neither did I
utilized (sic) the same in any proceedings to the damage to another.
x x x I also deny using a falsified document x x x.
(c) Mutilation. x x x Vasectomy does not in anyway equate to
castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an
organ in the context of law and medicine, it is quite remote from
the penis x x x.
(d) Child Abuse. x x x the complaint-affidavit is very vague in
specifying the applicability of said law. It merely avers that Laureano
Larry Aguirre is a child, and alleges his father, Pedro Aguirre, has
parental authority over him x x x.[20]
Similarly, respondent Dr. Pascual denied the criminal charges of falsification
and mutilation imputed to her. She stands by the contents of the assailed Psychiatric
Report, justifying it thus:
x x x My opinion of Larry Aguirres mental status was based on my
own personal observations, his responses during my interview of
him, the results of the two (2) psychological tests conducted by
clinical psychologists, the results of laboratory tests, including a CT
Scan and MRI, and his personal and family history which I obtained
from his sister, Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz x x x.
5. x x x the reference in my report concerning Mrs. Lourdes Aguirre
is not a statement of my opinion of Mrs. Aguirres mental status, x x
x. Rather, it is part of the patients personal and family history as
conveyed to me by Mrs. Aguirre-Olondriz.
6. x x x An expression of my opinion, especially of an expert opinion,
cannot give rise to a charge for falsification. A contrary opinion by
another expert only means that the experts differ, and does not
necessarily reflect on the truth or falsity of either opinion x x x.
7. x x x I never stated that I examined Mrs. Aguirre, because I never
did x x x.
8. I had no participation in the surgery performed on Larry Aguirre
except to render an opinion on his capacity to give informed
consent to the vasectomy x x x.
9. Without admitting the merits of the complaint, I submit that
complainants are not the proper persons to subscribe to the same
as they are not the offended party, peace officer or other public
officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated x x x. [21]
The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the circumstances attendant to the
case did not amount to the crime of falsification. He held that
[T]he claim of the complainant that the Psychiatric Report was
falsified, because consent was not given by Larry Aguirre to the
vasectomy and/or he was not consulted on said operation does not
constitute falsification. It would have been different if it was stated
in the report that consent was obtained from Larry Aguirre or that it
was written therein that he was consulted on the vasectomy,
because that would mean that it was made to appear in the report
that Larry Aguirre participated in the act or proceeding by giving his
consent or was consulted on the matter when in truth and in fact,
he did not participate. Or if not, the entry would have been an
untruthful statement. But that is not the case. Precisely (sic) the
report was made to determine whether Larry Aguirre could give his
consent to his intended vasectomy. Be that as it may, the matter of
Larrys consent having obtained or not may nor be an issue after all,
because complainants (sic) herself alleged that Larrys mental
condition is that of a child, who can not give consent. Based on the
foregoing consideration, no falsification can be established under
the circumstances.[22]
Even the statement in the Psychiatric Report of respondent Dr. Pascual that
Lourdes Aguirre had Bipolar Mood Disorder cannot be considered falsification since
The report did not state that Lourdes Aguirre was in fact personally
interviewed by respondent Dr. Pascual and that the latter
concluded that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood Disorder. The
report merely quoted other sources of information with respect to
the condition of Lourdes Aguirre, in the same manner that the fact
that Lourdes Aguirre was physically abusing Larry Aguirre was also
not of Dra. Pascual personal knowledge. But the fact that Dra.
65
 Pascual cited finding, which is not of her own personal knowledge in
her report does not mean that she committed falsification in the
process. Her sources may be wrong and may affect the veracity of
her report, but for as long as she has not alleged therein that she
personally diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation would not
then be true, she cannot be charged of falsification. Therefore, it
goes without saying that if the author of the report is not guilty,
then with more reason the other respondents are not liable. [23]
Respecting the charge of mutilation, the Assistant City Prosecutor also held
that the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and
penalized under Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., [t]he vasectomy operation
did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very
much part of his physical self. He ratiocinated that:
While the operation renders him the inability (sic) to procreate, the
operation is reversible and therefore, cannot be the permanent
damage contemplated under Article 262 of the Revised Penal
Code.[24]
The Assistant City Prosecutor,[25] in a Resolution[26] dated 8 January 2003,
found no probable cause to hold respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and
Dr. Pascual liable for the complaint of falsification and mutilation, more specifically,
the violation of Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic
Act No. 7610. Accordingly, the Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the dismissal
of petitioner Gloria Aguirres complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive
portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, it is recommended that the above-entitled
case be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.[27]
On 18 February 2003, petitioner Gloria Aguirre appealed the foregoing
resolution to the Secretary of the DOJ by means of a Petition for Review. [28]
In a Resolution dated 11 February 2004, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R.
Zuo, for the Secretary of the DOJ, dismissed the petition. In resolving said appeal, the
Chief State Prosecutor held that:
Under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of Department
Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, the Secretary of Justice
may, motu proprio, dismiss outright the petition if there is no
showing of any reversible error in the questioned resolution or finds
the same to be patently without merit.
We carefully examined the petition and its attachments
and found no error that would justify a reversal of the assailed
resolution which is in accord with the law and evidenced (sic) on the
matter.[29]
Petitioner Gloria Aguirres Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied
with finality by the DOJ in another Resolution dated 12 November 2004.
Resolute in her belief, petitioner Gloria Aguirre went to the Court of Appeals
by means of a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as amended.
On 21 July 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing
petitioner Gloria Aguirres recourse for lack of merit.
The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Consequently, the assailed Resolutions dated February 11,
2004 and November 12, 2004 of the Secretary of Justice in I.S. No.
02-12466 are hereby AFFIRMED.[30]
Petitioner Gloria Aguirres motion for reconsideration proved futile as it was
denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 5 December 2005.
Hence, the present petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, premised on the following arguments:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS, GRAVE AND
REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT CONCLUDED, BASED
PURPORTEDLY ON THE INTERNET WHICH RUNS AMUCK WITH OUR
SYSTEM OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD,
THAT BILATERAL VASECTOMY IS PURPORTEDLY 100% REVERSIBLE
66
 BY A FUTURE MEDICAL PROCEDURE HENCE NOT AMOUNTING TO
MUTILATION, X X X; AND
xxxx
II.
WORSE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS
AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT REFUSED TO DIRECT
THE INDICTMENT OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR MUTILATION
AND FALSIFICATION DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT
PROBABLE CAUSE THEREFOR X X X.[31]
The foregoing issues notwithstanding, the more proper issue for this Courts
consideration is, given the facts of the case, whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when the latter affirmed the public prosecutors finding
of lack of probable cause for respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr.
Pascual to stand trial for the criminal complaints of falsification and mutilation in
relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
In ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals explained that:
Evidently, the controversy lies in the permanency of
sterilization as a result of a vasectomy operation, and the chances
of restoring fertility with a reversal surgery x x x.
We sustain the DOJ in ruling that the bilateral vasectomy
performed on Larry does not constitute mutilation even if
intentionally and purposely done to prevent him from siring a child.
xxxx
Sterilization is to be distinguished from castration: in the latter act
the reproductive capacity is permanently removed or damaged.[32]
It then concluded that:
The matter of legal liability, other than criminal, which
private respondents may have incurred for the alleged absence of a
valid consent to the vasectomy performed on Larry, is certainly
beyond the province of this certiorari petition. Out task is confined
to the issue of whether or not the Secretary of Justice and the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City committed grave abuse
of discretion in their determining the existence or absence of
probable cause for filing criminal cases
for falsification and mutilation under Articles 172 (2) and 262 of
the Revised Penal Code.[33]
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, contends that the Court of Appeals and
the DOJ failed to appreciate several important facts: 1) that bilateral vasectomy
conducted on petitioners brother, Larry Aguirre, was admitted [34]; 2) that the
procedure caused the perpetual destruction of Larrys reproductive organs of
generation or conception;[35] 3) that the bilateral vasectomy was intentional and
deliberate to deprive Larry forever of his reproductive organ and his capacity to
procreate; and 4) that respondents, in conspiracy with one another, made not only
one but two (2) untruthful statements, and not mere inaccuracies when they made it
appear in the psychiatry report[36] that a) Larrys consent was obtained or at the very
least that the latter was informed of the intended vasectomy; and b) that Lourdes
Aguirre was likewise interviewed and evaluated. Paradoxically, however, petitioner
Gloria Aguirre does not in any way state that she, instead of respondent Pedro
Aguirre, has guardianship over the person of Larry. She only insists that respondents
should have obtained Larrys consent prior to the conduct of the bilateral vasectomy.
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for public respondent
DOJ, argues that the conduct of preliminary investigation to determine the existence
of probable cause for the purpose of filing (an) information is the function of the
public prosecutor.[37] More importantly, the element[s] of castration or mutilation of
an organ necessary for generation is completely absent as he was not deprived of any
organ necessary for reproduction, much less the destruction of such organ. [38]
Likewise, in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals, respondents
Pedro Aguirre and Olondriz assert that, fundamentally, petitioner Gloria Aguirre has
no standing to file the complaint, as she has not shown any injury to her person or
asserted any relationship with Larry other than being his common law sister; further,
that she cannot prosecute the present case, as she has not been authorized by law to
file said complaint, not being the offended party, a peace officer or a public officer
charged with the enforcement of the law. Accordingly, respondents Pedro Aguirre
and Olondriz posit that they, together with the other respondents Dr. Agatep and Dr.
Pascual, may not be charged with, prosecuted for and ultimately convicted of: 1)
mutilation x x x since the bilateral vasectomy conducted on Larry does not involve
castration or amputation of an organ necessary for reproduction as the twin elements
of the crime of mutilation x x x are absent[39]; and 2) falsification x x x since the acts
67
allegedly constituting falsification involve matters of medical opinion and not matters
of fact,[40] and that petitioner Gloria Aguirre failed to prove damage to herself or to
any other person.
Respondent Dr. Agatep, in the same vein, stresses that vasectomy is not
mutilation. He elucidates that vasectomy is merely the excision of the vas deferens,
the duct in testis which transport semen[41]; that it is the penis and the testis that
make up the male reproductive organ and not the vas deferens; and additionally
argues that for the crime of mutilation to be accomplished, Article 262 of the Revised
Penal Code necessitates that there be intentional total or partial deprivation of some
essential organ for reproduction. Tubes, seminal ducts, vas deferens or prostatic
urethra not being organs, respondent Dr. Agatep concludes, therefore, that
vasectomy does not correspond to mutilation.
Anent the charge of falsification of a private document, respondent Dr.
Agatep asseverates that he never took part in disclosing any information, data or
facts as contained in the contentious Psychiatric Report.
For her part, respondent Dr. Pascual insists that the assailed Psychiatry
Report was the result of her independent exercise of professional judgment. Rightly
or wrongly, (she) diagnosed Larry Aguirre to be incapable of giving consent, based on
interviews made by the psychiatrist on Larry Aguirre and persons who interacted with
him.[42] And supposing that said report is flawed, it is, at most, an erroneous medical
diagnosis.
The petition has no merit.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within
the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he was prosecuted.[43] The term does not mean actual and positive cause nor
does it import absolute certainty.[44] It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief;[45] that is, the belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand
trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.[46]
The executive department of the government is accountable for the
prosecution of crimes, its principal obligation being the faithful execution of the laws
of the land. A necessary component of the power to execute the laws is the right to
prosecute their violators,[47] the responsibility of which is thrust upon the DOJ. Hence,
the determination of whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the
prosecution in court of an accused is consigned and entrusted to the DOJ. And by the
nature of his office, a public prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a particular
criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the
averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion.
Put simply, public prosecutors under the DOJ have a wide range of
discretion, the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of
which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by (public)
prosecutors.[48] And this Court has consistently adhered to the policy of non-
interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to leave to the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what
constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an
information against the supposed offender.[49]
But this is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the
part of the prosecutor. It is entirely possible that the investigating prosecutor may
erroneously exercise the discretion lodged in him by law. This, however, does not
render his act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.[50]
Prescinding from the above, the courts duty in an appropriate case,
therefore, is confined to a determination of whether the assailed executive
determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction
resulting from a grave abuse of discretion. For courts of law to grant the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, so as to justify the reversal of the finding of whether
or not there exists probable cause to file an information, the one seeking the writ
must be able to establish that the investigating prosecutor exercised his power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must
be patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of
discretion is not enough.[51] Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over
the case but has transcended the same or acted without authority. [52]
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of
the Assistant City Prosecutor in dismissing the criminal complaints for falsification and
mutilation, as affirmed by the DOJ, is determinative of whether or not he committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In ruling the way he did that no probable cause for falsification and
mutilation exists - the Assistant City Prosecutor deliberated on the factual and legal
milieu of the case. He found that there was no sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case for the crimes complained of as defined and punished under Articles 172,
paragraph 2, and 262 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7610,
respectively. Concerning the crime of falsification of a private document, the
68
Assistant City Prosecutor reasoned that the circumstances attendant to the case did
not amount to the crime complained of, that is, the lack of consent by Larry Aguirre
before he was vasectomized; or the fact that the latter was not consulted. The lack of
the two preceding attendant facts do not in any way amount to falsification, absent
the contention that it was made to appear in the assailed report that said consent
was obtained. That would have been an untruthful statement. Neither does the fact
that the Psychiatric Report state that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood Disorder by
the same token amount to falsification because said report does not put forward that
such finding arose after an examination of the concerned patient. Apropos the charge
of mutilation, he reasoned that though the vasectomy rendered Larry unable to
procreate, it was not the permanent damage contemplated under the pertinent
provision of the penal code.
We agree. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the DOJ and the Assistant City Prosecutor was not shown in
the present case.
In the present petition, respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and
Dr. Pascual are charged with violating Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised Penal Code,
in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. Article 172, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code, defines the crime of falsification of a private document, viz
Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of
falsified documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon:
xxxx
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with
the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document
commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next
preceding article.
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre charges respondents with falsification of a private document
for conspiring with one another in keeping Larry in the dark about the foregoing
(vasectomy) as the same was concealed from him by the respondents x x x, [53] as well
as for falsely concluding and diagnosing Lourdes Aguirre to be suffering from Bipolar
Mood Disorder.
A scrutiny, however, of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code which defines
the acts constitutive of falsification, that is
Art. 171. x x x shall falsify a document by committing any of
the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature,
or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in
any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or
proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting
to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists,
or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from,
that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the
issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
vis--vis the much criticized Psychiatric Report, shows that the acts complained of do
not in any manner, by whatever stretch of the imagination, fall under any of the eight
(8) enumerated acts constituting the offense of falsification.
In order to properly address the issue presented by petitioner Gloria Aguirre,
it is necessary that we discuss the elements of the crime of falsification of private
document under the Revised Penal Code, a crime which all the respondents have
been accused of perpetrating. The elements of said crime under paragraph 2 of
Article 172 of our penal code are as follows: 1) that the offender committed any acts
of falsification, except those in par. 7, enumerated in Article 171; 2) that the
falsification was committed in any private document; and 3) that the falsification
caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent
to cause such damage. Under Article 171, paragraph 2, a person may commit
falsification of a private document by causing it to appear in a document that a
69
person or persons participated in an act or proceeding, when such person or persons
did not in fact so participate in the act or proceeding. On the other hand, falsification
under par. 3 of the same article is perpetrated by a person or persons who,
participating in an act or proceeding, made statements in that act or proceeding and
the offender, in making a document, attributed to such person or persons
statements other than those in fact made by such person or persons. And the crime
defined under paragraph 4 thereof is committed when 1) the offender makes in a
document statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to disclose
the truth of the facts narrated by him; 3) the facts narrated by the offender are
absolutely false; and 4) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made
with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
Applying the above-stated elements of the crime to the case at bar, in order
that respondent Dr. Pascual, and the rest acting in conspiracy with her, to have
committed the crime of falsification under par. 3 and 4 of Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code, it is essential that that there be prima facie evidence to show that she
had caused it to appear that Larry gave his consent to be vasectomized or at the very
least, that the proposed medical procedure was explained to Larry. But in the assailed
report, no such thing was done. Lest it be forgotten, the reason for having Larry
psychiatrically evaluated was precisely to ascertain whether or not he can validly
consent with impunity to the proposed vasectomy, and not to obtain his consent to it
or to oblige respondent Dr. Pascual to explain to him what the import of the medical
procedure was. Further, that Larrys consent to be vasectomized was not obtained by
the psychiatrist was of no moment, because nowhere is it stated in said report that
such assent was obtained. At any rate, petitioner Gloria Aguirre contradicts her very
own allegations when she persists in the contention that Larry has the mental age of
a child; hence, he was legally incapable of validly consenting to the procedure.
In the matter of the supposed incorrect diagnosis of Lourdes Aguirre, with
regard to paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, we quote with
approval the succinct statements of the Assistant City Prosecutor:
[T]he fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding, which is not of her own
personal knowledge in her report does not mean that she
committed falsification in the process. Her sources may be wrong
and may affect the veracity of her report, but for as long as she has
not alleged therein that she personally diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre,
which allegation would not then be true, she cannot be charged of
falsification. Therefore, it goes without saying that if the author of
the report is not guilty, then with more reason the other
respondents are not liable.[54]
As to the charge of mutilation, Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code defines
the crime as
Art. 262. Mutilation. The penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person
who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either
totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished
by prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods.
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the
elements[55] of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal
Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for
generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to
deprive the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction. According to
the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as
defined and penalized above, i.e., [t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way
deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his
physical self. Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, would want this Court to make a
ruling that bilateral vasectomy constitutes the crime of mutilation.
This we cannot do, for such an interpretation would be contrary to the
intentions of the framers of our penal code.
A fitting riposte to the issue at hand lies in United States v. Esparcia,[56] in
which this Court had the occasion to shed light on the implication of the term
mutilation. Therein we said that:
The sole point which it is desirable to discuss is whether or
not the crime committed is that defined and penalized by article
414 of the Penal Code. The English translation of this article reads:
"Any person who shall intentionally castrate another shall suffer a
penalty ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua." The
Spanish text, which should govern, uses the word "castrare,"
inadequately translated into English as "castrate." The word
"capar," which is synonymous of "castrar," is defined in the Royal
Academic Dictionary as the destruction of the organs of generation
or conception. Clearly it is the intention of the law to punish any
person who shall intentionally deprived another of any organ
necessary for reproduction. An applicable construction is that of
Viada in the following language:
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 "At the head of these crimes, according to their order of sufficient evidence to explain why the Assistant City Prosecutor and the DOJ ruled the
gravity, is the mutilation known by the name of 'castration' which way they did. Verily, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the writ of certiorari is
consists of the amputation of whatever organ is necessary for unavailing; hence, should not be issued.
generation. The law could not fail to punish with the utmost
severity such a crime, which, although not destroying life, deprives a It is once more apropos to pointedly apply the Courts general policy of non-
person of the means to transmit it. But bear in mind that according interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations. As it has been oft said, the
to this article in order for 'castration' to exist, it is indispensable that Supreme Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the
the 'castration' be made purposely. The law does not look only to prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima
the result but also to the intention of the act. Consequently, if by facie case.[62] The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but, as a rule, have no
reason of an injury or attack, a person is deprived of the organs of part in the initial decision to prosecute him.[63] The possible exception to this rule is
generation, the act, although voluntary, not being intentional to where there is an unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
that end, it would not come under the provisions of this article, but lack or excess of jurisdiction that will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the
under No. 2 of article 431." (Viada, Codigo Penal, vol. 3, p. 70. See to executive. But that is not the case herein.
same effect, 4 Groizard, Codigo Penal, p. 525.)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed 21 July 2005 Decision and 5 December 2005Resolution, both of the
Thus, the question is, does vasectomy deprive a man, totally or partially, of Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88370 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
some essential organ of reproduction? We answer in the negative. petitioner Gloria Aguirre.
SO ORDERED.
In the male sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular passage, called n
the vas deferens, through which the sperm (cells) are transported from the testicle to
the urethra where they combine with the seminal fluid to form the ejaculant, is
divided and the cut ends merely tied.[57] That part, which is cut, that is, the vas
deferens, is merely a passageway that is part of the duct system of the male
reproductive organs. The vas deferens is not an organ, i.e., a highly organized unit of
structure, having a defined function in a multicellular organism and consisting of a
range of tissues.[58] Be that as it may, even assuming arguendo that the tubular
passage can be considered an organ, the cutting of the vas deferens does not divest
or deny a man of any essential organ of reproduction for the simple reason that it
does not entail the taking away of a part or portion of the male reproductive
system. The cut ends, after they have been tied, are then dropped back into the
incision.[59]

Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction,

such procedure does not deprive him, either totally or partially, of some essential
organ for reproduction. Notably, the ordinary usage of the term mutilation is the
deprivation of a limb or essential part (of the body), [60] with the operative expression
being deprivation. In the same manner, the word castration is defined as the removal
of the testies or ovaries.[61] Such being the case in this present petition, the bilateral
vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted to the crime of mutilation as
defined and punished under Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. And
no criminal culpability could be foisted on to respondent Dr. Agatep, the urologist
who performed the procedure, much less the other respondents. Thus, we find

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